Existing law requires a person arrested to be taken before a magistrate without delay and, in any event, within 48 hours after arrest, not including weekends and holidays, as specified. Existing law allows an attorney to visit a prisoner after their arrest, as specified. Under existing law, an officer in charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow an attorney to visit that prisoner is liable for criminal and civil penalties, as provided.

This bill would clarify that the above provisions regarding criminal and civil penalties for officers apply if a prisoner is in a jail, prison, or medical setting. The bill would make other technical changes, as provided.

Existing law requires a person arrested to be taken before a magistrate without delay and, in any event, within 48 hours after arrest, not including weekends and holidays, as specified. Existing law allows an attorney to visit a prisoner after their arrest, as specified. Under existing law, an officer in charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow an attorney to visit that prisoner is liable for criminal and civil penalties, as provided.

This bill would clarify that the above provisions regarding criminal and civil penalties for officers apply if a prisoner is in a jail, prison, or medical setting. The bill would make other technical changes, as provided.

Existing law requires a person arrested to be taken before a magistrate without delay and, in any event, within 48 hours after arrest, not including weekends and holidays, as specified. Existing law allows an attorney to visit a prisoner after their arrest, as specified. Under existing law, an officer in charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow an attorney to visit that prisoner is liable for criminal and civil penalties, as provided.

This bill would clarify that the above provisions regarding criminal and civil penalties for officers apply if a prisoner is in a jail, prison, or a medical setting. The bill would make other technical changes, as provided.

 CONSENT  

Bill No: AB 2286

Author: Bryan (D)

Introduced: 2/19/26

Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 6/9/26

AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Cortese, Pérez, Wiener

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 68-0, 4/16/26 (Consent) - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Criminal procedure: attorney visits: medical settings

SOURCE: Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union, Local 148

DIGEST:

This bill clarifies that existing penalties for peace officers who refuse to allow an attorney to visit a prisoner apply if a prisoner is in a jail, prison, hospital or medical setting.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. (U.S. Const., Amend. 6)
2. Provides that the defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial, to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf, to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant’s defense, to be personally present with counsel, and to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant. (California (Cal.) Constitution (Const.), art. I, §§ 15, 24.)
3. Provides that in a criminal action the defendant is entitled to be allowed counsel as in civil actions, or to appear and defendant in person and with counsel. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 686.)
4. Provides that when a complaint is filed with a magistrate charging a felony originally triable in the superior court of the county in which he or she sits, if, and only if, the magistrate is satisfied from the complaint that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, except that, upon the request of the prosecutor, a summons instead of an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Pen. Code, § 813, subd. (a).)
5. Provides that an arrest warrant shall be directed generally to any peace officer, or to any public officer or employee authorized to serve process where the warrant is for a violation of a statute or ordinance which such person has the duty to enforce, in the state, and may be executed by any of those officers to whom it may be delivered. (Pen. Code, § 816.)
6. Provides that if the offense charged is a felony, and the arrest occurs in the county in which the warrant was issued, the officer making the arrest must take the defendant before the magistrate who issued the warrant or some other magistrate of the same county. (Pen. Code, § 821.)
7. Provides that an arrest is taking a person into custody in a case and in the manner authorized by law, and that an arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person. (Pen. Code, § 834.)
8. Provides that an arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer, and that the person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention. (Pen. Code, § 835.)
9. States that a defendant shall be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 48 hours after his or her arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays. (Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (a)(1).)
10. Provides that after the arrest, any attorney may, at the request of the prisoner or any relative of the prisoner, visit the prisoner. Any officer having charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow that attorney to visit a prisoner is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any officer having a prisoner in charge, who refuses to allow the attorney to visit the prisoner when proper application is made, shall forfeit and pay to the party aggrieved the sum of $500, to be recovered by action in any court of competent jurisdiction. (Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (b).)

This bill:

1. Strikes the provision stating that after the arrest, any attorney may visit the prisoner at the request of the prisoner or any relative of the prisoner.
2. Specifies that the misdemeanor for willfully refusing or neglecting to allow an attorney to visit a prisoner applies when the prisoner is in a jail, prison, medical setting, or hospital.

Comments

This bill relates specifically to access to counsel by arrestees, defendants and prisoners in medical settings. It is well established that while hospitals and their staff may restrict access to counsel in particular cases, like where such a meeting would interfere with hospital operations or compromise the person’s medical care, no attorney should be required to give the officer in charge of the prisoner the reason why he desired a private consultation with his client, as to do so could give the officer the power to determine whether such reasons were sufficient to grant such an interview, which would improperly substitute the judgment of the officer for the judgment of the prisoner and his counsel. Indeed, the right an accused person, confined to any place of detention, to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel is “one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the American criminal law – a right that no legislature or court can ignore or violate.”

Beyond its constitutional guarantees regarding the right to counsel, California law – Penal Code section 825 subdivision (b) – specifies that after an arrest, any attorney licensed in the state may, at the request of the prisoner or a relative of the prisoner visit the prisoner. Moreover, existing law makes it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor, for any peace officer having charge of the prisoner to refuse or neglect to allow that attorney to visit the prisoner, and allows the “party aggrieved” to recover from that officer damages in the amount of $500. California case law establishes that the statute does not require that booking be completed in order for the right to attach, and that, because the statute was enacted to “protect the historic rights of the accused to have counsel, the “party aggrieved” clearly refers to the prisoner, not the attorney.

The author asserts that “defense attorneys and public defenders have [experienced] refusal from sheriffs to see their clients while they were hospitalized” and stresses the importance of clarifying in statute that peace officers looking after incarcerated people be specifically disallowed from blocking a person’s access to counsel in a hospital or medical setting. Accordingly, this bill further clarifies the application of section 825(b), namely by specifying that an officer having charge of a prisoner in a “jail, prison, medical setting or hospital,” is subject to criminal liability under that section.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No

SUPPORT: (Verified 6/9/26)

Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union, Local 148 (source)

ACLU California Action

Bridges of Hope CA

California Association of Licensed Investigators

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice

California Civil Liberties Advocacy

California Coalition for Women Prisoners

California Community Foundation

California Public Defenders Association

Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice

Courage California

Drug Policy Alliance

Ella Baker Center for Human Rights

Felony Murder Elimination Project

Initiate Justice

Justice2Jobs Coalition

La Defensa

Restoring Hope California

Rubicon Programs

San Francisco Public Defender

San Quentin Skunkworks

Sister Warrior Freedom Coalition

Smart Justice

Uncommon Law

OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/9/26)

None received

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 68-0, 4/16/26

AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Boerner, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Elhawary, Ellis, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas

NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Berman, Bonta, Dixon, Flora, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Papan, Celeste Rodriguez, Schiavo

Prepared by: Alex Barnett / PUB. S. /

6/10/26 16:58:18

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular

Bill No: AB 2286 Hearing Date: June 9, 2026

Subject: Criminal procedure: attorney visits: medical settings

HISTORY

Source: Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union, Local 148

Prior Legislation: AB 2215 (Bryan), Ch. 954, Stats. of 2024

AB 1209 (Jones-Sawyer), held in Assembly Appropriations, 2023

Support: ACLU California Action; Bridges of Hope CA; California Association of Licensed Investigators; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Civil Liberties Advocacy; California Coalition for Women Prisoners; California Community Foundation; California Public Defenders Association; Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice; Courage California; Drug Policy Alliance; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; Felony Murder Elimination Project; Justice2Jobs Coalition; La Defensa; Restoring Hope California; Rubicon Programs; San Francisco Public Defender; San Quentin Skunkworks; Smart Justice; Uncommon Law

Opposition: None known

Assembly Floor Vote: 68 - 0

PURPOSE

The purpose of this bill is to clarify that existing penalties for peace officers who refuse to allow an attorney to visit a prisoner apply if a prisoner is in a jail, prison, or medical setting.

Existing law provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. (U.S. Const., Amend. 6)

Existing law provides that the defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial, to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant’s behalf, to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant’s defense, to be personally present with counsel, and to be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant. (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 15, 24.)

Existing law provides that in a criminal action the defendant is entitled to be allowed counsel as in civil actions, or to appear and defendant in person and with counsel. (Pen. Code, § 686.)

Existing law provides that when a complaint is filed with a magistrate charging a felony originally triable in the superior court of the county in which he or she sits, if, and only if, the magistrate is satisfied from the complaint that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, except that, upon the request of the prosecutor, a summons instead of an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Pen. Code, § 813, subd. (a).)

Existing law provides that the prosecutor shall not request the issuance of a summons in lieu of an arrest warrant as provided in this section under any of the following circumstances:

• The offense charged involves violence.
• The offense charged involves a firearm.
• The offense charged involves resisting arrest.

There are one or more outstanding arrest warrants for the person.

• The prosecution of the offense or offenses with which the person is charged, or the prosecution of any other offense or offenses would be jeopardized.
• There is a reasonable likelihood that the offense or offenses would continue or resume, or that the safety of persons or property would be imminently endangered.
• There is reason to believe that the person would not appear at the time and place specified in the summons.

Existing law provides that an arrest warrant shall be directed generally to any peace officer, or to any public officer or employee authorized to serve process where the warrant is for a violation of a statute or ordinance which such person has the duty to enforce, in the state, and may be executed by any of those officers to whom it may be delivered. (Pen. Code, § 816.)

Existing law provides that if the offense charged is a felony, and the arrest occurs in the county in which the warrant was issued, the officer making the arrest must take the defendant before the magistrate who issued the warrant or some other magistrate of the same county. (Pen. Code, § 821.)

Existing law provides that person who is specified or designated in a warrant of arrest for a misdemeanor offense may be released upon the issuance of a citation, in lieu of physical arrest, unless one of the following conditions exists:

• The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves violence.
• The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves a firearm.
• The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves resisting arrest.
• The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves giving false information to a peace officer.
• The person arrested is a danger to himself or herself or others due to intoxication or being under the influence of drugs or narcotics.
• The person requires medical examination or medical care or was otherwise unable to care for his or her own safety.
• The person has other ineligible charges pending against him or her.
• There is reasonable likelihood that the offense or offenses would continue or resume, or that the safety of persons or property would be immediately endangered by the release of the person.
• The person refuses to sign the notice to appear.
• The person cannot provide satisfactory evidence of personal identification.
• The warrant of arrest indicates that the person is not eligible to be released on a citation. (Pen. Code, § 827.1.)

Existing law provides that an arrest is taking a person into custody in a case and in the manner authorized by law, and that an arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person. (Pen. Code, § 834.)

Existing law provides that an arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of an officer, and that the person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention. (Pen. Code, § 835.)

Existing law states that a peace officer may arrest a person in obedience to a warrant, or without a warrant whenever any of the following circumstances occur:

• The officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officer’s presence.
• The person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the officer’s presence.
• The officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed. (Pen. Code, § 836.)

Existing law provides that when a person is arrested for an offense declared to be a misdemeanor, including a violation of a city or county ordinance, and does not demand to be taken before a magistrate, that person shall, instead of being taken before a magistrate, be released according to specified procedures, although nothing prevents an officer from first booking the arrestee as specified. If the person is released, the officer or the officer’s superior shall prepare in duplicate a written notice to appear in court, containing the name and address of the person, the offense charged, and the time when, and place where, the person shall appear in court. If the person is not released prior to being booked and the officer in charge of the booking or the officer’s superior determines that the person should be released, the officer or the officer’s superior shall prepare a written notice to appear in court. (Pen. Code, § 853.6, subd. (a).)

Existing law designates the following persons as magistrates:

• The judges of the Supreme Court.
• The judges of the courts of appeal.
• The judges of the superior courts. (Pen. Code, § 808.)

Existing law states that a defendant shall be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 48 hours after his or her arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays. (Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (a)(1).)

Existing law provides that after the arrest, any attorney may, at the request of the prisoner or any relative of the prisoner, visit the prisoner. Any officer having charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow that attorney to visit a prisoner is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any officer having a prisoner in charge, who refuses to allow the attorney to visit the prisoner when proper application is made, shall forfeit and pay to the party aggrieved the sum of $500, to be recovered by action in any court of competent jurisdiction. (Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (b).)

This bill strikes the provision stating that after the arrest, any attorney may visit the prisoner at the request of the prisoner or any relative of the prisoner.

This bill specifies that the misdemeanor for willfully refusing or neglecting to allow an attorney to visit a prisoner applies when the prisoner is in a jail, prison, medical setting, or hospital.

COMMENTS

1. Need for This Bill

According to the author:

No incarcerated person should lose their constitutional right to meet with their attorney because they are receiving medical care. AB 2286 clarifies that when someone in custody is being held in a medical setting, their attorney must still be allowed to meet with them so they can meaningfully participate in their defense. Ensuring consistent access to counsel protects due process, strengthens the integrity of our justice system, and helps ensure that people facing serious medical issues are not further disadvantaged in their legal proceedings.

1. Constitutional Right to Counsel

The right to counsel in criminal proceedings is protected by both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1 of the California Constitution.^[1] Under these provisions, a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all stages of a proceeding when his or her substantial rights may be affected, although there is a crucial distinction between how and precisely when these rights apply in the criminal process. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel – and its California counterpart under Article 1, Section 15 of the California Constitution – attaches upon the formal initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings, and at specific, “critical” stages of the criminal process, including arraignment, indictment, information and preliminary hearing, among others.^[2] Consequently, an arrestee’s right to counsel prior to the initiation of such proceedings (i.e. prior to the commencement of the prosecution) relies on the Fifth Amendment’s safeguard against self-incrimination. This doctrine is rooted in the landmark United States Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, in which the Court imposed specific, constitutional requirements for the advice an officer must provide prior to engaging in custodial interrogation and held that statements taken without these warnings are inadmissible against the defendant in a criminal case. Specifically, the Court held that prior to any questioning, the suspect must be warned that, among other rights possessed by the detained person, they have a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.^[3]

In order for Miranda protections to apply, an individual must be subjected to “custodial interrogation,” which is the case if a reasonable person in a similar situation would not feel free to end the interrogation and leave.^[4] However, unlike the Sixth Amendment’s right-to-counsel guarantee, which ensures that the accused has legal assistance at specific stages of the criminal process, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel established in Miranda does not guarantee the presence of an attorney and functions solely as a shield against coercive interrogations. As explained by the Supreme Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 178 whereas “the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right is to protect an unaided layman accused after the adverse positions of the government and the accused have solidified with respect to a particular alleged crime […] the purpose of the Miranda-Edwards guarantee […] is to protect a quite different interest: the suspect’s ‘desire to deal with the police only through counsel.’”^[5]

This distinction is especially important in the context of indigent defendants who do not necessarily have access to an attorney in the immediate post-arrest period. Although indigent defendants are constitutionally entitled to have an attorney provided for their defense (usually an attorney from a public defender’s office), because the judge is procedurally responsible for determining indigency and appointing the public defender, this right is not triggered until the initial court appearance.^[6] This can leave indigent arrestees particularly vulnerable during the prearraignment phase, when they are unrepresented by counsel but still subject to investigation an interrogation by law enforcement. Indeed, research has shown that low-income individuals who met with a public defender shortly after arrest were 28 percentage points more likely to be released pretrial, and 36 points more likely to see their cases dismissed relative to other similar individuals who would first meet with a public defender at arraignment.^[7]

1. Effect of This Bill

This bill relates specifically to access to counsel by arrestees, defendants and prisoners in medical settings. It is well established that while hospitals and their staff may restrict access to counsel in particular cases, like where such a meeting would interfere with hospital operations or compromise the person’s medical care, no attorney should be required to give the officer in charge of the prisoner the reason why he desired a private consultation with his client, as to do so could give the officer the power to determine whether such reasons were sufficient to grant such an interview, which would improperly substitute the judgment of the officer for the judgment of the prisoner and his counsel.^[8] Indeed, the right an accused person, confined to any place of detention, to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel is “one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the American criminal law – a right that no legislature or court can ignore or violate.”^[9]

Beyond its constitutional guarantees regarding the right to counsel, California law – Penal Code section 825 subdivision (b) – specifies that after an arrest, any attorney licensed in the state may, at the request of the prisoner or a relative of the prisoner visit the prisoner. Moreover, existing law makes it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor, for any peace officer having charge of the prisoner to refuse or neglect to allow that attorney to visit the prisoner, and allows the “party aggrieved” to recover from that officer damages in the amount of $500.^[10] California case law establishes that the statute does not require that booking be completed in order for the right to attach, and that, because the statute was enacted to “protect the historic rights of the accused to have counsel, the “party aggrieved” clearly refers to the prisoner, not the attorney.^[11]

The author asserts that “defense attorneys and public defenders have [experienced] refusal from sheriffs to see their clients while they were hospitalized” and stresses the importance of clarifying in statute that peace officers looking after incarcerated people be specifically disallowed from blocking a person’s access to counsel in a hospital or medical setting. Accordingly, this bill further clarifies the application of section 825(b), namely by specifying that an officer having charge of a prisoner in a “jail, prison, medical setting or hospital,” is subject to criminal liability under that section.

1. Argument in Support

According to California Attorneys for Criminal Justice:

California law guarantees that individuals in custody have the right to meet with their attorney, however, this right is often denied when an incarcerated individual is hospitalized. In many cases, when an individual is transferred to a medical setting, sheriffs have denied an attorney’s visits, sometimes even ignoring court ordered visits as well as failing to provide basic information about the client’s status. When an attorney is unable to meet with their client, they are left without critical information, this can impact their ability to make decisions, obtain waivers, or inform courts of situations. Denying this access is a clear violation of due process rights. California must protect these rights regardless of whether a client is held in a jail, prison, or hospital. AB 2286 provides that solution.

-- END --

1. U.S. Const., Amends. 5, 6; Cal. Const., art. 1, §§ 15, 24. ↑

2. Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 57; Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 689; Fellers v. United Stats (2004) 540 U.S. 519; Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 7; Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008) 554 U.S. 191 ↑

3. Id. at p. 444 ↑

4. Id. ↑

5. Quoting Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484. ↑

6. Pen. Code, §§ 859, 987, subd. (a); Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 342-343; Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 C3d 760, 766; People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076 ↑

7. Johanna Lacoe, Brett Fischer, and Steven Raphael, “The Effect of Pre-Arraignment Legal Representation on Criminal Case Outcomes,” NBER Working Paper 31289 (2023), https://doi.org/10.3386/w3128 ; For additional information and analysis on this issue see the 2022 Annual Report prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Penal Code, p. 40, available at https://clrc.ca.gov/CRPC/Pub/Reports/CRPC_AR2022.pdf ↑

8. In re Application of Snyder (1923) 62 Cal.App. 697, 701. ↑

9. In re Application of Rider (1920) 50 Cal.App 797, 799. ↑

10. Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (b). ↑

11. Beltram v. Appellate Department (1977) 66 Cal.App. 3d 711, 717; People v. Kingston (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d Supp. 879. ↑

Date of Hearing:

Counsel: Dustin Weber

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON

Nick Schultz, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:

Author:() – As Ver:

SUMMARY:

Clarifies that the misdemeanor for willfully refusing or neglecting to allow an attorney to visit a prisoner when a proper application is made applies to an officer having charge of a prisoner when the prisoner is in jail, prison, medical setting, or hospital.

EXISTING LAW:

1. States that a defendant shall be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 48 hours after his or her arrest, except as provided. (Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (a)(1).)
2. Establishes that after the arrest, any attorney may, at the request of the prisoner or any relative of the prisoner, visit the prisoner. Any officer having charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow that attorney to visit a prisoner is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any officer having a prisoner in charge, who refuses to allow the attorney to visit the prisoner when proper application is made, shall forfeit and pay to the party aggrieved the sum of $500, to be recovered by action in any court of competent jurisdiction. (Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (b).)
3. Provides that any physician and surgeon, including a psychiatrist, licensed to practice in this state, or any psychologist licensed to practice in this state who holds a doctoral degree and has at least two years of experience in the diagnosis and treatment of emotional and mental disorders, who is employed by the prisoner or his or her attorney to assist in the preparation of the defense, shall be permitted to visit the prisoner while he or she is in custody. (Pen. Code, § 825.5.)
4. Specifies that prosecution for an offense is commenced when any of the following occurs:
   1. An indictment or information is filed.
   2. A complaint is filed charging a misdemeanor or infraction.
   3. The defendant is arraigned on a complaint that charges the defendant with a felony.
   4. An arrest warrant or bench warrant is issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint. (CITATION)
5. States that a proceeding for the examination before a magistrate of a person on a charge of a felony must be commenced by written complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant and filed with the magistrate. Such complaint may be verified on information and belief. (Pen. Code, § 806.)
6. States that a person who is specified or designated in a warrant of arrest for a misdemeanor offense may be released upon the issuance of a citation, in lieu of physical arrest, unless the person requires medical examination or medical care or was otherwise unable to care for his or her own safety. (Pen. Code, § 827.1, subd. (f).)
7. Establishes that when the defendant first appears for arraignment on a charge of having committed a public offense, the magistrate shall immediately inform the defendant of the charge against him or her, and of his or her right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 858, subd. (a).)
8. States that at the time the defendant appears before the magistrate for arraignment, if the public offense is a felony to which the defendant has not pleaded guilty, as specified, the magistrate, immediately upon the appearance of counsel, or if none appears, after waiting a reasonable time therefor, shall set a time for the examination of the case and shall allow not less than two days, excluding Sundays and holidays, for the district attorney and the defendant to prepare for the examination. (Pen. Code, § 859b.)
9. Defines the following persons as magistrates:
   1. The judges of the Supreme Court.
   2. The judges of the courts of appeal.
   3. The judges of the superior courts. (Pen. Code, § 808.)

FISCAL EFFECT:

Unknown

COMMENTS:

1. Author's Statement: According to the author, “No incarcerated person should lose their constitutional right to meet with their attorney because they are receiving medical care. AB 2286 clarifies that when someone in custody is being held in a medical setting, their attorney must still be allowed to meet with them so they can meaningfully participate in their defense. Ensuring consistent access to counsel protects due process, strengthens the integrity of our justice system, and helps ensure that people facing serious medical issues are not further disadvantaged in their legal proceedings.”
2. Effect of the Bill: AB 2286 clarifies additional situations where willful or neglectful denial of access to counsel could be punished as a misdemeanor and with a fine.

The author notes, “defense attorneys and public defenders have [experienced] refusal from sheriffs to see their clients while they were hospitalized.” They additionally cite the importance of clarifying in statute that the sheriffs or other personnel looking after incarcerated people should not be authorized to block a person’s access to counsel in a hospital or medical setting.

This bill would modify Section 825(b) of the Penal Code to clarify that a law enforcement officer with charge over a prisoner in a hospital or medical setting is subject to a misdemeanor penalty and $500 fine should the officer willfully refuse or neglect access to an attorney to visit the prisoner following proper application. The bill eliminates parts of the first sentence of Section 825(b) that state an attorney requesting a visit with a prisoner must be an attorney of record authorized to practice in California, a relative of the prisoner can make the request for the attorney visit, and that the authorization to visit the prisoner begins after the arrest.

Eliminating the “after the arrest” language is unlikely to create any differences on the ground as someone being a “prisoner” essentially presupposes the person already has been “arrest[ed].” The removal of the language permitting a relative to request an attorney visit the prisoner is probably also unlikely to change much in practice, given California regulations already authorize relatives to make these requests. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3178, subd. (d)(5).) The elimination of the Section 825(b) language also suggests that any licensed attorney, regardless of the jurisdiction where the attorney is licensed, would be permitted to request a visit with a prisoner in a hospital or medical setting.

It is unclear how much impact this bill will have because there appears to be no statewide reliable data tracking incidents where a prisoner is denied access to counsel in a hospital or medical setting. By establishing clear punishment in statute for denying access to counsel in hospitals and medical settings, however, this bill could help reduce or eliminate even anecdotal reports of officers denying a prisoner’s access to counsel under these conditions.

1. The Right to Counsel: The accused’s constitutional right to a speedy and public trial includes the right of a person in police custody to be promptly brought before a magistrate and formally charged. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Youngblood v. Gates (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1302, 1308-1309.) An accused’s right to a speedy appearance before a magistrate is implemented by Section 825 of the Penal Code. (Ibid; Pen. Code, § 825, subd. (a).) The primary reasons for the requirement of prompt arraignment are to “prevent secret police interrogation, to place the issue of probable cause for the arrest before a judicial officer, to provide the defendant with full advice as to his rights and an opportunity to have counsel appointed, and to enable him to apply for bail or for habeas corpus when necessary.” (People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 244.)
   

The right of an accused, confined in any place of detention, to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel is “one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the American criminal law – a right that no legislature or court can ignore or violate.” (In re Application of Rider (1920) 50 Cal.App. 797, 799 [italics added].) In California, the right of the accused to consult with counsel is guaranteed by our Constitution. (Ibid.)

While hospitals and their staff may restrict access to counsel in particular cases, like where such a meeting would interfere with hospital operations or compromise the person’s medical care, no attorney should be required to give the officer in charge of the prisoner the reason why he desired a private consultation with his client. (In re Application of Snyder (1923) 62 Cal.App. 697, 701.) Requiring an attorney to give the officer in charge the reason why he desires a private interview with his client could give such officer the power to determine whether such reasons were sufficient or not to grant such an interview. (Ibid.) To give the officer the right to demand the reason for a private interview with counsel in these situations, and to adopt such a rule, would improperly substitute the judgment of the officer for the judgment of the prisoner and his counsel. (Ibid.)

Our Supreme Court found that a delay in being taken before a magistrate was valid where that delay only lasted seven days and appearance before a magistrate before the accused was medically cleared would have jeopardized his health. (People v. Lane (1961) 56 Cal.2d 773, 780-781.) Importantly, however, the court noted in this case that the delay was not the product of police indifference nor any attempt to prevent the defendant from communicating with loved ones or counsel. (Id. at p. 781.) In another case, a court observed that the law did not require booking of the accused to be completed being the accused is given access to counsel, and the accused is not required to state they want to see a specific attorney. (Beltram v. Appellate Department (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 711, 716-718.) Regarding whom qualifies as the “aggrieved” party, the court noted that because the statute clearly is intended to protect the right of the accused to confer with counsel, the accused is the aggrieved party. (Beltram, supra, at p. 717-18.)

Writing in dissent in a case involving the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, the estimable Justice Thurgood Marshall noted that where “a practical advantage is achieved only at the cost of permitting the police to disregard the limitations that the Constitution places on their behavior, [this is] a cost that a constitutional democracy cannot long absorb.” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 288 [Marshall, J. dissenting].) The right to counsel is foundational to our criminal justice system and this system is currently reeling, particularly from myriad federal attacks. Insofar as the right to counsel is not already secured under California and federal law, in the context of a prisoner requesting consultation with an attorney in a hospital or medical setting, AB 2286 could help fortify that right.

1. Argument in Support: According to La Defensa, “I write to express our strong support for AB 2286 (Bryan), which ensures access to counsel for incarcerated people who are hospitalized.

“AB 2286 (Bryan) clarifies that when an incarcerated person is transferred to a hospital and that attorneys must be allowed to meet with their clients regardless of whether the client is held in a jail, prison, or hospital setting.

“California law guarantees that people in custody have the right to consult with their attorney. In practice, however, this right is often denied when a person is transferred to a hospital. Defense attorneys across the state report that sheriffs frequently refuse attorney visits, decline to share basic information about a client’s status, and at times ignore court orders authorizing access.

“When attorneys cannot meet with hospitalized clients, cases stall and courts are left without critical information needed to move proceedings forward. Attorneys must be able to assess a client’s wellbeing, make informed litigation decisions, obtain necessary waivers, and advise courts on whether proceedings can continue. Denying access undermines due process and wastes judicial resources.

“AB 2286 (Bryan) provides a clear and practical solution. For these reasons, we support AB 2286.”

1. Argument in Opposition: None submitted.
   
2. Related Legislation:
   1. AB 1905 (Schultz) would prohibit a law enforcement officer from seeking statements or information while working undercover, or by individuals working in collaboration with, or acting as agents of, law enforcement, from a person who was 17 years of age or younger during the commission of crime and who is in custody. AB 1905 is pending a vote on the Assembly floor.
      
   2. SB 1401 (Stern) would authorize, among other things, a county behavioral health agency and jail medical provider to share confidential medical records and other relevant information with the court for the purpose of determining likelihood of eligibility for behavioral health services and programs pursuant to the above provisions. SB 1401 is pending hearing in the Senate Public Safety Committee.
3. Prior Legislation:
   1. SB 821 (Arreguin), of the 2025-26 Legislative Session, would have required the court to promptly, but no later than 48 hours after a warrantless arrest, review the basis for the arrest and make an initial determination whether probable cause exists that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person committed it if the defendant remains in custody. SB 821 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
   2. AB 2215 (Bryan), Chapter 954, Statutes of 2024, authorized an arresting officer to release an arrested person from custody without bringing the person before a magistrate if the person is, subsequent to being arrested, delivered or referred to a public health or social service organization that provides specified services and no further proceedings are desirable.
   3. AB 61 (Bryan), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would have required a person to be taken before the magistrate within 48 hours of their arrest, and would have required that the court make an initial determination of probable cause, as specified, no more than 48 hours after the warrantless arrest. AB 61 died on the inactive file on the Assembly floor.
   4. AB 1209 (Jones Sawyer), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would have required representation by counsel to commence as soon as feasible after being notified of a person’s arrest, but always within 24 hours after booking or sufficiently before the arraignment to allow the provision of meaningful representation. AB 1209 was held in suspense in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

ACLU California Action
All of US or None (HQ)
All of US or None Orange County
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Coalition for Women's Prisoners
California Public Defenders Association
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ)
Courage California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Families Inspiring Reentry & Reunification 4 Everyone (FIR4E)
Justice2jobs Coalition
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Local 148 Los Angeles County Public Defender's Union
Rubicon Programs
San Francisco Public Defender
San Quentin Skunkworks
Smart Justice California, a Project of Beyond Impact
The W. Haywood Burns Institute
2 Private Individuals

Opposition

None submitted.

Analysis Prepared by: