AB 1584: Electricity: cost allocation.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-10-02
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Oct 2, 2019 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 397, Statutes of 2019. |
| Oct 2, 2019 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 23, 2019 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3:30 p.m. |
| Sep 10, 2019 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. May be considered on or after September 8 pursuant to Assembly Rule 77. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Aug 20, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 19, 2019 | From committee: Be ordered to second reading pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8. |
| Aug 13, 2019 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Aug 12, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (July 2). |
| Jun 25, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on E., U. & C. |
| Jun 11, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| May 29, 2019 | Referred to Com. on E., U. & C. |
| May 23, 2019 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 22, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 16, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 15, 2019 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 16. Noes 0.) (May 15). |
| May 13, 2019 | Joint Rule 62(a), file notice suspended. (Page 1609.) |
| May 8, 2019 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| May 2, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| May 1, 2019 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 30, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 14. Noes 0.) (April 24). |
| Mar 26, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Mar 25, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on U. & E. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 14, 2019 | Referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Feb 25, 2019 | Read first time. |
| Feb 23, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 25. |
| Feb 22, 2019 | Introduced. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Sep 10, 2019 | AB 1584 Quirk Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Sep 6, 2019 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB1584 Quirk By Hertzberg | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Jul 2, 2019 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications |
Passed |
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| May 22, 2019 | AB 1584 Quirk Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| May 15, 2019 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Apr 24, 2019 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Utilities and Energy |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1584
Author:(Quirk)
As Amended Ver:August 13, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
This bill requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to develop and apply methodologies for allocating electrical system energy procurement needs to each load-serving entity (LSE) based on the contribution of that entity's load and resource portfolio to the electrical system conditions that created the need for the integration resource procurement.
The Senate Amendments:
Mandates the CPUC to develop and use methodologies for determining any costs resulting from a failure of a LSE to satisfy its allocation of those procurement needs. Those needs and cost shall be limited to the LSEs subject to the jurisdiction of the CPUC resource adequacy and integrated resource planning requirements. Defines electrical system integration resources to mean resources that provide certain electrical system integration functions benefits, or attributes, such as flexible ramping capability.
COMMENTS:
Ensuring that each LSE (investor owned utility, community choice aggregator and energy service provider) is collectively meeting their customer and overall system needs is of significant importance to the state. Procurement portfolios indicate that LSE's future procurement is not leveraging the potential benefits of renewable diversity in location and fuel source. Renewables Portfolio Standard goals are based on kilowatt-hours – the utilities and other LSEs are required to procure a percentage of kilowatt hours delivered which is stated as retail sales, although the program has always-required procurement to be based on "least-cost/best-fit." The CAISO has projected that in certain periods of the year, electricity demand will increase between 15,000 to 20,000 megawatts over three hours during sunset. Compounding the increasing complexity in operating the system with an increasing amount of solar, is the fact that there were several days in 2018 when solar generation's maximum production was less than 20% of its installed capacity.
This bill attempts to address the need to ensure each LSE is procuring a balanced portfolio of resources to meet the collective system demand and reliability needs. Each LSE's portfolio is assessed by the CPUC to determine if it contains the generation attributes needed to maintain electric system reliability. Under this measure, to the extent the LSE did not procure a balanced portfolio they would be assessed for the additional energy procurement and assume the associated cost. Currently, deficiencies are allocated across each LSE, regardless of their individual contributions to the integration shortfall. According to the CPUC, this authority is already available to the CPUC. However, because of the CPUC's unwillingness to allocate costs in such a manner, legislation could be warranted to require this allocation approach.
According to the Author:
"The electricity market has become increasingly fragmented, with more than 40 CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entities (LSEs) in operation, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), community choice aggregators (CCAs), and electric service providers (ESPs). By 2021, all LSEs must have 65% of their renewable resources under long-term contract. Portfolios that are not carefully balanced will impose indirect costs on the shared electrical system.
To the extent that the CPUC does not or is not able to require all LSE portfolios to conform to a system-wide optimal portfolio, California could end up with an overall resource portfolio that drives up system operation costs, which will ultimately be charged to all customers. In addition, to the extent that system balancing resources are gas-fired, they will increase California's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions."
Arguments in Support:
Southern California Edison (SCE): "SCE supports system-wide cooperation to ensure safe, clean, reliable, and affordable electric service for all customers. Developing a methodology to assign costs to LSEs according to the use of integration resources on the California Independent System Operator's (CAISO) system will encourage LSEs to factor those costs into their procurement decisions. This bill will spur LSEs to make more prudent procurement decisions that consider the health of the entire electric system and discourage them from depending on the CAISO's system when more economic procurement choices are available."
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the Large Scale Solar and the Solar Energy Industries Association: "AB 1584 may undermine CPUC policies on electric Resource Adequacy (RA). The CPUC is currently implementing a three-year ahead procurement paradigm for RA requirements on LSEs. This proposed methodology could force a change to the RA requirements for LSEs to align with an annually-accounted methodology. It is unclear how this would impact the emerging procurement paradigm and we are concerned that introducing an untested approach to a newly implementing practice could further confuse the market and participants. Further, we're concerned that a mis-match between this methodology and the procurement requirements may unintentionally result in inappropriate cost-shifting in the long-term."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to Assembly Appropriations: Negligible costs to the CPUC. This is because the CPUC already has authority, and obligation, to allocate to an LSE the system integration costs and costs associated with the LSE's failure to meet procurement obligations.
VOTES:
ASM UTILITIES AND ENERGY: 14-0-1
YES: Holden, Patterson, Burke, Carrillo, Chen, Cunningham, Eggman, Cristina Garcia, Rodriguez, Mayes, Quirk, Reyes, Santiago, Ting
ABS, ABST OR NV: Muratsuchi
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 16-0-2
YES: Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Diep, Eggman, Fong, Gabriel, Maienschein, Obernolte, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Brough, Eduardo Garcia
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 77-0-3
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Dahle, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Obernolte, Patterson, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Cooley, Eduardo Garcia, Muratsuchi
SENATE FLOOR: 34-0-6
YES: Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Borgeas, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Lena Gonzalez, Grove, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Morrell, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Stone, Umberg, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Allen, Glazer, Jones, Skinner, Stern, Wieckowski
UPDATED:
VERSION: August 13, 2019
CONSULTANT: Mary McDonald / U. & E. / 916-319-2083 FN: 0002189
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1584 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1584
Amended: 8/13/19 in Senate
SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 11-0, 7/2/19
AYES: Hueso, Moorlach, Bradford, Hertzberg, Hill, McGuire, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Stone, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Chang, Dodd
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 77-0, 5/22/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Electricity: cost allocation
SOURCE: California Wind Energy Association
DIGEST:
This bill requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to develop and apply methodologies for allocating electrical system energy procurement needs to each load-serving entity (LSE) based on the contribution of that entity’s load and resource portfolio to the electrical system conditions that created the need for the integration resource procurement.
Existing law:
- Requires the CPUC, in consultation with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), to establish resource adequacy requirements for electrical corporations, electric service providers (ESPs), and community choice aggregators (CCAs), known collectively as LSEs, to ensure the reliability of electric service in the state while advancing, to the extent possible, the state’s goals for clean energy, reducing air pollution, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the CPUC to identify a diverse and balanced portfolio of resources needed to ensure a reliable electricity supply that provides optimal integration of renewable energy in a cost-effective manner. The portfolio shall rely upon zero carbon-emitting resources to the maximum extent reasonable and be designed to achieve any statewide GHG emissions limits. Directs each electrical corporations to include in their procurement plans a strategy for procuring best fit and least cost generation which satisfies the CPUC’s portfolio. Permits CCAs to submit their plan for satisfying their portion of the renewable integration needs identified in the CPUC’s portfolio or achievement of the state’s energy policy. Ensures that all costs resulting from nonperformance shall be borne by electrical corporation or CCA that failed to perform. (Public Utilities Code §454.51)
- Requires the CPUC to adopt a process for each LSE to file an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) to ensure each entity meets the following: (a) GHG emissions reduction targets for the electricity sector, (b) the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), and (c) other goals and obligations. Requires each LSE to submit an IRP to the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §454.52)
- Directs the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the CPUC, where feasible, to authorize procurement of resources to provide grid reliability services that minimize reliance on system power and fossil fuel resources and, where feasible, cost effective, and consistent with other state policy objectives, increase the use of large- and small-scale energy storage. (Public Utilities Code §400).
- Requires the California Air Resources Board (ARB) to ensure that statewide GHG emissions are reduced to at least 40 percent below the 1990 statewide GHG emissions level no later than December 31, 2030. (Health and Safety Code §38566).
- Requires electric utilities to procure 60 percent of their retail sales of electricity from renewable energy by 2030. This is known as the RPS. (Public Utilities Code §399.11 et seq.).
This bill:
- Requires the CPUC to develop and use methodologies for allocating electrical system integration resource procurement needs to each LSE based on the contribution of that entity’s load and resource portfolio to the electrical system conditions that created the need for the procurement.
- Requires the CPUC to develop and use methodologies for determining any costs resulting from a failure of a LSE to satisfy its allocation of those procurement needs.
Background
Load-serving Entities (LSEs): IOUs, ESPs and CCAs. Several types of entities provide electricity service in California. Historically, the main distinction between electricity providers has been whether they are a municipal utility, rural cooperative, or an investor-owned utility (IOU). Which entity provides service to your home or businesses largely depends on the location of the home or business. For example, if you live in the City of Los Angeles, the municipal utility, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, provides electricity service. However, if you live in East Los Angeles, just a block away from the city limits, the community is served by an IOU, namely Southern California Edison (SCE). In more recent years, there has been a growth in additional LSEs within the service territory of the IOU.
- IOUs: privately owned electrical corporations, such as Southern California Edison (SCE), that provide monopoly electric utility services in distinct, defined geographic territories. In addition to providing the distribution and transmission, and customer billing services, IOUs have historically provided the energy supply. IOUs are rate-regulated by the CPUC to ensure they provide service at a just and reasonable rate. IOUs also have an obligation to serve to all customers, any customers not served by ESPs or CCAs must, generally, be served by the IOU who serves as the provider of las resort.
- ESPs: also known as direct access (DA) providers, provide electricity to end-use customers who choose the services of the ESP instead of the incumbent IOU or a CCA. An ESP uses the transmission and distribution infrastructure of the IOU to deliver electricity to the customer. ESP customers are generally large commercial customers (such as a university or large corporation) who wish to manage their own energy procurement decisions. ESP customers retain the option to return to the service of the incumbent IOU or to a CCA, if a CCA offers services in their area.
- CCAs: entities, such as MCE and Sonoma Clean Power, where local governments (either cities or counties) elect to buy or generate electricity on behalf of local residents and businesses while using the incumbent IOU’s transmission and distribution infrastructure. An individual customer within the territory of a CCA is generally automatically opted-in to receive electric service from the CCA when the customer’s local government elects to join the CCA. However, the customer retains the option to return to the service of the incumbent IOU. Customers, especially commercial customers, may also have the option to be served by an ESP, where ESP services are available.
Growth of LSEs. The combined procurement between CCA and DA service is anticipated to represent the majority (potentially 85 percent) of the customer load served in the IOU service territory in the coming decade or so. Although the growth of these LSEs is unequal across the state, among IOU service territories, and within IOU service territories.
SB 350 IRP. SB 350 (De León, Chapter 547, Statutes of 2015) established new targets to increase retail sales of renewable electricity to 50 percent by 2030. Subsequently SB 100 (De León, Chapter 312, Statutes of 2018) accelerated the goal to 60 percent by 2030. SB 350 also required each LSE—meaning an IOU, ESP, or CCA—to file a biennial IRP for approval or certification by the CPUC. The CPUC would then combine all LSEs’ IRPs to ensure the state was on its path to meet the SB 350 goals, including GHG reductions and procurement of at least 50 percent of renewable resources by the year 2030.
CPUC IRP Decision. The CPUC has finalized the first two-year IRP cycle. The findings from the first IRP two-year cycle provides a sense of how LSEs are participating in the process and what potential adjustments may be needed to ensure the state remains on track to achieve its energy procurement-related goals. While recognizing that the first IRP cycle was a learning opportunity for LSEs and the CPUC, the exercise did surface a number of issues, including that the individual resource choices by the LSEs collectively did not result in a diverse and balanced portfolio of resources needed to ensure sufficiently reliable or environmentally beneficial statewide electricity resource portfolio. Additionally, it was often difficult for the CPUC to distinguish between an LSE’s plan for a resource that is aspirational and one that has an executed contract. The CPUC also declined to certify 19 IRPs and required those LSE’s to re-file with the information missing from their plan – generally information about criteria pollution.
CPUC IRP procurement track. In furthering the IRP process, the CPUC has initiated the “procurement track” of the IRP proceeding. In the ruling, the CPUC has identified two broad categories: backstop or backup procurement mechanism and those resources that may require collective action to bring to fruition (such as large facilities or new type of resources). The CPUC proposal states “the need to address near- and medium-term renewable integration and reliability resources as a type most in need of the CPUC’s immediate attention.” The CPUC has outlined a timeline to provide for public comments with the goal of initiating these procurement activities by late 2019 or early 2020. Additionally, CPUC intends to address long-term reliability needs with a proposed decision in late 2020 or early 2021. With regards to the near- and medium-term reliability issues, the CPUC is proposing to address concerns for a tightened bilateral market due to retirement of gas power plants in response to the once-through-cooling regulations and declining values of solar energy to count towards the LSE’s resource adequacy requirements in August and September. The CPUC has proposed to require all LSEs to procure a proportional share of a total of 2,000 megawatts (MW) new peak capacity statewide to come on line by August 1, 2021 and require SCE to solicit for 500 MW of capacity from existing resources that are without a contract past 2021 to be procured as part of a medium-term contract (two-five years). The cost of the contract would be allocated using the cost-allocation mechanism (CAM) a regulatory process for allocating capacity costs of utility procurement across all benefitting customers. In the IRP procurement proposal, the CPUC is proposing to have those costs allocated to all LSEs with resource adequacy (RA) requirements, not just those in SCE service territory.
Flexible resource adequacy. An interim flexible capacity requirement was implemented in 2015 to address ramping needs associated with integration of variable energy resources. The interim product is the largest three-hour net load ramp of the month plus 3.5 percent of peak load. Resources are counted as flexible RA capacity if they can be economically dispatched to ramp up or sustain output for three hours. Each year, the CAISO conducts a Flexible Capacity Needs Assessment to determine the quantity of economically dispatched capacity needed by CAISO to manage grid reliability during the largest three-hour continuous ramp in each month. The study is submitted to the CPUC. Flexible requirements are allocated once annually and then revised in April, alongside the local RA requirements. While intended to be in place for only three years, according to the CPUC, the efforts to develop a durable flexible product have proven challenging with parties failing to reach consensus on the key elements of what should constitute the flexible product.
Comments
Duck Curve - need for integration of renewables. Ensuring that each LSE is collectively meeting their customer and system needs is of significant importance to the state. Procurement portfolios indicate that LSE’s future procurement is not leveraging the potential benefits of renewable diversity in location and fuel source. RPS goals are based on kilowatt hours – the utilities and other LSEs are required to procure a percentage of kilowatt hours delivered which is stated as retail sales, although the program has always required procurement to be based on “least-cost/best-fit.” The challenges of planning for best fit has significantly contributed to the duck curve - which reflects the high amount of solar resources in the middle of the day coupled with a decline of solar in the afternoon as the sun goes down, and high demand for electricity in the evening. The CAISO’s projections of a 15,000 to 20,000 MW three hour increase in generation demand during sunset. Additionally, there were several days in 2018 when solar generation’s maximum production was less than 20 percent of its installed capacity.
AB 1584. This bill attempts to address the need to ensure each LSE is procuring a balanced portfolio of resources by requiring the CPUC to allocate costs of generation based on the energy resource diversity of each LSE’s portfolio and to what extent each LSE’s portfolio contributed to the need for additional procurement to integrate resources, instead of allocating costs across each LSE, regardless of their individual contributions to the integration shortfall. According to the CPUC, this authority is already available to the CPUC. However, the sponsors of this bill cite the unwillingness of the CPUC to utilize such a mechanism when requiring new procurement. The sponsor wishes to have the CPUC adjust the cost allocation to be based on the shortfall of each LSE to meet its customer’s energy supply needs, utilizing a causation-based allocation methodology currently employed by the CAISO to allocate flexible resource adequacy capacity requirements. Such a proposal is intended to provide the proper incentives for each LSE to procure a diverse set of resources, rather than rely only on intermittent renewable resources which may exacerbate an imbalance in the electricity market. Opponents of this proposal raise concerns that such an approach is likely to limit the ability of LSEs to procure the resources of their choice. Assuming the costs allocated with these resources are significant, it may result in reduced financial ability for the LSE to procure other resources. Nonetheless, several of the opponents agree the CPUC’s existing authority allows for such an approach. However, they would prefer to have this addressed within the existing IRP process or resource adequacy proceedings. They may be correct, the CPUC action would be a preferred approach. However, the CPUC’s unwillingness to allocate costs in such a manner, including in the proposed IRP procurement track ruling may merit legislation to require them to consider this allocation approach.
Related/Prior Legislation
SB 155 (Bradford, 2019) makes specified requirements concerning the plans for energy procurement by entities within the jurisdiction of the CPUC. The bill is pending consideration by the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
SB 100 (De León, Chapter 312, Statutes of 2018) established the 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2017 which increases the RPS requirement from 50 percent by 2030 to 60 percent, and created the policy of planning to meet all of the state's retail electricity supply with a mix of RPS-eligible and zero-carbon resources by December 31, 2045, for a total of 100 percent clean energy.
SB 1136 (Hertzberg, Chapter 851, Statutes of 2018) revised existing statute that requires the CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, to establish RA requirements for the state’s electric LSEs.
SB 338 (Skinner, Chapter 92, Statutes of 2017) required the consideration of meeting net-load peak energy and reliability needs with specified resources as part of the IRP.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
California Wind Energy Association (source)
California Biomass Energy Alliance
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Southern California Edison
The Utility Reform Network
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/20/19)
350 Bay Area Action
California Alliance for Community Energy
Indivisible California Green Team
Large-scale Solar Association
Local Clean Energy Alliance
Muni-Fed Energy
Récolte Energy
San Diego 350
San José Community Energy Advocates
Solana Energy Alliance
Solar Energy Industries Association
Sustaenable
Sustainable Marin
Sustainable Novato
The Climate Reality Project
35 Individuals
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
The electricity market has become increasingly fragmented, with more than 40 CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entities (LSEs) in operation, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), community choice aggregators (CCAs), and electric service providers (ESPs). By 2021, all LSEs must have 65% of their renewable resources under long-term contract. Portfolios that are not carefully balanced will impose indirect costs on the shared electrical system.
To the extent that the CPUC does not or is not able to require all LSE portfolios to conform to a system-wide optimal portfolio, California could end up with an overall resource portfolio that drives up system operation costs, which will ultimately be charged to all customers. In addition, to the extent that system balancing resources are gas-fired, they will increase California’s GHG emissions.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: Those in opposition to this bill raise several concerns about the extent that this bill may hamstring community choice programs and limit decision-making by local governments to address the particular needs of their own customers and communities. Those opposed also suggest this bill may be premature, in light of the active IRP procurement track. The Large-scale Solar Association also raises concerns that the bill will hinder the state’s efforts to achieve its greenhouse gas reductions goals, particularly by impacting CCA’s energy procurement.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 77-0, 5/22/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Dahle, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Nazarian, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Patterson, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cooley, Eduardo Garcia, Muratsuchi
Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U., & C. / (916) 651-4107
8/21/19 14:34:42
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Senator Ben Hueso, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: AB 1584 Hearing Date: 7/2/2019
Author: | Quirk | ||
Version: | 6/25/2019 As Amended | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | Nidia Bautista | ||
SUBJECT: Electricity: cost allocation
DIGEST: This bill would require the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to develop and use methodologies for allocating electrical system integration resource procurement needs to each load-serving entity (LSE) based on the contribution of that entity’s load and resource portfolio to the electrical system conditions that created the need for the procurement.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Requires the CPUC, in consultation with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), to establish resource adequacy requirements for electrical corporations, electric service providers (ESPs), and community choice aggregators (CCAs), known collectively as LSEs, to ensure the reliability of electric service in the state while advancing, to the extent possible, the state’s goals for clean energy, reducing air pollution, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the CPUC to identify a diverse and balanced portfolio of resources needed to ensure a reliable electricity supply that provides optimal integration of renewable energy in a cost-effective manner. The portfolio shall rely upon zero carbon-emitting resources to the maximum extent reasonable and be designed to achieve any statewide GHG emissions limits. Directs each electrical corporations to include in their procurement plans a strategy for procuring best fit and least cost generation which satisfies the CPUC’s portfolio. Permits CCAs to submit their plan for satisfying their portion of the renewable integration needs identified in the CPUC’s portfolio or achievement of the state’s energy policy. Ensures that all costs resulting from nonperformance shall be borne by electrical corporation or CCA that failed to perform. (Public Utilities Code §454.51)
- Requires the CPUC to adopt a process for each LSE to file an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) to ensure each entity meets the following: (a) GHG emissions reduction targets for the electricity sector, (b) the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), and (c) other goals and obligations. Requires each LSE to submit an IRP to the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §454.52)
- Directs the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the CPUC, where feasible, to authorize procurement of resources to provide grid reliability services that minimize reliance on system power and fossil fuel resources and, where feasible, cost effective, and consistent with other state policy objectives, increase the use of large- and small-scale energy storage. (Public Utilities Code §400).
- Requires the California Air Resources Board (ARB) to ensure that statewide GHG emissions are reduced to at least 40 percent below the 1990 statewide GHG emissions level no later than December 31, 2030. (Health and Safety Code §38566).
- Requires electric utilities to procure 60 percent of their retail sales of electricity from renewable energy by 2030. This is known as the RPS. (Public Utilities Code §399.11 et seq.).
This bill:
- Requires the CPUC to develop and use methodologies for allocating electrical system integration resource procurement needs to each LSE based on the contribution of that entity’s load and resource portfolio to the electrical system conditions that created the need for the procurement.
- Requires the CPUC to develop and use methodologies for determining any costs resulting from a failure of a LSE to satisfy its allocation of those procurement needs.
Background
Load-serving Entities: IOUs, ESPs and CCAs. Several types of entities provide electricity service in California. Historically, the main distinction between electricity providers has been whether they are a municipal utility, rural cooperative, or an investor-owned utility (IOU). Who provides service to your home or businesses largely depends on the location of the home or business. For example, if you live in Los Angeles City, the municipal utility, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, provides electricity service, but if you live in East Los Angeles, just a block away from the city limits, the community is served by an IOU. In more recent years, there has been a growth in additional electricity providers within the service territory of the IOU. These entities are referred to in statute as LSEs and also provide electric service within the service territory of the IOU, although the IOU continues to provide distribution, transmission, and billing services to all customers in their service territory. These LSEs include:
- IOUs: privately owned electrical corporations, such as Southern California Edison (SCE), that provide monopoly electric utility services in distinct, defined geographic territories. In addition to providing the distribution and transmission, and billing services, IOUs have historically provided the energy supply. IOUs are rate-regulated by the CPUC to ensure they provide service at a just and reasonable rate. IOUs also have an obligation to serve to all customers, any customers not served by ESPs or CCAs must, generally, be served by the IOU.
- ESPs: also known as direct access (DA) providers, provide electricity to end-use customers who choose the services of the ESP instead of the incumbent IOU or a CCA. An ESP uses the transmission and distribution infrastructure of the IOU to deliver electricity to the customer. ESP customers are generally large commercial customers (such as a university or large corporation) who wish to manage their own energy procurement decisions. ESP customers retain the option to return to the service of the incumbent IOU or to a CCA, if a CCA offers services in their area.
- CCAs: entities, such as MCE and Sonoma Clean Power, where local governments (either cities or counties) elect to buy or generate electricity on behalf of local residents while using the incumbent IOU’s transmission and distribution infrastructure. An individual customer within the territory of a CCA is generally automatically opted-in to receive electric service from the CCA when the customer’s local government elects to join the CCA. However, the customer retains the option to return to the service of the incumbent IOU. Customers, especially commercial customers, can opt to be served by an ESP, where ESP services are allowed.
Growth of LSEs. The combined procurement between CCA and DA service is anticipated to represent the majority (potentially 85 percent) of the customer load served in the IOU service territory in the coming decade or so.
Growth of CCAs. While IOUs have existed for nearly a century, CCAs are a more recent entity. In 2002, statute first allowed the formation of CCAs. It was not until nearly a decade later that the first CCA—Marin Clean Energy—came into existence. Today, there are 19 CCAs operating in the state with a dozen more communities exploring the formation of a CCA. CCA growth is likely to cover substantial portions of the service territories of the state’s three largest IOUs.
Growth of ESPs. Last year, the Legislature passed and the governor signed SB 237 (Hertzberg, Chapter 600, Statutes of 2018) which increased the limit of the DA program by 4,000 gigawatt hours for non-residential customers. The bill also directs the CPUC to provide recommendations to the Legislature by June 2020 on the adoption and implementation of a second DA program reopening. The opening of the DA cap creates some additional competition, as well as, uncertainty for the incumbent utility and the CCAs serving energy load that might migrate to an ESP.
SB 350 IRP. SB 350 (De León, Chapter 547, Statutes of 2015) established new targets to increase retail sales of renewable electricity to 50 percent by 2030. Subsequently SB 100 (De León, Chapter 312, Statutes of 2018) accelerated the goal to 60 percent by 2030. SB 350 also required each LSE—meaning an IOU, ESP, or CCA—to file a biennial IRP for approval or certification by the CPUC. The CPUC would then combine all LSEs’ IRPs to ensure the state was on its path to meet the SB 350 goals, including GHG reductions and procurement of at least 50 percent of renewable resources by the year 2030.
CPUC IRP Decision. The CPUC has finalized the first two-year IRP cycle. The findings from the first IRP two-year cycle provides a sense of how LSEs are participating in the process and what potential adjustments may be needed to ensure the state remains on track to achieve its energy procurement-related goals. While recognizing that the first IRP cycle was a learning opportunity for LSEs and the CPUC, the exercise did surface a number of issues, including that the individual resource choices by the LSEs collectively did not result in a diverse and balanced portfolio of resources needed to ensure sufficiently reliable or environmentally beneficial statewide electricity resource portfolio. Additionally, it was often difficult for the CPUC to distinguish between an LSE’s plan for a resource that is aspirational and one that has an executed contract. The CPUC also declined to certify 19 IRPs and required those LSE’s to re-file with the information missing from their plan – generally information about criteria pollution.
CPUC IRP procurement track. In furthering the IRP process, the CPUC has initiated the “procurement track” of the IRP proceeding. In the ruling, the CPUC has identified two broad categories: backstop or backup procurement mechanism and those resources that may require collective action to bring to fruition (such as large facilities or new type of resources). The CPUC proposal states “the need to address near- and medium-term renewable integration and reliability resources as a type most in need of the CPUC’s immediate attention.” The CPUC has outlined a timeline to provide for public comments with the goal of initiating these procurement activities by late 2019 or early 2020. Additionally, CPUC intends to address long-term reliability needs with a proposed decision in late 2020 or early 2021. With regards to the near- medium-term reliability issues, the CPUC is proposing to address concerns for a tightened bilateral market due to retirement of gas power plants in response to the once-through-cooling regulations and declining values of solar energy to count towards the LSE’s resource adequacy requirements in August and September. The CPUC is proposing to require all LSEs to procure a proportional share of a total of 2,000 megawatts (MW) new peak capacity statewide to come on line by August 1, 2021 and require SCE to solicit for 500 MW of capacity from existing resources that are without a contract past 2021 to be procured as part of a medium-term contract (two-five years). The cost of the contract would be allocated using the cost-allocation mechanism (CAM).
CAM. The CAM is a regulatory process for allocating capacity costs of utility procurement across all benefitting customers. Conceived in a 2004 decision, adopted in a 2006 decision, affected by changes in law, and continuing to be adapted to new issues and circumstances even in 2014. The CAM is a fixture of the CPUC’s Long-Term Procurement policy and is based on the principle that the costs and benefits of new generation should be shared by all benefitting customers in an IOU’s service territory. In the IRP procurement proposal, the CPUC is proposing to have those costs allocated to all LSEs with resource adequacy (RA) requirements, not just those in SCE service territory.
Flexible resource adequacy. An interim flexible capacity requirement was implemented in 2015 to address ramping needs associated with integration of variable energy resources. The interim product is the largest three-hour net load ramp of the month plus 3.5 percent of peak load. Resources are counted as flexible RA capacity if they can be economically dispatched to ramp up or sustain output for three hours. Each year, the CAISO conducts a Flexible Capacity Needs Assessment to determine the quantity of economically dispatched capacity needed by CAISO to manage grid reliability during the largest three-hour continuous ramp in each month. The study is submitted to the CPUC. Flexible requirements are allocated once annually and then revised in April, alongside the local RA requirements. While intended to be in place for only three years, according to the CPUC, the efforts to develop a durable flexible product have proven challenging with parties failing to reach consensus on the key elements of what should constitute the flexible product.
Comments
Need for integration of renewables. Ensuring that each LSE is collectively meeting their customer and system needs is of significant importance to the state. Procurement portfolios indicate that LSE’s future procurement is not leveraging the potential benefits of renewable diversity in location and fuel source. RPS goals are based on kilowatt hours – the utilities and other LSEs are required to procure a percentage of kilowatt hours delivered which is stated as retail sales, although the program has always required procurement to be based on “least-cost/best-fit.” The challenges of planning for best fit has significantly contributed to the duck curve - which reflects the high amount of solar resources in the middle of the day coupled with a decline of solar in the afternoon as the sun goes down, and high demand for electricity in the evening. The CAISO’s projections of a 15,000 to 20,000 MW three hour increase in generation demand during sunset. Also important, to factor in that there were several days in 2018 when solar’s maximum production was less than 20 percent of its installed capacity.
AB 1584. This bill attempts to address the need to ensure each LSE is procuring a balanced portfolio of resources by requiring the CPUC to allocate costs of generation based on each LSE’s diverse portfolio and to what extent each LSE’s portfolio contributed to that need, instead of allocating costs across each LSE, regardless of their individual contributions to the integration shortfall. According to the CPUC, this authority is already available to the CPUC. However, the sponsors of this bill cite the unwillingness of the CPUC to utilize such a mechanism when requiring new procurement. The sponsor wishes to have the CPUC adjust the cost allocation to be based on the shortfall of each LSE to meet its customers energy supply needs, utilizing a causation-based allocation methodology currently employed by the CAISO to allocate flexible resource adequacy capacity requirements. Such a proposal is intended to provide the proper incentives for each LSE to procure a diverse set of resources, rather than rely only on intermittent renewable resources which may exacerbate an imbalance in the electricity market. Opponents of this proposal raise concerns that such an approach is likely to limit the ability of LSEs to procure the resources of their choice. Assuming the costs allocated with these resources are significant, it may result in reduced financial ability for the LSE to procure other resources. Nonetheless, several of the opponents agree the CPUC’s existing authority allows for such an approach. However, they would prefer to have this addressed within the existing IRP process or resource adequacy proceedings. They may be correct, the CPUC action would be a preferred approach. However, the CPUC’s unwillingness to allocate costs in such a manner, including in the proposed IRP procurement track ruling may merit legislation to require them to consider this allocation approach.
Need for amendments. The Large-scale Solar Industry raises several concerns, including that the language in this bill “curtailment mitigation capability” is undefined and introduces a new term. As such, the author and committee may wish to strike that term from this bill so as to not unnecessarily confuse the issue.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 155 (Bradford, 2019) makes specified requirements concerning the plans for energy procurement by entities within the jurisdiction of the CPUC. The bill is scheduled to be heard by the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources.
SB 1136 (Hertzberg, Chapter 851, Statutes of 2018) revised existing statute that requires the CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, to establish RA requirements for the state’s electric LSEs.
SB 338 (Skinner, Chapter 92, Statutes of 2017) required the consideration of meeting net-load peak energy and reliability needs with specified resources as part of the IRP.
SB 100 (De León, Chapter 312, Statutes of 2018) established the 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2017 which increases the RPS requirement from 50 percent by 2030 to 60 percent, and creates the policy of planning to meet all of the state's retail electricity supply with a mix of RPS-eligible and zero-carbon resources by December 31, 2045, for a total of 100 percent clean energy.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
SUPPORT:
California Wind Energy Association (Sponsor)
California Biomass Energy Alliance
Southern California Edison
The Utility Reform Network
OPPOSITION:
350 Bay Area Action
California Alliance for Community Energy
Indivisible California Green Team
Large-scale Solar Association
Local Clean Energy Alliance
Muni-Fed Energy
Récolte Energy
San Diego 350
San Jose Community Energy Advocates
Solana Energy Alliance
Solar Energy Industries Association
Sustaenable
Sustainable Marin
Sustainable Novato
The Climate Reality Project
25 Individuals
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
The electricity market has become increasingly fragmented, with more than 40 CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entities (LSEs) in operation, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), community choice aggregators (CCAs), and electric service providers (ESPs). By 2021, all LSEs must have 65% of their renewable resources under long-term contract. Portfolios that are not carefully balanced will impose indirect costs on the shared electrical system.
To the extent that the CPUC does not or is not able to require all LSE portfolios to conform to a system-wide optimal portfolio, California could end up with an overall resource portfolio that drives up system operation costs, which will ultimately be charged to all customers. In addition, to the extent that system balancing resources are gas-fired, they will increase California’s GHG emissions.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: Those in opposition to this bill raise several concerns about the extent that this bill may hamstring community choice programs and limit decision-making by local governments to address the particular needs of their own customers and communities. Those opposed also suggest this bill may be premature, in light of the active IRP procurement track. The Large-scale Solar Association also raises concerns that the bill will hinder the state’s efforts to achieve its greenhouse gas reductions goals, particularly by impacting CCA’s energy procurement.
-- END --
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1584
Author:(Quirk)
As Amended Ver:May 1, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
This bill directs the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to develop methodologies to use in allocating system integration resources procurement obligations and any associated cost.
Major Provisions
This bill mandates the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to develop methodologies to use in allocating system integration resources procurement obligations and any associated cost resulting from a failure of a load-serving entity (LSE) to meet its procurement obligations.
COMMENTS:
This measure provides the CPUC with guidance in the implementation of its existing authority as it relates to load serving entities (LSE) resource procurement. Statutes empower the CPUC to require every LSE (electrical corporation, electric service provider (ESP) and community choice aggregator (CCA)) to maintain physical generating capacity and electrical demand response adequate to meet its load requirements. Notably, statute authorizes the CPUC to enforce resource adequacy requirements on all LSEs. Similarly, statute directs each LSE to prepare and file an integrated resource plan (IRP) on a time schedule directed by the CPUC and subject to CPUC review. Statute provides the CPUC full authority over the IRP of an electrical corporation and directs the CPUC to certify the IRP of a CCA, provided the IRP meets certain requirements, including the resource adequacy requirements described above.
This bill, therefore, does not provide the CPUC with authority not already given to it by existing statute it provides. However, the measures does provide the CPUC with clarity and direction as it implements its existing authorities in the area of procurement obligations.
According to the Author:
"The electricity market has become increasingly fragmented, with more than 40 CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entities (LSEs) in operation, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), community choice aggregators (CCAs), and electric service providers (ESPs). By 2021, all LSEs must have 65% of their renewable resources under long-term contract. Portfolios that are not carefully balanced will impose indirect costs on the shared electrical system.
For example, LSEs may not match their energy purchases to their customer load profiles, leaving to the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) with the responsibility of ensuring that sufficient system resources are available to serve load.
To the extent that the CPUC does not or is not able to require all LSE portfolios to conform to a system-wide optimal portfolio, California could end up with a consolidation of resource portfolios that drives up system operation costs, which will ultimately be charged to customers. In addition, to the extent that system balancing resources are gas-fired, they will increase California's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
AB 1584 requires LSEs to pay for the indirect costs that their portfolios impose on the electric system to serve their customer loads will send price signals that will encourage LSEs to minimize necessary system integration resources by planning well-balanced portfolios that meet their customer loads."
Arguments in Support:
According to the California Wind Energy Association: "By charging needed integration resources, LSEs will be encouraged to assemble resource portfolios that match their customer loads as closely as possible, thereby minimizing the need for system integration resources in the first place. In turn, this will reduce the indirect system costs associated with meeting California's clean energy goals. Further, any investments made in system integration resources will go further in ensuring system reliability as California increases its reliance on variable renewable energy resources
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the California Community Choice Aggregators: "The CPUC's IRP proceeding is still actively under way pursuant to SB 350, with initial LSE plans having been filed in 2018. The CPUC continues to refine its modeling efforts and is considering.
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to Assembly Appropriations Committee: "Negligible costs to the CPUC. This is because the CPUC already has authority, and obligation, to allocate to an LSE the system integration costs and costs associated with the LSE's failure to meet procurement obligations. By necessity, the CPUC uses methodologies to determine and allocate those costs. This bill directs the CPUCs' development of such methodologies, but it does not create the need to develop the methodologies or to apply them."
VOTES:
ASM UTILITIES AND ENERGY: 14-0-1
YES: Holden, Patterson, Burke, Carrillo, Chen, Cunningham, Eggman, Cristina Garcia, Rodriguez, Mayes, Quirk, Reyes, Santiago, Ting
ABS, ABST OR NV: Muratsuchi
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 16-0-2
YES: Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Diep, Eggman, Fong, Gabriel, Maienschein, Obernolte, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Brough, Eduardo Garcia
UPDATED:
VERSION: May 1, 2019
CONSULTANT: Mary McDonald / U. & E. / (916)319-2083 FN: 0000467
Date of Hearing: May 16, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1584
Author:(Quirk) – As Amended Ver:May 1, 2019
Policy Committee: | Utilities and Energy | Vote: | 14 - 0 |
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| ||
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill directs the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to develop methodologies to use in allocating system integration resources procurement obligations and any associated cost resulting from a failure of a load-serving entity (LSE) to meet its procurement obligations.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Negligible costs to the CPUC. This is because the CPUC already has authority, and obligation, to allocate to an LSE the system integration costs and costs associated with the LSE’s failure to meet procurement obligations. By necessity, the CPUC uses methodologies to determine and allocate those costs. This bill directs the CPUCs’ development of such methodologies, but it does not create the need to develop the methodologies or to apply them.
COMMENTS:
Existing statute gives the CPUC authority to require procurement of LSEs. For example, statute empowers the CPUC to require every electrical corporation, electric service provider (ESP) and community choice aggregator (CCA) to maintain physical generating capacity and electrical demand response adequate to meet its load requirements, as determined by the CPUC, in consultation with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). Notably, statute authorizes the CPUC to enforce these resource adequacy requirements on all LSEs. Similarly, statute directs each LSE to prepare and file an integrated resource plan (IRP) on a time schedule directed by the CPUC and subject to CPUC review. Statute provides the CPUC full authority over the IRP of an electrical corporation and directs the CPUC to certify the IRP of a CCA, provided the IRP meets certain requirements, including the resource adequacy requirements described above.
This bill, therefore, does not provide the CPUC with authority not already given to it by existing statute. Rather, it adds detail to how the CPUC is to implement its existing statutory authority. The author describes the situation that compelled him to introduce this bill as follows:
To the extent that the CPUC does not or is not able to require all LSE portfolios to conform to a system-wide optimal portfolio, California could end up with a consolidation of resource portfolios that drives up system operation costs, which will ultimately be charged to customers. In addition, to the extent that system balancing resources are gas-fired, they will increase California’s GHG emissions.
Similarly, bill proponents contend it is important the CPUC allocate to an LSE the system integration costs that result from the LSE’s procurement choices, including the inadequacy of those choices.
The bill is opposed by the California Community Choice Association (Cal CCA), who contends it interferes with, and potentially disrupts, market-based mechanisms already at work.
Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 24, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY
Chris Holden, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1584 (
Author:Quirk) – As Amended Ver:March 25, 2019
SUBJECT: Electricity: cost allocation.
SUMMARY: Requires all load serving entities under the jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to pay for the indirect costs that their portfolios impose on the electric system to serve their customer loads.
EXISTING LAW:
- Mandates the PUC, in consultation with the Independent System Operator (ISO), to establish resource adequacy (RA) requirements for all load-serving entities (LSEs), as defined, in accordance with specified objectives. Each load serving entity shall maintain physical generating capacity and electrical demand response adequate to meet its load. (PUC § 380).
- Requires the PUC to:
- Identify a diverse and balanced portfolio of resources needed to ensure a reliable electricity supply that provides optimal integration of renewable energy in a cost-effective manner. The portfolio shall rely upon zero carbon-emitting resources to the maximum extent reasonable and be designed to achieve any statewide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limits. (PUC § 454.51(a)).
- Directs each electrical corporations to include in their procurement plans a strategy for procuring best fit and least cost generation which satisfies the PUC’s portfolio. (PUC § 454.51 (b)).
- Permits community choice aggregators (CCAs) to submit their plan for satisfying their portion of the renewable integration needs identified in the PUC’s portfolio or achievement of the state’s energy policy. (PUC § 454.51 (d)).
- Ensure that all costs resulting from nonperformance shall be borne by electrical corporation or CCA that failed to perform. (PUC § 454.51(e)).
- Directs the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the PUC, where feasible, to authorize procurement of resources to provide grid reliability services that minimize reliance on system power and fossil fuel resources and, where feasible, cost effective, and consistent with other state policy objectives, increase the use of large- and small-scale energy storage. (PUC § 400).
- Requires the PUC to adopt a process for each LSE to file an Integrated Resource Plan to ensure each entity meets the following: (a) GHG emissions reduction targets for the electricity sector, (b) the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), and (c) other goals and obligations. Requires each LSE to submit an IRP to the PUC. (PRC § 454.52).
- Requires the Air Resources Board (ARB) to ensure that statewide GHG emissions are reduced to at least 40 percent below the 1990 statewide GHG emissions level no later than December 31, 2030. (Health and Safety Code § 38566).
- Requires electric utilities to procure 60 percent of their retail sales of electricity from renewable energy by 2030. This is known as the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS). (PUC § 399.11 et seq.).
- Requires the PUC to direct each retail seller to prepare and submit an annual compliance report. Additionally, the PUC is required to adopt by rulemaking a process that provides criteria for the rank ordering and selection of least-cost and best-fit eligible renewable energy resources, which shall include: (i) estimates of indirect costs associated with transmission investments; (ii) cost impact of procuring RPS on the electrical corporations portfolio; (iii) the viability of the renewable energy resource; (iv) workforce; (v) estimates of electrical corporations expenses resulting from integrating and operating renewable energy, including, but not limited to, any additional wholesale energy and capacity costs associated with integrating each eligible renewable resource; (vi) consideration of statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits; and (vii) capacity and system reliability of the eligible renewable resource to ensure grid reliability. (PUC § 399.13 et seq.).
- Requires the PUC to determine appropriate targets, if any, for LSEs to procure energy storage systems. Requires LSEs to meet any targets adopted by the PUC by 2015 and 2020. Requires POUs to set their own targets for the procurement of energy storage and then meet those targets by 2016 and 2021. (PUC § 2835 et seq.).
BACKGROUND:
Integrated Resource Planning Process (IRP) – State law mandates all LSEs (electric service providers, community choice aggregation and investor owned utilities) to file Integrated Resource Plans (IRP) with the PUC. The LSEs must show how they will fulfill the following: GHG reduction targets; RPS mandates; just and reasonable rates, minimize ratepayer impact, ensure system and local reliability; strengthen the diversity, sustainability, and resilience of the bulk transmission and distribution systems, enhance distribution systems and demand-side energy management; and minimize localized air pollutants and other GHG emission, with early priority on disadvantaged communities.
On March 18, 2019 the PUC issued the proposed decision evaluating the first round of IRP compliance. When the PUC aggregated all of the individual IRPs together into the Preferred System Plan, they found that there were less diverse and balanced portfolio of resources needed to ensure a reliable electricity supply and optimal integration of renewable energy in a cost-effective manner. This problem stems from the fact that solar only generates during the day, but people are still utilizing power during times when solar isn’t generating. The IRP Proposed Decision recommends approval of the Reference System Plan (guiding plan) with a few modifications as the Preferred System Plan and not the resource portfolio created by aggregating all of the individual IRPs together.
Specifically, the Proposed Decision initiates a “procurement track” in the IRP proceeding to explore options for facilitating procurement of existing and new resources determined necessary for maintaining system reliability and facilitating renewable integration at lowest cost through 2030, beginning with the resources identified in the Preferred System Portfolio, as adopted:
- The Proposed Decision determines that realization of the Preferred System Portfolio by 2030 will require concrete procurement of specific resources by many LSEs, with a heavy focus on procurement by CCAs to serve their expanding load.
- The Proposed Decision also finds that existing natural gas resources are still needed in 2030 to integrate renewables, maintain system reliability, and provide affordable electricity while the broader transition to California’s GHG emission reduction goals is underway.
- Therefore, the Proposed Decision initiated new “procurement track” will evaluate the need for the following types of resources: diverse renewable resources in the near term at levels sufficient to reach the 2030 optimal portfolio; near-term resources with load following and hourly or intra-hour renewable integration capabilities; existing natural gas resources; and long duration (8-hour) storage resources.
Governor Newsom’s Strike Force Report - On April 12, 2019 Governor Newsom released the findings of a strike team which he charged with examining California’s catastrophic wildfires, climate change and the state’s energy future. The document includes a section entitled: Adapting to Intermittent Electric Generation[1], “Today almost two-thirds of California’s renewable energy generation capacity is from intermittent sources such as wind and solar. The output from these sources vary depending on weather, season, and time of day. This imposes challenges on the electric grid operations. Generation output from wind and solar sources is not controlled by the grid operator and can increase or decline rapidly, which requires adjustments in generation from other sources (or adjustments in demand) to keep supply in balance with demand. In particular, large amounts of low-cost solar electric generation during the middle of the day has created a situation where on some days there can be an overproduction of electricity and on many days generation from other sources must ramp up rapidly in the afternoon.”
Between rooftop solar, Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) and Direct Access providers (ESPs), as much as 85% of Investor Owned Utility (IOU) retail electric load will be effective unbundled and served by a non-IOU source or provider by the middle of the 2020s.” [2]
Maintaining Grid Reliability - There are 38 balancing authorities in the western interconnection. The California Independent System Operator (ISO) is the largest of the 38 balancing authorities operating in the western interconnection. The ISO operates 80 percent of California’s electric grid and a small area of Nevada. At this Committee’s March 6th informational hearing, the ISO spoke about the complexity in operating the grid with significant renewable penetration. Currently, there are more than 12,000 MW of installed solar on the transmission grid and approximately an additional 6,000 MW of distribution side solar. Demand on the ISO system ranges from 20,000 MW to 50,000 MW depending upon the season.
The ISO has observed that on days with significant cloud cover across the state, solar resources can produce only 10%-20% of their installed capacity. In 2018, there were 20 days in which solar’s actual production was less than 5,000 MW. In January 2018, there were four consecutive days where the solar maximum production was between 2,000 MW and 4,000 MW across the middle of the day. The grid operator must have resources available to serve a 14,000 MW swing in solar supply from a clear day to a cloudy day, which is equivalent to the output of 7 nuclear units. Because of the successful addition of solar generation in California, the ISO is projecting the need to increase supply by 15,000 to 20,000 MW over a three-hour period during the evening ramp during sun set.
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS: >
Author’s Statement: The electricity market has become increasingly fragmented, with more than 40 CPUC-jurisdictional load-serving entities (LSEs) in operation, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), community choice aggregators (CCAs), and electric service providers (ESPs). By 2021, all LSEs must have 65% of their renewable resources under long-term contract. Portfolios that are not carefully balanced will impose indirect costs on the shared electrical system.
For example, LSEs may not match their energy purchases to their customer load profiles, leaving to the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) with the responsibility of ensuring that sufficient system resources are available to serve load.
To the extent that the CPUC does not or is not able to require all LSE portfolios to conform to a system-wide optimal portfolio, California could end up with a consolidation of resource portfolios that drives up system operation costs, which will ultimately be charged to customers. In addition, to the extent that system balancing resources are gas-fired, they will increase California’s GHG emissions.
From a Duck to a Swan Curve: Ensuring that each LSE is collectively meeting their customer and system needs is of significant importance to the state. Procurement portfolios indicate that LSE’s future procurement is not leveraging the potential benefits of renewable diversity in location and fuel source. RPS goals are based on kilowatt hours – the utilities and other load-serving entities are required to procure a percentage of kilowatt hours delivered which is stated as retail sales. Although the program has always required procurement to be based on “least-cost/best-fit”, the “fit” seems to have been dropped on the cutting room floor long ago. The lack of planning for best fit has significantly contributed to the “Duck Curve becoming a Swan Curve” which reflects the high amount of solar resources in the middle of the day (the belly of the swan) coupled with a decline of solar in the afternoon as the sun goes down, and high demand for electricity in the evening (the neck of the swan). The ISO’s projections of a 15,000 to 20,000 MW three hour increase in generation demand during sunset likely makes that ramp among the highest anywhere. Also important, to factor in that there were 20 days in 2018 when solar’s maximum production was less than 20% of its installed capacity, and there were four consecutive days with that drop in solar production.
Procurement Challenges. California’s progress on decarbonizing the electric grid, achieving clean energy targets and preserving system reliability is placed at risk by a changing energy market. California’s electric system is undergoing – and planning for – significant structural changes that include: integrating greater numbers of intermittent renewable resources; repowering or retiring over 16 gigawatts of gas-fired power plants that rely on once-thorough cooling (OTC) technology; and an increasing number of resources that will surpass their design life in the coming years.
The California electric system is also witnessing rapid expansion of CCAs which has fragmented the retail market, credit challenges experienced by the IOUs, and an absence of a robust and clearly defined state-jurisdictional backstop procurement mechanism to fill unmet resource needs; a role historically managed by the IOUs. Most critically, the PUC has tracked and reported deficiencies in the resource adequacy program. Finally, a recent proposed PUC decision concerning the filing of integrated resource plans of CCAs reports that they “are having trouble keeping up”:
…several CCAs are beginning to procure new resources, primarily renewables and storage, in order to achieve the ambitious GHG goals for 2030. However, the amount of new resource procurement will need to be roughly twice what the CCAs have procured to date by 2022, and close to six times as much by 2030. These are ambitious goals that require a lot of concrete contracting in order to secure the resources necessary. It is not yet clear to us if it is feasible to rely on the CCAs for this level of procurement to achieve the 2030 portfolio. For example, the median project size so far being reported by CalCCA is approximately 1.75 MW. At that level of contract size, it would take almost 6,000 individual contracts to reach the 2030 new resource goals to achieve the optimal portfolio. This seems to be a serious challenge.[3]
Assigning Costs and Procurement Obligations: Electric grid is as resilient as the sum of its collective parts. By authorizing the CPUC to assign both cost and procurement obligations to LSE’s that do not meet the resource portfolio obligations, AB 1584 bolsters and affirms the PUC’s authority to maintain grid reliability. It is also important to recognize and not diminish the PUC’s existing authority to order procurement and assign costs within the mandates of the IRP program (PUC § 454.51). Those provision require the PUC to: 1) identify resources needed for renewable integration; 2) direct each corporation’s procurement obligations; 3) allocate the costs of procurement to all customers in a non-bypassable basis; and 4) permit CCAs to provide their portion of integration needs. Additionally, that section states that any CCA that fails to perform will bear their proportionate share of integration resource costs. These provisions of existing law provide important protections to ensure that all LSEs are responsible for a share of the costs associated with maintaining reliable system operation. Adding clarifying language to AB 1584, will ensure that provisions of the bill will not undermine the authority of the PUC to implement the requirements of §454.51.
The Committee may wish to consider the following amendment:
On page 3, add line 4.
(c) Nothing in this section shall infringe upon, or undermine, the authority of the commission to implement the provision of PUC 454.51.
Previous Legislation
SB 338 (Skinner, Chapter 92, 2017): Requires the consideration of meeting net-load peak energy and reliability needs with specified resources as part of the integrated resource planning process (IRP).
SB 1136 (Hertzberg, Chapter 851, 2018): Revises existing statute that requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), in consultation with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), to establish resource adequacy (RA) requirements for the state’s electric “load-serving entities” (LSEs).
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
The California Wind Energy Association (Calwea)
Support If Amended
The Utility Reform Network
Opposition
California Community Choice Association
Analysis Prepared by: Mary McDonald / U. & E. /
Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy Future, a Report from Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, April 12, 2019, p. 21-22. ↑
Wildfires and Climate Change: California’s Energy Future, a Report from Governor Newsom’s Strike Force, April 12, 2019, p. 19, ↑
See R.16-02-007, Proposed Decision Adopting Preferred System Portfolio and Plan for 2017-18 Integrated Resource Plan Cycle, CPUC, March 18, 2019, at p. 131, hereinafter PD. ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):