AB 1798: California Racial Justice Act: death penalty.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-03-21
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Date
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Status
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| Feb 3, 2020 | From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56. |
| Jan 31, 2020 | Died pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 10(c) of the Constitution. |
| May 16, 2019 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| May 1, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 24, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 1.) (April 23). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 25, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 21, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Feb 25, 2019 | Read first time. |
| Feb 23, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 25. |
| Feb 22, 2019 | Introduced. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Apr 23, 2019 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
Date of Hearing: May 1, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1798
Author:(Levine) – As Amended Ver:March 21, 2019
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 6 - 1 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: Yes
SUMMARY:
This bill prohibits a person from being executed pursuant to a judgment that was either sought or obtained on the basis of race. Specifically, this bill:
- States a finding that race was the basis of a decision to seek or impose a death sentence may be established if the court finds race was a significant factor in the decision to either seek or impose the death penalty.
- States evidence relevant to establish a finding that race was a significant factor in a decision to seek or impose the death penalty may include, but is not limited to, sworn testimony from attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors or other members of the criminal justice system or statistical evidence that death was sought or imposed significantly more frequency for one race of defendants over other races.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund/GF) in the millions of dollars annually in increased workload for trial courts to hear and resolve motions to set aside a charge or sentence of death. California averages 11 to 15 death sentences per year. Assuming each petition to set aside a charge or sentence of death takes sixteen hours of court time at a rate of $7,644 for every eight hours, the total cost would be between $168,168 and $229,320.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
African Americans and Latinos represent 67% of California’s Death Row population, leading criminal justice reform advocates to question whether race has been improperly factored into death penalty sentences. Racial bias in capital criminal cases denies justice to thousands of Americans and further erodes public confidence in our criminal justice system.
- Background. On March 13, 2019, Governor Newsom signed an executive order placing a moratorium on the death penalty. This bill would prohibit a death sentence that is sought or imposed as a result of racial bias either in the determination to seek the death penalty, or bias in the removal of jurors who hear the case during jury selection.
- Related Legislation.
- ACA 12 (Levine) amends the California Constitution to prohibit the death penalty from being imposed in any case. ACA 12 is pending referral in the Assembly Rules Committee.
- SCR 38 (Jones) condemns the actions of the governor in signing Executive Order N-09-19 (moratorium on the death penalty) and urges the attorney general to take all necessary actions to enforce the death penalty. SCR 38 is pending referral in the Senate Rules Committee.
- AB 580 (Lackey) requires that the district attorney in the relevant jurisdiction be given at least 30 days’ notice prior to the governor acting upon an application for a commutation of a death sentence.
Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 23, 2019
Counsel: Matthew Fleming
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1798
Author:(Levine) – As Amended Ver:March 21, 2019
SUMMARY:
Prohibits a person from being executed pursuant to a judgment that was either sought or obtained on the basis of race. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a person from being condemned to death or executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or obtained on the basis of race.
- States that a finding that race was the basis of a decision to seek or impose a sentence of death may be established if the court finds that race was a significant factor in the decision to either seek or impose the death penalty in the county or the state at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.
- States that evidence relevant to establish a finding that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty in the county or the state at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed may include statistical evidence or other evidence, including, but not limited to, the sworn testimony of attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or other members of the criminal justice system, that irrespective of statutory factors, either of the following applies:
- Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or,
- Race was a significant factor in the decision to exercise preemptory challenges during jury selection.
- Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or,
- Specifies that the defendant shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that race was a significant factor in the decision to seek or impose the death penalty in the county or state at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.
- Specifies that the state may offer evidence in rebuttal of the defendant’s evidence, including statistical evidence; further states that if a program to eliminate race as a factor in seeking or imposing the death penalty was in effect in the county or the state at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed in the defendant’s case, the court may consider that as evidence in rebuttal.
- Specifies that a claim that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty may be raised in a pretrial motion or in postconviction proceedings.
- Requires the defendant to state with particularity the manner in which the evidence supports the claim that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty in the county or the state at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.
- Requires the court to schedule a hearing on the claim and prescribe a time for the submission of evidence by both parties.
- Requires the court, upon a finding that race was a significant factor in the decision to either seek or impose the death penalty in the county or the state at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed, to either order that the death penalty not be sought if the finding is made before trial, or that the death sentence imposed be vacated and the defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the finding is made postconviction.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187.)
- Provides that malice aforethought may be express or implied. Malice aforethought is expressed when the perpetrator manifests a deliberate intention to take the life of another human. Malice aforethought is implied when there was "no considerable provocation" for the killing, or when the circumstances surrounding the killing show "an abandoned and malignant heart." (Pen. Code, § 188.)
- Classifies murder according to degrees, either first degree or second degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
- Provides that first-degree murder includes murders perpetrated by destructive device or explosive; knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor; poison; lying in wait; torture; any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing; discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death; and any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate:
- Arson;
- Rape;
- Carjacking;
- Robbery;
- Burglary;
- Mayhem;
- Kidnapping;
- Train wrecking;
- Sodomy;
- Lewd or lascivious acts on a child under age 14;
- Oral copulation; or,
- Penetration of genital or anal openings with a foreign object. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
- Arson;
- Provides that second-degree murders include all murders not enumerated as first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
- Specifies that first-degree murder without "special circumstances" (Pen. Code, § 190.2) is punishable in the state prison for a term of 25-years-to-life. (Pen. Code, § 190.)
- Specifies that first-degree murder with "special circumstances" (Pen. Code, § 190.2) is punishable by death, or in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). (Pen. Code, § 190.)
- Limits imposition of the death penalty to those first-degree murder cases where the trial jury finds true at least one "special circumstance." Currently, the Penal Code lists 22 separate categories of "special circumstances":
- The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain;
- The defendant was convicted previously of first- or second-degree murder;
- The defendant, in the present proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of first- or second-degree murder;
- The murder was committed by means of a destructive device planted, hidden or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building or structure;
- The murder was committed to avoid arrest or make an escape;
- The murder was committed by means of a destructive device that the defendant mailed or delivered, or attempted to mail or deliver;
- The victim was a peace officer who was intentionally killed while performing his or her duties and the defendant knew or should have known that; or the peace officer/former peace officer was intentionally killed in retaliation for performing his or her duties;
- The victim was a federal law enforcement officer who was intentionally killed [the same as Item (g) above];
- The victim was a firefighter who was intentionally killed while performing his or her duties;
- The victim was a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed to prevent his or her testimony, or killed in retaliation for testifying;
- The victim was a local, state or federal prosecutor murdered in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, official duties;
- The victim was a local, state, or federal judge murdered in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, official duties;
- The victim was an elected or appointed official of local, state or federal government murdered in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, official duties;
- The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, "manifesting exceptional depravity." "Manifesting exceptional depravity" is defined "a conscienceless or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous";
- The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait;
- The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin;
- The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or immediate flight after, committing or attempting to commit the following crimes: robbery; kidnapping; rape; sodomy; lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14; oral copulation; burglary; arson; train wrecking; mayhem; rape by instrument; carjacking; torture; poison; the victim was a local, state or federal juror murdered in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of his or her official duties; and, the murder was perpetrated by discharging a firearm from a vehicle.
- The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture;
- The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison;
- The victim was a juror and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's duties as a juror;
- The murder was intentional and committed by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle; or,
- The defendant intentionally killed the victim while actively participating in a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, § 190.2.)
- The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain;
- Requires three separate findings at the trial in order to qualify for the death penalty: (a) guilty of first-degree murder, (b) a finding that at least one of the charged "special circumstances" is true, and (c) the jury's determination that death is appropriate rather than LWOP. The first two findings occur when the jury deliberates at the close of the "guilt phase." (Pen. Code, §§ 190.1 and 190.4.) The penalty determination takes place during the "penalty phase" where either the judge or jury considers factors in aggravation or mitigation. (Pen. Code, § 190.3.) If the jury fixes the penalty at death, the judge still retains the power to reject the jury's penalty verdict and impose LWOP. (Pen. Code, § 190.4(e).)
- Provides that during the penalty phase of a death penalty trial, the prosecution and the defendant may present evidence relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence. In determining the penalty to be imposed, the trier of fact may take into account any relevant enumerated factors. Such factors in aggravation or mitigation include:
- The circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances;
- The presence or absence of threats or the actual use of force or violence;
- Prior felony convictions;
- Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
- Whether or not the victim was a participant or consented to the homicidal act;
- Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances that the defendant believed to be a moral justification or extenuation of his or her conduct.
- Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person;
- Whether or not at the time of the offense, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the law was impaired as a result of mental disease, defect, or the effects of intoxication;
- The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
- Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice and his or her participation in the offense was relatively minor; or,
- Any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime, though not a legal excuse for the crime. (Pen. Code, § 190.3.)
- The circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances;
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “California’s Death Row is the largest in the United States with 737 condemned prisoners. Since reinstatement of the death penalty in 1978, California has executed only thirteen individuals, costing taxpayers over $5 billion, nearly 18 times the cost of imprisoning a convicted person for life.
“African Americans and Latinos represent 67% of California’s Death Row population, leading criminal justice reform advocates to question whether race has been improperly factored into death penalty sentences. Along with DNA evidence that has proven the innocence of 150 Death Row inmates across the nation, there is growing consensus that the death penalty has failed to achieve its stated public safety goals.
“A 2000 study by the US Department of Justice revealed the influence that the race of the victim had in determining potential capital cases. U.S. Attorneys recommended the death penalty in 36 % of the cases with black defendants and non-black victims, but only recommended the death penalty in 20 % of the cases with black defendants and black victims.
“Racial bias in capital criminal cases denies justice to thousands of Americans and further erodes public confidence in our criminal justice system.
“To date, Racial Justice Act legislation has been introduced in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nebraska, North Carolina and South Carolina.
“AB 1798 would prohibit a person from being executed pursuant to a judgment that was either sought or obtained on the basis of race and allow a condemned prisoner to appeal their conviction and sentence if there is evidence of racial bias in the trial or sentencing.
“A court and a jury should determine the guilt or innocence of any defendant based exclusively upon evidence provided during a criminal trial, not by racial biases. AB 1798 will affirm California’s commitment to ensure unbiased due process in capital criminal cases and prevent wrongful convictions based upon racial bias.”
- The Death Penalty in California: California has a long and somewhat complicated history with the death penalty. The first death sentence imposed in California is believed to have occurred in the late 1700’s, before California was a state of the Union. Between then and 1967, approximately 700 executions were carried out. Methods for execution have varied during that time, from firing squad to hanging to gas chambers, and most recently, lethal injection.
Beginning in 1967, the death penalty came under scrutiny by various state and federal courts. Beginning in 1967, there were no executions in California for 25 years. In February 1972, the California Supreme Court found that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the California state constitution and 107 condemned inmates were resentenced to life with the possibility of parole and removed from California’s death row. Later that year, the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional as it was being administered at that time in a number of states in the case of Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238. Three years later, the United States Supreme Court clarified how the death penalty may be imposed without violating the United States Constitution. (Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153.)
Subsequently, California voters approved Proposition 7 in November 1978. Prop 7 reaffirmed the death penalty and established the death penalty statute under which California currently operates. Hundreds of people have been sentenced to the death penalty since that time. There are currently 737 inmates on death row. (https://sites.cdcr.ca.gov/capital-punishment/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2019/03/Condemned-Inmate-List-Secure.pdf.) Despite the large number of people on death row, the actually execution of death sentences has been sparing. No executions were carried out between the enactment of Prop 7 in 1978 and 1992. Since that time, exactly 13 executions have taken place in the state of California. (https://sites.cdcr.ca.gov/capital-punishment/inmates-executed-1978-to-present/.)
- Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Procedures Initiative: Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Procedures Initiative (Prop 66) was passed by the people of California in 2016. The initiative included a series of findings and declarations to the effect that California's death penalty system is inefficient, wasteful, and subject to protracted delay, thereby denying murder victims and their families justice and due process. Prop 66, among other things, enacted a series of statutory reforms aimed at expediting the review process for capital cases in order to reduce the delay between the time of judgment and execution. Specifically, Prop 66 changed the death penalty procedures to speed up the appeals process by putting trial courts in charge of initial petitions challenging death penalty convictions, establishing a time frame for death penalty review, and requiring more appointed attorneys who do not necessarily have death penalty experience, to work on death penalty cases. Under prop 66, completion of the appeals and habeas corpus process in death cases are required to be completed within five years. Also on the ballot in 2016 was Proposition 62, the Repeal the Death Penalty Initiative (Prop 62). Prop 66 and Prop 62 were not compatible measures. Therefore, if both were approved by a majority of voters, then the one with the most "yes" votes would have superseded the other. Prop 62 failed and Prop 66 was passed.
- Executive Order N-09-19: On March 13, 2019, Governor Newsom signed an executive order placing a moratorium on the death penalty. Executive Order N-09-19 declared, among other things that “California’s death penalty system is unfair, unjust, wasteful, protracted and does not make our state safer.” (available at: https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/3.13.19-EO-N-09-19.pdf, [as of Apr. 17, 2019].) The Governor ordered a moratorium on the death penalty in the form of a reprice for all people sentenced to death in the state. The order specified that the moratorium does not provide for the release of any person, repealed California’s lethal injection protocol and closed the death chamber at Sam Quentin State Prison.
Shortly after the governor’s executive order, the California Supreme Court issued an order affirming a death sentence in the case of People v. Potts. (S072161, Mar. 28, 2019, available at: https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S072161.PDF, [as of Apr. 17, 2019].) In that case, two justices wrote in a concurring opinion that “California’s death penalty is an expensive and dysfunctional system that does not deliver justice or closure in a timely manner, if at all.” (Id., J. Liu concurring, at 2.) The justices further stated that Prop 66 “promised more than the system can deliver.” (Ibid.) Potts was a case in which the death penalty was originally imposed in 1998. The California Supreme Court’s holding concluded the direct appeal, but the habeas corpus process has yet to begin. (Ibid.) - The Need for this Bill: This bill would prohibit a death sentence that is imposed as a result of racial bias either in the determination to seek the death penalty, or bias in the removal of jurors who hear the case during jury selection. Specifically, the defendant could move the court to take the death penalty off the table by establishing that the prosecutor was improperly motived by racial bias in choosing to seek the death penalty. In support of such a motion, the defendant would be able to advance statistical evidence tending to show that sentences were sought or imposed significantly more frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race. In addition it would prohibit the use of “preemptory strikes” – the striking of a juror without a specific reason – on the basis of race.
In regards to the provisions of this bill that deal with statistical evidence of racial disparities in seeking or imposing the death penalty, both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have decided that such statistical evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to establish unconstitutional racial discrimination. (McCleskey v. Kemp (1986) 481 U.S. 279, 296-97 (United States Supreme Court); In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 193, 202-03 (California Supreme Court).) This bill would provide that such statistical evidence can be advanced in support of a claim that a decision to seek the death penalty was racially biased. However, in light of the McCleskey and Seaton decisions, such evidence is unlikely to be enough to establish the fact that the decision was, in fact, motivated by racial bias.
With regard to the provisions of this bill that deal with the improper of exclusion of jurors on the basis of race, this bill seems to be restating a long-standing legal doctrine established by the courts. The California Supreme Court held in 1976 that the practice of excusing jurors from the jury pool on the basis of race was unconstitutional. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 258.) The United States Supreme Court followed suit in 1986 in the landmark decision of Batson v. Kentucky (1986). (476 U.S. 79.) Therefore, the provisions of this bill relating to improper striking of jurors on the basis of race are apparently a codification of existing case law. - Related Legislation:
- ACA 12 (Levine), would amend the California Constitution to prohibit the death penalty from being imposed as a punishment for any violation of law. ACA 12 is pending referral in the Assembly Rules Committee.
- SCR 38 (Jones), would condemn the actions of the Governor in signing Executive Order N-09-19 (moratorium on the death penalty) and would urge the Attorney General to take all necessary actions to enforce the death penalty. SCR 38 is pending referral in the Senate Rules Committee.
- AB 580 (Lackey), would require that the district attorney in the relevant jurisdiction be given at least 30 days notice prior to the governor acting upon an application for a commutation of a death sentence.
- ACA 12 (Levine), would amend the California Constitution to prohibit the death penalty from being imposed as a punishment for any violation of law. ACA 12 is pending referral in the Assembly Rules Committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 648 (Block) Chapter 437, Statutes of 2011, enacted Penal Code Section 4805 which requires that at least 10 days before the Governor acts upon any application for a pardon or commutation of sentence, the application must be served upon the district attorney in the county where the conviction was had.
- SB 490 (Hancock) of the 2011-2012 Legislative Session would have abolished the death penalty, and provided instead for imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. SB 490 died in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- AB 1512 (Aroner) of the 2001-2002 Legislative session, would have prohibited the application of the death penalty for people determined to be mentally retarded. AB 1512 died in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- AB 648 (Block) Chapter 437, Statutes of 2011, enacted Penal Code Section 4805 which requires that at least 10 days before the Governor acts upon any application for a pardon or commutation of sentence, the application must be served upon the district attorney in the county where the conviction was had.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None
Opposition
None
Analysis Prepared by:
Matthew Fleming / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):