AB 1363: Electrical corporations: financing wildfire expenses: executive compensation.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-05-01
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Date
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Status
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| Feb 3, 2020 | From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56. |
| Jan 31, 2020 | Died pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 10(c) of the Constitution. |
| May 16, 2019 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| May 16, 2019 | Joint Rule 62(a), file notice suspended. |
| May 15, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| May 13, 2019 | Joint Rule 62(a), file notice suspended. (Page 1609.) |
| May 8, 2019 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| May 2, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| May 1, 2019 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 30, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 10. Noes 2.) (April 24). |
| Apr 8, 2019 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| Mar 19, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Mar 18, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on U. & E. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 14, 2019 | Referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Feb 25, 2019 | Read first time. |
| Feb 23, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 25. |
| Feb 22, 2019 | Introduced. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Apr 24, 2019 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Utilities and Energy |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
Date of Hearing: May 16, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1363
Author:(Mark Stone) – As Amended Ver:May 1, 2019
Policy Committee: | Utilities and Energy | Vote: | 10 - 2 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires the governor to appoint a “special master for executive compensation” within 90 days of a filing by an electrical corporation with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) for recovery from ratepayers of costs incurred due to liability for damages to third parties resulting from a catastrophic wildfire or any other safety-related failure.
The special master is to negotiate with the electrical corporation and its executive officers—who must negotiate with the special master as a condition of rate recovery of costs of a wildfire or other safety-related failure the CPUC has not determined to be just and reasonable—for executive compensation. The bill ties the structure of the compensation to the promotion of safety, based on achievement of performance metrics. The bill directs the special master to submit the negotiated compensation package to the CPUC, who is to, contemporaneous with its approval of any recovery of ratepayers of costs described above, approve the compensation package if it meets the principles and requirements of this bill.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Negligible costs to the CPUC to review the negotiated compensation package. The CPUC must make complex determinations about rate recovery. The CPUC should be able to absorb within existing resources any additional consideration of a negotiated compensation package.
The bill is silent regarding compensation or support for the special master; however, it is reasonable to assume the CPUC budgets will pay for the cost of the special master (special funds), because the special master will work on rate-related issues and report to the CPUC. The exact costs of compensation and support are unknown. However, it is safe to assume they will run several hundred thousand dollars, based on the costs to compensate and support special masters that have operated in other areas of state government.
COMMENTS:
Background and Purpose. The state’s electric utilities have caused numerous wildfires, including some of the large, deadly fires in 2017 and 2018. In addition, a Pacific Gas and Electric natural gas pipeline underneath a residential neighborhood in San Bruno exploded in 2010, killing eight people.
The CPUC has fined and sanctioned the utilities. The Legislature has harangued the CPUC and passed measures to reform the regulator. Still, there is concern that when utilities fail to operate their systems safely, ratepayers pay and rank-and-file utility employees pay, while utility executives continue to receive rich compensation. This bill is an attempt to closely tie utility executive compensation with a utility’s safe operation of its system. According to the author:
Following the passage of SB 901 in 2018, electrical utilities hold significant power to pass liability costs onto ratepayers, powers not possessed by any other investor owned company in California. In order to protect ratepayers, the Legislature must ensure that the bonding powers provided by SB 901 do not become a “way of doing business” within the industry.
Accordingly, AB 1363, seeks to promote forward-thinking corporate planning within the electrical utility industry and insure that utility company executives have a vested interest in the long-term health and viability of their companies. By tying excess compensation to the company’s future results, AB 1363 strikes a balance by permitting utility companies to pay executives whatever they deem necessary to attract and retain top talent, while simultaneously ensuring that these executives have the same interest in the long-term health of the company that rank-and-file employees do.
Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 24, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY
Chris Holden, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1363 (
Author:Mark Stone) – As Amended Ver:March 18, 2019
SUBJECT: Electrical corporations: financing wildfire expenses: executive compensation
SUMMARY: Assigns excess compensation paid to an executive officer of an electrical corporation (IOU) to a fund in the State Treasury for a period of five years during which amounts can be applied to an IOU’s expenses for catastrophic wildfire costs under specified circumstances. Specifically, this bill:
- Creates the Electrical Corporation Recovery Fund (Fund) as a special fund in the State Treasury.
- Requires, until December 31, 2035, that excess compensation of an IOU executive officer be set aside in the Fund and held in trust for the benefit of the named executive officer throughout a five-year escrow period.
- Requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to consider the availability of all deposits into the Fund among the factors the CPUC considers when it evaluates an IOU application for the recovery of costs related to wildfires.
- Applies deposits into the Fund against the costs of financing wildfire cost recovery to reduce ratepayer impacts if the CPUC approves cost recovery and issues a financing order for those costs.
- Requires IOUs to annually inform each executive officer that any excess compensation paid to the executive officer is subject to escrow and recovery under this section, regardless of any action by the executive officer.
- Requires the Treasurer to invest fund deposits into four-week United States Treasury bills.
- Defines “average covered compensation increase,” “covered compensation covered employee,” “escrow period,” “excess compensation,” “executive compensation,” “executive officer,” and “increase in executive compensation” for the purpose of implementing this bill.
EXISTING LAW:
- Prohibits any expenditure of ratepayer funds for salaries, bonuses benefits, or other consideration paid to an officer of an electrical or gas corporation. (Public Utilities Code § 706)
- Prohibits ratepayer recovery for bonuses paid to an executive officer of a public utility when a utility has ceased to pay its debts and for a period of two years after the utility has resumed paying its debts. (Public Utilities Code § 451.5 [a])
- Defines executive officer as any person who performs policy making functions and is employed by the public utility subject to the approval of the board of directors, and includes the president, secretary, treasurer, and any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or function of the public utility. (Public Utilities Code § 451.5 [b])
- Permits an IOU to file with the CPUC an application for recovery of costs and expenses incurred as a result of catastrophic wildfires occurring after January 1, 2019 and establishes a standard of review for the CPUC to use to consider whether the conduct of the utility was reasonable. (Public Utilities Code § 451.1)
- Permits an IOU to file with the CPUC an application for recovery of costs and expenses incurred as a result of catastrophic wildfires which occurred in calendar year 2017, requires a determination of the IOU’s ability to pay those costs without harming ratepayers, and caps the shareholder responsibility to avoid utility instability. (Public Utilities Code § 451.2)
- Permits an IOU to apply for a financing order to securitize catastrophic wildfire costs and expenses which the CPUC has found to be just and reasonable, or costs from wildfires occurring calendar year in 2017, which would be payable through a nonbypassable charge on all distribution customers except for those enrolled in the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE) and Family Electric Rate Assistance (FERA) programs. (Public Utilities Code § 850 et seq.)
FISCAL EFFECT: This bill is keyed fiscal and will be referred to the Appropriations Committee for its review of the fiscal effect of this bill.
BACKGROUND:
Wildfire Devastation – California has continued to experience devastating death and destruction as a result of catastrophic wildfires some of which have been ignited by failures of IOU equipment or contact with vegetation. As part of the Legislature’s ongoing efforts to enhance wildfire prevention and the impacts of those events, the Wildfire Preparedness and Response Conference Committee was appointed in the summer of 2018. The resulting report, contained in SB 901, called for electric utilities to develop and implement expansive and detailed wildfire and emergency preparedness plans to prevent the ignition of fires as a result of utility infrastructure and plan for the temporary shut off of power during extreme weather to prevent ignition of fires by the electric distribution network. A new framework for cost recovery by IOUs for fires in 2017, and fires occurring after January 1, 2019, was also approved.
Utility Stabilization & Ratepayer Protection – Many of the fires in recent years have been caused by failures of IOU infrastructure and/or contact between vegetation and IOU distribution lines. Regardless of negligence, under the judicial doctrine of inverse condemnation, IOUs stand to be strictly liable for property losses in the billions of dollars. This risk of financial liability has destabilized the utilities in the markets and increased the cost of doing business. Bond ratings have fallen, financing costs have risen, and electric ratepayers will pay the costs. Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) was forced into bankruptcy because its bond ratings dropped so precipitously that it was unable to maintain the cash flow needed to operate as the markets anticipated that the utility would have to book billions of dollars in liability.
The SB 901 conference committee addressed this instability by revising rules and procedures for the CPUC’s review of IOU applications for cost recovery related to wildfire liability costs. For the 2017 fires, utilities can file an application for cost recovery under the current standard of review, commonly referred to as the “prudent manager standard.” A stress test will be done to determine the maximum liability a utility could bear before ratepayer harm (e.g. the cost of and ability to do business). Utility costs would be capped at that level; ratepayers would be responsible for any amounts above that cap which would be financed (securitized), and the costs would be reflected on bills as a nonbypassable charge. CARE and FERA customers are excluded from the charge.
Going forward, SB 901 established a new and additional standard of review that applies strictly to electrical IOU applications for recovery of costs related to catastrophic wildfires caused by electrical infrastructure occurring in 2019 and beyond. In evaluating whether cost recovery is just and reasonable, a new standard of review was established. The CPUC will consider specified factors related to reasonableness such as proper maintenance, but is also directed to consider extreme weather conditions including humidity, temperature, and winds. Upon a finding by the CPUC that the IOU acted reasonably, the CPUC is authorized to order the financing of those costs which would be paid by ratepayers via a non-bypassable charge. CARE & FERA customers are exempt.
No Ratepayer Recovery for Executive Compensation – Senate Bill 901 also prohibits gas and electrical corporations from rate recovery for executive officer compensation. The CPUC has taken steps to implement the new law and adopted a resolution[1] directing the following public utilities to establish memorandum accounts to track officer compensation. In order to remove ratepayer funding of officer compensation without violating the statutory prohibition against retroactive ratemaking, the Commission found the need to track all officer compensation in a memorandum account.
The policy applies to the officers of PG&E, Southern California Edison Company (SCE), San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas), Bear Valley Electric Services, a division of Golden State Water Company (Bear Valley), Pacific Power, a division of PacifiCorp (PacifiCorp), Liberty Utilities/CalPeco Electric (Liberty), Southwest Gas, West Coast Gas Company, and Alpine Natural Gas Operating Company.
Strike Team/Force Report – On April 12th Governor Newsom announced the findings of his strike force which he charged with examining California’s catastrophic wildfires, climate change and the state’s energy future. The strike force report[2] sets out steps it finds the state must take to reduce the incidence and severity of wildfires. Related issues also addressed include the state’s ability to continuing the transition to clean energy, the allocation of wildfire costs where IOU infrastructure is involved, strengthening utility market regulation, and holding PG&E accountable for safety.
In this last section the report recommends that consideration be given to CPUC reforms to better align IOU incentives with safety, including:
- Adjusting the allowed return on equity based on wildfire safety performance;
- Aligning compensation and stock options of executives with wildfire safety performance;
- Making board composition contingent on wildfire safety performance; and
- Requiring board-level reporting to the CPUC on wildfire safety issues.
Clawbacks – A clawback is generally a provision in a law or contract that limits or reverses a payment or distribution for specified reasons. At the request of the Committee, the California Research Bureau (Bureau) has provided the following summary regarding the concept and application of clawbacks which are the primary subject of this bill.
Monetary clawbacks fall into three broad categories:
The first is for medical overpayments from Federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. The aim of these provisions is to limit the cost increases for medical services and prescription drugs.
The second form of clawbacks, specifically related to compensation, is often tied to financial services jobs. These provisions are seen as a way to de-incentivize fraud or misrepresentation of sales or work performance. In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act has clawback provisions for executive compensation, though they have not yet been implemented. Virginia has such a statute for officers of banks. Other states such as Pennsylvania only require the listing of clawback provisions in corporate governance annual disclosures for insurance providers.
The third and most common clawback category requires private contractors who do business with state governments to agree to clawbacks if the service provided to the state is unsatisfactory or fraudulent. Often, this takes the form of businesses being required to pay back tax incentives offered by the state or even paying penalties to the state if the contract is breached. This is often seen in public-private partnerships. This statute from North Carolina is an example of this type of clawback implemented by states (see 143B-435.1). Florida also has a clawback provisions regarding charter schools.
We did not find any examples in statute or pending legislation of states imposing clawback provisions on individuals -- though some may exist.
The Bureau further reports four clawback provisions in federal law applicable to the compensation of corporate executives:
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304 The first initiative to codify clawback policies on executive compensation, which requires the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer of any public reporting company to forfeit any bonus or incentive compensation in the event that a company is required to restate its financial statements due to the material noncompliance, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement. This Act authorizes the Securities Exchange Commission to recover executive pay if a company restates financials as a result of a misconduct.
- Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 § 954 Requires exchange-listed companies to adopt and maintain a policy for the recovery of any incentive-based compensation from any current or former executive officer during the three year period preceding the date on which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement. “[I]n the event of an accounting restatement, ‘claw back’ from current and former executive officers incentive-based compensation they would not have received based on the restatement.” The SEC has yet to indicate when it intends to propose rules to implement Section 954. See table comparing provisions in Section 304 and Section 954.
- Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261 A portion of this relief program directed the Secretary of the Treasury to require firms participating in the TARP to meet appropriate standard for executive compensation and corporate governance as follows:
- Limits on compensation to exclude incentives for senior executive officers to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten their firm’s value;
- A “clawback” provision to permit the recovery of bonuses paid to senior executive officers based on earning statements and other criteria later proven to be materially inaccurate; and
- Prohibition on firms making golden parachute payments to senior executive officers.
- Dodd-Frank § 956 Requires the six Appropriate Federal Regulators to prohibit any types of incentive-based arrangement deemed to encourage inappropriate risks by covered financial institutions. It also requires Covered Financial Institutions to disclose the structures of all incentive-based compensation arrangements to determine whether “(A) provides…excessive compensations, fees, or (B) could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial institution.” The purpose of Section 956 is to ensure U.S. economic stability and prevent systematic economic failures.
CPUC Review of PG&E Governance – In 2015 the CPUC initiated an investigation into PG&E “to determine whether PG&E’s organizational culture and governance prioritize safety.” In its current phase, the CPUC is holding a series of forums that will feature invited speakers and panelists and will be open to a public audience. Topics to be discussed will include the safety practices of PG&E specifically, and alternatives to corporate ownership.
An April 15th the CPUC held a public discussion on PG&E which focused on the issues of governance including a panel on the “Impact of Corporate Governance on Corporate Culture, including Safety Culture.” Included on one panel was a presentation on ties between executive compensation and safety performance. The presenter was Kenneth Feinberg, Former Director of Executive Compensation at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. During the recession Feinberg was responsible for implementing the provision in TARP (see preceding comment on clawbacks) which required banks to adopt clawback provisions for executive compensation. The foundation for the clawbacks was similar to that which is the foundation of this bill – since U.S. taxpayers were bailing out the financial institutions executives should be held accountable for the performance of the financial institutions through ties to compensation.
He stated in the preface to a report[3] summarizing his work as Special Master appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury in June, 2009:
During the nearly 14 month period that followed, the Special Master’s Office implemented the unprecedented directive of determining compensation packages for the top executives at those companies that received exceptional taxpayer assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. It is my personal belief that this office made an important contribution to the highly-charged subject of executive compensation. It remains to be seen whether our work will have a lasting impact. Only time will tell…
The Feinberg report concluded that four key standards provide the groundwork for compensation structures and payments approved by the Special Master:
- Strict Limits on Guaranteed Cash Compensation: The primary portion of an employee’s compensation package should be allocated to compensation structures with performance components. Cash incentives should not be guaranteed under any circumstances;
- Achievement of Objective Performance Goals: Incentive compensation should be based on performance metrics that are measurable, enforceable and actually enforced in not met;
- Long-term Structures: A significant amount of compensation should reflect a company’s long-term performance and value, often using grants of company stock. In most circumstances a large proportion of compensation should be held or deferred for a period of at least three years; and
- Minimization of Indirect and Ancillary Compensation: Compensation structures that are not aligned with shareholder and taxpayer interests in the firm should be minimized or eliminated.[4]
At the CPUC forum, Feinberg elaborated on these standards and specifically provided this guidance if the policy is considered for utilities in California:
Be careful…there’s a tension…between regulating pay and making sure that you’re still able to get the best people to serve in…utility corporate America. You don’t want to be punitive…you don’t want to provide disincentives to the corporate people that might be interested in doing this work and “say it’s not worth it. I’m being punished through safety incentives so I’m not going to go there” and right away the utility is at a competitive disadvantage.
New PG&E CEO – On April 3rd PG&E Corporation announced the appointment of William "Bill" Johnson as Chief Executive Officer and President and the appointment of ten new directors to its 13-member board. Most recently Johnson was President and CEO of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Prior to that he was Chairman, President and CEO of Progress Energy which media reports indicate he left one day after a merger with Duke Energy took effect in 2012. He received a $44 million severance package. In a press release[5] announcing Johnson’s hire, PG&E stated that “more than half of Mr. Johnson's incentive compensation will be directly tied to safety performance and metrics, which PG&E believes significantly exceeds industry standards.”
P&GE disclosed details of Johnson’s three-year employment commitment in an April 16th filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The filing stated in part:
During the three-year employment commitment, Mr. Johnson will receive a base salary of $2.5 million annually. Mr. Johnson will also receive a one-time transition payment of $3 million on the first day of his employment, which is subject to claw-back in the event Mr. Johnson resigns or is terminated for cause within 12 months of his start date…
The compensation package also includes “equity incentive” compensation consisting of time-based (25%) and performance-based (75%) stock units, a portion of which is subject to unspecified safety-based performance conditions. Stock options and severance payments are also outlined.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s Statement. Following the passage of SB 901 in 2018, electrical utilities hold significant power to pass liability costs onto ratepayers, powers not possessed by any other investor owned company in California. In order to protect ratepayers, the Legislature must ensure that the bonding powers provided by SB 901 do not become a “way of doing business” within the industry.
Accordingly, AB 1363, seeks to promote forward-thinking corporate planning within the electrical utility industry and insure that utility company executives have a vested interest in the long-term health and viability of their companies. By tying excess compensation to the company’s future results, AB 1363 strikes a balance by permitting utility companies to pay executives whatever they deem necessary to attract and retain top talent, while simultaneously ensuring that these executives have the same interest in the long-term health of the company that rank-and-file employees do.
- Excess Compensation. This bill measures excess compensation awarded to executives as the percentage by which executive compensation increases over rank-and-file employees’ compensation in a given year. The excess compensation is placed in a five-year escrow with an extension of time whenever the utility is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The CPUC is then required to consider the escrowed excess compensation as a corporate asset for the purpose of determining whether to authorize the issuance of ratepayer-backed wildfire recovery bonds under the SB 901 securitization provisions. Before an IOU could issue recovery bonds, all of the IOUs excess executive compensation would be taken out of escrow and used to offset the ratepayer expenses related to wildfire costs. The Committee is not aware of any other corporate compensation which is subject to these conditions.
- Unlawful Taking? This measure would escrow the compensation of utility executives which some argue would violate the “takings clause” of the U.S. Constitution which reads as follows, “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”[6] The Committee has not researched the issue but those claiming that the bill would result in a taking did not provide pertinent case law to support the claim. We did receive information from the California Research Bureau which cited one case in which a federal circuit court of appeals considered whether a failure to pay a termination package two weeks after the government placed Freddie Mac into conservatorship in 2008 to prevent the mortgage giant’s collapse was a taking. The Court ruled it was not.[7] The fact pattern of that case is not analogous to the structure of the bill before the Committee today.
- Contract Clause? Opponents have also argued that application of this bill to executive compensation which has been established by contract would violate the “contract clause” of the U.S. Constitution which states that, “No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.”[8] The bill would require that excess compensation is escrowed annually, regardless of the terms of a preexisting employee contract. No case law was provided to the Committee on this issue.
- Conflicts with State & Federal Law? In addition to raising constitutional issues, opponents have argued generally that the bill violates the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act and state Labor Code provisions because it requires the withholding of benefits (such as 401K contributions) and the withholding of wages which are required to be paid to an employee immediately upon termination or resignation.
- Escrowed Compensation. The author’s stated intent is to tie the excess compensation of executive officers, as defined, to utility performance. However, it does not appear that the structure of this bill achieves this goal of the author.
Senate Bill 901 authorized two types of IOU cost recovery from ratepayers for catastrophic wildfire costs. For fires which ignited in calendar year 2017, an IOU can apply to the CPUC for the recovery of costs and the CPUC will determine whether the IOU’s conduct related to the fire ignition was reasonable (was the IOU at fault?). All reasonable costs are recoverable from ratepayers. However, if the utility was at fault, the CPUC shall only require the utility to pay costs up to the “maximum amount the corporation can pay without harming ratepayers or materially impacting its ability to provide adequate and safe service.” The remainder of costs are securitized and paid for in rates.
For fires which ignite on or after January 1, 2019, the CPUC has a new standard of review but can only authorize cost recovery where the utility acts reasonably (is not at fault).
Under this bill, if the CPUC issues a financing order (which would result in securitizing that debt with repayment from ratepayers), regardless of fault, the excess executive compensation held in the escrow account by the State Treasurer would be applied to offset the wildfire costs, thereby reducing the amount to be paid for by ratepayers. If the utility had no fault whatsoever in the cause of the fire, the excess executive compensation is still used to offset wildfire costs if securitized by ratepayers.
If a financing order is not issued within the five-year escrow period, it appears that the excess compensation funds would be released/paid to the executive. However, this is not explicit. Additionally, the escrow period is tolled if: the IOU is unable to pay debt; the liabilities of the IOU exceed assets; or the IOU asserts that its liabilities exceed assets.
The escrow structure has very limited connection to safety performance. The author expresses concern over “staggering” increases in executive compensation. For 2017, he reports that PG&E’s CEO “saw her total compensation grow by a staggering 106 percent when compared to the prior year, including a 189 percent increase in available stock options. The same company’s chief operating officer realized a compensation increase of 88.9 percent. Meanwhile, rank and file employees saw wage growth of approximately 3.5 percent over the same period.”
- How Can a Corporate Utility Be Incentivized to Promote Safety as a Priority? During the recession a Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, was appointed in the Office of the U.S. Treasury to determine the pay of the country’s top financial institutions which were on the brink of failure and ultimately survived because of taxpayer assistance. Feinberg issued a report at the conclusion of his work and recently appeared on a panel of experts regarding the governance of PG&E convened by the CPUC.
In his opinion, to elevate and link executive compensation and a corporation’s safety performance, it is recommended that the value of the compensation package be directly tied to the value of the stock in the market. A smaller annual salary with stock incentives that vest incrementally over the time of the executive’s employment is a critical element of compensation.
For PG&E, the market has immediately responded to catastrophic fire events with large drops in stock value. In August of 2017, PG&E was trading at over $70 per share; after the North Bay fires, PG&E stock slowly declined to the $40-$49 range where it settled for most of 2018. However, as a result of the Camp Fire in November, 2018 PG&E stock declined in value by almost half overnight. During the aftermath of the fire, as the estimates of property damage grew and loss of life became clear, stock continued to decline. As bankruptcy approached and was filed, the stock dropped to the $5 to $7 range.
Feinberg additionally opined that there was a “constant tension [at Treasury] worked out, I might add, between incentivizing corporate officials to be safer and take less risk and at the same time making sure that AIG and its corporate officials were competitive in trying to attract talent.”
Governor Newsom released the report of his strike force on April 12th which raises the issue of “CPUC reforms to better align IOU incentives with safety” including a recommendation addressing the issue of executive compensation in an apparently similar structure to that required for TARP recipients. The report calls for consideration of “aligning compensation and stock options of executives with wildfire safety performance.” This approach appears to be consistent with the presentation of Feinberg at the August 15th CPUC meeting.
The Committee may wish to more strongly link executive compensation to safety performance by amending the bill to, strike the content and condition any assistance provided to the IOU, with ratepayer or state funds as a result of IOU responsibility for failures in safety, on the acceptance of direction and management of executive officer compensation by a special master to be appointed by the Governor and report to the CPUC. The Special Master would be required to structure executive officer compensation to incentivize the promotion of safety as a priority,
- Casts a Wide Net. This bill currently applies to the officers of ten electrical and/or gas corporations: PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, SoCalGas, Bear Valley, PacifiCorp, Liberty, Southwest Gas, West Coast Gas Company, and Alpine Natural Gas Operating Company. The bill casts a wide net. The Committee may wish to consider amending the bill to narrow its application to any electrical and gas corporation with an electric distribution and transmission service territory exceeding 65,000 square miles, more than 75,000 miles of electric distribution and transmission lines, and more than two million poles, all of which is located in California.
- Enforcement/Oversight? Under current law the compensation of all executive officers is paid for by shareholders. CPUC President Michael Picker commented on a provision in SB 901 which prohibits rate recovery for executive compensation from ratepayers at the April 15th CPUC meeting. He is concerned that this restriction has removed “a lever of control over PG&E” and other utilities. During the recession the firms receiving assistance under TARP (AIG, Bank of America, Chrysler, Chrysler Financial, Citigroup, General Motors and GMAC [now known as Ally Financial]) were required to secure the approval of the Office of the Special Master for the compensation structures and payments to specified executives. Looking back, if the Special Master determined that executive compensation paid was contrary to policy, he had the authority to “seek to negotiate…appropriate reimbursement to the Federal Government” for the assistance provided to the financial institution which received the bailout.
In order to ensure oversight and enforcement of this measure, the author should work with the Committee and the CPUC to determine whether the CPUC’s jurisdiction over executive compensation is limited as a result of SB 901 and whether modifications to current law are needed to effectuate this bill. - Prior Legislation. The following bills were considered in prior sessions on the topic of IOU executive compensation.
SB 901 (Dodd) Established a comprehensive framework to address and prevent catastrophic wildfires including prevention and planning by the state's electric utilities, management of the state's forests, chaparrals, and other lands to prevent and defend against wildfires, and standards to stabilize IOUs in the event of extensive liability resulting from claims under inverse condemnation. Status: Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018.
AB 1266 (Gonzalez Fletcher) Restricted rate recovery by an IOU of executive officer excess compensation for five-years following a triggering event unless the utility complies with specified requirements and obtains the approval of the CPUC. Status: Chapter 599, Statutes of 2015.
AB 861(Hill) Increased penalty levels for failure to comply with utility laws and required the CPUC to determine rate recovery by an electrical corporation or gas corporation that is a public utility for earnings or stock-based price-based incentive pay for its employees or directors. Status: Chapter 464, Statutes of 2012.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
The Utility Reform Network
Opposition
California Chamber of Commerce
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Sempra Energy Utilities
Southern California Edison
Analysis Prepared by: Kellie Smith / U. & E. /
Resolution E-4963, December 13, 2018, California Public Utilities Commission. ↑
Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy Future, a Report from Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, April 12, 2019, p. 12, at https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Wildfires-and-Climate-Change-California%E2%80%99s-Energy-Future.pdf ↑
Office of the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, Final Report of Special Master Kenneth R. Feinberg, September 10, 2010 at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/exec_comp/Documents/Final%20Report%20of%20Kenneth%20Feinberg%20-%20FINAL.PDF ↑
Id. at 9-10. ↑
PG&E Announces New Chief Executive Officer and Appointment of a Refreshed Board of Directors; New Leadership Focused on Enhancing Safety Culture and Operational Excellence, April 3, 2019, at https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20190403_pge_announces_new_chief_executive_officer_and_appointment_of_a_refreshed_board_of_directors_new_leadership_focused_on_enhancing_safety_culture_and_operational_excellence ↑
U.S. Const. amend. V. ↑
See Piszel v, United States (Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 2015-5100, 2016) ↑
U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):