AB 1782: Personal information: contact tracing.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2020-08-11
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Aug 20, 2020 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| Aug 19, 2020 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Aug 13, 2020 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 0.) (August 13). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Aug 11, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jul 14, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 18, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jul 9, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Jun 12, 2019 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| May 30, 2019 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 29, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 24, 2019 | Assembly Rule 69 suspended. |
| May 9, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 8, 2019 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 13. Noes 4.) (May 8). |
| May 1, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 30, 2019 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 29, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 8. Noes 1.) (April 23). |
| Apr 11, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 10, 2019 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 9, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 9. Noes 1.) (April 9). |
| Apr 1, 2019 | Re-referred to Coms. on JUD. and P. & C.P. pursuant to Assembly Rule 96. |
| Mar 26, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Mar 25, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 21, 2019 | Referred to Coms. on P. & C.P. and JUD. |
| Feb 25, 2019 | Read first time. |
| Feb 23, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 25. |
| Feb 22, 2019 | Introduced. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 19, 2020 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Aug 13, 2020 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
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| May 29, 2019 | AB 1782 Chau Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| May 8, 2019 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Apr 23, 2019 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
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| Apr 9, 2019 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 1782 (Chau) - Personal information: contact tracing
Version: August 11, 2020 | Policy Vote: JUD. 5 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: August 19, 2020 | Consultant: Shaun Naidu |
Bill Summary:
AB 1782 would regulate public health entities and businesses that provide technology-assisted contact tracing (TACT).
Fiscal Impact:
- Department of Justice (DOJ): The department reports annual enforcement costs of $716,000 for 2.0 Deputy Attorneys General and 2.0 Legal Secretaries. (General Fund)
- State public health entities: Unknown costs related to compliance with this measure to the extent that a state public health department engages in TACT. Potential unknown costs to state health departments and public university health centers in damages for violations of AB 1782 but only if a violation results in the disclosure of data. (Various funds)
- Courts: Unknown, potentially-significant workload cost pressures to the courts to adjudicate alleged violations of this measure. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the Budget Act of 2020 appropriated $273.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Background:
The California Constitution provides that all people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (commonly known as HIPAA) establishes privacy protections for patients’ protected health information and generally provides that a covered entity (i.e., health plan, health care provider, and health care clearing house) may not use or disclose protected health information except as specified or as authorized by the patient in writing. The state analog, the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), prohibits providers of health care, health care service plans, or contractors, as defined, from sharing medical information without the patient’s written authorization, subject to certain exceptions. Additionally, the Information Practices Act of 1977, which declares that the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right and that all individuals have a right of privacy in information pertaining to them, regulates the handling of personal information in the hands of state agencies.
With respect to general consumer privacy safeguards, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 grants a consumer various rights with respect to personal information, as defined, that is collected or sold by a business, as defined, including the right to know the categories and the specific pieces of personal information that have been collected and to opt out of the sale of personal information. The act also grants a consumer the right to request a business to delete any personal information about the consumer collected by the business and requires a business to do so upon receipt of a verified request, except as specified. The act exempts certain categories of personal information and entities from its provisions, including a health care provider or a covered entity governed by certain federal privacy, security, and data breach notification rules if the health care provider or covered entity maintains information in accordance with specified requirements.
Proposed Law:
This bill would regulate public health entities and businesses that provide TACT. Specifically, it would:
- Require a business or public health entity offering TACT to provide a simple mechanism for a user to revoke consent for the collection, use, maintenance, or disclosure of data and permit revocation of consent at any time.
- Require a business offering TACT that is not affiliated with a public health entity to clearly and conspicuously disclose upon solicitation and provision of that service that the service is not affiliated with a public health entity.
- Require a public health entity participating in TACT to require that any report of exposure be verified by a health care professional or public health entity before notifying persons who have been or may have been in contact with the reporting individual or before publicly disclosing exposure data.
- Require a business or public health entity offering TACT to individual users to issue a public report, at least once every 90 days, containing certain information, including the number of individuals whose personal information was collected, used, or disclosed pursuant to TACT, the categories of information, and the recipients of that information, as specified.
- Prohibit a business or public entity from discriminating against a person on the basis of participation or nonparticipation in TACT, as specified.
- Subject a business that violates this provisions of this measure to a civil judgment for reasonable attorney fees, injunctive relief, and the following:
- If the violation does not directly result in disclosure of data, the greater of the following:
- Actual damages.
- Statutory damages $100 for each day that the violation occurred.
- If the violation is not a willful violation, but the violation directly results in disclosure of data, the greater of the following:
- Actual damages.
- Statutory damages of up to $100 for each violation.
- If the violation is a willful violation and directly results in disclosure of data, the greater of the following:
- Actual damages.
- Statutory damages $500 for each violation.
- If the violation does not directly result in disclosure of data, the greater of the following:
- Allow the Attorney General, a district attorney, a city attorney, or a member of the public to bring a civil action against a business.
- Subject a public entity that violates the provisions of this measure to a civil judgment for reasonable attorney fees, injunctive relief, and the following:
- If the violation does not directly result in disclosure of data, injunctive relief.
- If the violation is not a willful violation, but the violation directly results in disclosure of data, actual damages.
- If the violation is a willful violation and directly results in disclosure of data, the greater of the following:
- Actual damages.
- Statutory damages of up to $500 for each violation.
- Allow only the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney to bring a civil action against a public entity for damages.
- Allow a member of the public to bring a civil action against a public entity to obtain relief only to obtain injunctive relief and reasonable attorney fees.
- Prescribe a graduate civil penalty structure for a violation committed by a contractor, as defined.
Related Legislation:
AB 660 (Levine, 2019-2022 Reg. Sess.) would restrict the use of data collected for contact tracing and limit who may engaging in conducting contact tracing. AB 660 is pending in this Committee.
AB 685 (Reyes, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) would require employers to provide specified notifications to employees and specified state entities when they are aware of the exposure of their employees to COVID-19. AB 685 is pending in on the Suspense File of this Committee.
Staff Comments:
The Department of Justice anticipates an increased workload resulting from this measure. Committee staff queries if the anticipated personnel and costs reported by the department accurately reflects how many violations would be pursued by DOJ, as it is not known how many TACT violations actually would occur. If relatively few violations occur, enforcement costs could be absorbable within DOJ’s existing resources.
The fiscal impact of AB 1782 to the courts will depend on many unknown factors, including the numbers of violations alleged to have occurred, if parties settle the matter before the filing of an action, and the factors unique to each case. While it is not known how many actions for alleged violations ultimately would be filed, it generally costs about $7,896 (in FY 2019-2020) to operate a courtroom for one eight-hour day. Consequently, if alleged violations of AB 1782 lead to the filing of cases that, combined, take more than 50 hours of court involvement, the cost pressures of this measure to the courts would surpass the Suspense File threshold. As indicated above, while courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources.
-- END --
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2019-2020 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1782 (Author:Chau)
Version: August 11, 2020
Hearing Date: August 13, 2020
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Personal information: contact tracing
DIGEST
This bill regulates public entities and businesses engaging in technology-assisted contact tracing.[1]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contact tracing is a critical component in fighting the spread of infectious diseases. It has been traditionally conducted by public health officials to identify those infected, those who have come into contact with the infected individuals, and working with all parties to disrupt the spread of the disease. Given the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of contact tracing has been brought to the fore. But the scale at which it must be conducted and the introduction of digital applications and platforms raises serious privacy concerns and calls for stronger protections of individuals.
This bill regulates public entities and businesses engaging in technology-assisted contact tracing (TACT). It provides clear guidelines on who can engage in TACT, what information can be collected, and how long it can be kept. It implements use and disclosure limitations. The bill requires the affirmative, informed consent of a user before any data can be collected or used and prohibits any discrimination based on participation in TACT.
This bill is author-sponsored. It is supported by AARP and the California Immigrant Policy Center. It is opposed by a coalition of industry and technology organizations, including the California Chamber of Commerce.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution, that all people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue and obtain privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
- Establishes, pursuant to the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), privacy protections for patients’ protected health information and generally provides that a covered entity, as defined (health plan, health care provider, and health care clearing house), may not use or disclose protected health information except as specified or as authorized by the patient in writing. (45 C.F.R. § 164.500 et seq.)
- Prohibits, under the State Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), providers of health care, health care service plans, or contractors, as defined, from sharing medical information without the patient’s written authorization, subject to certain exceptions. (Civ. Code § 56 et seq.)
- Establishes the Information Practices Act of 1977 (IPA), which declares that the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right and that all individuals have a right of privacy in information pertaining to them. It regulates the handling of personal information in the hands of state agencies. The IPA states the following legislative findings:
- the right to privacy is being threatened by the indiscriminate collection, maintenance, and dissemination of personal information and the lack of effective laws and legal remedies;
- the increasing use of computers and other sophisticated information technology has greatly magnified the potential risk to individual privacy that can occur from the maintenance of personal information; and
- in order to protect the privacy of individuals, it is necessary that the maintenance and dissemination of personal information be subject to strict limits. (Civ. Code § 1798 et seq.)
- Establishes the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which grants consumers certain rights with regard to their personal information, including enhanced notice, access, and disclosure; the right to deletion; the right to restrict the sale of information; and protection from discrimination for exercising these rights. It places attendant obligations on businesses to respect those rights. (Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq.)
- Provides consumers the right to request that a business that collects a consumer’s personal information disclose to that consumer the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business has collected. A business must provide the information upon receipt of a verifiable consumer request. (Civ. Code § 1798.100(a), (c).)
- Requires a business that collects a consumer’s personal information to, at or before the point of collection, inform consumers as to the categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes for which the categories of personal information shall be used. A business shall not collect additional categories of personal information or use personal information collected for additional purposes without providing the consumer with notice, as specified. (Civ. Code § 1798.100(b).)
- Provides consumers the right to request that a business delete any personal information about the consumer which the business has collected from the consumer. (Civ. Code § 1798.105(a).)
- Provides consumers the right to request that a business that collects personal information about the consumer, or that sells that information, to disclose to the consumer certain specified details. (Civ. Code § 1798.110(a), 1798.115(a).)
- Provides a consumer the right, at any time, to direct a business that sells personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the consumer’s personal information. (Civ. Code § 1798.120.)
This bill:
- Establishes the Technology-Assisted Contact Tracing Public Accountability and Consent Terms (TACT-PACT) Act, which generally regulates business and public entity engagement in TACT, which is defined as the use of a digital application or other electronic or digital platform that is capable of independently transmitting information and is offered to individuals for the purpose of identifying and monitoring individuals, through data collection and analysis, who may have had contact with an infectious person as a means of controlling the spread of a communicable disease. The use of devices at certain health facilities is exempted if only used within the facility’s campus.
- Places a series of obligations and restrictions on businesses and public health entities offering TACT and specifically prohibits other public entities from offering TACT. The bill requires these entities and businesses to secure a user’s consent before they collect, use, maintain, or disclose a user’s data and prohibits them from requiring any user, including an employee or contractor, to participate. Businesses and public health entities are also prohibited from discriminating against or penalizing a user based on participation in TACT. They are also required to do the following:
- ensure that a request for an individual’s consent details the public health purposes for the data, and the party or parties to whom that data will be disclosed;
- provide a simple mechanism for a user to revoke consent at any time;
- disclose to the user the categories of data collected, used, or disclosed and the specific public health purposes for which each category will be collected, used, or disclosed;
- provide users with an effective mechanism by which to access, correct, and delete their personal information;
- delete any personal information collected pursuant to TACT within 60 days from the time of collection. All other data must also be deleted within 60 days of collection except for specified research purposes;
- ensure that all components of TACT are capable of being temporarily disabled and removed by the user in a manner that is clear, simple, and does not include any unnecessary steps;
- encrypt any data collected and maintained pursuant to TACT to the extent practicable;
- clearly and conspicuously disclose that the absence of an exposure notice does not ensure that the individual has not been exposed to the condition of public health concern;
- issue a public report, at least once every 90 days, containing specified information;
- implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, appropriate to the nature of the data and the purposes for which that data will be used.
- Restricts, except as provided, public health entities and businesses from associating data collected from a user pursuant to TACT in any way with data otherwise collected or maintained for other purposes. Personal information collected, used, or maintained by a public health entity through TACT shall not be used for any purpose other than facilitating the response to the immediate public health purpose.
- Provides that it shall not be construed to limit or prohibit a public health entity or its agent from administering programs to identify individuals who have contracted, or may have been exposed to, a public health condition through traditional means intended to monitor and mitigate the transmission of a disease or disorder, including interviews, outreach, case investigation, and other recognized investigatory measures.
- Requires that any data collected by, and any inventions, discoveries, intellectual property, technical communications, and records originated or prepared by, the contractor in the course of activities governed by the contract, including papers, reports, charts, computer programs, and other documentation, be the public health entity’s exclusive property.
- Requires a public TACT contract to include certain provisions, including the following:
- participation in TACT, and any behavior or furnishing of information or consent for the purpose of effectuating TACT, shall be entirely voluntary;
- except as provided, the contractor shall comply with the requirements imposed on public health entities;
- performance metrics for evaluation of the particular goods or services provided pursuant to the contract;
- the term of the contract shall not exceed one year;
- limitations on data collection and use;
- security and data breach requirements;
- a contractor shall provide any source code created by the contractor pursuant to a TACT contract to the public health entity and any entity charged with oversight of the public health entity’s acquisitions;
- a contract governed by this part shall be deemed a contract for the acquisition of information technology goods and services related to information technology projects for purposes of Section 12100.
- Requires a public TACT contract to also prohibit a contractor from certain actions, including reidentifying or attempting to reidentify deidentified, anonymized, or aggregated data, or collecting data that is not directly necessary for the public health purposes enumerated in the contract.
- Requires a business providing TACT that is not affiliated with a public health entity to clearly and conspicuously disclose upon solicitation and provision of a TACT service that the service is not affiliated with a public health entity. Such a business is restricted from all of the following:
- holding itself out to be affiliated with a public health entity;
- associating data collected from a user pursuant to TACT in any way with data otherwise collected or maintained for other purposes without that user’s consent;
- using data collected from a user pursuant to TACT for a purpose other than facilitating contact tracing for the immediate public health purpose or implementing TACT system improvements; and
- reidentifying or attempting to reidentify deidentified, anonymized, or aggregated data collected pursuant to TACT.
- Defines core terms, including the following:
- “consent” means an affirmative act by an individual that clearly and conspicuously communicates the individual’s authorization of an act or practice and is made in the absence of any mechanism in a user interface that has the purpose or substantial effect of obscuring, subverting, or impairing decisionmaking or choice to obtain consent;
- “data” means measurements, transactions, determinations, locations, or other information, whether or not that information can be associated with a specific natural person;
- “personal information” means data that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a specific natural person or household;
- “public health entity” means a state or local health department or a public university health center; and
- “business” means a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or other group, including, but not limited to, a nonprofit entity.
COMMENTS
- What is contact tracing?
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC):
Contact tracing is used by health departments to prevent the spread of infectious disease. In general, contact tracing involves identifying people who have an infectious disease (cases) and people who they came in contact with (contacts) and working with them to interrupt disease spread. This includes asking people with COVID-19 to isolate and their contacts to quarantine at home voluntarily.
This process typically entails the following elements:
- Interviewing people with COVID-19 to identify everyone they had close contact with during the time they may have been infectious;
- Notifying contacts of their potential exposure;
- Referring contacts for testing;
- Monitoring contacts for signs and symptoms of COVID-19; and/or
- Connecting contacts with services they might need during the self-quarantine period.
On May 22, 2020, Governor Newsom announced the launch of California Connected, which he hailed as “the state’s comprehensive contact tracing program and public awareness campaign.”[2] The program was detailed as follows:
As part of California Connected, public health workers from communities across the state will connect with individuals who test positive for COVID-19 and work with them, and people they have been in close contact with, to ensure they have access to confidential testing, as well as medical care and other services to help prevent the spread of the virus.
The state’s program is led by the Administration in collaboration with the California Department of Public Health, local public health departments and the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) and Los Angeles (UCLA), which have launched a robust online training academy to develop a culturally competent and skilled contact tracing workforce.
- Assessing the security and privacy concerns surrounding contact tracing
The Governor’s Office has assured the public that the data is only collected and stored for use by local and state public health departments for public health purposes and that public health authorities would not share information collected as part of these contact tracing efforts with any outside entities.[3]
Despite these commitments to protecting privacy, there is arguably a void of regulations and protections for how contact tracing can be carried out, who can engage in contact tracing, and what can be done with the information collected. Concerns about this gap are only amplified when new technologies are incorporated into contact tracing efforts and when entities outside of public health departments, including law enforcement and private entities, are conducting the tracing.
Many countries and other states have introduced apps to trace the spread of COVID-19 only to be met with a landslide of complaints and concerns surrounding the security and confidentiality of this technologically-assisted contact tracing.[4] Officials in these jurisdictions were forced to scramble to “address serious complaints that soon arose over extensive user data-mining or poor security practices.” Warnings streamed in from human rights groups and technologists that “the design of many apps put hundreds of millions of people at risk for stalking, scams, identity theft or oppressive government tracking — and could undermine trust in public health efforts.”
Studies have found that many of the apps being used lacked basic protections for the data and required or accessed sensitive personal information from users. Google and Apple have led the charge with the development of sophisticated tracing technology that principally relies on Bluetooth technology and importantly does not rely on GPS data, which can pinpoint a person’s exact locations. However, some countries have been dismayed to learn that Google’s Android system, the most popular in the world, requires users of the apps developed with the technology to “first turn on the device location setting, which enables GPS and may allow Google to determine their locations.”[5]
The core concern with this sort of contact tracing is that the apps can continuously collect sensitive data about users, including health information, precise location data, and the social interactions of the person. While this may provide a richer set of data for officials, it comes with serious privacy and security risks without proper oversight and regulation. Establishing oversight and regulation not only addresses the identified privacy and security risks but also builds the public trust that is necessary for effective contact tracing. Recent studies show that effective regulation can make individuals more likely to download a contact tracing app, share information about their contacts, and change their behavior.
For instance, a recent Axios-Ipsos poll found that a large majority of Americans report they would likely follow core elements of contact tracing systems.[6] Eighty-four percent said they would be likely to self-quarantine if they were notified that they came into contact with a coronavirus-infected individual, and 76 percent said they would give officials a list of all the people with whom they had recently come into contact. However, those numbers dropped significantly when it required access to their cell phone location data. The report concluded that “[f]ew Americans are likely to opt-in to cell phone-based contact tracing systems at this time.” Specifically, the report found that only 33 percent would be likely to opt-in to a cell phone based contact tracing system established by major tech companies. The number only rose to 51 percent for such a system sponsored by the CDC.
A recent Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that over 60 percent were willing to download a contact-tracing app if managed by their state or local health department.[7] But the latter study similarly found a much lower adoption rate, 31 percent, was likely if managed by a private tech company. The study concluded that while there is generally strong willingness to download the app, the public is extremely divided when certain types of information, such as geolocation information, is collected.
Highlighting the importance of these studies and appropriately responding to them, research out of Oxford University shows that digital contact tracing could “stop the epidemic if approximately 60% of the whole population use the app and adhere to the app’s recommendations.”[8] However, it made clear that lower percentages will also have a positive effect. Regardless of the necessary or ideal participation rate, the experts seem clear that trust is absolutely critical. The responses in the studies above, among others, reveal that the confidence of individuals hinges greatly on who is collecting the data, what data is being collected, and what can be done with that information.[9] Professor Michael Parker, a senior ethicist at Oxford University’s Nuffield Department of Population Health, and an author of the study discussed above, acknowledges the legitimate “concerns relating to the potential misuse of data” and stresses that individuals need “to feel confident that these issues have been taken seriously.”[10] Professor Christophe Fraser, co-lead on the contact tracing program at Oxford University’s Nuffield Department of Medicine and an independent scientific advisor to the UK government’s contact tracing efforts, puts a finer point on the issue:
We know that public health is all about building trust. So how do we build an environment where people know that the data is being shared for good? People fear misuse of data, which we’ve seen in the digital space. How do we stop misuse while encouraging positive use of data? This is clearly an important area. The power to do good things increases as we share information, but we need frameworks.[11]
The author of this bill asserts that the research makes clear that “sufficient protections for privacy, including consent requirements and data use limitations, must be in place for widespread use of TACT to be effective in combatting COVID-19 and future public health emergencies.” As will be discussed, this bill attempts to regulate these aspects of TACT.
- Filling the gap
This bill works to address the privacy and security concerns inherent in this type of data collection and dissemination. It governs “technology-assisted contact tracing” (TACT), defined as:
the use of a digital application or other electronic or digital platform that is capable of independently transmitting information and is offered to individuals for the purpose of identifying and monitoring individuals, through data collection and analysis, who may have had contact with an infectious person as a means of controlling the spread of a communicable disease.
The bill specifically exempts devices issued at specified health facilities, such as electronic key cards, from the definition of TACT where such devices are only used within the issuing facility’s campus.
While various health information laws, such as HIPAA and CMIA, regulate the collection and maintenance of medical information, the coverage is limited and does not provide adequate protections in the contact tracing sphere, leaving a significant legal gap guiding such programs. This bill implements various requirements and protections in connection with technology-assisted contact tracing.
- Consent and control
A core principle of the bill is that users must clearly and intelligently consent to the collection, use, disclosure, and retention of their personal information. The bill provides a robust definition of “consent,” requiring an affirmative act by the user that “clearly and conspicuously communicates” the user’s authorization of an act or practice and that is made “in the absence of any mechanism in a user interface that has the purpose or substantial effect of obscuring, subverting, or impairing decisionmaking or choice to obtain consent.”
This consent would be illusory if it could be coerced. Therefore, the bill prohibits businesses or public entities from mandating participation in TACT or discriminating against or penalizing users based on their participation or nonparticipation in TACT, or any behavior or disclosure pursuant thereto. Public health entities are also prohibited from charging any fees for participation in TACT.
The bill also affords users a measure of control over their data. It requires public and private entities to provide users a mechanism to access, correct, and delete their personal information and a mechanism to revoke any previously provided consent. Users must also be given a clear and simple process for disabling or removing TACT. These provisions not only engender trust in communities, but they better ensure the integrity of the systems and the reliability of the data collected. It should be noted that the reliability of the data is also enhanced through the requirement that “any report of exposure, including a presumptive report of exposure, be verified by a health care professional or public health entity before notifying persons who have been or may have been in contact with the reporting individual or before publicly disclosing exposure data.”
- Transparency and oversight
Many of the TACT programs that have been deployed have been derailed by revelations of personal information that was being collected unbeknownst to users or the entities deploying the technology. Ultimately, trust is critical to ensuring effective contact tracing, and full disclosure about what information is being collected and what is done with it is crucial to establishing that trust.
This bill provides that any public health entity or business that offers TACT must provide meaningful disclosures and get a user’s buy in before deploying the technology. Specifically, these entities must disclose the categories of data being collected and the public health purpose for which the user’s data will be collected, used, maintained, or disclosed, and to whom that data will be disclosed when seeking their affirmative consent.
In addition, the public health entity or business must also publicly issue a report at least every quarter that details the number of users whose personal information was collected, used, or disclosed pursuant to TACT; the categories of data collected, used, or disclosed and the specific public health purposes for which each category was collected, used, or disclosed pursuant to TACT; and the recipient to whom any of the information was disclosed.
A TACT contract between a public health entity and a business must also include certain transparency measures. The business is required to provide any source code created by the business pursuant to the TACT contract to both the public health entity and the entity charged with oversight of the public health entity’s acquisitions.
These transparency measures instill trust in the program and foster accountability.
- Appropriate and adequate safeguards
As learned from countless examples around the world, the security of these programs is paramount. The bill requires a business or public health entity to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect the data collected from unauthorized use, disclosure, access, destruction, or modification. This includes administrative, physical, and technical safeguards be put into place. Furthermore, any data collected and maintained pursuant to TACT must be encrypted to the extent practicable.
The security of these systems is also enhanced by requiring businesses and public health entities to limit the data that is collected, used, maintained, or disclosed to only that which is “reasonably necessary to provide TACT services.” TACT contracts must also prohibit a contractor from collecting data that is not “directly necessary for the public health purposes enumerated in the contract.” The bill also specifically bans a public health entity from offering TACT that collects, uses, retains, or shares geolocation information. Privacy issues arise anytime geolocation information is being systematically collected, used, and disclosed. Given the effectiveness of other models, including those relying on Bluetooth technology, highly sensitive geolocation information is largely unnecessary. It also exposes users to additional risks and opens the door for misuse of the information. As highlighted in the studies discussed above, users are also less likely to engage in contact tracing if they know that geolocation information is being collected.
Furthermore, the bill restricts contractors from maintaining any data collected pursuant to a TACT contract after the termination or expiration of the contract. It also requires businesses and public health entities to delete personal information collected pursuant to TACT within 60 days of collection.
“Data” is defined as measurements, transactions, determinations, locations, or other information, whether or not that information can be associated with a specific natural person. “Personal information” is defined as data that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a specific natural person or household. The latter definition tracks the definition of personal information in the CCPA. Concerns have been raised that the deletion requirement should be extended to cover all “data” rather than just “personal information,” given the reality that even deidentified information can be connected back to users.
In response, the author has amended the bill to require the deletion of any other data collected pursuant to TACT within 60 days with a limited exception for data that is maintained and used solely for purposes of research, as specified. The bill therefore requires the deletion of all personal information and further requires the deletion of data not considered personal information, with a limited exception.
The bill’s data minimization component and expanded deletion requirement significantly limit the exposure of personal information to theft and misuse.
- Limiting who can properly engage in TACT
Traditionally, public health departments have been the sole entities taking the lead on contact tracing efforts. However, the widespread pandemic currently consuming the world has brought in a multitude of players. In order to ensure the proper implementation of TACT, the bill lays out various restrictions and requirements.
First, the bill restricts public entities other than public health entities from entering into a TACT contract at all. The bill defines a “public health entity” as “a state or local health department or a public university health center.” The bill further restricts a public health entity that is a public university health center from allowing access to TACT data by any agent or division of the university outside of the health center. This ensures that only those public entities that have been officially and primarily tasked with supporting public health are engaging in this process.
While private entities are not restricted from engaging in TACT without public health entity involvement, they are required to clearly and conspicuously disclose that they are not affiliated with a public health entity and are prohibited from misleadingly holding themselves out as being so affiliated. A certain amount of credibility is afforded to private entities that engage in contact tracing in affiliation with a public health entity. This bill requires that such private entities be contractually required to abide by many of the provisions discussed herein. In fact, except for the public reporting requirement, such private contractors must be contractually obligated to comply with the requirements imposed on public health entities.
Such contracts between public health entities and businesses must also include clear performance metrics to ensure the effectiveness of the systems and cannot extend beyond one year. Certain security requirements must also be written into these contracts, establishing clear use limitations and subjecting them to data breach notification requirements.
- Preventing misuse
One of the primary privacy concerns with TACT, outside of the threat of unauthorized data exfiltration, is that the data collected can be used for other purposes outside of directly battling the underlying public health emergency. Effective contact tracing requires the widespread collection of, at times, sensitive personal information from individuals. However, the process is undermined and trust is broken if that data can be used for other purposes or combined with other data. For example, it is arguably a problematic practice, and a breach of a user’s reasonable expectations, to allow such information to be used for other business purposes, such as profiling consumers or marketing to them, or for the information to be provided to other public entities, including federal authorities, for any purposes other than stemming the spread of a communicable disease.
This bill establishes various safeguards in response to such concerns. First, public health entities and businesses working with public health entities are prohibited from using certain data for anything “other than facilitating the response to the immediate public health purpose,” or TACT system improvements carried out by the business. The bill makes clear that “facilitating the response to the immediate public health purpose” does not include “enforcement of laws or orders pertaining to the public health purpose or created in response to the public health purpose, or investigations into violations of those orders and laws.” Similarly, businesses participating in TACT outside of an affiliation with public health entities are restricted from “using data collected from a user pursuant to TACT for a purpose other than facilitating contact tracing for the immediate public health purpose or implementing TACT system improvements.”
TACT contracts must also restrict contractors from disclosing the data to any person or entity without the express written consent of the public health entity and the affirmative consent of the individual whose data would be disclosed. The bill also prohibits all businesses from reidentifying or attempting to reidentify deidentified, anonymized, or aggregated data.
All businesses and public entities are restricted from associating data collected from a user pursuant to TACT in any way with data otherwise collected or maintained for other purposes. However, the bill does allow a business not affiliated with a public health entity to so associate data with the user’s consent. It should be noted that, as discussed above, this would have to be affirmative consent from the user and the business would have to clearly disclose the purposes to which the data would be used. As noted in the letter submitted by a coalition of consumer and privacy groups: “Combining data sets generates more detailed individual profiles, and carries heightened privacy risks.” TACT contracts are also required to prohibit contractors from using data collected for a commercial purpose or to obtain anything of value apart from due compensation pursuant to the TACT contract.
To ensure the public health entity maintains control, the bill provides that any “data collected by, and any inventions, discoveries, intellectual property, technical communications, and records originated or prepared by, the contractor in the course of activities governed by the contract, including papers, reports, charts, computer programs, and other documentation, shall be the public health entity’s exclusive property.”
- Enforcement
Many believe that a right without a remedy is no right at all. The bill was recently amended to include a tiered system of enforcement in order to appropriately calibrate the enforcement to the violation. Businesses in violation of the bill’s provisions are subject to a civil judgment for injunctive relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and actual or statutory damages. The damages progress if the violation results in the disclosure of data and/or the violation is willful. Such civil actions can be brought by public prosecutors or members of the public.
Public entities in violation are also subject to a similar tiered enforcement scheme, however, members of the public are only authorized to bring an action for injunctive relief, to stop the unlawful conduct, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
These enforcement mechanisms will make compliance more likely, further protecting privacy and building public trusts. This in turn makes the state’s contact tracing efforts more likely to succeed.
- Stakeholder positions
According to the author:
AB 1782 would comprehensively regulate the development and use of technology-assisted contact tracing (TACT) applications and platforms by public and private entities, including specifying that any public or private TACT service must obtain affirmative consent before collecting any user’s data and abide by stringent limitations on the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of data. Importantly, AB 1782 would also prohibit discrimination on the basis of participation in TACT and specify that the provisions of the bill apply to employees as well. By providing explicit protections for user data collected, used, and disclosed by TACT services, AB 1782 would protect individual privacy and increase public confidence in promising digital techniques for combating the spread of COVID-19 and other infectious diseases.
The California Constitution considers the right to privacy inalienable. As technology changes the nature of disease response, it is imperative that we honor this right by ensuring that individual privacy is protected when technology is used for public health purposes. Broad public participation in TACT is essential for effectiveness in combatting COVID-19 and future public health threats, and public confidence in data privacy and security is critical to driving that participation. This bill would provide the public with the confidence necessary to contribute to this greater good.
Writing in support, the California Immigrant Policy Center asserts that “it is imperative that the state demonstrate its commitment to ensuring the privacy of all Californians.” They argue the bill “will help ease concerns around contact tracing and encourage more families to get tested for COVID-19, regardless of immigration status.”
A coalition of industry and technology groups write in opposition to the bill. They argue the bill “conflicts with CDC guidelines, existing law, and proposed legislation, thus causing confusion and creating a lack of coordination amid this pandemic.” Specifically, they assert that the definition of TACT is vague and overbroad and that the bill “arguably conflicts with current employment laws.”
The coalition also raises objections to providing users the ability to refuse to participate in TACT and claim that the anti-discrimination provisions “deny any organization, government or private, from mitigating risks to consumers and employees for individuals who refuse to participate in TACT.”
It should be noted that the anti-discrimination provisions are in connection with a user’s decision of whether to participate in contact tracing done through technology-assisted means and does not control a business or public health entity’s ability to implement proper public health measures unconnected to that specific decision or to otherwise interfere with a business’ or public health entity’s ability to comply with legal requirements. The author has also committed to continuing to work with this Committee and stakeholders to address issues regarding employers’ ability to impose reasonable practices as recommended by public health officials.
AARP California writes in support of the bill. It discusses the development and deployment of TACT programs and states:
Given the urgency with which such programs need to be deployed and given the complexity and far reaching impacts of the technological and programmatic choices that have to be made, it is imperative that a set of policies and accompanying regulation be defined to address these considerations so that these programs are developed in a manner consistent with the parameters necessary for public acceptance and protection.
AB 1782 provides this necessary regulation and guidelines for California.
A coalition of consumer and privacy groups writes in support of a previous version of the bill. They note that the bill contains important privacy safeguards, specifically highlighting how critically important the provisions are that require affirmative consent, systematic purging, and data minimization. However, they also urge the author to amend the bill to include stronger and more robust protections. A number of the suggested provisions have been included, at least in part, through recent amendments to the bill.
SUPPORT
AARP
ACLU California
California Immigrant Policy Center
Common Sense Media
Consumer Federation of America
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
OPPOSITION
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Manufacturers & Technology Association
California Retailers Association
Civil Justice Association of California
CompTIA
Consumer Technology Association
Insights Association
Internet Coalition
National Payroll Reporting Consortium
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation:
AB 660 (Levine, 2020) prohibits law enforcement from engaging in any contact tracing and prohibits the use of contact tracing information except for contact tracing purposes. This bill is set to be heard by this Committee on August 13, 2020.
AB 685 (Reyes, 2020) requires employers to provide specified notifications to employees and specified state entities when they are aware of the exposure of their employees to COVID-19. This bill is currently in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Prior Legislation: None known
PRIOR VOTES:
This bill was recently gutted and amended. As such, all prior votes on the bill are irrelevant.
**************
This analysis is of the bill as amended on August 11, 2020. Such amendments were taken in response to Committee and stakeholder concerns. ↑
Office of Governor Gavin Newsom, Governor Newsom Launches California Connected – California’s Contact Tracing Program and Public Awareness Campaign (May 22, 2020) Press Release, https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/05/22/governor-newsom-launches-california-connected-californias-contact-tracing-program-and-public-awareness-campaign/ [as of Aug. 5, 2020]. All further Internet citations are available as of August 9, 2020. ↑
Ibid.; California Connected, Contact Tracing (August 3, 2020) https://covid19.ca.gov/contact-tracing/. ↑
Natasha Singer, Virus-Tracing Apps Are Rife With Problems. Governments Are Rushing to Fix Them (July 8, 2020) The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/technology/virus-tracing-apps-privacy.html. ↑
Natasha Singer, Google Promises Privacy With Virus App but Can Still Collect Location Data (July 20, 2020) The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/technology/google-covid-tracker-app.html. ↑
Chris Jackson & Mallory Newall, Axios-Ipsos Coronavirus Index, (August 4, 2020) Ipsos, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/axios-ipsos-coronavirus-index. ↑
Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll – Late April 2020: Coronavirus, Social Distancing, and Contact Tracing (April 24, 2020) Kaiser Family Foundation, https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/kff-health-tracking-poll-late-april-2020/. ↑
Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop coronavirus transmission and ease us out of lockdown (April 16, 2020) University of Oxford, https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown. ↑
Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll – Late April 2020: Coronavirus, Social Distancing, and Contact Tracing (April 24, 2020) Kaiser Family Foundation, https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/kff-health-tracking-poll-late-april-2020/; Chris Jackson & Mallory Newall, Axios-Ipsos Coronavirus Index, (August 4, 2020) Ipsos, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/axios-ipsos-coronavirus-index. ↑
Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop coronavirus transmission and ease us out of lockdown (April 16, 2020) University of Oxford, https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown. ↑
Patrick Howell O'Neill, No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (June 5, 2020) MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covid-apps-effective-at-less-than-60-percent-download. ↑
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2019-2020 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1782 (Author:Chau)
Version: May 24, 2019
Hearing Date: July 9, 2019
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Automated license plate recognition information: usage and privacy policy
DIGEST
This bill requires those operating automated license plate recognition (ALPR) systems and those accessing or using ALPR data to have policies that include procedures to ensure nonanonymized ALPR information is timely destroyed, except as specified, and that all ALPR information that is shared is anonymized.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ALPR systems are searchable computerized databases resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. ALPR systems allow for the widespread and systematic collection of license plate information. ALPR data can have legitimate uses, including for law enforcement purposes, but presents serious privacy concerns. Current law requires operators of these systems and those using the data to implement usage and privacy policies.
To further address privacy concerns with ALPR systems and the troves of data they produce, this bill requires the ALPR policies to include procedures to ensure the destruction of nonanonymized data within 60 days of collection, with certain law enforcement exceptions. It also requires a procedure to ensure that any data shared with outside organizations or individuals is anonymized.
This bill is author-sponsored. It is opposed by Vigilant Solutions and various law enforcement entities, including the California Narcotic Officers’ Association and the California State Sheriffs’ Association.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution, that all people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue and obtain privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
- Defines “automated license plate recognition system” or “ALPR system” to mean a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data. “ALPR information” means information or data collected through the use of an ALPR system. “ALPR operator” means a person that operates an ALPR system, except as specified. “ALPR end-user” means a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system, except as specified. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.5.)
- Requires an ALPR operator to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR operators must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.51.)
- Requires ALPR end-users to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. ALPR end-users must implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the access, use, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. It further requires the policies to include, at a minimum, certain elements. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.53.)
- Provides that a public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law. For purposes of this section, the provision of data hosting or towing services shall not be considered the sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.55.)
- Authorizes the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by a license plate reader for no more than 60 days, except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence or for all felonies being investigated, including, but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnaping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alerts, and Blue Alerts. (Veh. Code § 2413(b).)
- Prohibits CHP from selling license plate reader data for any purpose and from making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement officer. The data may be used by a law enforcement agency only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. (Veh. Code § 2413(c).)
- Requires CHP to monitor internal use of the license plate reader data to prevent unauthorized use. (Veh. Code § 2413(d).)
- Requires CHP to annually report the license plate reader practices and usage, including the number of license plate reader data disclosures, a record of the agencies to which data was disclosed and for what purpose, and any changes in policy that affect privacy concerns to the Legislature. (Veh. Code § 2413(e).)
- Establishes the data breach notification law, which requires any agency, person, or business that owns, licenses, or maintains data including personal information to disclose a breach, as provided. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.29(a), (b), (c) and 1798.82(a), (b), (c).) Includes within the definition of “personal information,” ALPR data when combined with an individual’s first name or first initial and last name when either piece of data is not encrypted. (Civ. Code §§ 1798.29(g), 1798.82(h).)
This bill:
- Requires the ALPR operators’ and ALPR end-users’ policies to include a procedure to ensure the destruction of all nonanonymized ALPR information no more than 60 days from the date of collection, except as authorized pursuant to Section 2413 of the Vehicle Code or if the ALPR operator is a law enforcement agency and the ALPR information is being used as evidence or for the investigation of a felony.
- Requires the ALPR operators’ and ALPR end-users’ policies to include a procedure to ensure that all ALPR information that is shared with an organization or individual, not including a law enforcement agency, outside of the entity that generated that information is anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder.
- Deletes the requirement that the above policies include the length of time ALPR information will be retained, and the process the ALPR operator or ALPR end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.
- Defines “anonymize” to mean the redaction of the images of the registration plates and the characters they contain from the ALPR information so that the ALPR information does not identify, or does not provide a reasonable basis from which to identify, an individual.
COMMENTS
- Stated intent of the bill
According to the author:
While automated license plate reader (ALPR) information can have, and has had, positive public safety outcomes, without proper guidelines the technology poses a threat to the privacy of individuals who have done nothing wrong. AB 1782 would establish a balance between personal privacy and public safety by creating procedures around the use and retention of data collected by ALPR.
Specifically, the bill would require that all nonanonymized ALPR data be destroyed after 60 days, unless it is used as evidence or in a felony investigation.
- The troubling prevalence of ALPR information collection
The prevalence of ALPR systems and the ease with which license plate data can be gathered and aggregated have raised serious privacy concerns for years. Using large datasets of ALPR data gathered over time, it is possible to reconstruct the locational history of a vehicle and extrapolate certain details about the vehicle’s driver. As an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report explains:
Tens of thousands of license plate readers are now deployed throughout the United States. Unfortunately, license plate readers are typically programmed to retain the location information and photograph of every vehicle that crosses their path, not simply those that generate a hit. The photographs and all other associated information are then retained in a database, and can be shared with others, such as law enforcement agencies, fusion centers, and private companies. Together these databases contain hundreds of millions of data points revealing the travel histories of millions of motorists who have committed no crime.[1]
Unfortunately, the security and privacy concerns have only multiplied in recent years.[2]
The U.S. Supreme Court has examined the significant privacy concerns raised by locational tracking technology in United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400. The Jones case considered whether the attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor made the following observations:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS monitoring--by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track--may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.
I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.
(United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 416 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)
As with GPS monitoring, the accumulation of ALPR locational data into databases that span both time and distance also threatens to undermine one’s right to privacy. As with GPS monitoring, California residents may be less willing to exercise their associational and expressive freedoms if they know that their movements are being compiled into databases accessible not only to the government, but also to private industries and individuals.
A 2018 Los Angeles Times editorial illustrates the concerns:
When someone drives down a street or parks a car at a curb, there is no expectation of privacy — the driver, the car and the license plate are in public view. Yet most people would recoil if the government announced a program to scan those license plate numbers into a database it could use to determine whose car was parked where and when. It’s an obnoxiously intrusive idea that sneaks over the line between a free society and Big Brother dystopia. The notion that the government could trace people’s travels whenever it wishes undercuts our fundamental belief that, barring probable cause to suspect involvement in a crime, we should be able to move about freely without being tracked.
But government agencies, from local police departments to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, are able to do just that. Some police agencies — including the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department — maintain their own databases of scanned plates, which is problematic enough without proper policies and controls in place. Many share with other agencies in broad networks. Some agencies contract with private vendors that build massive databases by merging feeds from automatic license plate readers. So while police must obtain a warrant before placing a tracking device on someone’s car, they do not need a judge’s permission to contract with a database — or build their own — and, theoretically, track a person’s movements over time by consulting records of where his or her car has been spotted.
. . .
We have been concerned about the broad spread of license-plate scanners in recent years primarily because of the potential for ubiquitous monitoring. Clearly, a database that allows police to, in essence, go back in time and see what cars might have been parked outside a store as it was being robbed could be a useful investigative tool. But at what cost?
Under this privatized system, government officials can enter a license plate and receive an alert as soon as it turns up on any of the nationwide army of scanners — in police cars, on utility poles, in cars driven by private citizens working with the vendors — that feed these databases. Because the data is not purged after a short amount of time, it also means police can plug in a license plate and find out where a car had traveled on any specific day going back years. Such an arrangement might pass constitutional muster, but it certainly violates our right and expectation to not have our daily activities collected and saved for retrieval by government agents.[3]
This bill seeks to strengthen California law regarding ALPR data by requiring ALPR operators and end-users to implement and maintain privacy policies that limit retention of this information so that the depth of these troubling databases is modestly restrained. The bill also requires protective measures to be implemented before the information is shared.
- Strengthening existing ALPR information protections
SB 34 (Hill, Ch. 532, Stats. 2015) addressed concerns about the privacy of this information by placing certain protections around the operation of ALPR systems and the use of ALPR data. (See Civ. Code §§ 1798.90.51, 1798.90.53.)[4] The resulting statutes provided that both ALPR operators and ALPR end-users were required to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. They were further required to implement usage and privacy policies in order to ensure that the collection, access, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of ALPR information is consistent with respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.
These policies are required to be made available to the public in writing and posted to the operator or end-user’s internet website, if it exists. These policies are required to include at least the following:
- the authorized purposes for using the ALPR system, and collecting, accessing, and/or using ALPR information;
- a description of the job title or other designation of the employees and independent contractors who are authorized to access and use the ALPR system and its information, or to collect the ALPR information. It must also identify the necessary training requirements;
- a description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the ALPR information, and compliance with all applicable privacy laws;
- a process for periodic system audits for end-users;
- the purposes of, process for, and restrictions on, the sale, sharing, or transfer of ALPR information to other persons;
- the title of the official custodian, or owner, of the ALPR information responsible for implementing the relevant practices and policies;
- a description of the reasonable measures that will be used to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information and correct data errors; and
- the length of time ALPR information will be retained, and the process the ALPR operator or end-user will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information.
This bill replaces the final element from above with two additional elements. The bill requires both ALPR operators and end-users to include a procedure to ensure all ALPR data that is nonanonymized is destroyed within 60 days of collection. The bill has exceptions for CHP authorized use, in accordance with Vehicle Code Section 2413 and for where the ALPR operator or end-user is a “law enforcement agency” and the information is being used as evidence or for the investigation of a felony. Furthermore, the bill requires the policies to include a procedure to ensure that any ALPR information shared with an outside entity, except law enforcement, is anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder. Therefore, instead of requiring operators and users to simply have a retention policy, this bill places a hard cap on how long certain information can be kept, with exceptions.
The bill adds a definition for “anonymize”: “to redact the images of the registration plates and the characters they contain from the ALPR information so that the ALPR information does not identify, or does not provide a reasonable basis from which to identify, an individual.”
- Calibrating the response to the realities of the ALPR industry
ALPR systems pick up additional sensitive information outside of the license plates themselves. An ALPR scan can capture date, time, and GPS coordinates of where the photo was taken. In addition, as the ALPR-FAQ section of the Northern California Regional Information Center (NCRIC) indicates, ALPR systems are capable of capturing images of persons near a vehicle that is scanned.[5] NCRIC indicates that the ALPR systems are not designed to be used with facial recognition.
One of the largest private operators and end-users of ALPR systems, Vigilant Solutions, is also a provider of facial recognition technology and provides for ALPR data storage that allows the date, time, and location information to be stored with the plate image. Vigilant operates many of the ALPR systems used by law enforcement, but also indicates that it can offer access to its private database of “over 5 billion nationwide detections and over 150 million more added monthly.”[6] The company’s website specifically advertises its ability to run advanced analytics across the vast troves of data it maintains.
Given this widespread collection of various data points, it is important to ensure that the limits on retention and the scope of the redactions required before sharing are properly calibrated.
It is unclear what will be done with ALPR data anonymized pursuant to this bill. Given the additional data that is collected and the ubiquity of the ALPR cameras collecting it, the author may wish to amend the definition of anonymize to ensure all of the intimate data collected through ALPR systems is protected before it is widely shared and sold and combined with other data sets. The exception allowing for the retention of non-anonymized data for specified law enforcement purposes and the ability of law enforcement agencies to share non-anonymized data with each other limits the impact of a stricter definition for their purposes.
Oakland Privacy writes in a support if amended position. It argues for a stronger definition for anonymize. It raises concerns about how the language could be interpreted by various ALPR operators and users. For instance, it points to the City of La Verne’s ALPR policy, which asserts that ALPR “does not capture personal information; it is anonymous data. A string of numbers and letters with a date, time, and location.”[7] Writing in opposition, Vigilant Solutions and Digital Recognition Network, “leaders in machine vision and data analytics for the public safety and commercial markets,” state that they are “sensitive to concerns for the privacy of individuals regarding ALPR data. But ALPR does not contain any personally identifiable information.”
Given this stance, that such information is already anonymous or non-identifying, the definition will arguably need to be eminently clear to effectuate its purpose of protecting this data. In response to these concerns that sensitive data could still be contained in anonymized data pursuant to the current definition, the author has agreed to the following amendment to ensure that all information that could reasonably identify an individual, which would include any images of the registration plates or the characters they contain, and images of any persons. This definition also requires redaction of other information, such as date, time, and GPS coordinates, that may identify an individual.
Amendment
Amend Section 1798.90.5(a) to read: “Anonymize” means to redact the ALPR information so that the ALPR information does not identify, or does not provide a reasonable basis from which to identify, an individual.
The author is also taking an amendment to the bill to include a severability clause in case any portion of the statute is successfully challenged.
In addition, given the privacy concerns that arise with the widespread collection and retention of this data, the question arises of whether private operators and end-users should be authorized to systematically keep this information for so long. In most instances, the reads on these plates are immediately checked by law enforcement against various databases of vehicles of interest, sometimes referred to as hot lists. Current law already restricts the retention of ALPR data gathered by CHP to 60 days. However, it is not clear what all of the uses of this data are in the private sector and why retention for 60 days is necessary for those purposes. The author may wish to consider an amendment further limiting the retention of this sensitive information to no more than 30 days for non-law enforcement.
- Additional concerns
A recent Los Angeles Times article has recently reported on problems that have arisen in the ALPR industry:
Civil rights groups in California want police and sheriff’s departments to stop sending license plate scanner information to a national private database, saying new public documents show federal immigration agents are using the system in breach of sanctuary state and city laws.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, which obtained the documents as part of an open records lawsuit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is calling on lawmakers to request a statewide audit to review the data-sharing practices.
The collection of more than 1,000 pages of contracts, emails, manuals and other materials shows some California law enforcement departments have granted ICE unfettered access to the personal data of drivers and that federal officials are using it to track and locate immigrants in the country illegally who might not have criminal records and could be protected under the state’s sanctuary and privacy policies.
. . .
The documents obtained by the ACLU provide the deepest look yet into the database run by Vigilant Solutions, one of the largest suppliers of data analysis software and equipment for police and sheriff’s departments across the country. They show more than 9,000 ICE agents nationwide have access to the Vigilant system through a $6.1-million contract with Thomson Reuters Special Services that was signed in December 2017 and runs through September 2020.
ICE officials in the agency’s criminal investigations branch and its civil enforcement division — including agents in sanctuary cities such as San Francisco and San Jose — have access to the database, which agents began using last February.
Called the Law Enforcement Archival Reporting Network, it hosts information collected from license plate readers by local law enforcement agencies and commercial sources, including insurance, towing and parking companies. The cameras can be installed atop police cars, road signs or bridges, function at high speeds and capture photographs of passing license plates, creating a detailed roadmap of the time, date and locations a person has traveled.
The information can be stored for years, according to Vigilant.
The documents released Wednesday list more than 80 local law enforcement agencies nationwide that have granted ICE ongoing access to the database, including police in Union City near San Francisco, the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Department and the Merced Police Department.
Emails also show an ICE agent asking a La Habra police officer to run searches at an Orange County fusion center, where multiple law enforcement agencies work investigations.
“Will you please run AZ plate…?” the detective asked in an email. “I am only able to pull from commercial databases for now.”
It is unclear how many people ICE searched in the system have criminal records. But ACLU lawyers said ICE’s queries and privacy guidelines, which allow civil immigration enforcement officers to search the database for information up to five years old, show the agency circumvented internal privacy rules under the contract with Vigilant Solutions and state laws.
California’s “sanctuary state” law, which went into effect last year, prevents local police and sheriff’s departments from sharing information about the people they arrest, question and detain with federal law enforcement and immigration agencies unless a suspect has a prior criminal conviction from a list of more than 800 felony and misdemeanor crimes.
Another state law signed in 2015 requires law enforcement agencies across the state to maintain public privacy policies and usage guidelines on license plate readers and to keep reports on their use.
. . .
The case comes amid broader battles in the California Legislature this year over a far-reaching consumer privacy law, the right of people to control their information and the role of tech companies in facilitating Trump’s immigration policies.[8]
Existing law prohibits a public agency from selling, sharing, or transferring ALPR information, except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law, but does not consider data hosting (often done by companies like Vigilant) as a sale, sharing, or transferring of ALPR information. (Civ. Code § 1798.90.55.)
Given the concerns raised by this reporting, consideration as to whether additional restrictions on how this data can be shared is warranted and whether the exceptions should be narrowed. To address some of the concerns, the author has agreed to an amendment adding a specific definition for “law enforcement” so that it is clear who this non-anonymized information can be shared with.
Amendment
Insert the following definition into Section 1798.90.5: “Law enforcement agency” means every California police department and county sheriffs’ department, transit agency police department, school district police department, and the police department of any campus of the University of California, the California State University, or community college.
It should also be noted that an audit was recently requested and approved that would determine the extent to which local law enforcement agencies are complying with existing law regarding the use of automated license plate readers. The results of that audit will likely inform further legislation in this arena. A number of law enforcement agencies write in opposition that this limitation on retention will interfere with investigating certain older crimes.
The California Narcotic Officers’ Association writes in opposition:
Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set an arbitrary data destruction timeline such as 60 days in statute will hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool. Additionally, by effectively stopping the use of ALPR data sharing among law enforcement agencies and other collectors of the data, AB 1782 hampers a major virtue of the technology inasmuch as it provides information regarding the whereabouts of objects that are transient by nature.
Another argument put forward is that the bill “impedes any benefit of sharing ALPR data by requiring shared data to be anonymized.” It should be noted that the restriction on sharing nonanonymized data outside of the entity that generated the information does not apply to law enforcement agencies.
SUPPORT
None known
OPPOSITION
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs
California Association of Code Enforcement Officers
California College and University Police Chiefs Association
California Correctional Supervisors Organization
California Narcotic Officers’ Association
California Peace Officers’ Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
Digital Recognition Network
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Los Angele County Sheriff’s Department
Los Angeles Police Protective League
Vigilant Solutions
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation: AB 1491 (Obernolte, 2019) provides that a person shall not knowingly post the license plate or vehicle description of any elected or appointed official, or of the official’s family members, as specified. This bill is in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
Prior Legislation:
SB 34 (Hill, Ch. 532, Stats. 2015) See Comment 3.
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 49, Noes 18)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 13, Noes 4)
Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 8, Noes 1)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 1)
**************
ACLU, You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements (July 2013) https://www.aclu.org/other/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record-americans-movements?redirect=technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record [as of Jun. 20, 2019].) ↑
Zack Whittaker, Police license plate readers are still exposed on the internet (January, 22, 2019) TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/22/police-alpr-license-plate-readers-accessible-internet/ [as of Jun. 20, 2019]. ↑
Los Angeles Times Editorial Board, Private surveillance databases are just as intrusive as government ones (February 3, 2018) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-license-plate-readers-privacy-congress-20180203-story.html [as of Jun. 20, 2019]. ↑
SB 34 also included ALPR data within the definition of “personal information” for purposes of California’s Data Breach Notification Law. ↑
See https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/license-plate-recognition-lpr/. ↑
Jazmine Ulloa, ICE is tracking immigrants with the help of California sanctuary cities, court records show (March 13, 2019) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-ice-license-plate-immigrants-20190313-story.html [as of Jul. 2, 2019]. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1782
Author:(Chau)
As Amended Ver:May 24, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Requires automated license plate recognition (ALPR) operators and end-users to amend their privacy policies to require the destruction of ALPR information after 60 days, and to prohibit the sharing of non-anonymized ALPR information, as specified.
Major Provisions
- Require an operator or end-user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure the destruction of all non-anonymized ALPR information no more than 60 days from the date of collection, except in circumstances where the California Highway Patrol is using the ALPR data in a felony investigation or where a law enforcement agency is using the ALPR data as evidence or for the investigation of a felony.
- Require an operator or end-user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure that all ALPR information shared with an organization or individual, not including a law enforcement agency, outside of the entity that generated that information is anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder.
COMMENTS:
An ALPR system is one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms that can read and convert images of automobile registration plates, and the characters they contain, into computer-readable data showing the license plate itself, as well as the time, date, and place of the picture. ALPR systems can also provide a "contextual" photo of the car itself, making information about car make and model, distinguishing features, state of registration, and individuals in the car available as well. ALPR systems operate by automatically scanning any license plate within range. Some ALPR systems can scan up to 2,000 license plates per minute. In the private sector, ALPR systems are used to monitor parking facilities and assist repossession companies in identifying vehicles. Some gated communities use ALPRs to monitor and regulate access.
When used by law enforcement, each scanned license plate is checked against a variety of databases, such as the federal AMBER Alert for missing children, or the National Crime Information Center, which aggregates 21 different databases tracking categories such as stolen property, sex offenders, gang affiliates, and known violent persons. If one of the license plates photographed by the system gets a hit based on a match with one of the databases or some other "hot list," the ALPR system can alert law enforcement in real time so they can take action.
As recently reported by the Los Angeles Times, because law enforcement can buy data from private operators and databases, private surveillance databases of this data can be just as intrusive as government databases, these databases are also big business. One of the most well-known companies in this space, Livermore-based Vigilant Solutions, "has seen its appeal among law enforcement officers grow because it can offer police departments access to a trove of more than 2 billion scans, maintained by an affiliated company, Digital Recognition Network. That database is fed by cameras attached to vehicles driven by repossession agents roving the nation's roadways. The two companies have 160 employees. Vigilant reports having more than 3,500 law enforcement clients that either use the company's cameras or access its data. Digital Recognition Network has more than 250 customers. A Vigilant representative estimated that the entire industry brings in as much as $500 million a year." (Faturechi, Use of license plate photo databases is raising privacy concerns, LA Times, (May 16, 2014).)
Given that the government requires all car, truck, and motorcycle drivers to display license plates in public view, it is especially important that privacy be taken into account when considering the regulation of this type of data. It is particularly disturbing that ALPR systems track and record the movements of millions of ordinary people, even though the overwhelming majority are not connected to a crime. That being said, ALPR data can be incredibly useful to law enforcement. As recently amended, this bill allows law enforcement to share non-anonymized ALPR data, but continues to impose the 60-day destruction policy for ALPR data whether held by a private or public entity, with the exception of a law enforcement agency that is using the ALPR data as evidence or for the investigation of a felony. This both more accurately mirrors the restrictions currently imposed on the California Highway Patrol's use of ALPR data, but also arguably strikes the right balance between protecting individuals' privacy, and allowing law enforcement to use new technologies that can increase public safety.
Recent amendments additionally define the term anonymize to mean the redaction of the images of the registration plates and the characters they contain so that the ALPR information does not identify an individual, as specified.
According to the Author:
Current law requires that [ALPR] end-users provide usage and privacy policies for the security of any data that is collected (both in terms of the storage and access), destroy any non-investigative data, and make their policies easily accessible to the public. However, current law is vague and does not provide the public with the accountability of knowing their information is safe. […] AB 1782 would require that all non-anonymized ALPR data be destroyed after 60 days, and […] would further require that ALPR data be anonymized if it is shared with an outside entity, other than the entity that generated the data.
Arguments in Support:
None on file.
Arguments in Opposition:
The California State Sheriffs' Association writes in opposition, "Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set an arbitrary data destruction timeline such as 60 days in statute will hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool. Additionally, by effectively stopping the use of ALPR data sharing among law enforcement agencies and other collectors of the data, AB 1782 hampers a major virtue of the technology inasmuch as it provides information regarding the whereabouts of objects that are transient by nature. For these reasons, we must respectfully oppose AB 1782."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Likely minor costs (General Fund (GF)) to the California Highway Patrol to update its data privacy policy to ensure ALPR information that is not being used in a criminal investigation is destroyed after 60 days. Existing law already contains prescriptive requirements regarding California Highway Patrol's use of ALPR data that are consistent with the requirements of this bill.
- Likely minor non-reimbursable costs (GF) to local law enforcement using ALPR information to update their privacy policies and destroy ALPR information after 60 days. Use and access to ALPR information is not a mandated activity so any additional obligations pertaining to the destruction of ALPR data is not reimbursable by the state.
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-1-2
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
NO: Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Gallagher, Kiley
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 8-1-2
YES: Chau, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Calderon, Gabriel, Irwin, Smith, Wicks
NO: Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Kiley, Gallagher
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-4-1
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Diep, Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Fong
UPDATED:
VERSION: May 24, 2019
CONSULTANT: Nichole Rapier / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0001034
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1782
Author:(Chau)
As Amended Ver:April 30, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Requires automated license plate recognition (ALPR) operators and end-users to amend their privacy policies to require the destruction of ALPR information after 60 days, and to prohibit the sharing of non-anonymized ALPR information, as specified.
Major Provisions:
- Require an operator or end-user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure the destruction of all non-anonymized ALPR information no more than 60 days from the date of collection, except in circumstances where the California Highway Patrol is using the ALPR data in a felony investigation, as specified.
- Require an operator or end-user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure that all ALPR information shared with an organization or individual, not including a law enforcement agency, outside of the entity that generated that information is sufficiently anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder.
COMMENTS:
An ALPR system is one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with computer algorithms that can read and convert images of automobile registration plates, and the characters they contain, into computer-readable data showing the license plate itself, as well as the time, date, and place of the picture. ALPR systems can also provide a "contextual" photo of the car itself, making information about car make and model, distinguishing features, state of registration, and individuals in the car available as well. ALPR systems operate by automatically scanning any license plate within range. Some ALPR systems can scan up to 2,000 license plates per minute. In the private sector, ALPR systems are used to monitor parking facilities and assist repossession companies in identifying vehicles. Some gated communities use ALPRs to monitor and regulate access.
When used by law enforcement, each scanned license plate is checked against a variety of databases, such as the federal AMBER Alert for missing children, or the National Crime Information Center, which aggregates 21 different databases tracking categories such as stolen property, sex offenders, gang affiliates, and known violent persons. If one of the license plates photographed by the system gets a hit based on a match with one of the databases or some other "hot list," the ALPR system can alert law enforcement in real time so they can take action.
As recently reported by the Los Angeles Times, because law enforcement can buy data from private operators and databases, private surveillance databases of this data can be just as intrusive as government databases. These databases are also big business. One of the most well-known companies in this space, Livermore-based Vigilant Solutions, "has seen its appeal among law enforcement officers grow because it can offer police departments access to a trove of more than 2 billion scans, maintained by an affiliated company, Digital Recognition Network. That database is fed by cameras attached to vehicles driven by repossession agents roving the nation's roadways. The two companies have 160 employees. Vigilant reports having more than 3,500 law enforcement clients that either use the company's cameras or access its data. Digital Recognition Network has more than 250 customers. A Vigilant representative estimated that the entire industry brings in as much as $500 million a year." (Faturechi, Use of license plate photo databases is raising privacy concerns, LA Times, (May 16, 2014).)
Given that the government requires all car, truck, and motorcycle drivers to display license plates in public view, it is especially important that privacy be taken into account when considering the regulation of this type of data. It is particularly disturbing that ALPR systems track and record the movements of millions of ordinary people, even though the overwhelming majority are not connected to a crime. That being said, ALPR data can be incredibly useful to law enforcement. As recently amended, this bill allows law enforcement to share non-anonymized ALPR data, but continues to impose would not remove the 60-day destruction policy for ALPR data whether held by a private or public entity. This both more accurately mirrors the restrictions currently imposed on the California Highway Patrol's use of ALPR data, but also arguably strikes the right balance between protecting individuals' privacy, and allowing law enforcement to use new technologies that can increase public safety.
According to the Author:
Current law requires that [ALPR] end-users provide usage and privacy policies for the security of any data that is collected (both in terms of the storage and access), destroy any non-investigative data, and make their policies easily accessible to the public. However, current law is vague and does not provide the public with the accountability of knowing their information is safe. […] This bill would require that all non-anonymized ALPR data be destroyed after 60 days, and […] would further require that ALPR data be anonymized if it is shared with an outside entity, other than the entity that generated the data.
Arguments in Support:
None on file.
Arguments in Opposition:
The California State Sheriffs' Association writes in opposition, "Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set an arbitrary data destruction timeline such as 60 days in statute will hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool. Additionally, by effectively stopping the use of ALPR data sharing among law enforcement agencies and other collectors of the data, AB 1782 hampers a major virtue of the technology inasmuch as it provides information regarding the whereabouts of objects that are transient by nature. For these reasons, we must respectfully oppose AB 1782."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
- Likely minor costs (GF) to the California Highway Patrol to update its data privacy policy to ensure ALPR information that is not being used in a criminal investigation is destroyed after 60 days. Existing law already contains prescriptive requirements regarding California Highway Patrol's use of ALPR data that are consistent with the requirements of this bill.
- Likely minor non-reimbursable costs (GF) to local law enforcement using ALPR information to update their privacy policies and destroy ALPR information after 60 days. Use and access to ALPR information is not a mandated activity so any additional obligations pertaining to the destruction of ALPR data is not reimbursable by the state.
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-1-2
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
NO: Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Gallagher, Kiley
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 8-1-2
YES: Chau, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Calderon, Gabriel, Irwin, Smith, Wicks
NO: Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Kiley, Gallagher
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-4-1
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Diep, Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Fong
UPDATED:
VERSION: April 30, 2019
CONSULTANT: Nichole Rapier / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0000421
Date of Hearing: May 8, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1782
Author:(Chau) – As Amended Ver:April 30, 2019
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 9 - 1 |
Privacy and Consumer Protection | 8 - 1 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires automated license plate recognition (ALPR) “operators” and “end-users” to amend their privacy policies to require the destruction of ALPR information after 60 days and prohibits the sharing of non-anonymized ALPR information, as specified.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Likely minor costs (GF) to the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to update its data privacy policy to ensure ALPR information that is not being used in a criminal investigation is destroyed after 60 days. Existing law already contains prescriptive requirements regarding CHP’s use of ALPR data that are consistent with the requirements of this bill.
- Likely minor non-reimbursable costs (GF) to local law enforcement using ALPR information to update their privacy policies and destroy ALPR information after 60 days. Use and access to ALPR information is not a mandated activity so any additional obligations pertaining to the destruction of ALPR data is not reimbursable by the state.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. The author explains the purpose of this bill is to protect people’s privacy by prohibiting ALPR operators and end-users from sharing non-anonymized ALPR data, in part, by requiring the destruction of ALPR data within 60 days of its collection.
- Background. An ALPR system operates by automatically scanning any license plate within its range. ALPR operators (meaning entities that scan license plates) and ALPR end users (meaning persons or entities using the data from scanned license plates) are required to maintain reasonable security procedures to protect ALPR data from disclosure. Existing law ALprohibits CHP from retaining ALPR information for more than 60 days, except where the data is being used for felony investigations or as evidence, or from sharing ALPR data with anyone other than law enforcement. However, private businesses also use ALPR data to search for vehicles in repossession. Any ALPR operator or end user is required to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access.
- Prior Legislation. SB 34 (Hill), Chapter 532, Statutes of 2015, requires data collected through the use or operation of an ALPR system be treated as personal information for purposes of existing data breach notification laws.
Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 23, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Ed Chau, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1782 (
Author:Chau) – As Amended Ver:April 10, 2019
SUBJECT: Automated license plate recognition information: privacy policy
SUMMARY: This bill would require automated license plate recognition (ALPR) end-users to amend their privacy policies to require the destruction of ALPR information after 60 days, and to prohibit the sharing of non-anonymized ALPR information, as specified. Specifically, this bill would:
- Require an end-user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure the destruction of all non-anonymized ALPR information no more than 60 days from the date of collection.
- Require an end-user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure that all ALPR information shared with an agency, organization, or individual outside of the entity that generated that information is sufficiently anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, pursuant to the California Constitution, that all people have inalienable rights, including the right to pursue and obtain privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, Sec. 1.)
- Authorizes the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by an ALPR reader for not more than 60 days, unless the data is being used as evidence or for felony investigations, including but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnapping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alert, and Blue Alerts. (Veh. Code Sec. 2413(b).)
- Prohibits CHP from selling ALPR data or sharing it with anyone other than a law enforcement agency or law enforcement officer. Specifies that a law enforcement agency may only use ALPR data for purposes of locating vehicles or persons reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. Requires CHP to monitor internal use of ALPR data to prevent unauthorized use. (Veh. Code Sec. 2413(c).)
- Requires an “ALPR operator,” as defined, to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. (Civ. Code Sec. 1798.90.51.)
- Requires an ALPR end-user, as defined, to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. To further this end, the ALPR end-user must implement a prescribed usage and privacy policy that specifies, among other things, how long the ALPR end-user may retain the information and how the information is used. (Civ. Code Sec. 1798.90.53.)
- Requires, pursuant to the Data Breach Protection Law, a public agency, or a person or business conducting business in California, that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information to disclose a breach of the security of the system or data following discovery or notification of the security breach, to any California resident whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. (Civ. Code Secs. 1798.29 and 1798.82.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Purpose of the bill: This bill seeks to protect individuals’ privacy by prohibiting ALPR end-users from sharing non-anonymized ALPR data, and by requiring the destruction of that data within 60 days of its collection, subject to certain exceptions. This is an author-sponsored bill.
- Author’s statement: According to the author:
Current law requires that [ALPR] end-users provide usage and privacy policies for the security of any data that is collected (both in terms of the storage and access), destroy any non-investigative data, and make their policies easily accessible to the public. However, current law is vague and does not provide the public with the accountability of knowing their information is safe. […]
AB 1782 would require that all non-anonymized ALPR data be destroyed after 60 days, and […] would further require that ALPR data be anonymized if it is shared with an outside entity, other than the entity that generated the data.
- Automated license plate readers: An ALPR system is one or more mobile or fixed cameras
combined with computer algorithms that can read and convert images of automobile registration plates, and the characters they contain, into computer-readable data showing the license plate itself, as well as the time, date, and place of the picture. ALPR systems can also provide a “contextual” photo of the car itself, making information about car make and model, distinguishing features, state of registration, and individuals in the car available as well. ALPR systems operate by automatically scanning any license plate within range. Some ALPR systems can scan up to 2,000 license plates per minute. In the private sector, ALPR systems are used to monitor parking facilities and assist repossession companies in identifying vehicles. Some gated communities use ALPRs to monitor and regulate access.
When used by law enforcement, each scanned license plate is checked against a variety of databases, such as the federal AMBER Alert for missing children, or the National Crime Information Center, which aggregates 21 different databases tracking categories such as stolen property, sex offenders, gang affiliates, and known violent persons. If one of the license plates photographed by the system gets a hit based on a match with one of the databases or some other “hot list,” the ALPR system can alert law enforcement in real time so they can take action.
Prior to 2015, ALPR data was not considered personal information (PI). SB 34 (Hill, Ch. 532, Stats. 2015) created obligations for ALPR data for operators and end-users, and included ALPR data in the definition of PI for the purposes of California’s data breach notification law. That bill defined an ALPR “operator” to mean a person that operates an ALPR system, not including a transportation agency that employs electronic toll collection, as specified, and defined an ALPR “end-user” as a person that accesses or uses ALPR information, subject to certain exceptions. This bill now seeks to prohibit end-users from sharing ALPR data unless it is anonymized, and would require end-users to delete any ALPR data within 60 days from the date of collection.
- Law enforcement use of ALPR systems: ALPR systems can be used to serve four specific public safety goals: (a) crime analysis; (b) alert law enforcement officials that a license plate number on a “hot list” is nearby; (c) monitor the movements of vehicles operated by individuals with travel restrictions; and (d) identify criminal conduct that was otherwise unnoticed. Hot lists, are generally databases of “vehicles of interest,” such as such as the plate numbers of stolen cars or cars suspected of being involved in crimes or gang activity. In some cases, especially in Texas, law enforcement will create a list of individuals with overdue court fees. That way, police receive real time updates when particular vehicles are spotted by an ALPR camera. Hot lists may be compiled by the local law enforcement agency using the ALPR system or by other state or federal government agencies.
As recently reported by the Los Angeles Times, because law enforcement can buy data from private operators and databases, private surveillance databases of this data can be just as intrusive as government databases.
When someone drives down a street or parks a car at a curb, there is no expectation of privacy — the driver, the car and the license plate are in public view. Yet most people would recoil if the government announced a program to scan those license plate numbers into a database it could use to determine whose car was parked where and when. It’s an obnoxiously intrusive idea that sneaks over the line between a free society and Big Brother dystopia. The notion that the government could trace people’s travels whenever it wishes undercuts our fundamental belief that, barring probable cause to suspect involvement in a crime, we should be able to move about freely without being tracked.
But government agencies, from local police departments to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, are able to do just that. Some police agencies — including the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department — maintain their own databases of scanned plates, which is problematic enough without proper policies and controls in place. Many share with other agencies in broad networks. Some agencies contract with private vendors that build massive databases by merging feeds from automatic license plate readers. So while police must obtain a warrant before placing a tracking device on someone’s car, they do not need a judge’s permission to contract with a database — or build their own — and, theoretically, track a person’s movements over time by consulting records of where his or her car has been spotted. (Times Editorial Board, Private surveillance databases are just as intrusive as government ones, L.A. Times (Feb. 3, 2018).)
As described in this Committee’s analysis of SB 34, these databases are also big business. One of the most well-known companies in this space, Livermore-based Vigilant Solutions, “has seen its appeal among law enforcement officers grow because it can offer police departments access to a trove of more than 2 billion scans, maintained by an affiliated company, Digital Recognition Network. That database is fed by cameras attached to vehicles driven by repossession agents roving the nation’s roadways. The two companies have 160 employees. Vigilant reports having more than 3,500 law enforcement clients that either use the company’s cameras or access its data. Digital Recognition Network has more than 250 customers. A Vigilant representative estimated that the entire industry brings in as much as $500 million a year.” (Faturechi, Use of license plate photo databases is raising privacy concerns, LA Times, (May 16, 2014).)
A 2011 transportation budget trailer bill restricted the use of ALPR technology by the CHP. Pursuant to AB 115 (Committee on Budget, Ch. 38, Stats. 2011), the CHP is only authorized to retain data captured by ALPR systems for 60 days, except where the data is being used for felony investigations or as evidence. The CHP is also prohibited from selling the data for any purpose or making the data available to an agency or person other than law enforcement agencies or officers. The data may only be used by law enforcement agencies for purposes of locating vehicles or persons reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. The CHP is required to monitor the internal use of ALPR data to prevent unauthorized use, and to regularly report to the Legislature on its ALPR practices and uses.
By requiring ALPR data to be deleted after 60 days from collection, this bill seeks to apply the same standard employed by the CHP to public and private entities alike. The California State Sheriffs Association argues in opposition that this bill impedes any benefit of sharing ALPR data by requiring shared data to by anonymized, and by requiring its deletion.
Law enforcement agencies across the state and nation have used ALPR data to solve crimes and apprehend criminal suspects. While some cases are solved quickly using this technology, it can also be exceptionally helpful in solving crimes that have occurred deeper in the past. To set an arbitrary data destruction timeline such as 60 days in statute will hinder the use of a valuable law enforcement tool. Additionally, by effectively stopping the use of ALPR data sharing among law enforcement agencies and other collectors of the data, AB 1782 hampers a major virtue of the technology inasmuch as it provides information regarding the whereabouts of objects that are transient by nature. For these reasons, we must respectfully oppose AB 1782.
Given that the government requires all car, truck, and motorcycle drivers to display license plates in public view, it is especially important that privacy be taken into account when considering the regulation of this type of data. It is particularly disturbing that ALPR systems track and record the movements of millions of ordinary people, even though the overwhelming majority are not connected to a crime. That being said, ALPR data can be incredibly useful to law enforcement. The following amendment would remove agencies from the prohibition on sharing non-anonymized ALPR data, but would not remove the 60-day destruction policy for ALPR data. This both more accurately mirrors the restrictions currently imposed on the CHP, but also arguably strikes the right balance between protecting individuals’ privacy, and allowing law enforcement to use new technologies that can increase public safety.
Author’s amendment:
On page 4, line 15, strike “agency”
- Anonymization of ALPR data: In 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a case against the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, seeking to compel the departments to disclose all ALPR data collected during a one-week period pursuant to a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request. Petitioners sought disclosure of this ALPR data “so that the legal and policy implications of the government’s use of ALPRs to collect vast amounts of information on almost exclusively law-abiding [citizens of Los Angeles] may be fully and fairly debated.” Recognizing that the CPRA should be interpreted in light of modern technological realities, the court found that law enforcement may not withhold this data under the investigatory exemption in the CPRA, because the “scans are not conducted as part of a targeted inquiry into any particular crime or crimes.” (ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. County of Los Angeles (2017) 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 832; hereinafter ACLU v. Los Angeles County.)
When considering the trial court’s analysis of the “catch all” provision of the CPRA (Gov. Code Sec. 6255(a)), which permits an agency to withhold a public record if the agency demonstrates that on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweigh the interest served by disclosure of the record, the trial court held that raw ALPR data could be withheld because the balance of interests (at least in part, because of the privacy implications) weighed clearly against disclosure of raw ALPR data. The trial court reached the same conclusion for anonymized data. Finding that the trial court erred in in reaching this last conclusion, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to re-consider the question of whether anonymized data may be withheld despite a CPRA request, under that law’s catch all provision. (ACLU v. Los Angeles County at 441.)
In the past, this Committee has raised concerns about bills that interfere with pending litigation, as any such interference could prevent a court from deciding an action based upon the laws in place at the time the cause of action accrued or create a situation where the legislative branch is used to circumvent the discretion and independence of the judicial branch. While ACLU v. Los Angeles County was remanded so the court may re-consider whether anonymized ALPR data may be withheld from disclosure in response to a CPRA request, requiring anonymization of ALPR data before it may be shared by an end-user does not interfere with that case. In other words, this bill does not interfere with pending litigation because it does not amend the CPRA to settle that question before the court in the ACLU case. Moreover, the court has already determined that raw ALPR data cannot be disclosed pursuant to a CPRA request. The court is now tasked with determining whether anonymized data will receive the same treatment under the CPRA. This bill would not prohibit a law enforcement agency from possessing anonymized data or disclosing it pursuant to a CPRA request if the court decides such information is disclose-able.
That being said, there are legitimate concerns related to whether ALPR data can be sufficiently anonymized to protect individuals’ privacy. Because license plate numbers can be associated with the owner of a car, it appears that the only way to truly anonymize ALPR data is to scramble (or redact) the license plate numbers. Given the other information collected by ALPR systems, such as time, date, and location, even anonymized ALPR data may be “re-identifiable” when combined with other information. By requiring all end-users (and operators, as discussed more in Comment 6, below) to delete ALPR data within 60 days from the time of collection, this bill would arguably limit the information that people can use to re-identify ALPR data as well.
- Bill imposes obligations on end-users but not operators: As noted in Comment 3, above, existing law defines an ALPR “operator” to mean a person that operates an ALPR system, not including a transportation agency that employs electronic toll collection, as specified, and defines an ALPR “end-user” as a person that accesses or uses ALPR information, subject to certain exceptions.
The L.A. Times recently reported that ALPR data is being used by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to track undocumented immigrants. At the center of the controversy is a company, Vigilant Solutions, who has long been scrutinized for the volume of ALPR data it amasses and sells.
Civil rights groups in California want police and sheriff’s departments to stop sending license plate scanner information to a national private database, saying new public documents show federal immigration agents are using the system in breach of sanctuary state and city laws.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, which obtained the documents as part of an open records lawsuit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is calling on lawmakers to request a statewide audit to review the data-sharing practices.
The collection of more than 1,000 pages of contracts, emails, manuals and other materials shows some California law enforcement departments have granted ICE unfettered access to the personal data of drivers and that federal officials are using it to track and locate immigrants in the country illegally who might not have criminal records and could be protected under the state’s sanctuary and privacy policies. […]
The documents obtained by the ACLU provide the deepest look yet into the database run by Vigilant Solutions, one of the largest suppliers of data analysis software and equipment for police and sheriff’s departments across the country. They show more than 9,000 ICE agents nationwide have access to the Vigilant system through a $6.1-million contract with Thomson Reuters Special Services that was signed in December 2017 and runs through September 2020. (Ulloa, ICE is tracking immigrants with the help of California sanctuary cities, court records show, L.A. Times (Mar. 13, 2019).)
Another L.A. Times article describes the problems that Vigilant and similar companies create, even outside of the immigration context:
We have been concerned about the broad spread of license-plate scanners in recent years primarily because of the potential for ubiquitous monitoring. Clearly, a database that allows police to, in essence, go back in time and see what cars might have been parked outside a store as it was being robbed could be a useful investigative tool. But at what cost?
Under this privatized system, government officials can enter a license plate and receive an alert as soon as it turns up on any of the nationwide army of scanners — in police cars, on utility poles, in cars driven by private citizens working with the vendors — that feed these databases. Because the data is not purged after a short amount of time, it also means police can plug in a license plate and find out where a car had traveled on any specific day going back years. Such an arrangement might pass constitutional muster, but it certainly violates our right and expectation to not have our daily activities collected and saved for retrieval by government agents.
The top company selling such data, Vigilant Solutions — which claims more than 5 billion archived detections and another 150 million added monthly — is under no obligation to purge license-plate captures after a reasonable period of time. And there are no legal restrictions on to whom it may sell access. Such companies tend to cater to government agencies, insurance companies, collections agencies and other businesses with an interest in figuring out where a specific car has been. But they could easily decide to fully democratize access by selling the service to individuals. Imagine the repercussions if someone could create an account, pay a fee, enter a license plate number and establish an alert for every time and place the vehicle pops up on a scanner. It’s a stalker’s delight. (Times Editorial Board, Private surveillance databases are just as intrusive as government ones, L.A. Times (Feb. 3, 2018).)
To that end, this bill would require end-users to delete ALPR data within 60 days after it has been collected. Arguably, the author intends to limit the amount of ALPR data companies like Vigilant Solutions can collect and sell, but, according to Vigilant’s website, it merely stores information from operators on the cloud. Further complicating this issue, not all ALPR “operators” are private entities like Vigilant. For example, the Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office, which describes itself as an “end-user” and states that it accesses ALPR information “from systems controlled by private and outside law enforcement ALPR operator agencies.” Thus, it appears that law enforcement agencies could be either ALPR “operators” or ALPR “end users,” or both. Consider also, for example, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC). NCRIC refers to itself as a “multi-jurisdiction public safety program” that assists local, state, federal, and tribal public safety agencies with analysis, and its board members appear to be members of local law enforcement. Since NCRIC operates cameras and gathers information, it would be an “operator.” However, to the extent that members share this data among themselves for law enforcement purposes, it could also be an “end-user.”
The following amendment would apply the anonymization and deletion requirements of the bill to “operators” as well as end-users, thereby better effecting the author’s intent to limit the ALPR data that can be amassed and shared by private and public entities alike. The amendment would also reflect the prior amendment that the author accepted in Comment 4, above, ensuring that law enforcement may receive non-anonymized ALPR data.
Author’s amendment:
Civ. Code Sec. 1798.90.51 is amended to read, in relevant part: (b)(2)(G) The length of time ALPR information will be retained, and the process the ALPR operator will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained ALPR information. A procedure to ensure the destruction of all nonanonymized ALPR information no more than 60 days from the date of collection, except as authorized pursuant to Section 2413 of the Vehicle Code.
(H) A procedure to ensure that all ALPR information that is shared with an organization, or individual outside of the entity that generated that information is sufficiently anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder.
- Prior legislation: SB 35 (Hill, Ch. 532, Stats. 2015) See Comment 3.
SB 893 (Hill, 2014) would have placed restrictions on the use of ALPR technology by both public-sector and private-sector users, in a manner similar to this bill. SB 893 failed passage on the Senate Floor.
SB 1330 (Simitian, 2011) would have placed restrictions on the use of license plate recognition LPR technology by private entities, including restrictions on the retention, use, and sale of such data. SB 1330 failed passage on the Senate Floor.
AB 115 (Committee on Budget, Ch. 38, Stats. 2011) allows the CHP to retain data captured by ALPR systems for no more than 60 days, and also prohibits the CHP from selling ALPR data or making it available to anyone other than law enforcement agencies.
SB 854 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, 2010) would have authorized the CHP to retain ALPR data for not more than 72 hours unless the data is being used as evidence or for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and also would have prohibited CHP from selling ALPR data or making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual that is not a law enforcement officer. SB 854 failed passage on the Senate Floor.
AB 1614 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, 2010) would have authorized the CHP to retain ALPR data for not more than 72 hours unless the data is being used as evidence or for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and also would have prohibited CHP from selling ALPR data or making the data available to an agency that is not a law enforcement agency or an individual that is not a law enforcement officer. AB 1614 failed passage on the Senate Floor.
- Double-referral: This bill was double-referred to the Assembly Judiciary Committee where it was heard on April 9, 2019, and passed out on a 9 – 1 vote.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None on file
Opposition
California State Sheriffs Association
Analysis Prepared by: Nichole Rapier / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Date of Hearing: April 9, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1782
Author:(Chau) – As Amended Ver:March 25, 2019
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: Automated license plate recognition information
KEY ISSUES:
- Should entities holding automated license plate recognition (ALPR) information be required to destroy all non-anonymized data within 60 days of collection?
- Should entities holding ALPR information be prohibited from sharing information with any agency, organization, or individual outside of the entity that generated the information, unless the information is sufficiently anonymized before sharing?
SYNOPSIS
An automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system consists of one or more fixed or mobile cameras that can read and convert images of license plates into a computer-readable database that reveals the license plate number as well as time, date, and location information. Law enforcement uses this technology to check the scanned license plate number against other databases, such as a “hot list” of stolen vehicles or vehicles known to have been involved in child abduction or other criminal activity. While this technology is an important law enforcement tool, it raises considerable privacy concerns, as it could allow law enforcement, or even private entities, to track a person’s movements with meticulous detail. The California Legislature first recognized these privacy concerns in 2011 when it required the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to destroy ALPR information within 60 days unless needed for a specific investigation. However, because other entities, both private and public, began to generate or access ALPR information, SB 34 (Chap. 532, Stat. 2015) required “ALPR operators” (entities that capture the information) and “ALPR end-users” (those who access the information) to maintain usage and privacy policies that protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR information.
While SB 34 required operators and end users to adopt usage and privacy policies, including on matters of “retention” and “destruction” of information, it was short on specifics. This bill seeks to provide some specifics by requiring ALPR end-users (but not operators) to destroy ALPR information within 60 days of collection. It would also prohibit end-users from sharing ALPR information, unless it is “sufficiently anonymized.” While this bill laudably seeks to prevent the unauthorized use of ALPR data and stem potential threats to privacy, the analysis notes a number of questions that remain unanswered. For example, it is not clear what “anonymization” means when it comes to license plates. It is also unclear why the bill applies to “ALPR end-users” but not “ALPR operators,” or even how one meaningfully distinguishes between “operators” and “end-users.” If the bill passes out of this Committee, the author may wish to address the questions raised in the analysis in the bill’s next stop, the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection. There is no registered support or opposition to the bill at this time. The author will take clarifying amendments in this Committee, however, as reflected in the summary and analysis below.
SUMMARY: Requires automated license plate recognition (ALPR) “end-users” to amend their privacy policies to require the destruction of ALPR information after 60 days and to prohibit the sharing of non-anonymized ALPR information, as specified. Specifically, this bill:
- Requires an end user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure the destruction of all non-anonymized ALPR information no more than 60 days from the date of collection.
- Requires an end user that holds ALPR information to amend its usage and privacy policy to include a procedure to ensure that all ALPR information shared with an agency, organization or individual outside of the entity that generated that information is sufficiently anonymized to protect the privacy of the license plate holder.
EXISTING LAW:
- Authorizes the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to retain license plate data captured by an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) reader for not more than 60 days, unless the data is being used as evidence or for felony investigations, including but not limited to, auto theft, homicides, kidnapping, burglaries, elder and juvenile abductions, Amber Alert, and Blue Alerts. (Vehicle Code Section 2413 (b).)
- Prohibits CHP from selling ALPR data or sharing it with anyone other than a law enforcement agency or law enforcement officer. Specifies that a law enforcement agency may only use ALPR data for purposes of locating vehicles or persons reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense. Requires CHP to monitor internal use of ALPR data to prevent unauthorized use. (Vehicle Code Section 2413 (c).)
- Requires an “ALPR operator,” as defined, to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. (Civil Code Section 1798.90.51.)
- Requires an “ALPR end-user,” as defined, to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure. To further this end, the ALPR end-user must implement a prescribed usage and privacy policy that specifies, among other things, how long the ALPR end-user may retain the information and how the information is used. (Civil Code Section 1798.90.53.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: An automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system consists of one or more fixed or mobile cameras that can read and convert images of license plates into a computer-readable database that reveals the license plate number as well as time, date, and location information. Law enforcement uses this technology to check the scanned license plate number against other databases, such as a “hot list” of stolen vehicles or vehicles known to have been involved in child abduction or other criminal activity. While this technology is an important law enforcement tool, it raises considerable privacy concerns, as it could allow law enforcement, or even private entities, to track a person’s movements with meticulous detail. The California Legislature first recognized these privacy concerns in 2011 when it required the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to destroy ALPR information within 60 days unless needed for a specific investigation. However, because other entities, both private and public, began to generate or access ALPR information, SB 34 (Chap. 532, Stat. 2015) required “ALPR operators” (entities that capture the information) and “ALPR end-users” (those who access the information) to maintain usage and privacy policies that protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR information.
This bill will amend the statute created by SB 34. While SB 34 required operators and end users to adopt usage and privacy policies, it was short on specifics. This bill seeks to provide some of those specifics by requiring ALPR end-users (but not operators) to destroy ALPR information within 60 days of collection. It would also prohibit end-users from sharing ALPR information, unless it is “sufficiently anonymized.” The bill in print also amends the California Public Records Act relating to access to ALPR information; however, for reasons discussed in the analysis, the author will amend the bill to remove this section. However, this amendment does not address all questions raised by this bill. If AB 1782 passes out of this Committee, it will move to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection. There, the author may wish to consider a number of questions raised by the language in this bill. Two questions seem especially noteworthy.
What is anonymization and will anonymized information be useful to law enforcement? As noted, the bill would require the destruction of “nonanonymized” ALPR information after 60 days and prohibit the sharing of ALPR information unless it is “sufficiently anonymized.” However, the bill does not define “nonanonymized” or “sufficiently anonymized.” It is not at all obvious what it would mean to “anonymize” a license plate number. Because ALPR information only consists of the plate number and time, date, and location information, it will be anonymous to the extent that no person’s name or personally identifying information is included or associated with that information. However, the license plate number could identify the vehicle owner to anyone with access to the DMV vehicle registration database. Moreover, numerous data aggregation websites allow anyone willing to pay a fee to enter a license plate number and obtain the vehicle owner’s name (and other information) within seconds. (See e.g. https://www.searchquarry.com/free-license-plate-number-lookup/.) Therefore, it would seem that ALPR information could only be effectively “anonymized” if the license plate number were scrambled, which would mean that the ALPR information would only reveal the time and place when a license plate image was captured (without the license plate number). This meaning of “anonymized” ALPR information was apparently the one used in a recent court opinion arising out of an ACLU public records request. In that case, anonymized data (that is a scrambled number) was enough for ACLU’s purposes, because it apparently sought only to track how, where, and how often police captured the data. (ACLU of Southern California v. Los Angeles Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032.)
However, while “anonymization” that consists of scrambling plate numbers may have served the ACLU’s purpose in that particular instance, it is not clear how a scrambled license plate could be useful to law enforcement, or anyone else. For example, law enforcement access and use ALPR information in order to compare the plate number with plate numbers of stolen vehicles or vehicles associated with child abduction or other crimes. A scrambled number will not allow law enforcement to make these kinds of matches. Perhaps there is some other way to “anonymize” ALPR data that would still be useful to law enforcement, but the Committee has not discerned what this is, so the author’s office may wish to consider an alternative definition.
What is an ALPR “operator” and “end-user,” and why does this bill only apply to the latter? Another issue that needs clarification in this bill is the distinction between ALPR “operators” and ALPR “end-users.” The statute enacted by SB 34 defines an “ALPR operator,” as “a person that operates an ALPR system.” It defines “ALPR end-user” as “a person that accesses or uses an ALPR system.” To the best of the Committee’s knowledge, the ALPR “operator” is the public or private entity that owns and sets up the system of cameras, collects the license plate information, and then stores and grants access (sometimes by selling it) to “end users.” It appears that most “end-users” are law enforcement agencies, though there does not appear to be anything in existing law that would prohibit an ALPR operator from granting access to end users that are not law enforcement agencies. For example, Vigilant Solutions, apparently one of the largest private providers of ALPR information, states on its website that it only provides access to information stored in its Virginia database to law enforcement agencies. However, this is apparently only a policy that Vigilant has adopted; it is not clear that there is any law that requires Vigilant to limit the disclosure of ALPR information in this way.
Apparently, not all ALPR “operators” are private entities like Vigilant. For example, the Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office, which posts its ALPR usage and privacy policy online (as required to do by SB 34), describes itself as an “end-user” and states that it accesses ALPR information “from systems controlled by private and outside law enforcement ALPR operator agencies.” [Emphasis added.] Thus, it appears that law enforcement agencies could be either ALPR “operators” or ALPR “end users,” or both. Consider, for example, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC). NCRIC refers to itself as a “multi-jurisdiction public safety program” that assists local, state, federal, and tribal public safety agencies with analysis, and its board members appear to be members of local law enforcement (police chiefs, sheriffs, etc.). Since NCRIC operates cameras and gathers information, it would be an “operator.” However, to the extent that members share this data among themselves for law enforcement purposes, it could also be an “end-user.”
Wherever one draws the line between an ALPR “operator” and an “end user,” the changes proposed by AB 1782 only apply to the end-user – and not the operator – of an ALPR system. Specifically, the bill requires ALPR end-users to add two new provisions to the already-required usage and privacy policies, but it does so in a somewhat confusing manner. First, the end user’s policy must include a procedure to ensure the destruction of all nonanonymized data no later than 60 days after collection. As noted above, however, the Committee’s understanding is that the operator, not the end user, “collects” the information and then provides access to the information to end users. At a minimum, the author may wish to consider changing “after collection” to “after accessing.” However, this change would not resolve what appears to be a deeper confusion about the distinction between “operators” and “end users,” which is apparent in the second change that this bill proposes.
Sub-paragraph (H) on page 4, lines 36-39, requires the end user’s policy to ensure that “information that is shared with an agency, organization, or individual outside of the entity that generated that information is sufficiently anonymized.” Presumably, the end user could only share nonanonymized information with the ALPR operator – that is, the “entity that generated the information.” However, it is unclear why the operator would want this information; the operator must already have the information, since it provided it to the end-user in the first place.
The end user can only share information with anyone other than the operator – that is another end-user – if the information is “sufficiently anonymized.” “Sufficiently anonymized” is not defined, but if it means that the license plate number is scrambled, then it will not be of much use to the “agency” or “organization” with whom it is shared, especially if that is a law enforcement agency.
Finally, it is unclear if placing the language in the section that applies to end-users, and not in the section that applies to operators, was intentional or an oversight. If the author also wishes to protect ALPR information held by ALPR operators, then he may wish to amend the bill to do this in a way that corresponds to the operator’s role.
Proposed Amendments Appear to Address Concerns of California News Publishers Association. In addition to amending the Civil Code section created by SB 34, the bill in print would amend the California Public Records Act. Specifically, it would permit a public agency to withhold ALPR information for up to 45 days if it “relates to a critical incident” (an officer involved shooting or other use of force that results in death or serious bodily injury) and disclosure would substantially interfere with an investigation of that incident. This language modeled an existing law provision relating to recordings captured by a police officer camera. The California News Publishers Association (CNPA) did not oppose this bill, but it did raise substantial concerns about whether it was appropriate to model this section of existing law, given that ALPR information will not likely capture information that relates to a critical incident in the same manner as a police officer body camera. Moreover, the issue of access to ALPR information through the Public Records Act is a matter of pending litigation between the ACLU of Southern California and Los Angeles County. CNPA, like this Committee, prefers not to create exemptions to the California Public Records Act unless there is a very strong policy reason for doing so. The author has agreed to remove this section of the bill in the amendments he will take in this Committee.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author, while existing law “requires that automated license plate readers (ALPR) end-users provide usage and privacy policies for the security of any data that is collected (both in terms of the storage and access) . . . [existing law] is vague and does not provide the public with the accountability of knowing their information is safe.” The author believes that while ALPR information “can have, and has had, positive public safety outcomes, [but] without proper guidelines the technology poses a threat to the privacy of individuals who have done nothing wrong.” The author believes that “AB 1782 would establish a balance between personal privacy and public safety by creating procedures around the use and retention of data collected by ALPR. Specifically, the bill would require that all non-anonymized ALPR data be destroyed after 60 days, and 90 days if used in an active law enforcement investigation. It would further require that ALPR data be anonymized if it is shared with an outside entity, other than the entity that generated the data.” [NOTE: The amendments taken today will delete the language requiring destruction 90 days after an investigation.]
Proposed Author’s Amendments: The author will take the following amendments in this Committee. These amendments delete Section 2 of the bill entirely, and delete language from Section 1 that references that section. Specifically:
- Delete SECTION 2 of the bill in its entirety.
- On page 4 delete lines 32-35
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None on file
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):