Existing law authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol to retain license plate data captured by license plate reader technology, also referred to as an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system, for not more than 60 days unless the data is being used as evidence or for the investigation of felonies. Existing law authorizes the department to share that data with law enforcement agencies for specified purposes.

Existing law requires ALPR operators and ALPR end-users, as those terms are defined, to implement usage and privacy policies and to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices regarding ALPR information, as specified. Existing law requires the usage and privacy policy implemented by an ALPR operator or an ALPR end-user to include the length of time ALPR information will be retained and the process the ALPR operator or ALPR end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.

This bill would require an ALPR operator or ALPR end-user that is a public agency, excluding an airport authority, to include in those policies, procedures, and practices a requirement that ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list, as defined, be purged in 30 days, as specified. The bill would also prohibit those ALPR operators and end-users from accessing an ALPR system that retains that unmatched ALPR information for more than 60 days, as specified. ALPR information that is older than 60 days, except as specified.

The bill would impose annual audit requirements to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine compliance with the usage and privacy policy, as specified.

Existing law prohibits a public agency from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law.

This bill would prohibit ALPR information from being sold, shared, or transferred to an out-of-state or federal agency without a court order or warrant issued by a California court.

The bill would make related findings and declarations.

Existing law authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol to retain license plate data captured by license plate reader technology, also referred to as an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system, for not more than 60 days unless the data is being used as evidence or for the investigation of felonies. Existing law authorizes the department to share that data with law enforcement agencies for specified purposes.

Existing law requires ALPR operators and ALPR end-users, as those terms are defined, to implement usage and privacy policies and to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices regarding ALPR information, as specified. Existing law requires the usage and privacy policy implemented by an ALPR operator or an ALPR end-user to include the length of time ALPR information will be retained and the process the ALPR operator or ALPR end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.

This bill would require an ALPR operator or ALPR end-user that is a public agency, excluding an airport authority, to include in those policies, procedures, and practices a requirement that ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list, as defined, be purged in 30 days, as specified. The bill would also prohibit those ALPR operators and end-users from accessing an ALPR system that retains that unmatched ALPR information for more than 60 days, as specified.

The bill would impose annual audit requirements to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine compliance with the usage and privacy policy, as specified.

Existing law prohibits a public agency from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law.

This bill would prohibit ALPR information from being sold, shared, or transferred to an out-of-state or federal agency without a valid subpoena, court order, or warrant. court order or warrant issued by a California court.

The bill would make related findings and declarations.

Existing law authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol to retain license plate data captured by license plate reader technology, also referred to as an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system, for not more than 60 days unless the data is being used as evidence or for the investigation of felonies. Existing law authorizes the department to share that data with law enforcement agencies for specified purposes.

Existing law requires ALPR operators and ALPR end-users, as those terms are defined, to implement usage and privacy policies and to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices regarding ALPR information, as specified. Existing law requires the usage and privacy policy implemented by an ALPR operator or an ALPR end-user to include the length of time ALPR information will be retained and the process the ALPR operator or ALPR end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.

This bill would require an ALPR operator or ALPR end-user that is a public agency, excluding an airport authority, to include in those policies, procedures, and practices a requirement that ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list, as defined, be purged in 30 days, as specified. The bill would also prohibit those ALPR operators and end-users from accessing an ALPR system that retains that unmatched ALPR information for more than 60 days. days, as specified.

The bill would impose annual audit requirements to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine compliance with the usage and privacy policy, as specified.

Existing law prohibits a public agency from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law.

This bill would prohibit ALPR information from being sold, shared, or transferred to an out-of-state or federal agency without a valid subpoena, court order, or warrant.

The bill would make related findings and declarations.

Existing law, the Information Practices Act of 1977, requires certain state agencies to maintain personal information, as defined, in a specified manner and restricts those state agencies from disclosing personal information contained in its records, as specified. The act requires these state agencies to maintain the source or sources of the information when collecting personal information.

This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to the provision of the act relating to the requirement to maintain the source or sources of information.

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair

2023-2024 Regular Session

Bill No: AB 1463 (Author:Lowenthal)

Version: July 3, 2023

Hearing Date: July 11, 2023

Fiscal: Yes

Urgency: No

Consultant: CK

SUBJECT

Automated license plate recognition systems: retention and use of information

DIGEST

This bill requires operators and end-users of automated license plate recognition systems (“ALPR system”) to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches. If the operator or end-user is a public agency, the bill further requires them to destroy all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list within 30 days. The bill places restrictions on accessing certain systems and sharing ALPR information.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ALPR systems are searchable computerized databases resulting from the operation of one or more cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. The cameras can be mobile, e.g. mounted on patrol cars, or fixed, e.g. mounted on light poles. ALPR systems allow for the widespread and systematic collection of license plate information. ALPR data can have legitimate uses, including for law enforcement purposes. Currently, at least 230 police and sheriff departments in California use an ALPR system, with at least three dozen more planning to use them. While such systems are useful, there are serious privacy concerns associated with the collection, storage, disclosure, sharing, and use of ALPR data.

Current law requires operators of these systems and those using the data to implement usage and privacy policies. However, concerns have remained about the widespread collection of this data and the wildly inconsistent and opaque ways the data is used, stored, and destroyed. A report from the California State Auditor confirms that police departments in the state are not complying with existing law and recommends further regulation of these systems.

This bill implements some of the report’s recommendations by mandating audits of ALPR systems to provide a clear trail for what uses the information is being used for and by who, and requiring most public agencies to destroy ALPR data within 30 days if it does not match the information on a hot list.

This bill is sponsored by Oakland Privacy and supported by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It is opposed by the City of Thousand Oaks and sheriffs associations.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW

Existing law:

1. Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution, that all people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue and obtain privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
2. Defines “automated license plate recognition system” or “ALPR system” to mean a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. “ALPR information” means information or data collected through the use of an ALPR system. “ALPR operator” means a person that operates an ALPR system, except as specified. “ALPR end-user” means a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system, except as specified. The definitions for both ALPR operator and ALPR end-user exclude transportation agencies when subject to Section 31490 of the Streets and Highways Code. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.5.)
3. Requires an ALPR operator to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR operators must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.51.)
4. Requires ALPR end-users to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR end-users must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the access, use, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.53.)
5. Provides that a public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. For purposes of this section, the provision of data hosting or towing services shall not be considered the sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.55.)
6. Authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by a license plate reader for no more than 60 days, except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence or for all felonies being investigated, including, but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnaping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alerts, and Blue Alerts. (Veh. Code § 2413(b).)
7. Prohibits CHP from selling license plate reader data for any purpose and from making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement officer. The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. (Veh. Code § 2413(c).)
8. Requires CHP to monitor internal use of the license plate reader data to prevent unauthorized use. (Veh. Code § 2413(d).)
9. Requires CHP to annually report the license plate reader practices and usage, including the number of license plate reader data disclosures, a record of the agencies to which data was disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in policy that affect privacy concerns to the Legislature. (Veh. Code § 2413(e).)
10. Establishes the data breach notification law, which requires any agency, person, or business that owns, licenses, or maintains data including personal information to disclose a breach, as provided. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.29(a), (b), (c) and 1798.82(a), (b), (c).) Includes within the definition of “personal information,” ALPR data when combined with an individual’s first name or first initial and last name when either piece of data is not encrypted. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.29(g), 1798.82(h).)
11. Prohibits a transportation agency from selling or otherwise providing to any other person or entity personally identifiable information of any person who subscribes to an electronic toll or electronic transit fare collection system or who uses a toll bridge, toll lane, or toll highway that employs an electronic toll collection system, except as expressly provided. (Sts. & Hy. Code § 31490.)

This bill:

1. Requires ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to do the following:
   1. review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine if all searches were in compliance with the usage and privacy policy; and
   2. if the ALPR operator or end-user is a public agency assess whether all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list has been purged no more than 30 days from the date of collection.
2. Provides that if the ALPR operator is a private corporation or limited liability company which provides an ALPR system to a public agency, the auditing requirements shall apply to the public agency and not to the private entity providing the ALPR system.
3. Provides that an ALPR operator or end-user that is a public agency must include a requirement in its usage and privacy policy that all ALPR information is to be purged within 30 days if it does not match information on a hot list.
4. Defines “hot list” to mean a list or lists of license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways.
5. Excludes airport authorities from the provisions of the bill applying to public agencies.
6. Prohibits ALPR operators and end-users that are public agencies from accessing ALPR information that is older than 60 days unless the data matches information on a hot list, has been entered into evidence in a criminal matter under California law, or the ALPR system is operated by an airport authority.
7. Prohibits a public agency from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by California state law. Prohibits selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information to out-of-state or federal agencies without a court order or warrant issued by a California court.

COMMENTS

1. ALPR systems and the privacy implications

The prevalence of ALPR systems and the ease with which license plate data can be gathered and aggregated have raised serious privacy concerns for years. Using large datasets of ALPR data gathered over time, it is possible to reconstruct the locational history of a vehicle and extrapolate certain details about the vehicle’s driver. As a 2013 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report explains:

Tens of thousands of license plate readers are now deployed throughout the United States. Unfortunately, license plate readers are typically programmed to retain the location information and photograph of every vehicle that crosses their path, not simply those that generate a hit. The photographs and all other associated information are then retained in a database, and can be shared with others, such as law enforcement agencies, fusion centers, and private companies. Together these databases contain hundreds of millions of data points revealing the travel histories of millions of motorists who have committed no crime.^[1]

The U.S. Supreme Court has examined the significant privacy concerns raised by locational tracking technology in United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400. The Jones case considered whether the attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor made the following observations:

Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS monitoring--by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track--may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.

I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.

(United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 416 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

As with GPS monitoring, the accumulation of ALPR locational data into databases that span both time and distance also threatens to undermine one’s right to privacy. As with GPS monitoring, California residents may be less willing to exercise their associational and expressive freedoms if they know that their movements are being compiled into databases accessible not only to the government, but also to private industries and individuals. Without adequate regulations, the use of these systems threatens Californian’s right to privacy, a right explicitly enshrined in the California Constitution.

1. Enhancing the law to ensure the legitimacy of ALPR systems and the security of their data

In 2015, SB 34 (Hill, Ch. 532, Stats. 2015) sought to address some of the concerns about the privacy of this information by placing certain protections around the operation of ALPR systems and the use of ALPR data. (See Civ. Code §§ 1798.90.51, 1798.90.53.)^[2] The resulting statutes provided that both ALPR operators and ALPR end-users^[3] were required to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. They were further required to implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, access, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.

These policies are required to be made available to the public in writing and posted to the operator or end-user’s internet website, if it exists. These policies are required to include at least the following:

• the authorized purposes for using the ALPR system, and collecting, accessing, and/or using ALPR information;
• a description of the job title or other designation of the employees and independent contractors who are authorized to access and use the ALPR system and its information, or to collect the ALPR information. It must also identify the necessary training requirements;
• a description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the ALPR information, and compliance with all applicable privacy laws;
• a process for periodic system audits for end-users;
• the purposes of, process for, and restrictions on, the sale, sharing, or transfer of ALPR information to other persons;
• the title of the official custodian, or owner, of the ALPR information responsible for implementing the relevant practices and policies;
• a description of the reasonable measures that will be used to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information and correct data errors; and
• the length of time ALPR information will be retained, and the process the ALPR operator or end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.

Unfortunately, the security and privacy concerns have only multiplied in the wake of SB 34. Many ALPR systems have been found to have weak security protections, leading to the leaking of sensitive ALPR data and easy access to potential hackers.^[4] A 2018 Los Angeles Times editorial illustrates the concerns:

When someone drives down a street or parks a car at a curb, there is no expectation of privacy — the driver, the car and the license plate are in public view. Yet most people would recoil if the government announced a program to scan those license plate numbers into a database it could use to determine whose car was parked where and when. It’s an obnoxiously intrusive idea that sneaks over the line between a free society and Big Brother dystopia. The notion that the government could trace people’s travels whenever it wishes undercuts our fundamental belief that, barring probable cause to suspect involvement in a crime, we should be able to move about freely without being tracked.

But government agencies, from local police departments to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, are able to do just that. Some police agencies — including the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department — maintain their own databases of scanned plates, which is problematic enough without proper policies and controls in place. Many share with other agencies in broad networks. Some agencies contract with private vendors that build massive databases by merging feeds from automatic license plate readers. So while police must obtain a warrant before placing a tracking device on someone’s car, they do not need a judge’s permission to contract with a database — or build their own — and, theoretically, track a person’s movements over time by consulting records of where his or her car has been spotted.

. . .

We have been concerned about the broad spread of license-plate scanners in recent years primarily because of the potential for ubiquitous monitoring. Clearly, a database that allows police to, in essence, go back in time and see what cars might have been parked outside a store as it was being robbed could be a useful investigative tool. But at what cost?

Under this privatized system, government officials can enter a license plate and receive an alert as soon as it turns up on any of the nationwide army of scanners — in police cars, on utility poles, in cars driven by private citizens working with the vendors — that feed these databases. Because the data is not purged after a short amount of time, it also means police can plug in a license plate and find out where a car had traveled on any specific day going back years. Such an arrangement might pass constitutional muster, but it certainly violates our right and expectation to not have our daily activities collected and saved for retrieval by government agents.^[5]

1. California State Auditor report uncovers disturbing lack of compliance, oversight

In response to the growing concerns with ALPR systems, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee tasked the California State Auditor with conducting an audit of law enforcement agencies’ use of ALPR systems and data.

The report focused on four law enforcement agencies that have ALPR systems in place.^[6] The report found that “the agencies have risked individuals’ privacy by not making informed decisions about sharing ALPR images with other entities, by not considering how they are using ALPR data when determining how long to keep it, by following poor practices for granting their staff access to the ALPR systems, and by failing to audit system use.” In addition, the audit found that three of the four agencies failed to establish ALPR policies that included all of the elements required by SB 34. All three failed to detail who had access to the systems and how it will monitor the use of the ALPR systems to ensure compliance with privacy laws. Other elements missing were related to restrictions on the sale of the data and the process for data destruction. The fourth entity, the Los Angeles Police Department did not even have an ALPR policy.

The Auditor’s report calls into question how these systems are being run, how the data is being protected, and what is being done with the data. The report reveals that agencies commingled standard ALPR data with criminal justice information and other sensitive personal information about individuals, heightening the need for stronger security measures and more circumscribed access and use policies. However, the lack of clear guidelines or auditing made it unclear exactly where information was coming from, who was accessing it, and what purposes it was being put to. The report does make clear that these agencies have “shared their ALPR images widely, without considering whether the entities receiving them have a right to and need for the images.” Increasing the vulnerability of such vast troves of sensitive data, the agencies’ retention policies were uninformed and not tied to the usefulness of the data or the risks extended retention posed.

In fact, the Auditor had difficulty determining whether the agencies made informed decisions about sharing the ALPR data at all because of the deficient record keeping. It was discovered that two of the agencies reviewed approved sharing with hundreds of entities and one shared with over a thousand. The sharing occurred with most of the other 49 states and included public and private entities. However, the audit makes clear that ultimately it was impossible to verify the identity of each of these entities or their purpose for receiving this data.

Many of these agencies relied on Vigilant Solutions software and protocols rather than establishing their own protocols and safety measures. Vigilant is one of the largest private operators and end-users of ALPR systems and is also a provider of facial recognition technology and provides for ALPR data storage that allows the date, time, and location information to be stored with plate images. Vigilant’s parent company has since been acquired by Motorola Solutions. Vigilant operates many of the ALPR systems used by law enforcement, including 70 percent of the law enforcement users surveyed by the Auditor. However, Vigilant indicates that it can also offer access to its private database of “over 5 billion nationwide detections and over 150 million more added monthly.”^[7] The company’s website specifically advertises its ability to run advanced analytics across the vast troves of data it maintains.

The report indicates that for the agencies partnering with Vigilant, it was not even clear who owns the data being put into the Vigilant cloud. Serious security concerns were identified with the agencies using Vigilant, including the lack of contractual guarantees that the data will be stored in the United States or that adequate safeguards will be implemented. While LAPD contracts with another company, Palantir, for IT, they failed to provide an up to date contract with security provisions required by the FBI based on the type of data being collected.

Perhaps most disturbingly, some of these agencies have a history of sharing their ALPR information with ICE, and the audit reveals that they have continued to authorize “shares with entities with border patrol duties,” including the San Diego Sector Border Patrol of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Customs and Border Protection National

Targeting Center, and with an unknown entity simply listed as the “California Border Patrol.” The report concludes that “[a]ll of these entities’ duties could potentially intersect with immigration enforcement.” Reports indicate that such sharing is not limited to the four agencies at the center of the Auditor’s report. The Los Angeles Times reported that Pasadena police were found to have been sharing data from their Vigilant ALPR system directly with a Homeland Security division affiliated with ICE, and the Long Beach Police Department was found to have been sending ALPR data directly to ICE through Vigilant’s “group approval” feature.^[8]

While the report urges the Legislature to require DOJ to establish templates and best practices for a number of features of ALPR systems, the report indicated that their “guidelines for sharing data are particularly relevant in these cases.” Despite the existence of these clear immigration-related guidelines for sharing data, “the agencies were either unaware of these guidelines or had not implemented them for their ALPR systems.”

The major companies intricately tied to California’s ALPR systems, Vigilant and Palantir, both have strong ties to ICE, and reports have indicated that ICE directly accesses the ALPR database run by Vigilant. In fact, a recent investigation found that “Vigilant Solutions provided ICE with step-by-step guides on how to get license plate data from other agencies, including local and state law enforcement agencies and said it could give ICE access to millions more license plate scans.”^[9]

While the report deeply investigated only four entities, it conducted a statewide survey of law enforcement agencies, revealing that 70 percent operate or plan to operate an ALPR system, and 84 percent of those operating a system shared their images. The report indicates that this “raises concerns that these agencies may share the deficiencies [they] identified at the four agencies [they] reviewed.”

1. Responding to the lack of transparency, accountability, and security

The Auditor’s report provides several recommendations for the Legislature “[t]o better protect individuals’ privacy and to help ensure that local law enforcement agencies structure their ALPR programs in a manner that supports accountability for proper database use.” They urge the Legislature to do the following:

• Require the California Department of Justice (DOJ) to draft and make available on its website a policy template that local law enforcement agencies can use as a model for their ALPR policies.
• Require DOJ to develop and issue guidance to help local law enforcement agencies identify and evaluate the types of data they are currently storing in their ALPR systems. The guidance should include the necessary security requirements agencies should follow to protect the data in their ALPR systems.
• Establish a maximum data retention period for ALPR images.
• Specify how frequently ALPR system use must be audited and that the audits must include assessing user searches.

This bill implements several of these recommendations and applies them to a broader universe of ALPR operators and end-users.^[10] It requires all ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine if all searches were in compliance with the usage and privacy policy. Given the need for increased transparency, the author has agreed to amend the bill to require the audits be made publicly available.

For operators and end-users that are public agencies other than airport authorities, the bill establishes a strict retention period for ALPR information. It provides that their SB 34-mandated usage and privacy policies must require all such information be destroyed within 30 days if it does not match information on a hot list. The audits conducted by these public agency ALPR operators and end-users must also assess whether the ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list has been routinely destroyed in 30 days or less, as provided. Hot lists contain license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways. The bill further provides that these public agency ALPR operators and end-users are prohibited from accessing an ALPR system that retains ALPR information that does not match a hot list for more than 60 days, except where the system is operated by an airport authority.

Currently, public agencies are prohibited from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. This bill narrows that to only where permitted by California law. It goes further to prohibit any selling, sharing, or transferring to out-of-state or federal agencies without a court order or warrant issued by a California Court. As already discussed, there are very real concerns with this information getting into the hands of immigration enforcement officials. With the climate across the country in the wake of the Dobbs decision, there is also increased concern about law enforcement in other states using this data to further restrict or punish reproductive health care.^[11]

These additional requirements work toward addressing the privacy and security concerns highlighted above. Specifically, these new guardrails will further protect against ALPR data falling into the wrong hands and being used for purposes contrary to California values, such as assisting in federal immigration enforcement or in the ongoing assault against reproductive rights.

1. Stakeholder positions

According to the author:

ALPRs are just one of the many surveillance tools police departments and anti-abortion, groups have available to them, but and are becoming one of the most powerful tools available. As states start passing laws that put bounties on a woman’s head for seeking abortions in abortion safe states and are trying to make it illegal [to] even make that trek, not to mention the number of states that are targeting Drag queens and the trans community, California must take all precautions to preserve the identities and whereabouts of seeking refuge in our state. AB 1463 is one measure that will prevent law enforcement in cooperating with states that seek to criminalizing people seeking medically safe abortions in California.

Writing in support, Oakland Privacy, the sponsor of the bill, explains the need for the bill:

Queries into these large databases, mostly held in private hands like the LEARN system belonging to Vigilant Solutions, a division of Motorola Inc., the FALCON system belonging to Flock Safety, and some held in the state's homeland security fusion centers, do not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion to access sensitive geolocation data for any Californian and unless specifically restricted, red state law enforcement could locate vehicles in California from travelers they believe drove to California for reproductive or gender-affirming care and prepare to arrest them on their return.

These large data repositories, like any huge trove of data, become subject to mistakes and errors the bigger and more aged they get. It is important to note that a license plate reader hit, whether erroneous or not, is justification under most California law enforcement agency policies for a felony traffic stop with guns drawn. License plate reader mistakes have led to erroneous and violent traffic stops that not only terrorize innocent drivers, but lead to expensive civil litigation that drains municipal coffers. This is particularly a problem with rental cars that are reported stolen when returned late and then re-rented without clearing the previous stolen car alert. 8

The California State Auditor observed that many agencies are not fully aware of all their sharing partners. Moreover, California's State Auditor also stated:

Three agencies (75% of the sample group) share their images with hundreds of entities across the U.S. but could not provide evidence that they had determined whether those entities have a right or a need to access the images.

As an example of the data-sharing practices in place, this printout of the Sacramento Sheriff's Department Vigilant LEARN sharing profile, secured by a public records request, shows the department routinely share d their ALPR data with more than 800 other agencies, the majority of them out of the state.

Having reviewed dozens of similar public records responses from all over California, we can attest that the Sacramento Sheriff's Department practices are not an outlier, but a reflection of what have been standard practices. Just on the first of the thirteen pages of agencies with access, we can identify at least twenty that have no reason to be investigating the travel patterns of Sacramentans, including the police departments in Alapaha, GA (population 668), Bensalem Township, PA, Beaumont, TX, and the airport in Atlantic City, NJ.

The City of Thousand Oaks writes in opposition:

ALPR is a valuable public safety tool used by the Thousand Oaks Police Department (TOPD). To clarify, ALPR simply takes images of license plates and does not take video images of motorists. ALPR serves as not only an investigatory tool but a crime deterrent. ALPRs are affixed to patrol cars, intersections and even on message board trailers. The system alerts officers immediately if a motorist associated with a missing person, stolen vehicle, or other crimes. TOPD has strict policy on the use of this tool, which is limited to searches related to criminal activity. By setting an arbitrary timeframe for the retention of ALPR data to 30 days, surveillance data needed to solve a crime or apprehend criminals could be potentially deleted. Investigations may require data older than 30 days. Creating a short retention schedule eliminates access to data that could help resolve a crime.

The California State Sheriffs’ Association argues in opposition:

Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects and continue to do so today. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set a data destruction timeline such as 30 days in statute will significantly hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool.

SUPPORT

Oakland Privacy (sponsor)
Electronic Frontier Foundation

OPPOSITION

California State Sheriffs’ Association

City of Thousand Oaks

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department

RELATED LEGISLATION

Pending Legislation: None known.

Prior Legislation:

SB 210 (Wiener, 2021) would have provided greater transparency and accountability with respect to ALPR systems by requiring, similar hereto, ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches. It would have further required an operator or end-user that is a public agency to destroy all ALPR data that does not match information on a hot list within 24 hours. It died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SB 1143 (Wiener, 2020) was largely identical to the current bill. It was held under submission in the Senate Transportation Committee.

AB 1782 (Chau, 2019) would have required those operating ALPR systems and those accessing or using ALPR data to have policies that include procedures to ensure nonanonymized ALPR information is timely destroyed, except as specified, and that all ALPR information that is shared is anonymized. The bill was subsequently gutted and amended to address a different topic. It died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SB 34 (Hill, Ch. 532, Stats. 2015) See Comment 2.

PRIOR VOTES:

Assembly Floor (Ayes 48, Noes 15)

Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 4)

Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 8, Noes 2)

Assembly Transportation Committee (Ayes 10, Noes 4)

**************

1. ACLU, You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements (July 2013) https://www.aclu.org/other/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record-americans-movements?redirect=technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record. All internet citations are current as of June 26, 2023. ↑

2. SB 34 also included ALPR data within the definition of “personal information” for purposes of California’s Data Breach Notification Law. ↑

3. The law defines an “ALPR operator” as a person that operates an ALPR system and an “ALPR end-user” as a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system, with certain exemptions. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.5.) Both definitions exclude a transportation agency when subject to Section 31490 of the Streets and Highways Code. ↑

4. Zack Whittaker, Police license plate readers are still exposed on the internet (January, 22, 2019) TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/22/police-alpr-license-plate-readers-accessible-internet/. ↑

5. Los Angeles Times Editorial Board, Private surveillance databases are just as intrusive as government ones (February 3, 2018) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-license-plate-readers-privacy-congress-20180203-story.html. ↑

6. Automated License Plate Readers, To Better Protect Individuals’ Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects (February 2020) California State Auditor, https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf]. ↑

7. See https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/license-plate-recognition-lpr/. ↑

8. Suhauna Hussain & Johana Bhuiyan, Police in Pasadena, Long Beach pledged not to send license plate data to ICE. They shared it anyway (December 21, 2020) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-12-21/pasadena-long-beach-police-ice-automated-license-plate-reader-data. ↑

9. Ibid. ↑

10. The Brennan Center for Justice also put out a detailed report on ALPR systems in which they similarly recommend strict retention limits and regular auditing. See Angel Diaz & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use (September 10, 2020) Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations. ↑

11. Press Release, Civil Liberties Groups Demand California Police Stop Sharing Drivers’ Location Data With Police In Anti-Abortion States (May 25, 2023) ACLU Northern California, https://www.aclunc.org/news/civil-liberties-groups-demand-california-police-stop-sharing-drivers-location-data-police-anti (“California law enforcement’s sharing of ALPR data with law enforcement in states that criminalize abortion also undermines California’s extensive efforts to protect reproductive health privacy, specifically a 2022 law (AB 1242) prohibiting state and local agencies from providing abortion-related information to out-of-state agencies.”). ↑

ASSEMBLY THIRD READING

ATR Bill Id:AB 1463

Author:(Lowenthal)

As Amended Ver:May 1, 2023

Majority vote

SUMMARY

Requires a public agency end-user of an automated license plate reader (ALPR) to purge information that does not match information on a hot list, as defined, within 30 days and explicitly prohibits the selling, sharing or transferring of ALPR data with an out-of-state or federal agency without a valid subpoena, court order, or warrant issued by a California court.

Major Provisions

1. Defines "hot list" to mean a list or lists of license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways.
2. Requires an ALPR operator to have reasonable security procedures and practices that include, but are not limited to, an annual audit to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine if all searches were in compliance with the usage and privacy policy. If the ALPR operator is a public agency other than an airport authority, the audit shall assess whether all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list has been purged no more than 30 days from the date of collection.
3. Explicitly prohibits that ALPR information shall not be sold, shared or transferred to out-of-state or federal agencies without a valid subpoena, court-order, or warrant.
4. Prohibits an ALPR operator or ALPR end-user that is a public agency, excluding an airport authority, from accessing an ALPR system that retains ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list for more than 60 days after the date of collection unless they are accessing an ALPR system operated by an airport authority.

COMMENTS

According to the United States Department of Justice, the Police Scientific Development Branch in the United Kingdom (U.K.) invented ALPR technology in 1976. The technology rose to prominence after Provisional Irish Republican Army terrorist bombings in the City of London that resulted in the establishment of a surveillance and security network around the city referred to as the "ring of steel" in 1993.

ALPR systems are capable of capturing information on up to 1,800 plates per minute at speeds of 120-160 miles per hour. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, ALPR systems can be mounted on stationary poles, moving police cruisers, and handheld devices. The devices log pictures of the vehicles, and their GPS coordinates. This data can be compared against "hot lists" to find vehicles that have been stolen or help find an abducted child.

Law enforcement agencies use of ALPR was prevalent across the United States by the mid-2000s. The 2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey indicated that as of 2007, 48% of law enforcement agencies with more than 1,000 sworn officers were regularly using ALPR readers, with 32% of agencies with greater than 500 officers, but less than 1,000.

California's use of ALPRs and Legislative response: According to a 2019 Auditor report, out of the 391 law enforcement agencies in California, 230 police and sheriff departments in California currently use ALPR systems, with 36 more planning to do so. ACLU in a 2013 report indicated that law enforcement is collecting and storing ALPR images related to individuals not suspected of a crime, and that this data could be used inappropriately to monitor the movements individuals such as ex-spouses, neighbors, and other associates.

Out of increasing concern surrounding the privacy of individuals data collected through ALPR systems, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed SB 34 (Hill), Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015. According to Senator Hill at the time, "California law has not kept up with the rapid adoption of the technology. Except for the California Highway Patrol and transportation agencies, current California law doesn't require any privacy safeguards or establish any protocols for the use of ALPR systems. Not only has the law failed to keep up with the quick adoption of ALPR, but the entities using ALPR have also been slow in crafting their own internal policies. For example, according to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, only 48% of police agencies across the country have developed policies that govern ALPR use and privacy."

SB 34 imposed a range of privacy protections on ALPR data, including requiring ALPR operators to secure information collected by ALPR systems with reasonable operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure confidentiality and integrity.

Security and privacy concerns surrounding ALPR systems have only grown since the passage of SB 34 and in 2019 the Auditor reviewed four local law enforcement agencies use of ALPR and found that these agencies were accumulating massive amounts of data unrelated to criminal investigations. Also, the Auditor found that none of the agencies they reviewed were complying with the requirements set forth in SB 34, and that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had no ALPR policy at all. The other three agencies did not completely or clearly specify who has system access, who has system oversight, or how to destroy ALPR data. For example, of the 320 million images LAPD had collected, only 400,000 generated an immediate match against a hot list.

California State Audit on ALPR users: According to the Auditor's 2019 report, "The agencies we reviewed have few safeguards for the creation of ALPR user accounts and have also failed to audit the use of their ALPR systems. Instead of ensuring that only authorized users' access ALPR data for appropriate purposes, the agencies have left their systems open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight. Over the years, the media has reported that some individuals within law enforcement used or could use data systems—and sometimes ALPR systems—to obtain information about individuals for their personal use, including to locate places they regularly visit, to determine their acquaintances, and to blackmail them based on this information. ALPR systems should be accessible only to employees who need the data, and accounts should be promptly disabled otherwise. However, the agencies often neglected to limit ALPR system access and have allowed accounts that should be disabled to remain active longer than is prudent. To further ensure that individuals with access do not misuse the ALPR systems, the agencies should be auditing the license plate searches that users perform, along with conducting other monitoring activities. Instead, the agencies have conducted little to no auditing and monitoring and thus have no assurance that misuse has not occurred."

The State Auditor recommended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) draft and make available on its website a policy template that local law enforcement agencies can use as a model for their ALPR policies, and that DOJ develop and issue guidance to help local law enforcement agencies identify and evaluate the types of data they are currently storing in their ALPR systems. It also suggests the Legislature set a requirement for when law enforcement agencies should delete ALPR data.

According to the Author

According to the author, "ALPRs are just one of the many surveillance tools police departments and anti-abortion, groups have available to them, but and are becoming one of the most powerful tools available. As states start passing laws that put bounties on a woman's head for seeking abortions in abortion safe states and are trying to make it illegal even make that trek, not to mention the number of states that are targeting Drag queens and the trans community, California must take all precautions to preserve the identities and whereabouts of seeking refuge in our state. AB 1463 is one measure that will prevent law enforcement in cooperating with states that seek to criminalizing people seeking medically safe abortions in California."

Arguments in Support

Oakland Privacy, writing in support of this bill, argues "Assembly Bill 1463 is both timely, and somewhat overdue. In 2015, the Legislature unanimously passed AB 34 from Senator Jerry Hill which imposed policy transparency requirements and attempted to restrict out of state sharing, although it did not end the practice. In 2019, then Assembly-privacy chair Ed Chau of Monterey Park wrote a bill to purge non-evidentiary license plate scans from databases after 60 days. AB 1782 was voted out of the Assembly Judiciary and Privacy committees and passed by the full Assembly in May of 2019.3 AB 1782 was delayed in the Senate due to Senator Scott Weiner's request to the JLAC for the California State Auditor to review ALPR use in California. The auditor's report was released in February of 2020.

Arguments in Opposition

The California State Sheriffs Association, writing in opposition to this bill, argue " Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects and continue to do so today. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set a data destruction timeline such as 30 days in statute will significantly hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool."

FISCAL COMMENTS

According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee, costs of an unknown, but presumably significant amount statewide, for each local agency that uses and ALPR to conduct an annual compliance audit. If the Commission on State Mandates determines these costs to constitute a reimbursable state mandate, the state may need to reimburse these local costs (General Fund).

VOTES

ASM TRANSPORTATION: 10-4-1

YES: Friedman, Berman, Juan Carrillo, Gipson, Hart, Jackson, Kalra, Lowenthal, Ward, Wicks

NO: Vince Fong, Davies, Sanchez, Wallis

ABS, ABST OR NV: Stephanie Nguyen

ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 8-2-1

YES: Gabriel, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Essayli, Lowenthal, Papan, Wicks, Wilson

NO: Joe Patterson, Vince Fong

ABS, ABST OR NV: Irwin

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-4-1

YES: Holden, Bryan, Calderon, Wendy Carrillo, Mike Fong, Hart, Lowenthal, Papan, Pellerin, Weber, Ortega

NO: Megan Dahle, Dixon, Mathis, Sanchez

ABS, ABST OR NV: Robert Rivas

UPDATED

VERSION: May 1, 2023

CONSULTANT: David Sforza / TRANS. / (916) 319-2093 FN: 0000887

Date of Hearing: May 17, 2023

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Chris Holden, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1463

Author:(Lowenthal) – As Amended Ver:May 1, 2023

Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: Yes

SUMMARY:

This bill restricts and proscribes a local agency’s use and dissemination of automated license plate reader (ALPR) data.

Specifically, this bill:

1. Requires a local agency, other than an airport, must delete within 30 days ALPR data that does not match information on a “hot list,” which the bill defines as a list or lists of license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways.
2. Prohibits a law enforcement agency from sharing the data with any federal or out-of-state entity unless the entity has a valid California court order or warrant.
3. Requires any department using an ALPR system to conduct an annual compliance audit.

FISCAL EFFECT:

Costs of an unknown, but presumably significant amount statewide, for each local agency that uses and ALPR to conduct an annual compliance audit. If the Commission on State Mandates determines these costs to constitute a reimbursable state mandate, the state may need to reimburse these local costs (General Fund).

COMMENTS:

1. Purpose. The author intends this bill to prescribe local agency management of ALPR date, consistent with a recommendation made in 2019 by the State Auditor. According to the author:

ALPRs are just one of the many surveillance tools police departments and anti-abortion, groups have available to them, but are rapidly becoming one of the most powerful tools available. As states start passing laws that put bounties on a woman’s head for seeking abortions in abortion safe states, along with a number of states that are targeting Drag queens and the trans community, California must take all precautions to preserve the identities and whereabouts of people seeking refuge in our state. AB 1463 is one measure that will prevent law enforcement in cooperating with states that seek to criminalizing people seeking medically safe abortions in California.

1. Background. An ALPR is a camera that captures an image of license plates within its field of view. California law allows the use of ALPRs. By middle of the last decade, the Legislature became concerned enough with privacy issues related to the use, and misuse, of ALPRs that it passed SB 34 (Hill), Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015, which, among other things, requires public agencies, including law enforcement agencies, that operate or use an ALPR system to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect ALPR data, to implement a usage and privacy policy, to make that policy available to the public and to post that policy on its website should the agency have one, among other provisions.

Soon after, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee directed the State Auditor to audit local law enforcement agencies’ use of ALPRs. In February of 2020, the State Auditor released its audit, which found that, of 391 police and sheriff departments surveyed by the State Auditor, 230 used an ALPR system, and 36 others planned to use one. More disturbing, the audit found the following:

the agencies have risked individuals’ privacy by not making informed decisions about sharing ALPR images with other entities, by not considering how they are using ALPR data when determining how long to keep it, by following poor practices for granting their staff access to the ALPR systems, and by failing to audit system use.

In conclusion, the State Auditor made a number of recommendations, including that the Legislature (a) establish a maximum data retention period for ALPR images, (b) establish a maximum data retention period for data or lists, such as hot lists, that are used to link persons of interest with license plate images, (c) require periodic evaluation of a retention period for ALPR images to ensure that the period is as short as practicable and (d) specify how frequently ALPR system use must be audited and that the audits must include assessing user searches.

This bill generally places the State Auditor recommendations in law.

1. Support and Opposition. The bill is sponsored by Oakland Privacy, which contends this bill “protects the investments made by law enforcement in the technology to fight crime, while safeguarding the geolocation data of Californians and out of state visitors not involved in any crimes from indiscriminate and dangerous sharing and distribution.

The bill is opposed by California State Sheriff’s Association, which describes the bill as “excessive.” The association writes:

Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects and continue to do so today. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set a data destruction timeline such as 30 days in statute will significantly hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool.

1. Prior Legislation.

AB 1076 (Kiley), of the 2021-22 Legislative Session, would have required the Department of Justice to draft and make available on its internet website an ALPR system policy template for local law enforcement agencies and require that the guidance given include the necessary security requirements agencies should follow to protect the data in their ALPR systems. The bill died in this committee.

AB 2192 (Ramos), of the 2021-22 Legislative Session, would have authorized a public agency that uses an ALPR to share the data that it collects with a law enforcement agency of the federal government or another state if the ALPR information was being sold, shared, or transferred to locate a vehicle or person reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense, except as specified. The bill was referred to but not voted on in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.

SB 210 (Wiener), of the 2021-22 Legislative Session, would have required ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches and would have required most public ALPR operators and end-users to destroy all ALPR data within 24 hours if it did not match information on a hot list. The bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SB 1143 (Wiener), of the 2019-20 Legislative Session, was largely identical to SB 210 and was held by the Senate Transportation Committee.

AB 1782 (Chau), of the 2019-20 Legislative Session, would have required those operating ALPR systems and those accessing or using ALPR data to have policies that included procedures to ensure non-anonymized ALPR information is destroyed within 60 days and that all ALPR information that is shared be anonymized. The bill was subsequently amended to address a different topic.

Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing:

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

Jesse Gabriel, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1463 (

Author:Lowenthal) – As Amended Ver:March 22, 2023

As Proposed to Amended

SUBJECT: Automated license plate recognition systems: retention and use of information

SYNOPSIS

Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) systems are searchable computerized databases resulting from the operation of one or more cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. The cameras can be mobile, e.g., mounted on patrol cars, or fixed, e.g., mounted on light poles. ALPR systems allow for the widespread and systematic collection of license plate information. ALPR data can have legitimate uses, including for law enforcement purposes.

Unfortunately, a 2019 audit by the State Auditor calls into question how these systems are being run, how the data is being protected, and what is being done with the data. The report reveals that agencies commingled standard ALPR data with criminal justice information and other sensitive personal information about individuals, illustrating the need for stronger security measures and more circumscribed access and use policies. However, the lack of clear guidelines or auditing made it unclear exactly where information was coming from, who was accessing it, and what purposes it was being put to. The report does make clear that these agencies have “shared their ALPR images widely, without considering whether the entities receiving them have a right to and need for the images.” Increasing the vulnerability of such vast troves of sensitive data, the agencies’ retention policies were uninformed and not tied to the usefulness of the data or the risks that extended retention posed.

This bill does three things:

1. Requires that license plate data that does not match information contained on a “hot list” must be deleted within 30 days.

2. Prohibits law enforcement agencies from sharing the data with any federal or out of state entities unless they have a valid California court order or warrant.

3. Requires departments using ALPR systems to conduct annual compliance audits.

The question before this Committee is whether or not this bill furthers its policy priorities, particularly ensuring that all Californians, and those coming from out of state, are protected from punitive and discriminatory, draconian laws attacking the LGBTQ+ community and criminalizing people seeking abortion and gender affirming care. Another priority of the Committee is ensuring that our laws protect our immigrant neighbors from federal policies that make them vulnerable to being separated from their families, imprisoned, and ultimately returned to countries that many were forced to flee for their own safety.

Given the reports of misuse of the data, and the lackadaisical way that some local law enforcement agencies are monitoring the use of ALPR and failing to establish basic security protocols, if this surveillance system is going to continue to be used, it is prudent for the state to adopt policies like the ones contained in this bill to stop the data from being improperly shared.

This bill is sponsored by Oakland Privacy and supported by Initiate Justice and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The California State Sheriffs’ Association and the California Association of Highway Patrolmen are opposed.

This bill previously passed the Transportation Agency on a 10-4-1 vote.

SUMMARY: Requires a local public agency end-user of an automated license plate reader (ALPR) to purge information that does not match information on a hot list, as defined, within 30 days and explicitly prohibits the selling, sharing or transferring of ALPR data with an out-of-state or federal agency without a valid California court order or warrant. Specifically, this bill:

1. Defines “hot list” to mean a list or lists of license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways.
2. Requires that a local public agency, other than an airport authority, purge any ALPR data that is not on a hotlist after 30 days.
3. Requires an ALPR operator to have reasonable security procedures and practices that include, but are not limited to, an annual audit to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine if all searches were in compliance with the applicable usage and privacy policy. If the ALPR operator is a public agency other than an airport authority, the audit shall assess whether all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list has been purged no more than 30 days from the date of collection.
4. Explicitly prohibits ALPR information from being shared or transferred to out-of-state or federal agencies without a valid court order or warrant from a California court.
5. Prohibits an ALPR operator or ALPR end-user that is a local public agency, excluding an airport authority, from accessing an ALPR system that retains ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list for more than 30 days after the date of collection unless they are accessing an ALPR system operated by an airport authority.
6. States legislative findings and declarations.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution, that all people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue and obtain privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
2. Defines “automated license plate recognition system” or “ALPR system” to mean a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. “ALPR information” means information or data collected through the use of an ALPR system. “ALPR operator” means a person that operates an ALPR system, except as specified. “ALPR end-user” means a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system, except as specified. The definitions for both “ALPR operator” and” ALPR end-user” exclude transportation agencies subject to certain provisions of the Streets and Highways Code that apply to electronic toll collection. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.5.)
3. Requires an ALPR operator to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR operators must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.51.)
4. Requires ALPR end-users to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR end-users must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the access, use, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.53.)
5. Provides that a public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. For purposes of this section, the provision of data hosting or towing services is not considered the sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.55.)
6. Authorizes the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by a license plate reader for no more than 60 days, except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence, or for all felonies being investigated, including, but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnaping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alerts, and Blue Alerts. (Veh. Code § 2413(b).)
7. Prohibits the CHP from selling license plate reader data for any purpose and from making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement officer. The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. (Veh. Code § 2413(c).)
8. Requires the CHP to monitor internal use of the license plate reader data to prevent unauthorized use. (Veh. Code § 2413(d).)
9. Requires the CHP to annually report license plate reader practices and usage, including the number of license plate reader data disclosures, a record of the agencies to which data was disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in policy that affect privacy concerns, to the Legislature. (Veh. Code § 2413(e).)
10. Establishes the Data Breach Notification Law, which requires any agency, person, or business that owns, licenses, or maintains data including personal information to disclose a breach, as provided. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.29; 1798.82.) Includes ALPR data within the definition of “personal information,” if combined with an individual’s first name or first initial and last name, when either piece of data is not encrypted. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.29(g), 1798.82(h).)
11. Prohibits a transportation agency from selling or otherwise providing to any other person or entity personally identifiable information of any person who subscribes to an electronic toll or electronic transit fare collection system or who uses a toll bridge, toll lane, or toll highway that employs an electronic toll collection system, except as expressly provided. (Sts. & Hwy. Code § 31490.)
12. Establishes the California Values Act, which prohibits state law enforcement from using state resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law, except as specified. (Gov. Code § 7282 et seq.)
13. Establishes California as a sanctuary state and prohibits any law enforcement agency from cooperating with federal immigration enforcement authorities. (Gov. Code § 7284, et seq.)
14. Prohibits use of California state funds for travel to any state that is subject to a ban on state-funded and state-sponsored travel because that state enacted a law that voids or repeals, or has the effect of voiding or repealing, existing state or local protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression, or has enacted a law that authorizes or requires discrimination against same-sex couples or their families on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression. (Gov. Code § 11139.8.)
15. Establishes the Reproductive Privacy Act, which provides that the Legislature finds and declares that every individual possesses a fundamental right of privacy with respect to personal reproductive decisions, which entails the right to make and effectuate decisions about all matters relating to pregnancy, including prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, contraception, sterilization, abortion care, miscarriage management, and infertility care. Accordingly, it is the public policy of the State of California that:
    1. Every individual has the fundamental right to choose or refuse birth control.
    2. Every individual has the fundamental right to choose to bear a child or to choose to obtain an abortion, with specified limited exceptions.
    3. The state shall not deny or interfere with a person’s fundamental right to choose to bear a child or to choose to obtain an abortion, except as specifically permitted. (Health & Saf. Code § 123462.)
16. Provides that the state may not deny or interfere with a person’s right to choose or obtain an abortion prior to viability of the fetus or when the abortion is necessary to protect the life or health of the person. (Health & Saf. Code § 123466 (a).)
17. States that a person shall not be compelled in a state, county, city, or other local criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding to identify or provide information that would identify or that is related to an individual who has sought or obtained an abortion if the information is being requested based on either another state’s laws that interfere with a person’s rights under subdivision (a) or a foreign penal civil action. (Health & Saf. Code § 123466(b).)

FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.

COMMENTS:

1) Background. Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) systems are searchable computerized databases resulting from the operation of one or more cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. The cameras can be mobile, e.g., mounted on patrol cars, or fixed, e.g., mounted on light poles. ALPR systems allow for the widespread and systematic collection of license plate information. ALPR data can have legitimate uses, including for law enforcement purposes. As of 2019, at least 230 police and sheriff departments in California use an ALPR system, with at least three dozen more planning to use them. While such systems are useful, there are serious privacy concerns associated with the collection, storage, disclosure, sharing, and use of ALPR data. (California State Auditor, Automated License Plate Readers, To Better Protect Individuals’ Privacy, Law Enforcement Must Increase Its Safeguards for the Data It Collects (Feb. 2020), available at https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2019-118.pdf [State Auditor Report].)

In 2015, SB 34 (Hill, Chap. 532, Stats. 2015) sought to address some of the concerns about the privacy of the information collected by these systems by placing certain protections around the operation of ALPR and the use of the data. (See Civ. Code §§ 1798.90.51, 1798.90.53.) The resulting statutes provide that both ALPR operators and ALPR end-users ae required to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. These operators and end-users are further required to implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, access, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.

These policies are required to be made available to the public in writing and posted to the operator or end-user’s internet website, if it exists. These policies are required to include at least the following:

1. The authorized purposes for using the ALPR system, and collecting, accessing, and/or using ALPR information.

2. A description of the job title or other designation of the employees and independent contractors who are authorized to access and use the ALPR system and its information, or to collect the ALPR information. Necessary training requirements must also be identified.

3. A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure (a) the security of the ALPR information, and (b) compliance with all applicable privacy laws.

4. A process for periodic system audits for end-users.

5. The purposes of, process for, and restrictions on, the sale, sharing, or transfer of ALPR information to other persons.

6. The title of the official custodian, or owner, of the ALPR information responsible for implementing the relevant practices and policies.

7. A description of the reasonable measures that will be used to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information and correct data errors.

8. The length of time ALPR information will be retained, and the process the ALPR operator or end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.

Unfortunately, security and privacy concerns have only multiplied in the wake of SB 34 and it appears that law enforcement agencies may not have followed the requirements of the law. Many ALPR systems have been found to have weak security protections, leading to the leaking of sensitive ALPR data and easy access to potential hackers. In addition, since the passage of the bill in 2015, alarm over the overturning of Roe v. Wade and continued aggressive and punitive federal immigration policies have become a central concern for the Legislature and this Committee. This statute has not been updated to insure that proper protections are in place for people traveling from out of state seeking sanctuary in California for abortion and gender affirming care, protection from federal immigration authorities, or fleeing the large number of states that have introduced or passed anti-LBGTQ+ laws. This bill is an effort to put some of those protections in place.

In response to the growing concerns with ALPR systems, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee tasked the California State Auditor with conducting an audit of law enforcement agencies’ use of ALPR systems and data.

The resulting report, released in February 2020, focused on four law enforcement agencies that have ALPR systems in place. The report found that “the agencies have risked individuals’ privacy by not making informed decisions about sharing ALPR images with other entities, by not considering how they are using ALPR data when determining how long to keep it, by following poor practices for granting their staff access to the ALPR systems, and by failing to audit system use.” In addition, the audit found that three of the four agencies failed to establish ALPR policies that included all of the elements required by SB 34. All three failed to detail who had access to the systems and how it will monitor the use of the ALPR systems to ensure compliance with privacy laws. Other elements missing were related to restrictions on the sale of the data and the process for data destruction. The fourth entity, the Los Angeles Police Department did not even have an ALPR policy. (State Auditor Report, supra.)

The Auditor’s report calls into question how these systems are being run, how their data is being protected, and what is being done with the data. The report reveals that agencies commingled standard ALPR data with criminal justice information and other sensitive personal information about individuals, illustrating the need for stronger security measures and more circumscribed access and use policies. However, the lack of clear guidelines or auditing made it unclear exactly where information was coming from, who was accessing it, and what purposes the information was being put to. The report does make clear that these agencies have “shared their ALPR images widely, without considering whether the entities receiving them have a right to and need for the images.” Increasing the vulnerability of such vast troves of sensitive data, the agencies’ retention policies were uninformed and not tied to the usefulness of the data or the risks extended retention posed. (Ibid.)

In fact, the Auditor had difficulty determining whether the agencies made informed decisions about sharing the ALPR data at all because of the deficient record keeping. It was discovered that two of the agencies reviewed approved data sharing with hundreds of entities and one shared data with over a thousand. The sharing occurred with most of the other 49 states and included public and private entities. However, the audit makes clear that ultimately it was impossible to verify the identity of each of these entities or their purpose for receiving this data. (Ibid.)

Along with the Auditor’s report, at least two other breaches have been reported in the news in the last year. First, a suit was filed against the Marin County Sheriff in October 2021 alleging that despite laws against sharing ALPR data out of state and with the federal government, since 2014 the Sheriff’s Office had been forwarding scans from ALPR cameras to out-of-state and federal agencies, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which has used the information to track and deport immigrants. In the June 2022 settlement agreement, the Sheriff agreed to start complying with state laws and stop sharing the information. The other example is the Vallejo police department, which captured over 400,000 license plates a month and had been sharing their data with law enforcement in Arizona and Texas, according to an October 2022 article in The Guardian. (Bhuiyan, How expanding web of license plate readers could be ‘weaponized’ against abortion, The Guardian (Oct. 6, 2022) available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/06/how-expanding-web-of-license-plate-readers-could-be-weaponized-against-abortion?ref=vallejosun.com.)

The Auditor’s report and the two examples above demonstrate that some law enforcement agencies are either accidentally or deliberately violating the state’s privacy laws. This bill appears to be a reasonable first step in trying to rein in that dangerous behavior.

2) Author’s statement. According to the author:

ALPRs are just one of the many surveillance tools police departments and anti-abortion, groups have available to them, but are rapidly becoming one of the most powerful tools available. As states start passing laws that put bounties on a woman’s head for seeking abortions in abortion safe states, along with a number of states that are targeting Drag queens and the trans community, California must take all precautions to preserve the identities and whereabouts of people seeking refuge in our state. AB 1463 is one measure that will prevent law enforcement in cooperating with states that seek to criminalizing people seeking medically safe abortions in California.

3) Committee amendments. The amendments being taken in the Committee seek to align the bill with several data sanctuary laws passed last year to protect data that might be associated with seeking or obtaining reproductive medical care, including abortion services. The amendments are as follows:

 Section 1798.90.55 of the Civil Code is amended to read:

 Notwithstanding any other law or regulation:

(a) A public agency that operates or intends to operate an ALPR system shall provide an opportunity for public comment at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the governing body of the public agency before implementing the program.

(b) A public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. ALPR information shall not be sold, shared, or transferred to out-of-state or federal agencies without a valid subpoena, court order or warrant issued by a California court. For purposes of this section, the provision of data hosting or towing services shall not be considered the sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information.

4) Analysis of this bill. The question before this Committee is whether or not this bill furthers its policy priorities, particularly ensuring that all Californians, and those coming from out of state, are protected from punitive and discriminatory draconian laws attacking the LGBTQ+ community and criminalizing people seeking abortion and gender affirming care. Another priority of the Committee is ensuring that our laws protect our immigrant neighbors from federal policies that make them vulnerable to being separated from their families, imprisoned, and ultimately returned to countries that many were often forced to flee from for their own safety.

As discussed previously, this bill is intended to address some of the concerns raised by the State Auditor and align this bill with previously-enacted bills designed to protect reproductive health data, including abortion care and gender affirming care. Toward that end, the bill essentially does three things:

1. Purges geolocation data not associated with the investigation of any crime after 30 days. Under current law, there are no restrictions against law enforcement agencies amassing large stores of license plate data. As an example, the ALRP audit report found that in the Los Angeles ALPR database, “only 400,000 of the 320 million images it has accumulated over several years and stores in its database generated an immediate match against its hot lists. In other words, 99.9 percent of the ALPR images Los Angeles stores are for vehicles that were not on a hot list at the time the image was made.” Given the massive volume of images being stored in these databases, it makes the previous discussion related to the Marin County Sheriff’s Department collecting data on perhaps millions of license plates as people drove on the highways through Marin County on their way to and from San Francisco and then repeatedly sharing that information with federal immigration authorities all the more alarming.

As noted in The Guardian article mentioned previously:

License plate readers, which are usually installed on streetlights, highway overpasses or police squad cars, capture the details of passing cars and help police keep track of the vehicles that pass through certain locations or neighborhoods. The information is collected in a database, which police can search to see where certain vehicles have been or what cars have been in a certain area during a specific time frame.

The more data collected and retained, the more vulnerable people become to having their daily movements tracked, regardless of whether or not they are suspected of having committed a crime.

Requiring that the data not related to ongoing investigations be purged every 30 days seems to be a sensible time-frame and is significantly longer than in previous versions of the bill. In the last session, SB 210 (Weiner, 2022), the most recent attempt to set limits on the use of ALPR data, required law enforcement agencies to delete the data within 24 hours. Prior to that, SB 1143 (Wiener, 2020), would have also limited data retention to 24 hours. AB 1782 (Chau, 2019) would have allowed the data to be retained for 60 days, but also required anonymization of the data.

According to the author, this bill recommends 30 days, which is what is recommended by the state’s leading ALPR supplier, Flock Safety, which notes that 30 days is considered the best practice for protecting drivers’ privacy. In addition, 30 days is in line with the CA State Auditor recommendation to limit retention to the shortest possible time.

2. Forbids the sharing of geolocation data with out of state and federal agencies without a valid California court order or warrant. This bill, as proposed to be amended, seeks to align the data sharing prohibitions with the suite of reproductive privacy bills that are either currently moving through the Legislature or were passed in the last session. Specifically, this bill prohibits the sharing of ALPR data with any other public agency if it is contrary to state law. In addition, law enforcement agencies from another state or a federal agency will be required to obtain a court order or warrant from a California court in order to obtain access to the data. This language is similar to other data sharing restrictions that have been put in place to protect the data of vulnerable populations. This provision significantly strengthens current law and the version of the bill currently in print.

3. Requires public agencies operating ALPR systems to perform an annual compliance audit. This provision in the bill, like the data retention provision, is based on a recommendation from the State Auditor. As discussed previously, the Auditor had difficulty determining whether the agencies made informed decisions about sharing the ALPR data at all because of the deficient record keeping. It was discovered that two of the agencies reviewed approved sharing with hundreds of entities and one shared with over a thousand. The sharing occurred with most of the other 49 states and included public and private entities. However, ultimately it was impossible to verify the identity of each of these entities or their purpose for receiving this data. As a result of this finding, the Auditor recommended the Legislature specify how frequently ALPR system use must be audited.

Under this bill, local law enforcement agencies would be required to perform a compliance audit once a year. Specifically, they must include in their annual audit a review and assessment of all end-user searches during the previous year to determine if all searches were in compliance with their usage and privacy policies. In addition, the audit must also include an assessment of whether or not all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list had been purged no more than 30 days from the date of collection.

Given the finding in the audit report that law enforcement agencies often were not assessing how their ALPR systems were being used and often could not provide the auditors with any information regarding how often or for what reasons they conducted ALPR searches, an annual compliance audit appears to be a reasonable first step toward ensuring that the technology is used appropriately.

Given the reports of misuse of the data, and the lackadaisical way that some local law enforcement agencies are monitoring the use of ALPR and failing to establish basic security protocols, if this surveillance system is going to continue to be used, it is prudent for the state to adopt policies like the ones contained in this bill to stop the data from being improperly shared.

On a final important note, the California Association of Highway Patrolmen have opposed this bill. However, the laws being amended by this bill apply only to local public entities, including law enforcement agencies, and will not impact the CHP’s use of this technology. In addition, the provisions of this bill specifically exclude airport authorities, which may have national security reasons for retaining the data for longer periods of time.

5) Related legislation. SB 34 (Hill. Chap. 532, Stats. 2015) established regulations on the privacy and usage of automatic license plate recognition data and expanded the meaning of “personal information” to include information or data collected through the use or operation of an ALPR system.

AB 2192 (Ramos, 2022) would have authorized a public agency that uses an ALPR to share the data that it collects with a law enforcement agency of the federal government or another state if the ALPR information was being sold, shared, or transferred to locate a vehicle or person reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense, except as specified. That bill was taken up in Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection for testimony only.

SB 210 (Wiener, 2022) would have required ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches and required most public ALPR operators and end-users to destroy all ALPR data within 24 hours if it did not match information on a “hot list.” It also would have required the DOJ to make available model ALPR policies and issue guidance to local law enforcement agencies, as specified. That bill was held on suspense by the Senate Appropriations Committee.

AB 1076 (Kiley, 2021) would have required the Department of Justice to draft and make available on its internet website an ALPR system policy template for local law enforcement agencies and require that the guidance given include the necessary security requirements agencies should follow to protect the data in their ALPR systems. That bill was held on suspense by the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

SB 1143 (Wiener, 2020) was largely identical to SB 210. It was held by the Senate Transportation Committee.

AB 1782 (Chau, 2019) would have required those operating ALPR systems and those accessing or using ALPR data to have policies that included procedures to ensure non-anonymized ALPR information is destroyed within 60 days, except as specified, and that all ALPR information that is shared be anonymized. The bill was subsequently gutted and amended to address a different topic. It died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT. The sponsor of this bill, Oakland Privacy, notes:

Retention policies vary across the state, but on average are about a year. Some California agencies retain for longer periods of time than a year and a few retain indefinitely. These long periods of time that capture multiple scans of individual vehicles and record regularly repeated travel patterns can reveal residences, places of employment and ongoing associations with the assistance of other databases that law enforcement agencies can easily access.

In fact, in 2015, Senator Hill [the author of SB 34] was dismayed to discover that a private investigator provided with his spouse’s automobile license plate number was able to track his spouse to a local gym by using license plate reader scan data to analyze the travel patterns of the vehicle.

Also in support of the bill, Initiate Justice, states:

In just the last few years, public records requests from public interest groups showed that at least two California police departments, Pasadena and Long Beach, were sharing their license plate reader scans with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Vigilant LEARN database. After the sharing became public, both agencies stated it had been a “mistake” and would cease, but such mistakes can cause deportations that cannot be undone. The mistakes point to the lack of control over the geolocation data created by automated license plate readers by agencies. If it is so easy to share this data with federal immigration without an agency even knowing that it is doing it, then there are not sufficient safeguards and those lack of safeguards are putting Californians and visitors at risk.

Since at least 99.8% of all automated license plate reader scans taken in the state are never of interest in any criminal or civil matter, but are simply records of vehicle locations being kept in cold storage just in case, AB 1463 restricts retention beyond a month to vehicle scans that are of no interest in a criminal or civil matter and prevents the location data of drivers from being shared willy-nilly across the country without a proper legal process.

One of the safest states in the nation, New Hampshire, reduced its retention period for license plate reader scans that were not of interest in a criminal matter to three minutes in 2007. 16 years after enacting this policy, New Hampshire remains one of the safest states in the nation.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION. In opposition to this bill, the California State Sheriffs’ Association argues:

Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects and continue to do so today. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set a data destruction timeline such as 30 days in statute will significantly hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Oakland Privacy (sponsor)

Electronic Frontier Foundation
Initiate Justice

Opposition

California Association of Highway Patrolmen
California State Sheriffs' Association

Analysis Prepared by: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200

Date of Hearing: March 27, 2023

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

Laura Friedman, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1463 (

Author:Lowenthal) – As Amended Ver:March 9, 2023

SUBJECT: Automated license plate recognition systems: retention and use of information

SUMMARY: Requires a public agency end-user of an automated license plate reader (ALPR) to purge information that does not match information on a hot list, as defined, within 30 days and explicitly prohibits the selling, sharing or transferring of ALPR data with an out-of-state or federal agency without a valid subpoena, court order, or warrant. Specifically, this bill:

1. Defines “hot list” to mean a list or lists of license plates of vehicles of interest against which the ALPR system is comparing vehicles on the roadways.
2. Requires an ALPR operator to have reasonable security procedures and practices that include, but are not limited to, an annual audit to review and assess ALPR end-user searches during the previous year to determine if all searches were in compliance with the usage and privacy policy. If the ALPR operator is a public agency other than an airport authority, the audit shall assess whether all ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list has been purged no more than 30 days from the date of collection.
3. Explicitly prohibits that ALPR information shall not be sold, shared or transferred to out-of-state or federal agencies without a valid subpoena, court-order, or warrant.
4. Prohibits an ALPR operator or ALPR end-user that is a public agency, excluding an airport authority, from accessing an ALPR system that retains ALPR information that does not match information on a hot list for more than 60 days after the date of collection unless they are accessing an ALPR system operated by an airport authority.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Defines ALPR system to mean a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. “ALPR information” means information or data collected through the use of an ALPR system. “ALPR operator” means a person that operates an ALPR system, except as specified. “ALPR end-user” means a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system, except as specified. (Civil Code (CIV) 1798.90.5)
2. Requires an ALPR operator to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR operators must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (CIV 1798.90.51)
3. Requires ALPR end-users to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR end-users must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the access, use, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (CIV 1798.90.53)
4. Provides that a public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. (CIV 1798.90.55)
5. Defines a “Public agency” to mean the state, any city, county, or city and county, or any agency or political subdivision of the state or a city, county, or city and county, including, but not limited to, a law enforcement agency. (CIV 1798.90.5)
6. Authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by a license plate reader for no more than 60 days, except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence or for all felonies being investigated, including, but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnaping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alerts, and Blue Alerts. (Vehicle Code (VEH) 2413)
7. Prohibits CHP from selling license plate reader data for any purpose and from making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement officer. The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. (VEH 2413)
8. Requires CHP to monitor internal use of the license plate reader data to prevent unauthorized use. (VEH 2413)
9. Requires CHP to annually report the license plate reader practices and usage, including the number of license plate reader data disclosures, a record of the agencies to which data was disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in policy that affect privacy concerns to the Legislature. (VEH 2413(e))
10. Establishes the data breach notification law, which requires any agency, person, or business that owns, licenses, or maintains data including personal information to disclose a breach, as provided. . (CIV 1798.29 and 1798.82)

FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown

COMMENTS:

According to the author, “ALPRs are just one of the many surveillance tools police departments and anti-abortion, groups have available to them, but and are becoming one of the most powerful tools available. As states start passing laws that put bounties on a woman’s head for seeking abortions in abortion safe states and are trying to make it illegal even make that trek, not to mention the number of states that are targeting Drag queens and the trans community, California must take all precautions to preserve the identities and whereabouts of seeking refuge in our state. AB 1463 is one measure that will prevent law enforcement in cooperating with states that seek to criminalizing people seeking medically safe abortions in California.”

According to the United States Department of Justice, the Police Scientific Development Branch in the United Kingdom (U.K.) invented ALPR technology in 1976. The technology rose to prominence after Provisional Irish Republican Army terrorist bombings in the City of London that resulted in the establishment of a surveillance and security network around the city referred to as the “ring of steel” in 1993.

ALPR systems are capable of capturing information on up to 1,800 plates per minute at speeds of 120-160 miles per hour. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, ALPR systems can be mounted on stationary poles, moving police cruisers, and handheld devices. The devices log pictures of the vehicles, and their GPS coordinates. This data can be compared against “hot lists” to find vehicles that have been stolen or help find an abducted child.

Law enforcement agencies use of ALPR was prevalent across the United States by the mid-2000s. The 2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey indicated that as of 2007, 48% of law enforcement agencies with more than 1,000 sworn officers were regularly using ALPR readers, with 32% of agencies with greater than 500 officers, but less than 1,000.

California’s use of ALPRs and Legislative response: According to a 2019 Auditor report, out of the 391 law enforcement agencies in California, 230 police and sheriff departments in California currently use ALPR systems, with 36 more planning to do so. ACLU in a 2013 report indicated that law enforcement is collecting and storing ALPR images related to individuals not suspected of a crime, and that this data could be used inappropriately to monitor the movements individuals such as ex-spouses, neighbors, and other associates.

Out of increasing concern surrounding the privacy of individuals data collected through ALPR systems, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed SB 34 (Hill), Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015. According to Senator Hill at the time, “California law has not kept up with the rapid adoption of the technology. Except for the California Highway Patrol and transportation agencies, current California law doesn’t require any privacy safeguards or establish any protocols for the use of ALPR systems. Not only has the law failed to keep up with the quick adoption of ALPR, but the entities using ALPR have also been slow in crafting their own internal policies. For example, according to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, only 48% of police agencies across the country have developed policies that govern ALPR use and privacy."

SB 34 imposed a range of privacy protections on ALPR data, including requiring ALPR operators to secure information collected by ALPR systems with reasonable operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure confidentiality and integrity.

Security and privacy concerns surrounding ALPR systems have only grown since the passage of SB 34 and in 2019 the Auditor reviewed four local law enforcement agencies use of ALPR and found that these agencies were accumulating massive amounts of data unrelated to criminal investigations. Also, the Auditor found that none of the agencies they reviewed were complying with the requirements set forth in SB 34, and that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had no ALPR policy at all. The other three agencies did not completely or clearly specify who has system access, who has system oversight, or how to destroy ALPR data. For example, of the 320 million images LAPD had collected, only 400,000 generated an immediate match against a hot list.

California State Audit on ALPR users: According to the Auditor’s 2019 report, “The agencies we reviewed have few safeguards for the creation of ALPR user accounts and have also failed to audit the use of their ALPR systems. Instead of ensuring that only authorized users’ access ALPR data for appropriate purposes, the agencies have left their systems open to abuse by neglecting to institute sufficient oversight. Over the years, the media has reported that some individuals within law enforcement used or could use data systems—and sometimes ALPR systems—to obtain information about individuals for their personal use, including to locate places they regularly visit, to determine their acquaintances, and to blackmail them based on this information. ALPR systems should be accessible only to employees who need the data, and accounts should be promptly disabled otherwise. However, the agencies often neglected to limit ALPR system access and have allowed accounts that should be disabled to remain active longer than is prudent. To further ensure that individuals with access do not misuse the ALPR systems, the agencies should be auditing the license plate searches that users perform, along with conducting other monitoring activities. Instead, the agencies have conducted little to no auditing and monitoring and thus have no assurance that misuse has not occurred.”

The State Auditor recommended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) draft and make available on its website a policy template that local law enforcement agencies can use as a model for their ALPR policies, and that DOJ develop and issue guidance to help local law enforcement agencies identify and evaluate the types of data they are currently storing in their ALPR systems. It also suggests the Legislature set a requirement for when law enforcement agencies should delete ALPR data.

The California State Sheriffs Association, writing in opposition to this bill, argue “ Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects and continue to do so today. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set a data destruction timeline such as 30 days in statute will significantly hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool.”

Oakland Privacy, writing in support of this bill, argues “Assembly Bill 1463 is both timely, and somewhat overdue. In 2015, the Legislature unanimously passed AB 34 from Senator Jerry Hill which imposed policy transparency requirements and attempted to restrict out of state sharing, although it did not end the practice. In 2019, then Assembly-privacy chair Ed Chau of Monterey Park wrote a bill to purge non-evidentiary license plate scans from databases after 60 days. AB 1782 was voted out of the Assembly Judiciary and Privacy committees and passed by the full Assembly in May of 2019.3 AB 1782 was delayed in the Senate due to Senator Scott Weiner’s request to the JLAC for the California State Auditor to review ALPR use in California. The auditor’s report was released in February of 2020.

Senator Weiner’s SB 210 attempted to replicate New Hampshire’s state policy of immediate purges, and Assemblymember James Ramos’ AB 2192 attempted to explicitly authorize out of state sharing of ALPR scans. Neither bill advanced out of their respective houses. So three years after the California State Auditor declared that legislative action is necessary to protect Californian’s privacy rights, nothing has happened, and new out of state laws focused on out of state visitors seeking reproductive and gender-affirming medical care have made restrictions on sharing geolocation data critical to California’s safety net.

In just the last three years, public records requests from public interest groups showed that at least two California police departments, Pasadena and Long Beach, were sharing their license plate reader scans with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Vigilant LEARN database. 10 After the sharing became public, both agencies stated it had been a "mistake" and would cease, but such mistakes can cause deportations and family separations that cannot be undone and are in direct contradiction to Legislature's policies regarding immigration enforcement and local and state law enforcement agencies. The mistakes point to the lack of control over the geolocation data created by automated license plate readers by agencies. If it is so easy to share this data with federal immigration without an agency even knowing that it is doing it, then there are not sufficient safeguards and those lack of safeguards are putting Californians and visitors at risk.

Assembly Bill 1463 addresses these problems by minimizing the amount of geolocation data

available to be mishandled.”

Committee Comments: This bill seeks to implement the California State Auditor’s (Auditor) 2019 recommendation that the Legislature set a date in which law enforcement has to delete ALPR data. It also seeks to prevent California agencies from selling or sharing ALPR data with out-of-state agencies, something the sponsors of this bill contend is existing law, but needs clarification because various law enforcement agencies have violated this provision. For example, last year the Marin County Sheriff settled a lawsuit with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for sharing information with out-of-state and federal agencies.

Double referral: Should this bill pass this committee it will be referred to the Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection.

Previous Legislation: SB 34 (Hill), Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015 established regulations on the privacy and usage of automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) data and expands the meaning of “personal information” to include information or data collected through the use or operation of an ALPR system.

AB 2192 (Ramos of 2022) would have authorized a public agency that uses an ALPR to share the data that they collect with a law enforcement agency of the federal government or another state if the ALPR information is being sold, shared, or transferred to locate a vehicle or person reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense, except as specified. That bill passed out of this committee and was taken up in Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection for testimony only.

SB 210 (Weiner of 2022) would have required ALPR operators and end-users to conduct annual audits to review ALPR searches and require most public ALPR operators and end-users to destroy all ALPR data within 24 hours that does not match information on a “hot list.” It also would require the DOJ to make available model ALPR policies and issue guidance to local law enforcement agencies, as specified. That bill was held on suspense by Senate Appropriations Committee.

AB 1076 (Kiley of 2021) would have required the Department of Justice to draft and make available on its internet website an ALPR system policy template for local law enforcement agencies and requires that the guidance given include the necessary security requirements agencies should follow to protect the data in their ALPR systems. That bill was held on suspense by Assembly Appropriations Committee.

SB 1143 (Wiener of 2020) was largely identical to SB 210. It was held by the Senate Transportation Committee.

AB 1782 (Chau of 2019) would have required those operating ALPR systems and those accessing or using ALPR data to have policies that include procedures to ensure non-anonymized ALPR information is timely destroyed, except as specified, and that all ALPR information that is shared is anonymized. The bill was subsequently gutted and amended to address a different topic. It died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Oakland Privacy

Opposition

California State Sheriff’s Association

Analysis Prepared by: David Sforza / TRANS. / (916) 319-2093