AB 1735: Protective orders: human trafficking: pimping: pandering.
- Session Year: 2017-2018
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2018-09-27
Existing law requires a court to consider issuing a protective order restraining the defendant from contact with the victim for up to 10 years in all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, or any crime requiring registration as a sex offender, including, but not limited to, pimping or pandering a minor, and human trafficking to effect or maintain a violation of specified sex offenses. A violation of a protective order is punishable as contempt, a misdemeanor.
This bill would additionally require the court to consider issuing a protective order, as provided above, in all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of human trafficking with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, and pimping or pandering without regard to whether the victim is a minor. Because a violation of the protective order would be a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law requires a court to consider issuing a protective order restraining the defendant from contact with the victim for up to 10 years in all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, or any crime requiring registration as a sex offender, including, but not limited to, pimping or pandering a minor, and human trafficking to effect or maintain a violation of specified sex offenses. A violation of a protective order is punishable as contempt, a misdemeanor.
This bill would additionally require the court to consider issuing a protective order, as provided above, in all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of human trafficking with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, and pimping or pandering without regard to whether the victim is a minor. Because a violation of the protective order would be a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law requires a court to consider issuing a protective order restraining the defendant from contact with the victim for up to 10 years in all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, or any crime requiring registration as a sex offender, including, but not limited to, pimping or pandering a minor, and human trafficking to effect or maintain a violation of specified sex offenses. A violation of a protective order is punishable as contempt, a misdemeanor.
This bill would additionally require the court to consider issuing a protective order, as provided above, in all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of human trafficking with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, and pimping or pandering without regard to whether the victim is a minor. Because a violation of the protective order would be a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)The safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 236.1, Section 261, 261.5, 262, subdivision (a) of Section 266h, or subdivision (a) of Section 266i, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)The safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 236.1, Section 261, 261.5, 262, subdivision (a) of Section 266h, or subdivision (a) of Section 266i, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)The safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 236.1, Section 261, 261.5, or 262, subdivision (a) of Section 266h, or subdivision (a) of Section 266i, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 27, 2018 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 805, Statutes of 2018. |
| Sep 27, 2018 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Aug 30, 2018 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4:30 p.m. |
| Aug 24, 2018 | In Assembly. Ordered to Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 24, 2018 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Aug 21, 2018 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| Aug 17, 2018 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (August 16). |
| Aug 6, 2018 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jun 20, 2018 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 4. Noes 0.) (June 19). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 7, 2018 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 30, 2018 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 29, 2018 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 25, 2018 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 4, 2018 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to suspense file. |
| Mar 6, 2018 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (March 6). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jan 16, 2018 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jan 4, 2018 | From printer. May be heard in committee February 3. |
| Jan 3, 2018 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 24, 2018 | Special Consent AB1735 | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 16, 2018 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 6, 2018 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 19, 2018 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| May 29, 2018 | AB 1735 CUNNINGHAM Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 25, 2018 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Mar 6, 2018 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| A Crime Involving Domestic Violence, As Specified; | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| According To End Violence Against Women International: | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Alameda County District Attorney's Office | * Support | Mar 6, 2018 |
| American Civil Liberties Union of California | ** Against | Aug 18, 2018 |
| Any Offense Requiring Sex-Offender Registration; | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Argument In Support | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Assembly Floor Vote: 76 - 2 | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Against | Aug 18, 2018 |
| California State Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| Cases Of Rape, Spousal Rape, And Statutory Rape; | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Crime Victims United Of California | * Support | Mar 6, 2018 |
| Criminal Contempt | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Effects Of Restraining Orders | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| end violence against women international | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| Gang Cases; | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Los Angeles County District Attorney | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association | * Support | Jun 19, 2018 |
| Need For This Bill | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Protective Orders | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| PURPOSE | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
| Riverside Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| San Diego County District Attorney's Office | ** Support | Aug 18, 2018 |
| Stalking Cases; And | ** Against | Jun 18, 2018 |
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1735 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1735
Introduced: 1/3/18
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 4-0, 6/19/18
AYES: Anderson, Jackson, Stone, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Skinner, Bradford, Mitchell
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 8/16/18
AYES: Portantino, Bates, Beall, Bradford, Hill, Nielsen, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 76-2, 5/29/18 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Protective orders: human trafficking: pimping: pandering
DIGEST:
This bill requires the court to consider issuing a protective order in all cases in which a defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping or pandering.
Existing law:
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code § 136.2, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code § 136.2, subd. (b).
- Requires a court to consider issuing a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Gang cases;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases. (Pen. Code §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 646.9, subd. (k); 368, subd. (l).)
This bill adds human trafficking, pimping and pandering to the list of offenses for which a court is required to consider issuing a protective order upon a conviction.
Background
Protective Orders
As a general matter, the court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation. For example, when domestic violence criminal proceedings have concluded, the court can issue a “no-contact order” as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code § 1203.097.)
Finally, in some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant’s child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic-violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, gang cases, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases. (Pen. Code §646.9, subd. (k).) Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order “that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim’s family members or spouse.” (Pen. Code § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code § 368, subd. (l).)
This bill extends the court’s authority to issue post-conviction protective orders lasting up to 10 years in human trafficking, pimping, and pandering cases. As to all three offenses addressed by this bill, it should be noted that human trafficking for commercial sexual purposes, as well as the pimping or pandering of a minor require sex offender registration. (Pen. Code § 290, subd. (c).) As noted above, the court is already required to consider issuing a post-conviction restraining order for any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).)
Therefore, the practical effect of this bill is to permit such an order when (1) the victim of pimping or pandering is an adult, and (2) in human trafficking cases involving forced labor or services.
Criminal Contempt
Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended “to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) A violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order. (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code Section 166 is a misdemeanor, and so proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) Therefore, the criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution; the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt “is entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights.” (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4t Supp. 8, 11.) Therefore, the defendant has the right to a jury trial, regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
Effects of Restraining Orders
A restraining order prevents a person from being able to go to certain places or to do certain things. For example, the restraining order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, thereby implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing him or her to vacate his or her own home.
The restraining order may affect a person’s immigration status. A violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states: “Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court an whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.”
The restrained person will also generally not be able to own a gun and will have to turn in, sell, or store any guns he or she has, and will not be able to buy a gun while the restraining order is in effect. (Pen. Code § 29825.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- State prison: Unknown, potentially-significant increase in state costs for new commitments to state prison for persons found guilty of violating a restraining order related to a human trafficking, pimping, or pandering conviction. The 2018-19 per capita cost to house a person in a state prison is $80,729 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of between $10,000 and $12,000. The average contract-prison rate cost per inmate is over $30,000 annually. The actual costs would depend on how many defendants are sentenced to prison for violating the specified protective orders. (General Fund)
- Court: Unknown, potentially-significant workload cost pressures to the court to adjudicate charges brought against defendants for contempt of court for violating protective orders that are the subject of this bill. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the 2018 Budget Act appropriated $64 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and penalty revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Prosecution & incarceration: Unknown potential increase in non-reimbursable local enforcement and incarceration costs to prosecute and incarcerate those charged with and found in contempt of court for violating a protective order. Costs would be offset, to a degree, by fee and assessment revenue. (Local funds)
* Trial Court Trust Fund
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
End Violence Against Women International
Los Angeles County District Attorney
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association
San Diego County District Attorney’s Office
University of San Diego School of Law – Children’s Advocacy Institute
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/16/18)
American Civil Liberties Union of California
California Public Defenders Association
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 76-2, 5/29/18
AYES: Acosta, Aguiar-Curry, Travis Allen, Arambula, Baker, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Caballero, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chávez, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Dahle, Daly, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez Fletcher, Gray, Grayson, Harper, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Patterson, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Rodriguez, Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Steinorth, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Kamlager-Dove, Quirk
Prepared by: Stephanie Jordan / PUB. S. /
8/18/18 13:45:42
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2017 - 2018 Regular Session
AB 1735 (Cunningham) - Protective orders: human trafficking: pimping: pandering
Version: January 3, 2018 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 4 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: Yes |
Hearing Date: August 6, 2018 | Consultant: Shaun Naidu |
This bill meets the criteria for referral to the Suspense File.
Bill Summary:
AB 1735 would require the court to consider issuing a protective order in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping, or pandering.
Fiscal Impact:
- State prison: Unknown, potentially-significant increase in state costs for new commitments to state prison for persons found guilty of violating a restraining order related to a human trafficking, pimping, or pandering conviction. The 2018-19 per capita cost to house a person in a state prison is $80,729 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of between $10,000 and $12,000. The average contract-prison rate cost per inmate is over $30,000 annually. The actual costs would depend on how many defendants are sentenced to prison for violating the specified protective orders. (General Fund)
- Court: Unknown, potentially-significant workload cost pressures to the court to adjudicate charges brought against defendants for contempt of court for violating protective orders that are the subject of this measure. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the 2018 Budget Act appropriated $64 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and penalty revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Prosecution & incarceration: Unknown potential increase in non-reimbursable local enforcement and incarceration costs to prosecute and incarcerate those charged with and found in contempt of court for violating a protective order. Costs would be offset, to a degree, by fee and assessment revenue. (Local funds)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Background:
According to the analysis of this bill by the Senate Committee on Public Safety:
As a general matter, the court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation. For example, when domestic violence criminal proceedings have concluded, the court can issue a "no-contact order" as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
Finally, in some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic-violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, gang cases, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases. (Pen. Code, §646.9, subd. (k).) Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order "that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim's family members or spouse." (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (l).)
Generally, a willful and knowing violation of a protective order is a misdemeanor contempt of court, punishable by incarceration in county jail for up to one year and/or a base fine of up to $1,000. A subsequent violation in less than seven years that involves an act of violence or “a credible threat,” as that term is defined, is an alternate felony-misdemeanor that is punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or state prison for sixteen months, two years, or three years.
Proposed Law:
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to ten years in all cases in which the defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping, or pandering.
Related Legislation:
AB 264 (Low, Ch. 270, Stats. 2017) and SB 352 (Block, Ch. 279, Stats. 2015) required the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to ten years in gang cases and when a defendant is convicted of elder or dependent adult abuse, respectively.
AB 307 (Campos, Ch. 291, Stats. 2013), SB 723 (Pavley, Ch. 155, Stats. 2011), SB 834 (Florez, Ch. 627, Stats. 2010), and AB 289 (Spitzer, Ch. 582, Stats. 2007) allowed the court to issue protective orders for up to ten years when a defendant is convicted of specified sex crimes, domestic violence, sex crimes involving a minor, and stalking, respectively, regardless of the sentence imposed.
Staff Comments:
The fiscal impact of this bill cannot be known with certainty, as the actual impact will be dependent on numerous factors, including, but not limited to, judicial and prosecutorial discretion, the criminal history of the defendant, and the factors unique to each case. To the extent even one additional defendant is committed to state prison as a result of this bill, state incarceration costs would surpass the Suspense File threshold. Additionally, as the crime created by this bill is punishable with the potential for incarceration, certain rights to the defendants are attached to the proceedings, including the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel (at public expense if the defendants are unable to afford the costs of representation) which could lead to lengthier court proceedings.
As stated in the analysis of this bill by the Assembly Committee on Appropriations, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has admitted an average of thirty-seven inmates a year from 2015 to 2017 for repeated violations of restraining orders. This bill likely would increase the issuance of restraining orders for defendants convicted of trafficking, pimping, and pandering and, therefore, could lead to an increase in the state prison population.
California is subject to a federal court order to reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5 percent of design capacity. The state has undertaken efforts to implement a durable remedy to reduce and avoid prison overcrowding. On July 4, 2018, 115,306 inmates were housed in the state’s thirty-five adult institutions, 6,286 were housed in in-state contract beds, and 2,810 inmates were housed in out-of-state facilities. The prison population changes daily as new inmates are admitted and others are released, but, on that date, the state’s prison population was approximately 135.5 percent of design capacity. By potentially increasing the inmate population in in-state institutions, this bill could make it more difficult for the state to comply with the court order.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair
2017 - 2018 Regular
Bill No: AB 1735 Hearing Date: June 19, 2018
Author: | Cunningham | ||
Version: | January 3, 2018 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SC | ||
Subject: Protective Orders: Human Trafficking: Pimping: Pandering
HISTORY
Source: Author
Prior Legislation: AB 264 (Low), Ch. 270, Stats. 2017
AB 352 (Block), Ch. 279, Stats. 2015
AB 307 (Campos), Ch. 291, Stats. 2013
SB 723 (Pavley), Ch. 155, Stats. 2011
SB 834 (Florez), Ch. 627, Stats. 2010
SB 289 (Spitzer), Ch. 582, Stats. 2007
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California Police Chiefs Association; California State Sheriffs’ Association; End Violence Against Women International; Los Angeles County District Attorney; Riverside Sheriffs’ Association; San Diego County District Attorney’s Office; University of San Diego School of Law – Children’s Advocacy Institute
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union of California; California Public Defenders Association
Assembly Floor Vote: 76 - 2
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to require the court to consider issuing a protective order in all cases in which a defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping or pandering.
Existing law authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
Existing law requires a court to consider issuing a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Gang cases;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 646.9, subd. (k); 368, subd. (l).)
This bill would add human trafficking, pimping and pandering to the list of offenses for which a court is required to consider issuing a protective order upon a conviction.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
Currently, California law only affords the protection of a 10-year criminal protective order for minor victims of pimping and pandering. But victims age 18 and over are in need of the protection as well. Pimping and pandering crimes follow a psychology that is similar to domestic violence. All domestic violence victims are eligible for a 10-year protective order, while adult victims of pimping and pandering are not.
Additionally, human trafficking victims listed in Penal Code section 236.1(a) have been left out of protections of the lengthier stay away orders, as they are not trafficked for sexual purposes and are not specifically listed in PC 136.1(i)(1). These are the victims that are trafficked for forced labor or services. But these human trafficking victims are also vulnerable to the abuse and coercion of their traffickers, and should not be excluded from protection.
- Protective Orders
As a general matter, the court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation. For example, when domestic violence criminal proceedings have concluded, the court can issue a "no-contact order" as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
Finally, in some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic-violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, gang cases, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases. (Pen. Code, §646.9, subd. (k).) Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order "that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim's family members or spouse." (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (l).)
This bill would extend the court's authority to issue post-conviction protective orders lasting up to 10 years in human trafficking, pimping, and pandering cases. As to all three offenses addressed by this bill, it should be noted that human trafficking for commercial sexual purposes, as well as the pimping or pandering of a minor require sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (c).) As noted above, the court is already required to consider issuing a post-conviction restraining order for any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).)
Therefore, the practical effect of this bill is to permit such an order when (1) the victim of pimping or pandering is an adult, and (2) in human trafficking cases involving forced labor or services.
- Criminal Contempt
Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended "to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence." (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) A violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order. (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code Section 166 is a misdemeanor, and so proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) Therefore, the criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution; the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt "is entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights." (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4t Supp. 8, 11.) Therefore, the defendant has the right to a jury trial, regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
- Effects of Restraining Orders
A restraining order prevents a person from being able to go to certain places or to do certain things. For example, the restraining order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, thereby implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing him or her to vacate his or her own home.
The restraining order may affect a person’s immigration status. A violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states: “Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court an whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.”
The restrained person will also generally not be able to own a gun and will have to turn in, sell, or store any guns he or she has, and will not be able to buy a gun while the restraining order is in effect. (Pen. Code, § 29825.)
- Argument in Support
According to End Violence Against Women International:
Adult victims of pimps and panderers are among the most vulnerable members of our society. They live on the margins, are often products of the foster care system or abusive childhoods, and lack source of love or support. Street-wise pimps and panderers prey upon these individuals, drawing them into a life of prostitution through promises of affection or money, plying them with drugs, or exploiting other vulnerabilities in their situations. Many adult victims of pimps and panderers were introduced to prostitution as child sex trafficking victims. Yet once they turn 18, they face potential criminal consequences for the very actions for which they were victimized as children. Faced with criminal histories and limited job opportunities, many find it nearly impossible to escape their abusive and controlling pimps.
Victims of labor trafficking are similarly vulnerable. Cunning labor traffickers frequently target foreign nationals who are off the radar screen of those who could help them. Many fear immigration consequences, face language barriers, or lack understanding of their rights under US and California laws. According to a 2012 study conducted by researchers from San Diego State University, 30% of undocumented, Spanish-speaking migrant workers in the San Diego area had experienced labor trafficking. Because labor traffickers control their victims through physical restraint, psychological intimidation, threats to family members, and other forms of coercion, they represent a continuing threat to victims even after they are prosecuted and convicted for their crimes.
- Argument in Opposition
The American Civil Liberties Union of California opposes this bill and writes:
Penal Code section 136.2 (i) gives the court an additional tool to protect victims in specific kinds of cases, such as domestic violence, rape, or cases involving registrable sex offenses including human trafficking to effect certain sex offenses or pimping or pandering a minor. In these cases, the relationship between the victim and the offender is such that the victim may have particular reason to fear further harm from the offender.
AB 1735 would expand the list of crimes that would allow a protective order to be issued to crimes where the same type of relationship between victim and defendant is not at issue, as where the victim was trafficked for forced labor rather than for sexual purposes. This change will increase the number of protective orders issued, often without the same kind of specific need to protection having been shown. In many cases this could be used as a form of additional punishment, regardless of whether there was any reason to believe that the defendant posed a continuing threat to the victim. For up to ten years, potentially far longer than the period of the sentence or term of probation, the defendant would remain subject to the control of the criminal justice system. The terms of the restraining order in many cases would make it much more difficult for the defendant to reintegrate into the community, by keeping the defendant from returning to his former home or even neighborhood. An offender who is unable to reconnect with friends, neighbors and family is more likely to reoffend, not less. The end result in many cases would likely be conviction for violation of the restraining order, and a prolonged cycle of reincarceration.
Moreover, expanding the list of crimes allowing for issuance of a protective order beyond those currently in law will open the door to expansion to still more crimes – turning what is now a tool to protect specific categories of victims into an additional form of punishment applied regardless of the needs of the victim in a particular case.
-- END –
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1735
Author:(Cunningham)
As Introduced Ver:January 3, 2018
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Public Safety | 6-0 | Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Carrillo, Gonzalez Fletcher, Kiley, Santiago | |
Appropriations | 15-0 | Gonzalez Fletcher, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Fong, Friedman, Gallagher, Eduardo Garcia, Nazarian, Obernolte, Reyes |
|
SUMMARY: Requires the court to consider issuing a protective order in all cases in which a defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping or pandering.
EXISTING LAW:
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur.
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court.
- Allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Gang cases;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration (including pimping and pandering of a minor);
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases
- Allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders and workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown, likely significant costs for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate individuals who violate a protective order (as expanded by this bill) more than once and commit an act of violence or a credible threat of violence. For example, if five additional offenders are admitted annually to CDCR with two-year sentences (the mid-term sentence for this crime), costs in the first year will be $150,000 (assuming the out-of-state contract rate of $30,000 annually per offender) and $300,000 in the second year and ongoing.
- Non-reimbursable local costs for incarceration, to the extent more protective orders are issued and some individuals violate those orders and are sentenced to county jail. These local costs are offset, at least partially, by fine and fee revenue.
- Minor costs for courts and the Department of Justice.
COMMENTS: According to the author, "Human Trafficking is an epidemic that is plaguing our state. According to the National Human Trafficking Hotline, California alone saw 705 cases reported in 2017. 544 of these cases were the result of sex trafficking; another 95 were the result of labor trafficking. The remainder involved a combination of the two. These victims often are under the complete dominion and control of their trafficker. They should be given the same protections afforded other human trafficking victims. This bill would give California courts the discretion to issue up to 10-year criminal protective orders for the vulnerable victims of these specific offenses.''
Analysis Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003118
Date of Hearing: April 4, 2018
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1735
Author:(Cunningham) – As Introduced Ver:January 3, 2018
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 6 - 0 |
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires courts to consider issuing a protective order (restraining order) in all cases in which a defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping or pandering.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Unknown, likely significant GF costs for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate individuals who violate a protective order (as expanded by this bill) more than once and commit an act of violence or a credible threat of violence. This is because while an initial violation of a protective order is a misdemeanor, subsequent violations that include an act of violence or credible threat of violence are “wobblers”—punishable either in county jail or in state prison. Between 2015 and 2017, CDCR admitted to state prison an average of 37 offenders each year for repeated violations of protective orders. By potentially expanding the number of protective orders issued, it is likely that this bill will result in additional offenders receiving sentences to state prison. For example, if five additional offenders are admitted annually to CDCR with two-year sentences (the mid-term sentence for this crime), costs in the first year will be $150,000 (assuming the out-of-state contract rate of $30,000 annually per offender) and $300,000 in the second year and ongoing. The actual costs for CDCR will depend on the number of additional protective orders issued by the courts, the number of individuals who commit repeat violations of those orders, and whether those offenders are sentenced to county jail or state prison.
- Non-reimbursable local costs for incarceration, to the extent more protective orders are issued and some individuals violate those orders and are sentenced to county jail. These local costs are offset, at least partially, by fine and fee revenue.
- Minor costs for courts to consider whether to issue a protective order as specified by this bill.
COMMENTS:
- Background. Under existing law, a court is authorized to issue no-contact protective orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. The court can also issue no-contact protective orders lasting up to 10 years in numerous other types of cases, such as a domestic-violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, gang cases, or any crime requiring sex offender registration.
- Purpose. According to the author:
Human Trafficking is an epidemic that is plaguing our state. According to the National Human Trafficking Hotline, California alone saw 705 cases reported in 2017. 544 of these cases were the result of sex trafficking; another 95 were the result of labor trafficking. The remainder involved a combination of the two. These victims often are under the complete dominion and control of their trafficker. They should be given the same protections afforded other human trafficking victims. This bill would give California courts the discretion to issue up to 10-year criminal protective orders for the vulnerable victims of these specific offenses.
- Related legislation.
AB 2036 (Gipson), of the current legislative session, extends a court’s authority to issue criminal protective orders in juvenile delinquency cases. AB 2036 is pending hearing in the Assembly Public Safety Committee.
AB 2290 (Gallagher), of the current legislative session, requires the courts to consider issuing an order restraining a criminal defendant who has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence from any contact with a minor who is a witness and requires this order have precedence over a civil court order. AB 2290 is pending hearing in the Assembly Public Safety Committee.
- Prior legislation.
AB 264 (Low), Chapter 270, Statutes of 2017, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases.
SB 352 (Block), Chapter 279, Statutes of 2015, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving abuse of an elder or a dependent adult, regardless of the sentence imposed.
AB 307 (Campos), Chapter 291, Statutes of 2013, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted of specified sex crimes, regardless of the sentence imposed.
Analysis Prepared by: Jessica Peters / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: March 6, 2018
Counsel: Sandra Uribe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:
Author:() – As Ver:
SUMMARY:
Requires the court to consider issuing a protective order in all cases in which a defendant has been convicted of human trafficking, pimping or pandering.
EXISTING LAW:
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Gang cases;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration (including pimping and pandering of a minor);
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 646.9, subd. (k); 368, subd. (l).)
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders and workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Pro. Code, §§ 527.6 and 527.8.)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Human Trafficking is an epidemic that is plaguing our state. According to the National Human Trafficking Hotline, California alone saw 705 cases reported in 2017. 544 of these cases were the result of sex trafficking; another 95 were the result of labor trafficking. The remainder involved a combination of the two. These victims often are under the complete dominion and control of their trafficker. They should be given the same protections afforded other human trafficking victims. This bill would give California courts the discretion to issue up to 10-year criminal protective orders for the vulnerable victims of these specific offenses.”
- Protective Orders: As a general matter, the court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation. For example, when domestic violence criminal proceedings have concluded, the court can issue a "no-contact order" as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
Finally, in some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic-violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, gang cases, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases (Pen. Code, §646.9, subd. (k)). Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order "that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim's family members or spouse." (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (l).)
This bill would extend the court's authority to issue post-conviction protective orders lasting up to 10 years in human trafficking, pimping, and pandering cases. As to all three offenses addressed by this bill, it should be noted that human trafficking for commercial sexual purposes, as well as the pimping or pandering of a minor require sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (c).) As noted above, the court is already required to consider issuing a post-conviction restraining order for any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) Therefore, the practical effect of this bill is to permit such an order when (1) the victim of pimping or pandering is an adult, and (2) in human trafficking cases involving other forms of forced labor or services.
- Criminal Contempt: Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended "to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence." (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) Nevertheless, a violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order." (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code Section 166 is a misdemeanor, and so proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) Therefore, the criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution; the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt "is entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights." (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4t Supp. 8, 11.) Therefore, the defendant has the right to a jury trial, regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
- Effects of Restraining Orders: The consequences of having the court issue a restraining order against a person can be very severe. The person will not be able to go to certain places or to do certain things. For example, the restraining order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, thereby implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing him or her to vacate his or her own home.
The restraining order may affect a person’s immigration status. A violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states: “Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court an whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.”
The restrained person will generally not be able to own a gun and will have to turn in, sell, or store any guns he or she has, and will not be able to buy a gun while the restraining order is in effect. (Pen. Code, § 29825.) - Argument in Support: According to the California Police Chiefs Association, “AB 1735 creates parity for victims who face comparable psychological and emotional damage that warrant ongoing protective measure to ensure their safety and welfare.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to American Civil Liberties Union of California (ACLU), “Penal Code section 136.2 (i) gives the court an additional tool to protect victims in specific kinds of cases, such as domestic violence, rape, or cases involving registrable sex offenses including human trafficking to effect certain sex offenses or pimping or pandering a minor. In these cases, the relationship between the victim and the offender is such that the victim may have particular reason to fear further harm from the offender.
“AB 1735 would expand the list of crimes that would allow a protective order to be issued to crimes where the same type of relationship between victim and defendant is not at issue, as where the victim was trafficked for forced labor rather than for sexual purposes. This change will increase the number of protective orders issued, often without the same kind of specific need to protection having been shown. In many cases this could be used as a form of additional punishment, regardless of whether there was any reason to believe that the defendant posed a continuing threat to the victim. For up to ten years, potentially far longer than the period of the sentence or term of probation, the defendant would remain subject to the control of the criminal justice system. The terms of the restraining order in many cases would make it much more difficult for the defendant to reintegrate into the community, by keeping the defendant from returning to his former home or even neighborhood. An offender who is unable to reconnect with friends, neighbors and family is more likely to reoffend, not less. The end result in many cases would likely be conviction for violation of the restraining order, and a prolonged cycle of reincarceration.
“Moreover, expanding the list of crimes allowing for issuance of a protective order beyond those currently in law will open the door to expansion to still more crimes – turning what is now a tool to protect specific categories of victims into an additional form of punishment applied regardless of the needs of the victim in a particular case.”
- Related Legislation:
- AB 1737 (Cunningham) redefines the crime of pandering. AB 1737 will be heard in this Committee today.
- AB 2036 (Gipson) would extend a court authority to issue criminal protective orders in juvenile delinquency cases. AB 2036 is pending hearing in this committee.
- AB 2290 (Gallagher) would require the court to consider issuing an order restraining a criminal defendant who has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence from any contact with a minor who is a witness and would require this order have precedence over a civil court order. AB 2290 is pending hearing in this committee.
- SB 1089 (Jackson) would clarify that all protective orders subject to transmittal to the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, also known as CLETS, are required to be so transmitted. SB 1089 is pending hearing in the Senate Public Safety Committee.
- AB 1737 (Cunningham) redefines the crime of pandering. AB 1737 will be heard in this Committee today.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 264 (Low), Chapter 270, Statutes of 2017, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases.
- SB 352 (Block), Chapter 279, Statutes of 2015, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving abuse of an elder or a dependent adult, regardless of the sentence imposed.
- AB 307 (Campos), Chapter 291, Statutes of 2013, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted of specified sex crimes, regardless of the sentence imposed.
- SB 723 (Pavley), Chapter 155, Statutes of 2011, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving domestic violence, regardless of the sentence imposed.
- SB 834 (Florez), Chapter 627, Statutes of 2010, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years in sex cases involving a minor victim.
- AB 289 (Spitzer), Chapter 582, Statutes of 2007, allows a court to issue a protective order for 10 years upon a defendant's conviction for stalking.
- AB 264 (Low), Chapter 270, Statutes of 2017, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association
Opposition
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Analysis Prepared by:
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):