AB 237: Crimes: threats.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2025-07-03
Current Status:
In Progress
(2025-09-13: Ordered to inactive file at the request of Senator Grayson.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined. Under existing law, this crime is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for no more than one year for a misdemeanor, or by imprisonment in state prison for a felony.
This bill would make it a crime for a person to willfully threaten, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime at specified locations, including a daycare and workplace, with specific intent that the statement is be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or person to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at the specified locations. This bill would make this crime, for a person 18 years of age or older, punishable as a wobbler by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months or 2 or 3 years. If a person under 18 years of age commits this crime, the bill would make this crime punishable as require the person to be referred to specified services in lieu of being declared a ward of the court, if eligible. If the person is ineligible, the bill would require the offense to be punished as a misdemeanor. By creating a new crime, crime and imposing additional duties on local governments, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined. Under existing law, this crime is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for no more than one year for a misdemeanor, or by imprisonment in state prison for a felony.
This bill would make it a crime for a person to willfully threaten, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime at specified locations, including a daycare and workplace, with specific intent that the statement is be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or person to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at the specified locations. This bill would make this crime crime, for a person 18 years of age or older, punishable as a wobbler by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months or 2 or 3 years. If a person under 18 years of age commits this crime, the bill would make this crime punishable as a misdemeanor. By creating a new crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined. Under existing law, this crime is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for no more than one year for a misdemeanor, or by imprisonment in state prison for a felony.
This bill would make it a crime for a person to threaten willfully threaten, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime at specified locations, including a daycare and workplace, with reckless disregard, as defined. specific intent that the statement is be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or person to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at the specified locations. This bill would make this crime punishable as a wobbler by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months or 2 or 3 years. By creating a new crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined. Under existing law, this crime is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for no more than one year for a misdemeanor, or by imprisonment in state prison for a felony.
This bill would make it a crime for a person to threaten to commit a crime at specified locations, including a daycare and workplace, with reckless disregard, as defined. By creating a new crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who willfully threatens, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if that threat causes a person or person persons to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at these locations, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b)If a person who commits an act in violation of subdivision (a) is under 18 years of age, the person is guilty of shall be referred to services pursuant to Section 654 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if eligible. If ineligible, the offense shall be punished as a misdemeanor.
(c)This section does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution for certain costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district because, in that regard, this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
(a)Any Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who willfully threatens, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if that threat causes a person or person to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at these locations, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b)If a person who commits an act in violation of subdivision (a) is under 18 years of age, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b)(c)This section does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Any person who threatens willfully threatens, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, medical facility, or public venue with reckless disregard or medical facility with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if that threat causes a person or person to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at these locations, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or by imprisonment in the state prison. pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b)For purposes of this section, the threat described in subdivision (a) includes a threat conveyed in or as an image as well as a threat posted on or published through any medium, including, but not limited to, an internet web page or the World Wide Web.(c)For purposes of this section, a person threatens with reckless disregard when the person making the threat is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the threat will cause another person of ordinary emotions and sensibilities to fear for their safety, the safety of a family member, or the safety of a person at the threatened daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, medical facility, or public venue.(b)This section does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Any person who threatens to commit a crime at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, medical facility, or public venue with reckless disregard shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(b)For purposes of this section, the threat described in subdivision (a) includes a threat conveyed in or as an image as well as a threat posted on or published through any medium, including, but not limited to, an internet web page or the World Wide Web.
(c)For purposes of this section, a person threatens with reckless disregard when the person making the threat is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the threat will cause another person of ordinary emotions and sensibilities to fear for their safety, the safety of a family member, or the safety of a person at the threatened daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, medical facility, or public venue.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Sep 13, 2025 | Ordered to inactive file at the request of Senator Grayson. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (August 29). |
| Aug 18, 2025 | In committee: Referred to suspense file. |
| Jul 3, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 2, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (July 1). |
| Jun 18, 2025 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 4, 2025 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| Jun 3, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 75. Noes 0. Page 2001.) |
| May 27, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (May 23). |
| May 23, 2025 | Assembly Rule 63 suspended. (Ayes 51. Noes 16. Page 1644.) |
| Apr 9, 2025 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Mar 6, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 5, 2025 | Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 4, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 0.) (March 4). |
| Feb 10, 2025 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jan 14, 2025 | From printer. May be heard in committee February 13. |
| Jan 13, 2025 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
|
Description
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Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 29, 2025 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 18, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 1, 2025 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jun 3, 2025 | AB 237 Patel Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 23, 2025 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Mar 4, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aclu California Action | ** Against | |
| Alliance for Boys and Men of Color | ** Against | |
| Arcadia Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Black Organizing Project | ** Against | |
| Brea Police Association | ** Support | |
| Burbank Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice | ** Against | |
| California Association Of Highway Patrolmen | ** Support | |
| California Association of School Police Chiefs | ** Support | |
| California Attorneys For Criminal Justice | ** Against | |
| California Civil Liberties Advocacy | ** Against | |
| California Coalition of School Safety Professionals | ** Support | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | |
| California Narcotic Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Support | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Against | |
| California Reserve Peace Officers Association | ** Support | |
| California School Employees Association | ** Support | |
| Californians United for a Responsible Budget | ** Against | |
| city of carlsbad | ** Support | |
| City Of San Diego | ** Support | |
| City of Santa Rosa | ** Support | |
| City of Whittier | ** Support | |
| CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Community Asset Development Redefining Education | ** Against | |
| Corona Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Culver City Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Disability Rights California | ** Against | |
| East Bay Community Law Center | ** Against | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Against | |
| Fresh Lifelines for Youth | ** Against | |
| Fullerton Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Hindu American Foundation, INC. | ** Support | |
| Initiate Justice | ** Against | |
| Justice2jobs Coalition | ** Against | |
| LA Defensa | ** Against | |
| League Of California Cities | ** Support | |
| Local 148 La County Public Defenders Union | ** Against | |
| Los Angeles School Police Management Association | ** Support | |
| los angeles school police officers association | ** Support | |
| Murrieta Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association | ** Support | |
| Newport Beach Police Association | ** Support | |
| Palos Verdes Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Peace Officers Research Association Of California | ** Support | |
| PLACER COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Pomona Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Public Counsel | ** Against | |
| Rancho Bernardo Community Council | ** Support | |
| RIVERSIDE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Riverside Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| San Diego County District Attorney's Office (source) | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Public Defender | ** Against | |
| Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office | ** Support | |
| Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition | ** Against | |
| Smart Justice California, a project of Tides Advocacy | ** Against | |
| The Collective for Liberatory Lawyering | ** Against | |
| United Administrators of Southern California | ** Support | |
| Youth Law Center | ** Against |
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 237 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 237
Author: Patel (D), et al.
Amended: 7/3/25 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 7/1/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 8/29/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Dahle, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 75-0, 6/3/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Crimes: threats
SOURCE: San Diego County District Attorney’s Office
DIGEST:
This bill creates a new crime of threatening to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor.
ANALYSIS:
Existing Law:
- States that any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement made (either verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic device) is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and which thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or that of their family, is guilty of a crime punishable either as a misdemeanor or felony, as specified. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 422.)
- States that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his or her duties, by means of a directly-communicated threat to the person, to inflict unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd, (a).)
- States that any person who with intent to annoy, telephones another or contacts him or her by means of an electronic device, and threatens to inflict injury on the person or the person’s family, or to the person’s property is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 653m, subd. (a).)
- Provides that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause or causes, another to refrain from exercising his or her religion or from engaging in a religious service by means of a threat directly communicated to such a person to inflict an injury upon the person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such a threat could be carried out, is guilty of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 11412.)
- Provides that any person who knowingly threatens to use a weapon of mass destruction with the specific intent that the statement, as defined, or a statement made by means of an electronic device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear of for personal safety or that of their family is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, § 11418.5, subd. (a).)
- Defines a "hate crime" as a criminal act committed, in whole or in part, because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim:
- Disability;
- Gender;
- Nationality;
- Race or ethnicity;
- Religion;
- Sexual orientation;
- Association with a person or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics. (Pen. Code, § 422.55, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a “hate crime” includes but is not limited to violating or interfering with the exercise of civil rights, or knowingly defacing, destroying, or damaging property because of actual or perceived characteristics of the victim that fit the “hate crime definition.” (Pen. Code, §§ 422.55, subds. (a) & (b), 422.6, subds. (a) & (b).)
- Provides that a conviction for violating or interfering with the civil rights of another on the basis of actual or perceived characteristics of the victim that fit the “hate crime” definition is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or by both the above imprisonment and fine, and a minimum of community service, not to exceed 400 hours, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.6, subd. (c).)
- Makes any other hate crime that is not punishable by imprisonment in the state prison a wobbler (punishable alternatively as a misdemeanor or county jail felony) if the crime is committed against the person or property of another for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with that other person’s free exercise or enjoyment of any constitutional right under any of the following circumstances:
- The crime against the person either includes the present ability to commit a violent injury or causes actual physical injury;
- The crime against property causes damage in excess of $950; or,
- The person charged with a crime under this provision has been convicted previously of a hate crime or conspiracy to commit a hate crime, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.7.)
- The crime against the person either includes the present ability to commit a violent injury or causes actual physical injury;
- Provides that unless punishable under the provision above:
- A person who commits a felony that is a hate crime or attempts to do so, shall receive an additional term of one, two, or three years in the state prison, at the court's discretion; and,
- A person who commits a felony that is a hate crime, or attempts to do so, and who voluntarily acted in concert with another person in the commission of the crime shall receive an additional term of two, three, or four years in the state prison. (Pen. Code, § 422.75, subds. (a) & (b).)
- A person who commits a felony that is a hate crime or attempts to do so, shall receive an additional term of one, two, or three years in the state prison, at the court's discretion; and,
- Provides that every person who intentionally disturbs or disquiets any assemblage of people met for religious worship at a tax-exempt place of worship, by profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary noise, either within the place where the meeting is held, or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the meeting, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by both. (Pen. Code, § 302.)
This Bill:
- Provides that any person who, willfully threatens, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if that threat causes a person or person to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at these locations, is guilty of a crime.
- States that the new crime is an alternate felony-misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or in county jail for 16 months, 2, or 3 years pursuant to realignment.
- Specifies that a person under 18 years of age who commits this crime is guilty of a misdemeanor.
- States that this crime does not preclude punishment under any other law, but prohibits dual conviction for this crime and the general criminal threats statute based on the same threat.
Background:
In order to convict a person under the current criminal threat statute, Penal Code section 422, the prosecutor must prove the following:
- that the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person;
- that the defendant made the threat;
- that the defendant intended that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out;
- that the threat was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat;
- that the threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety; and,
- that the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances. (Pen. Code, §422; CALCRIM No. 1300; see also People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)
Penal Code section 422 applies to all criminal threats which will result in death or great bodily injury regardless of location or the exact type of violence that is threatened. This bill seeks to create the specific crime of criminal threats when the threat is to take place at a daycare, school campus, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility. This new crime is very similar to the existing criminal threats statute. Some prosecutors argue that the current criminal threats statute does not fit well into instances of threats to locations in general rather than to specific persons.
However, a recent example illustrating the existing law's application to threats of violence on school grounds notwithstanding no specified target can be found in an appellate court's recent ruling. In In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, A.G., a high school student posted an image of a realistic-looking gun replica with the caption, “Everybody goes to school tomorrow. I’m taking gum [sic],” on his Snapchat account, which was visible to about 60 “friends.” (Id. at p. 650.) Another student saw the post, “worried when she saw the story because she knew school shootings happened regularly”, and alerted a teacher. (Id. at p. 651.) This same student saw a subsequent post by A.G. saying, “Everyone, it wasn't real. I was xanned out.” But this did not alleviate her fear. (Ibid.) The juvenile court found this conduct was sufficient to constitute a violation of the criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422. (Id. at p. 650.) The minor appealed alleging insufficient evidence to support the adjudication. Specifically, the minor alleged that the evidence failed to show: “(1) he intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a threat; (2) he willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or cause great bodily injury to anyone; (3) he intended to threaten D.J. or Henriquez specifically; (4) any alleged threat was unequivocal or unambiguous to reasonably sustain fear in either D.J. or Henriquez; or (5) any threat to D.J. or Henriquez was sufficiently immediate to place either of them in fear.” (Id. at p. 653.) The appellate court disagreed with all of A.G.’s contentions and affirmed. (Id. at p. 659.)
In other words, courts have upheld convictions/juvenile adjudications in these circumstances. Additionally, as to places of worship, general threats which do not single out an individual can be prosecuted under hate crime laws or a violation of Penal Code section 11412.
The existing crime of criminal threats is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. (Pen. Code, § 422.) When a criminal threats conviction is punished as a felony, it is also becomes a serious felony for purposes of enhanced punishment under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, 1192.7. subd. (c)(38)) and the five-year prison enhancement for prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667). Additionally it triggers credit earning limitations. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12; see also People v. Moore (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 74.)
This bill would also punish the new crime as an alternate felony or misdemeanor, with the felony punishment being served in county jail rather than state prison. However, this bill does not add the newly-created crime of criminal threats directed at a daycare, school, university, workplace, place of worship, or medical facility to the serious-felony list. Therefore, credits limitations and future enhanced penalty provisions for prior convictions would not apply. This bill would also specify that a minor committing this offense can be adjudicated only of a misdemeanor.
Because of the differences in punishment, the creation of this new crime gives prosecutors additional charging options and judges additional sentencing options.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crime created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. While most individuals incarcerated under this bill will serve their sentences in county jail, this bill specifies that violations are punishable “pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” Under subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, if the defendant has specified prior felony convictions, the sentence for a felony shall be served in the state prison. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. Potential cost pressures (General Fund) to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), in order to adequately house, treat, and care for persons committed to DSH that otherwise would not. Cost pressures to DSH are connected with an increase in state prison sentences. Creating a new crime will increase the number of defendants declared incompetent to stand trial (IST), or committed to DSH due to their being not guilty by reason of insanity. Unknown, potentially significant costs to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to adjudicate the increased criminal penalties in this bill. Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (local funds, General Fund) to county probation departments of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, if individuals convicted under this bill, particularly people under the age of 18 who must be referred to services, are supervised locally in the community in lieu of or in addition to incarceration. Actual supervision costs will vary by each county probation department and how many individuals sentenced to probation, mandatory supervision, or post release community supervision as a result of this bill.
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/29/2025)
San Diego County District Attorney's Office (source)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of Highway Patrolmen
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
California School Employees Association
City of Carlsbad
City of San Diego
City of Santa Rosa
City of Whittier
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Hindu American Foundation, INC.
League of California Cities
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Rancho Bernardo Community Council
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
United Administrators of Southern California
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/29/2025)
ACLU California Action
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color
Black Organizing Project
California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice
California Public Defenders Association
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Community Asset Development Re-defining Education
Disability Rights California
East Bay Community Law Center
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Fresh Lifelines for Youth
Initiate Justice
Justice2jobs Coalition
LA Defensa
Public Counsel
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
The Collective for Liberatory Lawyering
Youth Law Center
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:
According to the San Diego District Attorney:
Current laws are outdated and do not meet the imperative safety needs of communities across our state.
The increased availability of anonymized software applications has led to a rise in threats against schools. Whether these threats are legitimate or not, they have a significant impact on the community. Lockdowns and ripple effects of fear and trauma grip what should be protected spaces, regardless of whether the threat turns out to be legitimate or not….
Between 2015 and 2023, the San Diego District Attorney's Juvenile Division reviewed 293 school threat cases, resulting in 127 cases being filed. Last year, the division collected data on school threat cases submitted by law enforcement for potential formal charges. They reviewed 49 reports and filed criminal charges in 9 cases. One of the main challenges in filing charges was identifying a named victim. Often, if law enforcement locates someone who could be a potential victim in a threat made to a school, that person is either reluctant to come forward or does not express fear. Another common hurdle was that some threatening language did not meet the criteria of Penal Code 422, which requires the threat to be clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific.
The increase in violent threats directed at schools has generated significant fear, anxiety, and frustration among educators, students, and parents. Threats to "shoot up" schools must be taken seriously and investigated thoroughly. Consequently, hundreds of schools are losing valuable classroom time, police resources are being misallocated, and children and parents feel frightened and alarmed….
Current law prohibits any individual from willfully threatening to commit a crime that could result in death or serious bodily injury to another person, especially if such threats cause the targeted individual or their family to experience ongoing fear for their safety. This offense can be charged as either a misdemeanor or a felony. However, under existing law, if someone posts images of a handgun on social media with a caption indicating they plan to "shoot up" a school and does not explicitly threaten an individual, then they do not violate the criminal threats statute.
Within our county, a preliminary hearing was held for a defendant who sent out hundreds of email threats to commit a mass shooting at Shoal Creek Elementary School. The judge dismissed the case because the threatening emails were not sent directly to the school. It was ruled that the existing criminal threat statute requires the threat to be specific to a threatened person.
The students, parents, staff, and faculty of Shoal Creek Elementary were left unprotected by California law when charges were dismissed because the threats were not specific to a person. The gap in existing law that resulted in the dismissal of charges instilled fear, trauma, and disruption in the lives of the families and children of the community.
AB 237 explicitly addresses threats of school shootings and does not require proof of a specifically targeted individual or evidence of sustained fear from any one person. This legislation fills a gap left by existing laws regarding bombs and criminal threats. It empowers law enforcement to respond decisively to terrorism-related incidents, ensuring thorough investigations and holding offenders accountable for their actions. It's a critical step toward enhancing public safety and delivering justice.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION:
According to the American Civil Liberties Union California Action:
While ensuring that our schools, workplaces, houses of worship, hospitals, and public venues are safe spaces is of the utmost importance, we do not believe this bill is necessary to accomplish that goal. Current law, Penal Code § 422, makes it a felony to willfully threaten to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying the threat out. Current law already punishes criminal threats in all settings.
Moreover, we caution against expanding §422 because the existing law’s enforcement is often problematic. Penal Code Section §422 is often misused to penalize conduct that does not truly belong in the criminal justice system. Penal Code section §422, like AB 237, does not require that the person making the threat have either the intent or the ability to carry it out, or that the person take any action to carry out the threat. Defendants – often young people, or individuals with mental health issues – face criminal punishment for mere words even when they have no intent to take any action. This is particularly true for those with mental health conditions, who often suffer from crippling paranoia and delusions. The fear they experience can lead them to say things that are easily misinterpreted threats as a y a product of their illness. Thus, expanding this statute is not the avenue that the Legislature should use to address this issue.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 75-0, 6/3/25
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Elhawary, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bryan, Kalra, McKinnor, Celeste Rodriguez
Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. /
8/29/25 20:27:47
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 237 (Patel) - Crimes: threats
Version: July 3, 2025 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 6 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: Yes |
Hearing Date: August 18, 2025 | Consultant: Liah Burnley |
Bill Summary:
AB 237 creates a new crime of threatening to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility.
Fiscal Impact:
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crime created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. For example, in 2021, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail spending, including $89,580 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. While most individuals incarcerated under this bill will serve their sentences in county jail, this bill specifies that violations are punishable “pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” Under subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, if the defendant has specified prior felony convictions, the sentence for a felony shall be served in the state prison. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. Thus, if even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR.
- Potential cost pressures (General Fund) to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), in order to adequately house, treat, and care for persons committed to DSH that otherwise would not. Cost pressures to DSH are connected with an increase in state prison sentences. Creating a new crime will increase the number of defendants declared incompetent to stand trial (IST), or committed to DSH due to their being not guilty by reason of insanity. DSH’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2025-26 totals $3.4 billion – an increase of $3.4 million from the 2024 Budget Act. An increase the DSH population would result in the need for additional funding.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to adjudicate the increased criminal penalties in this bill. Defendants are constitutionally guaranteed certain rights during criminal proceedings, including the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel (at public expense if the defendants are unable to afford the costs of representation). Increasing penalties leads to lengthier and more complex court proceedings with attendant workload and resource costs to the court. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknowns, including the numbers of people charged with an offense and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. This is a conservative estimate, based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. In 2023–24, over 4.8 million cases were filed statewide in the superior courts, including 77,850 nontraffic infractions, 451,647 misdemeanor cases, and 179,821 felony cases. Filings increased over the past year, driven mostly by misdemeanors and infractions, and civil limited cases. The increase in filings from the previous year is greater than 5% for civil limited and unlimited, appellate division appeals, juvenile delinquency, misdemeanors and infractions, and probate. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations.
- Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (local funds, General Fund) to county probation departments of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, if individuals convicted under this bill, particularly people under the age of 18 who must be referred to services, are supervised locally in the community in lieu of or in addition to incarceration. Actual supervision costs will vary by each county probation department and how many individuals sentenced to probation, mandatory supervision, or post release community supervision as a result of this bill. It is not clear whether the county probation duties imposed by this bill constitute a reimbursable state mandate or whether they may be subject to Proposition 30 (2012). Proposition 30 provides that legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for programs or levels of service mandated by realignment applies to local agencies only to the extent the state provides annual funding for the cost increase.
Background:
In order to convict a person under the criminal threat statute, Penal Code section 422, a prosecutor must prove the following: that the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person; that the defendant made the threat; that the defendant intended that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out; that the threat was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat; that the threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety; and, that the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances. (Pen. Code, §422; CALCRIM No. 1300; see also People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.) Penal Code section 422 applies to all criminal threats regardless of location or the exact type of violence that is threatened. Despite assertions that the current criminal threats statute is insufficient and does not cover a general threat to people at a school or place of worship, courts have upheld convictions/juvenile adjudications of general threats that do not target a specific person. (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647; In re L.F. (June 3, 2015, A142296) [nonpub. opn.].)
Proposed Law:
- Provides that any person who willfully threatens, by any means, including, but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on an internet web page, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person or persons threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if that threat causes a person or persons to reasonably be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of others at these locations, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or as a felony by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
- Provides that, if a person who commits a violation is under 18 years of age, the person shall be referred to services as specified, if eligible. If ineligible, the offense shall be punished as a misdemeanor.
- Provides that these provisions not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422 of the Penal Code.
Related Legislation:
- SB 19 (Rubio) is substantially similar to this bill and applies to “grounds of a school or place of worship”. SB 19 is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 796 (Alvarado-Gil), 2023, was substantially similar to this bill. SB 796 was held under submission in Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- AB 2768 (Melendez), 2018, was substantially similar to this bill. AB 2768 was held on the Suspense File of the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
- SB 110 (Fuller), 2015, was substantially similar to this bill. SB 110 was vetoed. In his veto message, Governor Brown stated, “[…] the offensive conduct covered by this bill is already illegal. In recent decades, California has created an unprecedented number of new and detailed criminal laws. Before we keep enacting more, I think we should pause and reflect on the fact that our bulging criminal code now contains in excess of 5,000 separate provisions, covering almost every conceivable form of human misbehavior.”
Staff Comments:
Mass incarceration in California did not occur in a vacuum; it was the result of decades of cumulative policy decisions, that while well-intentioned, collectively expanded the scope and severity of the criminal justice system. Although individual pieces of legislation like this bill, and many others introduced this legislative session, may appear narrow or incremental, their combined effect will significantly increase incarceration rates. California has a well-documented history of prison overcrowding, which culminated in federal court intervention and a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Plata (2011) that found the state’s prison conditions unconstitutional due to severe overcrowding. Returning to such conditions would undermine fiscal sustainability, public safety, and rehabilitation goals.
The state strives to have a balanced system that preserves public safety while remaining fiscally responsible. Given the state’s fiscal situation, the May Revision to the Governor’s 2025-26 Budget proposes to close one additional prison by October 2026. Upon full closure, the state will achieve an estimated savings of about $150 million General Fund annually. Measures that increase the incarcerated population threaten the state’s ability to continue making progress in right-sizing California’s prison system.
-- END --
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 237
Author:(Patel)
As Amended Ver:May 23, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Creates a new crime for a person to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in great bodily injury or death at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility, as specified.
Major Provisions
- States that any person who willfully threatens by any means, including but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on the internet, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility, with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor.
- Requires the threat, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, to be so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the persons or persons threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat and that it causes a person or persons to be reasonably in sustained fear for their safety or the safety of others at these locations.
- Makes the new crime, if committed by a person 18 years of age or older, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for no more than one year or imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months, or two or three years.
- Specifies that if a person who commits the new crime is under 18 years of age, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
- Specifies that the bill's provisions do not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and existing Penal Code Section 422.
COMMENTS
According to the Author
"The rise of threats against sensitive locations has continued to increase. Paired with the increasing number of actual violent acts in schools, synagogues, public venues, institutions, and care facilities, we must be able to act even when the crime is just a threat. AB 237 closes a loophole in Penal Code 422 that complicates prosecution and clarifies that it's criminal to threaten a location. It's common sense to understand that threatening a building threatens people in that building."
Arguments in Support
According to California District Attorneys Association, a co-sponsor of this bill:
"Currently, prosecutors rely upon Penal Code section 422 to prosecute threats to do violence on school grounds, places of worship or other public places. However, PC 422 has limitations that prevents its effective use as a tool to hold all offenders accountable who make true threats directed at our schools and places of worship. Because PC 422 requires proof that the criminal threat causes a victim to be in sustained fear, these prosecutions are difficult to prove when the offender does not identify a specific target but instead communicates a threat to commit a violent act at a place where many potential people could be in harm's way such as a school or a place of worship.
"Penal Code section 422's requirement that the threat caused sustained fear in a victim presents real world challenges. In 2023, a 38 year-old man sent hundreds of emails threatening to commit a shooting at Shoal Creek Elementary School in San Diego's Carmel Mountain Ranch community. The different emails included the same sentence that read "I'm going to commit mass shootings at 11775 Shoal Creek elementary school, San Diego, CA 92128." At the preliminary hearing, the judge dismissed the Penal Code section 422 prosecution because the threatening emails were not sent directly to the school. The judge ruled that the law requires the threat to be specific towards a targeted person."
Man accused of threatening mass shooting at San Diego elementary school charged again – NBC 7 San Diego
Arguments in Opposition
According to the Californians United for a Responsible Budget:
"California law already provides broad protection against criminal threats. Current law makes it a felony to willfully threaten to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out. That standard has served California well by both protecting the public from criminal threats, but also ensuring that individuals are not convicted of the crime of making a threat unless the individual had some intent to make a threat."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts of an unknown but potentially significant amount to adjudicate cases of the new offense created by this bill. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time and resources needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2024-25 state budget provides $37.3 million ongoing General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Costs (local funds, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of the offense created by this bill. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000. The Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. Although county incarceration costs are generally not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012), overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from 2011 public safety realignment.
VOTES
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-0-4
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez, Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: May 23, 2025
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0000733
Date of Hearing: April 9, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 237
Author:(Patel) – As Amended Ver:March 5, 2025
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 9 - 0 |
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| ||
|
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill creates a new alternative felony-misdemeanor (“wobbler”) offense for willfully threatening to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to any person in a school, house of worship, or other specified location.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts of an unknown but potentially significant amount to adjudicate cases of the new offense created by this bill. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time and resources needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2024-25 state budget provides $37.3 million ongoing General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Costs (local funds, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of the offense created by this bill. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. Although county incarceration costs are generally not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012), overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from 2011 public safety realignment.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
The rise of threats against sensitive locations has continued to increase. Paired with the increasing number of actual violent acts in schools, synagogues, public venues, institutions, and care facilities, we must be able to act even when the crime is just a threat. AB 237 closes a loophole in Penal Code 422 that complicates prosecution and clarifies that it’s criminal to threaten a location. It’s common sense to understand that threatening a building threatens people in that building.
- Background. Under the existing offense of criminal threats, it is unlawful for a person to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the person’s statement is to be taken as a threat, even if the person had no intent of actually carrying the threat out. To obtain a conviction, such a threat must be so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and the threat must cause the person threatened to be in sustained, reasonable fear for their own safety or for their immediate family’s safety. Criminal threats is a wobbler, meaning the offense may be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor at the discretion of a prosecutor. Misdemeanor criminal threats is punishable by up to one year in county jail. Felony criminal threats is punishable by up to three years in state prison.
This bill criminalizes a threat to inflict violence at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility, even if the threat does not identify any particular person who will be harmed at the threatened institution. The bill creates a new wobbler for threatening to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury at any of these types of institutions. A misdemeanor conviction of the offense created by this bill is punishable by up to one year in county jail. A felony conviction of the offense created by this bill is punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in county jail. If a defendant has certain prior convictions, a felony conviction is punishable by incarceration in state prison.
- Related Legislation. SB 19 (Rubio) creates a wobbler for willfully threatening to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship. The maximum punishment for a minor convicted of the bill’s offense is a misdemeanor. SB 19 is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- Prior Legislation. SB 796 (Alvarado-Gil), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, was substantively the same as SB 19, described above. SB 796 was held on this committee’s suspense file.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing:
Deputy Chief Counsel: Stella Choe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 237
Author:(Patel) – As Introduced Ver:January 13, 2025
As Proposed to be Amended in Committee
SUMMARY:
Creates a new crime for a person to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in great bodily injury or death at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility, as specified. Specifically, this bill:
- States that any person who willfully threatens by any means, including but not limited to, an image or threat posted or published on the internet, to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person or persons at a daycare, school, university, workplace, house of worship, or medical facility, with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor.
- Requires the threat, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, to be so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the persons or persons threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat and that it causes a person or persons to be reasonably in sustained fear for their safety or the safety of others at these locations.
- Makes the new crime punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for no more than one year or imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months, or 2 or 3 years.
- Specifies that the bill’s provisions do not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and existing Penal Code Section 422
EXISTING LAW:
- States that any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement made (either verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic device) is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and which thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or that of their family, is guilty of a crime punishable either as a misdemeanor or felony, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.)
- States that any person who with intent to annoy, telephones another or contacts him or her by means of an electronic device, and threatens to inflict injury on the person or the person’s family, or to the person’s property is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 653m, subd. (a).)
- States that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his or her duties, by means of a directly-communicated threat to the person, to inflict unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a crime, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor on a first offense, and a felony on a second or subsequent offense. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd, (a).)
- States that any person who reports that a misdemeanor or felony has been committed knowing the report to be false is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 148.5.)
- States that any person who maliciously informs any other person that a bomb or other explosive has been or will be placed or secreted in any public or private place, knowing that the information is false, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishable in county jail not to exceed one year, or as a county jail-eligible felony. (Pen. Code, § 148.1, subd. (c).)
- Provides that any person who transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (18 U.S.C. § 875.)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “The rise of threats against sensitive locations has continued to increase. Paired with the increasing number of actual violent acts in schools, synagogues, public venues, institutions, and care facilities, we must be able to act even when the crime is just a threat. AB 237 closes a loophole in Penal Code 422 that complicates prosecution and clarifies that it’s criminal to threaten a location. It’s common sense to understand that threatening a building threatens people in that building.”
- First Amendment Considerations: A law that restricts speech has First Amendment implications. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” This fundamental right is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 121, 133-134, citing Gitlow v. People of New York (1925) 268 U.S. 652, 666.) Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution provides that: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
While these guarantees are stated in broad terms, “the right to free speech is not absolute.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 134, citing Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 708; and Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 359.) As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged: “Many crimes can consist solely of spoken words, such as soliciting a bribe (Pen. Code, § 653f), perjury (Pen. Code, § 118), or making a terrorist threat (Pen. Code, § 422).”
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid (R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 382), however, courts have upheld restrictions on content-based speech when the speech is “‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ Thus, for example, a State may punish those words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’” (In re J.M. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 668, 674, citing Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 358–359.)
True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. (In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698. Existing Penal Code section 422 has been found to be constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to apply only to true threats which is defined as a threat "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person . . . which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 233.)
As originally enacted, Penal Code section 422 was found to be unconstitutional and void for vagueness. (People v. Mirmirani (1981) 30 Cal.3d. 375, 383.) In order to meet the strict standard required for criminalizing content-based speech, the statute “must provide clear lines by which citizens, law enforcement officials, judges and juries can understand what is prohibited and what is not.” (Id. at p. 384.) In Mirmirani, the court noted that a threat can be penalized if “on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution. . . .” (Mirmirani, supra, 30 Cal.3d. at p. 388.) Following Mirmirani, the Legislature enacted a revised version of Penal Code section 422 to ensure the amended statute would not violate the First Amendment. (People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 802.)
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the requisite mental state for true threats. In Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 600 U.S. 66, the statute at issue made it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause that person serious emotional distress. (Counterman, supra, citing Colo. Rev. Stat. section 18-3-602(1)(c) (2022).) The defendant argued that the statute violated the First Amendment because it did not require proof of the speaker’s subjective intent, rather it required only that a reasonable person would have viewed the communication as threatening violence.
The Supreme Court held that for true threats to fall outside of the First Amendment’s protections, there must be a showing of the subjective mental state of the defendant in order to reduce the prospect of chilling fully protected speech. After reviewing the three basic categories of mens rea (purpose, knowledge, recklessness), the court found that a recklessness standard was sufficient. Specifically, this means the speaker consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the statement will be regarded as threatening violence and made the statement anyway. (Counterman, supra, 600 U.S. at p. 80.) Counterman addressed the minimum mens rea required to criminalize true threats. It did not reevaluate any other standards to determine whether a statement meets the other elements of a true threat.
- Prior Legislation and Existing Law: Threats of violence directed at particular locations such as schools and places of worship has been the subject of several bills in the past few years.[1] SB 796, of the 2023-2024 Legislative session, would have created a similar statute to existing Penal Code section 422 but applied its provisions to schools and places of worship and modified the sustained fear requirement so that it applied if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person. SB 796 was held in the Senate Appropriations’ suspense file. AB 907, of the 2019-2020 Legislative session, was substantially similar to SB 796, however, AB 907 was amended in policy committee to specify that the minor who commits the new offense is guilty of a misdemeanor rather than facing a potential felony acknowledging that concern raised by opposition that minors will be disproportionately prosecuted for the new crime. AB 907 was held in the Senate Appropriations’ suspense file.
Similar to the stated need for those prior bills, the sponsor of this bill argues that the current criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422, does fit well into instances of threats of violence at specific locations such as schools because often times threats posted on social media do not specify a targeted individual. Rather, the threat oftentimes applies to anyone present at those locations. Background materials provided by the author of this bill listed instances where the court dismissed charges because a specific individual was not the target of the threat. However, courts’ reading of the law appears to be mixed in various jurisdictions.
An example illustrating the existing law's application to threats of violence made to a group of people rather than naming a specific person as the target can be found in case law. In In re L.F. (June 3, 2015, A142296) [nonpub. opn.], the adjudged minor was a Fairfield High School student who posted on her Twitter account that she planned to bring a gun to school and shoot people. While she did note specified areas of the school and one of the campus monitors by name in some of her posts, her Tweets were generally targeted at all of the students and staff at the school. The petition filed against the minor alleged that the minor had made criminal threats against "Fairfield High School students and staff" instead of listing specific persons. (Id. at p. 4.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's ruling that the minor had violated the existing criminal threats statute. (In re L.F., supra, A142296 at p. 8.) This interpretation of the law is consistent with older case law that says a true threat may be made to a particular individual or group of individuals.” (Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359, citing Watts v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 708.)
Another example showing that the current law is applicable regardless whether the threat was made to an individual or a group of people is In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App. 5th 647 where the adjudged minor was convicted of criminal threats after a Snapchat image showed that he was going to bring a gun to school with a picture of a gun. The Snapchat image did not include the name of the school or any individuals and the minor later posted that it was all a joke, however the court found that it was sufficient under the law that an individual and a teacher saw the post and were in sustained fear. (Id. at pp. 656-657.)
Also illustrated in the cases above, Penal Code section 422 does not require the statement of deadly harm to be true, it can be used to prosecute false statements as well. Specifically, the statute states that the speaker need not have intent to carry out the act of violence. (Pen. Code, § 422.)
This bill creates a similar offense to existing Penal Code section 422 but contains differences on which persons may be in sustained fear of the threat. This bill also contains language specifying that the bill’s provisions do not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.
- Impetus for this Bill: This bill is in response to a recent case where a 39-year-old Marine combat veteran, Lee Lor, was arrested and charged with making criminal threats to commit a mass shooting at an elementary school in San Diego.[2] Over the course of several months, Lor sent seemingly random replies to hundreds of spam emails he had received, many of which named Shoal Creek Elementary School which is located about a mile from where Lor lived. In one email Lor wrote, “If you think this is a joke, laugh. If not, a lot of children are going to die.”[3] This email was received in the spam folder of a woman living in Beverly Hills who reported it to law enforcement. Lor was investigated and arrested for making criminal threats against his neighbors. After 10 months in custody, the charges were dismissed after the judge determined there was not sufficient evidence to move forward with the charges at trial. The judge ruled that the criminal threats counts concerned the man’s neighbors rather than anyone connected to the school.
Two weeks after the dismissal of charges and Lor’s release from custody, law enforcement executed a search warrant of his home and found a firearm as well as research on ammunition and the school’s layout. The man was then rearrested and charged with making criminal threats but named the principal of the school as the victim. The judge denied bail citing public safety and an existing gun violence restraining order[4] that was issued against him as factors. The new case is currently pending after a new preliminary hearing and has been ordered to trial.[5]
- Argument in Support: According to California District Attorneys Association, a co-sponsor of this bill:
“Currently, prosecutors rely upon Penal Code section 422 to prosecute threats to do violence on school grounds, places of worship or other public places. However, PC 422 has limitations that prevents its effective use as a tool to hold all offenders accountable who make true threats directed at our schools and places of worship. Because PC 422 requires proof that the criminal threat causes a victim to be in sustained fear, these prosecutions are difficult to prove when the offender does not identify a specific target but instead communicates a threat to commit a violent act at a place where many potential people could be in harm’s way such as a school or a place of worship.
“Penal Code section 422’s requirement that the threat caused sustained fear in a victim presents real world challenges. In 2023, a 38 year-old man sent hundreds of emails threatening to commit a shooting at Shoal Creek Elementary School in San Diego’s Carmel Mountain Ranch community. The different emails included the same sentence that read “I’m going to commit mass shootings at 11775 Shoal Creek elementary school, San Diego, CA 92128.” At the preliminary hearing, the judge dismissed the Penal Code section 422 prosecution because the threatening emails were not sent directly to the school. The judge ruled that the law requires the threat to be specific towards a targeted person.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to the Californians United for a Responsible Budget:
“California law already provides broad protection against criminal threats. Current law makes it a felony to willfully threaten to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out. That standard has served California well by both protecting the public from criminal threats, but also ensuring that individuals are not convicted of the crime of making a threat unless the individual had some intent to make a threat.”
- Related Legislation: SB 19 (Rubio), would create a new crime for a person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with specific intent and under certain circumstances. A person violating the bill’s provisions would be guilty of a misdemeanor or felony punishable by imprisonment in a county jail, except that if the person is under 18 years of age, the bill would make the person guilty of a misdemeanor. SB 19 is pending hearing in Senate Public Safety Committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- SB 796 (Alvarado-Gil), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, would have created a new criminal threats statute for threats of violence to occur on the grounds of a school or place of worship. SB 796 was held in the Assembly Appropriations suspense file.
- SB 1330 (Borgeas), of the 2021-2022 Legislative Session, would have prohibited maliciously informing any other person that a terror incident, as defined, will occur at any school or place of worship, as defined, or at any school-sponsored event, knowing that the information is false. SB 1330 failed passage in Senate Public Safety Committee.
- AB 907 (Grayson), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, was substantially similar to SB 796 except the maximum penalty for minor who commit the offense was a misdemeanor, rather than an alternate felony-misdemeanor. AB 907 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- AB 2768 (Melendez), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, would have created a new criminal threats statute specific to threats made against administrators of a school or place of worship. AB 2768 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 110 (Fuller), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have made it an alternate felony-misdemeanor offense for any person to willfully threaten unlawful violence that will result in death or great bodily injury to occur on the grounds of a school, as defined, where the threat creates a disruption at the school. SB 110 was vetoed by the Governor.
- SB 456 (Block), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have specified that any person who threatens to discharge a firearm on the campus of a school, as defined, or location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor. SB 456 was vetoed by the Governor.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California District Attorneys Association (Sponsor)
California Police Chiefs Association (Sponsor)
San Diego County District Attorney's Office (Sponsor)
California Association of Highway Patrolmen
California School Employees Association
Hindu American Foundation, INC.
League of California Cities
National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association (NAPIPA)
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office
Oppose
ACLU California Action
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
California Public Defenders Association (CPDA)
Californians United for A Responsible Budget
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Initiate Justice Action
LA Defensa
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
San Francisco Public Defender
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Analysis Prepared by:
Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
For a summary of all similar prior legislation, see note 8 below. ↑
See https://timesofsandiego.com/crime/2024/10/04/judge-finds-man-didnt-target-san-diego-school-in-email-dismisses-criminal-threats-charges/ [accessed Feb. 14, 2025]. ↑
https://www.10news.com/news/local-news/san-diego-news/combat-veteran-pleads-not-guilty-after-being-re-arrested-for-threatening-to-commit-school-shooting-over-350-times [accessed Feb. 14, 2025]. ↑
A Gun Violence Restraining Order prohibits a person subject to this restraining order from having in his or her custody or control, own or possess, or receive any firearms or ammunition while the order is in effect. (Pen. Code, § 18100 et seq.) ↑
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/2025/02/18/neighbor-ordered-to-stand-trial-in-carmel-mountain-ranch-school-shooting-threats-case/ [accessed Feb. 20, 2025]. ↑
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):