AB 1547: Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2023-02-17
Current Status:
Failed
(2024-02-01: From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56.)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
What does this bill do?
This bill revives certain lawsuits that were barred because the time to sue had expired when the abuse was by an employee of a county juvenile probation camp or detention facility or by an employee of a youth facility run by the Division of Juvenile Justice. Those revived claims can be filed or continued in court during 2024, but claims already finally decided by a court or settled in writing before January 1, 2024 are not revived.
The summary is provided by generative AI which can make mistakes. For original language, please view the details in the table below.
Existing law requires that specified actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, as defined, be commenced within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever occurs later. Existing law prohibits certain of those actions from commencing on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault, as specified.
This bill would provide that a claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county or of a youth facility owned and operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice at the time the sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2024, because the applicable statute of limitations has expired, is revived and may proceed or be commenced within one year, as specified.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result of a cover up may recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless prohibited by another law.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
(c)An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to constitute a substantive change in negligence law.
(d)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 287 or of former Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(e)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(f)Every plaintiff 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (g).
(g)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of the practitioners knowledge of the facts and issues, that in the practitioners professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(h)If certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (f), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(i)In any action subject to subdivision (f), a defendant shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (g) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(j)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(k)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(l)In any action subject to subdivision (f), a defendant shall be named by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(m)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)If the application to name a defendant is made before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)If the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(n)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(o)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (m).
(p)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (g) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (g) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(q)Notwithstanding any other law, a claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2020. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
(r)The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that amended this subdivision in 2019 apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
(s)(1)Notwithstanding any other law, a claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county or of a youth facility owned and operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2024, solely because the applicable statute of limitation has or had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2024, or, if not filed by that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2024, and December 31, 2024.
(2)This subdivision does not revive either of the following claims:
(A)A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2024.
(B)A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2024.
(s)(t)Notwithstanding any other law, including Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 of Part 3 of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code (commencing with Section 910), a claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a), is not required to be presented to any government entity prior to the commencement of an action.
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Date
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Status
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| Feb 1, 2024 | From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56. |
| Jan 31, 2024 | Died pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 10(c) of the Constitution. |
| May 18, 2023 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| May 3, 2023 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 18, 2023 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (April 18). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 9, 2023 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 18, 2023 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 20. |
| Feb 17, 2023 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Apr 18, 2023 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
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Organization
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Position
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Date
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| Child Abuse Prevention Center | ** Support | |
| Consumer Attorney's of California | * Support | Apr 18, 2023 |
Date of Hearing: May 3, 2023
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Chris Holden, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1547
Author:(McKinnor) – As Introduced Ver:February 17, 2023
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 11 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill would suspend, for a one-year period, the statute of limitations on civil claims of childhood sexual assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp, county juvenile detention facility, or a Division of Juvenile Justice youth facility.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs to CDCR (General Fund) and counties (local funds) of an unknown but likely significant amount for litigation and settlement of claims brought under this bill. CDCR estimates potential litigation costs in the tens of millions of dollars resulting from this bill. The scope of potential county costs is unknown. Costs will depend on the number of cases filed within the revival period.
- Potential cost pressures to the courts (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to adjudicate cases that are time-barred by the current statute of limitation, but may be brought during the one-year revival period. Although this bill only revives one type of childhood sexual assault claims, the short duration of the revival period could result in a large number of cases being filed in a short period of time. A significant increase in workload to the courts could result in delays of court services and prioritization of court cases might impact access to justice, and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s Statement. According to the author:
AB 1547 will prolong the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault the chance to report any sexual abuse that occurred in facilities that fall under the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice in court before the end of 2024. This bill is needed to ensure those who have been sexually abused as children by law enforcement officers are provided a realistic opportunity to seek civil redress for their harms.
- Statute of Limitations for Childhood Sexual Assault. The statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault has been extended several times to give survivors more time to file claims based on abuse they experienced. These changes in law were made in acknowledgment that victims of childhood sexual assault often delay reporting the abuse they experienced, or that they may not even understand that they experienced abuse until well into adulthood. Most recently, AB 218 (Gonzalez) Chapter 861, Statutes of 2019, allowed a plaintiff to file a lawsuit up to 22 years after they turned 18, or within five years of when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered a psychological injury stemmed from childhood sexual assault. That bill also created a three-year revival period for any earlier claims that were otherwise barred by the existing statute of limitations. That revival period ended on January 1, 2023.
This bill creates a one-year revival period for childhood sexual assault claims based on assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp, county juvenile detention facility, or a Division of Juvenile Justice youth facility. By suspending the current statute of limitations for one year, the bill would allow a plaintiff who was the victim of sexual assault by a specified juvenile detention facility employee to file a civil lawsuit between January 1, 2024, and December 31, 2024, even if the plaintiff’s claim would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. As described above, costs associated with a one-year revival period depend on the total number of lawsuits filed during the period, which cannot be predicted. However, due to the short duration of the revival period, there may be a significant number of claims filed within a relatively short period of time, resulting in cost pressures to the entities above to litigate and adjudicate them simultaneously.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 18, 2023
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Brian Maienschein, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1547
Author:(McKinnor) – As Introduced Ver:February 17, 2023
SUBJECT: Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
KEY ISSUE: Should a time-barred claim arising out of a sexual assault at a juvenile detention facility be revived and allowed to commence between January 1, 2024, and december 31, 2024?
SYNOPSIS
In 2022 the Los Angeles Times reported on an untold number of sexual assaults committed by employees of juvenile facilities scattered throughout Los Angeles County. According to reports, hundreds of children, and perhaps many more, were sexually assaulted between the 1970s and 2019. In December of 2022, a suit representing 279 of these victims was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. At least two other lawsuits, albeit with fewer plaintiffs, were filed earlier in 2022. Because many of the assaults occurred many years ago, the suit took advantage of AB 218 (Chap. 861, Stats. 2019), which extended the then-existing statute of limitations (SOL) and also created a three-year window to revive otherwise time-barred clams. That three year window closed on December 31, 2022. However, not all of the victims of this abuse were included in the lawsuits filed in 2022.
This narrowly-tailored bill would create a one-year revival period, but only for victims whose assaults occurred when they were held in a state or county-operated juvenile detention facility. Earlier this session, the Committee heard and passed AB 452, which would eliminate the SOL for actions alleging childhood sexual assaults; but that bill applies to assaults occurring after January 1, 2024. As reported in the Times series, many of the young people who suffered assaults lacked the knowledge, understanding, or resources to seek legal recourse for their injuries at the time or within then-existing SOLs. This bill opens a one-year window for those youths who were victimized by the employees of juvenile facilities but who were not, for various reasons, able to join the pending lawsuits filed in 2022. The bill will not have any effect on those pending lawsuits, which were revived under the provisions of AB 218. The bill is supported by the Child Abuse Prevention Center and the Consumer Attorneys of California. There is no opposition to this bill.
SUMMARY: Provides that a claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile detention facility, as described, that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2024, is revived and may proceed or be commenced until December 31, 2024. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that a claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county or of a youth facility owned and operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred by applicable statutes of limitation, is revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2024, or, if not filed by that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2024, and December 31, 2024.
- Specifies that the revival described in 1) above does not revive either of the following:
- A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2024.
- A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2024.
EXISTING LAW:
- Requires an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault to commence within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
- An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
- An action against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity legally caused the childhood sexual assault.
- An action against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity legally caused the childhood sexual assault.
- Specifies that an action described in b) or c) above shall not commence on or after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday unless the defendant person or entity knew or had reason to know that conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent that created risk of childhood sexual assault, or the person or entity failed to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid childhood sexual assault. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: According to the author, “AB 1547 will prolong the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault the chance to report any sexual abuse that occurred in facilities that fall under the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice in court before the end of 2024. This bill is needed to ensure those who have been sexually abused as children by law enforcement officers are provided a realistic opportunity to seek civil redress for their harms.”
The purpose of SOLs and their evolving application to actions alleging childhood sexual assault. Unless there is a statute providing otherwise, the time for bringing a tort action is two years after the injury occurs or, depending upon the type of injury, two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. Statutes of limitation reflect the reality that, over time, evidence is lost or destroyed and witnesses’ memories fade. However, current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often delay coming forward for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, lack of trust, fear, or some combination thereof. Indeed, child victims may not even understand what has happened to them, let alone know of their right to take timely legal action. Recognizing this, several states have already eliminated SOLs for childhood sexual assault. According to the Child USA online tracker, 15 states and two U.S. territories have already eliminated SOLs for civil actions alleging sexual assault of a child, and 33 states (including California) have such bills pending. (See Child USA, National Overview of Statute of Limitations for Child Sex Abuse: 2023 SOL Reform Legislation and Best Current Civil and Criminal SOLs, at https//www.childusa.org, last visited March 17, 2023.) Last year, President Biden signed the “Eliminating Limits to Justice for Child Sex Abuse Victims Act of 2022,” which eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault cases brought in federal court. Previously such federal actions were subject to a 10-year limitations period. (18 U.S.C. Section 2255.)
California has long recognized the unique problem that SOLs create in childhood sexual assault cases. The state’s existing SOL for childhood sexual abuse has been amended several times. For example, SB 108 (Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990) provided that actions for childhood sexual abuse could be brought within eight years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years of age), or within three years of the date when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness they are experiencing in adulthood was caused by childhood sexual abuse. This statute has also been amended multiple times as it applies to third parties that might have a duty of care to the plaintiff, such as a school. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties had to be commenced within a year of the plaintiff’s 18th birthday. AB 1651 (Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998) made the time to commence actions against third parties the same as actions against abusers, so long as the suits were commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. In 2002, in response to revelations about abuse in the Catholic Church, SB 1179 (Chap. 149, Stats. 2002) amended the law yet again to allow delayed-discovery suits against third parties, at least in certain circumstances, to be brought beyond the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. Most recently, AB 218 (Chap. 861, Stats. 2019) extended the SOL for such actions by another fourteen years, from eight to 22 years after the age of majority, or typically from 26 to 40 years of age, and extended the delayed discovery provision from three to five years. AB 218 also created a three-year revival period for any lapsed case not litigated to finality before the bill's enactment. Earlier this year, this Committee heard AB 452, which, if enacted, will eliminate the SOL for childhood sexual assault going forward.
This bill will effectively add an additional year, until December 31, 2024, for childhood victims who were assaulted by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county, or an employee of a youth facility owned and operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice, if the action would otherwise be barred solely because the applicable SOL has expired. The bill, therefore, would permit a cause of action to proceed if it is already pending in court on January 1, 2024, or, if not filed by that date, will be commenced between January 1 and December 31, 2024.
A “culture of child abuse” and the need for a narrowly tailored revival of claims. In 2022 the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles detailing an appalling pattern of sexual assaults committed by employees of juvenile detention facilities in Los Angeles County. According to the Times reporting, hundreds of children, and perhaps more, were assaulted between the 1970s and 2019. In December of 2022, a lawsuit representing 279 of these victims was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. Lawsuits filed earlier in 2022 include the allegations of 70 women who, as girls, were sexually assaulted at a handful of juvenile camps in Los Angeles County between 1985 and 2019. Some of the women alleged that they had been abused by more than one employee and on multiple occasions, and many of the employees named were accused by multiple plaintiffs. A former sex-crimes prosecutor claimed that the “Los Angeles County juvenile probation system has been infested with a culture of child abuse for decades.”
In recent years, as noted above, the Legislature has repeatedly found that SOLs create a bar to justice when it comes to childhood sexual abuse. Nevertheless, we know that many people who were assaulted as children in juvenile detention centers did not join the recent suit taking advantage of the AB 218 revival window. Children do not always identify what happened to them as sexual assault, and even when they do, they are relatively powerlessness to seek a legal remedy on their own. In addition to these reasons, which apply to all cases of childhood sexual assault, the argument for creating a one-year revival window restricted to assaults that occurred in a juvenile detention facility is especially compelling. As the Los Angeles Times series makes clear, children in juvenile detention are especially vulnerable. Not only was the abuse perpetrated by people who were supposed to protect them, it was carried out by people who exercised considerable power over the children. The conditions described in the pending lawsuits show that juvenile parole officers and other employees used their position of authority to offer combination of threats and favors to force children to perform sexual acts. Moreover, especially in the case of parole officers, employees of the juvenile justice system continue to exercise power over the children even after they have been released. Many children may have believed, rightly or wrongly, that if they reported their abusers they might end up back in juvenile detention. Finally, the case of children abused in juvenile detention is strong because the children often did not have the supportive families or resources that might have aided them in seeking justice through the legal system.
This narrowly tailored bill creates a one-year revival period, restricted only to childhood sexual assaults that occurred in a county- or state-operated juvenile detention facility, including so-called juvenile “camps” where much of the abuse occurred. The Los Angeles Times articles have raised awareness about the patterns, and it is quite possible that survivors who did not come forward in time to join the suits filed before December 31, 2022, will take advantage of this one-year window to seek belated justice.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the Consumer Attorneys of California (CAOC), “the emotional trauma following sexual assault does not present the same in all survivors and may lead to a delay in seeking medical or legal assistance.” Minors, in particular, “may not define victimization as rape or sexual assault for many reasons such as self-blame, embarrassment, not clearly understanding the legal definition of the terms, or not wanting to define someone they know who victimized them as a rapist or because others blame them for their sexual assault.” This is especially true when “the perpetrator is someone they trusted.” While previous legislation has addressed the general problems created by SOLs in child sexual assault cases, CAOC notes that juvenile survivors, that AB 1547 seeks to help, “were in tragically unique circumstances [and] could not escape the reach and awesome power of the person whose conduct serves as the basis of the action.” AB 1547, CAOCC concludes, “will prolong the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault arising out of an assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility their day in court. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice before the end of 2024.”
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Child Abuse Prevention Center
Consumer Attorneys of California
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by: Tom Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):