AB 2542: Criminal procedure: discrimination.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2020-09-30
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Date
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Status
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| Sep 30, 2020 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 317, Statutes of 2020. |
| Sep 30, 2020 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 15, 2020 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3 p.m. |
| Aug 31, 2020 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 31, 2020 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 26. Noes 10.). |
| Aug 26, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 25, 2020 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Aug 24, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 20, 2020 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (August 20). |
| Aug 17, 2020 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Aug 8, 2020 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 4. Noes 2.) (August 7). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Aug 1, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jul 2, 2020 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jul 2, 2020 | Withdrawn from committee. |
| Jul 1, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on TRANS. |
| Jun 23, 2020 | Referred to Com. on TRANS. |
| Jun 9, 2020 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| Jun 8, 2020 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 76. Noes 0. Page 4728.) |
| Jun 3, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to Consent Calendar. |
| Jun 2, 2020 | From committee: Do pass. To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 18. Noes 0.) (June 2). |
| May 5, 2020 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (May 4). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 17, 2020 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| Mar 2, 2020 | Referred to Com. on TRANS. |
| Feb 20, 2020 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 21. |
| Feb 19, 2020 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Aug 31, 2020 | AB 2542 KALRA Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Aug 31, 2020 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB2542 Kalra et al. By Mitchell | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Aug 20, 2020 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Aug 17, 2020 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Aug 7, 2020 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
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| Jun 8, 2020 | AB 2542 Kalra Consent Calendar Second Day Regular Session | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Jun 2, 2020 | Do pass. To Consent Calendar. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| May 4, 2020 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Assembly Standing Committee on Transportation |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
(Without Reference to File)
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 2542
Author:(Kalra, et al.)
As Amended Ver:August 25, 2020
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
The Senate Amendments:
Delete the Assembly version of this bill and instead:
- Prohibit the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, obtaining or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:
- The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin;
- During the trial, in a court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin, except as specified, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful;
- Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges, whether or not purposeful;
- The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained;
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed; or,
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- State that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the prohibition.
- State that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing, as specified.
- Provide that a defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of the prohibition that is in the possession or control of the prosecutor. Upon a showing of good cause, and if the records are not privileged, the court shall order the records to be released and may permit, upon a showing of good cause, redaction thereof.
- State that, notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the voters, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence a violation of the prohibition, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the following list of remedies:
- Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial if requested by the defendant, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or, in the interests of justice, the court may dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges;
- When judgement has been entered:
- If the court finds that the conviction was sought or obtained in violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings;
- If the court finds the violation was based only on the defendant being charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins, and the court has the ability to rectify the violation by modifying the judgment, the court may do so and impose an appropriate remedy for the violation that occurred, except that the court shall not impose a sentence greater than that previously imposed; and,
- If the court finds that only the sentence was sought or obtained in violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence no greater than the sentence previously imposed.
- Prohibit imposition of the death penalty where the court finds a violation of the prohibition.
- Provide that a court is not foreclosed from imposing any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.
- Specify that these provisions apply to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system.
- Define "more frequently sought or obtained" or "more frequently imposed" as meaning that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.
- Define "prima facie showing" as meaning that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish a substantial likelihood that a violation of the prohibition occurred, as specified.
- Define "racially discriminatory language" as meaning language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant's physical appearance, culture, ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is discriminatory.
- Apply these provisions only prospectively to cases in which a judgment has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.
- State that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted, as specified, following a judgment entered on or after January 1, 2021, based on evidence of a violation of the prohibition.
- Make conforming changes to allow a person who is no longer in custody to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a violation of the prohibition.
- State that if the Legislature adopts AB 3070 and it is chaptered and enrolled, then the provisions of this bill related to peremptory challenges shall only apply to cases in which jury selection was completed prior to January 1, 2021.
- State that these provisions are severable.
- Make a number of Legislative findings and declarations including that it is the intent of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California's criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI of the California Constitution, and violates the laws and Constitution of the State of California.
COMMENTS:
According to the Author:
"One year ago, Governor Gavin Newsom imposed a moratorium on executions, stating that it is a racist system perpetuating inequality. As person of color and a former deputy public defender, I have seen racial discrimination in the court system first hand. We must confront racism in the courts. We can no longer accept racial bias in the criminal justice system as unfixable. The California Racial Justice Act will help us take an important step in prohibiting the use of race and ethnicity as a factor in the state's justice system across the board.
"The California Racial Justice Act is a countermeasure to a widely condemned 1987 legal precedent established in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp. Known as the McCleskey decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has since required defendants in criminal cases to prove intentional discrimination when challenging racial bias in their legal process. This established an unreasonably high standard for victims of racism in the criminal legal system that is almost impossible to meet without direct proof that the racially discriminatory behavior was conscious, deliberate and targeted. The Court's majority, however, also observed that State Legislatures concerned about racial bias in the criminal justice system could act to address it.
"Regarding the unprecedented times we are facing in the fight against COVID-19, this bill is more needed today than it was prior to the appearance of the virus. Prejudiced and discriminatory treatment does not stop because of COVID-19. It continues and those impacted by the socio-economic disparities in the application of the law have historically been and continue to be disproportionately people of color. This plays a distinct role in how and when a person is charged with a crime and how they pursue their due process in the courts. Without acting now, we continue to allow rulings such as the McCleskey precedent to guide the application of race and racism in courts."
Arguments in Support:
According to the American Civil Liberties Union, "…This bill is needed because of a widely condemned 1987 legal precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp. The McCleskey decision has the functional effect of requiring that criminal defendants prove intentional discrimination when challenging racial bias in their legal process. This is an unreasonably high standard and is almost impossible to meet without direct proof that the racially discriminatory behavior was conscious, deliberate, and targeted.
[…]"
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the California District Attorneys Association, "…[A] successful motion to overturn a conviction or obtain habeas relief based on a violation of section 745 requires no showing of prejudice! Together, proposed Penal Code sections 745(b)(1) and 745(e)(1) would require either the granting of a mistrial, the dismissal of a case, or a reduction in charges if a judge, attorney, law enforcement officer involved in the case, expert witness, or juror was biased against a defendant because of defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin - without any showing that the defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the bias, that the bias has any impact whatsoever on the outcome of the trial, or that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial!
[…]"
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Courts: Unknown workload cost increases, potentially in the low millions of dollars. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the Budget Act of 2020 appropriated $273.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Incarceration savings: Unknown potential savings in state incarceration costs for individuals who do not receive a prison sentence because of this bill. The FY 2020-2021 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $91,100 annually, with an annual marginal rate per person of over $12,000. The contract bed rate averages to about $29,000 annually. Aside from marginal cost savings per individual, however, the department would experience an institutional cost savings only if the number of persons incarcerated decreased to a level to effectuate the closing of a yard or wing of a prison. (General Fund)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
VOTES:
ASM TRANSPORTATION: 15-0-0
YES: Frazier, Fong, Aguiar-Curry, Berman, Chu, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Friedman, Gipson, Grayson, Kiley, Medina, Nazarian, O'Donnell
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 18-0-0
YES: Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bauer-Kahan, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Megan Dahle, Diep, Eggman, Fong, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Petrie-Norris, McCarty, Robert Rivas, Voepel
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 76-0-3
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Megan Dahle, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Obernolte, Patterson, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Low, Muratsuchi, Quirk
UPDATED:
VERSION: August 25, 2020
CONSULTANT: Cheryl Anderson / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003537
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 2542 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 2542
Author: Kalra (D), Kamlager (D), Robert Rivas (D) and Santiago (D), et al.
Amended: 8/25/20 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 4-2, 8/7/20
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Moorlach, Morrell
NO VOTE RECORDED: Jackson
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/20/20
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Hill, Leyva, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: Not relevant
SUBJECT: Criminal procedure: discrimination
SOURCE: American Friends Service Committee
Anti-Death Penalty Coalition
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
League of Women Voters of California
NextGen California
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits the state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, as specified.
Senate Floor Amendments of 8/25/20 clarify and limit provisions in the bill related to the use of discriminatory language during a defendant’s trial, requests for relevant records, appointment of counsel and remedies and add a severability clause.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a).)
- States that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
- New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. Specifies that “new evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b).)
- Provides that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473 subd. (c).)
- States that nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies. (Pen. Code, § 1473 subd. (d).)
- Specifies “false evidence” includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e)(1).)
- Provides that a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted on the basis that evidence relating to intimate partner battering and its effects, as defined, was not introduced at the trial relating to the prisoner's incarceration for a conviction of a violent felony, as defined, and was of such substance that had the substantial and competent expert evidence been introduced, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction or sentence, that the result of the proceedings would have been different. (Pen. Code, § 1473.5, subds. (a) & (b).)
- Specifies that habeas corpus is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death. (Pen. Code, § 1509.)
- Creates an explicit right for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a prejudicial error damaging to the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7.)
- Specifies what the prosecution is required to disclose to the defense, including exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession or known to be in the possession of investigating agencies. (Pen. Code, § 1054.1.)
- Provides that a new trial may be granted for specified grounds including when material new evidence is discovered and could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and introduced at trial. An application for new trial must be made and decided before judgment. (Pen. Code, §§ 1180, 1181, 1182.)
- Provides the trial court broad authority to dismiss a case in the interests of justice, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1385.)
- Allows parties an unlimited number of challenges to prospective jurors for cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 226.)
- States that challenges for cause may be based on general disqualification, implied bias, or actual bias. (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1).)
- Defines implied bias as occurring when there is “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 229, subd. (f).)
- Defines actual bias as the “state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
- Allots each party a number of peremptory challenges to jurors – an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.)
This bill:
- Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, obtaining or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- Applies prospectively to cases in which judgement has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.
- States that a violation is established if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:
- The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the court proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful. This does not apply to a person who is describing language used by another person that is relevant to the case or who is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.
- Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenge to demonstrate a violation of this provision.
- The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origins in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- States that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the above provision.
- States that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing.
- Provides that at the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert.
- States that the defendant shall have the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make findings on the record.
- States that a defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation that is in the possession or control of the state. A motion filed for such evidence shall describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks. Upon a showing of good cause and if the records are not privileged, the court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.
- States that, notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the voters, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that a violation has occurred, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the following list:
- Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose any of the following remedies:
- Reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge;
- Declare a mistrial if requested by the defendant;
- Discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or;
- If the court determines that it would be in the interest of justice, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges.
- When a judgement has been entered, if the court finds that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of this bill’s provisions, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings. If the court finds that the only violation of this bill’s prohibitions was that the defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than other defendants who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated and the court has the ability to rectify the violation by modifying the judgement, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence and find that the conviction is legally invalid, and modify the judgement to impose an appropriate remedy for the violation that occurred. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.
- When judgment has been entered, if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of this bill’s provisions, the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.
- When the court finds that there has been a violation of the bill’s prohibitions, the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.
- Before a judgment has been entered, the court may impose any of the following remedies:
- Specifies that remedies available under the provisions of this bill do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.
- Specifies that its provisions applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system.
- Provides that its provisions do not prevent the prosecution of hates crimes.
- Provides the following definitions:
- “More frequently sought or obtained” or “more frequently imposed” means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.
- “Prima facie showing means that the defendant produces fact that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of this bill’s prohibitions occurred. For purposes of this section, a “substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.
- “Racially discriminatory language” means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether the language is discriminatory.
- “State” includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city prosecutor.
- States that a defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregated data among groups to demonstrate a violation of the bill’s provisions.
- Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted after a judgment has been entered based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed discriminatorily if the judgment was entered on or after January 1, 2021:
- A petition raising such a claim for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a successive or abusive petition.
- If the petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition pending in state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was sought, obtained or imposed in violation of this bill’s provisions.
- The petition shall state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of the bill’s prohibitions or the State Public Defender requests counsel be appointed. Newly appointed counsel may amend a petition filed before their appointment.
- The court shall review the petition and if the court determines that the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause.
- The defendant shall appear at the hearing by video unless counsel indicates that their presence in court is needed.
- If the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.
- Makes conforming changes to allow a person who is no longer in custody to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a violation of this bill.
- Provides contingency language so that the bill’s provisions related to peremptory challenges would only go into effect if AB 3070 is not signed into law.
- Contains a severability clause so that if any provision of this bill or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
Comments
According to the author:
The California Racial Justice Act is a countermeasure to a widely condemned 1987 legal precedent established in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp. Known as the McCleskey decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has since required defendants in criminal cases to prove intentional discrimination when challenging racial bias in their legal process. This established an unreasonably high standard for victims of racism in the criminal legal system that is almost impossible to meet without direct proof that the racially discriminatory behavior was conscious, deliberate and targeted. The Court’s majority, however, also observed that State Legislatures concerned about racial bias in the criminal justice system could act to address it.
Regarding the unprecedented times we are facing in the fight against COVID-19, this bill is more needed today than it was prior to the appearance of the virus. Prejudiced and discriminatory treatment does not stop because of COVID-19. It continues and those impacted by the socio-economic disparities in the application of the law have historically been and continue to be disproportionately people of color. This plays a distinct role in how and when a person is charged with a crime and how they pursue their due process in the courts. Without acting now, we continue to allow rulings such as the McCleskey precedent to guide the application of race and racism in courts.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Courts: Unknown workload cost increases, potentially in the low millions of dollars. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the Budget Act of 2020 appropriated $273.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Incarceration savings: Unknown potential savings in state incarceration costs for individuals who do not receive a prison sentence because of this bill. The FY 2020-2021 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $91,100 annually, with an annual marginal rate per person of over $12,000. The contract bed rate averages to about $29,000 annually. Aside from marginal cost savings per individual, however, the department would experience an institutional cost savings only if the number of persons incarcerated decreased to a level to effectuate the closing of a yard or wing of a prison. (General Fund)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/24/20)
American Friends Service Committee (co-source)
Anti-Death Penalty Coalition (co-source)
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California (co-source)
California Coalition for Women Prisoners (co-source)
Californians United for a Responsible Budget (co-source)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights (co-source)
League of Women Voters of California (co-source)
NextGen California (co-source)
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930 (co-source)
8th Amendment Project
A New Path
A New Way of Life Re-entry Project
Alianza for Youth Justice
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Amnesty International USA
Anti-recidivism Coalition
Asian Law Alliance
Bend the Arc: Jewish Action
Black Leadership Kitchen Cabinet
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Faculty Association
California Federation of Teachers
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Innocence Coalition
California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO
California League of United Latin American Citizens
California Nurses Association
California Public Defenders Association
California Teachers Association
Californians for Justice
Californians for Safety and Justice
Centro Binacional Para El Desarrollo Indígena Oaxaqueno
Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice
Community Agency for Resources Advocacy and Services
Consumer Attorneys of California
Disability Rights California
Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities
Empowering Pacific Islander Communities
Ensuring Opportunity Campaign to End Poverty in Contra Costa County
Equal Justice Society
Equal Justice USA
Equal Rights Advocates
F.U.E.L. – Families United to End LWOP
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Huckleberry Youth Programs
Human Impact Partners
If/When/How: Lawyering for Reproductive Justice
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Indivisible Sausalito
Indivisible South Bay LA
Indivisible Yolo
Initiate Justice
Inland Empire – Immigrant Youth Collective
Innercity Struggle
Insight Center for Community Economic Development
Insight Garden Program
Japanese American Citizens League, Pacific Southwest District
Japanese American Citizens League, San Jose Chapter
Justice LA
Latinos United for A New America
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Legal Aid At Work
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition
Lutheran Office of Public Policy - California
Mid-City Community Advocacy Network
Monarch Services
NARAL Pro-Choice California
National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter
National Center for Lesbian Rights
National Center for Youth Law
National Immigration Law Center
North East Medical Services
Oakland Privacy
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center
Partnership for the Advancement of New Americans
Peace Over Violence
People's Pottery Project
Pilipino Workers Center
Prevention at the Intersections
Project Kinship
Project Rebound Consortium
Re:store Justice
San Francisco Public Defender
San Jose Nikkei Resisters
San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP
Santa Barbara Women's Political Committee
Santa Cruz Barrios Unidos INC.
Secure Justice
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
Showing Up for Racial Justice Bay Area
Showing Up for Racial Justice Marin
Smart Justice California
South Bay People Power
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center
Stonewall Democratic Club
The Justice Collaborative, a Project of Tides Advocacy
The Sentencing Project
The W. Haywood Burns Institute
The Women's Foundation of California
Transforming Justice Orange County
Unapologetically Hers
Uncommon Law
Underground Scholars Initiative Berkeley
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council
University of California Student Association
USC Suzanne Dworak Peck School of Social Work's Unchained Scholars
Voices for Progress
White People 4 Black Lives
Women For: Orange County
Young Women's Freedom Center
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/24/20)
California District Attorneys Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
Prepared by: Stella Choe / PUB. S. /
8/26/20 18:35:24
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 2542 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 2542
Author: Kalra (D), Kamlager (D), Robert Rivas (D) and Santiago (D), et al.
Amended: 8/20/20 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 4-2, 8/7/20
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Moorlach, Morrell
NO VOTE RECORDED: Jackson
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/20/20
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Hill, Leyva, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: Not relevant
SUBJECT: Criminal procedure: discrimination
SOURCE: American Friends Service Committee
Anti-Death Penalty Coalition
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
League of Women Voters of California
NextGen California
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits the state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a).)
- States that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
- New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. Specifies that “new evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b).)
- Provides that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473 subd. (c).)
- States that nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies. (Pen. Code, § 1473 subd. (d).)
- Specifies “false evidence” includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e)(1).)
- Provides that a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted on the basis that evidence relating to intimate partner battering and its effects, as defined, was not introduced at the trial relating to the prisoner's incarceration for a conviction of a violent felony, as defined, and was of such substance that had the substantial and competent expert evidence been introduced, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction or sentence, that the result of the proceedings would have been different. (Pen. Code, § 1473.5, subds. (a) & (b).)
- Specifies that habeas corpus is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death. (Pen. Code, § 1509.)
- Creates an explicit right for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a prejudicial error damaging to the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7.)
- Specifies what the prosecution is required to disclose to the defense, including exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession or known to be in the possession of investigating agencies. (Pen. Code, § 1054.1.)
- Provides that a new trial may be granted for specified grounds including when material new evidence is discovered and could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and introduced at trial. An application for new trial must be made and decided before judgment. (Pen. Code, §§ 1180, 1181, 1182.)
- Provides the trial court broad authority to dismiss a case in the interests of justice, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1385.)
- Allows parties an unlimited number of challenges to prospective jurors for cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 226.)
- States that challenges for cause may be based on general disqualification, implied bias, or actual bias. (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1).)
- Defines implied bias as occurring when there is “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 229, subd. (f).)
- Defines actual bias as the “state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
- Allots each party a number of peremptory challenges to jurors – an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.)
This bill:
- Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, obtaining or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- Applies to cases in which judgement has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.
- States that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the above provision.
- States that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing.
- Provides that at the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert.
- States that the defendant shall have the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make findings on the record.
- States that a violation of a discriminatory conviction or sentences may be established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:
- The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- During the trial, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness or juror, used racially discriminatory language or otherwise exhibited bias or animus based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful or directed at a defendant.
- Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenge to demonstrate a violation of this provision.
- The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origins in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- States that a defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation. A motion for discovery under this section shall describe the type of records or information the defendant seeks. Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.
- States that, notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the voters, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that a violation of seeking a discriminatory conviction or sentence, the following remedies shall be imposed as the court deems appropriate to an established violation:
- Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury. If the court determines that it would be in the interest of justice, the court may dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges. Monetary sanctions and training alone are not sufficient as a remedy.
- When a judgement has been entered, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings. If the court finds that the only violation of this bill’s prohibitions was that the defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than other defendants who commit similar offenses and are similarly situated and the court has the ability to rectify the violation by modifying the judgement, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence and find that the conviction is legally invalid, and modify the judgement to impose an appropriate remedy for the violation that occurred. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.
- Prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
- Specifies that remedies available under the provisions of this bill do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.
- Specifies that its provisions applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile delinquency system.
- Provides that its provisions do not prevent the prosecution of hates crimes.
- Provides the following definitions:
- “More frequently sought or obtained” or “more frequently imposed” means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.
- “Prima facie showing means that the defendant produces fact that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of this bill’s prohibitions occurred. For purposes of this section, a “substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.
- “Racially discriminatory language” means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether the language is discriminatory.
- “State” includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, a city prosecutor, or a superior court judge.
- States that a defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregated data among groups to demonstrate a violation of the bill’s provisions.
- Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted following a conviction based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed discriminatorily:
- A petition raising such a claim for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed successive.
- If the petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition on file in state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was sought, obtained or imposed in violation of this bill’s provisions.
- The petition shall state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of the bill’s prohibitions or if requested by the State Public Defender.
- The court shall review the petition and if the court determines that the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause.
- The defendant shall appear at the hearing by video unless counsel indicates that their presence in court is needed.
- If the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.
- Makes conforming changes to allow a person who is no longer in custody to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a violation of this bill.
- States that if the Legislature adopts AB 3070 and it is chaptered and enrolled, then the provisions of this bill related to peremptory challenges shall only apply to cases in which jury selection was completed prior to January 1, 2021.
Comments
According to the author:
The California Racial Justice Act is a countermeasure to a widely condemned 1987 legal precedent established in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp. Known as the McCleskey decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has since required defendants in criminal cases to prove intentional discrimination when challenging racial bias in their legal process. This established an unreasonably high standard for victims of racism in the criminal legal system that is almost impossible to meet without direct proof that the racially discriminatory behavior was conscious, deliberate and targeted. The Court’s majority, however, also observed that State Legislatures concerned about racial bias in the criminal justice system could act to address it.
Regarding the unprecedented times we are facing in the fight against COVID-19, this bill is more needed today than it was prior to the appearance of the virus. Prejudiced and discriminatory treatment does not stop because of COVID-19. It continues and those impacted by the socio-economic disparities in the application of the law have historically been and continue to be disproportionately people of color. This plays a distinct role in how and when a person is charged with a crime and how they pursue their due process in the courts. Without acting now, we continue to allow rulings such as the McCleskey precedent to guide the application of race and racism in courts.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Courts: Unknown workload cost increases, potentially in the low millions of dollars. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the Budget Act of 2020 appropriated $273.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Incarceration savings: Unknown potential savings in state incarceration costs for individuals who do not receive a prison sentence because of this bill. The FY 2020-2021 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $91,100 annually, with an annual marginal rate per person of over $12,000. The contract bed rate averages to about $29,000 annually. Aside from marginal cost savings per individual, however, the department would experience an institutional cost savings only if the number of persons incarcerated decreased to a level to effectuate the closing of a yard or wing of a prison. (General Fund)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/20/20)
American Friends Service Committee (co-source)
Anti-Death Penalty Coalition (co-source)
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California (co-source)
California Coalition for Women Prisoners (co-source)
Californians United for a Responsible Budget (co-source)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights (co-source)
League of Women Voters of California (co-source)
NextGen California (co-source)
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930 (co-source)
8th Amendment Project
A New Path
A New Way of Life Re-entry Project
Alianza for Youth Justice
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Amnesty International USA
Anti-recidivism Coalition
Asian Law Alliance
Bend the Arc: Jewish Action
Black Leadership Kitchen Cabinet
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Faculty Association
California Federation of Teachers
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Innocence Coalition
California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO
California League of United Latin American Citizens
California Nurses Association
California Public Defenders Association
California Teachers Association
Californians for Justice
Californians for Safety and Justice
Centro Binacional Para El Desarrollo Indígena Oaxaqueno
Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice
Community Agency for Resources Advocacy and Services
Consumer Attorneys of California
Disability Rights California
Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities
Empowering Pacific Islander Communities
Ensuring Opportunity Campaign to End Poverty in Contra Costa County
Equal Justice Society
Equal Justice USA
Equal Rights Advocates
F.U.E.L. – Families United to End LWOP
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Huckleberry Youth Programs
Human Impact Partners
If/When/How: Lawyering for Reproductive Justice
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Indivisible Sausalito
Indivisible South Bay LA
Indivisible Yolo
Initiate Justice
Inland Empire – Immigrant Youth Collective
Innercity Struggle
Insight Center for Community Economic Development
Insight Garden Program
Japanese American Citizens League, Pacific Southwest District
Japanese American Citizens League, San Jose Chapter
Justice LA
Latinos United for A New America
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Legal Aid At Work
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition
Lutheran Office of Public Policy - California
Mid-City Community Advocacy Network
Monarch Services
NARAL Pro-Choice California
National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter
National Center for Lesbian Rights
National Center for Youth Law
National Immigration Law Center
North East Medical Services
Oakland Privacy
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center
Partnership for the Advancement of New Americans
Peace Over Violence
People's Pottery Project
Pilipino Workers Center
Prevention at the Intersections
Project Kinship
Project Rebound Consortium
Re:store Justice
San Francisco Public Defender
San Jose Nikkei Resisters
San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP
Santa Barbara Women's Political Committee
Santa Cruz Barrios Unidos INC.
Secure Justice
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
Showing Up for Racial Justice Bay Area
Showing Up for Racial Justice Marin
Smart Justice California
South Bay People Power
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center
Stonewall Democratic Club
The Justice Collaborative, a Project of Tides Advocacy
The Sentencing Project
The W. Haywood Burns Institute
The Women's Foundation of California
Transforming Justice Orange County
Unapologetically Hers
Uncommon Law
Underground Scholars Initiative Berkeley
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council
University of California Student Association
USC Suzanne Dworak Peck School of Social Work's Unchained Scholars
Voices for Progress
White People 4 Black Lives
Women For: Orange County
Young Women's Freedom Center
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/20/20)
California District Attorneys Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
Prepared by: Stella Choe / PUB. S. /
8/25/20 10:06:03
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 2542 (Kalra) - Criminal procedure: discrimination
Version: August 1, 2020 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 4 - 2 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: Yes |
Hearing Date: August 20, 2020 | Consultant: Shaun Naidu |
Bill Summary:
AB 2542 would prohibit the state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, as specified.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on August 20, 2020
Fiscal Impact:
- Courts: Unknown workload cost increases, potentially in the low millions of dollars. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the Budget Act of 2020 appropriated $273.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Incarceration savings: Unknown potential savings in state incarceration costs for individuals who do not receive a prison sentence because of this bill. The FY 2020-2021 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $91,100 annually, with an annual marginal rate per person of over $12,000. The contract bed rate averages to about $29,000 annually. Aside from marginal cost savings per individual, however, the department would experience an institutional cost savings only if the number of persons incarcerated decreased to a level to effectuate the closing of a yard or wing of a prison. (General Fund)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Author Amendments:
- Clarify language on disparity analysis by adding “similarly situated.”
- Require the defense to file a motion for discovery and to describe the records requested and show good cause.
- Clarify language on remedies.
- Allow the reviewing court to modify the sentence.
- Specify application to the juvenile delinquency system.
- Raise the standard to grant the motion for a hearing in the trial court.
- Limit the retroactive application. (This Committee rejected certain author amendments.)
- Clarify that the ability to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is available only following a conviction.
- Require appointment of counsel for the habeas petition only if the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of this bill or if requested by the Office of the State Public Defender.
- Allow a petitioner to appear by video in post-conviction proceedings.
- Allow a person who is not in custody to vacate a conviction or sentence due to a violation of this bill.
Committee Amendments:
Limit the application of the bill to cases in which judgement has not been entered prior to January 1, 2021.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 2542 (Kalra) - Criminal procedure: discrimination
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 2542 would prohibit the state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, as specified.
Fiscal Impact:
- Courts: The Judicial Council estimates increased workload costs between the range of $9.3 million and $40.6 million given the prospective and retroactive application of this measure. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the Budget Act of 2020 appropriated $273.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Transporting habeas petitioners: Unknown, potentially-significant workload costs to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to supervise and transport inmates from state facilities to the appropriate courthouses for the petition and resentencing hearings. Actual costs would be dependent on the number of individuals the department is required to transport and how many CDCR could transport and supervise per excursion. (General Fund)
- Incarceration savings: Unknown potential savings in state incarceration costs for individuals whom the court sentences (or resentences) to a lower term of imprisonment and are released from state facilities earlier than they would be absent this measure or who do not receive a prison sentence because of this bill. These savings would be offset, in part, to the extent that these individuals are placed on parole (as opposed to post-release community supervision). The FY 2020-2021 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $91,100 annually, with an annual marginal rate per person of over $12,000. The contract bed rate averages to about $29,000 annually. Aside from marginal cost savings per individual, however, the department would experience an institutional cost savings only if the number of persons incarcerated decreased to a level to effectuate the closing of a yard or wing of a prison. (General Fund)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Background:
Existing law allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of their imprisonment or restraint. A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to the person’s incarceration.
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material, or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
- New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. “New evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death.
Additionally, existing law creates an explicit right for a person who is no longer imprisoned or restrained to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a prejudicial error damaging to the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or based on newly-discovered evidence of actual innocence, as specified.
The prosecution is required to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession or known to be in the possession of investigating agencies. The trial court broad authority to dismiss a case in the interests of justice, except as specified.
Parties in a criminal case are allowed an unlimited number of challenges to prospective jurors for cause, and challenges for cause may be based on general disqualification, implied bias, or actual bias. “Implied bias” occurs when there is the existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party. “Actual bias” is defined as the state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.
Separate from challenges for cause, each party may strike a prospective juror through the use of a peremptory challenge for which no reason needs be given. Parties can make only a limited number of peremptory challenges for each case.
Proposed Law:
This bill would:
- Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, obtaining or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- Allow a defendant to file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement had been imposed, to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the above provision.
- Require the court shall hold a hearing if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation.
- Allow either party to present evidence at the hearing, including statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court would be allowed to appoint an independent expert.
- Placed the burden of proof on the defendant to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Require the court to make findings on the record at the conclusion of the hearing.
- Allow a violation of a discriminatory conviction or sentences to established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:
- The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- During the trial, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness or juror, used racially discriminatory language or otherwise exhibited bias or animus based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful or directed at a defendant.
- Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenge to demonstrate a violation of this provision.
- The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origins in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- Require the prosecution to disclose to the defense all evidence relevant to a potential violation pursuant to a written request. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.
- Require the following remedies to be imposed if, notwithstanding any other law, the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that a violation of seeking a discriminatory conviction or sentence:
- Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges. Monetary sanctions and training alone are not sufficient as a remedy.
- When a judgement has been entered, the court is required to vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings.
- Prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
- Applies the provisions of this measure to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile justice system.
- Allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed discriminatorily, as specified.
- Specify that the provisions of this bill related to peremptory challenges apply only to cases in which jury selection was completed prior to January 1, 2021, if AB 3070 is enacted.
Related Legislation:
AB 1798 (Levine, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) would have would prohibited a person from being executed pursuant to a judgment that was either sought or obtained on the basis of race if the court makes a finding that race was a significant factor in seeking or imposing the death penalty. AB 1798 was held on the Suspense File of the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
AB 3070 (Weber, 2019-2022 Reg. Sess.) would make a number of substantive and procedural changes related to peremptory challenges on the basis of a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups. AB 3070 is pending in this Committee.
Staff Comments:
Between FY 2009 and FY 2018 courts handled approximately 10.2 million criminal felony, misdemeanor and juvenile delinquency cases. Determining the number of cases that are retroactively eligible is difficult, but if only 1 percent of criminal cases disposed of since FY 2008 apply for habeas relief pursuant to AB 2542, it would translate to 100,000 petitions. Feedback from the courts indicates a general estimate of between three minutes and 15 minutes would be spent to review each petition to determine if it meets the “prima facie” standard for an additional review hearings. For 100,000 petitions, that would equal a workload cost for the courts of between $4.8 million $24 million.
Although there are many variables that influence whether a petition will be able to meet the prima facie standard for an additional review hearing, if only 5 percent of the estimated potentially eligible petitions are granted additional review, it would result in 5,000 additional review hearings that are estimated to take between 30 minutes and 90 minutes per case. This equates to an increased workload cost to the courts of between $2.4 million and $7.2 million.
Additionally, AB 2542 likely would produce additional costs to CDCR to transport incarcerated individuals to and from court for habeas corpus petition hearings. There are many factors that affect the costs of out-of-institution transportation, including each person’s escape risk and in-custody behavior, the distance from the person’s housing facility to the courthouse, and the pace at which a court moves through its docket. Presuming that two correctional officers with regular hourly wages would transport one person with a total travel and court time of four hours, which is a conservative assumption, this bill would cost the department almost $300 per hearing. If the court and travel time were extended, department costs would rise commensurately. If CDCR is able to transport multiple inmates to a courthouse at one time, the per-incarcerated person costs would be lowered in turn.
With respect to workload cost to the courts related to prospective cases, there were about 681,000 criminal cases disposed of in FY 2018, but factoring in an average of 7 percent decline in the disposition of cases over the past five years, a total universe of loosely 634,000 criminal cases annually would be a more realistic figure for the total number of cases that could be impacted by this bill. If 5 percent (30,000) of these cases resulted in challenges pursuant to AB 2542, at between three minutes and 15 minutes of reviewing time each, it would cost $1.4 million to $7.2 million in additional court workload. If 5 percent of the 30,000 challenges leads to an additional review hearing of between 30 minutes and 90 minutes per hearing, that would result in an additional workload cost to the courts of between $700,000 and $2.2 million.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: AB 2542 Hearing Date: August 7, 2020
Author: | Kalra | ||
Version: | August 1, 2020 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SC | ||
Subject: Criminal Procedure: Discrimination
HISTORY
Source: American Friends Service Committee
Anti-Death Penalty Coalition
Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
Californians United for Responsible Budgets
Ella Baker Center on Human Rights
League of Women Voters California
Nextgen Policy
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Prior Legislation: AB 1798 (Levine), held in Asm. Approps. 2019
Support: 8th Amendment Project; A New Path; A New Way of Life Re-entry Project; Alianza for Youth Justice; Alliance for Boys and Men of Color; American Civil Liberties Union of California; Anti-recidivism Coalition; Asian Law Alliance; Bend the Arc: Jewish Action; Black Leadership Kitchen Cabinet; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Federation of Teachers; California Immigrant Policy Center; California Innocence Coalition; California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO; California League of United Latin American Citizens; California Nurses Association; California Public Defenders Association; California Teachers Association; Californians for Justice; Californians for Safety and Justice; Centro Binacional Para El Desarrollo Indígena Oaxaqueno; Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice; Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ); Community Agency for Resources Advocacy and Services; Consumer Attorneys of California; Disability Rights California; Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities; Empowering Pacific Islander Communities (EPIC); Ensuring Opportunity Campaign to End Poverty in Contra Costa County; Equal Justice Society; Equal Justice USA; Equal Rights Advocates; F.U.E.L - Families United to End LWOP; Felony Murder Elimination Project; Friends Committee on Legislation of California; Huckleberry Youth Programs; Human Impact Partners; Inland Empire - Immigrant Youth Collective; If/when/how: Lawyering for Reproductive Justice; Immigrant Legal Resource Center; Indivisible Sausalito; Indivisible South Bay LA; Indivisible Yolo; Initiate Justice; Innercity Struggle; Insight Center for Community Economic Development; Insight Garden Program; Japanese American Citizens League - Pacific Southwest District; Japanese American Citizens League, San Jose Chapter; Justice LA; Latinos United for A New America; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights; League of Women Voters of California; Legal Aid At Work; Legal Services for Prisoners With Children; Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition; Lutheran Office of Public Policy – California; Mid-city Community Advocacy Network; Monarch Services; National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter; National Center for Lesbian Rights; National Center for Youth Law; National Immigration Law Center; Nextgen California; North East Medical Services; Oakland Privacy; Pacific Juvenile Defender Center; Partnership for the Advancement of New Americans; Peace Over Violence; People's Pottery Project; Pilipino Workers Center; Prevention At the Intersections; Project Kinship; Project Rebound Consortium; Re:store Justice; San Francisco Public Defender; San Jose Nikkei Resisters; San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP; Santa Cruz Barrios Unidos Inc.; Secure Justice; Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network; Showing Up for Racial Justice (SURJ) Bay Area; Smart Justice CA; South Bay People Power; Southeast Asia Resource Action Center; Stonewall Democratic Club; Showing Up for Racial Justice (SURJ) Marin; The Justice Collaborative; The Sentencing Project; The W. Haywood Burns Institute; The Women's Foundation of California; Transforming Justice OC; Unapologetically Hers; Uncommon Law; Underground Scholars Initiative Berkeley; United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council; University of California Student Association; USC Suzanne Dworak Peck School of Social Work's Unchained Scholars; Voices for Progress; White People 4 Black Lives; Women For: Orange County; Young Women's Freedom Center
Opposition: California District Attorneys Association; California State Sheriffs’ Association
Assembly Floor Vote: Not relevant
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to prohibit the state from seeking or upholding a conviction or sentence that is discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, or national origin as specified.
Existing law allows a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a).)
Existing law states that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
- New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. Specifies that “new evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
(Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b).)
Existing law provides that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473 subd. (c).)
Existing law states that nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies. (Pen. Code, § 1473 subd. (d).)
Existing law specifies “false evidence” includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e)(1).)
Existing law provides that a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted on the basis that evidence relating to intimate partner battering and its effects, as defined, was not introduced at the trial relating to the prisoner's incarceration for a conviction of a violent felony, as defined, and was of such substance that had the substantial and competent expert evidence been introduced, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction or sentence, that the result of the proceedings would have been different. (Pen. Code, § 1473.5, subds. (a) & (b).)
Existing law specifies that habeas corpus is the exclusive procedure for collateral attack on a judgment of death. (Pen. Code, § 1509.)
Existing law creates an explicit right for a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence based on a prejudicial error damaging to the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1473.7.)
Existing law specifies what the prosecution is required to disclose to the defense, including exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession or known to be in the possession of investigating agencies. (Pen. Code, § 1054.1.)
Existing law provides that a new trial may be granted for specified grounds including when material new evidence is discovered and could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and introduced at trial. An application for new trial must be made and decided before judgment. (Pen. Code, §§ 1180, 1181, 1182.)
Existing law provides the trial court broad authority to dismiss a case in the interests of justice, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1385.)
Existing law allows parties an unlimited number of challenges to prospective jurors for cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 226.)
Existing law states that challenges for cause may be based on general disqualification, implied bias, or actual bias. (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1).)
Existing law defines implied bias as occurring when there is “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 229, subd. (f).)
Existing law defines actual bias as the “state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
Existing law allots each party a number of peremptory challenges to jurors – an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.)
This bill prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, obtaining or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.
This bill states that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement had been imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the above provision.
This bill states that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing.
This bill provides that at the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert.
This bill states that the defendant shall have the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make findings on the record.
This bill states that a violation of a discriminatory conviction or sentences may be established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following:
- The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.
- During the trial, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness or juror, used racially discriminatory language or otherwise exhibited bias or animus based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful or directed at a defendant.
- Race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The defendant need not show that purposeful discrimination occurred in the exercise of peremptory challenge to demonstrate a violation of this provision.
- The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar offenses and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origins in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
- A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other individuals convicted of the same offense and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.
This bill states that pursuant to a written request, the prosecution shall disclose to the defense all evidence relevant to a potential violation. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.
This bill states that, notwithstanding any other law, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that a violation of seeking a discriminatory conviction or sentence, the following remedies shall be imposed:
- Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges. Monetary sanctions and training alone are not sufficient as a remedy.
- When a judgement has been entered, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings.
- Prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
This bill specifies that remedies available under the provisions of this bill do not foreclose any other remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or any other law.
This bill specifies that its provisions applies to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile justice system.
This bill provides that its provisions do not prevent the prosecution of hates crimes.
This bill provides the following definitions:
- “More frequently sought or obtained” or “more frequently imposed” means that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have committed similar offenses and the prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.
- “Prima facie showing: means that the defendant produces fact that, if true, establish that the defendant is a member of one or more of the classes covered by the provisions of the bill and raise an inference of a violation.
- “Racially discriminatory language” means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether the language is discriminatory.
- “State” includes the Attorney General, a district attorney, a city prosecutor, or a superior court judge.
This bill states that a defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more than one group. A defendant may aggregated data among groups to demonstrate a violation of the bill’s provisions.
This bill specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted based on evidence that a criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed discriminatorily:
- A petition raising such a claim, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed successive.
- If the petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition on file in state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was sought, obtained or imposed in violation of this bill’s provisions.
- The petition shall state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the court shall appoint counsel if requested.
- The court shall review the petition and if the court determines that the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the state declines to show cause.
- If the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis for its conclusion.
This bill states that if the Legislature adopts AB 3070 and it is chaptered and enrolled, then the provisions of this bill related to peremptory challenges shall only apply to cases in which jury selection was completed prior to January 1, 2021.
This bill makes a number of Legislative findings and declarations including the following:
- It is the intent of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, inimical to a fair criminal justice system, and violates the laws and Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although often unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into proceedings similar to intentional bias. The intent of the Legislature is not to punish this type of bias, but rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system. It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing. It is the intent of the Legislature to reject the conclusion that racial disparities within our criminal justice are inevitable, and to actively work to eradicate them.
- It is the further intent of the Legislature to provide remedies that will eliminate racially discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system, in addition to intentional discrimination. It is the further intent of the Legislature to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author of this bill:
One year ago, Governor Gavin Newsom imposed a moratorium on executions, stating that it is a racist system perpetuating inequality. As person of color and a former deputy public defender, I have seen racial discrimination in the court system first hand. We must confront racism in the courts. We can no longer accept racial bias in the criminal justice system as unfixable. The California Racial Justice Act will help us take an important step in prohibiting the use of race and ethnicity as a factor in the state’s justice system across the board.
The California Racial Justice Act is a countermeasure to a widely condemned 1987 legal precedent established in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp. Known as the McCleskey decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has since required defendants in criminal cases to prove intentional discrimination when challenging racial bias in their legal process. This established an unreasonably high standard for victims of racism in the criminal legal system that is almost impossible to meet without direct proof that the racially discriminatory behavior was conscious, deliberate and targeted. The Court’s majority, however, also observed that State Legislatures concerned about racial bias in the criminal justice system could act to address it.
Regarding the unprecedented times we are facing in the fight against COVID-19, this bill is more needed today than it was prior to the appearance of the virus. Prejudiced and discriminatory treatment does not stop because of COVID-19. It continues and those impacted by the socio-economic disparities in the application of the law have historically been and continue to be disproportionately people of color. This plays a distinct role in how and when a person is charged with a crime and how they pursue their due process in the courts. Without acting now, we continue to allow rulings such as the McCleskey precedent to guide the application of race and racism in courts.
- McClesky v. Kemp
In McClesky v. Kemp, (1987) 481 U.S. 279, the defendant, a black man, was sentenced to death for the murder of a white police officer during the course of a robbery. The defendant filed a habeas petition challenging his sentence on the grounds that the death penalty is administered in a discriminatory manner in Georgia in violation of the equal protection clause and cruel and unusual punishment clause under the 14th and 8th Amendments to the U.S Constitution. In support of his claim, the defendant proffered a statistical study indicating that, even after taking into account nonracial variables, defendants who were charged with killing whites 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty in Georgia as opposed to killing blacks, and in general black defendants were 1.1 times more likely to receive a death sentence than other defendants. The District Court denied his petition and the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court. Both courts assumed the validity of the study.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiori and in reviewing the case, the Court also assumed the validity of the study which conducted an extensive examination of over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. The study indicated that black defendants who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. (McClesky v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 287.)
The defendant claimed that the Georgia capital punishment statute violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment because a defendant’s race and the race of the victim has an impact on the likelihood of being sentenced to death, as evidenced by the study. The Court began its analysis with the principal that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving purposeful discrimination that had a discriminatory effect on the defendant. (Ibid.) While statistical evidence had been accepted by the Court to prove an equal protection violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district, the Court reasoned that the nature of the capital sentencing decision is fundamentally different than venire-selection.
Most importantly, each particular decision to impose the death penalty is made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire. Each jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular capital offense. . . . . Thus, the application of an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from general statistics to a specific venire-selection. . . . In those cases, the statistics relate to fewer entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged decisions.
(Id. at p. 294.) The Court thus held that the study is insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in defendant’s case acted with discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of the equal protection clause. The defendant’s argument that the study proves that the State as whole acted with discriminatory purpose by adopting a criminal punishment statute despite its allegedly discriminatory application also failed because there was no evidence that the statute was enacted to further a racially discriminatory purpose. (Id. at p. 298.)
The defendant’s claim that Georgia’s capital sentencing system violates the Eighth Amendment was also rejected by the Court. The Court found that the defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to other death sentences imposed in the state and the fact that the capital sentencing statute gives jurors discretion does not make the application of the law arbitrary and capricious because focused discretion is fundamental in the criminal justice system. (Id. at p. 311-312.)
According to background information provided by the author’s office, the ruling in McClesky requiring proof of intentional or purposeful discrimination established a legal standard nearly impossible to meet.
This bill allows racial bias to be shown by, among other things, statistical evidence that convictions for an offense were more frequently sought or obtained against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin than for defendants of other races, ethnicities or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained; or longer or more severe sentences were imposed on persons based on their race, ethnicity or national origin or based on the victim’s race, ethnicity or national origin. This bill does not require the discrimination to have been purposeful or to have had prejudicial impact on the defendant’s case.
- Bias by Judicial Officers
This bill provides that the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. A defendant may prove a violation of this section by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not standard), that a judge or attorney, among other listed persons associated with the defendant’s case, exhibited bias towards the defendant, or used racially discriminatory language or otherwise exhibited bias or animus, based on the defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin. There is not a requirement that the racially discriminatory language be purposeful or directed at the defendant. Under the bill’s provisions, if a prosecutor, judge or defense attorney is found to have used racially discriminatory language or exhibited racial bias during trial, the remedies could include ordering a new trial or potential dismissal or reduction of charges.
- Judicial Bias
A judge can be disqualified from a case if “it is established that the judge is prejudiced against party or attorney of the interest of a party or attorney appearing in the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6, subd. (a)(1).)
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires "a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal' (Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35, 46, 43 L.Ed.2d 712) before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case." (Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 904-905; see e.g., (See Berger v. U.S. (1921) 255 U.S. 22, 28 [judge's expressed belief that "German-Americans['] . . . hearts are reeking with disloyalty" barred judge from presiding over espionage trial against German-American defendants].) Generally, a party can move to disqualify a judge prior to the start of trial. (Code Civ. Proc. §170.6, subd. (a)(2).)
- Prosecutor Bias
A defendant may move to disqualify a district attorney. (Pen. Code, § 1424.) "The motion may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial." (Pen. Code, § 1424, subd. (a)(1).) Under the statute, the mere appearance of impropriety is not an independent ground for prosecutorial disqualification. (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 592.) The statutory language presumes a motion for disqualification will be filed before trial. (Pen. Code, § 1424, subd. (a)(1).)
Generally, a trial court may find a prosecutor in contempt of court, issue a fine or reprimand, or recommend to bar associations to take disciplinary action. During trial, a prosecutor’s misconduct can result in the trial court ordering a new trial. (Pen. Code, § 1181.)
- Defense Attorney Bias
A defendant is entitled to new appointed counsel if the record shows the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation or that there is such an irreconcilable conflict or complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that ineffective representation is likely to result. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 95; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905.)
In the context of a writ of habeas, the standard of ineffective counsel in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights is shown by the following: 1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) counsel’s performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that if counsel had performed adequately, the result would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1968) 466 U.S. 668.)
- Disclosures by Prosecution
In Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, the United States Supreme Court held that federal constitutional due process creates an obligation on the part of the prosecution to disclose all evidence within its possession that is favorable to the defendant and material on the issue of guilt or punishment. Brady evidence includes evidence that impeaches prosecution witnesses, even if it is not inherently exculpatory. (Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-155.) Further, the prosecution's disclosure obligation under Brady extends to evidence collected or known by other members of the prosecution team, including law enforcement, in connection with the investigation of the case. (In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 696-697, citing Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 437.) In order to comply with Brady, “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.” (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 437; accord, In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879.)
Evidence is material under Brady if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the information been disclosed. (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682.) The prosecution's duty to disclose exists whether or not the defendant specifically requests the information. (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107.) Failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused violates due process irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.)
This bill would require the prosecution, pursuant to a written request, to disclose to the defense all evidence relevant to a potential violation of this bill’s prohibition against seeking a conviction or sentencing based on race, ethnicity or national origin. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure.
- Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
Challenges to a juror for cause are constitutionally guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as under our state Constitution, both of which confer the rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. (People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 916.) In California, criminal defendants and prosecutors are allowed an unlimited number of challenges to prospective jurors for cause. (Ibid; Code Civ. Proc., § 226.) Challenges for cause may be based on “[g]eneral disqualification,” “[i]mplied bias,” or “[a]ctual bias.” (Black, supra, at p. 916; see Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1).) Implied bias occurs when there is “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 229, subd. (f).) Actual bias is defined as the “state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
In addition to challenges to jurors for cause, depending on the offense and number of defendants tried in a case, each side is allotted a number of peremptory challenges – an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. The court is required to excuse jurors challenged peremptorily. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.) “Although challenges for cause are constitutionally guaranteed, the right to peremptory challenges is statutory.” (People v. Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 916; Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a).) In other words, “‘[p]eremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension,’ but are merely 'a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury.’” (Black, supra, at pp. 916-917.)
Though no reason need be given when exercising a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror, use of a peremptory challenge to exclude jurors based on membership in a cognizable group – e.g., racial, religious, ethnic -- violates both the federal and state Constitutions. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276 [decision based on California Constitution representative cross-section rule]; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84 [decision based on Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment]; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1313.) Batson-Wheeler applies to both the defense and the prosecution. (Georgia v. McCollum (1992) 505 U.S. 42, 59; People v. Willis (2002) 27 Cal.4th 811.)
The question of whether a peremptory challenge has been improperly exercised requires a three-step Batson inquiry. (Chism, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1313.) “‘First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing [“. . . the defendant must show that such facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 81] that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. [Citation.] The three-step procedure also applies to state constitutional claims.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 506)
If a jury “has been partially or totally stripped of members of a cognizable group by the improper use of peremptory challenges,” one remedy is for the trial court to dismiss the selected jurors and the remaining venire. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282.) “Under such circumstances, and with the assent of the complaining party, the trial court should have the discretion to issue appropriate orders short of outright dismissal of the remaining jury, including … reseating any improperly discharged jurors if they are available to serve.” (People v. Willis (2002) 27 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
On January 29, 2020, the California Supreme Court announced it will form a new work group to study whether modifications or additional measures are needed to guard against impermissible discrimination in jury selection.
For more than 30 years, courts have applied the legal framework set forth in Batson/Wheeler for ferreting out impermissible discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. In recent years, some states have adopted or begun to consider additional measures designed to address perceived shortcomings in the practical application of the Batson framework and to better ensure that juries represent a cross-section of their communities. Today we join this dialogue with the creation of the California Jury Selection Work Group.
The purpose of this work group is to undertake a thoughtful, inclusive study of how Batson/Wheeler operates in practice in California and whether modifications or additional measures are warranted to address impermissible discrimination against cognizable groups in jury selection.
(< https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/supreme-court-announces-jury-selection-work-group > [as of Aug. 3, 2020].)
This bill would provide the defendant with a more favorable standard to trigger relief where peremptory challenges are used based on race. It would require the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that race, ethnicity, or national origin was a factor in the exercise of a peremptory challenge and does not require a showing of purposeful discrimination.
A separate pending bill, AB 3070, would prohibit racial discrimination in the selection of juries. This bill provides that if AB 3070 is enacted, this bill’s provisions would apply retroactively, while AB 3070’s provisions would apply prospectively.
- Writ of Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus, also known as "the Great Writ", is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from illegal restraint. The functions of the writ is set forth in Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (a): “Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.” Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (d) specifies that “nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted.” A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; and,
- Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b).)
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
A habeas corpus claim of false testimony requires proof that false evidence was introduced against petitioner at his or her trial and that such evidence was material or probative on the issue of his or her guilt. (In re Bell (2007) 42 Cal.4th 630, italics added.) False evidence introduced at trial against a defendant is substantially material or probative if there is a reasonable probability that, had the false evidence not been introduced, the result would have been different. (In re Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 726, italics added.) A reasonable probability that the result would have been different if false evidence had not been introduced against defendant is a chance great enough, under the totality of circumstances, to undermine the court's confidence in the outcome. (Ibid.)
A writ of habeas corpus may also be prosecuted based on newly discovered evidence. The new evidence must be “credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(3)(A), italics added.)
This bill would provide that writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted where the state violates the bill’s prohibition against seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. Unlike existing habeas provisions, the bill’s habeas provision does not require a showing that the bias was prejudicial to the criminal proceedings. If the petitioner is successful in their habeas claim, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings that are consistent with the bill’s prohibitions against racial bias.
- Remedies
This bill specifies the remedies available for a violation of its provisions. Specifically, if a person has not yet been sentenced (during pretrial or trial proceedings), the bill provides that the court may “reseat a juror removed by use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or dismiss or reduce one or more charges. Monetary sanctions and training alone are not sufficient as a remedy.”
When judgment of guilt has already been entered, and the court finds that the conviction was sought in violation of the new law, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings. If the court finds that only the sentence was sought in violation of the bill’s provisions, the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.
If a violation of the new law is found, the defendant shall not be eligible for the death penalty.
California Judges Association, who is not opposed to the bill, but has concerns, writes:
Current law balances the importance of the finality of valid judgment against the need to provide a mechanism for challenging invalid judgements by providing for a “screening” mechanism in many areas. For example, California Rules of Court, Rule 4.551, sets forth the manner in which habeas corpus proceedings shall occur, and only provides for a full evidentiary hearings once a court has determined that the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief. This permits evidentiary hearings, and the extensive court resources that they entail, to be reserved for cases that a court has found are not frivolous.
The prima facie showing required in this bill is an “inference of a violation.” Is this a high enough standard considering there is no required showing of prejudicial impact on the case, i.e. without the violation there is a reasonable probably that the result would have been different? Could the court be required to order a remedy such as a new hearing or order a new trial or reduce sentencing, even if the result of the new proceedings would likely be the same as the original proceedings?
- Argument in Support
According to Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, a co-sponsor of this bill:
This bill is needed because of a widely condemned 1987 legal precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp. The McCleskey decision has the functional effect of requiring that criminal defendants prove intentional discrimination when challenging racial bias in their legal process. This is an unreasonably high and is almost impossible to meet without direct proof that the racially discriminatory behavior was conscious, deliberate and targeted.
Californians have relied on state or federal constitutional provisions to challenge discrimination in the criminal justice system. However, these provisions are insufficient to address persistent racial discrimination in the criminal legal system, because courts have concluded that, due to the McCleskey case and others, proof of purposeful discrimination is required. As a result, California convictions and sentences are routinely upheld despite:
• Blatantly racist statements by attorneys, judges, jurors and expert witnesses;
• The exclusion of all, or nearly all Black, Brown, Native, Indigenous, and people of color from serving on a jury; and
• Stark statistical evidence showing systemic bias in charging and sentencing.
The McCleskey majority observed that state legislatures concerned about racial bias in the criminal legal system could act to address the problem. We agree. Just as California's Unruh Civil Rights Act currently prohibits racial discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodation, we need a statewide policy that makes it unlawful to discriminate against Black and Brown people in the state’s criminal legal system. It's time to take a stand against racial discrimination in our criminal legal system.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the California District Attorneys Association:
First, under proposed Penal Code section 745(d), a court will be required to hold lengthy and costly evidentiary hearings involving the testimony of attorneys, law enforcement officers, jurors, experts, or other members of the criminal justice system . . . . These hearings will necessarily involve massive amounts of statistical evidence which must take into account numerous and intangible factors in order to be valid and will grind the system to a halt at a time when the court system is already facing tremendous delays and burdensome costs in holding trials due to the pandemic. To delay a criminal proceeding and force testimony from innumerable witnesses based merely on an accusation of bias absent some initial showing “that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose” (Wayte v. United States (1985) 470 U.S. 598, 608) reflects an ideological “ends justify the means” approach that is oblivious to practical concerns.
Second, this bill is retroactive to ALL cases. Practically every single conviction that has ever occurred in California can now be re-opened and potentially reversed. All the defendant needs to do is allege one of the five grounds described in section 745(b) were present at trial or sentencing. Moreover, the defendant may be able to mandate a hearing without any showing at all or based on no more than a prima facie showing. The difficulties in trying to defend against the allegation and the ramifications of dismissal are compounded because relevant statistics are more likely to be absent, relevant witnesses (i.e., judges, attorneys, prosecutors, officers, etc.,) may be dead, and retrying the cases after years or decades may be impossible.
Third, a successful motion to overturn a conviction or obtain habeas relief based on a violation of section 745 requires no showing of prejudice! Together, proposed Penal Code sections 745(b)(1) and 745(e)(1) would require either the granting of a mistrial, the dismissal of a case, or a reduction in charges if a judge, attorney, law enforcement officer involved in the case, expert witness, or juror was biased against a defendant because of defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin - without any showing that the defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the bias, that the bias has any impact whatsoever on the outcome of the trial, or that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial!
-- END –
Date of Hearing: June 2, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2542
Author:(Kalra) – As Introduced Ver:February 19, 2020
Policy Committee: | Transportation | Vote: | 15 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill changes the timeframe within which a regional transportation planning agency must annually submit a report to the State Controller’s Office (SCO) on eligibility for the State Transit Assistance (STA).
The bill also deletes the requirement that the Controller submit an annual STA report to the Legislature and instead requires the Controller to compile, publish, and make publicly available on its website the data and information on or before November 1 of each year.
FISCAL EFFECT:
No state costs.
COMMENTS:
Purpose and Background. State law provides for the funding of local transportation services by distributing revenue generated from two sources: the Local Transportation Funds (LTF), derived from a ¼ cent of the general sales tax collected statewide, and the State Transit Assistance Fund (STA), derived from the statewide sales tax on diesel fuel.
The Legislature appropriates STA funds to the Controller, who distributes the funds to local transportation planning agencies, based on a statutory formula—50% allocated by population and 50% allocated according to transit operator revenues from the prior fiscal year. The local agencies then use the funds for transportation planning and local transit. Law requires the local agencies to file financial reports with the SCO by June 15 of each year. The Controller, in turn, must compute and publish an estimate of STA Program payments for the current fiscal year by August 1.
The Controller (sponsor) describes this timeframe as constrained and seeks the changes in the bill to allow the SCO to complete its work accurately. According to the author:
AB 2542 will allow additional time to identify errors and reporting discrepancies, resolve issues prior to calculating transportation fund estimates, and help ensure accurate STA allocations are made to transit operators. AB 2542 will also change the publishing data of transit operator FTR data to November 1st of each year to align with the publication of all other FTR data received from counties, cities, and special districts.
Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: May 4, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
Jim Frazier, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2542 (
Author:Kalra) – As Introduced Ver:February 19, 2020
SUBJECT: Local transportation funds: State Transit Assistance Program: reports
SUMMARY: Revises provisions of annual reporting requirements in relation to the State Transit Assistance Program (STA). Specifically, this bill:
- Shifts the deadline for when a regional transportation planning agency (RTPA) must submit an STA eligibility report to the State Controller’s Office (SCO) to within seven months of the end of each fiscal year.
- Requires SCO to compile, publish, and make publicly available on its website the data and information of all transit operator financial transaction reports (FTRs) on or before November 1 of each year.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the State Controller as the state’s chief financial officer whose responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the accounting and record-keeping of state funds and the auditing and review of state operations.
- Establishes STA as a program where SCO allocates funds, generated from the state sales tax on diesel fuels, to support the operating and capital costs of eligible transit operators, as defined.
- Requires SCO to allocate STA funds to STA-eligible transit operators, as defined, by a formula where 50% of funds are allocated by population and 50% of funds are allocated according to operator revenues from the prior fiscal year.
- Requires SCO to design and adopt a uniform system of accounts and records under which transit operators, as defined, must file annual reports of their finances and operations (FTRs) within seven months of the end of the fiscal year.
- Requires RTPAs to report to SCO those STA-eligible transit operators within its jurisdiction that meet certain criteria, as specified, by June 15.
- Requires SCO to compute and publish an estimate of STA payments for the current fiscal year by August 1.
- Requires SCO, on the basis of the data received in the transit operator financial reports and within three months of receiving such data, to submit an annual report to the Legislature on the revenues available and expenditures made.
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS: The Mills-Alquist-Deddeh Act, otherwise known as the Transportation Development Act (TDA) of 1971, was enacted to improve existing public transportation services and encourage regional transportation coordination. TDA allocates funding for transit and transit-related purposes that comply with regional transportation plans. Specifically, TDA is derived from two funding sources:
- The Local Transportation Funds (LTF), which is derived from a ¼ cent of the general sales tax collected statewide.
- The State Transit Assistance Fund (STA), which is derived from the statewide sales tax on diesel fuel.
For STA, funds are appropriated by the Legislature to SCO. SCO then allocates the tax revenue by formula to RTPAs and other select transportation agencies with respect to the STA-eligible transit operators within their jurisdiction. Current law requires that 50% of STA funds be allocated by population and 50% be allocated according to transit operator revenues from the prior fiscal year, as specified. STA funding may only be used for transportation planning and public transit purposes.
This bill makes two minor changes relative to the STA Program.
First, it adjusts deadlines by which transit operators and RTPAs must file financial reports and STA-eligibility information with SCO. Under current law, transit operators must file an annual report of financial transaction and operations to SCO within seven months of the end of their fiscal year. With a fiscal year end of June 30, this filing deadline is January 31. In turn, the SCO must submit an annual report to the Legislature on the basis of these reports within three months of receipt. Meanwhile, RTPAs are required to submit to SCO a report of the STA-eligible transit operators within their jurisdiction by June 15. SCO uses this information to determine and publish STA payment estimates by August 1.
SCO states that the disjointedness of the FTR submission deadline (January 31), the SCO annual report to the Legislature deadline (within three months of receipt of FTRs), and the STA-eligibility report submission deadline (June 15), causes administrative inefficiencies. In particular, the annual SCO report to the Legislature is due before SCO has received STA-eligibility information from RTPAs. This tangle of misaligned deadlines is subject to cause misreported data and erroneous STA-payment estimate calculations.
To resolve this problem, this bill aligns the submission deadline of the transit operator FTR with the submission deadline of the RTPA STA-eligibility report, with both being due within seven months of the end of the fiscal year (e.g., January 31). This shift in deadlines allows SCO, transit operators, and RTPAs additional time to review and reconcile their financial data before STA payment estimates are released on August 1. Such changes are likely to make SCO data review and STA payment determination more efficient.
The Controller’s open data website, www.bythenumbers.sco.ca.gov, provides the revenues and expenditures reported by cities, counties, special districts, RTPAs, and transit operators as submitted via their FTRs. The website is updated annually in accordance to current law which requires the financial transactions of cities, counties, special districts, RTPAs, and transit operators to be published on or before November 1 of each year following the end of the annual reporting period.
The second minor change this bill accomplishes is that it brings SCO into reconciliation with these practices by eliminating the SCO’s annual transit operator FTR report to the Legislature and instead requiring SCO to make this information publicly available on its website by November 1 of each year, as it already does for the FTR data it receives from other sources.
According to the author, “AB 2542 will allow additional time to identify errors and reporting discrepancies, resolve issues prior to calculating transportation fund estimates, and help ensure accurate STA allocations are made to transit operators. AB 2542 will also change the publishing data of transit operator FTR data to November 1st of each year to align with the publication of all other FTR data received from counties, cities, and special districts.”
Previous legislation: AB 1113 (Bloom) Chapter 84, Statues of 2017, revises and recasts the provisions of the STA program by, among other things, changing the deadline by which transit operators must file FTRs with SCO from within 90 days of the end of the fiscal to within seven months of the end of the fiscal year.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
CA State Controller (Sponsor)
Opposition
None received
Analysis Prepared by: Chanel Matney / TRANS. / (916) 319-2093
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):