AB 2693: Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2024-09-04
Current Status:
Failed
(2024-09-29: Vetoed by Governor.)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law provides that there is no statute of limitations for actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, as defined, that occurred on or after January 1, 2024. For actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault that occurred on or before December 31, 2023, existing law provides that the time of commencement of the action shall be later of within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the date of majority, or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault.
Existing law generally limits the liability of a public entity for injuries to or proximately caused by prisoners or patients of mental institutions.
This bill would, notwithstanding any other law, revive claims for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, by the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or other time limit, as specified. The bill would provide that the limitations on liability described above do not apply to these claims.
Existing law provides that there is no statute of limitations for actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, as defined, that occurred on or after January 1, 2024. For actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault that occurred on or before December 31, 2023, existing law provides that the time of commencement of the action shall be later of within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the date of majority, or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault.
Existing law limits the liability of a school district, charter school, or the state for injury, accident, illness or death occurring during or by reason of a field trip or excursion. Existing law also generally limits the liability of a public entity for injuries to or proximately caused by prisoners or patients of mental institutions.
This bill would, notwithstanding any other law, revive claims for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, by the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or other time limit, as specified. The bill would provide that the limitations on liability described above do not apply to these claims.
Existing law provides that there is no statute of limitations for actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, as defined, that occurred on or after January 1, 2024. For actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault that occurred on or before December 31, 2023, existing law provides that the time of commencement of the action shall be later of within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the date of majority, or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault.
Existing law limits the liability of a school district, charter school, or the state for injury, accident, illness or death occurring during or by reason of a field trip or excursion. Existing law also generally limits the liability of a public entity for injuries to or proximately caused by prisoners or patients of mental institutions.
This bill would, notwithstanding any other law, revive claims for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, by the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or other time limit, as specified. The bill would provide that the limitations on liability described above do not apply to these claims.
(a)(1)Notwithstanding any other law, including Section 340.11, an action for recovery of the types described in paragraphs (1) to (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
(2)This subdivision does not revive either of the following claims:
(A)A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
(B)A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, Section 844.6 or 854.8 of the Government Code do not apply to any claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a sexual assault described in subdivision (a). This subdivision is retroactive and applies to any action commenced on or after the date of the enactment of the act adding this subdivision, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 844.6 of the Government Code is amended to read:844.6.(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section, in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, in Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for:
(1)An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
(2)An injury to any prisoner.
(b)Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.
(c)Except for an injury to a prisoner, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part.
(d)Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by the employees negligent or wrongful act or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of their employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.
SEC. 3.Section 854.8 of the Government Code is amended to read:854.8.(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section, Sections 814, 814.2, 855, and 855.2, and Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a public entity is not liable for:
(1)An injury proximately caused by a patient of a mental institution.
(2)An injury to an inpatient of a mental institution.
(b)Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.
(c)Except for an injury to an inpatient of a mental institution, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part.
(d)Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by the employees negligent or wrongful act or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of their employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.
(a)(1)Notwithstanding any other law, including Section 340.11, an action for recovery of the types described in paragraphs (1) to (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
(2)This subdivision does not revive either of the following claims:
(A)A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
(B)A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, Section 35330 of the Education Code and Section 844.6 or 854.8 of the Government Code do not apply to any claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a sexual assault described in subdivision (a). This subdivision is retroactive and applies to any action commenced on or after the date of the enactment of the act adding this subdivision, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 35330 of the Education Code is amended to read:35330.(a)The governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of schools of a county may:(1)Conduct field trips or excursions in connection with courses of instruction or school-related social, educational, cultural, athletic, or school band activities to and from places in the state, any other state, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country for pupils enrolled in elementary or secondary schools. A field trip or excursion to and from a foreign country may be permitted to familiarize pupils with the language, history, geography, natural sciences, and other studies relative to the districts course of study for pupils.(2)Engage instructors, supervisors, and other personnel to contribute their services over and above the normal period for which they are employed by the district, if necessary, and provide equipment and supplies for the field trip or excursion.(3)Transport by use of district equipment, contract to provide transportation, or arrange transportation by the use of other equipment, of pupils, instructors, supervisors, or other personnel to and from places in the state, another state, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country where those excursions and field trips are being conducted, provided that, when district equipment is used, the governing board shall secure liability insurance, and if travel is to and from a foreign country, liability insurance shall be secured from a carrier licensed to transact insurance business in the foreign country.(4)Provide supervision of pupils involved in field trips or excursions by certificated employees of the district.(b)(1)A pupil shall not be prevented from making the field trip or excursion because of lack of sufficient funds. To this end, the governing board shall coordinate efforts of community service groups to supply funds for pupils in need.(2)A group shall not be authorized to take a field trip or excursion authorized by this section if a pupil who is a member of an identifiable group will be excluded from participation in the field trip or excursion because of lack of sufficient funds.(c)(1)The attendance or participation of a pupil in a field trip or excursion authorized by this section shall be considered attendance for the purpose of crediting attendance for apportionments from the State School Fund in the fiscal year. Credited attendance resulting from a field trip or excursion shall be limited to the amount of attendance that would have accrued had the pupils not been engaged in the field trip or excursion.(2)Credited attendance shall not exceed 10 schooldays except in the case of pupils participating in a field trip or excursion in connection with courses of instruction, or school-related educational activities, and that are not social, cultural, athletic, or school band activities.(d)(1)All persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have waived all claims against the district, a charter school, or the State of California for injury, accident, illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion. All adults taking out-of-state field trips or excursions and all parents or guardians of pupils taking out-of-state field trips or excursions shall sign a statement waiving all claims.(2)Paragraph (1) shall not apply to claims made pursuant to Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure.(e)Transportation allowances shall not be made by the Superintendent for expenses incurred with respect to field trips or excursions that have an out-of-state destination. A school district that transports pupils, teachers, or other employees of the school district in schoolbuses within the state and to destinations within the state, pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall report to the Superintendent on forms prescribed by the Superintendent the total mileage of schoolbuses used in connection with educational excursions. In computing the allowance to a school district for regular transportation there shall be deducted from that allowance an amount equal to the depreciation of schoolbuses used for the transportation in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Superintendent.SEC. 3.SEC. 2.Section 844.6 of the Government Code is amended to read:844.6.(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section, in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, in Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for:
(1)An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
(2)An injury to any prisoner.
(b)Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.
(c)Except for an injury to a prisoner, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part.
(d)Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by the employees negligent or wrongful act or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of their employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.
SEC. 4.SEC. 3.Section 854.8 of the Government Code is amended to read:854.8.(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section, Sections 814, 814.2, 855, and 855.2, and Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a public entity is not liable for:
(1)An injury proximately caused by a patient of a mental institution.
(2)An injury to an inpatient of a mental institution.
(b)Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.
(c)Except for an injury to an inpatient of a mental institution, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part.
(d)Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by the employees negligent or wrongful act or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of their employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.
(a)(1)Notwithstanding any other law, including Section 340.11, an action for recovery of the types described in paragraphs (1) to (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
(2)This subdivision does not revive either of the following claims:
(A)A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
(B)A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, Section 35330 of the Education Code and Section 844.6 or 854.8 of the Government Code do not apply to any claim seeking to recover damages arising out of a sexual assault described in subdivision (a). This subdivision is retroactive and applies to any action commenced on or after the date of the enactment of the act adding this subdivision, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 35330 of the Education Code is amended to read:35330.(a)The governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of schools of a county may:
(1)Conduct field trips or excursions in connection with courses of instruction or school-related social, educational, cultural, athletic, or school band activities to and from places in the state, any other state, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country for pupils enrolled in elementary or secondary schools. A field trip or excursion to and from a foreign country may be permitted to familiarize pupils with the language, history, geography, natural sciences, and other studies relative to the districts course of study for pupils.
(2)Engage instructors, supervisors, and other personnel to contribute their services over and above the normal period for which they are employed by the district, if necessary, and provide equipment and supplies for the field trip or excursion.
(3)Transport by use of district equipment, contract to provide transportation, or arrange transportation by the use of other equipment, of pupils, instructors, supervisors, or other personnel to and from places in the state, another state, the District of Columbia, or a foreign country where those excursions and field trips are being conducted, provided that, when district equipment is used, the governing board shall secure liability insurance, and if travel is to and from a foreign country, liability insurance shall be secured from a carrier licensed to transact insurance business in the foreign country.
(4)Provide supervision of pupils involved in field trips or excursions by certificated employees of the district.
(b)(1)A pupil shall not be prevented from making the field trip or excursion because of lack of sufficient funds. To this end, the governing board shall coordinate efforts of community service groups to supply funds for pupils in need.
(2)A group shall not be authorized to take a field trip or excursion authorized by this section if a pupil who is a member of an identifiable group will be excluded from participation in the field trip or excursion because of lack of sufficient funds.
(c)(1)The attendance or participation of a pupil in a field trip or excursion authorized by this section shall be considered attendance for the purpose of crediting attendance for apportionments from the State School Fund in the fiscal year. Credited attendance resulting from a field trip or excursion shall be limited to the amount of attendance that would have accrued had the pupils not been engaged in the field trip or excursion.
(2)Credited attendance shall not exceed 10 schooldays except in the case of pupils participating in a field trip or excursion in connection with courses of instruction, or school-related educational activities, and that are not social, cultural, athletic, or school band activities.
(d)(1)All persons making the field trip or excursion shall be deemed to have waived all claims against the district, a charter school, or the State of California for injury, accident, illness, or death occurring during or by reason of the field trip or excursion. All adults taking out-of-state field trips or excursions and all parents or guardians of pupils taking out-of-state field trips or excursions shall sign a statement waiving all claims.
(2)Paragraph (1) shall not apply to claims made pursuant to Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(e)Transportation allowances shall not be made by the Superintendent for expenses incurred with respect to field trips or excursions that have an out-of-state destination. A school district that transports pupils, teachers, or other employees of the school district in schoolbuses within the state and to destinations within the state, pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall report to the Superintendent on forms prescribed by him or her the Superintendent the total mileage of schoolbuses used in connection with educational excursions. In computing the allowance to a school district for regular transportation there shall be deducted from that allowance an amount equal to the depreciation of schoolbuses used for the transportation in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Superintendent.
SEC. 3.Section 844.6 of the Government Code is amended to read:844.6.(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section and section, in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, or in Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for:
(1)An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
(2)An injury to any prisoner.
(b)Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.
(c)Except for an injury to a prisoner, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part.
(d)Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his the employees negligent or wrongful act or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of his their employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.
SEC. 4.Section 854.8 of the Government Code is amended to read:854.8.(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section and in section, Sections 814, 814.2, 855, and 855.2, and Section 340.12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a public entity is not liable for:
(1)An injury proximately caused by a patient of a mental institution.
(2)An injury to an inpatient of a mental institution.
(b)Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code.
(c)Except for an injury to an inpatient of a mental institution, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part.
(d)Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his the employees negligent or wrongful act or omission. The public entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement, or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in the scope of his their employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has agreed.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 29, 2024 | Vetoed by Governor. |
| Sep 11, 2024 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4 p.m. |
| Aug 30, 2024 | In Assembly. Ordered to Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 30, 2024 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0.). |
| Aug 19, 2024 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 15, 2024 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 5. Noes 1.) (August 15). |
| Jul 1, 2024 | In committee: Referred to suspense file. |
| Jun 19, 2024 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 10. Noes 0.) (June 18). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 5, 2024 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and APPR. |
| May 23, 2024 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 22, 2024 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 70. Noes 0. Page 5498.) |
| May 20, 2024 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 16, 2024 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (May 16). |
| May 8, 2024 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| May 1, 2024 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (April 30). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 4, 2024 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 3, 2024 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 4, 2024 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 15, 2024 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 16. |
| Feb 14, 2024 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 30, 2024 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB2693 Wicks By Menjivar | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 15, 2024 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 1, 2024 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 18, 2024 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| May 22, 2024 | AB 2693 Wicks Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 16, 2024 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 30, 2024 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Advocates for Peace and Urban Unity | * Support | Jun 18, 2024 |
| California Association Of Marriage And Family Therapists | ** Support | |
| Child Abuse Prevention Center | ** Support | |
| Children'S Law Center Of California | ** Support | |
| Consumers Attorneys of California | * Support | Jun 18, 2024 |
| County Of Los Angeles | * Against | Jun 18, 2024 |
| County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors | ** Against | |
| Crime Survivors for Safety and Justice | ** Support | |
| Initiate Justice | * Support | Jun 18, 2024 |
| John Burton Advocates for Youth | ** Support | |
| Just Detention International | ** Support | |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Support | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| Perk Advocacy | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Board of Supervisors | * Support | Jun 18, 2024 |
| Smart Justice California | ** Support | |
| Valorus | ** Support | |
| Young Women's Freedom Center | ** Support |
GOVERNOR'S VETO
GV Bill Id:AB 2693
Author:(Wicks)
As Enrolled Ver:September 4, 2024
2/3 vote
SUMMARY
Permits an otherwise time-barred action alleging childhood sexual assault occurring at a county juvenile detention facility to proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
Major Provisions
- Provides that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned or operated by a county at the time the assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because of the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit has expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
- Specifies that these provisions do not revive either of the following claims:
- A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
- A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
- Clarifies that these provisions do not apply to an injury caused by another prisoner or a patient of a mental institution, as specified.
Governor's Veto Message
This bill would revive, for a one-year period, claims for childhood sexual assault committed by employees of county juvenile probation camps and detention facilities that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
I previously signed Assembly Bill 218 (Gonzalez, 2019), which revived expired childhood sexual assault claims for a three-year period that began on January l, 2020, and ended on December 31, 2022. As a result, thousands of individuals were able to file suit for the alleged harm they suffered as children.
Last year, I signed Assembly Bill 452 (Addis, 2023), which eliminated the civil statute of limitations for incidents of childhood sexual assault that occur on or after January l, 2024. That measure was meant to ensure, among other things, that all public and private entities take proactive steps to prevent children from being assaulted, quickly respond to reports of employee misconduct, and maintain records documenting their handling of these incidents.
I deeply appreciate the intent of this bill and the importance of providing victims of childhood sexual assault a path to pursue justice. That is why I supported the important legislation referenced above, through which California provided all victims of childhood sexual assault with lapsed claims a three-year window to revive those claims and has eliminated the limitations period for such claims going forward.
However, I am concerned that again reviving the statute of limitations for these individuals, even for one year, will invite future legislation seeking to revive claims for other affected groups, both in the immediate future and in the years beyond. Statutes of limitations recognize that, as time passes, physical and documentary evidence may be lost and witnesses may die, no longer remember key facts, or otherwise no longer be available to testify, potentially prejudicing the ability of a party to present its case in court. Institutional employers are now on notice that childhood sexual assault claims are not subject to statutes of limitations going forward. But, having recently provided a three-year window for all victims of past abuse to bring claims, I am concerned that immediately reopening the claims period establishes a precedent for perpetually reopening claims periods for claims well in the past, for which key evidence may have been lost or no longer available.
COMMENTS
The purpose of statutes of limitation (SOLs) and their evolving application to actions alleging childhood sexual assault. Unless there is a statute providing otherwise, the time for bringing a tort action is two years after the injury occurs or, depending upon the type of injury, two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. SOLs reflect the reality that, over time, evidence is lost or destroyed and witnesses' memories fade. However, current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often delay coming forward for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, lack of trust, fear, or some combination thereof. Indeed, child victims may not even understand what has happened to them, let alone know of their right to take timely legal action. Recognizing this, several states have already eliminated SOLs for childhood sexual assault. Two years ago, President Biden signed the "Eliminating Limits to Justice for Child Sex Abuse Victims Act of 2022," which eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault cases brought in federal court. Previously such federal actions were subject to a 10-year limitations period. (18 U.S.C. Section 2255.)
California has long recognized the unique problem that SOLs create in childhood sexual assault cases. The state's existing SOL for childhood sexual abuse has been amended several times. For example, SB 108 Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990 provided that actions for childhood sexual abuse could be brought within eight years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years of age), or within three years of the date when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness they are experiencing in adulthood was caused by childhood sexual abuse. This statute has also been amended multiple times as it applies to third parties that might have a duty of care to the plaintiff, such as a school. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties had to be commenced within a year of the plaintiff's 18th birthday. AB 1651 (Ortiz) Chapter 1032, Statutes of 1998 made the time to commence actions against third parties the same as actions against abusers, so long as the suits were commenced before the plaintiff's 26th birthday. In 2002, in response to revelations about abuse in the Catholic Church, SB 1179 (Burton) Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002 amended the law yet again to allow delayed-discovery suits against third parties, at least in certain circumstances, to be brought beyond the plaintiff's 26th birthday. In 2019, AB 218 (Gonzalez) Chapter 861, Statutes of 2019 extended the SOL for such actions by another fourteen years, from eight to 22 years after the age of majority, or typically from 26 to 40 years of age, and extended the delayed discovery provision from three to five years. AB 218 also created a three-year revival period for any lapsed case not litigated to finality before the bill's enactment. Last year's AB 452 (Addis) Chapter 655, Statutes of 2023 abandoned the piecemeal extensions of the past and simply eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault altogether. However, AB 452 only applied to actions arising on or after January 1, 2024, leaving some children who were abused to fall through the cracks and never have their cases heard on the merits.
This bill seeks to address the needs of a particularly vulnerable group not protected by AB 452 or elsewhere in existing law. It does so by effectively opening a one year period, until December 31, 2025, for childhood victims who were assaulted by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county to file their claims. This will allow children to bring an action, even if it would be otherwise barred because the applicable SOL has expired. The bill, therefore, would permit a cause of action to proceed if it is already pending in court on January 1, 2025, or, if not filed by that date, commenced between January 1, 2025 and December 31, 2025.
A "culture of child abuse" and the need for a narrowly tailored revival of claims. In 2022, the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles detailing an appalling pattern of sexual assaults committed by employees of juvenile detention facilities in Los Angeles County. According to the Times reporting, hundreds of children, and perhaps more, were assaulted between the 1970s and 2019. In December of 2022, a lawsuit representing 279 of these victims was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. Lawsuits filed earlier in 2022 include the allegations of 70 women who, as girls, were sexually assaulted at a handful of juvenile camps in Los Angeles County between 1985 and 2019. Some of the women alleged that they had been abused by more than one employee and on multiple occasions, and many of the employees named were accused by multiple plaintiffs. A former sex-crimes prosecutor claimed that the "Los Angeles County juvenile probation system has been infested with a culture of child abuse for decades."
In recent years, as noted above, the Legislature has repeatedly found that SOLs create a bar to justice when it comes to childhood sexual abuse. Nevertheless, we know that many people who were assaulted as children in juvenile detention centers did not join the recent suit taking advantage of the AB 218 revival window. Children do not always identify what happened to them as sexual assault, and even when they do, they are relatively powerlessness to seek a legal remedy on their own. In addition to these reasons, which apply to all cases of childhood sexual assault, the argument for creating a one-year revival window restricted to assaults that occurred in a juvenile detention facility is especially compelling. As the Los Angeles Times series makes clear, children in juvenile detention are especially vulnerable. Not only was the abuse perpetrated by people who were supposed to protect them, it was carried out by people who exercised considerable power over the children. The conditions described in the pending lawsuits show that juvenile parole officers and other employees used their position of authority to offer combination of threats and favors to force children to perform sexual acts. Moreover, especially in the case of parole officers, employees of the juvenile justice system continue to exercise power over the children even after they have been released. Many children may have believed, rightly or wrongly, that if they reported their abusers they might end up back in juvenile detention. Finally, the case for granting an extension to children abused in juvenile detention is strong because the children often did not have the supportive families or resources that might have aided them in seeking justice through the legal system.
This narrowly tailored bill creates a one-year revival period, restricted only to childhood sexual assaults that occurred in a county-run juvenile detention facility, including so-called juvenile "camps" where much of the abuse occurred. The Los Angeles Times articles have raised awareness about the patterns, and it is quite possible that survivors who did not come forward in time to join the suits filed before December 31, 2022, will take advantage of this one-year window to seek belated justice.
According to the Author
According to the author, this measure "will prolong the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault the chance to report any sexual abuse that occurred in a juvenile probation camp or detention facilities owned and operated by a county the ability to file a claim. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice in court before the end of 2025. This bill is needed to ensure those who have been sexually abused as children by law enforcement officers and juvenile probation camp staff are provided a realistic opportunity to seek civil redress for their harm."
Arguments in Support
The Children's Law Center of California (CLC), mirroring the views of many other supporters, points out:
Emotional trauma following sexual assault does not present the same in all survivors and may lead to a delay in seeking medical or legal assistance. They may not define a victimization as a rape or sexual assault for many reasons such as self-blame, embarrassment, not clearly understanding the legal definition of the terms, or not wanting to define someone they know who victimized them as a rapist or because others blame them for their sexual assault2. When the perpetrator is someone, they trusted, it can take years for victims even to identify what happened to them as a violation. Furthermore, the survivors AB 2963 seeks to help were in tragically unique circumstances. They could not escape the reach and awesome power of the person whose conduct serves as the basis of the action.
The time a survivor needs to process and recover from their assault, enough to engage with the legal system, can take years and even decades, certainly longer than currently allowable for many survivors to seek civil restitution. We should not require vulnerable people who have already been sexually assaulted by law enforcement to overcome trauma of their assaults and the officers' powerful authority as a pre-condition to them seeking compensation for their life-altering ordeal.
AB 2693 will revive the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault arising out of an assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county their day in court. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice before the end of 2025.
Arguments in Opposition
No opposition on file.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriation analysis, potentially significant cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts to adjudicate cases that are time-barred by the current statute of limitation, but may be brought during the one-year revival period. Although this bill only revives one type of childhood sexual assault claim, the short duration of the revival period could result in a large number of cases being filed in a short period of time. A significant increase in workload to the courts could result in delays of court services and prioritization of court cases might impact access to justice, and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.
The Governor's 2024-25 budget proposes $83.1 million ongoing from the General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund. According to the Legislative Analyst's Office, the General Fund faces a structural deficit in the tens of billions of dollars over the next several fiscal years.
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 11-0-1
YES: Kalra, Dixon, Bauer-Kahan, Bryan, Connolly, Haney, Maienschein, McKinnor, Pacheco, Reyes, Sanchez
ABS, ABST OR NV: Essayli
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 15-0-0
YES: Wicks, Sanchez, Arambula, Bryan, Calderon, Wendy Carrillo, Dixon, Mike Fong, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Jim Patterson, Pellerin, Ta, Villapudua
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 70-0-10
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Juan Carrillo, Wendy Carrillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Mike Fong, Vince Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Lee, Low, Lowenthal, Maienschein, McCarty, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Stephanie Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Jim Patterson, Joe Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Rendon, Reyes, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Santiago, Schiavo, Soria, Ta, Ting, Valencia, Villapudua, Waldron, Wallis, Ward, Weber, Wicks, Wilson, Wood, Zbur, Robert Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Calderon, Cervantes, Megan Dahle, Essayli, Flora, Friedman, Gallagher, Holden, Mathis, Luz Rivas
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Ashby, Atkins, Becker, Blakespear, Bradford, Caballero, Cortese, Dodd, Durazo, Eggman, Glazer, Gonzalez, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, Menjivar, Min, Newman, Nguyen, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Seyarto, Skinner, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dahle
UPDATED
VERSION: September 4, 2024
CONSULTANT: Tom Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0005159
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 2693 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 2693
Author: Wicks (D)
Amended: 4/3/24 in Assembly
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 10-0, 6/18/24
AYES: Umberg, Wilk, Allen, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Niello, Roth, Stern, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Laird
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-1, 8/15/24
AYES: Caballero, Ashby, Becker, Seyarto, Wahab
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bradford
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 70-0, 5/22/24 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill revives otherwise expired claims for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, there is no time limit for the commencement of any of the following actions:
- An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault;
- An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; or
- An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(a).)
- Authorizes a person who is sexually assaulted and proves it was the result of a cover up to recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless prohibited by another law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(b).)
- Provides that claims pursuant to Section 340.1 are not required to be presented to any government entity prior to the commencement of an action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(q).)
- Provides that, except as specified, a public entity is not liable for an injury proximately caused by or to any prisoner or patient in a mental institution. (Gov. Code §§ 844.6, 854.8.)
This bill:
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, an action for recovery of the types described in Section 340.1 for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
- Provides that the above revival does not apply to a claim that has been litigated to finality or that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
- Exempts the above revived claims from claims presentation requirements and public entity immunity provisions.
Background
The past decades have brought waves of revelations of long covered up sexual abuse by major institutions in this country, from the Catholic Church to United States Gymnastics to the Boy Scouts. California has repeatedly bolstered its law providing a cause of action for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault. This has involved expanding the conduct that is included, extending the relevant statute of limitations, eliminating that statute of limitations, and providing revival periods for expired claims.
Many of these changes reveal an appreciation for the especially acute trauma child survivors of this sexual assault experience. Scientific research and studies make clear that many victims of these crimes repress memories of their assault or are incredibly fearful of reporting it. It is therefore not surprising that childhood sexual assault is grossly underreported. Making matters worse, many of the institutions where the crimes have occurred have played a role in covering up the sexual assaults and failing to prevent further damage.
This author-sponsored bill addresses well-documented abuse in county probation camps and detention facilities for children by reviving claims for childhood sexual assault committed by employees of these facilities and bypassing the attendant government claims presentation timelines. This bill is supported by a variety of groups, including Smart Justice. It is opposed by the County of Los Angeles.
Comments
According to the author:
This narrowly tailored bill will [bring] justice to a group of particularly vulnerable children who endured sexual assault while held in county juvenile probation camps or detention facilities. The need for this bill was starkly illustrated by a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times in 2022 and most recent in April by ABC national news. Many of the victims identified in the stories were able to use the three-year revival window created by AB 218 by joining lawsuits filed before the window closed, but many did not meet this deadline. AB 2693 will open up the window again for one year and give these victims of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county the ability to file a claim. With this extension, these survivors will have an opportunity to seek justice in court by the end of 2025.
This bill responds to claims related to widespread sexual abuse and assault at county juvenile camps and detention facilities:
For five decades, boys and girls in Los Angeles County juvenile camps and detention halls have suffered repeated sexual assaults at the hands of probation and detention officers, according to a lawsuit filed by nearly 300 former detainees.
Page after page of the 359-page lawsuit filed Dec. 20 details allegations of systemic failures and horrific scenes of sexual abuse that lawyers say went unchecked by the L.A. County Probation Department, which operates the camps and halls.
Attorneys for the 279 plaintiffs say some of the boys and girls were victimized by more than one officer, and some officers are accused of being serial abusers, repeatedly finding new victims among those sent to the facilities over the years.
The lawsuit states that not only were the plaintiffs minors, but they also were incarcerated, which marks the abuse under the “color of authority.”
The alleged assaults, dating from the 1970s through 2018, spanned a wide swath of L.A. County’s once-vast and now mostly closed juvenile hall system, including Camp Scott and Camp Kenyon Scudder — girls facilities; the Challenger Memorial Youth Center; and the Los Padrinos, Central and Barry J. Nidorf juvenile halls.
County officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment.[1]
Among other things, AB 218 (Gonzalez, Ch. 861, Stats. 2019) provided a three-year window in which expired childhood sexual assault claims were revived. Many of the victims of these facilities were able to take advantage of this revival period even though their claims had expired. However, many survivors of this alleged systematic abuse were not able to take advantage of that window. As stated, there is currently no statute of limitations period for childhood sexual assault claims, but these expired claims do not benefit from that prospective change.
This bill provides that actions for the types of claims provided for in Section 340.1(a) for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because an applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is explicitly revived by the bill. This bill creates a one-year window in which such claims can be brought. As with previous revival periods, this does not apply to claims litigated to finality or compromised by a written settlement before 2025. Given that the section newly created by this bill does not specify that the damages provided for in Section 340.1 are also available, it is unlikely that the treble damages specified in Section 340.1(b) are recoverable in connection with these revived claims.[2]
The California Supreme Court has squarely addressed the modification of statutes of limitations and the revival of stale claims:
The Legislature has authority to establish—and to enlarge—limitations periods. . . . [H]owever, legislative enlargement of a limitations period does not revive lapsed claims in the absence of express language of revival. This rule of construction grows out of an understanding of the difference between prospective and retroactive application of statutes. . . . As long as the former limitations period has not expired, an enlarged limitations period ordinarily applies and is said to apply prospectively to govern cases that are pending when, or instituted after, the enactment took effect. This is true even though the underlying conduct that is the subject of the litigation occurred prior to the new enactment. . . . However, when it comes to applying amendments that enlarge the limitations period to claims as to which the limitations period has expired before the amendment became law—that is, claims that have lapsed—the analysis is different. Once a claim has lapsed (under the formerly applicable statute of limitations), revival of the claim is seen as a retroactive application of the law under an enlarged statute of limitations. Lapsed claims will not be considered revived without express language of revival.[3]
The court continues, specifically addressing the policy reasons against revival:
“The reason for this rule is a judicial perception of unfairness in reviving a cause after the prospective defendant has assumed its expiration and has conducted his affairs accordingly.” As one court commented, “a statute of limitations grants prospective defendants relief from the burdens of indefinite exposure to stale claims. By reviving lapsed claims, the Legislature may appear to renege on this promise. As Judge [Learned] Hand wrote, there may be something ‘unfair and dishonest’ in after-the-fact withdrawal of this legislative assurance of safety.” Individuals, as well as businesses and other enterprises ordinarily rely upon the running of the limitations period: “The keeping of records, the maintenance of reserves, and the commitment of funds may all be affected by such reliance . . . . To defeat such reliance . . . deprives [enterprises] of the ability to plan intelligently with respect to stale and apparently abandoned claims.”[4]
The California Supreme Court thus makes the case against reviving claims that have expired, highlighting the principle that such revival, while within the Legislature’s power, should not be provided lightly. The courts have made clear that important state interests must be at stake to justify such a disruption of the law.
According to research on the trauma of child sexual abuse:
Childhood sexual trauma can have a profoundly devastating effect upon the victim. Some individuals appear to be relatively asymptomatic while others can be greatly affected. Sexual trauma can impact many of the normal developmental processes of childhood; typically exhibited by emotional or behavioral features that show distress. Victims of child sexual abuse attempt numerous efforts to psychologically escape from the abuse (e.g. avoidance, attempts at memory repression, distraction, addictive behaviors) and cognitive efforts at coping (e.g. cognitive reappraisal, reframing, minimization, and working through the abuse, among others).
Childhood sexual abuse has been correlated with higher levels of depression, guilt, shame, self-blame, eating disorders, somatic concerns, anxiety, dissociative patterns, repression, denial, sexual problems, relationship problems and trauma.[5]
Given the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault, these claims are arguably worthy of such revival, despite the general disregard for doing so. In fact, one of the only examples found where claims have been revived is in this context.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Potentially significant cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts to adjudicate cases that are time-barred by the current statute of limitation, but may be brought during the one-year revival period. Although this bill only revives one type of childhood sexual assault claim, the short duration of the revival period could result in a large number of cases being filed in a short period of time. A significant increase in workload to the courts could result in delays of court services and prioritization of court cases might impact access to justice, and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a need for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The Governor’s 2024-25 budget proposes $83.1 million ongoing from the General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) due to settlements and judgments that must be paid out by counties as a result of claims that are successfully brought by plaintiffs that would have otherwise been barred by the existing statute of limitations. Such cost pressures would be exacerbated by a large number of potential settlements and judgments that would have to be paid in a short window of time.
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/25/24)
Child Abuse Prevention Center
Crime Survivors for Safety and Justice
Perk Advocacy
Smart Justice California
ValorUS
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/25/24)
County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Smart Justice California writes:
The existing statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault requires that victims file actions for damages by the age of 40 or within five years of the date the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault. Unfortunately, many victims who endured abuse at these facilities have been turned away when seeking legal representation because the statute of limitations for individual cases has expired. In 2019, former Assemblymember Lorena Gonzalez championed AB 218 which provided a three-year extension to the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual assault cases that had expired. With the extension provided in AB 218 expiring January 1, 2023, additional time is needed so victims have a chance to come forward and report their abuse.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The County of Los Angeles writes:
[T]he County of Los Angeles must oppose AB 2693 based on the significant costs associated with settling existing and future claims of childhood sexual assault. Moreover, the fact that a significant portion of victim awards, paid from County dollars, would likely go to attorney fees, rather than victims is concerning. This is evident when assessing the thousands of recovery damage claims filed against the County, to date.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 70-0, 5/22/24
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Juan Carrillo, Wendy Carrillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Mike Fong, Vince Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Lee, Low, Lowenthal, Maienschein, McCarty, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Stephanie Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Jim Patterson, Joe Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Rendon, Reyes, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Santiago, Schiavo, Soria, Ta, Ting, Valencia, Villapudua, Waldron, Wallis, Ward, Weber, Wicks, Wilson, Wood, Zbur, Robert Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Calderon, Cervantes, Megan Dahle, Essayli, Flora, Friedman, Gallagher, Holden, Mathis, Luz Rivas
Prepared by: Christian Kurpiewski / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
8/18/24 9:19:28
**** END ****
Richard Winton, Nearly 300 sue over alleged sexual abuse at L.A. County juvenile halls and camps (December 27, 2022) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-12-27/hundreds-sue-alleging-sexual-abuse-at-l-a-juvenile-halls. All internet citations are current as of August 15, 2024. ↑
See K.M. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 717, 738 (finding that reference to claims encompassed in Section 340.1(a) does not “necessarily encompass[]” damages provision in Section 340.1(b)). ↑
Quarry v. Doe I (Quarry) (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955-957, internal citations omitted. ↑
Id. at 958, internal citations omitted.) ↑
Allison N Sinanan, Trauma and Treatment of Child Sexual Abuse (October 9, 2015) Journal of Trauma & Treatment, https://www.hilarispublisher.com/open-access/trauma-and-treatment-of-child-sexual-abuse-2167-1222-S4-024.pdf. ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular Session
AB 2693 (Wicks) - Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
Version: April 3, 2024 | Policy Vote: JUD. 10 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: July 1, 2024 | Consultant: Liah Burnley |
Bill Summary:
AB 2693 would permit an otherwise time-barred action alleging childhood sexual assault occurring at a county juvenile detention facility to proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
Fiscal Impact:
- Potentially significant cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts to adjudicate cases that are time-barred by the current statute of limitation, but may be brought during the one-year revival period. Although this bill only revives one type of childhood sexual assault claim, the short duration of the revival period could result in a large number of cases being filed in a short period of time. A significant increase in workload to the courts could result in delays of court services and prioritization of court cases might impact access to justice, and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a need for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The Governor’s 2024-25 budget proposes $83.1 million ongoing from the General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) due to settlements and judgments that must be paid out by counties as a result of claims that are successfully brought by plaintiffs that would have otherwise been barred by the existing statute of limitations. Such cost pressures would be exacerbated by a large number of potential settlements and judgments that would have to be paid in a short window of time.
Background:
Statutes of limitations dictate the time period within which a legal proceeding must begin. A case will typically be dismissed if it is not brought before the statute of limitation expires.
Statutes of limitations play a critical role in ensuring that justice is timely served. They encourage plaintiffs to gather their evidence early and to bring their cases to court promptly, thereby preventing any delays and inaccuracies that arise due to the destruction of evidence, fading memories, and the passing away of witnesses. Statutes of limitations also prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims “concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution.” (Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co. (1944) 25 Cal. 2d 226, 228-29.)
One of the underlying purposes of statutes of limitation is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution. When statutes of limitations are too long or are uncertain (for example, when an expired limitations period is arbitrarily revived by the Legislature) commercial and other activities become encumbered by the looming threat of litigation.
The limitations period serves important policy goals that help to preserve both the integrity of our legal system and the due process rights of individuals. “These statutes are declared to be 'among the most beneficial to be found in our books. They rest upon sound policy, and tend to the peace and welfare of society.” (Ibid.)
Unless there is a statute providing otherwise, the time for bringing a civil action is two years after the injury occurs or, depending upon the type of injury, two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. California’s existing statute of limitation for childhood sexual abuse has been amended several times. AB 452 (Chapter 655, Statutes of 2023) abandoned the piecemeal extensions of the past and simply eliminated the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault altogether for actions arising on or after January 1, 2024.
Proposed Law:
This bill creates a one-year revival period for childhood sexual assault claims based on assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or county juvenile detention facility. By suspending the current statute of limitations for one year, the bill would allow a plaintiff who was the victim of sexual assault by a specified juvenile detention facility employee to file a civil lawsuit between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2025, even if the plaintiff’s claim would otherwise be barred by the existing statute of limitations.
-- END --
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2023-2024 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 2693 (Author:Wicks)
Version: April 3, 2024
Hearing Date: June 18, 2024
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
DIGEST
This bill revives otherwise expired claims for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The past decades have brought waves of revelations of long covered up sexual abuse by major institutions in this country, from the Catholic Church to United States Gymnastics to the Boy Scouts. California has repeatedly bolstered its law providing a cause of action for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault. This has involved expanding the conduct that is included, extending the relevant statute of limitations, eliminating that statute of limitations, and providing revival periods for expired claims.
Many of these changes reveal an appreciation for the especially acute trauma child survivors of this sexual assault experience. Scientific research and studies make clear that many victims of these crimes repress memories of their assault or are incredibly fearful of reporting it. It is therefore not surprising that childhood sexual assault is grossly underreported. Making matters worse, many of the institutions where the crimes have occurred have played a role in covering up the sexual assaults and failing to prevent further damage.
This author-sponsored bill addresses well-documented abuse in county probation camps and detention facilities for children by reviving claims for childhood sexual assault committed by employees of these facilities and bypassing the attendant government claims presentation timelines. The bill is supported by a variety of groups, including Initiate Justice. No timely opposition was received by the Committee.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Provides that in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, there is no time limit for the commencement of any of the following actions:
- an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault;
- an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; or
- an action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(a).)
- Authorizes a person who is sexually assaulted and proves it was the result of a cover up to recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless prohibited by another law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(b).)
- Provides that claims pursuant to Section 340.1 are not required to be presented to any government entity prior to the commencement of an action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(q).)
- Provides that, except as specified, a public entity is not liable for an injury proximately caused by or to any prisoner or patient in a mental institution. (Gov. Code §§ 844.6, 854.8.)
This bill:
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, an action for recovery of the types described in Section 340.1 for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county at the time the childhood sexual assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
- Provides that the above revival does not apply to a claim that has been litigated to finality or that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
- Exempts the above revived claims from claims presentation requirements and public entity immunity provisions.
COMMENTS
- Background on laws governing childhood sexual assault
In 2002, the Legislature enacted SB 1779 (Burton, Ch. 149, Stats. 2002), to provide that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse may be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday if the third party defendant person or entity knew, had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps and implement reasonable safeguards to avoid future acts of unlawful sexual conduct. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1(b)(2).) SB 1779 also enacted Section 340.1(c) to allow a claim under Section 340.1(b)(2) to be brought within a one-year window, January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2003, even if that claim would otherwise be time barred as of January 1, 2003, because of an applicable statute of limitations.
The Government Tort Claims Act (the Act) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. (Gov. Code § 815 et seq.) In addition to any time limitations placed by other statutes on such claims, the Act requires that a claim that is brought against a public entity relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after accrual of the cause or causes of action. (Gov. Code § 911.2.)
In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding Section 340.1, a timely claim to a public entity pursuant to the Act is a prerequisite to maintaining an action for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity school district. The Court based its holding primarily on its finding that nothing in the express language of SB 1779 or the bill’s legislative history indicated an intent by the Legislature to exempt Section 340.1 claims from the Act and its six-month claim presentation requirement. Essentially, many claims for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity could not benefit from the change to Section 340.1 because the six-month presentation requirement for such claims was not addressed by SB 1779.
To address this loophole for childhood sexual abuse claims against public entities, SB 640 (Simitian, Ch. 383, Stats. of 2008) was enacted into law. It added an explicit exception to the claims presentation requirements to Section 905 of the Act for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” (Gov. Code § 905(m).) Section 905(m) applied to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
Despite this additional legislation making it clear the Legislature intended Section 340.1 to apply to claims against local public entities, numerous public entities, including school districts, were using another statute, Section 935 of the Government Code, to circumvent and undermine SB 640 and Section 905(m) of the Government Code. These public entities were attempting to defeat lawsuits alleging claims of childhood sexual abuse based on claims-presentations requirements the local public entities have set in their own charter, ordinance, or regulation.
To address this issue, SB 1053 (Beall, Ch. 153, Stats. 2018) provided that the procedures authorized to be prescribed by Section 935 relating to claims for money or damages against local public entities do not apply to claims of childhood sexual abuse made as described in Section 905(m). SB 1053 thereafter effectuated the intent of the Legislature in enacting SB 640, thereby ensuring the delayed discovery provisions in Section 340.1 apply to all childhood sexual abuse claims against local public entities.
These bills exempted claims for childhood sexual assault from claims presentation requirements pursuant to the Act, but only as against local public entities. AB 2959 (Committee on Judiciary, Ch. 444, Stats. 2022) took the next step and provided that claims for childhood sexual assault are not required to be presented to any governmental entity prior to the commencement of an action. Just last year, AB 452 (Addis, Ch. 655, Stats. 2023) amended Section 340.1 to completely eliminate the statute of limitations that applies to childhood sexual assault claims. This change applied prospectively to actions arising on and after January 1, 2024.
- Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations and revival of expired claims
A statute of limitations is a requirement to commence legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) within a specific period of time. Statutes of limitations are tailored to the cause of action at issue – for example, cases involving injury must be brought within two years from the date of injury, cases relating to written contracts must be brought four years from the date the contract was broken, and, as commonly referenced in the media, there is no statute of limitations for murder. Although it may appear unfair to bar actions after the statute of limitations has elapsed, that limitations period serves important policy goals that help to preserve both the integrity of our legal system and the due process rights of individuals.
For example, one significant reason that a limitations period is necessary in many cases is that evidence may disappear over time – paperwork gets lost, witnesses forget details or pass away, and physical locations that may be critical to a case change over time. Limitations periods also promote finality by encouraging an individual who has been wronged to bring an action sooner rather than later – timely actions arguably ensure that the greatest amount of evidence is available to all parties.
In general, California law requires all civil actions be commenced within applicable statutes of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc. § 312.) Under existing law, the general statute of limitations in California to bring an action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, is two years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1)
This bill responds to claims related to widespread sexual abuse and assault at county juvenile camps and detention facilities:
For five decades, boys and girls in Los Angeles County juvenile camps and detention halls have suffered repeated sexual assaults at the hands of probation and detention officers, according to a lawsuit filed by nearly 300 former detainees.
Page after page of the 359-page lawsuit filed Dec. 20 details allegations of systemic failures and horrific scenes of sexual abuse that lawyers say went unchecked by the L.A. County Probation Department, which operates the camps and halls.
Attorneys for the 279 plaintiffs say some of the boys and girls were victimized by more than one officer, and some officers are accused of being serial abusers, repeatedly finding new victims among those sent to the facilities over the years.
The lawsuit states that not only were the plaintiffs minors, but they also were incarcerated, which marks the abuse under the “color of authority.”
The alleged assaults, dating from the 1970s through 2018, spanned a wide swath of L.A. County’s once-vast and now mostly closed juvenile hall system, including Camp Scott and Camp Kenyon Scudder — girls facilities; the Challenger Memorial Youth Center; and the Los Padrinos, Central and Barry J. Nidorf juvenile halls.
County officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment.[1]
Among other things, AB 218 (Gonzalez, Ch. 861, Stats. 2019) provided a three-year window in which expired childhood sexual assault claims were revived. Many of the victims of these facilities were able to take advantage of this revival period even though their claims had expired. However, many survivors of this alleged systematic abuse were not able to take advantage of that window. As stated, there is currently no statute of limitations period for childhood sexual assault claims, but these expired claims do not benefit from that prospective change.
This bill provides that actions for the types of claims provided for in Section 340.1(a) for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because an applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is explicitly revived by the bill. The bill creates a one-year window in which such claims can be brought. As with previous revival periods, this does not apply to claims litigated to finality or compromised by a written settlement before 2025. Given that the section newly created by the bill does not specify that the damages provided for in Section 340.1 are also available, it is unlikely that the treble damages specified in Section 340.1(b) are recoverable in connection with these revived claims.[2]
The California Supreme Court has squarely addressed the modification of statutes of limitations and the revival of stale claims:
The Legislature has authority to establish—and to enlarge—limitations periods. . . . [H]owever, legislative enlargement of a limitations period does not revive lapsed claims in the absence of express language of revival. This rule of construction grows out of an understanding of the difference between prospective and retroactive application of statutes. . . . As long as the former limitations period has not expired, an enlarged limitations period ordinarily applies and is said to apply prospectively to govern cases that are pending when, or instituted after, the enactment took effect. This is true even though the underlying conduct that is the subject of the litigation occurred prior to the new enactment. . . . However, when it comes to applying amendments that enlarge the limitations period to claims as to which the limitations period has expired before the amendment became law—that is, claims that have lapsed—the analysis is different. Once a claim has lapsed (under the formerly applicable statute of limitations), revival of the claim is seen as a retroactive application of the law under an enlarged statute of limitations. Lapsed claims will not be considered revived without express language of revival.[3]
The court continues, specifically addressing the policy reasons against revival:
“The reason for this rule is a judicial perception of unfairness in reviving a cause after the prospective defendant has assumed its expiration and has conducted his affairs accordingly.” As one court commented, “a statute of limitations grants prospective defendants relief from the burdens of indefinite exposure to stale claims. By reviving lapsed claims, the Legislature may appear to renege on this promise. As Judge [Learned] Hand wrote, there may be something ‘unfair and dishonest’ in after-the-fact withdrawal of this legislative assurance of safety.” Individuals, as well as businesses and other enterprises ordinarily rely upon the running of the limitations period: “The keeping of records, the maintenance of reserves, and the commitment of funds may all be affected by such reliance . . . . To defeat such reliance . . . deprives [enterprises] of the ability to plan intelligently with respect to stale and apparently abandoned claims.”[4]
The California Supreme Court thus makes the case against reviving claims that have expired, highlighting the principle that such revival, while within the Legislature’s power, should not be provided lightly. (See also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314 [finding statutes of limitations are “good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control”]; Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 828, 831-834; Lent v. Doe (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1181 [finding the Legislature has the power to revive causes of action].) The courts have made clear that important state interests must be at stake to justify such a disruption of the law.
According to research on the trauma of child sexual abuse:
Childhood sexual trauma can have a profoundly devastating effect upon the victim. Some individuals appear to be relatively asymptomatic while others can be greatly affected. Sexual trauma can impact many of the normal developmental processes of childhood; typically exhibited by emotional or behavioral features that show distress. Victims of child sexual abuse attempt numerous efforts to psychologically escape from the abuse (e.g. avoidance, attempts at memory repression, distraction, addictive behaviors) and cognitive efforts at coping (e.g. cognitive reappraisal, reframing, minimization, and working through the abuse, among others).
Childhood sexual abuse has been correlated with higher levels of depression, guilt, shame, self-blame, eating disorders, somatic concerns, anxiety, dissociative patterns, repression, denial, sexual problems, relationship problems and trauma.[5]
Given the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault, these claims are arguably worthy of such revival, despite the general disregard for doing so. In fact, one of the only examples found where claims have been revived is in this context.
According to the author:
This narrowly tailored bill will [bring] justice to a group of particularly vulnerable children who endured sexual assault while held in county juvenile probation camps or detention facilities. The need for this bill was starkly illustrated by a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times in 2022 and most recent in April by ABC national news. Many of the victims identified in the stories were able to use the three-year revival window created by AB 218 by joining lawsuits filed before the window closed, but many did not meet this deadline. AB 2693 will open up the window again for one year and give these victims of childhood sexual assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county the ability to file a claim. With this extension, these survivors will have an opportunity to seek justice in court by the end of 2025.
Writing in support, Smart Justice California explains the need for the bill:
The existing statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault requires that victims file actions for damages by the age of 40 or within five years of the date the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault. Unfortunately, many victims who endured abuse at these facilities have been turned away when seeking legal representation because the statute of limitations for individual cases has expired. In 2019, former Assemblymember Lorena Gonzalez championed AB 218 which provided a three-year extension to the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual assault cases that had expired. With the extension provided in AB 218 expiring January 1, 2023, additional time is needed so victims have a chance to come forward and report their abuse.
SUPPORT
Smart Justice California
OPPOSITION
None received
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation: AB 2587 (Aguiar-Curry, 2024) revives otherwise time-barred claims for damages arising from sexual assault and related claims arising out of the sexual assault against the perpetrator and any entities responsible, as specified. AB 2587 is currently in this Committee.
Prior Legislation:
AB 452 (Addis, Ch. 655, Stats. 2023) See Comment 1.
AB 1547 (McKinnor, 2023) attempted a nearly identical revival to this bill. AB 1547 died in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
AB 2959 (Committee on Judiciary, Ch. 444, Stats. 2022) See Comment 1.
AB 1455 (Wicks, Ch. 595, Stats. 2021) amended the statute of limitations for seeking damages arising out of a sexual assault committed by a law enforcement officer, eliminated the claim presentation requirements for such claims, and revived such claims that would otherwise be barred by the existing statute of limitations.
AB 218 (Gonzalez, Ch. 861, Stats. 2019) See Comment 2.
SB 1053 (Beall, Ch. 153, Stats. 2018) See Comment 1.
SB 640 (Simitian, Ch. 383, Stats. 2008) See Comment 1.
SB 1779 (Burton, Ch. 149, Stats. 2002) See Comment 1.
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 70, Noes 0)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 15, Noes 0)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 0)
**************
Richard Winton, Nearly 300 sue over alleged sexual abuse at L.A. County juvenile halls and camps (December 27, 2022) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-12-27/hundreds-sue-alleging-sexual-abuse-at-l-a-juvenile-halls. All internet citations are current as of June 5, 2024. ↑
See K.M. v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 717, 738 (finding that reference to claims encompassed in Section 340.1(a) does not “necessarily encompass[]” damages provision in Section 340.1(b)). ↑
Quarry v. Doe I (Quarry) (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955-957, internal citations omitted. ↑
Id. at 958, internal citations omitted.) ↑
Allison N Sinanan, Trauma and Treatment of Child Sexual Abuse (October 9, 2015) Journal of Trauma & Treatment, https://www.hilarispublisher.com/open-access/trauma-and-treatment-of-child-sexual-abuse-2167-1222-S4-024.pdf. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 2693
Author:(Wicks)
As Amended Ver:April 3, 2024
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Permits an otherwise time-barred action alleging childhood sexual assault occurring at a county juvenile detention facility to proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
Major Provisions
- Provides that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned or operated by a county at the time the assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because of the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit has expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
- Specifies that these provisions do not revive either of the following claims:
- A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
- A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
- Clarifies that these provisions do not apply to an injury caused by another prisoner or a patient of a mental institution, as specified.
COMMENTS
The purpose of statutes of limitation (SOLs) and their evolving application to actions alleging childhood sexual assault. Unless there is a statute providing otherwise, the time for bringing a tort action is two years after the injury occurs or, depending upon the type of injury, two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. SOLs reflect the reality that, over time, evidence is lost or destroyed and witnesses' memories fade. However, current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often delay coming forward for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, lack of trust, fear, or some combination thereof. Indeed, child victims may not even understand what has happened to them, let alone know of their right to take timely legal action. Recognizing this, several states have already eliminated SOLs for childhood sexual assault. Two years ago, President Biden signed the "Eliminating Limits to Justice for Child Sex Abuse Victims Act of 2022," which eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault cases brought in federal court. Previously such federal actions were subject to a 10-year limitations period. (18 U.S.C. Section 2255.)
California has long recognized the unique problem that SOLs create in childhood sexual assault cases. The state's existing SOL for childhood sexual abuse has been amended several times. For example, SB 108 Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990 provided that actions for childhood sexual abuse could be brought within eight years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years of age), or within three years of the date when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness they are experiencing in adulthood was caused by childhood sexual abuse. This statute has also been amended multiple times as it applies to third parties that might have a duty of care to the plaintiff, such as a school. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties had to be commenced within a year of the plaintiff's 18th birthday. AB 1651 (Ortiz) Chapter 1032, Statutes of 1998 made the time to commence actions against third parties the same as actions against abusers, so long as the suits were commenced before the plaintiff's 26th birthday. In 2002, in response to revelations about abuse in the Catholic Church, SB 1179 (Burton) Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002 amended the law yet again to allow delayed-discovery suits against third parties, at least in certain circumstances, to be brought beyond the plaintiff's 26th birthday. In 2019, AB 218 (Gonzalez) Chapter 861, Statutes of 2019 extended the SOL for such actions by another fourteen years, from eight to 22 years after the age of majority, or typically from 26 to 40 years of age, and extended the delayed discovery provision from three to five years. AB 218 also created a three-year revival period for any lapsed case not litigated to finality before the bill's enactment. Last year's AB 452 (Addis) Chapter 655, Statutes of 2023 abandoned the piecemeal extensions of the past and simply eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault altogether. However, AB 452 only applied to actions arising on or after January 1, 2024, leaving some children who were abused to fall through the cracks and never have their cases heard on the merits.
This bill seeks to address the needs of a particularly vulnerable group not protected by AB 452 or elsewhere in existing law. It does so by effectively opening a one year period, until December 31, 2025, for childhood victims who were assaulted by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county to file their claims. This will allow children to bring an action, even if it would be otherwise barred because the applicable SOL has expired. The bill, therefore, would permit a cause of action to proceed if it is already pending in court on January 1, 2025, or, if not filed by that date, commenced between January 1, 2025 and December 31, 2025.
A "culture of child abuse" and the need for a narrowly tailored revival of claims. In 2022, the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles detailing an appalling pattern of sexual assaults committed by employees of juvenile detention facilities in Los Angeles County. According to the Times reporting, hundreds of children, and perhaps more, were assaulted between the 1970s and 2019. In December of 2022, a lawsuit representing 279 of these victims was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. Lawsuits filed earlier in 2022 include the allegations of 70 women who, as girls, were sexually assaulted at a handful of juvenile camps in Los Angeles County between 1985 and 2019. Some of the women alleged that they had been abused by more than one employee and on multiple occasions, and many of the employees named were accused by multiple plaintiffs. A former sex-crimes prosecutor claimed that the "Los Angeles County juvenile probation system has been infested with a culture of child abuse for decades."
In recent years, as noted above, the Legislature has repeatedly found that SOLs create a bar to justice when it comes to childhood sexual abuse. Nevertheless, we know that many people who were assaulted as children in juvenile detention centers did not join the recent suit taking advantage of the AB 218 revival window. Children do not always identify what happened to them as sexual assault, and even when they do, they are relatively powerlessness to seek a legal remedy on their own. In addition to these reasons, which apply to all cases of childhood sexual assault, the argument for creating a one-year revival window restricted to assaults that occurred in a juvenile detention facility is especially compelling. As the Los Angeles Times series makes clear, children in juvenile detention are especially vulnerable. Not only was the abuse perpetrated by people who were supposed to protect them, it was carried out by people who exercised considerable power over the children. The conditions described in the pending lawsuits show that juvenile parole officers and other employees used their position of authority to offer combination of threats and favors to force children to perform sexual acts. Moreover, especially in the case of parole officers, employees of the juvenile justice system continue to exercise power over the children even after they have been released. Many children may have believed, rightly or wrongly, that if they reported their abusers they might end up back in juvenile detention. Finally, the case for granting an extension to children abused in juvenile detention is strong because the children often did not have the supportive families or resources that might have aided them in seeking justice through the legal system.
This narrowly tailored bill creates a one-year revival period, restricted only to childhood sexual assaults that occurred in a county-run juvenile detention facility, including so-called juvenile "camps" where much of the abuse occurred. The Los Angeles Times articles have raised awareness about the patterns, and it is quite possible that survivors who did not come forward in time to join the suits filed before December 31, 2022, will take advantage of this one-year window to seek belated justice.
According to the Author
According to the author, this measure "will prolong the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault the chance to report any sexual abuse that occurred in a juvenile probation camp or detention facilities owned and operated by a county the ability to file a claim. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice in court before the end of 2025. This bill is needed to ensure those who have been sexually abused as children by law enforcement officers and juvenile probation camp staff are provided a realistic opportunity to seek civil redress for their harm."
Arguments in Support
The Children's Law Center of California (CLC), mirroring the views of many other supporters, points out:
Emotional trauma following sexual assault does not present the same in all survivors and may lead to a delay in seeking medical or legal assistance. They may not define a victimization as a rape or sexual assault for many reasons such as self-blame, embarrassment, not clearly understanding the legal definition of the terms, or not wanting to define someone they know who victimized them as a rapist or because others blame them for their sexual assault2. When the perpetrator is someone, they trusted, it can take years for victims even to identify what happened to them as a violation. Furthermore, the survivors AB 2963 seeks to help were in tragically unique circumstances. They could not escape the reach and awesome power of the person whose conduct serves as the basis of the action.
The time a survivor needs to process and recover from their assault, enough to engage with the legal system, can take years and even decades, certainly longer than currently allowable for many survivors to seek civil restitution. We should not require vulnerable people who have already been sexually assaulted by law enforcement to overcome trauma of their assaults and the officers' powerful authority as a pre-condition to them seeking compensation for their life-altering ordeal.
AB 2693 will revive the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault arising out of an assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county their day in court. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice before the end of 2025.
Arguments in Opposition
No opposition on file.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriation analysis, potentially significant cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts to adjudicate cases that are time-barred by the current statute of limitation, but may be brought during the one-year revival period. Although this bill only revives one type of childhood sexual assault claim, the short duration of the revival period could result in a large number of cases being filed in a short period of time. A significant increase in workload to the courts could result in delays of court services and prioritization of court cases might impact access to justice, and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.
The Governor's 2024-25 budget proposes $83.1 million ongoing from the General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund. According to the Legislative Analyst's Office, the General Fund faces a structural deficit in the tens of billions of dollars over the next several fiscal years.
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 11-0-1
YES: Kalra, Dixon, Bauer-Kahan, Bryan, Connolly, Haney, Maienschein, McKinnor, Pacheco, Reyes, Sanchez
ABS, ABST OR NV: Essayli
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 15-0-0
YES: Wicks, Sanchez, Arambula, Bryan, Calderon, Wendy Carrillo, Dixon, Mike Fong, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Jim Patterson, Pellerin, Ta, Villapudua
UPDATED
VERSION: April 3, 2024
CONSULTANT: Tom Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0003057
Date of Hearing: May 8, 2024
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2693
Author:(Wicks) – As Amended Ver:April 3, 2024
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 11 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill suspends, for one year, the statute of limitations on civil claims of childhood sexual assault committed by an employee of a county-operated juvenile probation camp or detention facility.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Potentially significant cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts to adjudicate cases that are time-barred by the current statute of limitation, but may be brought during the one-year revival period. Although this bill only revives one type of childhood sexual assault claim, the short duration of the revival period could result in a large number of cases being filed in a short period of time. A significant increase in workload to the courts could result in delays of court services and prioritization of court cases might impact access to justice, and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.
The Governor’s 2024-25 budget proposes $83.1 million ongoing from the General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund. According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the General Fund faces a structural deficit in the tens of billions of dollars over the next several fiscal years.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice in court before the end of 2025. This bill is needed to ensure those who have been sexually abused as children by law enforcement officers and juvenile probation camp staff are provided a realistic opportunity to seek civil redress for their harm.
- Background. The statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault has been extended several times to give survivors more time to file claims based on abuse they experienced. These changes in law were made in acknowledgment that victims of childhood sexual assault often delay reporting the abuse they experienced, or that they may not even understand that they experienced abuse until well into adulthood. For example, AB 218 (Gonzalez) Chapter 861, Statutes of 2019, allowed a plaintiff to file a lawsuit up to 22 years after they turned age 18, or within five years of when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered a psychological injury stemmed from childhood sexual assault. That bill also created a three-year revival period for any earlier claims that were otherwise barred by the existing statute of limitations. That revival period ended on January 1, 2023.
This bill creates a one-year revival period for childhood sexual assault claims based on assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or county juvenile detention facility. By suspending the current statute of limitations for one year, the bill would allow a plaintiff who was the victim of sexual assault by a specified juvenile detention facility employee to file a civil lawsuit between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2025, even if the plaintiff’s claim would otherwise be barred by the existing statute of limitations. According to advocates for this bill, there are potentially hundreds of survivors who may be eligible to file claims during this period.
- Related Legislation. AB 1547 (McKinnor) is similar to this bill but also suspended the statute of limitations for certain sexual abuse claims against state-operated juvenile detention facilities. AB 1547 was held on this committee’s suspense file.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 30, 2024
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2693
Author:(Wicks) – As Amended Ver:April 3, 2024
SUBJECT: Childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
KEY ISSUE: should a time-barred claim arising out of a sexual assault of a child at a county-run juvenile camp or detention facility be revived, so that an action otherwise barred as of January 1, 2025, may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025?
SYNOPSIS
In the past three decades, and especially after the shocking revelations of sexual assault and related cover-ups in the Catholic Church, the Legislature has extended or otherwise modified the statute of limitations (SOL) a number of times or revived certain types of sexual assault claims otherwise barred by the SOL. In the past five years, the Committee has heard bills dealing in particular with childhood sexual assault. Most of these bills extended SOLs or revived expired cases, reflecting an increased awareness that children only reluctantly report assaults or, in some cases, only recover memories of sexual assault several years later. For example, AB 218 (Chap. 861, Stats. 2019) extended the SOL for childhood sexual assault actions until 22 years after the age of majority (typically 40 years of age) and revived most expired claims for a period of three years. Last year AB 452 (Chap. 655, Stats. 2023) abandoned the piecemeal extensions of the past and simply eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault altogether. However, AB 452 only applied to actions arising on or after January 1, 2024, leaving some children who were abused in the past to fall through the cracks and never have their cases heard on the merits.
This narrowly tailored bill attempts to bring justice to a group of particularly vulnerable children who endured sexual assault by staff while held in a county juvenile probation camp or detention facility. The need for this legislation was starkly illustrated by a series of articles published in the Los Angeles Times in 2022, and which have been reinforced by later reporting. Some 279 of the victims identified in the story were able to use the three-year revival window created by AB 218, joining lawsuits filed just before the AB 218 window closed on December 31, 2022. But hundreds of others did not meet the deadline. This bill would create a one-year revival window, restricted only to children abused in county juvenile detention facility, so that claims otherwise barred as of January 1, 2025, may be commenced by December 31, 2025.
This author-sponsored bill is supported by several children’s advocacy groups and the Consumer Attorneys of California. There is no known opposition to this bill.
SUMMARY: Permits an otherwise time-barred action alleging childhood sexual assault occurring at a county juvenile detention facility to proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault committed by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned or operated by a county at the time the assault occurred, that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2025, because of the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit has expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if commenced by December 31, 2025.
- Specifies that these provisions do not revive either of the following claims:
- A claim that has been litigated to finality in a court of competent jurisdiction before January 1, 2025.
- A claim that has been compromised by a written settlement agreement between the parties entered into before January 1, 2025.
- Clarifies that these provisions do not apply to an injury caused by another prisoner or a patient of a mental institution, as specified.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that there is no time limit for the commencement of any of the following actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault:
- An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
- An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
- An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (a).)
- Provides that in an action described in 1) above a person who is sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result of a cover up may recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault, unless prohibited by another law. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (b).)
- Specifies that 1) above applies to any claim in which the childhood sexual assault occurred on and after January 1, 2024. Notwithstanding any other law, a claim for damages based on 1) above, in which the childhood sexual assault occurred on or before December 31, 2023, may only be commenced pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations set forth in existing law as it read on December 31, 2023. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (p).)
- Defines “childhood sexual assault” for purposes of the above to include any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been a crime under specified provisions of the Penal Code. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (c).)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: According to the author, this measure “will prolong the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault the chance to report any sexual abuse that occurred in a juvenile probation camp or detention facilities owned and operated by a county the ability to file a claim. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice in court before the end of 2025. This bill is needed to ensure those who have been sexually abused as children by law enforcement officers and juvenile probation camp staff are provided a realistic opportunity to seek civil redress for their harm.”
The purpose of SOLs and their evolving application to actions alleging childhood sexual assault. Unless there is a statute providing otherwise, the time for bringing a tort action is two years after the injury occurs or, depending upon the type of injury, two years after the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury. Statutes of limitation reflect the reality that, over time, evidence is lost or destroyed and witnesses’ memories fade. However, current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often delay coming forward for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, lack of trust, fear, or some combination thereof. Indeed, child victims may not even understand what has happened to them, let alone know of their right to take timely legal action. Recognizing this, several states have already eliminated SOLs for childhood sexual assault. Two years ago, President Biden signed the “Eliminating Limits to Justice for Child Sex Abuse Victims Act of 2022,” which eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault cases brought in federal court. Previously such federal actions were subject to a 10-year limitations period. (18 U.S.C. Section 2255.)
California has long recognized the unique problem that SOLs create in childhood sexual assault cases. The state’s existing SOL for childhood sexual abuse has been amended several times. For example, SB 108 (Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990) provided that actions for childhood sexual abuse could be brought within eight years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years of age), or within three years of the date when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness they are experiencing in adulthood was caused by childhood sexual abuse. This statute has also been amended multiple times as it applies to third parties that might have a duty of care to the plaintiff, such as a school. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties had to be commenced within a year of the plaintiff’s 18th birthday. AB 1651 (Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998) made the time to commence actions against third parties the same as actions against abusers, so long as the suits were commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. In 2002, in response to revelations about abuse in the Catholic Church, SB 1179 (Chap. 149, Stats. 2002) amended the law yet again to allow delayed-discovery suits against third parties, at least in certain circumstances, to be brought beyond the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. In 2019, AB 218 (Chap. 861, Stats. 2019) extended the SOL for such actions by another fourteen years, from eight to 22 years after the age of majority, or typically from 26 to 40 years of age, and extended the delayed discovery provision from three to five years. AB 218 also created a three-year revival period for any lapsed case not litigated to finality before the bill's enactment. Last year’s AB 452 (Chap. Stats. 2023) abandoned the piecemeal extensions of the past and simply eliminated the SOL for childhood sexual assault altogether. However, AB 452 only applied to actions arising on or after January 1, 2024, leaving some children who were abused to fall through the cracks and never have their cases heard on the merits.
This bill seeks to address the needs of a particularly vulnerable group not protected by AB 452 or elsewhere in existing law. It does so by effectively opening a one year period, until December 31, 2025, for childhood victims who were assaulted by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county to file their claims. This will allow children to bring an action, even if it would be otherwise barred because the applicable SOL has expired. The bill, therefore, would permit a cause of action to proceed if it is already pending in court on January 1, 2025, or, if not filed by that date, commenced between January 1, 2025 and December 31, 2025.
A “culture of child abuse” and the need for a narrowly tailored revival of claims. In 2022, the Los Angeles Times published a series of articles detailing an appalling pattern of sexual assaults committed by employees of juvenile detention facilities in Los Angeles County. According to the Times reporting, hundreds of children, and perhaps more, were assaulted between the 1970s and 2019. In December of 2022, a lawsuit representing 279 of these victims was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. Lawsuits filed earlier in 2022 include the allegations of 70 women who, as girls, were sexually assaulted at a handful of juvenile camps in Los Angeles County between 1985 and 2019. Some of the women alleged that they had been abused by more than one employee and on multiple occasions, and many of the employees named were accused by multiple plaintiffs. A former sex-crimes prosecutor claimed that the “Los Angeles County juvenile probation system has been infested with a culture of child abuse for decades.”
In recent years, as noted above, the Legislature has repeatedly found that SOLs create a bar to justice when it comes to childhood sexual abuse. Nevertheless, we know that many people who were assaulted as children in juvenile detention centers did not join the recent suit taking advantage of the AB 218 revival window. Children do not always identify what happened to them as sexual assault, and even when they do, they are relatively powerlessness to seek a legal remedy on their own. In addition to these reasons, which apply to all cases of childhood sexual assault, the argument for creating a one-year revival window restricted to assaults that occurred in a juvenile detention facility is especially compelling. As the Los Angeles Times series makes clear, children in juvenile detention are especially vulnerable. Not only was the abuse perpetrated by people who were supposed to protect them, it was carried out by people who exercised considerable power over the children. The conditions described in the pending lawsuits show that juvenile parole officers and other employees used their position of authority to offer combination of threats and favors to force children to perform sexual acts. Moreover, especially in the case of parole officers, employees of the juvenile justice system continue to exercise power over the children even after they have been released. Many children may have believed, rightly or wrongly, that if they reported their abusers they might end up back in juvenile detention. Finally, the case for granting an extension to children abused in juvenile detention is strong because the children often did not have the supportive families or resources that might have aided them in seeking justice through the legal system.
This narrowly tailored bill creates a one-year revival period, restricted only to childhood sexual assaults that occurred in a county-run juvenile detention facility, including so-called juvenile “camps” where much of the abuse occurred. The Los Angeles Times articles have raised awareness about the patterns, and it is quite possible that survivors who did not come forward in time to join the suits filed before December 31, 2022, will take advantage of this one-year window to seek belated justice.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The Children’s Law Center of California (CLC), mirroring the views of many other supporters, points out:
Emotional trauma following sexual assault does not present the same in all survivors and may lead to a delay in seeking medical or legal assistance. They may not define a victimization as a rape or sexual assault for many reasons such as self-blame, embarrassment, not clearly understanding the legal definition of the terms, or not wanting to define someone they know who victimized them as a rapist or because others blame them for their sexual assault2. When the perpetrator is someone, they trusted, it can take years for victims even to identify what happened to them as a violation. Furthermore, the survivors AB 2963 seeks to help were in tragically unique circumstances. They could not escape the reach and awesome power of the person whose conduct serves as the basis of the action.
The time a survivor needs to process and recover from their assault, enough to engage with the legal system, can take years and even decades, certainly longer than currently allowable for many survivors to seek civil restitution. We should not require vulnerable people who have already been sexually assaulted by law enforcement to overcome trauma of their assaults and the officers’ powerful authority as a pre-condition to them seeking compensation for their life-altering ordeal.
AB 2693 will revive the extension granted through AB 218 for an additional year and give victims of childhood sexual assault arising out of an assault by an employee of a juvenile probation camp or detention facility owned and operated by a county their day in court. With this extension, victims will have an opportunity to seek justice before the end of 2025.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists
Child Abuse Prevention Center
Children's Law Center of California
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Survivors for Safety and Justice
Initiate Justice
John Burton Advocates for Youth
Just Detention International
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
Oakland Privacy
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
ValorCalifornia / ValorUS
Young Women's Freedom Center
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by: Tom Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):