AB 1380: Premarital agreements: enforcement.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-08-30
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Date
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Status
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| Aug 30, 2019 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 193, Statutes of 2019. |
| Aug 30, 2019 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Aug 23, 2019 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3:30 p.m. |
| Aug 12, 2019 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Jul 11, 2019 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. May be considered on or after August 9 pursuant to Assembly Rule 77. |
| Jul 11, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0.). |
| Jul 3, 2019 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| Jun 20, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jun 19, 2019 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 9. Noes 0.) (June 18). |
| Jun 10, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| May 22, 2019 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| May 9, 2019 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 9, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 2, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 1, 2019 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Apr 30, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (April 30). |
| Mar 14, 2019 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 25, 2019 | Read first time. |
| Feb 23, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 25. |
| Feb 22, 2019 | Introduced. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Aug 12, 2019 | AB 1380 Obernolte Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Jul 11, 2019 | Special Consent AB1380 | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Jun 18, 2019 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
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| May 9, 2019 | AB 1380 Obernolte Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Apr 30, 2019 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1380
Author:(Obernolte)
As Amended Ver:June 10, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Requires, for premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020, that the time period between when any party, against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought, is presented with the final premarital agreement and when it is signed must be at least seven days and clarifies that unrepresented parties be told to seek legal counsel as least seven days before execution.
Major Provisions
- Clarifies that a party, against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought who was not represented by independent legal counsel when the premarital agreement was signed, has been advised to seek independent legal counsel at least seven calendar days before the final agreement is signed.
- Clarifies that, for a premarital agreement executed between January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2020, a party against whom enforcement of the agreement is sought must have had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the final premarital agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time that the agreement was signed. Provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement.
- Requires that, for a premarital agreement executed after January 1, 2020, a party against whom enforcement of the agreement is sought must have had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the final premarital agreement and the time that the agreement was signed, regardless of whether the party is represented by legal counsel. Provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement.
The Senate Amendments:
Clarify that the requirement that a party has seven calendar days to review the final premarital agreement applies to all parties, regardless of whether they are represented by counsel.
COMMENTS:
California is a community property state, which means that all property acquired during a marriage or domestic partnership, subject to specified exceptions, is considered community property and, on dissolution, shared equally by both spouses or partners, absent an agreement to the contrary between the parties. (Family Code Section (FC) 760.) (Separate property includes property owned before the marriage and all property acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance (FC 770).) Spouses and partners can, by agreement executed before, during, or after the marriage or domestic partnership, decide on different rules to control their property and spousal support post-separation. An agreement entered before the marriage, known as a premarital agreement, is subject to very specific rules in order to be enforceable, including that the parties see the agreement in advance and seek advice from independent legal counsel. There has been some inconsistency in court interpretation of the rules governing premarital agreements, and this bill seeks to clarify those rules.
In response to recent cases, this bill seeks to clarify the requirements for the seven-day review period in several key ways. First, it specifies that, for premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020, the seven-day waiting period applies regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel. Even parties represented by counsel may be loath to postpone a wedding with hundreds of guests waiting because they have just been presented with a new or substantially revised premarital agreement. As the Conference of California Bar Associations states, "Though representation by counsel provides solid protection against deception under normal circumstances, it is by no means an absolute guard against 11th hour drafting shenanigans. It is better policy to maximize protection by making the seven-day period begin anew with the addition or revision of any item that changes the terms of the agreement, not essentially technical changes." Second, the seven-day period starts to run when the final agreement is provided to the other party. However, to ensure that the seven-day requirement does not apply to small, nonsubstantive changes, such as correcting the spelling of names, this bill provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement. These changes, taken together, should ensure that all parties, including represented parties, have sufficient time to consider a premarital agreement, but that minor, nonsubstantive changes do not require the seven-day clock to restart.
This bill also clarifies that an unrepresented party must be told to seek independent legal counsel at least seven days before the final agreement is signed. This is basically what the current requirement is, but clarified slightly to minimize future legal disputes.
According to the Author:
Current law provides that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not represented by counsel and received the agreement less than seven days before it was signed. Family law attorneys are not presently clear if the seven days runs from the presentation of the first draft of the agreement, or revised drafts. This causes significant confusion for self-represented litigants, family law attorneys, and courts. AB 1380 would provide clarity for all of these groups by making it clear that the seven day waiting period begins upon the presentation of the final draft of the agreement.
Arguments in Support:
The bill's sponsor, the Conference of California Bar Associations, states: "AB 1380 provides clarity to this provision in a way that ensures that parties will not be held subject to a premarital agreement containing disadvantageous provisions snuck in late in the drafting process that they had insufficient time to review or to obtain legal assistance."
Arguments in Opposition:
None
FISCAL COMMENTS:
None
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 11-0-1
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Kiley, Maienschein, Obernolte, Petrie‑Norris, Reyes
ABS, ABST OR NV: Gallagher
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 77-0-3
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Obernolte, Patterson, Petrie‑Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Chen, Dahle
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Grove, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Jones, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Morrell, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Stone, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Borgeas
UPDATED:
VERSION: June 10, 2019
CONSULTANT: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0001153
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1380 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1380
Amended: 6/10/19 in Senate
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 9-0, 6/18/19
AYES: Jackson, Borgeas, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Jones, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 77-0, 5/9/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Premarital agreements: enforcement
SOURCE: California Conference of Bar Associations
DIGEST:
This bill (1) clarifies that an existing requirement that an unrepresented party be given seven days to sign a premarital agreement is triggered when the final agreement is presented, and (2) applies the seven-day period to all premarital agreements executed after January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the parties are represented by counsel.
Existing law:
- Defines “premarital agreement” as an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effected upon marriage. (Fam. Code § 1610(a).)[1]
- Requires that a premarital agreement be in writing and signed by both parties. Specifies that the agreement is enforceable without consideration. (§ 1611.)
- Provides that parties to a premarital agreement may contract to all of the following:
- The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of their property, regardless of when and where the property was acquired;
- The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property;
- The disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
- The making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement;
- The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy;
- The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and
- Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty (§ 1612(a).)
- Specifies that a child’s right to child support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement. (§ 1612(b).) Provides that a provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not represented by independent counsel, or if the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. (§ 1612(c).)
- Provides that a premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage. (§ 1613.) A premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by both parties. (§ 1614.)
- Provides that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that (a) the party did not execute the agreement voluntarily or (b) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed, and before the execution, all of the following applied to that party:
- The party was not provided a fair, reasonable, and full disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
- The party did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and
- The party did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. (§ 1615(a).)
- Provides that, for purposes of showing that a premarital agreement was not entered into voluntarily, the agreement is unenforceable unless a court finds in writing or on the record all of the following:
- The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or, after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.
- The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.
- The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations the party was giving up by signing the agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the explanation of the party’s rights was conducted and in which the agreement was written. The explanation of the rights and obligations relinquished must be memorialized in writing and delivered to the party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party must, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, execute a document declaring that the party received the information required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that information.
- The agreement and the writings executed pursuant to (a) and (c), above, were not executed under duress, fraud, or undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.
- Any other factors the court deems relevant. (Id. at (c).)
This bill:
- Clarifies that the version of the premarital agreement that triggers the seven-day period described in 7(a) and (b), above, must be the final agreement, excluding nonsubstantive amendments to the agreement.
- Requires, for premarital agreements executed between January 1, 2002, and January 1, 2020, that the final agreement be presented to the party against whom enforcement is sought at least seven days before the agreement is signed, regardless of whether the party is represented by independent legal counsel.
- Finds and declares that the changes in 1) are declaratory of exiting law and that the changes in 2) are intended to supersede the holding of In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945, 960 (seven-day period applies only to unrepresented parties) on a prospective basis.
Comments
Existing law enables prospective spouses to enter into premarital agreements to establish their rights and obligations upon getting married. As with all contracts, such agreements must be voluntary. Recognizing that premarital agreements are often hastily negotiated by parties with considerable imbalances in sophistication and bargaining power, the Legislature has sought to protect prospective spouses from unwittingly entering into disadvantageous arrangements by establishing objective criteria to ensure that the agreements are truly voluntary. Family Code Section 1615 provides that a premarital contract is entered into voluntarily, and thus is enforceable against a spouse, only if the spouse was represented by legal counsel or advised to seek counsel. If the spouse is not represented by counsel, they must be given seven days after being presented with the agreement before signing it.
This bill, which is sponsored by the California Conference of Bar Associations, clarifies that the seven-day period is commenced only when the final version of the agreement has been presented. Additionally, for premarital agreements executed after January 1, 2020, this bill requires that the seven-day period be observed regardless of whether the parties are represented by counsel.
This latter provision has drawn the opposition of organizations that represent family law practitioners, which contend that the seven-day period is unnecessary for parties that are represented by counsel. They contend that an attorney provides sufficient protection and that having more time to negotiate leads to better, more equitable agreements.
While there are reasonable policy arguments for limiting the seven-day period to unrepresented parties, there are also strong arguments for applying it to all parties. A cooling-off period offers the opportunity to reflect on the proposed agreement, scrutinize it thoroughly, seek advice and insights of family and friends, and potentially reconsider the wisdom of provisions that will have potentially tremendous implications far down the line. For many people, a premarital agreement is the most consequential contract they will ever sign.
The mere fact that a party is represented by counsel does not ensure that the party’s assent to a premarital agreement is truly voluntary. Nor does it eliminate imbalances in sophistication, bargaining power, or the pressure that a party may feel in last-minute negotiations. An attorney can advise the client not to sign the agreement until the attorney has reviewed the agreement and consulted with the client. But if the client feels rushed and pressured to succumb to a hasty decision in such emotionally fraught circumstances, their attorney’s advice may be difficult to heed. A mandatory seven-day waiting period protects against this possibility and gives leverage to the party with less bargaining power.
The opposition also argues that the seven-day period could force parties to “deal with the embarrassment and financial devastation of having to cancel their wedding at the last minute because of the need to wait 7 days after the last substantive change.” However, the seven day period only applies to substantive changes. More to the point, nothing in this bill prevents the parties from delaying their signing of the marriage license, as opposed to the wedding itself. Decoupling these things may be inconvenient and unromantic, but so is negotiating a premarital agreement.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
California Conference of Bar Associations (source)
OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/17/19)
Association of Certified Family Law Specialists
Executive Committee of the Family Law Section of the California Lawyers Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The author writes:
Family law attorneys are not presently clear if the seven days runs from the presentation of the first draft of the agreement, or revised drafts. This causes significant confusion for self-represented litigants, family law attorneys, and courts. AB 1380 would provide clarity for all of these groups by making it clear that the seven day waiting period begins upon the presentation of the final draft of the agreement.
The sponsor, California Conference of Bar Associations, writes:
Though representation by counsel provides solid protection against deception under normal circumstances, it is by no means an absolute guard against 11th hour drafting shenanigans. It is better policy to maximize protection by making the seven-day period begin anew with the addition or revision of any item that changes the terms of the agreement, not essentially technical changes.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The Association of Certified Family Law Specialists writes:
When negotiating a premarital agreement, it is typical for counsel for one of the parties to prepare a draft of a premarital agreement and after their client approves the same, present that draft to the other party and that party’s counsel to review. Often times, revisions are made to the agreement after being first presented to the other party, whether those revisions are requested by the other party or initiated by the party who hired counsel to draft the agreement. Often times, during negotiations, several drafts of the agreement are often circulated before a final draft of the agreement is ready to be signed. Sometimes these changes are made close to the wedding date. Having retained counsel is a protective factor. Allowing retained counsel to have the flexibility to control the timeline makes the most sense versus having the parties enter into an agreement that neither of them want, or even worse, having the parties deal with the embarrassment and financial devastation of having to cancel their wedding at the last minute because of the need to wait 7 days after the last substantive change.
The Executive Committee of the Family Law Section of the California Lawyers Association writes:
Under current law, represented parties retain important protections, as a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that the party did not execute the agreement voluntarily or that other conditions are not met. The proposed amendment to Section 1615 is significant because it would be deemed as a matter of law that a premarital agreement is not executed voluntarily and is unenforceable unless a party – even if represented – had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the final agreement and the time the agreement was signed. FLEXCOM is concerned that the application of the seven-day requirement is overly restrictive and would have unintended consequences, prohibiting represented parties from making substantive and necessary changes, even if voluntarily and knowingly agreed upon by all parties and their counsel, if the agreement is executed within the seven-day period.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 77-0, 5/9/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Patterson, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Chen, Dahle
Prepared by: Josh Tosney / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
6/21/19 11:43:04
**** END ****
All further statutory references are to the Family Code. ↑
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2019-2020 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1380 (Author:Obernolte)
Version: June 10, 2019
Hearing Date: June 18, 2019
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
Consultant: JT
SUBJECT
Premarital agreements: enforcement
DIGEST
This bill (1) clarifies that an existing requirement that an unrepresented party be given seven days to sign a premarital agreement is triggered when the final agreement is presented, and (2) applies the seven-day period to all premarital agreements executed after January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the parties are represented by counsel.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Existing law enables prospective spouses to enter into premarital agreements to establish their rights and obligations upon getting married. As with all contracts, such agreements must be voluntary. Recognizing that premarital agreements are often hastily negotiated by parties with considerable imbalances in sophistication and bargaining power, the Legislature has sought to protect prospective spouses from unwittingly entering into disadvantageous arrangements by establishing objective criteria to ensure that the agreements are truly voluntary. Family Code section 1615 provides that a premarital contract is entered into voluntarily, and thus is enforceable against a spouse, only if the spouse was represented by legal counsel or advised to seek counsel. If the spouse is not represented by counsel, they must be given seven days after being presented with the agreement before signing it.
This bill, which is sponsored by the California Conference of Bar Associations, clarifies that the seven-day period is commenced only when the final version of the agreement has been presented. Additionally, for premarital agreements executed after January 1, 2020, the bill would require that the seven-day period be observed regardless of whether the parties are represented by counsel. This provision has drawn the opposition of organizations that represent family law practitioners, which contend that the seven-day period is unnecessary for parties that are represented by counsel.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Defines “premarital agreement” as an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effected upon marriage. (Fam. Code § 1610(a).)[1]
- Requires that a premarital agreement be in writing and signed by both parties. Specifies that the agreement is enforceable without consideration. (§ 1611.)
- Provides that parties to a premarital agreement may contract to all of the following:
- the rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of their property, regardless of when and where the property was acquired;
- the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property;
- the disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
- the making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement;
- the ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy;
- the choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and
- any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty (§ 1612(a).)
- Specifies that a child’s right to child support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement. (§ 1612(b).) Provides that a provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not represented by independent counsel, or if the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. (§ 1612(c).)
- Provides that a premarital agreement becomes effective upon marriage. (§ 1613.) A premarital agreement may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by both parties. (§ 1614.)
- Provides that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that (1) the party did not execute the agreement voluntarily or (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed, and before the execution, all of the following applied to that party:
- the party was not provided a fair, reasonable, and full disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
- the party did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and
- the party did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. (§ 1615(a).)
- Provides that, for purposes of showing that a premarital agreement was not entered into voluntarily, the agreement is unenforceable unless a court finds in writing or on the record all of the following:
- The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or, after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.
- The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.
- The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations the party was giving up by signing the agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the explanation of the party’s rights was conducted and in which the agreement was written. The explanation of the rights and obligations relinquished must be memorialized in writing and delivered to the party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party must, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, execute a document declaring that the party received the information required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that information.
- The agreement and the writings executed pursuant to (a) and (c), above, were not executed under duress, fraud, or undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.
- Any other factors the court deems relevant. (Id. at (c).)
This bill:
- Clarifies that the version of the premarital agreement that triggers the seven-day period described in 7(a) and (b), above, must be the final agreement, excluding nonsubstantive amendments to the agreement.
- Requires, for premarital agreements executed between January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2020, that the final agreement be presented to the party against whom enforcement is sought at least seven days before the agreement is signed, regardless of whether the party is represented by independent legal counsel.
- Finds and declares that the changes in 1) are declaratory of exiting law and that the changes in 2) are intended to supersede the holding of In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945, 960 (seven-day period applies only to unrepresented parties) on a prospective basis.
COMMENTS
1. Premarital agreements generally
Existing law establishes a comprehensive scheme that governs the creation, content, and enforcement of premarital agreements. (§ 1600 et seq.) These provisions generally establish that parties may enter into a premarital agreement governing the disposition, management, and control of their property as long as they do so with informed consent and in circumstances suggesting they operated with relative parity of bargaining power.
This bill amends section 1615, which governs the enforcement of premarital contracts. That section was last amended following the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, which addressed a premarital contract between Major League Baseball’s all-time home run leader Barry Bonds and his then-fiancée, whose native language was Swedish and who was not represented by independent counsel. On the eve of their nuptials, she signed a premarital agreement from Bonds’ attorney. When the agreement was later used against her in litigation, she asserted that she did not enter into it voluntarily. The Court of Appeal held that if the less sophisticated party is not represented by independent counsel, the agreement is subject to strict scrutiny—the most exacting standard of judicial review. However, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and concluded instead that the absence of counsel is but one of many factors a court may consider in determining the agreement’s enforceability. (Id. at 6.)
The Legislature responded by amending section 1615. SB 78 (Kuehl, Ch. 286, Stats. 2001), among other things, added subdivision (c), which provides that a premarital agreement was not executed voluntarily unless a court finds five specified factors, including the following provisions, which are the subject of this bill:
(1) The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or, after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.
(2) The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.
2. Clarifies that the seven-day period commences upon presentation of the final agreement
As described above, section 1615(c)(1) requires that a party against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought be given the opportunity to seek independent legal counsel, or to expressly waive this right in a separate writing. This bill would provide that seven days must elapse between the advisement to seek independent counsel and the signing of the agreement. This change amounts to a clarification, as section 1615(c)(2) already imposes this requirement.
Additionally, the bill clarifies that the seven-day period commences upon presentation of the final draft of the agreement. Existing law does not expressly address whether an initial draft triggers the seven-day period. If an agreement is revised substantially after it is first presented, the other party may not have an adequate opportunity to consider the agreement that they ultimately end up signing. This would allow for bait-and-switch tactics that would arguably undermine the Legislature’s intent to ensure that premarital agreements are truly voluntary. On the other hand, it can be argued that the intent of the provision is simply to put the party on notice that they should seek counsel.
This bill would bring clarity to this issue. The author writes:
Family law attorneys are not presently clear if the seven days runs from the presentation of the first draft of the agreement, or revised drafts. This causes significant confusion for self-represented litigants, family law attorneys, and courts. AB 1380 would provide clarity for all of these groups by making it clear that the seven day waiting period begins upon the presentation of the final draft of the agreement.
Although case law has not directly addressed this issue, courts have assumed that the final draft of the agreement triggers the seven-day period. For instance, in In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945, (Cadwell-Faso), which held that the seven-day requirement does not apply to represented parties (id. at 962), calculated the timeframe from the fifth and final draft of the agreement; had it commenced with the first draft, the applicability of the seven-day period would have been inapposite, as several months had passed. (See id. at 950-951, fn. 2.) Thus, the holding of the case relies on the assumption that the seven-day period is measured from the presentation of the final draft.
More recently, In re Marriage of Clarke & Akel (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 914 held that a premarital agreement was unenforceable against an unrepresented party because the seven-day period had not been properly observed. In that case, the initial draft was created by the unrepresented party on February 26th and the marriage did not occur until March 7th. The court cited to Cadwell-Faso before launching into its discussion about timing:
Under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (c)(2), a premarital agreement may not be enforced against a party who was not represented during negotiations unless that party had “seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.” (See Cadwell-Faso, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 962.) Here, the final draft of the premarital agreement was sent to Matthew by Attorney Chernick on March 5, 2008, and included significant provisions that were not a part of the initial draft prepared by Matthew himself. In particular, the final draft included a waiver of Matthew’s statutory right to reimbursement of his separate property contribution to the home at 538 Palomar Drive and an agreement that Matthew would pay all of the expenses for the home for the duration of Claudia’s lifetime tenancy. Given the material nature of these additions to the original draft, substantial evidence supports the determination that Matthew was “first presented” with the agreement on March 5. Additionally, Matthew was not “advised to seek independent legal counsel” until his meeting with Chernick on March 4, 2008. Whether we calculate the seven-day period as running from March 4, 2008, or March 5, 2008, fewer than seven days elapsed between those dates and the execution of the premarital agreement on March 6, 2008.
(In re Marriage of Clarke & Akel (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 914, 920.) Thus, although courts have not definitively resolved this issue, the understanding that the final agreement triggers the seven-day period was necessary to the holdings described above. Consequently, this bill’s express qualification that the seven-day period commences upon presentation of the final agreements amounts to a clarification rather than a substantive change to the law.
The bill makes one other clarifying change. Because subdivision (c) of section 1615 became effective January 1, 2002, a court would not apply the seven-day period to premarital agreements executed before that date. This bill makes this point express by providing that the seven-day period applies to agreements after that date. This change also helps to clarify the relationship between current law and the change described next.
3. Opposition to the application of the seven-day period to represented parties
Under current law, section 1615(c)(2) only applies to unrepresented parties. (See Cadwell-Faso, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 962.) Consequently, the seven-day period need not be observed if the parties have independent counsel. This bill seeks to change that on a prospective basis: after January 1, 2020, all parties, regardless of whether they are represented by counsel, would be subject to the seven-day period.[2]
This provision, which was added by the Assembly Judiciary Committee, is intended to ensure that premarital agreements are not executed hastily and without a full opportunity for scrutiny of their contents and consideration of their consequences. That committee’s analysis of this bill states that this change, coupled with the clarifying change discussed above, “should ensure that all parties, including represented parties, have sufficient time to consider a premarital agreement, but that minor, nonsubstantive changes do not require the seven-day clock to restart.” (Id. at 7.) Quoting the bill’s sponsor, the Assembly Judiciary Committee’s analysis of this bill further states:
“Though representation by counsel provides solid protection against deception under normal circumstances, it is by no means an absolute guard against 11th hour drafting shenanigans. It is better policy to maximize protection by making the seven-day period begin anew with the addition or revision of any item that changes the terms of the agreement, not essentially technical changes.”
(Ibid.) However, this provision has drawn the opposition of the Association of Certified Family Law Specialists (ACFLS) and the Executive Committee of the Family Law Section of the California Lawyers Association (FLEXCOM). These organizations argue that applying the seven-day period to all premarital agreements for which the parties are represented by independent counsel is needlessly paternalistic. FLEXCOM argues:
Under current law, represented parties retain important protections, as a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that the party did not execute the agreement voluntarily or that other conditions are not met. The proposed amendment to Section 1615 is significant because it would be deemed as a matter of law that a premarital agreement is not executed voluntarily and is unenforceable unless a party – even if represented – had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the final agreement and the time the agreement was signed. FLEXCOM is concerned that the application of the seven-day requirement is overly restrictive and would have unintended consequences, prohibiting represented parties from making substantive and necessary changes, even if voluntarily and knowingly agreed upon by all parties and their counsel, if the agreement is executed within the seven-day period.
In support of their arguments, both organizations cite to the Cadwell-Faso case. In that case, the court was considering whether section 1615(c)(2) applies to parties that are represented by independent counsel. The court found that while the provision was ambiguous, the statute as a whole and the requirement that the party be advised to seek counsel suggested that section 1615(c)(2) was intended to apply only to unrepresented parties. The court wrote:
Scrutinizing the statute as a whole as we must, we are mindful that section 1615(c)(1) and (3) both make distinctions between represented and unrepresented parties, thus demonstrating that the drafters knew how to place limitations on the party against whom enforcement was sought. Specifically, subdivision (c)(1) distinguishes between a party represented by independent legal counsel and a party who, after being advised to seek counsel, waives representation; subdivision (c)(3) concerns solely unrepresented parties. On the other hand, subdivision(c)(2) contains no such explicit limitations or distinctions. However, we cannot avoid the glaring fact that the seven-day waiting period is measured from the time the party against whom enforcement is sought “was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel,” and the moment of execution. (§ 1615(c)(2), italics added.) The conjunctive phrase, requiring both presentment and advice, implies that the waiting period is for the benefit of a party not represented by counsel at the time the agreement is presented, thereby affording time to obtain counsel and enjoy the benefit of counsel's review of the agreement and advice prior to signing it. We also point out that this requirement follows directly from the subdivision (c)(1) language specifying that the party to be held to the agreement is either independently represented by counsel or expressly waives counsel in writing “after being advised to seek independent legal counsel … .” (§ 1615(c)(1), italics added.) In other words, the flow and sense of the statute is that section 1615(c)(2) is a continuation of the requirements pertaining to an unrepresented party.
(Id. at 959-960; italics in original.) In support of this conclusion, the court examined the policy underlying the requirement that the party be advised to seek independent legal counsel. The court continued:
From a practical and commonsense perspective, it would be absurd to require a party pursuing enforcement to advise the other party to seek independent legal counsel when that party is already represented in the transaction by independent counsel. In other words, were we to interpret section 1615(c)(2) as applying to represented parties, the advisement requirement becomes meaningless surplusage. Yet, when applied to an unrepresented party, the advisement proviso is critical.
Moreover, the seven-day period makes sense as a necessary condition to finding voluntary execution on the part of an unrepresented party because the requirement affords a reasonable period of time to obtain and consult with independent counsel prior to signing a premarital agreement. On the other hand, when a party is already represented by counsel in the transaction, obtaining the requisite advice can occur very quickly and no purpose is served by imposing a statutory waiting period. Retained counsel can control the timeline. If not available straight away to review a document, any competent attorney would advise the client not to sign it until the attorney reviewed the document and consulted with the client. Whether this occurred within the seven-day period or beyond it, the client is protected. The same cannot be said for the unrepresented party.
Further, as we have shown, the legislative history reveals that the Legislature was concerned with protecting unrepresented parties. The seven-day rule allows time for the unrepresented party to locate and consult with independent counsel, or time to consider the agreement after receiving it.
(Id. at 960; emphasis in original.) Thus, the court offered a policy argument in support of its conclusion that 1615(c)(2)’s requirement that a party be advised to seek independent counsel implied that the Legislature intended the seven-day period to apply only to unrepresented parties. Importantly, the court was not purporting to tell the Legislature what to do; it was simply trying to determine what the Legislature did.
While there are reasonable policy arguments for limiting the seven-day period to unrepresented parties, there are also strong arguments for applying it to all parties.
A cooling-off period offers the opportunity to reflect on the proposed agreement, scrutinize it thoroughly, seek advice and insights of family and friends, and potentially reconsider the wisdom of provisions that will have potentially tremendous implications far down the line. For many people, a premarital agreement is the most consequential contract they will ever sign.
The mere fact that a party is represented by counsel does not ensure that the party’s assent to a premarital agreement is truly voluntary. Nor does it eliminate imbalances in sophistication, bargaining power, or the pressure that a party may feel in last-minute negotiations. The court in Cadwell-Faso noted that an attorney can advise the client not to sign the agreement until the attorney has reviewed the agreement and consulted with the client. But if the client feels rushed and pressured to succumb to a hasty decision in such emotionally fraught circumstances, their attorney’s advice may be difficult to heed. A mandatory seven-day waiting period protects against this possibility and gives leverage to the party with less bargaining power.
ACFLS argues that this protection could backfire by forcing parties to prematurely sign an agreement. ACFLS writes:
When negotiating a premarital agreement, it is typical for counsel for one of the
parties to prepare a draft of a premarital agreement and after their client approves the same, present that draft to the other party and that party’s counsel to review. Often times, revisions are made to the agreement after being first presented to the other party, whether those revisions are requested by the other party or initiated by the party who hired counsel to draft the agreement. Often times, during negotiations, several drafts of the agreement are often circulated before a final draft of the agreement is ready to be signed. Sometimes these changes are made close to the wedding date. Having retained counsel is a protective factor. Allowing retained counsel to have the flexibility to control the timeline makes the most sense versus having the parties enter into an agreement that neither of them want, or even worse, having the parties deal with the embarrassment and financial devastation of having to cancel their wedding at the last minute because of the need to wait 7 days after the last substantive change.
However, the seven-day period does not apply to nonsubstantive changes. More to the point, nothing in the bill prevents the parties from delaying their signing of the marriage license, as opposed to the wedding itself. Decoupling these things may be inconvenient and unromantic, but so is negotiating a premarital agreement.
SUPPORT
California Conference of Bar Associations (sponsor)
OPPOSITION
Association of Certified Family Law Specialists
Executive Committee of the Family Law Section of the California Lawyers Association
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation: None known
Prior Legislation: See Comment 1.
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 77, Noes 0)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 0)
**************
All further statutory references are to the Family Code. ↑
The bill would also declare the intent of the Legislature, in making this change, to supersede the holding in Cadwell-Faso. This provision is intended to clarify the Legislature’s intent in applying the seven-day period regardless of whether the parties are represented. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1380
Author:(Obernolte)
As Amended Ver:May 1, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Clarifies, for premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020, that the time period between when any party, against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought, is presented with the final premarital agreement and when it is signed must be at least seven days and that unrepresented parties be told to seek legal counsel as least seven days before execution.
Major Provisions
- Requires that a party, against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought who was not represented by independent legal counsel when the premarital agreement was signed, have been advised to seek independent legal counsel at least seven calendar days before the final agreement is signed.
- Requires that a party against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought must have had no less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the final premarital agreement and the time that the agreement was signed. Provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement.
- Provides that the changes made by this bill apply prospectively only to premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020.
COMMENTS:
California is a community property state, which means that all property acquired during a marriage or domestic partnership, subject to specified exceptions, is considered community property and, on dissolution, shared equally by both spouses or partners, absent an agreement to the contrary between the parties. (Family Code Section (FC) 760.) (Separate property includes property owned before the marriage and all property acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance (FC 770).) Spouses and partners can, by agreement executed before, during, or after the marriage or domestic partnership, decide on different rules to control their property and spousal support post-separation. An agreement entered before the marriage, known as a premarital agreement, is subject to very specific rules in order to be enforceable, including that the parties see the agreement in advance and seek advice from independent legal counsel. There has been some inconsistency in court interpretation of the rules governing premarital agreements, and this bill seeks to clarify those rules.
In response to recent cases, this bill seeks to clarify the requirements for the seven-day review period in several key ways. First, it specifies that the seven-day waiting period applies regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel. Even parties represented by counsel may be loath to postpone a wedding with hundreds of guests waiting because they have just been presented with a new or substantially revised premarital agreement. As the Conference of California Bar Associations states, "Though representation by counsel provides solid protection against deception under normal circumstances, it is by no means an absolute guard against 11th hour drafting shenanigans. It is better policy to maximize protection by making the seven-day period begin anew with the addition or revision of any item that changes the terms of the agreement, not essentially technical changes." Second, the seven-day period starts to run when the final agreement is provided to the other party. However, to ensure that the seven-day requirement does not apply to small, nonsubstantive changes, such as correcting the spelling of names, this bill provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement. These changes, taken together, should ensure that all parties, including represented parties, have sufficient time to consider a premarital agreement, but that minor, nonsubstantive changes do not require the seven-day clock to restart.
This bill also clarifies that an unrepresented party must be told to seek independent legal counsel at least seven days before the final agreement is signed. This is basically what the current requirement is, but clarified slightly to minimize future legal disputes.
Finally, the bill, by its own terms, is prospective only, applying only to premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020. Agreements made before that date are subject to the requirements of existing law. This ensures that any agreement made in reliance on the existing rules, although less than clear, are enforceable by those same rules and not the rules as revised and clarified by this bill. This seems only fair not to change the rules of the game after it has already started.
According to the Author:
Current law provides that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not represented by counsel and received the agreement less than seven days before it was signed. Family law attorneys are not presently clear if the seven days runs from the presentation of the first draft of the agreement, or revised drafts. This causes significant confusion for self-represented litigants, family law attorneys, and courts. AB 1380 would provide clarity for all of these groups by making it clear that the seven day waiting period begins upon the presentation of the final draft of the agreement.
Arguments in Support:
The bill's sponsor, the Conference of California Bar Associations, states: "AB 1380 provides clarity to this provision in a way that ensures that parties will not be held subject to a premarital agreement containing disadvantageous provisions snuck in late in the drafting process that they had insufficient time to review or to obtain legal assistance."
Arguments in Opposition:
None
FISCAL COMMENTS:
None
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 11-0-1
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Kiley, Maienschein, Obernolte, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
ABS, ABST OR NV: Gallagher
UPDATED:
VERSION: May 1, 2019
CONSULTANT: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000314
Date of Hearing: April 30, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1380
Author:(Obernolte) – As Introduced Ver:February 22, 2019
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: Premarital agreements: enforcement
KEY ISSUE: TO AVOID CONFUSION, SHOULD THE LAW BE CLARIFIED TO PROVIDE THAT A PREMARITAL AGREEMENT IS ONLY ENFORCEABLE AGAINST A PARTY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE REPRESENTED, WHEN IT IS GIVEN TO THAT PARTY IN FINAL FORM AT LEAST SEVEN DAYS BEFORE EXECUTION?
SYNOPSIS
California is a community property state, which means that all property acquired during a marriage or domestic partnership, subject to specified exceptions, is considered community property and, on dissolution, shared equally by both spouses or partners, absent an agreement to the contrary between the parties. (Family Code Section 760.) (Separate property includes property owned before the marriage and all property acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance (Section 770).) Spouses and partners can, by agreement executed before, during, or after the marriage or domestic partnership, decide on different rules to control their property and spousal support post-separation. An agreement entered before the marriage, known as a premarital agreement, is subject to very specific rules in order to be enforceable, including that parties see the agreement in advance and seek advice from independent legal counsel. As the result of some inconsistency in court interpretation of the rules governing premarital agreements, the author finds that there is today “significant confusion for self-represented litigants, family law attorneys, and courts.” This bill, as proposed to be amended, seeks to mitigate the confusion and clarify the rules by specifying that the existing seven-day waiting period applies regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel, starts to run with the receipt of the final agreement, and does not apply to nonsubstantive changes to the agreement.
The bill is sponsored by the Conference of California Bar Associations, which writes that the bill “provides clarity to this provision in a way that ensures that parties will not be held subject to a premarital agreement containing disadvantageous provisions snuck in late in the drafting process that they had insufficient time to review or to obtain legal assistance.” There is no reported opposition to the bill as proposed to be amended.
SUMMARY: Clarifies, for premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020, that the time period between when any party, against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought, is presented with the final premarital agreement and when it is signed must be at least seven days and that unrepresented parties be told to seek legal counsel as least seven days before execution. Specifically, this bill:
- Requires that a party, against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought who was not represented by independent legal counsel when the premarital agreement was signed, have been advised to seek independent legal counsel at least seven calendar days before the final agreement is signed.
- Requires that a party against whom enforcement of a premarital agreement is sought must have had no less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the final premarital agreement and the time that the agreement was signed. Provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement.
- Provides that the changes made by this bill apply prospectively only to premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020.
EXISTING LAW:
- Except as otherwise provided, provides that all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property. (Family Code Section 760. Unless stated otherwise, all further statutory provisions are from the Family Code.)
- Provides that domestic partners have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations and duties under law as are granted to and imposed on spouses. (Section 297.5.)
- Defines a “premarital agreement” as an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage. Requires that the agreement be in writing and enforceable without consideration. (Sections 1610-11.)
- Allows parties to a premarital agreement to contract with respect to any of the following:
- The rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;
- The right to buy, sell, use, transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in, mortgage, encumber, dispose of, or otherwise manage and control property;
- The disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
- The making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement;
- The ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life insurance policy;
- The choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and
- Any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty. (Section 1612 (a).)
- Prohibits the enforcement of any provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support, including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, if the party against whom enforcement of the spousal support provision is sought was not represented by independent counsel at the time the agreement containing the provision was signed, or if the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. Provides that an otherwise unenforceable provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support may not become enforceable solely because the party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent counsel. (Section 1612 (b).)
- Prohibits the enforcement of a premarital agreement if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves either of the following:
- That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily. A premarital agreement is deemed not to be executed voluntarily unless the court finds in writing or on the record all of the following:
- The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or, after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.
- The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.
- The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations that person was giving up by signing the agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the explanation of the party’s rights was conducted and in which the agreement was written. Requires that the explanation of the rights and obligations relinquished be memorialized in writing and delivered to the party prior to signing the agreement. Requires the unrepresented party, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, to execute a document declaring that they received the information required and indicating who provided that information.
- The agreement and the writings executed were not executed under duress, fraud, or undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement.
- Any other factors the court deems relevant.
- The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, all of the following applied to that party:
- That party was not provided a fair, reasonable, and full disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
- That party did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided.
- That party did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. (Section 1615.)
- That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily. A premarital agreement is deemed not to be executed voluntarily unless the court finds in writing or on the record all of the following:
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: California is a community property state, which means that all property acquired during a marriage or domestic partnership, subject to specified exceptions, is considered community property and, on dissolution, shared equally by both spouses or partners, absent an agreement to the contrary between the parties. (Section 760.) (Separate property includes property owned before the marriage and all property acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance (Section 770).) Spouses and partners can, by agreement executed before, during, or after the marriage or domestic partnership, decide on different rules to control their property and spousal support post-separation. An agreement entered before the marriage, known as a premarital agreement, is subject to very specific rules in order to be enforceable, including that the parties see the agreement in advance and seek advice from independent legal counsel. There has been some inconsistency in court interpretation of the rules governing premarital agreements, and this bill seeks to clarify those rules.
In support of the bill, the author states:
Current law provides that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not represented by counsel and received the agreement less than seven days before it was signed. Family law attorneys are not presently clear if the seven days runs from the presentation of the first draft of the agreement, or revised drafts. This causes significant confusion for self-represented litigants, family law attorneys, and courts. AB 1380 would provide clarity for all of these groups by making it clear that the seven day waiting period begins upon the presentation of the final draft of the agreement.
Community Property and Premarital Agreements. The doctrine of community property law has governed marriage (and, more recently, domestic partnerships) and their dissolution, in California for over 150 years. For just as long, California has recognized the right of parties to agree to marriage terms at variance with California’s community property laws through premarital agreements. These agreements had historically been considered enforceable unless they violated general contractual concepts of fraud, duress, or undue influence, or otherwise were contrary to public policy.
In 1983, California enacted the Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act (UPAA) into law. (Sections 1612-1617.) That Act, among other things, provided that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that (1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily, or (2) the agreement was unconscionable and the party reasonably could not have known of, did not receive fair and reasonable disclosure of, and did not waive disclosure of, the other party's property and financial obligations.
In 2000, the California Supreme Court upheld enforcement of a premarital agreement, even though that case raised questions about the “knowing” execution of the agreement. In 2000, the California Supreme Court issued several decisions upholding the enforcement of premarital agreements that eventually led to the Legislature tightening up the requirements for those agreements, one of which is particularly relevant to this bill. In that case, In re Bonds (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 1, the Court held that a party's lack of representation by independent counsel when executing a premarital agreement was only one factor to consider in determining whether the overall agreement was entered into voluntarily, as opposed to simply being unenforceable under California's version of the UPAA. In that case, Barry Bonds, then an active professional baseball player, married Sun Bonds, a native of Sweden who was working as a waitress when they met. Shortly thereafter she moved in with him and they became engaged. On February 5, 1988, they signed a premarital agreement that had been prepared by Barry's attorney, and that same day they flew to Las Vegas, where they were married the following day. The premarital agreement provided that all of each party's earnings and accumulations from personal services rendered during marriage would be that party's separate property. Subsequently, the parties moved to California and, in 1994, Barry filed a petition for legal separation.
As in many divorce cases, the two parties' versions of the events surrounding the execution of the premarital agreement were quite different. The trial court, however, expressly found that the testimony of Barry and his witnesses was more credible, and in its statement of decision the court found, among other things, that: (1) Sun had known since the commencement of the parties' relationship that Barry wanted to keep his property and earnings separate; (2) Sun was an intelligent woman who was fluent enough in English to understand the agreement; (3) Sun had an opportunity to read the document before it was signed; (4) Sun had been advised that she had the right to obtain independent counsel at least a week before the agreement was presented to her, and she voluntarily elected not to retain independent counsel; (5) and the close proximity of the wedding to the execution of the agreement was not a significant factor in the court's view because Barry and Sun's wedding was "a small, impromptu affair" that easily could have been postponed if Sun had wanted more time to review the agreement. Consequently, the trial court held that Sun had entered into the premarital agreement freely and voluntarily and, therefore, the agreement was valid and enforceable.
In a split decision, the court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling, promulgating a rule that would have subjected premarital agreements to stricter judicial scrutiny in situations in which one spouse did not have independent counsel. The California Supreme Court, however, unanimously held the court of appeal had erred in taking this position. Instead, the Court held that a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel should be only one of the factors to be considered by the courts to determine voluntariness. Despite Sun’s lack of counsel, the Court upheld enforcement of the agreement.
The Legislature responded to the Bonds case the very next year with SB 78 (Kuehl), which, among other things, created more requirements for a knowing execution of a premarital agreement. The next year, in response to, among others, the Bonds case, the Legislature passed SB 78 (Kuehl), Chap. 286, Stats. 2001, which set forth specific findings a court must make to find that a premarital agreement was executed voluntarily and required that any spousal support provision in a premarital agreement, including a waiver, is unenforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not represented by counsel at the time the agreement was signed. In particular, that bill required that a premarital agreement is only entered into voluntarily (one of the necessary elements for enforceability of the agreement) if a court finds that all of the following conditions are present:
- The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or, after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel;
- The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed;
- The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations that party was giving up by signing the agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the explanation of the party's rights was conducted and in which the agreement was written. The explanation of the rights and obligations relinquished were memorialized in writing and delivered to the party prior to signing the agreement;
- The agreement and the writings executed pursuant to the above requirements were not executed under duress, fraud, or undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into the agreement; and,
- Any other factors the court deemed relevant. (Section 1615 (c).)
Since then there has been almost no legislative activity regarding premarital agreements, although the issue of the voluntariness of the execution of premarital agreements has continued to be litigated.
Two recent cases have raised questions about how the existing scheme to ensure that parties are voluntarily entering premarital agreements is working. Two recent courts of appeal decisions have raised questions about the clarity of the statutory language regarding voluntary execution of premarital agreements. In the first case, In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso and Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945, both parties were represented by counsel, but could not, after multiple drafts, agree to the terms of the premarital agreement, so Cadwell-Faso broke off the engagement, which let to an addendum being quickly drafted and signed by the parties in less than seven days, followed quickly by the wedding. Cadwell-Faso petitioned for separation a decade later and sought to enforce the full premarital agreement, including the addendum. The trial court ruled that the Section 1615 (c)(2), which requires that the party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed, was mandatory, regardless of whether the parties were represented. Since less than seven days had elapsed between the presentation of the last addendum and its execution, the agreement was unenforceable. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the seven-day waiting period only applied if a party was unrepresented by counsel:
Retained counsel can control the timeline. If not available straight away to review a document, any competent attorney would advise the client not to sign it until the attorney reviewed the document and consulted with the client. Whether this occurred within the seven-day period or beyond it, the client is protected. The same cannot be said for the unrepresented party. (191 Cal.App.4th at 960.)
Just last year, the same court of appeal considered a slightly different issue surround the seven-day rule. In that case, In re Marriage of Clark and Akel (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 914, one party had hired an attorney for the other party, but was himself unrepresented. The court assumed the seven-day rule applied only to the unrepresented party, and then found that the unrepresented party had had less than seven days to review the latest draft of the agreement, despite recitations in the agreement that he had had the full seven days from presentation of the final version of the agreement. The court then refused to enforce the agreement.
Both cases raise issues about the clarity of existing law and its application. Are all parties covered by the seven-day rule or just unrepresented parties, and when does the seven-day period start? The bill’s sponsor, the Conference of California Bar Associations, writes of these questions:
The current configuration of this provision, Family Code §1615(c), is confusing to family lawyers and others because it does not make clear when the seven days begins to run. Does it begin with the original presentation of a draft agreement, which then may be revised – often substantively - several times within the seven-day window? Or does the clock start over each time the document is revised? And does it make a difference if the party is represented by counsel or not? The answers can have a profound impact on the rights of parties in dissolution proceedings.
This bill seeks to address the ambiguity in the statutes raised by recent cases. In response to those cases, this bill seeks to clarify the requirements for the seven-day review period in several key ways. First, it specifies that the seven-day waiting period applies regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel. Despite what the court of appeal said in the In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso and Faso case, even parties represented by counsel may be loath to postpone a wedding with hundreds of guests waiting because they have just been presented with a new or substantially revised premarital agreement. As the Conference of California Bar Associations states, “Though representation by counsel provides solid protection against deception under normal circumstances, it is by no means an absolute guard against 11th hour drafting shenanigans. It is better policy to maximize protection by making the seven-day period begin anew with the addition or revision of any item that changes the terms of the agreement, not essentially technical changes.” Second, the seven-day period starts to run when the final agreement is provided to the other party. However, to ensure that the seven-day requirement does not apply to small, nonsubstantive changes, such as correcting the spelling of names, this bill provides that the seven-day requirement does not apply to nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms of the agreement. These changes, taken together, should ensure that all parties, including represented parties, have sufficient time to consider a premarital agreement, but that minor, nonsubstantive changes do not require the seven-day clock to restart.
This bill also clarifies that an unrepresented party must be told to seek independent legal counsel at least seven days before the final agreement is signed. This is basically what the current requirement is, but clarified slightly to minimize future legal disputes.
Finally, the bill, by its own terms, is prospective only, applying only to premarital agreements executed on or after January 1, 2020. Agreements made before that date are subject to the requirements of existing law. This ensures that any agreement made in reliance on the existing rules, although less than clear, are enforceable by those same rules and not the rules as revised and clarified by this bill. This seems only fair not to change the rules of the game after it has already started.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The bill’s sponsor, the Conference of California Bar Associations, states: “AB 1380 provides clarity to this provision in a way that ensures that parties will not be held subject to a premarital agreement containing disadvantageous provisions snuck in late in the drafting process that they had insufficient time to review or to obtain legal assistance.”
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Conference of California Bar Associations (sponsor)
California Judges Association (to the prior version of the bill)
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):