(1)Existing law vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the states energy policies.

This bill would require the Energy Commission to select a research institute, as defined, to conduct a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the electrical corporations to a public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation in order to identify a recommended model, as provided. The bill would require the research institute to complete the analysis on or before January 1, 2029, and, upon completion, to submit the analysis to the Legislature and the Energy Commission. The bill would require the Energy Commission to make a draft of the analysis available to the public for comment before submitting the final draft to the Legislature, and would limit the cost of conducting the analysis to $5,000,000.

This bill would, upon completion of the analysis by the research institute, require the Energy Commission to present the analysis at a publicly noticed business meeting on or before September 30, 2029.

(2)Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations, while local publicly owned utilities are under the direction of their governing boards. Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customers residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customers dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill.

This bill would require a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, to quarterly each electrical corporation and gas corporation, on or before March 1, 2026, and each local publically owned electric utility, on or before March 1, 2027, and annually thereafter, to post specified information concerning termination terminations of service due to nonpayment on their respective internet websites, as provided.

(3)Existing law requires the Director of the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety to issue a safety certification that is valid for 12 months after the date of issuance to an electrical corporation if the electrical corporation provides documentation that it is meeting certain requirements and the office that it has an approved the executive incentive compensation structure of the electrical corporation. that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety and utility financial stability with performance metrics, as specified.

This bill would additionally require that the electrical corporations executive incentive compensation structure is structured to ensure ratepayer affordability, as provided. The bill would also require, for purposes of the safety certification, that documentation related to compensation include specified dollar amounts.

(4)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the PUC is a crime.

Because certain provisions of this bill would be part of the act and a violation of a PUC action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

In addition, to the extent the bill would impose new requirements on local publicly owned utilities, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for specified reasons.

(1)Existing law vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the states energy policies.

This bill would require the Energy Commission to select a research institute, as defined, to conduct a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the electrical corporations to a public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation in order to identify a recommended model, as provided. The bill would require the research institute to complete the analysis on or before January 1, 2029, and, upon completion, to submit the analysis to the Legislature and the Energy Commission. The bill would require the Energy Commission to make a draft of the analysis available to the public for comment before submitting the final draft to the Legislature, and would limit the cost of conducting the analysis to $5,000,000.

This bill would, upon completion of the analysis by the research institute, require the Energy Commission to present the analysis at a publicly noticed business meeting on or before September 30, 2029.

(2)Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations, while local publicly owned utilities are under the direction of their governing boards. Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customers residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customers dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill.

This bill would require a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, to quarterly post specified information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment on their respective internet websites, as provided.

(3)Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation.

This bill would require each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the PUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics, as provided.

(4)Existing law requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment.

This bill would require each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporations equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life. The bill would require the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. The bill would require an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within 5 years, as provided. The bill would require the PUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.

This bill would require the PUC to develop a best value procurement model in a new or existing proceeding for use in the procurement of equipment and materials for electrical corporation infrastructure projects that compares the costs and benefits of potential supplies, as provided.

(6)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the PUC is a crime.

Because certain provisions of this bill would be part of the act and a violation of a PUC action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

In addition, to the extent the bill would impose new requirements on local publicly owned utilities, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for specified reasons.

(1)Existing law vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the states energy policies.

This bill would require the Energy Commission, in coordination with the public advisor and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), on or before March 31, 2026, to issue a request for proposals for a team to develop a study. The bill would require the study to conduct a historical energy justice assessment of the investor-owned utilitys (IOU) operations and impacts and complete Commission to select a research institute, as defined, to conduct a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs electrical corporations to a successor entity public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation in order to identify a recommended model. model, as provided. The bill would require the Energy Commission, on or before June 30, 2026, to select the study team that is awarded the contract. The bill would require the Energy Commission to hold a public proceeding and submit a report of the study teams findings and recommendations to the Legislature no later than 24 months after selecting the study team, as specified. research institute to complete the analysis on or before January 1, 2029, and, upon completion, to submit the analysis to the Legislature and the Energy Commission. The bill would require the Energy Commission to make a draft of the analysis available to the public for comment before submitting the final draft to the Legislature, and would limit the cost of conducting the analysis to $5,000,000.

This bill would require the Energy Commission to require the study team to select and convene an advisory council by December 31, 2026, to participate in the study of the vision for a new energy system, as provided. Upon would, upon completion of the first 2 study components, the bill would require the study team, in consultation with the advisory council, to provide a recommendation for a particular successor entity type to the Energy Commission, as provided. The bill would analysis by the research institute, require the Energy Commission to present the study analysis at a publicly noticed business meeting on or before September 30, 2028. 2029.

(2)Existing law vests the PUC Public Utilities Commission (PUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations, while local publicly owned utilities are under the direction of their governing boards. Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customers residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customers dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill.

This bill would require a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, to quarterly post specified information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment on their respective internet websites, as provided.

(3)Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation.

This bill would require each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the PUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics, as provided.

(4)Existing law requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment.

This bill would require each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporations equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life. The bill would require the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. The bill would require an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within 5 years, as provided. The bill would require the PUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.

This bill would require the PUC to develop a best value procurement model for consideration use in the procurement of all equipment and materials for electrical corporation infrastructure projects, as specified. projects that compares the costs and benefits of potential supplies, as provided.

(5)Existing law requires the PUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program.

This bill would require, after an emergency or disaster in which an electrical corporations electrical infrastructure was destroyed, if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure, the electrical corporation to use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable. The bill would prohibit the cost of undergrounding, installing covered conductors, or other cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies for the electrical infrastructure from being only authorize those costs that the commission finds to be just and reasonable to be recovered from ratepayers.

(6)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the PUC is a crime.

Because certain provisions of this bill would be part of the act and a violation of a PUC action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

In addition, to the extent the bill would impose new requirements on local publicly owned utilities, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for specified reasons.

(1)Existing law vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the states energy policies.

This bill would require the Energy Commission, in coordination with the public advisor and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), on or before March 31, 2026, to issue a request for proposals for a team to develop a study. The bill would require the study to (1) conduct a historical energy justice assessment of the investor-owned utilitys (IOU) operations and impacts, (2) impacts and complete a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity in order to identify a recommended model, and, (3) if the study finds that it is in the best long-term interests of the people and ecologies of California to transition away from an investor-owned utility model, create a justice-centered implementation plan for managing the transition. model. The bill would require the Energy Commission, on or before June 30, 2026, to select the study team that is awarded the contract. The bill would require the Energy Commission to hold a public proceeding and submit a report of the study teams findings and recommendations to the Legislature no later than 24 months after selecting the study team for the feasibility portion of the study, and no later than 36 months after selecting the study team for the implementation plan portion of the study, team, as specified.

This bill would require the Energy Commission to require the study team to select and convene an advisory council by December 31, 2026, to participate in the study of the vision for a new energy system, as provided. Upon completion of the first 2 study components, the bill would require the study team, in consultation with the advisory council, to provide a recommendation for a particular successor entity type to the Energy Commission, as provided. The bill would require the Energy Commission to vote to approve the study and recommended successor entity present the study at a publicly noticed business meeting on or before September 30, 2028. Upon approval by the Energy Commission, the bill would require the study team to begin work to create a justice-centered implementation plan. The bill would require the Energy Commission to vote to approve the implementation plan no later than October 31, 2029.

(2)Existing law vests the PUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations, while local publicly owned utilities are under the direction of their governing boards. Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customers residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customers dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill.

This bill would, among other things, prohibit would require a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, from disconnecting a customers residential service for nonpayment if the customer has a household income at or below 200% of the federal poverty line. The bill would prohibit a utility from disconnecting a customers residential service for nonpayment if the customers household is the residence of certain persons, including, among other persons, a person who is pregnant or 0 to 12 weeks postpartum. The bill would require the commission to establish a citation program to impose a penalty on an electrical corporation or gas corporation that violates the above-described prohibitions. The bill would also authorize the commission, a customer, or a member of the customers household to bring an action in state court for equitable relief regarding a utilitys or community choice aggregators use of any method, act, or practice inconsistent with the above-described provisions. to quarterly post specified information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment on their respective internet websites, as provided.

(3)Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation.

This bill would require each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the PUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics, as provided.

(4)Existing law requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment. The California Energy Infrastructure Safety Act established the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety within the Natural Resources Agency, and provides that, on and after July 1, 2021, the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety is the successor to, and is vested with, all of the duties, powers, and responsibilities of the Wildfire Safety Division of the commission.

This bill would require each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporations equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life. The bill would require the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. The bill would require an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within 5 years, as provided. The bill would require the PUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.

This bill would require the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety PUC to develop a best value procurement model for consideration in the procurement of all electrical corporation infrastructure projects, as specified. The bill would require each electrical corporation, for all infrastructure projects, to demonstrate to the commission that the selected contractor is the best value contractor, as specified.

(5)Existing law requires the PUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program.

This bill would require, after an emergency or disaster in which an electrical corporations electrical infrastructure was destroyed, if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure, the electrical corporation to use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable. The bill would prohibit the cost of undergrounding, installing covered conductors, or other cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies for the electrical infrastructure from being recovered from ratepayers.

(6)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission PUC is a crime.

Because certain provisions of this bill would be part of the act and a violation of a commission PUC action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

In addition, to the extent the bill would impose new requirements on local publicly owned utilities, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for specified reasons.

(1)Existing law vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the states energy policies.

This bill would require the Energy Commission, in coordination with the public advisor and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), on or before March 31, 2026, to issue a request for proposals for a team to develop a study. The bill would require the study to (1) conduct a historical energy justice assessment of the investor-owned utilitys (IOU) operations and impacts, (2) complete a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity in order to identify a recommended model, and, (3) if the study finds that it is in the best long-term interests of the people and ecologies of California to transition away from an investor-owned utility model, create a justice-centered implementation plan for managing the transition. The bill would require the Energy Commission, on or before June 30, 2026, to select the study team that is awarded the contract. The bill would require the Energy Commission to hold a public proceeding and submit a report of the study teams findings and recommendations to the Legislature no later than 24 months after selecting the study team for the feasibility portion of the study, and no later than 36 months after selecting the study team for the implementation plan portion of the study, as specified.

This bill would require the Energy Commission to require the study team to select and convene an advisory council by December 31, 2026, to participate in the study of the vision for a new energy system, as provided. Upon completion of the first 2 study components, the bill would require the study team, in consultation with the advisory council, to provide a recommendation for a particular successor entity type to the Energy Commission, as provided. The bill would require the Energy Commission to vote to approve the study and recommended successor entity on or before September 30, 2028. Upon approval by the Energy Commission, the bill would require the study team to begin work to create a justice-centered implementation plan. The bill would require the Energy Commission to vote to approve the implementation plan no later than October 31, 2029.

(2)Existing law vests the PUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations, while local publicly owned utilities are under the direction of their governing boards. Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customers residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customers dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill.

This bill would, among other things, prohibit a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, from disconnecting a customers residential service for nonpayment if the customer has a household income at or below 200% of the federal poverty line. The bill would prohibit a utility from disconnecting a customers residential service for nonpayment if the customers household is the residence of certain persons, including, among other persons, a person who is pregnant or 0 to 12 weeks postpartum. The bill would require the commission to establish a citation program to impose a penalty on an electrical corporation or gas corporation that violates the above-described prohibitions. The bill would also authorize the commission, a customer, or a member of the customers household to bring an action in state court for equitable relief regarding a utilitys or community choice aggregators use of any method, act, or practice inconsistent with the above-described provisions.

This bill would require a utility to offer a residential customer who meets the above-described requirements a payment plan for the customers electrical and gas service that includes a percentage of income payment plan, as specified. The bill would require each utility providing electrical service or gas service, or both, to residential customers to collect and submit to the commission monthly data on electrical and gas service terminations, reconnections, bill assistance and payment agreements, arrears, and created and broken payment plans, as provided.

(3)Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation.

This bill would require each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the PUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics, as provided.

(4)Existing law authorizes the PUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable.

This bill would prohibit, for proposed rate increases subject to PUC approval and a finding that the new rate is just and reasonable, an electrical corporation from proposing a compounded annual rate increase on residential customers above the increase in the Consumer Price Index. The bill would prohibit, for proposed rate increases not subject to PUC approval and a finding that the new rate is just and reasonable, an electrical corporation from proposing more than one rate increase per year, as provided.

(5)Existing law establishes the Wildfire Fund to pay eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire, as provided. Existing law requires the PUC to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to consider using its existing authority to require certain electrical corporations to collect a nonbypassable charge from its ratepayers to support the Wildfire Fund, and requires the PUC to direct those electrical corporations to collect that charge if the PUC determines that the imposition of the charge is just and reasonable and that it is an appropriate exercise of its authority, as specified.

This bill would require the PUC to revise the above-described rulemaking proceeding to reduce the charge imposed on ratepayers to an amount equal to 5% of the costs to support the fund, and require each electrical corporation to contribute the remaining 95% of the costs to support the fund.

Existing law establishes procedures under which electrical corporations are required to reimburse the Wildfire Fund for amounts disallowed by the PUC for recovery from ratepayers. Existing law requires an electrical corporation to reimburse the fund for the full amount of costs and expenses the PUC determined were disallowed, except as provided. Under existing law those exceptions do not apply if the administrator determines that the electrical corporations actions or inactions that resulted in the covered wildfire constituted conscious or willful disregard of the rights and safety of others.

This bill would provide that, for those purposes, evidence that an electrical corporations action were prudent includes common sense best practices such as conducting annual audits and replacing equipment that has outlived its usable life and deenergizing the electrical grid under threatening conditions.

(6)Existing law requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment. The California Energy Infrastructure Safety Act established the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety within the Natural Resources Agency, and provides that, on and after July 1, 2021, the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety is the successor to, and is vested with, all of the duties, powers, and responsibilities of the Wildfire Safety Division of the commission.

This bill would require each electrical corporation to annually triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporations equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have outlived their useful life. reached their end of life. The bill would require the audit to be completed on or before June 30, 2026, and by June 30 of each year thereafter and submitted to the PUC on or before August 31, of each year. in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. The bill would require an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire risk area fire-threat district within 5 years, as provided. The bill would require the PUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.

(7)Existing law requires the PUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program.

This bill would instead require all large electrical corporations to participate in the program. The bill would also require an electrical corporation, require, after an emergency or disaster in which its an electrical corporations electrical infrastructure was destroyed, to rebuild if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure using infrastructure, the electrical corporation to use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable. The bill would prohibit the cost of undergrounding undergrounding, installing covered conductors, or other cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies for the electrical infrastructure from being recovered from ratepayers.

(8)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.

Because certain provisions of this bill would be part of the act and a violation of a commission action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

In addition, to the extent the bill would impose new requirements on local publicly owned utilities, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for specified reasons.

(1)Existing law vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the states energy policies.

This bill would require the Energy Commission, in coordination with the public advisor and the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), on or before March 31, 2026, to issue a request for proposals for a team to develop a study. The bill would require the study to (1) conduct a historical energy justice assessment of the investor-owned utilitys (IOU) operations and impacts, (2) complete a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity in order to identify a recommended model, and, (3) if the study finds that it is in the best long-term interests of the people and ecologies of California to transition away from an investor-owned utility model, create a justice-centered implementation plan for managing the transition. The bill would require the Energy Commission, on or before June 30, 2026, to select the study team that is awarded the contract. The bill would require the Energy Commission to hold a public proceeding and submit a report of the study teams findings and recommendations to the Legislature no later than 24 months after selecting the study team for the feasibility portion of the study, and no later than 36 months after selecting the study team for the implementation plan portion of the study, as specified.

This bill would require the Energy Commission to require the study team to select and convene an advisory council by December 31, 2026, to participate in the study of the vision for a new energy system, as provided. Upon completion of the first 2 study components, the bill would require the study team, in consultation with the advisory council, to provide a recommendation for a particular successor entity type to the Energy Commission, as provided. The bill would require the Energy Commission to vote to approve the study and recommended successor entity on or before September 30, 2028. Upon approval by the Energy Commission, the bill would require the study team to begin work to create a justice-centered implementation plan. The bill would require the Energy Commission to vote to approve the implementation plan no later than October 31, 2029.

(2)Existing law vests the PUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations, while local publicly owned utilities are under the direction of their governing boards. Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customers residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customers dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill.

This bill would, among other things, prohibit a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, from disconnecting a customers residential service for nonpayment if the customer has a household income at or below 200% of the federal poverty line. The bill would prohibit a utility from disconnecting a customers residential service for nonpayment if the customers household is the residence of certain persons, including, among other persons, a person who is pregnant or 0 to 12 weeks postpartum. The bill would require the commission to establish a citation program to impose a penalty on an electrical corporation or gas corporation that violates the above-described prohibitions. The bill would also authorize the commission, a customer, or a member of the customers household to bring an action in state court for equitable relief regarding a utilitys or community choice aggregators use of any method, act, or practice inconsistent with the above-described provisions.

This bill would require a utility to offer a residential customer who meets the above-described requirements a payment plan for the customers electrical and gas service that includes a percentage of income payment plan, as specified. The bill would require each utility providing electrical service or gas service, or both, to residential customers to collect and submit to the commission monthly data on electrical and gas service terminations, reconnections, bill assistance and payment agreements, arrears, and created and broken payment plans, as provided.

(3)Existing law prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation.

This bill would require each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the PUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics, as provided.

(4)Existing law authorizes the PUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable.

This bill would prohibit, for proposed rate increases subject to PUC approval and a finding that the new rate is just and reasonable, an electrical corporation from proposing a compounded annual rate increase on residential customers above the increase in the Consumer Price Index. The bill would prohibit, for proposed rate increases not subject to PUC approval and a finding that the new rate is just and reasonable, an electrical corporation from proposing more than one rate increase per year, as provided.

(5)The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 establishes the State Air Resources Board as the state agency responsible for monitoring and regulating sources emitting greenhouse gases. The act requires the state board to ensure that statewide greenhouse gas emissions are reduced to at least 40% below the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit, as defined, no later than December 31, 2030. The act requires the state board to adopt rules and regulations in an open public process to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reductions. The state board is authorized to include market-based compliance mechanisms to comply with the regulations. The implementing regulations adopted by the state board provide for the direct allocation of greenhouse gas allowances to electrical corporations pursuant to a market-based compliance mechanism.

Existing law authorizes the PUC to allocate 15% of the revenues received by the electrical corporations from that allocation of allowances for clean energy and energy efficiency projects established pursuant to statute that are administered by electrical corporations. Existing law requires the PUC to direct the balance of the revenues to be credited directly to the residential, small business, and emissions-intensive trade-exposed retail customers of the electrical corporations, as specified.

Beginning with the fiscal year commencing July 1, 2026, and ending with the fiscal year ending June 30, 2036, this bill would require the PUC to annually allocate $100,000,000 of the revenues received by the electrical corporations from that allocation of greenhouse gas allowances to the Transformative Climate Communities Program and to the Community Resilience Center Program, as specified. The bill would require those allocations for the Transformative Climate Communities Program and Community Resilience Center Program to benefit disadvantaged communities in census tracts that are the most vulnerable to climate disaster, as specified.

(6)Existing law establishes the Wildfire Fund to pay eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire, as provided. Existing law requires the PUC to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to consider using its existing authority to require certain electrical corporations to collect a nonbypassable charge from its ratepayers to support the Wildfire Fund, and requires the PUC to direct those electrical corporations to collect that charge if the PUC determines that the imposition of the charge is just and reasonable and that it is an appropriate exercise of its authority, as specified.

This bill would require the PUC to revise the above-described rulemaking proceeding to reduce the charge imposed on ratepayers to an amount equal to 5% of the costs to support the fund, and require each electrical corporation to contribute the remaining 95% of the costs to support the fund.

Existing law establishes procedures under which electrical corporations are required to reimburse the Wildfire Fund for amounts disallowed by the PUC for recovery from ratepayers. Existing law requires an electrical corporation to reimburse the fund for the full amount of costs and expenses the PUC determined were disallowed, except as provided. Under existing law those exceptions do not apply if the administrator determines that the electrical corporations actions or inactions that resulted in the covered wildfire constituted conscious or willful disregard of the rights and safety of others.

This bill would provide that, for those purposes, evidence that an electrical corporations action were prudent includes common sense best practices such as conducting annual audits and replacing equipment that has outlived its usable life and deenergizing the electrical grid under threatening conditions.

(7)Existing law requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment.

This bill would require each electrical corporation to annually contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporations equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have outlived their useful life. The bill would require the audit to be completed on or before June 30, 2026, and by June 30 of each year thereafter and submitted to the PUC on or before August 31, of each year. The bill would require an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire risk area within 5 years, as provided. The bill would require the PUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.

(8)Existing law requires the PUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program.

This bill would instead require all large electrical corporations to participate in the program. The bill would also require an electrical corporation, after an emergency or disaster in which its electrical infrastructure was destroyed, to rebuild the destroyed electrical infrastructure using undergrounding methods, to the extent applicable. The bill would prohibit the cost of undergrounding the electrical infrastructure from being recovered from ratepayers.

(9)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.

Because certain provisions of this bill would be part of the act and a violation of a commission action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

In addition, to the extent the bill would impose new requirements on local publicly owned utilities, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for specified reasons.

Date of Hearing: August 20, 2025

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Buffy Wicks, Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 332

Author:(Wahab) – As Amended Ver:July 14, 2025

Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No

SUMMARY:

This bill, among other things, calls for a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning California’s electrical corporations (also known as “investor-owned utilities” or “IOUs”) to a successor entity.

More specifically, this bill:

1. Directs the California Energy Commission (CEC), with input from the disadvantaged communities advisory group established in existing law, to select a research institute to conduct a comparative analysis, completed and submitted to the Legislature by January 1, 2029, on the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity in order to identify a recommended model, assess the feasibility of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity and identify priority “just design features” for the successor entity, with the goal of serving the public interest and necessity of the people and ecologies of California.
2. Specifies numerous elements that are to comprise the comparative analysis, directs the research institute to consult with a labor institute in conducting all aspects of the comparative analysis with respect to impacts on workforce and labor relations, and authorizes CEC, the research institute and the disadvantaged advisory group to solicit input from stakeholders, including those with specified lived experiences or subject matter expertise.
3. Require the research institute to conduct the first phase of the comparative analysis by December 31, 2026, and submit an interim report to CEC on threshold legal issues, as specified, and directs CEC to convene a group of state attorneys from the legal departments of state agencies that regulate electrical corporations to advise the research institute on the first phase of the comparative analysis.
4. Limits the cost of conducting the comparative analysis to $5 million from an unspecified fund source.
5. Modifies existing law to require the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS) newly consider ratepayer affordability when assessing IOU executive compensation as a factor as part of its deciding, per current law, whether to issue a safety certification to an IOU, and directs the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to share certain related information with the OEIS.
6. Requires each electrical IOU and each gas IOU, by March 1, 2026, to annually post on its website specified data for the prior year concerning termination of service due to nonpayment, and requires each publicly owned electric utility (POU), by March 1, 2027, to post on the POU’s website comparable data relevant to its customers.

FISCAL EFFECT:

1. Costs of an unknown, but significant amount, likely in the millions of dollars, to CEC to fund and support the third-party analysis (Energy Resources Programs Account (ERPA)).

CEC describes the study to entail work by both a multi-disciplinary contractor team and substantive expertise from CEC staff, who will oversee the contract and work, and validate the contractor’s analysis and conclusions.  CEC estimates associated costs at $6.4 million over a three-year period—$5 million for the contract, and $1.4 million for five personnel years. CEC further breaks down the personnel costs as one research specialist working for three years, at $279,199 per year, to provide overall strategic direction and validation, supported by one research data specialist for three years, at $200,000 per year.

1. Significant costs to the CPUC, likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, to coordinate and support interagency efforts and provide necessary data.

The CPUC assumes it will dedicate two regulatory analysts to this effort, at a total annual cost of $403,000, and incur additional annual expenses of $750,000 ($250,000 for travel and meeting support and $500,000 for interpretation and translation services) across five years. (Public Utilities Commission Utilities Reimbursement Account).

1. Significant costs to each of the state agencies the bill requires to be among the group of attorneys convened by CEC. For example, the Air Resources Board (ARB) estimates costs of $282,000 annually for a limited-term attorney, which ARB assumes would be paid from ERPA, while the Department of Justice describes the workload as “unquantifiable, but potentially significant.”

ARB warns of the difficulty it has had trying to hire qualified, experienced attorneys on a limited-term basis.

ERPA, the CEC’s main funding source, faces an ongoing structural deficit and likely could not support the expenses created by this bill absent reductions in other expenses currently funded from ERPA.

COMMENTS:

1. Purpose. The author intends this bill to “ensure there is greater accountability to the public, better safety and stability of our infrastructure, and increased affordability for ratepayers” by “rein[ing] in the investor-owned utilities and ensure they are serving the best interests of Californians.”
2. Background. Generally, and with some exception, Californians receive their electrical service from one of two types of entities: (a) municipal utilities, also knowns as POUs, such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) and the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District (SMUD), which are governed by a board elected by the voters of the service territory served by the utility, and (b) IOUs (sometimes called “public utilities”) which are privately held profit-seeking companies. Both POUs and IOUs generally have a monopoly on providing electric utility service within their respective service territories. The POUs are largely responsible for their own operations, including the setting and establishing the rates of service they charge their customers.

In contrast, the IOUs are overseen by the five-member CPUC, the members of which are appointed by the Governor. The CPUC, empowered by the California constitution and the Public Utilities Code, has broad authority over the IOUs and is authorized to "supervise and regulate every public utility in the State and...do all things...necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.” This includes setting the rates each IOU charges its customers for service, provided such terms are “just and reasonable,” and regulating many aspects of the services provided by the IOUs. The CPUC grants each IOU an exclusive franchise to provide service within a defined territory within which the IOU may recover from its customers prudently incurred expenses and earn a reasonable return on investment (profit). In return for the franchise, the IOU must provide safe, reliable, nondiscriminatory service to all customers in its service area.

Over the past two decades, equipment owned by the state’s IOUs have started a number of wildfires, several of them particularly devastating and deadly. In 2020, many questioned the ability of one of the state’s largest IOUs—Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)—to withstand the costs and other financial difficulty resulting from several large wildfires it had caused. In response, the Legislature passed SB 350 (Hill), Chapter 27, Statutes of 2020, which, among other things, authorizes creation of Golden State Energy (GSE), a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to acquire and operate PG&E, if certain circumstances are met. Senator Jerry Hill, the author of SB 350, said of the bill at the time:

The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.

Ultimately, PG&E continued to exist and provide electrical and gas service as an IOU. Yet, its rates of service—and the rates of the state’s other electric IOUs—have increased considerably since 2020. Several parties have identified wildfire mitigation costs as one of the key drivers of these rate increases, as well as upgrades to the IOUs’ distribution systems to accommodate a cleaner and more dynamic electrical system.

The author points to another factor behind the increasing rates: greed. Noting the disparity between POU electric rates (lower) and IOU electric rates (higher), the author asserts “While IOUs are permitted to profit, they are not entitled to financially gouge Californians.” And the author faults the CPUC for failing both to prevent these rate increases and to ensure the IOUs maintain their equipment so it operates safely and reliably.

A very large coalition of supporters agrees, describing this bill as “a critical step toward protecting Californians from rising energy bills, widespread shutoffs, catastrophic wildfires, and other harms driven by profit-focused IOUs.”

The IOUs see it differently. For example, PG&E, writing in opposition to this bill as it read on July 1, 2027, writes:

While we share the goals of improving safety, affordability, and accountability, we believe that SB 332 presents a flawed and incomplete view of the challenges faced by IOUs and fails to account for the significant regulatory oversight already in place. We strongly urge you to reconsider the provisions of this bill and work with stakeholders to develop a more balanced and effective approach to addressing the complex issues facing California’s energy system.

Separately, associations representing the state’s POUs object specifically to the requirement they post data concerning termination of service due to nonpayment.

Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing: July 9, 2025

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY

Cottie Petrie-Norris, Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 332

Author:(Wahab) – As Amended Ver:June 30, 2025

SENATE VOTE: 25-10

SUBJECT: Investor-Owned Utilities Accountability Act

SUMMARY: This bill contains various provisions intended to increase accountability for investor-owned utilities (IOUs), including requirements for a study of the feasibility of transitioning each IOU’s operations to a successor entity, for IOUs to audit all electrical infrastructure every three years, for addressing affordability in review of IOU executive compensation, and for IOUs and publicly owned utilities (POUs) to report on customer service disconnections due to nonpayment. Specifically, this bill:

1. Makes numerous legislative findings about the electric IOU model and California’s large IOUs, the increase in electricity rates, utility record profits, wildfires caused by utility infrastructure, and concerns that electric IOUs prioritize profits over the safety and well-being of the ratepayers and residents of California.
2. Requires the California Energy Commission (CEC) to select a research institute to conduct a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning each IOU to a successor entity that is either a public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation in order to identify a recommended model, with many detailed issues identified that are required to be addressed in the study.
3. Requires the research institute to complete the analysis and submit it to the Legislature and the CEC on or before January 1, 2029, and make a draft available for public comment and present it at a public meeting before submitting the final analysis to the Legislature.
4. Limits the cost of conducting the analysis to $5 million.
5. Requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), in a new or existing proceeding, to develop a “best value” procurement model for IOUs to use in procurement of equipment and materials for electric infrastructure projects with “best value” defined as using objective criteria to evaluate qualifications and a selection representing the best combination of price and qualifications.
6. Authorizes multiple exceptions to the requirement that IOUs use best value procurement and specifies circumstances when sole source contracting is permissible.
7. Requires each IOU, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit an executive compensation proposal to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety and ratepayer affordability as priorities with specified performance metrics as conditions of CPUC approval.
8. Requires each IOU to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of its equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or lines that have reached their end of life, to be aligned with the IOU’s wildfire mitigation plan (WMP) cycle.
9. Requires the CPUC to assess a fine if an IOU fails to conduct the audit and requires fines to be used for needed repairs and maintenance.
10. Requires IOUs and POUs to quarterly post on their internet websites the following information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment: total number of customers terminated, total number of customers reconnected, total number of payment agreements, total number of customers in arrears, the aggregated value of the arrears, and total number of created and broken payment plans.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Establishes the CPUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
2. Establishes the CEC with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the state’s energy policies. (Public Resources Code § 25000 et seq.)
3. Establishes the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS) within the Natural Resources Agency, as established by the California Energy Infrastructure Safety Act, and provides that, after July 1, 2021, the OEIS is the successor to the Wildfire Safety Division of the CPUC. (Government Code §§15470 et seq. and 15475.6, Public Utilities Code §§ 326 and 8385)
4. Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code § 451)
5. Authorizes the CPUC to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction. (Public Utilities Code § 701)
6. Requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment. (Public Utilities Code § 8386)
7. Requires OEIS to issue a safety certificate to an IOU after review of the IOU’s compliance with conditions related to its WMP, including an assessment of whether the IOU’s executive compensation structure prioritizes safety. (Public Utilities Code § 8389)
8. Prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other compensation paid to an officer, and requires that executive compensation instead be funded solely by shareholders. (Public Utilities Code § 706)
9. Prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customer’s residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances and requires escalating steps such as notice, personal contact, and payment options before disconnection. (Public Utilities Code §§ 779, 779.1, 779.2, and 779.3)
10. Requires the CPUC to adopt residential utility disconnections for nonpayment as a metric to be incorporated into each gas and electrical corporation general rate case, including a review of the impact of any proposed rate increase on nonpayment and disconnections for nonpayment. (Public Utilities Code § 718(b)(2))
11. Requires the CPUC to develop policies, rules, or regulations with a goal of reducing, by January 1, 2024, the statewide level of gas and electric service disconnections for nonpayment by residential customers, including policies, rules, or regulations specific to the large IOUs. (Public Utilities Code § 718(a))
12. Requires the CPUC to submit an annual report to the Legislature with information on residential and household gas and electric service disconnections, with data for the most recent five years, the total annual number of residential disconnections for nonpayment, reconnections following disconnection for nonpayment, disconnections for nonpayment that did not result in a reconnection within 30 days, and disaggregated data for customers in low-income or medical baseline programs. (Public Utilities Code § 910.5)

FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, this bill will create significant costs, likely in the millions of dollars annually ongoing and potentially in the tens of millions one-time, for the CEC and CPUC. In addition, ratepayer impacts of this bill could impact the state as a ratepayer. The State of California is a natural gas and electrical customer, purchasing roughly 1 percent of the state’s electricity and 4 percent of its natural gas. As such, the state incurs costs if rates or surcharges increase, and realizes savings if they decrease.

CONSUMER COST IMPACTS: Unknown.

BACKGROUND:

IOU model of regulated monopoly – Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison Company (SCE), and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E) are public utilities regulated by the CPUC. Pursuant to its authority granted in the California Constitution, the CPUC issues licenses to privately owned companies with shareholders to provide electric and gas utility service. This license, known as a certificate of public convenience and necessity, authorizes the company to provide monopoly utility service in a designated geographic area in exchange for the obligation to serve all customers and be subject to all CPUC oversight and regulation to provide safe, reliable, and affordable service. CPUC regulation includes setting rates the utility is allowed to charge its customers through a general rate case every three or four years, with the law requiring that rates be “just and reasonable.” A CPUC rate case includes review of utility expenditures for reasonableness, setting the rate of return the utility may earn, and specifying certain costs that cannot be included in rates and must be borne by utility shareholders. Consumer advocates regularly participate in IOU rate case proceedings and can be awarded intervenor compensation. Historically, this regulated utility model evolved because stringing electric wires to all homes and businesses across the country was a “natural monopoly” and too impractical for multiple competing providers.

While most of California is served by one of the big IOUs, the rest of the state is served by other utility types -- POUs such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, and many smaller POUs; rural electric cooperatives; and tribal utilities. The geographic size of service areas, number of customers, and regulatory framework differ for each type of utility but generally include an obligation to serve all customers with rates set by a governing body. Thus, rates for service can vary significantly among different providers. In addition, all utilities in California are subject to myriad statutory obligations related to public safety, wildfires, climate goals, environmental justice, low-income customer access, and other objectives. The cost of compliance generally is considered a cost that can be recovered in rates if reasonable.

Wildfire mitigation driving up rates – The CPUC in its most recent SB 695 Utility Cost Report has noted that wildfire-related costs are a key driver of increasing electric rates and are projected to continue their upward trend. In a recent study by the Energy Institute at Haas “Risk-Cost Tradeoffs in Power Sector Wildfire Prevention,” the authors note that in 2023 WMPs, California electric IOUs proposed investing over $9 billion annually to reduce wildfire ignition risk. PG&E’s recent general rate case authorized undergrounding of up to 1,200 miles of electric distribution lines. This contributed to the overall rate increases this year, roughly $35 per month more for the average utility bill, with another rate increase approved for a portion of the utility’s wildfire-related expenses, and the expectation that more are on the horizon. PG&E is also pursuing efforts to underground 10,000 miles of electric distribution lines in areas with high-fire risk with the intent to reduce wildfire ignition risk by approximately 99% as the best long-term solution for keeping customers and communities safe. SCE and SDG&E wildfire mitigation costs may be on a downward trend in the mid- to long-term, as much of their mitigation has been or will be completed, though they had less reliance on undergrounding lines as a primary strategy. However, recent wildfires in Southern California may affect this trajectory.

IOU executive compensation review – Electric IOUs are required to annually file WMP updates and a comprehensive WMP every three years with OEIS, which is responsible for reviewing, approving or denying and overseeing compliance with WMPs. The CPUC evaluates the reasonableness of costs associated with implementation of the WMPs for purposes of cost recovery and has enforcement authority with regard to electric IOUs’ performance of their WMPs and utility-caused wildfires. OEIS can issue a safety certificate that makes an IOU eligible to recover wildfire-related costs from the state Wildfire Fund if OEIS determines, among other conditions, that the IOU executive compensation structure sufficiently prioritizes safety.

Disconnecting utility service – In light of an upward trend in the number of utility disconnections due to nonpayment for IOU customers, the Legislature passed SB 598 (Hueso, Chapter 362, Statutes of 2017). SB 598 prohibits electrical and gas corporations from disconnecting service due to nonpayment of customers facing life-threatening medical conditions when the customer is financially unable to pay for service within the normal payment period and is willing to enter into an amortization agreement. The bill also requires the CPUC to adopt rules, policies and regulations with the goal of reducing the statewide level of gas and electric utility service disconnections for nonpayment by residential customers. It also requires consideration of utility disconnections in utility general rate cases and requires the CPUC to submit an annual report to the Legislature on residential gas and electric service disconnections. POUs are not regulated by the CPUC and have their own individual disconnection policies, which generally include an escalating number of steps to work with customers before service is cut off.

COMMENTS:

1. Author’s Statement. According to the author: “Californians who are customers of investor-owned utilities are being financially crushed by the constant rate increases and devastated by wildfires caused by poorly maintained infrastructure. As policymakers it is our responsibility to address these issues and ensure there is greater accountability to the public, better safety and stability of our infrastructure, and increased affordability for ratepayers. Investor-owned utilities are legal monopolies that must operate within the statutory and regulatory framework we establish. However, that framework is failing Californians. While IOUs are permitted to profit, they are not entitled to financially gouge Californians. According to the January 7, 2025 report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office,^[1] rates are nearly double the rest of the nation and these high rates are driven by the three largest investor-owned utilities. They also state that the rates of investor-owned utilities are more than 50 percent higher than rates charged by publicly-owned utilities. While the CPUC may consider safety and cost effectiveness in its decisions, they are not required to prioritize those concerns relative to ratepayers. With the CPUC enabling the status quo, we must take action to rein in the investor-owned utilities and ensure they are serving the best interests of Californians.”
2. Findings. This bill includes findings about IOU operations, rate increases and shareholder profits, and expresses a preferred outcome of the study the bill requires. Some of the findings include subjective conclusions that cannot be verified. The committee recommends refining the legislative findings to facts that can be verified.
3. Study Threshold Legal Issues First. This bill requires an “IOU Transition Feasibility Study” to be completed by January 1, 2029, and specifies many detailed issues to be analyzed, including an assessment of “all legal, economic, financial, governance,” and other relevant issues related to transitioning the assets and operations of each IOU to either a public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation, while also achieving many other broad objectives relating to climate, social justice, workers’ rights, and equity, among others. The study is to identify legal and regulatory issues that might arise during and after transition of IOU assets and operations to each corporate form, and a “preliminary evaluation of the long-term costs and benefits over at least a 30-year horizon,” among many other required areas of analysis. The scope of the required study is massive. Moreover, the dynamic nature of the electric utility ecosystem could make findings in a three-year study stale by the time they are delivered.

A phased approach to the study may be more efficient and produce more useful results. A logical first step is to analyze threshold legal issues related to each transition option. This could reveal that some options face insurmountable legal barriers, which would make it imprudent to spend three years and millions of tax dollars to study the many other issues specified in this bill. On the other hand, an initial legal analysis could identify a lawful pathway and framework for transition of an IOU to each corporate form and help organize and narrow the many other issues to be analyzed. The provisions and legislative history of SB 350 (2020), which authorized creation of Golden State Energy, a nonprofit public benefit corporation to acquire PG&E, can help identify some relevant threshold legal issues that warrant analysis, such as eminent domain, court-appointed receivers, Attorney General oversight of nonprofit entities, rate convenants, takings, bond authority, liability, and income taxation, among others. In addition, a complete inventory of all existing federal, state, and local statutory and regulatory requirements that apply to IOUs would be needed to ensure each obligation could seamlessly apply to each type of successor entity without jeopardizing provision of safe, reliable and affordable service.

This bill requires the CEC to select a “research institute,” defined to be an academic institution, to conduct the study, with three universities called out as options – the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California (UC) Berkeley, and the Initiative for Climate Leadership and Resilience at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. The sponsors of this bill report that each of these institutes has indicated that it could conduct the study for the $5 million this bill authorizes. The bill also requires the selected research institute to consult with a “labor institute,” defined to be either the UC Berkeley Labor Center or the UCLA Labor Center. The research institute also is required to seek input from a disadvantaged communities advisory group, and may seek input of other stakeholders.

With a phased approach to the study, focusing first on legal requirements and barriers, it seems essential to include legal experts. The IOUs currently are subject to numerous statutory and regulatory requirements under the jurisdiction of many agencies, including the CPUC, CEC, OEIS, California Independent System Operator, California Air Resources Board, CalFire, Office of Emergency Services, plus federal and local agencies. The input of attorneys from each relevant agency, rather than only academics, may provide a more pragmatic perspective of legal issues facing each transition option. On the ground regulators will be more familiar with the many nuances and complexities of compliance with the full panoply of existing IOU legal obligations, which should enhance the usefulness of the analysis.

Thus, the committee recommends amending Section 3 of the bill to require, within one year of the effective date of this bill, an interim report to the commission on a first phase study of all constitutional, statutory, and regulatory issues, with identification of legal barriers and legally permissible pathways to the proposed transition of an IOU to each successor corporate form, and to require participation of attorneys from relevant state agencies that regulate IOUs.

1. Best Value Procurement. This bill requires the CPUC, in a new or existing proceeding, to develop a “best value procurement model” that compares the cost and benefits of potential supplies that IOUs purchase. The bill requires IOUs to use this model in their purchase of equipment and materials for infrastructure projects, but also states that it is not required for procurement of equipment and materials by an IOU contractor. The bill also authorizes sole source contracting instead of the best value method if equipment or materials are “in short supply,” if “a specific brand or type of equipment or materials is essential for performance requirements,” or if using the best value model “is not feasible or would not result in a suitable contract.” These provisions are so broad and subjective that the exceptions could easily swallow the rule. It would be very time-consuming and costly to determine when the best value procurement model applies or not, and then difficult to determine if the IOU properly compared costs and benefits for each equipment and material purchase to which the model is deemed to apply.

The author states that requiring use of the best value procurement model will help reduce infrastructure costs by ensuring that IOUs are “not simply choosing the most expensive supplier every time.” The author and sponsors assert that IOUs are motivated to choose the most expensive supplies because that increases the dollar amount of the rate base and the associated rate of return the IOU is authorized to earn, leading to greater profits for IOU shareholders. IOUs claim the new model would result in duplicative and costly regulation. The IOU purchases covered by this bill overlap with IOU capital investments and expenditures already subject to CPUC review for reasonableness in IOU general rate cases. IOUs also express concern with potential disruption to established diversity, local sourcing, and workforce development initiatives. A new layer of procurement requirements could impact decades of progress by the CPUC and California utilities in building an inclusive supplier ecosystem.^[2]

The bill does not specify how the CPUC would enforce IOU compliance with a best value procurement model, although presumably that would be determined in a CPUC proceeding. With billions of dollars in IOU procurement every year, it would be a massive task to review whether this model was used in each purchase or whether the subjective factors allowing a sole source contract were met. Overall, especially given the broad exemptions, it is unclear if potential benefits from requiring best value procurement would outweigh the extra regulatory costs and likely protracted CPUC proceedings the requirement would impose, costs that ultimately could translate to higher customer bills. Thus, the committee recommends amending this bill by striking the best value procurement model provisions.

1. Audit of Equipment and Lines. This bill requires each IOU, every three years, to contract with an independent third party to audit all equipment and electrical lines and identify those that have reached their end of life, to be completed in alignment with the IOU’s WMP cycle. The bill authorizes the CPUC to impose fines if an IOU fails to complete an audit and states that these fines shall be used to “finance needed repairs” with excess to be “transferred to a future maintenance and repair budget.” Other than outlining these consequences if an IOU fails to perform an audit, the bill does not specify how or if the CPUC would review the results of each audit or precisely how the audit is to be aligned with the WMP process. A prior version of the bill required an IOU to replace or underground equipment and lines identified in the audit as at end of life. Standing alone, this new audit requirement lacks clear standards for imposition of fines and the mechanics of how fines the CPUC collects would be used for repairs and maintenance. IOUs claim this audit requirement is duplicative with the WMP review of infrastructure, and overlaps with review in general rate cases of IOU equipment investments and depreciation. At a minimum, the CPUC would need a proceeding to determine how to implement this requirement and then work with OEIS to align with WMP cycles. Accordingly, the committee recommends amending this bill by striking this audit requirement.
2. Executive Compensation and Affordability. This bill requires each IOU to submit to the CPUC by April 1, 2026, a proposed executive compensation structure to promote safety and affordability with performance metrics. This adds to the AB 1054 requirement that OEIS review executive compensation structures as part of IOU safety certification necessary for an IOU to draw from the Wildfire Fund. Recent author amendments to this bill also require the AB 1054 review of executive compensation include specified dollar amounts of compensation, noting lack of transparency with just percentages.^[3] Since those author amendments, given concerns about duplication, the author has proposed focusing on enhancing the existing AB 1054 provisions rather than adding a new requirement at the CPUC.

As a result, the author proposes further amendment of the AB 1054 provisions to include ratepayer affordability in executive compensation assessment. The author proposes a metric of an IOU’s percent of customers in arrears and year-to-year change in that percent. It is not specified how OEIS would implement this metric. Another approach is to require OEIS to consider IOU affordability data the CPUC already collects pursuant to SB 598 -- IOU disconnect, arrears, and uncollectibles data already submitted to the CPUC for a report to the Legislature, data related to the disconnect metric the CPUC applies in each IOU’s general rate case, and data in the ongoing CPUC rulemaking on service disconnections (further discussed in Comment 7 below). Accordingly, the committee recommends amending the bill by striking Section 5 and instead requiring that the AB 1054 assessment of IOU compensation structures include ratepayer affordability with review of any disconnect, arrears, uncollectibles and related data for each IOU already required by SB 598.

1. Posting Customer Disconnect Data. This bill requires all IOUs and POUs to post quarterly on their websites the total number of customers terminated, total number of customers reconnected, total number of payment agreements, total number of customers in arrears, the aggregated value of the arrears, and total number of created and broken payment plans. IOUs already provide customer disconnect and related data to the CPUC, which is included in reports to the Legislature, as required by SB 598. As part of an ongoing and active CPUC proceeding to implement SB 598, IOUs already report monthly to the CPUC on disconnects, arrears and uncollectibles, with copies to all parties to the proceeding, and accessible on the CPUC’s website.^[4] SB 598 also requires the CPUC to adopt residential utility disconnections for nonpayment as a metric incorporated into each IOU general rate case.

The sponsors of this bill state that arrearage data is the most important indicator of whether service is affordable. Some utilities state that the number of disconnects is most important because so many steps are taken to address nonpayment before the last resort of disconnect. They claim that public reporting of arrearage data can be misleading, potentially create an inaccurate impression of utility debt to lenders, and unintentionally inspire financially able customers to not pay bills on time. Utilities raise concerns that this approach is driving toward a policy against any customer disconnects. They also point out that utilities need financial stability to ensure reliable service. Any signal toward ending disconnects could lead to more customers not paying bills, costs that are then spread to other customers. The author has agreed to limit the data POUs are required to post to include only total number of disconnects and reconnections, along with requiring each utility to post on its internet website its disconnect policy. Regarding IOUs, it seems reasonable to require posting on their internet websites the same data they already submit to the CPUC.

The committee recommends amending the bill to require both POUs and IOUs to annually post the total number of customer disconnects and reconnections, with IOUs required to also post any related data already submitted pursuant to SB 598, and to require both POUs and IOUs to post their disconnect policies.

1. Related Legislation.

SB 254 (Becker), of the current legislative session, among other changes, clarifies the roles and responsibilities between the OEIS and the CPUC in reviewing IOU WMPs and related filings, including IOU executive compensation structures. Status: pending in this committee.

SB 256 (Perez), of the current legislative session, includes various changes to the WMP filing, including an accounting of all transmission facilities, including those “permanently abandoned”; requires IOUs to maintain wildfire mitigation around these abandoned lines, and file within their WMP information about their location and risk reduction plans. Status: pending in this committee.

SB 636 (Menjivar) of the current legislative session, prohibits an electrical or gas corporation from disconnecting service of a customer for three months if the customer is participating in specified low-income assistance programs and is experiencing specified hardships. Status: held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SB 24 (McNerney) of the current legislative session, among its provisions, prohibits electrical or gas corporations from terminating residential or commercial service for nonpayment on days (and three days after) when the air quality index is unhealthy for sensitive groups. Status: pending in Assembly Appropriations Committee.

1. Prior Legislation.

SB 1142 (Menjivar) proposed policies related to disconnection of electric and gas utility service, including requiring the CPUC, on or before July 1, 2025, to determine whether to direct electrical and gas corporations to take into account a customer’s ability to pay before terminating or reconnecting services. Status: Chapter 600, Statutes of 2024.

AB 1054 (Holden) included numerous provisions related to addressing wildfires caused by electric utility infrastructure, including: bolstering safety oversight and processes, such as required updates to each electric corporation’s WMPs, recasting recovery of costs from damages to third-parties, including the authorization for an electrical corporation and ratepayer jointly funded Wildfire Fund to address future damages, and changes to provisions concerning the workforce of a change of ownership of a full or portion of an electrical or gas corporation. Status: Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019.

SB 598 (Hueso), among its provisions, prohibits electrical and gas corporations from disconnecting service due to nonpayment of customers facing life-threatening medical conditions when the customer is financially unable to pay for service within the normal payment period and is willing to enter into an amortization agreement. Status: Chapter 362, Statutes of 2017.

SB 1028 (Hill) required electric CPUC-regulated utilities to file annual WMPs and requires the CPUC to review and comment on those plans. Status: Chapter 598, Statutes of 2016.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

350 Bay Area Action
350 Humboldt
350 Sacramento
350 South Bay Los Angeles
350 Southland Legislative Alliance
Activist San Diego
Agroecology Commons
Ban Sup (single Use Plastic)
Bay Area-system Change Not Climate Change
Berkeley City Councilmember Cecilia Lunaparra
Berkeley City Councilmember Igor Tregub
Biofuelwatch
California Alliance for Community Energy
California Brain Tumor Association
California Climate Voters
California Democratic Socialists of America
California Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA) Action
California Environmental Justice Coalition
California Interfaith Power and Light
Catholic Charities of Stockton
Center for Biological Diversity
Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice
Center for Community Energy
Central California Asthma Collaborative
Central Valley Partnership
Christina Fugazi - Mayor of Stockton
Claudia Jiménez, Councilmember District 6 City of Richmond
Cleanearth4kids.org
Climate Action California
Climate Action Campaign
Climate Equity Policy Center
Climate Health Now Action Fund
Coalition for Economic Equity and Economics
Cofem (the Mexican Federations in the United States)
Collective Resilience
Communities for a Better Environment
Consumer Watchdog
Courage California
Democratic Socialists of America, Sacramento
Democrats of Rossmoor
Disability Justice Culture Club
Doing Good Works
Dsa LA
Earthjustice
Eduardo Martinez - Mayor of Richmond
Energy Equity Project
Environmental Committee of the Valley Women’s Club of San Lorenzo Valley
Feed Black Futures
Foothills Community Democrats
Friends of the Public Bank East Bay
Frontline Catalysts
Glendale Environmental Coalition
Green the Church
Greenbank Associates
Hodg
Housing Now!
Human Impact Partners
Indigenous Environmental Network
Indigenous Justice
Indivisible California Green Team
Institute for Local Self-reliance
Little Manila Rising
Local Clean Energy Alliance
Local Government Sustainable Energy Coalition
Long Beach Alliance for Clean Energy
Media Alliance
Mineral Baths Community Gardens
National Association of Climate Resilience Planners
North American Climate, Conservation and Environment (NACCE)
Oakland City Councilmember Carroll Fife
Oil and Gas Action Network
Parable of the Sower Healing Center
Partners for Collaborative Change
Party for Socialism and Liberation
Peninsula Chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America
People's Climate Innovation Center
Poder
Public Power San Diego
Puente Latino Association
Reclaim Our Power!
Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign
Recolte Energy
Regenerating Paradise
Resources for Community Development
Richmond City Councilmember Gayle Mclaughlin
Sacramento Environmental Justice Coalition
Saginaw CAP
San Diego Dsa
San Luis Obispo County Democratic Party
Sandiego350
Santa Cruz Climate Action Network
Seventh Native American Generation Magazine
Sierra Club California
Soheila Bana, Phd - Richmond City Councilmember
Solar United Neighbors Action
Solidarity, Bay Area
Stop Pg$e
Stopwaste
Sunflower Alliance
Sunrun
Sustainable Rossmoor
Sustainable Systems Research Foundation
Synergistic Solutions
The Climate Center
The Energy Coalition
The Native Education Sustainable Training
Third ACT
Third ACT Bay Area
Third ACT Socal
Urban Ecology Project
Urban Tilth
Vote Solar
Wellbeing Economy Alliance California
West Berkeley Alliance for Clean Air and Safe Jobs
Youth Vs. Apocalypse

Oppose

Calchamber
California State Association of Electrical Workers
Coalition of California Utility Employees
Edison International and Affiliates, Including Southern California Edison
Engineers and Scientists of California, Ifpte Local 20, Afl-cio
North American Wood Pole Council
Pacific Gas and Electric Company and its Affiliated Entities
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
Southern California Gas Company
Treated Wood Council
Western Wood Preservers Institute

Analysis Prepared by: Jackie Kinney / U. & E. / (916) 319-2083

1. https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Detail/495/ Assessing California’s Climate Policies—Residential Electricity Rates in California ↑

2. https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/supplierdiversity/. ↑

3. Edison's safety record declined last year. Executive bonuses rose anyway. ↑

4. R.18-07-005; D. 18-12-013, OP 6 (ordering monthly reports). ↑

 THIRD READING  

Bill No: SB 332

Author: Wahab (D)

Amended: 5/28/25

Vote: 21

SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 12-4, 4/21/25

AYES: Becker, Allen, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Gonzalez, Grayson, Limón, McNerney, Stern, Wahab

NOES: Ochoa Bogh, Dahle, Grove, Strickland

NO VOTE RECORDED: Rubio

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-1, 5/23/25

AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab

NOES: Seyarto

NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle

SUBJECT: Investor-Owned Utilities Accountability Act

SOURCE: Center for Biological Diversity

Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign

DIGEST:

This bill contains various provisions intended to provide accountability of investor-owned utilities (IOUs), including a transition feasibility study to transition the large gas and electric IOUs’ operations to a successor entity; requirements regarding the auditing and replacement of electrical infrastructure; and reporting on disconnections due to nonpayment, among other provisions.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Establishes and vests the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
2. Establishes and vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (California Energy Commission (CEC)) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the state’s energy policies. (Public Resources Code §25000 et seq.)
3. Establishes the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS) within the Natural Resources Agency, as established by the California Energy Infrastructure Safety Act, and provides that, after July 1, 2021, the OEIS is the successor to the Wildfire Safety Division of the CPUC. (Government Code §§15470 et seq. and 15475.6, Public Utilities Code §§326 and 8385
4. Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
5. Authorizes the CPUC to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction. (Public Utilities Code §701)
6. Requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment. (Public Utilities Code §8386)
7. Requires the CPUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program. (Public Utilities Code §8388.5)
8. Prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customer’s residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customer’s dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill. (Public Utilities Code §779.1)
9. Prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §706)

This bill:

1. Relevant to the study on the transitioning the IOU model to a successor entity:
   1. Makes numerous findings and declarations concerning the electric IOU model, the increase in electricity rates, utility record profits wildfires caused by utility infrastructure, concerns that electric IOUs prioritize profits over the safety and well-being of the ratepayers and residents of California.
   2. Requires the CEC to select a research institute to conduct a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the electrical corporations to a public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation in order to identify a recommended model.
   3. Requires the research institute to complete the analysis on or before January 1, 2029 and upon completion to submit the analysis to the Legislature and the CEC.
   4. Requires the CEC to make a draft of the analysis available to the public for comment before submitting the final draft to the Legislature.
   5. Limits the cost of conducting the analysis to $5 million.
2. Relevant to infrastructure procurement:
   1. Requires the CPUC to develop a best value procurement model for use in the procurement of equipment and materials for electrical corporation infrastructure projects that compares the costs and benefits of potential supplies.
3. Relevant to electric IOU executive compensation:
   1. Requires each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics.
4. Relevant to auditing and replacement of electrical corporation infrastructure:
   1. Requires each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporation’s equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life. Requires the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. Requires an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within five years, as provided. Requires the CPUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions.
   2. Requires, after an emergency or disaster in which an electrical corporation’s electrical infrastructure was destroyed, if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure, the electrical corporation to use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable.
5. Relevant to utility disconnections due to nonpayment:
   1. Requires each utility providing electrical service or gas service, or both, to residential customers to post quarterly data on electrical and gas service terminations, reconnections, payment agreements, arrears, and created and broken payment plans.

Background

IOU model and the regulatory compact. In its early days of the advent of electricity service, only a small fraction of the country (roughly eight percent in 1907) received electricity service. At the time, numerous companies with different electric systems in the same city provided service to those who could afford it. Many residents and businesses relied on other less expensive energy forms (such as steam, natural gas, and oil) to power lamps, motors, and manufacturing facilities. Competition was fierce and multiple electric lines strung across urban areas. Thomas Edison’s former secretary, Samuel Insull, advocated for the idea of a natural monopoly for electricity service with government economic regulation – the regulatory compact. The natural monopoly model afforded vertically integrated utilities, both public and private, to prosper and expand (along with federal actions to expand hydroelectricity and rural electrification), the IOU model generally supported universal access, economies of scale, and steady financing. Over the past hundred years, the model has shifted with some aspects of competition, particularly in California with the 1990s restructuring of the vertically integrated IOU model. At that time, pursuant to CPUC orders and legislation, IOUs divested of significant portions of their generation. Ultimately, the state experienced an energy crisis, due to manipulation by nefarious actors (including Enron), and a restructured market that lacked appropriate safeguards to protect customers.

Since the energy crisis of 2000-01, the electricity landscape has changed significantly, with the growth of community choice aggregators, the limits of electric service providers, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders for open access of transmission lines, requirements for resource adequacy to ensure sufficient supply, and policies to diversify resources, including renewable and zero-carbon energy. In California, as in much of the country, both IOU and publicly owned utility models exist (as well as, rural cooperatives). Frustrations regarding profit-making by shareholders within the IOU model have often been a source of anger and frustration, particularly so at times when customers’ electricity utility bills run high. In California, the combination of high electricity bills, recent catastrophic wildfires caused by electrical infrastructure (Camp Fire, Dixie Fire, Thomas Fire to name a few), and the proactive power shutoffs employed by the IOUs to prevent catastrophic fires have further raised the ire of their customers. The first several sections of this bill would require the CEC to work with the Disadvantaged Communities Advisory Group, the CPUC and the CEC Public Advisor, to contract a research institute to analyze to the IOU model and the comparative analysis of alternative models. Numerous provisions of the language in this bill related to the study reflect a strong desire to transition away from the IOU model with a lens towards the proponents perspective for a justice-centered model.

Wildfire mitigation plans (WMPs). Electric IOUs are required to annually file WMP updates and a comprehensive WMP every three years with guidance by OEIS, which reviews and determines whether to approve these plans and ensures compliance with guidance and statute. Under this framework, the OEIS is responsible for reviewing, approving or denying and overseeing compliance with WMPs, while the CPUC evaluates the reasonableness of costs associated with implementation of the WMPs for purposes of cost recovery and has enforcement authority with regard to electric IOUs’ performance of their WMPs and utility-caused wildfire. Further, SB 884 (McGuire, Chapter 819, Statutes of 2022) required the CPUC to establish a program for expediting the undergrounding of large electric IOUs distribution infrastructure. Electric IOUs with 250,000 or more customer accounts may participate in the program. Electric IOUs wishing to participate in the program must first submit their 10-year plan to OEIS for review who must approve or deny the plan within nine months. If OEIS approves the plan, the electric IOU submits an application to the CPUC for conditional approval of the plan’s costs.

Wildfire mitigation as significant driver of costs in electric utility bills. The CPUC in its most recent SB 695 Utility Cost Report has noted that wildfire-related costs are a key driver putting upward pressure on customers’ electric rates. The CPUC has stated that over the next several years, wildfire risk mitigation costs are projected to continue their upward trend. In a recent study by the Energy Institute at Haas “Risk-Cost Tradeoffs in Power Sector Wildfire Prevention”, the authors note that in 2023 WMPs, California electric IOUs proposed investing over $9 billion annually to reduce wildfire ignition risk. Pacific Gas & Electric’s (PG&E’s) recent general rate case (GRC) included authorization to underground up to 1200 miles of electric distribution lines. This contributed to the overall rate increases that customers are experiencing this year, roughly $35 per month more for the average utility bill, with another rate increase approved for a portion of the utility’s wildfire-related expenses, and the expectation that more are on the horizon. PG&E is also pursuing efforts to underground 10,000 miles of electric distribution lines in areas with high-fire risk with the intent to reduce wildfire ignition risk by approximately 99% as the best long-term solution for keeping customers and communities safe. In the case of Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), their wildfire mitigation costs may be on a downward trend in the mid- to long-term, as much of their mitigation has been or will be completed, though they had less reliance on undergrounding lines as a primary strategy. However, recent wildfires in Southern California may affect this trajectory. This bill would require auditing of electrical corporations infrastructure and requirement to replace end of life infrastructure with consideration for undergrounding the infrastructure. Opponents to this bill express concerns that these requirements may be redundant and complicate the existing risk-informed mitigation strategies.

Process for disconnecting electric and gas utility service. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of utility disconnections due to nonpayment had been trending upwards among the four largest utilities–(PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas). In response to the rise of electric and gas utility disconnections due to nonpayment, the Legislature passed SB 598 (Hueso, Chapter 362, Statutes of 2017). The bill prohibited electrical and gas corporations from disconnecting service due to nonpayment of customers facing life-threatening medical conditions when the customer is financially unable to pay for service within the normal payment period and is willing to enter into an amortization agreement. The bill also required the CPUC to adopt rules, policies and regulations with the goal of reducing the statewide level of gas and electric utility service disconnections for nonpayment by residential customers. Additionally, SB 598 required consideration of utility disconnections in utility GRCs and required the CPUC to submit a report to the Legislature on residential gas and electric service disconnections. This bill would require utilities – IOUs and local publicly owned utilities – to post quarterly data on their respective websites concerning disconnections. Supporters of the bill express a desire for quarterly data readily available to customers on their respective utility’s website.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

• Significant costs, likely in the millions of dollars annually ongoing and potentially in the tens of millions one-time, for the California Energy Commission and the California Public Utilities to implement the provisions of this bill.
• To the extent that the provisions of this bill result in utility ratepayer impacts, it could impact the state as a ratepayer. The State of California is a natural gas and electrical customer, purchasing roughly one percent of the state’s electricity and four percent of its natural gas. As such, the state incurs costs if rates or surcharges increase, and realizes savings if they decrease.

SUPPORT: (Verified 6/2/25)

Center for Biological Diversity (co-source)

Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign (co-source)

Cecilia Lunaparra, Berkeley Councilmember, District 7

Claudia Jiménez, Richmond Councilmember, District 6

Gayle McLaughlin, Former Richmond Mayor

Igor Tregub, Berkeley Councilmember, District 4

Soheila Bana, Richmond Councilmember, District 4

350 Bay Area Action

350 Humboldt

350 Southland Legislative Alliance

Ban SUP (single Use Plastic)

Bay Area System Change Not Climate Change

Biofuelwatch

California Alliance for Community Energy

California Brain Tumor Association

California Climate Voters

California Environmental Justice Alliance Action

California Environmental Justice Coalition

California Green New Deal Coalition

California Interfaith Power and Light

California Solar & Storage Association

Catholic Charities of Stockton

Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice

Center for Community Energy

Central California Asthma Collaborative

Central Valley Partnership

CleanEarth4Kids.org

Climate Action California

Climate Action Campaign

Climate Equity Policy Center

Climate Health Now

Coalition for Economic Equity and Economics

Collective Resilience

Communities for a Better Environment

Consumer Watchdog

Courage California

Democratic Socialists of America, Peninsula

Democratic Socialists of America, Sacramento

Democrats of Rossmoor

Disability Justice Culture Club

Doing Good Works

Energy Equity Project

Environmental Working Group

Feed Black Futures

Foothills Community Democrats

Friends of the Public Bank East Bay

Frontline Catalysts

Greenbank Associates

HODG

Housing Now!

Human Impact Partners

Indigenous Environmental Network

Indigenous Justice

Indivisible California Green Team

Indivisible California StateStrong

Indivisible ReSisters Contra Costa County

Institute for Local Self-Reliance

Little Manila Rising

Local Clean Energy Alliance

Local Government Sustainable Energy Coalition

Long Beach Alliance for Clean Energy

Los Angeles County Democratic Party

Media Alliance

Mineral Baths Community Gardens

National Association of Climate Resilience Planners

North American Climate, Conservation and Environment

Oil & Gas Action Network

Parable of the Sower Intentional Community Cooperative

Partners for Collaborative Change

Party for Socialism and Liberation

People's Climate Innovation Center

PODER

Public Power San Diego

Puente Latino Association Inc.

Récolte Energy

Regenerating Paradise

Resources for Community Development

Sacramento Environmental Justice Coalition

Saginaw CAP

San Diego DSA

San Diego350

San Luis Obispo County Democratic Party

Santa Cruz Climate Action Network

Solar United Neighbors Action

Solidarity, Bay Area

Stop PG&E

StopWaste

Sunflower Alliance

Sustainable Rossmoor

Sustainable Systems Research Foundation

Synergistic Solutions

The Climate Center

The Energy Coalition

Third ACT

Third ACT Bay Area

Third ACT SoCal

Urban Ecology Project

Urban Tilth

Vote Solar

Wellbeing Economy Alliance California

West Berkeley Alliance for Clean Air and Safe Jobs

Youth vs. Apocalypse

Several Individuals

OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/2/25)

California Chamber of Commerce

California State Association of Electrical Workers

Coalition of California Utility Employees

North American Wood Pole Council

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

San Diego Gas & Electric

Southern California Edison

Southern California Gas Company

The Utility Wildfire Survivor Coalition

Treated Wood Council

Western Wood Preservers Institute

Several Individuals

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The Center for Biological Diversity and Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign, co-sponsors of this bill states:

Over the past years, catastrophic wildfires have grown in frequency and severity, caused or accelerated by our reliance on an antiquated and dangerous IOU business model that prioritizes profits over public health. Over the past three years, the IOUs have recorded record profits, while ratepayers’ bills have gone up on average over 50%. Now, Californians face an affordability crisis that has over 6 million people behind on their bills, some so severely that record numbers of families are facing potentially life-threatening disconnections.

SB 332 would go a long way to address these systemic problems. In particular, the bill would fund a feasibility study to determine what form of utility best serves ratepayers. SB 332 is a critical bill to help us achieve our decarbonization and climate targets, by assessing and remedying the broken—and monopoly—utility system, ensuring the safety of our electrical infrastructure, addressing the significant energy burdens faced by California households, and providing protections for the State’s most vulnerable populations.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The utilities opposed to this bill raise concerns that some of this bill’s provisions are redundant to existing requirements and express concerns that proposed study would require substantial investment of time and resources at a time when other needs merit attention (including advancing clean energy, reliability, and affordability). PG&E states “…SB 332 proposes sweeping changes without fully accounting for existing regulatory safeguards or the operational complexities of transforming the state’s energy infrastructure.” SCE states “… [SB 332] presents a flawed and incomplete view of the challenges faced by investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and does not take into consideration current regulatory oversight.”

Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U. & C. / (916) 651-4107

6/2/25 13:14:45

**** END ****

 THIRD READING  

Bill No: SB 332

Author: Wahab (D)

Amended: 5/28/25

Vote: 21

SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 12-4, 4/21/25

AYES: Becker, Allen, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Gonzalez, Grayson, Limón, McNerney, Stern, Wahab

NOES: Ochoa Bogh, Dahle, Grove, Strickland

NO VOTE RECORDED: Rubio

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-1, 5/23/25

AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab

NOES: Seyarto

NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle

SUBJECT: Investor-Owned Utilities Accountability Act

SOURCE: Center for Biological Diversity

Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign

DIGEST:

This bill contains various provisions intended to provide accountability of investor-owned utilities (IOUs), including a transition feasibility study to transition the large gas and electric IOUs’ operations to a successor entity; requirements regarding the auditing and replacement of electrical infrastructure; and reporting on disconnections due to nonpayment, among other provisions.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Establishes and vests the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
2. Establishes and vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (California Energy Commission (CEC)) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the state’s energy policies. (Public Resources Code §25000 et seq.)
3. Establishes the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS) within the Natural Resources Agency, as established by the California Energy Infrastructure Safety Act, and provides that, after July 1, 2021, the OEIS is the successor to the Wildfire Safety Division of the CPUC. (Government Code §§15470 et seq. and 15475.6, Public Utilities Code §§326 and 8385
4. Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
5. Authorizes the CPUC to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction. (Public Utilities Code §701)
6. Requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment. (Public Utilities Code §8386)
7. Requires the CPUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program. (Public Utilities Code §8388.5)
8. Prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customer’s residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customer’s dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill. (Public Utilities Code §779.1)
9. Prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §706)

This bill:

1. Relevant to the study on the transitioning the IOU model to a successor entity:
   1. Makes numerous findings and declarations concerning the electric IOU model, the increase in electricity rates, utility record profits wildfires caused by utility infrastructure, concerns that electric IOUs prioritize profits over the safety and well-being of the ratepayers and residents of California.
   2. Requires the CEC to select a research institute to conduct a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the electrical corporations to a public entity, nonprofit public benefit corporation, or mutual benefit corporation in order to identify a recommended model.
   3. Requires the research institute to complete the analysis on or before January 1, 2029 and upon completion to submit the analysis to the Legislature and the CEC.
   4. Requires the CEC to make a draft of the analysis available to the public for comment before submitting the final draft to the Legislature.
   5. Limits the cost of conducting the analysis to $5 million.
2. Relevant to infrastructure procurement:
   1. Requires the CPUC to develop a best value procurement model for use in the procurement of equipment and materials for electrical corporation infrastructure projects that compares the costs and benefits of potential supplies.
3. Relevant to electric IOU executive compensation:
   1. Requires each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics.
4. Relevant to auditing and replacement of electrical corporation infrastructure:
   1. Requires each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporation’s equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life. Requires the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. Requires an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within five years, as provided. Requires the CPUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions.
   2. Requires, after an emergency or disaster in which an electrical corporation’s electrical infrastructure was destroyed, if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure, the electrical corporation to use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable.
5. Relevant to utility disconnections due to nonpayment:
   1. Requires each utility providing electrical service or gas service, or both, to residential customers to post quarterly data on electrical and gas service terminations, reconnections, payment agreements, arrears, and created and broken payment plans.

Background

IOU model and the regulatory compact. In its early days of the advent of electricity service, only a small fraction of the country (roughly eight percent in 1907) received electricity service. At the time, numerous companies with different electric systems in the same city provided service to those who could afford it. Many residents and businesses relied on other less expensive energy forms (such as steam, natural gas, and oil) to power lamps, motors, and manufacturing facilities. Competition was fierce and multiple electric lines strung across urban areas. Thomas Edison’s former secretary, Samuel Insull, advocated for the idea of a natural monopoly for electricity service with government economic regulation – the regulatory compact. The natural monopoly model afforded vertically integrated utilities, both public and private, to prosper and expand (along with federal actions to expand hydroelectricity and rural electrification), the IOU model generally supported universal access, economies of scale, and steady financing. Over the past hundred years, the model has shifted with some aspects of competition, particularly in California with the 1990s restructuring of the vertically integrated IOU model. At that time, pursuant to CPUC orders and legislation, IOUs divested of significant portions of their generation. Ultimately, the state experienced an energy crisis, due to manipulation by nefarious actors (including Enron), and a restructured market that lacked appropriate safeguards to protect customers.

Since the energy crisis of 2000-01, the electricity landscape has changed significantly, with the growth of community choice aggregators, the limits of electric service providers, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders for open access of transmission lines, requirements for resource adequacy to ensure sufficient supply, and policies to diversify resources, including renewable and zero-carbon energy. In California, as in much of the country, both IOU and publicly owned utility models exist (as well as, rural cooperatives). Frustrations regarding profit-making by shareholders within the IOU model have often been a source of anger and frustration, particularly so at times when customers’ electricity utility bills run high. In California, the combination of high electricity bills, recent catastrophic wildfires caused by electrical infrastructure (Camp Fire, Dixie Fire, Thomas Fire to name a few), and the proactive power shutoffs employed by the IOUs to prevent catastrophic fires have further raised the ire of their customers. The first several sections of this bill would require the CEC to work with the Disadvantaged Communities Advisory Group, the CPUC and the CEC Public Advisor, to contract a research institute to analyze to the IOU model and the comparative analysis of alternative models. Numerous provisions of the language in this bill related to the study reflect a strong desire to transition away from the IOU model with a lens towards the proponents perspective for a justice-centered model.

Wildfire mitigation plans (WMPs). Electric IOUs are required to annually file WMP updates and a comprehensive WMP every three years with guidance by OEIS, which reviews and determines whether to approve these plans and ensures compliance with guidance and statute. Under this framework, the OEIS is responsible for reviewing, approving or denying and overseeing compliance with WMPs, while the CPUC evaluates the reasonableness of costs associated with implementation of the WMPs for purposes of cost recovery and has enforcement authority with regard to electric IOUs’ performance of their WMPs and utility-caused wildfire. Further, SB 884 (McGuire, Chapter 819, Statutes of 2022) required the CPUC to establish a program for expediting the undergrounding of large electric IOUs distribution infrastructure. Electric IOUs with 250,000 or more customer accounts may participate in the program. Electric IOUs wishing to participate in the program must first submit their 10-year plan to OEIS for review who must approve or deny the plan within nine months. If OEIS approves the plan, the electric IOU submits an application to the CPUC for conditional approval of the plan’s costs.

Wildfire mitigation as significant driver of costs in electric utility bills. The CPUC in its most recent SB 695 Utility Cost Report has noted that wildfire-related costs are a key driver putting upward pressure on customers’ electric rates. The CPUC has stated that over the next several years, wildfire risk mitigation costs are projected to continue their upward trend. In a recent study by the Energy Institute at Haas “Risk-Cost Tradeoffs in Power Sector Wildfire Prevention”, the authors note that in 2023 WMPs, California electric IOUs proposed investing over $9 billion annually to reduce wildfire ignition risk. Pacific Gas & Electric’s (PG&E’s) recent general rate case (GRC) included authorization to underground up to 1200 miles of electric distribution lines. This contributed to the overall rate increases that customers are experiencing this year, roughly $35 per month more for the average utility bill, with another rate increase approved for a portion of the utility’s wildfire-related expenses, and the expectation that more are on the horizon. PG&E is also pursuing efforts to underground 10,000 miles of electric distribution lines in areas with high-fire risk with the intent to reduce wildfire ignition risk by approximately 99% as the best long-term solution for keeping customers and communities safe. In the case of Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), their wildfire mitigation costs may be on a downward trend in the mid- to long-term, as much of their mitigation has been or will be completed, though they had less reliance on undergrounding lines as a primary strategy. However, recent wildfires in Southern California may affect this trajectory. This bill would require auditing of electrical corporations infrastructure and requirement to replace end of life infrastructure with consideration for undergrounding the infrastructure. Opponents to this bill express concerns that these requirements may be redundant and complicate the existing risk-informed mitigation strategies.

Process for disconnecting electric and gas utility service. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of utility disconnections due to nonpayment had been trending upwards among the four largest utilities–(PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas). In response to the rise of electric and gas utility disconnections due to nonpayment, the Legislature passed SB 598 (Hueso, Chapter 362, Statutes of 2017). The bill prohibited electrical and gas corporations from disconnecting service due to nonpayment of customers facing life-threatening medical conditions when the customer is financially unable to pay for service within the normal payment period and is willing to enter into an amortization agreement. The bill also required the CPUC to adopt rules, policies and regulations with the goal of reducing the statewide level of gas and electric utility service disconnections for nonpayment by residential customers. Additionally, SB 598 required consideration of utility disconnections in utility GRCs and required the CPUC to submit a report to the Legislature on residential gas and electric service disconnections. This bill would require utilities – IOUs and local publicly owned utilities – to post quarterly data on their respective websites concerning disconnections. Supporters of the bill express a desire for quarterly data readily available to customers on their respective utility’s website.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

• Significant costs, likely in the millions of dollars annually ongoing and potentially in the tens of millions one-time, for the California Energy Commission and the California Public Utilities to implement the provisions of this bill.
• To the extent that the provisions of this bill result in utility ratepayer impacts, it could impact the state as a ratepayer. The State of California is a natural gas and electrical customer, purchasing roughly one percent of the state’s electricity and four percent of its natural gas. As such, the state incurs costs if rates or surcharges increase, and realizes savings if they decrease.

SUPPORT: (Verified 5/27/25)

Center for Biological Diversity (co-source)
Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign (co-source)
Cecilia Lunaparra, Berkeley Councilmember, District 7

Claudia Jiménez, Richmond Councilmember, District 6

Gayle McLaughlin, Former Richmond Mayor

Igor Tregub, Berkeley Councilmember, District 4

Soheila Bana, Richmond Councilmember, District 4

350 Bay Area Action
350 Humboldt
350 Southland Legislative Alliance
Ban SUP (single use plastic)
Bay Area System Change Not Climate Change
Biofuelwatch
California Alliance for Community Energy
California Brain Tumor Association

California Climate Voters
California Environmental Justice Alliance Action
California Environmental Justice Coalition
California Green New Deal Coalition
California Interfaith Power and Light
California Solar & Storage Association
Catholic Charities of Stockton
Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice
Center for Community Energy
Central California Asthma Collaborative

Central Valley Partnership
CleanEarth4Kids.org

Climate Action California
Climate Action Campaign
Climate Equity Policy Center
Climate Health Now
Coalition for Economic Equity and Economics
Collective Resilience
Communities for a Better Environment
Consumer Watchdog
Courage California
Democratic Socialists of America, Sacramento
Democrats of Rossmoor
Disability Justice Culture Club
Doing Good Works
Energy Equity Project

Environmental Working Group
Feed Black Futures
Foothills Community Democrats

Friends of the Public Bank East Bay
Frontline Catalysts
HODG
Housing Now!

Human Impact Partners
Indigenous Environmental Network
Indigenous Justice
Indivisible California Green Team

Indivisible California StateStrong
Indivisible ReSisters Contra Costa

Institute for Local Self-Reliance
Little Manila Rising

Local Clean Energy Alliance
Long Beach Alliance for Clean Energy
Los Angeles County Democratic Party
Media Alliance
Mineral Baths Community Gardens
National Association of Climate Resilience Planners
North American Climate, Conservation and Environment
Oil & Gas Action Network
Parable of the Sower Intentional Community Cooperative
Partners for Collaborative Change
Party for Socialism and Liberation
People's Climate Innovation Center
PODER
Public Power San Diego
Puente Latino Association Inc.

Récolte Energy

Regenerating Paradise
Resources for Community Development
Sacramento Environmental Justice Coalition
Saginaw CAP
San Diego DSA
San Diego350
San Luis Obispo Democratic Party

Santa Cruz Climate Action Network
Solar United Neighbors Action
Solidarity, Bay Area
Stop PG&E
StopWaste

Sunflower Alliance
Sustainable Rossmoor
Sustainable Systems Research Foundation
Synergistic Solutions
The Climate Center
Third ACT
Third ACT Bay Area
Third ACT SoCal
Urban Ecology Project
Urban Tilth
Vote Solar
Wellbeing Economy Alliance California
West Berkeley Alliance for Clean Air and Safe Jobs
Youth vs. Apocalypse

Several Individuals

OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/27/25)

California Chamber of Commerce

California State Association of Electrical Workers
Coalition of California Utility Employees
North American Wood Pole Council
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
San Diego Gas & Electric
Southern California Edison

Southern California Gas Company
The Utility Wildfire Survivor Coalition

Treated Wood Council
Western Wood Preservers Institute

Several Individuals

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The Center for Biological Diversity and Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign, co-sponsors of this bill states:

Over the past years, catastrophic wildfires have grown in frequency and severity, caused or accelerated by our reliance on an antiquated and dangerous IOU business model that prioritizes profits over public health. Over the past three years, the IOUs have recorded record profits, while ratepayers’ bills have gone up on average over 50%. Now, Californians face an affordability crisis that has over 6 million people behind on their bills, some so severely that record numbers of families are facing potentially life-threatening disconnections.

SB 332 would go a long way to address these systemic problems. In particular, the bill would fund a feasibility study to determine what form of utility best serves ratepayers. SB 332 is a critical bill to help us achieve our decarbonization and climate targets, by assessing and remedying the broken—and monopoly—utility system, ensuring the safety of our electrical infrastructure, addressing the significant energy burdens faced by California households, and providing protections for the State’s most vulnerable populations.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The utilities opposed to this bill raise concerns that some of this bill’s provisions are redundant to existing requirements and express concerns that proposed study would require substantial investment of time and resources at a time when other needs merit attention (including advancing clean energy, reliability, and affordability). PG&E states “…SB 332 proposes sweeping changes without fully accounting for existing regulatory safeguards or the operational complexities of transforming the state’s energy infrastructure.” SCE states “… [SB 332] presents a flawed and incomplete view of the challenges faced by investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and does not take into consideration current regulatory oversight.”

Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U. & C. / (916) 651-4107

5/28/25 17:34:42

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON

Senator Anna Caballero, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular Session

SB 332 (Wahab) - Investor-Owned Utilities Accountability Act

Bill Summary:

This bill would, among other things intended to provide Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU) accountability, require (1) a feasibility study on transitioning operations of the large gas and electric IOUs to a successor entity, (2) that utilities post specified information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment on their websites, and (3) that each electrical corporation submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety, as provided.

*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********

The following information is revised to reflect amendments

adopted by the committee on May 23, 2025

Fiscal Impact:

• Significant costs, likely in the millions of dollars annually ongoing and potentially in the tens of millions one-time, for the California Energy Commission and the California Public Utilities to implement the provisions of this bill.
• To the extent that the provisions of this bill result in utility ratepayer impacts, it could impact the state as a ratepayer. The State of California is a natural gas and electrical customer, purchasing roughly one percent of the state’s electricity and four percent of its natural gas. As such, the state incurs costs if rates or surcharges increase, and realizes savings if they decrease.

Amendments:

Amendments would reduce costs, revise study and best value procurement processes, and clarify cost recovery and fines. Specifically, they would:

1. Modify the study to expand the eligible research institutes .
2. Reduce costs of the study and cap the overall cost of the study not to exceed $5 million.
3. Replace the definition of “IOUs” with the existing definition for “electrical corporations” and make conforming amendments.
4. Related to the audit, align the ability for IOUs to recover costs from ratepayers for work done with existing CPUC processes. Remove the prescribed fines and instead allow the commission to fine based on the severity of the violations.
5. For rebuilding infrastructure, align the ability for IOUs to recover costs from ratepayers for work done with existing CPUC processes.

-- END --

SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Senator Anna Caballero, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular Session

SB 332 (Wahab) - Investor-Owned Utilities Accountability Act

Bill Summary:

This bill would, among other things intended to provide Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU) accountability, require (1) a feasibility study on transitioning operations of the large gas and electric IOUs to a successor entity, (2) that utilities post specified information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment on their websites, and (3) that each electrical corporation submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety, as provided.

Fiscal Impact:

• The California Energy Commission (CEC) estimates one-time costs of about $18 million spread over three years (Energy Resources Program Account [ERPA]) for 5 temporary positions and contract funds to conduct the study required by this bill. The CEC notes that this study would require substantial work conducted by a multi-disciplinary contractor team and CEC staff with extensive expertise.
• The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) estimates ongoing costs of about $2.2 million annually (ratepayer funds) and 8 positions to coordinate with the CEC and enforce the requirements on IOUs and utilities that would be established by this bill, among other things.
• To the extent that the provisions of this bill result in utility ratepayer impacts, it could impact the state as a ratepayer. The State of California is a natural gas and electrical customer, purchasing roughly one percent of the state’s electricity and four percent of its natural gas. As such, the state incurs costs if rates or surcharges increase, and realizes savings if they decrease.

Background:

IOU model and the regulatory compact. In its early days, only a small fraction of the country (roughly eight percent in 1907) received electricity service. At the time, numerous companies with different electric systems in the same city provided service to those who could afford it. Many residents and businesses relied on other less expensive energy forms (such as steam, natural gas, and oil) to power lamps, motors, and manufacturing facilities. Competition was fierce and multiple electric lines strung across urban areas. Thomas Edison’s former secretary, Samuel Insull, pushed the idea of a natural monopoly for electricity service with government economic regulation – the regulatory compact. The natural monopoly model afforded vertically integrated utilities, both public and private, to prosper and expand (along with federal actions to expand hydroelectricity and rural electrification), the IOU model generally supported universal access, economies of scale, and steady financing. Over the past hundred years, the model has shifted with some aspects of competition, particularly in California with the 1990s restructuring of the vertically integrated IOU model, pursuant to CPUC orders and legislation, IOUs divested of significant portions of their generation. Ultimately, the state experienced an energy crisis, due to manipulation by nefarious actors (including Enron), and a restructured market that lacked some of the safeguards to protect customers.

Since the energy crisis of 2000-01, the electricity landscape has changed significantly, with the growth of CCAs, the limits of electric service providers, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders for open access of transmission lines, requirements for resource adequacy to ensure sufficient supply, and policies to diversify resources, including renewable and zero-carbon energy. In California, as in much of the country, both IOU and publicly owned utility (POU) utility models exist (as well as, rural cooperatives). Frustrations regarding profit-making by shareholders within the IOU model have often been a source of anger and frustration, particularly so at times when customers’ electricity utility bills run high. In California, the combination of high electricity bills, recent catastrophic wildfires caused by electrical infrastructure (Camp Fire, Dixie Fire, Thomas Fire to name a few), and the proactive power shutoffs employed by the IOUs to prevent catastrophic fires have further raised the ire of their customers.

Inverse condemnation and Wildfire Fund. After those recent wildfires, the IOU model was further shaken due to the combination of claims from those fires as the California Constitution provides the basis for recovery against government entities and public utilities via the theory of inverse condemnation. Section 19 of Article 12, requires that just compensation be paid when private property is taken for public use. This is commonly understood as eminent domain. In the case where a property is damaged by a public improvement project, the application is known as inverse condemnation, unlike in cases of negligence, the responsible entity is held strictly liable where a public improvement causes property damage. The California Supreme Court and appellate courts have held that inverse condemnation is applicable to IOUs (Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 458, 469), and (Barham v. Southern California Edison Company (1999) 74 Cal. App 4th 744).

Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) filed for bankruptcy due to their credit ratings being downgraded by the credit ratings agencies to a point characterized as “junk status.” The credit ratings downgrade occurred following information that the CPUC was investigating PG&E concerning gas safety reporting violations, on the heels of the Camp Fire which was speculated (and since found to have been) caused by PG&E electric infrastructure, and in the midst of a criminal probation stemming from the San Bruno gas pipeline explosion. Nearly a week after the downgrade, PG&E notified its workforce (and the public) that it intended to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on or around January 29, 2019. Subsequently, the Legislature and Governor established a process to allow for claims paying capacity from covered wildfires via a Wildfire Fund that would be capitalized up to $21 billion, with half paid by shareholders and the other half from ratepayers. The fund has received nearly $15 billion including annual contributions (as required by the statute) from shareholders for electrical corporations that chose to participate and from a nonbypassable charge on electric IOU customers of roughly $0.0056 per kilowatt hour of electricity.

Addressing safety risks from energy utility operations. The CPUC oversees the development of the risk framework each IOU uses as basis for analyzing their risks. The risk framework includes a Risk Assessment Mitigation Phase (RAMP) whereby CPUC staff scrutinize energy IOU safety-risk threat assessments along with associated proposed mitigation plans and estimated costs and spending requests. The risk reports are submitted to the CPUC on a four-year cycle basis to inform applications and approval of system-wide IOU operating and capital spending. In addition to the RAMP filings, the Safety Model Assessment Proceeding (S-MAP) is a parallel rulemaking track at the CPUC to continually refine and improve the RAMP and its associated mandates. The S-MAP continuously updates utility risk-related requirements and provides interpretations to support California utilities’ capacity building to respond to new and growing risks and makes use of the latest risk-modeling science. RAMP and S-MAP efforts inform each energy IOUs’ general rate case (GRC) and help the CPUC (and stakeholders) assess whether the utilities are properly directing resources to wildfire and safety risks.

Wildfire mitigation plans (WMPs). In addition to the RAMP and S-MAP processes, the state has created a separate entity, the OEIS, and a special process to review wildfire-related risks via electric IOU WMPs. Electric IOUs are required to annually file WMP updates and a comprehensive WMP every three years with guidance by OEIS, which reviews and determines whether to approve these plans and ensures compliance with guidance and statute. Under this framework, the OEIS is responsible for reviewing, approving or denying and overseeing compliance with WMPs, while the CPUC evaluates the reasonableness of costs associated with implementation of the WMPs for purposes of cost recovery and has enforcement authority with regard to electric IOUs’ performance of their WMPs and utility-caused wildfire. Further, SB 884 (McGuire, Chapter 819, Statutes of 2022) required the CPUC to establish a program for expediting the undergrounding of large electric IOUs distribution infrastructure. Electric IOUs with 250,000 or more customer accounts may participate in the program. Electric IOUs wishing to participate in the program must first submit their 10-year plan to OEIS for review who must approve or deny the plan within nine months. If OEIS approves the plan, the electric IOU submits an application to the CPUC for conditional approval of the plan’s costs.

Wildfire mitigation as significant driver of costs in electric utility bills. The CPUC in its most recent SB 695 Utility Cost Report has noted that wildfire-related costs are a key driver putting upward pressure on customers’ electric rates. The CPUC has stated that over the next several years, wildfire risk mitigation costs are projected to continue their upward trend. In a recent study by the Energy Institute at Haas “Risk-Cost Tradeoffs in Power Sector Wildfire Prevention”, the authors note that in 2023 WMPs, California electric IOUs proposed investing over $9 billion annually to reduce wildfire ignition risk. PG&E’s recent GRC included authorization to underground up to 1200 miles of electric distribution lines. This contributed to the overall rate increases that customers are experiencing this year, roughly $35 per month more for the average utility bill, with another rate increase approved for a portion of the utility’s wildfire-related expenses, and the expectation that more are on the horizon. PG&E is also pursuing efforts to underground 10,000 miles of electric distribution lines in areas with high-fire risk with the intent to reduce wildfire ignition risk by approximately 99% as the best long-term solution for keeping customers and communities safe. In the case of Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), their wildfire mitigation costs may be on a downward trend in the mid- to long-term, as much of their mitigation has been or will be completed, though they had less reliance on undergrounding lines as a primary strategy. Additionally, recent wildfires in Southern California may affect this trajectory.

Costs to underground electric utility infrastructure. While the electric utilities incorporate undergrounding efforts in their WMPs, it is a strategy that had been utilized for very few of their electric circuit lines, largely due to costs in comparison to other mitigation options, and the long-lead time for undergrounding projects. According to data gathered from electric IOUs, and analyzed by the CPUC, converting overhead distribution infrastructure to underground can be 10 times more expensive than installing new distribution overhead lines and undergrounding of electric distribution lines can be eight times more expensive than insulating (covering) the conductors (wires) to prevent them from igniting when contacting vegetation and other foreign objects. Per the data collected from PG&E, SCE and SDG&E, the costs for undergrounding existing overhead distribution infrastructure can range between $1.85 million to $6.072 million per mile. Costs to underground electric transmission lines can be exponentially more.

Costs of other mitigation measures. Generally, electric utilities are incorporating other wildfire mitigation measures that can be more cost-effective, including covered conductor, sectionalizing circuit lines, vegetation management, and operational controls such as fast-trips and public safety power shutoffs. Per the data collected by the CPUC, installing new overhead distribution infrastructure is much less expensive. On average, the costs to install new overhead distribution infrastructure is between $634,000-$760,000 per mile, according to the electric utilities’ Rule 21 interconnection unit cost guides. PG&E has shared that their undergrounding efforts are averaging under $3 million per mile and overhead upgrades are averaging just over $1 million. The Energy Institute at Hass report on wildfire mitigation prevention measures notes that undergrounding powerlines, despite the higher investment cost, is more cost effective than pruning and removing vegetation. However, new operational controls, especially the use of “fast-trip” settings is significantly more cost effective than other strategies.

Proposed Law:

This bill includes various provisions intended to provide IOU accountability. Specifically, it would:

1. Require the CEC, in coordination with the public advisor and the CPUC, on or before March 31, 2026, to issue a request for proposals for a team to develop a study.
2. Require that the study
   1. Conduct a historical energy justice assessment of the IOU’s operations and impacts.
   2. Complete a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity in order to identify a recommended model
3. Require the CEC, on or before June 30, 2026, to select the study team that is awarded the contract.
4. Require the CEC to hold a public proceeding and submit a report of the study team’s findings and recommendations to the Legislature no later than 24 months after selecting the study team, as specified.
5. Require the CEC to require the study team to select and convene an advisory council by December 31, 2026, to participate in the study of the vision for a new energy system, as provided. Upon completion of the first 2 study components, the bill would require the study team, in consultation with the advisory council, to provide a recommendation for a particular successor entity type to the CEC, as provided.
6. Require a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, to quarterly post specified information concerning termination of service due to nonpayment on its respective internet websites, as provided.
7. Require each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics, as provided.
8. Require each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporation’s equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life.
   1. Require the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified.
   2. Require an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within 5 years, as provided.
   3. Require the CPUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.
9. Require, after an emergency or disaster in which an electrical corporation’s electrical infrastructure was destroyed, if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure, that the electrical corporation use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable.
10. Prohibit the cost of undergrounding, installing covered conductors, or other cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies for the electrical infrastructure from being recovered from ratepayers.
11. Provide that no reimbursement is required for specified reasons.

Related Legislation:

SB 636 (Menjivar) of the current legislative session would prohibit an electrical or gas corporation from disconnecting service of a customer for three months if the customer is participating in specified low-income assistance programs and is experiencing specified hardships.

SB 24 (McNerney) of the current legislative session, among its provisions, would prohibit electrical or gas corporations from terminating residential or commercial service for nonpayment on days (and three days after) when the air quality index is unhealthy for sensitive groups.

SB 1142 (Menjivar, Chapter 600, Statutes of 2024) proposed policies related to disconnection of electric and gas utility service, including requiring the CPUC, on or before July 1, 2025, to determine whether to direct electrical and gas corporations to take into account a customer’s ability to pay before terminating or reconnecting services.

SB 1003 (Dodd, 2024) would have made numerous changes to the processes for addressing wildfire mitigation by electrical corporations and other electric utilities, including clarifying the roles of relevant state agencies in addressing wildfire risk; and would have required electrical corporations to take into account both the amount of wildfire risk reduction for the cost-effectiveness and time value of the proposed mitigation measure within the utility’s wildfire mitigation plan. The bill was held on the Assembly Floor.

SB 884 (McGuire, Chapter 819, Statutes of 2022) required the CPUC to establish an expedited electric utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program for large electrical corporations. Requires the OEIS to approve or deny the plan within nine months and requires additional actions and reports.

AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) included numerous provisions related to addressing wildfires caused by electric utility infrastructure, including: bolstering safety oversight and processes, such as required updates to each electric corporation’s WMPs, recasting recovery of costs from damages to third-parties, including the authorization for an electrical corporation and ratepayer jointly funded Wildfire Fund to address future damages, and changes to provisions concerning the workforce of a change of ownership of a full or portion of an electrical or gas corporation.

SB 901 (Dodd, Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018) addressed numerous issues concerning wildfire prevention, response and recovery, including funding for mutual aid, fuel reduction and forestry policies, WMPs by electric utilities, and cost recovery by electric corporations of wildfire-related damages.

SB 1028 (Hill, Chapter 598, Statutes of 2016) required electric CPUC-regulated utilities to file annual wildfire mitigation plans and requires the CPUC to review and comment on those plans.

Staff Comments:

CEC costs. This bill would require a substantive effort by the CEC to lead a large RFP study to identify whether there is value in moving IOUs to some other structure and to develop a strategy for this shift. The CEC notes that the bill has an unusual amount of detail on what the CEC needs to do to issue the RFP and on the scope of the study compared to what is typically in statute when the CEC is required to undertake an RFP. The CEC believes this multi-year effort would be challenging to complete in the timeline that is in the bill and would require a substantial level of effort by CEC staff and leadership. The CEC expects that this work would take at least double the amount of time provided in the bill.

The main funding source supporting CEC is ERPA, which was established to provide funds for ongoing energy programs and energy as established to provide funds for ongoing energy programs and energy projects, including the operations of the CEC. ERPA is supported by a statutory surcharge on electricity consumption. According to the CEC, as building and appliance energy efficiency and the increase of behind-the-meter solar produce customer savings and flatten statewide electricity consumption, ERPA revenues have decreased, and the costs have been borne by fewer and fewer customers. Even as revenues drop, ERPA is repeatedly tapped to support new programs and must cover increases in employee compensation and benefit contributions. 

As part of the 2022-23 budget, the Legislature passed trailer bill language that raised the statutory cap on the ERPA surcharge, tied the statutory cap to the Consumer Price Index, and extended the surcharge to behind-the-meter electricity consumption. Using ERPA to fund implementation of this bill would increase ERPA expenditures thereby exacerbating the structural deficit. A better funding source may need to be identified.

Potential ratepayer impacts. As noted above, efforts to underground electrical infrastructure can be costly. However, the risk of utility equipment igniting fires can also pose significant costs on utility customers given the associated liability and potential impacts of the borrowing costs to the utility. With the growing risks of fires and the expenses associated with other strategies, including the costs of ongoing vegetation management, electric utilities are reassessing these costs and calculations. In the case of PG&E, the utility contends that undergrounding 10,000 miles of electric distribution utility lines will help to better mitigate the risks for the long-term. SCE has been working with affected communities in southern California for their rebuild in an attempt to also underground electric lines. This bill attempts to allay concerns about ratepayer costs by requiring shareholders to fund many of the activities related to rebuilding infrastructure after a natural disaster or to address wildfire risk. However, as noted in the analysis for the Senate Energy, Utilities, & Communications Committee, it is likely this language could result in concerns about Constitutional takings issues, and this approach could result in diminished financing opportunities for utility operations that could also increase costs for customers.

-- END --

SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Senator Josh Becker, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular

Bill No: Hearing Date: 4/21/2025

SUBJECT:

DIGEST: This bill contains various provisions intended to provide accountability of investor-owned utilities (IOUs), including a transition feasibility study to transition the large gas and electric IOUs’ operations to a successor entity; requirements regarding the auditing and replacement of electrical infrastructure; and protections from disconnections due to nonpayment for households with specified individuals, including someone who is pregnant; among other provisions.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Establishes and vests the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
2. Establishes and vests the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (California Energy Commission (CEC)) with various responsibilities for developing and implementing the state’s energy policies. (Public Resources Code §25000 et seq.)
3. Establishes the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS) within the Natural Resources Agency, as established by the California Energy Infrastructure Safety Act, and provides that, on and after July 1, 2021, the OEIS is the successor to, and is vested with, all of the duties, powers, and responsibilities of the Wildfire Safety Division of the CPUC. (Government Code §§15470 et seq. and 15475.6, Public Utilities Code §§326 and 8385
4. Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
5. Authorizes the CPUC to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction. (Public Utilities Code §701)
6. Requires each electrical corporation to construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment. (Public Utilities Code §8386)
7. Requires the CPUC to establish an expedited utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program and provides that only large electrical corporations may participate in the program. (Public Utilities Code §8388.5)
8. Prohibits an electrical corporation, gas corporation, or water corporation from terminating a customer’s residential service for nonpayment of a delinquent account in certain circumstances, including, among other circumstances, unless the corporation first gives notice to the customer of the delinquency and impending termination, during the pendency of an investigation by the corporation of the customer’s dispute or complaint, or when the customer has been granted an extension of the period for payment of a bill. (Public Utilities Code §779.1)
9. Prohibits an electrical corporation from recovering from ratepayers an annual salary, bonus, benefit, or other consideration of any value paid to an officer of the electrical corporation, and requires that compensation to instead be funded solely by shareholders of the electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §706)
10. Establishes the Wildfire Fund to pay eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire, as provided. Requires the CPUC to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to consider using its existing authority to require certain electrical corporations to collect a nonbypassable charge from its ratepayers to support the Wildfire Fund, and requires the CPUC to direct those electrical corporations to collect that charge if the CPUC determines that the imposition of the charge is just and reasonable and that it is an appropriate exercise of its authority. (Public Utilities Code §§3289 and 3291)
11. Establishes procedures under which electrical corporations are required to reimburse the Wildfire Fund for amounts disallowed by the CPUC for recovery from ratepayers. Requires an electrical corporation to reimburse the fund for the full amount of costs and expenses the CPUC determined were disallowed, except as provided. Provides that those exceptions do not apply if the administrator of the Wildfire Fund determines that the electrical corporation’s actions or inactions that resulted in the covered wildfire constituted conscious or willful disregard of the rights and safety of others. (Public Utilities Code §3292)

This bill:

Relevant to the study on the transitioning the IOU model to a successor entity

1. Makes numerous findings and declarations concerning the electric IOU model, the increase in electricity rates, utility record profits wildfires caused by utility infrastructure, concerns that electric IOUs prioritize profits over the safety and well-being of the ratepayers and residents of California.
2. Requires the CEC, in coordination with the public advisor and the CPUC, on or before March 31, 2026, to issue a request for proposals for a team to develop a study. Requires the study to:
   1. conduct a historical energy justice assessment of the IOU operations and impacts;
   2. complete a comparative analysis of the benefits and challenges of transitioning the IOUs to a successor entity in order to identify a recommended model; and
   3. if the study finds that it is in the best long-term interests of the people and ecologies of California to transition away from an IOU model, create a justice-centered implementation plan for managing the transition.
3. Requires the CEC, on or before June 30, 2026, to select the study team that is awarded the contract.
4. Requires the CEC to hold a public proceeding and submit a report of the study team’s findings and recommendations to the Legislature no later than 24 months after selecting the study team for the feasibility portion of the study, and no later than 36 months after selecting the study team for the implementation plan portion of the study.
5. Requires the CEC to require the study team to select and convene an advisory council by December 31, 2026, to participate in the study of the vision for a new energy system, as provided. Requires, upon completion of the first two study components, the study team, in consultation with the advisory council, to provide a recommendation for a particular successor entity type to the CEC.
6. Requires the CEC to vote to approve the study and recommended successor entity on or before September 30, 2028.
7. Requires, upon approval by the CEC, the study team to begin work to create a justice-centered implementation plan. Requires the CEC to vote to approve the implementation plan no later than October 31, 2029.

Relevant to utility disconnections due to nonpayment

1. Makes several findings and declarations regarding access to electricity and heating services as a human right, and essential to the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state.
2. Prohibits a utility, including an electrical corporation, local publicly owned electric utility, gas corporation, and local publicly owned gas utility, from disconnecting a customer’s residential service for nonpayment if the customer has a household income at or below 200% of the federal poverty line.
3. Prohibits a utility from disconnecting a customer’s residential service for nonpayment if the customer’s household is the residence of certain persons, including a person who is pregnant or 0 to 12 weeks postpartum, a person who is 65 years or older, a person with a disability, and others.
4. Requires, on or after January 1, 2026, each electrical corporation and gas corporation to automatically reconnect all households that are eligible for protection under the provisions of this bill noted above in (9) and (10).
5. Requires the CPUC to establish a citation program to impose a penalty on an electrical corporation or gas corporation that violates the above prohibitions on disconnections and requirements to reconnect service.
6. Authorizes the CPUC, a customer, or a member of the customer’s household to bring an action in state court for equitable relief regarding a utility’s or community choice aggregator’s (CCAs) use of any method, act, or practice inconsistent with the above-described provisions.
7. Requires a utility to offer a residential customer who meets the income or specified household members, noted in (10), a payment plan for the customer’s electrical and gas service that includes a percentage of income payment plan.
8. Requires each utility providing electrical service or gas service, or both, to residential customers to collect and submit to the CPUC monthly data on electrical and gas service terminations, reconnections, bill assistance and payment agreements, arrears, and created and broken payment plans.

Relevant to electric IOU executive compensation

1. Requires each electrical corporation, on or before April 1, 2026, to submit a proposed executive compensation structure to the CPUC that is structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety through performance metrics.

Relevant to proposed rate increases by electrical corporations

1. Prohibits, for proposed rate increases subject to CPUC approval and a finding that the new rate is just and reasonable, an electrical corporation from proposing a compounded annual rate increase on residential customers above the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
2. Prohibits, for proposed rate increases not subject to CPUC approval and a finding that the new rate is just and reasonable, an electrical corporation from proposing more than one rate increase per year and prohibits the rate increase from applying to customers enrolled in the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE) and the Family Electric Rate Assistance (FERA).

Relevant to the Wildfire Fund

1. Requires the CPUC to revise the CPUC decision related to the Wildfire Fund nonbypassable charge in order to reduce the charge imposed on ratepayers to an amount equal to five percent of the costs to support the Wildfire Fund, and requires each electrical corporation to contribute the remaining 95% of the costs to support the fund.
2. Provides that, for purposes related to reimbursing the Wildfire Fund, evidence that an electrical corporation’s action were prudent includes common sense best practices such as conducting annual audits and replacing equipment that has outlived its usable life, and deenergizing the electrical grid under threatening conditions.

Relevant to auditing and replacement of electrical corporation infrastructure

1. Requires each electrical corporation to triennially contract with an independent and reputable third party to audit all of the electrical corporation’s equipment and electrical lines and identify any equipment or electrical lines that have reached their end of life. Requires the audit to be completed in alignment with the wildfire mitigation plan cycle, as specified. Requires an electrical corporation to replace any equipment or electrical lines identified by the third-party auditor that are located in a high fire-threat district within 5 years, as provided. Requires the CPUC to assess fines on an electrical corporation that fails to comply with these provisions, as specified.
2. Requires the OEIS to develop a best value procurement model for all electrical corporation infrastructure projects, as specified. Requires each electrical corporation, for all infrastructure projects, to demonstrate to the CPUC that the selected contractor is the best value contractor, as specified.
3. Requires, after an emergency or disaster in which an electrical corporation’s electrical infrastructure was destroyed, if the electrical corporation rebuilds the destroyed electrical infrastructure, the electrical corporation to use the most cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies that conform to state and industry safety standards for electrical equipment and that minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire as quickly as possible, including consideration of undergrounding and covered conductor methods, to the extent applicable.
4. Prohibits the cost of undergrounding, installing covered conductors, or other cost-effective wildfire mitigation strategies for the electrical infrastructure from being recovered from ratepayers.

Background

IOU model and the regulatory compact. In its early days, only a small fraction of the country (roughly eight percent in 1907) received electricity service. At the time, numerous companies with different electric systems in the same city provided service to those who could afford it. Many residents and businesses relied on other less expensive energy forms (such as steam, natural gas, and oil) to power lamps, motors, and manufacturing facilities. Competition was fierce and multiple electric lines strung across urban areas. Thomas Edison’s former secretary, Samuel Insull, pushed the idea of a natural monopoly for electricity service with government economic regulation – the regulatory compact. The natural monopoly model afforded vertically integrated utilities, both public and private, to prosper and expand (along with federal actions to expand hydroelectricity and rural electrification), the IOU model generally supported universal access, economies of scale, and steady financing. Over the past hundred years, the model has shifted with some aspects of competition, particularly in California with the 1990s restructuring of the vertically integrated IOU model, pursuant to CPUC orders and legislation, IOUs divested of significant portions of their generation. Ultimately, the state experienced an energy crisis, due to manipulation by nefarious actors (including Enron), and a restructured market that lacked some of the safeguards to protect customers.

Since the energy crisis of 2000-01, the electricity landscape has changed significantly, with the growth of CCAs, the limits of electric service providers, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders for open access of transmission lines, requirements for resource adequacy to ensure sufficient supply, and policies to diversify resources, including renewable and zero-carbon energy. In California, as in much of the country, both IOU and publicly owned utility (POU) utility models exist (as well as, rural cooperatives). Frustrations regarding profit-making by shareholders within the IOU model have often been a source of anger and frustration, particularly so at times when customers’ electricity utility bills run high. In California, the combination of high electricity bills, recent catastrophic wildfires caused by electrical infrastructure (Camp Fire, Dixie Fire, Thomas Fire to name a few), and the proactive power shutoffs employed by the IOUs to prevent catastrophic fires have further raised the ire of their customers.

Inverse condemnation and Wildfire Fund. After those recent wildfires, the IOU model was further shaken due to the combination of claims from those fires as the California Constitution provides the basis for recovery against government entities and public utilities via the theory of inverse condemnation. Section 19 of Article 12, requires that just compensation be paid when private property is taken for public use. This is commonly understood as eminent domain. In the case where a property is damaged by a public improvement project, the application is known as inverse condemnation, unlike in cases of negligence, the responsible entity is held strictly liable where a public improvement causes property damage. The California Supreme Court and appellate courts have held that inverse condemnation is applicable to IOUs (Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 458, 469), and (Barham v. Southern California Edison Company (1999) 74 Cal. App 4th 744).

Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) filed for bankruptcy due to their credit ratings being downgraded by the credit ratings agencies to a point characterized as “junk status.” The credit ratings downgrade occurred following information that the CPUC was investigating PG&E concerning gas safety reporting violations, on the heels of the Camp Fire which was speculated (and since found to have been) caused by PG&E electric infrastructure, and in the midst of a criminal probation stemming from the San Bruno gas pipeline explosion. Nearly a week after the downgrade, PG&E notified its workforce (and the public) that it intended to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on or around January 29, 2019. Subsequently, the Legislature and Governor established a process to allow for claims paying capacity from covered wildfires via a Wildfire Fund that would be capitalized up to $21 billion, with half paid by shareholders and the other half from ratepayers. The fund has received nearly $15 billion including annual contributions (as required by the statute) from shareholders for electrical corporations that chose to participate and from a nonbypassable charge on electric IOU customers of roughly $0.0056 per kilowatt hour of electricity.

Addressing safety risks from energy utility operations. The CPUC oversees the development of the risk framework each IOU uses as basis for analyzing their risks. The risk framework includes a Risk Assessment Mitigation Phase (RAMP) whereby CPUC staff scrutinize energy IOU safety-risk threat assessments along with associated proposed mitigation plans and estimated costs and spending requests. The risk reports are submitted to the CPUC on a four-year cycle basis to inform applications and approval of system-wide IOU operating and capital spending. In addition to the RAMP filings, the Safety Model Assessment Proceeding (S-MAP) is a parallel rulemaking track at the CPUC to continually refine and improve the RAMP and its associated mandates. The S-MAP continuously updates utility risk-related requirements and provides interpretations to support California utilities’ capacity building to respond to new and growing risks and makes use of the latest risk-modeling science. RAMP and S-MAP efforts inform each energy IOUs’ general rate case (GRC) and help the CPUC (and stakeholders) assess whether the utilities are properly directing resources to wildfire and safety risks.

Wildfire mitigation plans (WMPs). In addition to the RAMP and S-MAP processes, the state has created a separate entity, the OEIS, and a special process to review wildfire-related risks via electric IOU WMPs. Electric IOUs are required to annually file WMP updates and a comprehensive WMP every three years with guidance by OEIS, which reviews and determines whether to approve these plans and ensures compliance with guidance and statute. Under this framework, the OEIS is responsible for reviewing, approving or denying and overseeing compliance with WMPs, while the CPUC evaluates the reasonableness of costs associated with implementation of the WMPs for purposes of cost recovery and has enforcement authority with regard to electric IOUs’ performance of their WMPs and utility-caused wildfire. Further, SB 884 (McGuire, Chapter 819, Statutes of 2022) required the CPUC to establish a program for expediting the undergrounding of large electric IOUs distribution infrastructure. Electric IOUs with 250,000 or more customer accounts may participate in the program. Electric IOUs wishing to participate in the program must first submit their 10-year plan to OEIS for review who must approve or deny the plan within nine months. If OEIS approves the plan, the electric IOU submits an application to the CPUC for conditional approval of the plan’s costs.

Wildfire mitigation as significant driver of costs in electric utility bills. The CPUC in its most recent SB 695 Utility Cost Report has noted that wildfire-related costs are a key driver putting upward pressure on customers’ electric rates. The CPUC has stated that over the next several years, wildfire risk mitigation costs are projected to continue their upward trend. In a recent study by the Energy Institute at Haas “Risk-Cost Tradeoffs in Power Sector Wildfire Prevention”, the authors note that in 2023 WMPs, California electric IOUs proposed investing over $9 billion annually to reduce wildfire ignition risk. PG&E’s recent GRC included authorization to underground up to 1200 miles of electric distribution lines. This contributed to the overall rate increases that customers are experiencing this year, roughly $35 per month more for the average utility bill, with another rate increase approved for a portion of the utility’s wildfire-related expenses, and the expectation that more are on the horizon. PG&E is also pursuing efforts to underground 10,000 miles of electric distribution lines in areas with high-fire risk with the intent to reduce wildfire ignition risk by approximately 99% as the best long-term solution for keeping customers and communities safe. In the case of Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), their wildfire mitigation costs may be on a downward trend in the mid- to long-term, as much of their mitigation has been or will be completed, though they had less reliance on undergrounding lines as a primary strategy. Additionally, recent wildfires in Southern California may affect this trajectory.

Process for disconnecting electric and gas utility service. The process of disconnecting service due to nonpayment by an electrical or gas corporation is governed by existing statutory minimum timeline requirements, the practices that were adopted in CPUC Rulemaking 10-02-005, and reflected in Tariff Rule 11 for electric utilities and Rule 9 for gas utilities. In general, the rules require a utility to mail a 15-day written notice to the customer for disconnection due to non-payment. The second step requires a 48-hour written notice mailed to the customer, including an in-person visit for customers on life support or other life-threatening medical condition. Lastly, the utility makes an outbound call on the day of the scheduled disconnection, but before disconnecting service, in order to offer a payment plan option.

Utility bill assistance. There are several programs that provide eligible utility ratepayers with utility bill assistance. They include:

• CARE program – The CARE program provides a discount of up to 35% reduction in utility bills to low-income ratepayers whose income falls below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines.
• FERA program – For household incomes that slightly exceeds the CARE program eligibility, the program provides an 18% line-item discount on electric bills for households whose income falls between 200% and 250% of federal poverty guidelines.

• Medical baseline allowance – Per statute, utilities are required to provide additional baseline allowance of electric or gas service for customers facing life-threatening conditions or on life support. Electric and gas corporations currently administer medical baseline, and, as such, have existing processes for identifying these customers, including requiring physicians and other medical personnel to certify as to the medical condition. Customers on medical baseline are also provided the opportunity to amortize their bill payment, for a period up to 12 months, in order to avoid disconnection of service.
• Payment plan options – In addition to rate assistance programs, utilities provide ratepayers payment plan options that can spread the costs of their bills over a limited time period, generally three months to twelve months, depending on the utility and circumstances.
• Low Income Home Energy Assistance program (LIHEAP) – Federal energy assistance program that helps low-income customers heat their homes. In addition to weatherization services, the program provides one-time assistance funds for ratepayers facing a utility disconnection. The U.S. Congress appropriates funding for LIHEAP, including over $4 billion for 2025, most of which has been sent to states to administer the program. However, recent Trump administration actions, including the recent firing of LIHEAP staff, raise concerns about the ability of the program to provide this critical safety net in future years.
• Energy Savings Assistance (ESA) program – Additionally, there are assistance programs to help reduce energy costs through weatherization improvements and appliance rebates for customers on CARE and FERA.

SB 598 (Hueso, Chapter 362, Statutes of 2017). Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of utility disconnections due to nonpayment had been trending upwards among the four largest utilities–(PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas). In response to the rise of electric and gas utility disconnections due to nonpayment, the Legislature passed SB 598. The bill prohibited electrical and gas corporations from disconnecting service due to nonpayment from customers facing life-threatening medical conditions when the customer is financially unable to pay for service within the normal payment period and is willing to enter into an amortization agreement. The bill also required the CPUC to adopt rules, policies and regulations with the goal of reducing the statewide level of gas and electric utility service disconnections for nonpayment by residential customers. Additionally, SB 598 required consideration of utility disconnections in utility GRCs and required the CPUC to submit a report to the Legislature on residential gas and electric service disconnections.

CPUC Rulemaking 18-07-005. In response to SB 598, in July 2018, the CPUC opened a rulemaking proceeding (R. 18-07-005), Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider New Approaches to Disconnections and Reconnections to Improve Energy Access and Contain Costs. The proceeding has been very active and robust, with many stakeholders participating, including ratepayer organizations, utilities, CCAs, and organizations representing particular stakeholders. The primary goal of the proceeding is to reduce residential disconnections and improve reconnection processes. Within the proceeding there have been several CPUC decisions to require new policies and new pilot programs to address electric and gas residential utility disconnections. Overlapping the timing of these decisions are related policies to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Various CPUC decisions have further authorized payment plans, percent of income payment plan pilots, arrearage management plans and others.

Comments

Need for this bill. The author states:

Californians who are customers of investor-owned utilities are being financially crushed by the constant rate increases and devastated by wildfires caused by poorly maintained infrastructure. As policymakers, it is our responsibility to address these issues and ensure there is greater accountability to the public, better safety and stability of our infrastructure, and increased affordability for ratepayers. Investor-owned utilities are legal monopolies that must operate within the statutory and regulatory framework we establish. While they are permitted to profit, they are not entitled to financially gouge Californians. According to the January 7^th report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office, rates are nearly double the rest of the nation and these high rates are driven by the three largest investor-owned utilities. They also state that the rates of investor-owned utilities are more than 50 percent higher than rates charged by publicly-owned utilities. The CPUC is not required to render decisions that prioritize safety and cost effectiveness for ratepayers. Additionally, the CPUC has not denied a rate increase in over 20 years. We must take action to rein in the investor-owned utilities and ensure they are serving the best interests of Californians.

Study of IOU model. The first several sections of this bill would require the CEC to work with the Disadvantaged Communities Advisory Group, the CPUC and the CEC Public Advisor, to contract a third-party consultant to examine historical energy justice assessment of the IOU model. The criteria would largely tip the scale towards a review that finds the IOU model not in the best long term interests of the people and ecologies of California. Numerous provisions of the language in this bill related to the study reflect a strong desire to transition away from the IOU model.

Costs to underground electric utility infrastructure. While the electric utilities incorporate undergrounding efforts in their WMPs, it is a strategy that had been utilized for very few of their electric circuit lines, largely due to costs in comparison to other mitigation options, and the long-lead time for undergrounding projects. According to data gathered from electric IOUs, and analyzed by the CPUC, converting overhead distribution infrastructure to underground can be 10 times more expensive than installing new distribution overhead lines and undergrounding of electric distribution lines can be eight times more expensive than insulating (covering) the conductors (wires) to prevent them from igniting when contacting vegetation and other foreign objects. Per the data collected from PG&E, SCE and SDG&E, the costs for undergrounding existing overhead distribution infrastructure can range between $1.85 million to $6.072 million per mile. Costs to underground electric transmission lines can be exponentially more.

Costs of other mitigation measures. Generally, electric utilities are incorporating other wildfire mitigation measures that can be more cost-effective, including covered conductor, sectionalizing circuit lines, vegetation management, and operational controls such as fast-trips and public safety power shutoffs. Per the data collected by the CPUC, installing new overhead distribution infrastructure is much less expensive. On average, the costs to install new overhead distribution infrastructure is between $634,000-$760,000 per mile, according to the electric utilities’ Rule 21 interconnection unit cost guides. PG&E has shared that their undergrounding efforts are averaging under $3 million per mile and overhead upgrades are averaging just over $1 million. The Energy Institute at Hass report on wildfire mitigation prevention measures notes that undergrounding powerlines, despite the higher investment cost, is more cost effective than pruning and removing vegetation. However, new operational controls, especially the use of “fast-trip” settings is significantly more cost effective than other strategies.

Tradeoffs abound! The OEIS has proposed some level of review on interim measures that may be needed when mitigation measures can not be implemented within a year. Additionally, OEIS reports an intention to incorporate cost-effectiveness criteria, in line with the CPUC’s updated cost-benefit approach within the RAMP and S-MAP processes.

Ratepayer impacts, shareholder costs? As noted above, efforts to underground electrical infrastructure can be costly. However, the risk of utility equipment igniting fires can also pose significant costs on utility customers given the associated liability and potential impacts of the borrowing costs to the utility. With the growing risks of fires and the expenses associated with other strategies, including the costs of ongoing vegetation management, electric utilities are reassessing these costs and calculations. In the case of PG&E, the utility contends that undergrounding 10,000 miles of electric distribution utility lines will help to better mitigate the risks for the long-term. SCE has been working with affected communities in southern California for their rebuild in an attempt to also underground electric lines. This bill attempts to allay concerns about ratepayer costs by requiring shareholders to fund many of the activities related to rebuilding infrastructure after a natural disaster or to address wildfire risk. It is likely this language could result in concerns about Constitutional takings issues. As this bill moves forward, the author may wish to review this approach as it could also result in diminished financing opportunities for utility operations that could also increase costs for customers.

Need for amendments. Amendments are needed to address many of the concerns about some of the far-reaching aspects proposed in this bill, including the wide range of protections against utility disconnections from nonpayment, limiting rate increases to the CPI which could result in unintended consequences, changes to the Wildfire Fund that could limit recovery for claims by wildfire survivors, and others. The author and committee may wish to consider the following amendments:

• As it relates to the IOU study, delete provisions that require development or adoption of an implementation plan.
• As it relates to best value procurement model, ensure it is developed by the CPUC, instead of OEIS, and ensure it is consistent with existing labor contracts and protections and remove any language requiring its implementation.
• Delete provisions related to changes to the Wildfire Fund.
• Delete provisions related to capping rate increases to a consumer price index.
• Delete provisions related to protections for disconnections due to nonpayment and replace with quarterly reporting by utilities (on their respective websites) of specified disconnections data.

Dual Referral. Should this bill be approved by this committee, it will be re-referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Prior/Related Legislation

SB 636 (Menjivar) of the current legislative session, prohibits an electrical or gas corporation from disconnecting service of a customer for three months, if the customer is participating in specified low-income assistance programs and is experiencing specified hardships. The bill is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SB 24 (McNerney) of the current legislative session, among its provisions, prohibits electrical or gas corporations from terminating residential or commercial service for nonpayment on days (and three days after) when the air quality index is unhealthy for sensitive groups. The bill also prohibits executive compensation of electrical and gas corporations from being recovered from ratepayers. The bill is pending in this committee.

SB 1142 (Menjivar, Chapter 600, Statutes of 2024) proposed policies related to disconnection of electric and gas utility service, including requiring the CPUC, on or before July 1, 2025, to determine whether to direct electrical and gas corporations to take into account a customer’s ability to pay before terminating or reconnecting services.

SB 1003 (Dodd) of 2024, makes numerous changes to the processes for addressing wildfire mitigation by electrical corporations, and other electric utilities, including clarifying the roles of relevant state agencies in addressing wildfire risk; and requires electrical corporations to take into account both the amount of wildfire risk reduction for the cost-effectiveness and time value of the proposed mitigation measure within the utility’s wildfire mitigation plan. The bill was held on the Assembly Floor.

SB 884 (McGuire, Chapter 819, Statutes of 2022) required the CPUC to establish an expedited electric utility distribution infrastructure undergrounding program for large electrical corporations. Requires the OEIS to approve or deny the plan within nine months and requires additional actions and reports.

AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) included numerous provisions related to addressing wildfires caused by electric utility infrastructure, including: bolstering safety oversight and processes, such as required updates to each electric corporation’s WMPs, recasting recovery of costs from damages to third-parties, including the authorization for an electrical corporation and ratepayer jointly funded Wildfire Fund to address future damages, and changes to provisions concerning the workforce of a change of ownership of a full or portion of an electrical or gas corporation.

SB 901 (Dodd, Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018) addressed numerous issues concerning wildfire prevention, response and recovery, including funding for mutual aid, fuel reduction and forestry policies, WMPs by electric utilities, and cost recovery by electric corporations of wildfire-related damages.

SB 1028 (Hill, Chapter 598, Statutes of 2016) required electric CPUC-regulated utilities to file annual wildfire mitigation plans and requires the CPUC to review and comment on those plans.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:

SUPPORT:

Center for Biological Diversity (Co-Sponsor)
Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign (Co-Sponsor)
Councilmember Cecilia Lunaparra, City of Berkeley, District 7