AB 32: Detention facilities: private, for-profit administration services.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-10-11
Existing law establishes the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and sets forth its powers and duties regarding the administration of correctional facilities and the care and custody of inmates. Existing law, until January 1, 2020, authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to enter into one or more agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in the state or in another state, upon terms and conditions deemed necessary and appropriate to the secretary. Existing law, until January 1, 2020, authorizes the secretary to enter into agreements for the transfer of prisoners to, or placement of prisoners in, community correctional centers, and to enter into contracts to provide housing, sustenance, and supervision for inmates placed in community correctional centers.
This bill, on or after January 1, 2020, would prohibit the department from entering into or renewing a contract with a private, for-profit prison to incarcerate state prison inmates. The bill would also prohibit, after January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of the department from being incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
(a)On or after January 1, 2020, the department shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates.
(b)On or after January 1, 2020, the department shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
(c)After January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of the department shall not be incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Oct 11, 2019 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 739, Statutes of 2019. |
| Oct 11, 2019 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 20, 2019 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3:30 p.m. |
| Sep 11, 2019 | Assembly Rule 77 suspended. |
| Sep 11, 2019 | Assembly Rule 77 suspended. (Page 3370.) |
| Sep 10, 2019 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. May be considered on or after September 12 pursuant to Assembly Rule 77. |
| Sep 10, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Sep 10, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 33. Noes 6. Page 2762.). |
| Sep 9, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 5, 2019 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Aug 30, 2019 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (August 30). |
| Aug 12, 2019 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 9, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (July 9). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 3, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. (Ayes 7. Noes 1.) (July 2). Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 26, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Jun 26, 2019 | Re-referred to Coms. on JUD. and PUB. S. |
| Jun 26, 2019 | Withdrawn from committee. |
| Jun 25, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 6, 2019 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 24, 2019 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 23, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 20, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 16, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 13. Noes 5.) (May 16). |
| Mar 6, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to suspense file. |
| Feb 26, 2019 | Coauthors Revised. |
| Jan 17, 2019 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Dec 4, 2018 | From printer. May be heard in committee January 3. |
| Dec 3, 2018 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Sep 11, 2019 | AB 32 Bonta Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Sep 10, 2019 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB32 Bonta et al. By Durazo | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 30, 2019 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 12, 2019 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 9, 2019 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jul 2, 2019 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Public Safety] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| May 23, 2019 | AB 32 Bonta Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 16, 2019 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Feb 26, 2019 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 32
Author:(Bonta, et al.)
As Amended Ver:September 6, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from entering into, or renewing contracts with private for-profit prisons after January 1, 2020, and eliminates their use by January 1, 2028. Also prohibits the operation of a private detention facility within the state, except as specified.
The Senate Amendments:
- Allow CDCR to renew or extend contracts with private for-profit prisons if needed to comply with any court-ordered population caps.
- Prohibit the operation of a "private detention facility" within the state, as defined.
- State that the prohibition does not apply to any of the following:
- A facility providing rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile court ward;
- A facility providing evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court;
- A facility providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate under the custody of CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency;
- A residential care facility;
- A school facility used for the disciplinary detention of a pupil;
- A facility used for to quarantine people for public health reasons; or,
- A facility used to temporarily detain someone stopped or arrested by a merchant, private security guard, or other private person.
- Exempt any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR, a county sheriff, or other law enforcement agency.
- State that this prohibition does not apply to:
- Any private detention facility operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by that contract; and,
- Renewed contracts between a private detention facility and CDCR in order to comply with court-ordered population caps.
- Provide that the provisions of this bill are severable; if any provision is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision.
COMMENTS:
According to the Author:
"The built-in incentives for these businesses are all wrong. A private, for-profit company that is traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important 'cost' of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates—through warehousing our inmates. These companies have a duty to shareholders, not to California. It's time we redirect our criminal justice system to value and prioritize effective prison rehabilitation programs, which will help minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society."
Arguments in Support:
According to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, "The accelerated use of for-profit, private prisons by California was in response to a court order from a three-judge panel ordering the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of capacity. Since peaking in 2006, California's prison population has been steadily declining, currently standing at 135% of design capacity. While more still needs to be done to further prison reform, California no longer needs to rely on private prisons to meet the demand of inmate housing.
"Private prisons are notorious for their use of exploitative practices on their inmates. Prisoners are forced to work for egregiously low wages, while the facilities enter into contracts with private companies which charge expensive rates for basic services. For instance, some private prisons have eliminated in-person visitation and have instead contracted with telecommunications companies to provide video calls with then charge inmates and their families exorbitant rates. These practices do nothing to further rehabilitation and instead only serve to increase the profits of the prison at the expense of the inmates and their families. In fact, studies have found that private prisons may increase the likelihood of recidivism by up to 22%.
"AB 32 prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into, or renewing, a contract with a private, for-profit prison. As the strain on our public correctional facilities begins to relax due to a decreasing prison population, the validity of the need for private prisons vanishes. Ending the contracting of private prisons will allow California to focus on rehabilitating inmates rather than warehousing them. When we shift these priorities, inmates will have the ability to complete their sentence with the tools that allow them to leave a life of crime and become productive members of society."
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the California State Sheriffs' Association, "Many different tools and approaches are included in California's efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
"While there has been a significant reduction in the state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three-judge panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR's authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious, offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- CDCR: Unknown costs, potentially as high as $133.9 million, if CDCR could no longer contract with for-profit private prisons to house state inmates. Actual costs would depend on a number of factors, including the availability of other non-CDCR capacity (e.g., at a non-profit private prison or a facility operated by a public entity), the number of inmates remaining at a private, for-profit prison at the expiration of the current contracts (i.e., on January 1, 2023) who need to be transferred elsewhere, and the available capacity within CDCR facilities. (General Fund)
- The Fiscal Year 2019-20 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $84,848 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of over $12,000. The contract rate varies per facility but averages around $26,600 per person for the men's contract facilities and is $35,232 per inmate at the women's contract facility.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Unknown workload increase, ranging from the tens of thousands of dollars to the hundreds of thousands of dollars in personnel costs, to DOJ to defend against conditions-of-confinement lawsuits (e.g., claims of excessive force, improper medical care, violation of religious rights) by inmates who are transferred to CDCR facilities from for-profit private facilities. Currently, an inmate housed at a contract facility would file these types of suits against the private facility operator and/or staff, which presumably would retain its own legal representation, as DOJ is unaware of its Deputy Attorneys General defending against such types of cases from private facilities. Generally, the higher the number of inmates imprisoned at CDCR facilities, the higher number of conditions-of-confinement lawsuits against CDCR that DOJ must defend. Litigation costs in these suits would be fully reimbursable by CDCR to DOJ. (Special fund* with respect to DOJ, General Fund with respect to CDCR)
*Legal Services Revolving Fund
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 6-0-2
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Bauer-Kahan, Kamlager-Dove, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Diep
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-5-0
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Diep, Fong, Obernolte
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13-6
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Melendez, Obernolte, Ramos, Salas, Voepel
ABS, ABST OR NV: Cooley, Eduardo Garcia, Mathis, Mayes, Patterson, Waldron
SENATE FLOOR: 33-6-1
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Beall, Borgeas, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Jackson, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Stone, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk
NO: Bates, Dahle, Grove, Jones, Moorlach, Morrell
ABS, ABST OR NV: Hurtado
UPDATED:
VERSION: September 6, 2019
CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe (Counsel) / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002306
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 32 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 32
Author: Bonta (D), Chiu (D), Gloria (D), Gonzalez (D), Kamlager-Dove (D) and Santiago (D), et al.
Amended: 9/6/19 in Senate
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/2/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-2, 7/9/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Moorlach, Morrell
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13, 5/23/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Detention facilities: private, for-profit administration services
SOURCE: California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association
DIGEST:
This bill abolishes, in line with California’s interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of its residents, the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect incarcerated individuals from serious harm within our state border.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/6/19 clarify that the detention facility ban will not get in the way of the state’s required compliance with a specified federal court order.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/5/19 add two Senators as co-authors and also clarify the definition of “private detention facility” to conform the definition with another provision of the bill that provides that the prohibition does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
Existing law:
- Authorizes the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity within California. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (a) & (d).)
- Authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in another state. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b) & (d).)
- Prohibits CDCR from operating its own facility outside of California. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b).)
- Allows the Secretary of CDCR to enter into an agreement with a city, county, or city and county, to permit the transfer of prisoners in the custody of the secretary to a jail or other adult correctional facility. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2010 (a) & (h).)
- Anticipates, as outlined in the Budget Act of 2018, that all California inmates will be returned from out-of-state contract correctional facilities by February 2019. (Pen. Code § 2067 (a).)
- Requires CDCR, to the extent that the adult offender population continues to decline, to begin reducing private in-state male contract correctional facilities in a manner that maintains sufficient flexibility to comply with the federal court order to maintain the prison population at or below 137.5 percent of design capacity. The private in-state male contract correctional facilities that are primarily staffed by non-CDCR personnel shall be prioritized for reduction over other in-state contract correctional facilities. (Pen. Code § 2067(a).)
- Requires CDCR to consider the following factors in reducing the capacity of state-owned and operated prisons or in-state leased or contract correctional facilities: the cost to operate at the capacity; workforce impacts; subpopulation and gender-specific housing needs; long-term investment in state-owned and operated correctional facilities, including previous investments; public safety and rehabilitation; and the durability of the state’s solution to prison overcrowding. (Pen. Code § 2067 (b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state, as specified.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to facilities that are primarily engaged in specified services such as:
- Rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile that is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 100) of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code;
- Evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court, pursuant to Section 1026, or pursuant to Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code; and
- Providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, the CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to those that operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by the contract.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2020, CDCR: (a) shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates; and (b) shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of CDCR shall not be incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
- Provides that a “private, for-profit prison facility” does not include a facility that is privately owned, but is leased and operated by CDCR.
- Clarifies that the detention facility ban will not get in the way of the state’s required compliance with a specified federal court order.
- Contains a severability clause.
Background
AB 32 abolishes the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect vulnerable individuals from serious harm within our state border. For-profit run private prison facilities hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal and civil laws. There are numerous documented abuses of people held in for-profit run prison facilities in California.[1] For-profit prison companies have not limited their business ventures to profiting from the incarceration of Californians convicted of crimes. Private prison corporations also profit from incarcerating Californians in civil detention. The problems inherent in the private prison industry apply to any population they currently house or could house in the future. AB 32 was thus amended on June 25, 2019, to ensure that all Californians are protected. Until June 25, 2019, this bill only sought to end the operation of for-profit run private prison facilities that hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal laws.
These for-profit run private prison companies benefit from incarcerating Californians and have no incentive to invest in their rehabilitation or mental and physical health. For-profit prison companies owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Their mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the Californians who are held against their will. Every dollar spent in treating their prisoners and detainees in a way that promotes the health and welfare of the prisoners and detainees is a dollar less in profit for shareholders. Indeed, these for-profit corporations have a documented history of operating in a manner that is detrimental to the health and welfare of those detained against their will. This bill is sponsored by the California Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Riverside Sheriffs’ Association, and is supported by numerous civil rights organizations. This bill is opposed by the California State Sheriffs’ Association.
Comments
AB 32 will likely be challenged in court and will likely survive the challenge.[2] Since AB 32 regulates private for-profit companies that run facilities that detain people who are held against their will under criminal and civil law, including immigrants, this anti-immigrant President’s Administration will likely sue California to enjoin this bill’s enactment under various theories. The federal government will likely lose. The federal government will likely challenge AB 32 by arguing that AB 32 is preempted by federal immigration law, that AB 32 violates the Intergovernmental Immunity Doctrine, and that AB 32 interferes with existing contractual obligations. Relevant to the constitutional analysis, this bill provides for the following:
A person shall not operate a detention facility, defined as any facility in which persons are incarcerated or otherwise involuntarily confined for purposes of execution of a punitive sentence imposed by a court or detention pending a trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding, that is a private detention facility, defined as a facility that is operated by a private, nongovernmental, for-profit entity, and operating pursuant to a contract or agreement with a governmental entity, within the state. The bill also provides that this prohibition does not apply if the for-profit detention facility is operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by that contract. Additionally, the prohibition does not apply to privately owned property or facilities that are leased and operated by any law enforcement agency.
After reviewing AB 32, as amended on June 25, 2019, constitutional law scholar and University of California, Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, wrote the following:
I have had the opportunity to closely review AB 32, which would abolish all paid detention in California. I believe that this is constitutional and within the power of California to enact. A state has broad power to act to protect all within its borders. The documented serious abuses with paid detention make clear that this is exactly what AB 32 is doing: protecting vulnerable individuals from serious harms. I do not believe that this is preempted by federal law or violates any intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Quite importantly, California is not regulating the federal government; it is regulating private companies, which is very much within the state’s constitutional authority. To the extent that this law affects existing contractual obligations, the Supreme Court has been clear that a state government may do so if its action serves a significant and legitimate public purpose and is reasonably related to achieving that goal. AB 32 clearly meets this standard in that it is a reasonable, indeed essential, way of protecting those in California from harm in paid detention centers.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- CDCR: Unknown costs, potentially as high as $133.9 million, if CDCR could no longer contract with for-profit private prisons to house state inmates. Actual costs would depend on a number of factors, including the availability of other non-CDCR capacity (e.g., at a non-profit private prison or a facility operated by a public entity), the number of inmates remaining at a private, for-profit prison at the expiration of the current contracts (i.e., on January 1, 2023) who need to be transferred elsewhere, and the available capacity within CDCR facilities. (General Fund)
The FY 2019-20 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $84,848 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of over $12,000. The contract rate varies per facility but averages around $26,600 per person for the men’s contract facilities and is $35,232 per inmate at the women’s contract facility.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Unknown workload increase, ranging from the tens of thousands of dollars to the hundreds of thousands of dollars in personnel costs, to DOJ to defend against conditions-of-confinement lawsuits (e.g., claims of excessive force, improper medical care, violation of religious rights) by inmates who are transferred to CDCR facilities from for-profit private facilities. Currently, an inmate housed at a contract facility would file these types of suits against the private facility operator and/or staff, which presumably would retain its own legal representation, as DOJ is unaware of its Deputy Attorneys General defending against such types of cases from private facilities. Generally, the higher the number of inmates imprisoned at CDCR facilities, the higher number of conditions-of-confinement lawsuits against CDCR that DOJ must defend. Litigation costs in these suits would be fully reimbursable by CDCR to DOJ. (Special fund* with respect to DOJ, General Fund with respect to CDCR)
*Legal Services Revolving Fund
California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond (co-source)
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association (co-source)
52nd District
Accountable
ADEM District 41
Alianza Sacramento
All Rise Alameda
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Amigos de Guadalupe Center for Justice and Empowerment
Asian Americans Advancing Justice -- California
Audaz – Indivisible District 40
Berkeley/Oakland YWCA
Building the Base Face to Face
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California Alliance for Youth & Community Justice
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
California Collaborative for Immigrant Justice
California Correctional Peace Officers Association
California Faculty Association
California for Progress
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Immigrant Youth Justice Alliance
California Public Defenders Association
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California Sanctuary Campaign
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Central American Resource Center of Northern California
Central Valley Immigrant Integration Collaborative
Centro Legal de la Raza
Cloverdale Indivisible
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto
Contra Costa MoveOn
Council on American-Islamic Relations - Sacramento Valley/Central California
Courage Campaign
Defending Our Future: Indivisible in CA
Disability Rights California
Dolores Huerta Foundation
Dolores Street Community Services
El Cerrito Progressives
ESG Transparency Initiative
Faith in the Valley
Feminists in Action Los Angeles
Freedom for Immigrants
Greater Long Beach Interfaith Community Organization
Haitian Bridge Alliance
Hand in Hand: The Domestic Employers Network
Hillcrest Indivisible
Human Impact Partners
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Immigration Task Force of Monterey County
Indi Squared
Indivisible 30/Keep Sherman
Indivisible 36
Indivisible 41
Indivisible Auburn CA
Indivisible Beach Cities
Indivisible CA 29
Indivisible CA 33
Indivisible CA 34 Womens
Indivisible CA-25 Simi Valley-Porter Ranch
Indivisible CA-3
Indivisible CA-37
Indivisible CA-39
Indivisible CA-43
Indivisible CA-7
Indivisible California: StateStrong
Indivisible East Bay
Indivisible Lorin
Indivisible Los Angeles
Indivisible Marin
Indivisible Media City Burbank
Indivisible Normal Heights
Indivisible North Oakland Resistance
Indivisible North San Diego County
Indivisible OC 46
Indivisible OC 48
Indivisible Petaluma
Indivisible Sacramento
Indivisible San Bernardino
Indivisible San Jose
Indivisible Santa Barbara
Indivisible Sausalito
Indivisible Sebastopol
Indivisible SF
Indivisible SF Peninsula CA-14
Indivisible Sonoma County
Indivisible South Bay LA
Indivisible Stanislaus
Indivisible Suffragists
Indivisible Ventura
Indivisible Windsor
Indivisible Yolo
Indivisible: San Diego Central
Indivisibles of Sherman Oaks
Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Collective
Interfaith Council of Contra Costa County
Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity
Legal Services for Children
LGBTQ Center OC
Livermore Invisible
Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition
Long Beach Sacred Resistance
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Mi Familia Vota
Mill Valley Community Action Network
Mountain Progressives
National Lawyers Guild SF Bay Area Chapter
Nothing Rhymes with Orange
Oakland Community Law Office
Oakland Privacy
Open Immigration Legal Services
Orange County Rapid Response Network
Orchard City Indivisible
Organizing for Action – Contra Costa
Orinda Progressive Action Alliance
Our Revolution Long Beach
Pacifica Social Justice
Pajaro Valley Rapid Response
Peace and Freedom Party of California
PICO California
Rapid Response Network of Monterey County
Resilience Orange County
RiseUp
Saint John of God Church
San Diego Indivisible Downtown
San Diego Rapid Response Network
San Mateo Faith Leaders Solidarity Cohort
Santa Cruz Indivisible
Secure Justice
Service Employees International Union California
Service Employees International Union Local 1000
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
SFV Indivisible
Simi Valley Democratic Club
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas
Social Justice Collaborative
Social Justice Ministry, St. Jerome Catholic Church
St. Mary the Virgin Episcopal Church
Step Up! Sacramento
Tehama Indivisible
The Resistance Northridge
The Resistance Sacramento/Elk Grove
Time for Change Foundation
Together We Will Contra Costa
TWW/Indivisible – Los Gatos
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Unitarian Universalists of San Mateo
Vallejo-Benicia Indivisible
Venice Resistance
Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club
Women’s Alliance Los Angeles
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The author writes:
A for-profit, private company that’s traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important “costs” of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates.
These companies have a duty to their shareholders, not to California. These programs will minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society, outcomes best achieved in facilities run by governments.
AB 32 would prohibit the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into a contract or renewing a contract with a for-profit, private prison facility located in or outside of the state, on or after January 1, 2020, and completely phase-out their use by 2028.
As amended, AB 32 expands the scope of the bill to provide a general ban of for-profit, private detention facilities in California—including facilities used for immigration detention.
We’ve all seen the current humanitarian crisis play out along the southern border. No human being deserves to be held in the horrific conditions we’ve been seeing in these for-profit, private facilities. It’s clearly not enough to focus our legislation solely on criminal detention facilities.
Recent inspections by the California Department of Justice show concerning deficiencies.
B 32 would address the complete scope of what’s going on in these Wall Street-run corporate detention facilities. This is inhumane and goes against who we are as Californians and Americans.
We are better than this and we cannot and must not be silent during this inflection moment in our history.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The California State Sheriffs’ Association writes the following in opposition:
Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
While there has been a significant reduction in state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three judge-panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials and operations.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13, 5/23/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Melendez, Obernolte, Ramos, Salas, Voepel
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cooley, Eduardo Garcia, Mathis, Mayes, Patterson, Waldron
Prepared by: Margie Estrada / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/9/19 18:33:22
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 32 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 32
Author: Bonta (D), Chiu (D), Gloria (D), Gonzalez (D), Kamlager-Dove (D) and Santiago (D), et al.
Amended: 9/5/19 in Senate
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/2/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-2, 7/9/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Moorlach, Morrell
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13, 5/23/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Detention facilities: private, for-profit administration services
SOURCE: California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association
DIGEST:
This bill abolishes, in line with California’s interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of its residents, the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect incarcerated individuals from serious harm within our state border.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/5/19 add two Senators as co-authors and also clarify the definition of “private detention facility” to conform the definition with another provision of the bill that provides that the prohibition does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
Existing law:
- Authorizes the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity within California. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (a) & (d).)
- Authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in another state. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b) & (d).)
- Prohibits CDCR from operating its own facility outside of California. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b).)
- Allows the Secretary of CDCR to enter into an agreement with a city, county, or city and county, to permit the transfer of prisoners in the custody of the secretary to a jail or other adult correctional facility. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2010 (a) & (h).)
- Anticipates, as outlined in the Budget Act of 2018, that all California inmates will be returned from out-of-state contract correctional facilities by February 2019. (Pen. Code § 2067 (a).)
- Requires CDCR, to the extent that the adult offender population continues to decline, to begin reducing private in-state male contract correctional facilities in a manner that maintains sufficient flexibility to comply with the federal court order to maintain the prison population at or below 137.5 percent of design capacity. The private in-state male contract correctional facilities that are primarily staffed by non-CDCR personnel shall be prioritized for reduction over other in-state contract correctional facilities. (Pen. Code § 2067(a).)
- Requires CDCR to consider the following factors in reducing the capacity of state-owned and operated prisons or in-state leased or contract correctional facilities: the cost to operate at the capacity; workforce impacts; subpopulation and gender-specific housing needs; long-term investment in state-owned and operated correctional facilities, including previous investments; public safety and rehabilitation; and the durability of the state’s solution to prison overcrowding. (Pen. Code § 2067 (b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state, as specified.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to facilities that are primarily engaged in specified services such as:
- Rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile that is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 100) of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code;
- Evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court, pursuant to Section 1026, or pursuant to Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code; and
- Providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, the CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to those that operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by the contract.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2020, CDCR: (a) shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates; and (b) shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of CDCR shall not be incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
- Provides that a “private, for-profit prison facility” does not include a facility that is privately owned, but is leased and operated by CDCR.
- Contains a severability clause.
Background
AB 32 abolishes the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect vulnerable individuals from serious harm within our state border. For-profit run private prison facilities hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal and civil laws. There are numerous documented abuses of people held in for-profit run prison facilities in California.[1] For-profit prison companies have not limited their business ventures to profiting from the incarceration of Californians convicted of crimes. Private prison corporations also profit from incarcerating Californians in civil detention. The problems inherent in the private prison industry apply to any population they currently house or could house in the future. AB 32 was thus amended on June 25, 2019, to ensure that all Californians are protected. Until June 25, 2019, this bill only sought to end the operation of for-profit run private prison facilities that hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal laws.
These for-profit run private prison companies benefit from incarcerating Californians and have no incentive to invest in their rehabilitation or mental and physical health. For-profit prison companies owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Their mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the Californians who are held against their will. Every dollar spent in treating their prisoners and detainees in a way that promotes the health and welfare of the prisoners and detainees is a dollar less in profit for shareholders. Indeed, these for-profit corporations have a documented history of operating in a manner that is detrimental to the health and welfare of those detained against their will. This bill is sponsored by the California Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Riverside Sheriffs’ Association, and is supported by numerous civil rights organizations. This bill is opposed by the California State Sheriffs’ Association.
Comments
AB 32 will likely be challenged in court and will likely survive the challenge.[2] Since AB 32 regulates private for-profit companies that run facilities that detain people who are held against their will under criminal and civil law, including immigrants, this anti-immigrant President’s Administration will likely sue California to enjoin this bill’s enactment under various theories. The federal government will likely lose. The federal government will likely challenge AB 32 by arguing that AB 32 is preempted by federal immigration law, that AB 32 violates the Intergovernmental Immunity Doctrine, and that AB 32 interferes with existing contractual obligations. Relevant to the constitutional analysis, this bill provides for the following:
A person shall not operate a detention facility, defined as any facility in which persons are incarcerated or otherwise involuntarily confined for purposes of execution of a punitive sentence imposed by a court or detention pending a trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding, that is a private detention facility, defined as a facility that is operated by a private, nongovernmental, for-profit entity, and operating pursuant to a contract or agreement with a governmental entity, within the state. The bill also provides that this prohibition does not apply if the for-profit detention facility is operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by that contract. Additionally, the prohibition does not apply to privately owned property or facilities that are leased and operated by any law enforcement agency.
After reviewing AB 32, as amended on June 25, 2019, constitutional law scholar and University of California, Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, wrote the following:
I have had the opportunity to closely review AB 32, which would abolish all paid detention in California. I believe that this is constitutional and within the power of California to enact. A state has broad power to act to protect all within its borders. The documented serious abuses with paid detention make clear that this is exactly what AB 32 is doing: protecting vulnerable individuals from serious harms. I do not believe that this is preempted by federal law or violates any intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Quite importantly, California is not regulating the federal government; it is regulating private companies, which is very much within the state’s constitutional authority. To the extent that this law affects existing contractual obligations, the Supreme Court has been clear that a state government may do so if its action serves a significant and legitimate public purpose and is reasonably related to achieving that goal. AB 32 clearly meets this standard in that it is a reasonable, indeed essential, way of protecting those in California from harm in paid detention centers.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- CDCR: Unknown costs, potentially as high as $133.9 million, if CDCR could no longer contract with for-profit private prisons to house state inmates. Actual costs would depend on a number of factors, including the availability of other non-CDCR capacity (e.g., at a non-profit private prison or a facility operated by a public entity), the number of inmates remaining at a private, for-profit prison at the expiration of the current contracts (i.e., on January 1, 2023) who need to be transferred elsewhere, and the available capacity within CDCR facilities. (General Fund)
The FY 2019-20 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $84,848 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of over $12,000. The contract rate varies per facility but averages around $26,600 per person for the men’s contract facilities and is $35,232 per inmate at the women’s contract facility.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Unknown workload increase, ranging from the tens of thousands of dollars to the hundreds of thousands of dollars in personnel costs, to DOJ to defend against conditions-of-confinement lawsuits (e.g., claims of excessive force, improper medical care, violation of religious rights) by inmates who are transferred to CDCR facilities from for-profit private facilities. Currently, an inmate housed at a contract facility would file these types of suits against the private facility operator and/or staff, which presumably would retain its own legal representation, as DOJ is unaware of its Deputy Attorneys General defending against such types of cases from private facilities. Generally, the higher the number of inmates imprisoned at CDCR facilities, the higher number of conditions-of-confinement lawsuits against CDCR that DOJ must defend. Litigation costs in these suits would be fully reimbursable by CDCR to DOJ. (Special fund* with respect to DOJ, General Fund with respect to CDCR)
*Legal Services Revolving Fund
California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond (co-source)
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association (co-source)
52nd District
Accountable
ADEM District 41
Alianza Sacramento
All Rise Alameda
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Amigos de Guadalupe Center for Justice and Empowerment
Asian Americans Advancing Justice -- California
Audaz – Indivisible District 40
Berkeley/Oakland YWCA
Building the Base Face to Face
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California Alliance for Youth & Community Justice
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
California Collaborative for Immigrant Justice
California Correctional Peace Officers Association
California Faculty Association
California for Progress
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Immigrant Youth Justice Alliance
California Public Defenders Association
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California Sanctuary Campaign
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Central American Resource Center of Northern California
Central Valley Immigrant Integration Collaborative
Centro Legal de la Raza
Cloverdale Indivisible
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto
Contra Costa MoveOn
Council on American-Islamic Relations - Sacramento Valley/Central California
Courage Campaign
Defending Our Future: Indivisible in CA
Disability Rights California
Dolores Huerta Foundation
Dolores Street Community Services
El Cerrito Progressives
ESG Transparency Initiative
Faith in the Valley
Feminists in Action Los Angeles
Freedom for Immigrants
Greater Long Beach Interfaith Community Organization
Haitian Bridge Alliance
Hand in Hand: The Domestic Employers Network
Hillcrest Indivisible
Human Impact Partners
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Immigration Task Force of Monterey County
Indi Squared
Indivisible 30/Keep Sherman
Indivisible 36
Indivisible 41
Indivisible Auburn CA
Indivisible Beach Cities
Indivisible CA 29
Indivisible CA 33
Indivisible CA 34 Womens
Indivisible CA-25 Simi Valley-Porter Ranch
Indivisible CA-3
Indivisible CA-37
Indivisible CA-39
Indivisible CA-43
Indivisible CA-7
Indivisible California: StateStrong
Indivisible East Bay
Indivisible Lorin
Indivisible Los Angeles
Indivisible Marin
Indivisible Media City Burbank
Indivisible Normal Heights
Indivisible North Oakland Resistance
Indivisible North San Diego County
Indivisible OC 46
Indivisible OC 48
Indivisible Petaluma
Indivisible Sacramento
Indivisible San Bernardino
Indivisible San Jose
Indivisible Santa Barbara
Indivisible Sausalito
Indivisible Sebastopol
Indivisible SF
Indivisible SF Peninsula CA-14
Indivisible Sonoma County
Indivisible South Bay LA
Indivisible Stanislaus
Indivisible Suffragists
Indivisible Ventura
Indivisible Windsor
Indivisible Yolo
Indivisible: San Diego Central
Indivisibles of Sherman Oaks
Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Collective
Interfaith Council of Contra Costa County
Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity
Legal Services for Children
LGBTQ Center OC
Livermore Invisible
Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition
Long Beach Sacred Resistance
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Mi Familia Vota
Mill Valley Community Action Network
Mountain Progressives
National Lawyers Guild SF Bay Area Chapter
Nothing Rhymes with Orange
Oakland Community Law Office
Oakland Privacy
Open Immigration Legal Services
Orange County Rapid Response Network
Orchard City Indivisible
Organizing for Action – Contra Costa
Orinda Progressive Action Alliance
Our Revolution Long Beach
Pacifica Social Justice
Pajaro Valley Rapid Response
Peace and Freedom Party of California
PICO California
Rapid Response Network of Monterey County
Resilience Orange County
RiseUp
Saint John of God Church
San Diego Indivisible Downtown
San Diego Rapid Response Network
San Mateo Faith Leaders Solidarity Cohort
Santa Cruz Indivisible
Secure Justice
Service Employees International Union California
Service Employees International Union Local 1000
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
SFV Indivisible
Simi Valley Democratic Club
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas
Social Justice Collaborative
Social Justice Ministry, St. Jerome Catholic Church
St. Mary the Virgin Episcopal Church
Step Up! Sacramento
Tehama Indivisible
The Resistance Northridge
The Resistance Sacramento/Elk Grove
Time for Change Foundation
Together We Will Contra Costa
TWW/Indivisible – Los Gatos
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Unitarian Universalists of San Mateo
Vallejo-Benicia Indivisible
Venice Resistance
Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club
Women’s Alliance Los Angeles
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The author writes:
A for-profit, private company that’s traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important “costs” of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates.
These companies have a duty to their shareholders, not to California. These programs will minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society, outcomes best achieved in facilities run by governments.
AB 32 would prohibit the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into a contract or renewing a contract with a for-profit, private prison facility located in or outside of the state, on or after January 1, 2020, and completely phase-out their use by 2028.
As amended, AB 32 expands the scope of the bill to provide a general ban of for-profit, private detention facilities in California—including facilities used for immigration detention.
We’ve all seen the current humanitarian crisis play out along the southern border. No human being deserves to be held in the horrific conditions we’ve been seeing in these for-profit, private facilities. It’s clearly not enough to focus our legislation solely on criminal detention facilities.
Recent inspections by the California Department of Justice show concerning deficiencies.
B 32 would address the complete scope of what’s going on in these Wall Street-run corporate detention facilities. This is inhumane and goes against who we are as Californians and Americans.
We are better than this and we cannot and must not be silent during this inflection moment in our history.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The California State Sheriffs’ Association writes the following in opposition:
Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
While there has been a significant reduction in state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three judge-panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials and operations.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13, 5/23/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Melendez, Obernolte, Ramos, Salas, Voepel
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cooley, Eduardo Garcia, Mathis, Mayes, Patterson, Waldron
Prepared by: Margie Estrada / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/6/19 14:12:59
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 32 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 32
Author: Bonta (D), Chiu (D), Gloria (D), Gonzalez (D), Kamlager-Dove (D) and Santiago (D), et al.
Amended: 6/25/19 in Senate
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/2/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-2, 7/9/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Moorlach, Morrell
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13, 5/23/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Detention facilities: private, for-profit administration services
SOURCE: California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association
DIGEST:
This bill abolishes, in line with California’s interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of its residents, the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect incarcerated individuals from serious harm within our state border.
Existing law:
- Authorizes the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity within California. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (a) & (d).)
- Authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in another state. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b) & (d).)
- Prohibits CDCR from operating its own facility outside of California. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b).)
- Allows the Secretary of CDCR to enter into an agreement with a city, county, or city and county, to permit the transfer of prisoners in the custody of the secretary to a jail or other adult correctional facility. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2010 (a) & (h).)
- Anticipates, as outlined in the Budget Act of 2018, that all California inmates will be returned from out-of-state contract correctional facilities by February 2019. (Pen. Code § 2067 (a).)
- Requires CDCR, to the extent that the adult offender population continues to decline, to begin reducing private in-state male contract correctional facilities in a manner that maintains sufficient flexibility to comply with the federal court order to maintain the prison population at or below 137.5 percent of design capacity. The private in-state male contract correctional facilities that are primarily staffed by non-CDCR personnel shall be prioritized for reduction over other in-state contract correctional facilities. (Pen. Code § 2067(a).)
- Requires CDCR to consider the following factors in reducing the capacity of state-owned and operated prisons or in-state leased or contract correctional facilities: the cost to operate at the capacity; workforce impacts; subpopulation and gender-specific housing needs; long-term investment in state-owned and operated correctional facilities, including previous investments; public safety and rehabilitation; and the durability of the state’s solution to prison overcrowding. (Pen. Code § 2067 (b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state, as specified.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to any to the following:
- Any facility providing rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile that is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 100) of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code;
- Any facility providing evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court, pursuant to Section 1026, or pursuant to Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code;
- Any facility providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, the CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- A residential care facility licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code;
- Any school facility used for the disciplinary detention of a pupil;
- Any facility used for the quarantine or isolation of persons for public health reasons pursuant to Division 105 (commencing with Section 120100) of the Health and Safety Code; and
- Any facility used for the temporary detention of a person detained or arrested by a merchant, private security guard, or other private person pursuant to Section 490.5 or 837.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to those that operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by the contract.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2020, CDCR: shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates; and shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of the department shall not be incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
- Provides that a “private, for-profit prison facility” does not include a facility that is privately owned, but is leased and operated by the department.
- Contains a severability clause.
Background
AB 32 abolishes the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect vulnerable individuals from serious harm within our state border. For-profit run private prison facilities hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal and civil laws. There are numerous documented abuses of people held in for-profit run prison facilities in California.[1] For-profit prison companies have not limited their business ventures to profiting from the incarceration of Californians convicted of crimes. Private prison corporations also profit from incarcerating Californians in civil detention. The problems inherent in the private prison industry apply to any population they currently house or could house in the future. AB 32 was thus amended on June 25, 2019, to ensure that all Californians are protected. Until June 25, 2019, this bill only sought to end the operation of for-profit run private prison facilities that hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal laws.
These for-profit run private prison companies benefit from incarcerating Californians and have no incentive to invest in their rehabilitation or mental and physical health. For-profit prison companies owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Their mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the Californians who are held against their will. Every dollar spent in treating their prisoners and detainees in a way that promotes the health and welfare of the prisoners and detainees is a dollar less in profit for shareholders. Indeed, these for-profit corporations have a documented history of operating in a manner that is detrimental to the health and welfare of those detained against their will. This bill is sponsored by the California Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Riverside County Sheriffs’ Association, and is supported by numerous civil rights organizations. The bill is opposed by the California State Sheriffs’ Association.
AB 32 will likely be challenged in court and will likely survive the challenge.[2] Since AB 32 regulates private for-profit companies that run facilities that detain people who are held against their will under criminal and civil law, including immigrants, this anti-immigrant President’s Administration will likely sue California to enjoin thIS bill’s enactment under various theories. The federal government will likely lose. The federal government will likely challenge AB 32 by arguing that AB 32 is preempted by federal immigration law, that AB 32 violates the Intergovernmental Immunity Doctrine, and that AB 32 interferes with existing contractual obligations. Relevant to the constitutional analysis, the bill provides for the following:
A person shall not operate a detention facility, defined as any facility in which persons are incarcerated or otherwise involuntarily confined for purposes of execution of a punitive sentence imposed by a court or detention pending a trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding, that is a private detention facility, defined as a facility that is owned and operated by a private, nongovernmental, for-profit entity, and operating pursuant to a contract or agreement with a governmental entity, within the state. The bill also provides that this prohibition does not apply if the for-profit detention facility is operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by that contract. Additionally, the prohibition does not apply to privately owned property or facilities that are leased and operated by any law enforcement agency.
After reviewing AB 32, as amended on June 25, 2019, constitutional law scholar and University of California, Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, wrote the following:
I have had the opportunity to closely review AB 32, which would abolish all paid detention in California. I believe that this is constitutional and within the power of California to enact. A state has broad power to act to protect all within its borders. The documented serious abuses with paid detention make clear that this is exactly what AB 32 is doing: protecting vulnerable individuals from serious harms. I do not believe that this is preempted by federal law or violates any intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Quite importantly, California is not regulating the federal government; it is regulating private companies, which is very much within the state’s constitutional authority. To the extent that this law affects existing contractual obligations, the Supreme Court has been clear that a state government may do so if its action serves a significant and legitimate public purpose and is reasonably related to achieving that goal. AB 32 clearly meets this standard in that it is a reasonable, indeed essential, way of protecting those in California from harm in paid detention centers.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- CDCR: Unknown costs, potentially as high as $133.9 million, if the department could no longer contract with for-profit private prisons to house state inmates. Actual costs would depend on a number of factors, including the availability of other non-CDCR capacity (e.g., at a non-profit private prison or a facility operated by a public entity), the number of inmates remaining at a private, for-profit prison at the expiration of the current contracts (i.e., on January 1, 2023) who need to be transferred elsewhere, and the available capacity within CDCR facilities. (General Fund)
The FY 2019-20 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $84,848 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of over $12,000. The contract rate varies per facility but averages around $26,600 per person for the men’s contract facilities and is $35,232 per inmate at the women’s contract facility.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Unknown workload increase, ranging from the tens of thousands of dollars to the hundreds of thousands of dollars in personnel costs, to DOJ to defend against conditions-of-confinement lawsuits (e.g., claims of excessive force, improper medical care, violation of religious rights) by inmates who are transferred to CDCR facilities from for-profit private facilities. Currently, an inmate housed at a contract facility would file these types of suits against the private facility operator and/or staff, which presumably would retain its own legal representation, as DOJ is unaware of its Deputy Attorneys General defending against such types of cases from private facilities. Generally, the higher the number of inmates imprisoned at CDCR facilities, the higher number of conditions-of-confinement lawsuits against CDCR that DOJ must defend. Litigation costs in these suits would be fully reimbursable by CDCR to DOJ. (Special fund* with respect to DOJ, General Fund with respect to CDCR)
*Legal Services Revolving Fund
California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond (co-source)
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association (co-source)
52nd District
Accountable
ADEM District 41
Alianza Sacramento
All Rise Alameda
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Amigos de Guadalupe Center for Justice and Empowerment
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - California
Audaz – Indivisible District 40
Berkeley/Oakland YWCA
Building the Base Face to Face
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California Alliance for Youth & Community Justice
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
California Collaborative for Immigrant Justice
California Correctional Peace Officers Association
California Faculty Association
California for Progress
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Immigrant Youth Justice Alliance
California Public Defenders Association
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California Sanctuary Campaign
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Central American Resource Center of Northern California
Central Valley Immigrant Integration Collaborative
Centro Legal de la Raza
Cloverdale Indivisible
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto
Contra Costa MoveOn
Council on American-Islamic Relations - Sacramento Valley/Central California
Courage Campaign
Defending Our Future: Indivisible in CA
Disability Rights California
Dolores Huerta Foundation
Dolores Street Community Services
El Cerrito Progressives
ESG Transparency Initiative
Faith in the Valley
Feminists in Action Los Angeles
Freedom for Immigrants
Greater Long Beach Interfaith Community Organization
Haitian Bridge Alliance
Hand in Hand: The Domestic Employers Network
Hillcrest Indivisible
Human Impact Partners
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Immigration Task Force of Monterey County
Indi Squared
Indivisible 30/Keep Sherman
Indivisible 36
Indivisible 41
Indivisible Auburn CA
Indivisible Beach Cities
Indivisible CA 29
Indivisible CA 33
Indivisible CA 34 Womens
Indivisible CA-25 Simi Valley-Porter Ranch
Indivisible CA-3
Indivisible CA-37
Indivisible CA-39
Indivisible CA-43
Indivisible CA-7
Indivisible California: StateStrong
Indivisible East Bay
Indivisible Lorin
Indivisible Los Angeles
Indivisible Marin
Indivisible Media City Burbank
Indivisible Normal Heights
Indivisible North Oakland Resistance
Indivisible North San Diego County
Indivisible OC 46
Indivisible OC 48
Indivisible Petaluma
Indivisible Sacramento
Indivisible San Bernardino
Indivisible San Jose
Indivisible Santa Barbara
Indivisible Sausalito
Indivisible Sebastopol
Indivisible SF
Indivisible SF Peninsula CA-14
Indivisible Sonoma County
Indivisible South Bay LA
Indivisible Stanislaus
Indivisible Suffragists
Indivisible Ventura
Indivisible Windsor
Indivisible Yolo
Indivisible: San Diego Central
Indivisibles of Sherman Oaks
Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Collective
Interfaith Council of Contra Costa County
Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity
Legal Services for Children
LGBTQ Center OC
Livermore Invisible
Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition
Long Beach Sacred Resistance
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Mi Familia Vota
Mill Valley Community Action Network
Mountain Progressives
National Lawyers Guild SF Bay Area Chapter
Nothing Rhymes with Orange
Oakland Community Law Office
Oakland Privacy
Open Immigration Legal Services
Orange County Rapid Response Network
Orchard City Indivisible
Organizing for Action – Contra Costa
Orinda Progressive Action Alliance
Our Revolution Long Beach
Pacifica Social Justice
Pajaro Valley Rapid Response
Peace and Freedom Party of California
PICO California
Rapid Response Network of Monterey County
Resilience Orange County
RiseUp
Saint John of God Church
San Diego Indivisible Downtown
San Diego Rapid Response Network
San Mateo Faith Leaders Solidarity Cohort
Santa Cruz Indivisible
Secure Justice
Service Employees International Union California
Service Employees International Union Local 1000
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
SFV Indivisible
Simi Valley Democratic Club
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas
Social Justice Collaborative
Social Justice Ministry, St. Jerome Catholic Church
St. Mary the Virgin Episcopal Church
Step Up! Sacramento
Tehama Indivisible
The Resistance Northridge
The Resistance Sacramento/Elk Grove
Time for Change Foundation
Together We Will Contra Costa
TWW/Indivisible – Los Gatos
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Unitarian Universalists of San Mateo
Vallejo-Benicia Indivisible
Venice Resistance
Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club
Women’s Alliance Los Angeles
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/30/19)
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The author writes:
A for-profit, private company that’s traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important “costs” of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates.
These companies have a duty to their shareholders, not to California. These programs will minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society, outcomes best achieved in facilities run by governments.
AB 32 would prohibit the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into a contract or renewing a contract with a for-profit, private prison facility located in or outside of the state, on or after January 1, 2020, and completely phase-out their use by 2028.
As amended, AB 32 expands the scope of the bill to provide a general ban of for-profit, private detention facilities in California—including facilities used for immigration detention.
We’ve all seen the current humanitarian crisis play out along the southern border. No human being deserves to be held in the horrific conditions we’ve been seeing in these for-profit, private facilities. It’s clearly not enough to focus our legislation solely on criminal detention facilities.
Recent inspections by the California Department of Justice show concerning deficiencies.
AB 32 would address the complete scope of what’s going on in these Wall Street-run corporate detention facilities. This is inhumane and goes against who we are as Californians and Americans.
We are better than this and we cannot and must not be silent during this inflection moment in our history.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The California State Sheriffs’ Association writes the following in opposition:
Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
While there has been a significant reduction in state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three judge-panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials and operations.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-13, 5/23/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Melendez, Obernolte, Ramos, Salas, Voepel
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cooley, Eduardo Garcia, Mathis, Mayes, Patterson, Waldron
Prepared by: Margie Estrada / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/1/19 11:04:03
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 32 (Bonta) - Detention facilities: private, for-profit administration services
Version: June 25, 2019 | Policy Vote: JUD. 7 - 1, PUB. S. 5 - 2 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: August 12, 2019 | Consultant: Shaun Naidu |
Bill Summary:
AB 32 would prohibit the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from entering into or renewing contracts with for-profit private prisons after January 1, 2020 and would eliminate their use by January 1, 2028. It also would prohibit the operation of a private detention facility within the state, except as specified.
Fiscal Impact:
- CDCR: Unknown costs, potentially as high as $133.9 million, if the department could no longer contract with for-profit private prisons to house state inmates. Actual costs would depend on a number of factors, including the availability of other non-CDCR capacity (e.g., at a non-profit private prison or a facility operated by a public entity), the number of inmates remaining at a private, for-profit prison at the expiration of the current contracts (i.e., on January 1, 2023) who need to be transferred elsewhere, and the available capacity within CDCR facilities. (General Fund)
The FY 2019-20 per capita cost to detain a person in a state prison is $84,848 annually, with an annual marginal rate per inmate of over $12,000. The contract rate varies per facility but averages around $26,600 per person for the men’s contract facilities and is $35,232 per inmate at the women’s contract facility.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Unknown workload increase, ranging from the tens of thousands of dollars to the hundreds of thousands of dollars in personnel costs, to DOJ to defend against conditions-of-confinement lawsuits (e.g., claims of excessive force, improper medical care, violation of religious rights) by inmates who are transferred to CDCR facilities from for-profit private facilities. Currently, an inmate housed at a contract facility would file these types of suits against the private facility operator and/or staff, which presumably would retain its own legal representation, as DOJ is unaware of its Deputy Attorneys General defending against such types of cases from private facilities. Generally, the higher the number of inmates imprisoned at CDCR facilities, the higher number of conditions-of-confinement lawsuits against CDCR that DOJ must defend. Litigation costs in these suits would be fully reimbursable by CDCR to DOJ. (Special fund* with respect to DOJ, General Fund with respect to CDCR)
*Legal Services Revolving Fund
Background:
Until January 1, 2020, CDCR is authorized to enter into one or more agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in the state or in another state, upon terms and conditions deemed necessary and appropriate to the secretary. (Pen. Code, § 2915.) The department is authorized to enter into agreements with a city or county for the transfer of inmates to a jail or other adult correctional facility, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 2910.) Additionally, the department may establish and operate community correctional centers, upon proper notice and receipt of comments and recommendations, and may enter into a long-term contract of up to 20 years for the transfer of inmates to, or the placement of inmates in, the centers. (Pen. Code, § 6250.) The department has the authority, until January 1, 2020, to enter into agreements for the transfer of inmates to, or placement on them in, community correctional centers and to contract for their housing, sustenance and supervision for inmates placed in the centers. (Pen. Code, § 6250.2) Separately, the CDCR Secretary may enter into contracts, with the approval of the Department of General Services, with appropriate public or private agencies, to provide housing, sustenance, and supervision for inmates who are eligible for placement in community correctional centers. (Pen. Code, § 6256.) The department is responsible for paying the contracted entities through funds that are appropriate for the support of state prison inmates. (Ibid.)
In January 2010, a federal three-judge court ordered the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity by June 2013, because overcrowding was the primary reason that CDCR was unable to provide inmates with constitutionally-adequate healthcare. The order was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011. Currently, CDCR is in compliance with the three-judge court’s order.
The state currently contracts with four in-state private for-profit prisons to hold CDCR inmates. With these four facilities, the department has contract to house a total of 2,342 inmates, 2,049 men and 293 women. As of July 10, 2019, there were 2,172 CDCR inmates housed in these facilities, 1,916 men and 256 women. According to the department, the current contracts with the four facility operators expire on January 1, 2023. There are no CDCR inmates housed in out-of-state prisons and all out-of-state contracts have ended as of June 30, 2019.
Proposed Law:
The bill would prohibit CDCR, starting on January 1, 2020, from entering into or renewing a contract with a private, for-profit prison to incarcerate state prison inmates. Additionally, it would prohibit, after January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under CDCR’s jurisdiction from being incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
This bill also would prohibit, with exceptions, the operation of a private detention facility, as defined, within the state. The prohibition does not apply to any of the following:
- Any facility providing rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a minor who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, as specified.
- Any facility providing evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court, related to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or related to specified community mental health or civil commitments
- Any facility providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, CDCR, a county sheriff, or other law enforcement agency.
- A residential care facility, licensed as specified.
- Any school facility used for the disciplinary detention of a pupil.
- Any facility used for the quarantine or isolation of persons for public health reasons, as specified.
- Any facility used for the temporary detention of a person detained or arrested by a merchant, private security guard, or other private person related to retail or other specified theft or to an arrest by a private person, as specified.
- Any privately-owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR, a county sheriff, or other law enforcement agency.
- Any private detention facility that is operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract. This exception would not include any extensions made to or allowed by that contract.
The provisions of this bill would be severable.
Related Legislation:
AB 33 (Bonta, 2019) would require the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System to divest from private prison companies, from making new or renewing existing investments in such companies, and to constructively engage with private prison companies to establish whether the companies are transitioning their business model to another industry, among other provisions. AB 33 was never heard by the Assembly Committee on Public Employment and Retirement.
AB 1320 (Bonta, 2017) would have prohibited CDCR from entering into a contract with an out-of-state, private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2018 and would have prohibited CDCR from renewing a contract with an out-of-state, private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2020. It also would have prohibited, after January 1, 2021, any state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of the department from being housed in any out-of-state, private, for-profit prison facility. AB 1320 was vetoed by the Governor.
SB 29 (Lara, Ch. 494, Stats. 2017) established, after January 1, 2018, contracting restrictions and new notice and public hearing requirements, as specified, upon local governments and local law enforcement agencies with respect to contracts, building permits, and other official actions involving the federal government, federal agencies, or private corporations seeking to house or detain noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration detention. SB 1289 (Lara, 2016) was similar to SB 29 but was vetoed by the Governor.
SB 843 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review, Ch. 43, Stats. 2016) extended the authority of CDCR to contract with in-state and out-of-state for-profit prison through January 1, 2020.
SB 105 (Steinberg, Ch. 310, Stats. 2013) authorized the state, through January 1, 2017, to act expeditiously in contracting with private and public entities to house inmates inside and outside of the state.
Staff Comments:
As mentioned above, California is subject to a federal court order to sustainably reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5 percent of design capacity. The state has undertaken efforts to implement a durable remedy to reduce and avoid prison overcrowding. On July 31, 2019, 114,921 inmates were detained in the state’s 35 adult institutions, 2,826 in camps, and 6,181 were held in in-state contract beds. The prison population changes daily as new inmates are admitted and others are released, but, on that date, the population at the state’s adult institutions was approximately 135.1 percent of design capacity. By potentially increasing the inmate population in state facilities, this bill could make it more difficult for the state to comply with the court order.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: AB 32 Hearing Date: July 9, 2019
Author: | Bonta | ||
Version: | June 25, 2019 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SC | ||
Subject: Detention Facilities: Private, For-Profit Administration Services
HISTORY
Source: Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association
Prior Legislation: SB 29 (Lara), Ch. 494, Stats. 2017
AB 1320 (Bonta), 2017, Vetoed
AB 103 (Committee on Budget), Ch. 17, Stats. 2017.
SB 1289 (Lara), 2016, Vetoed
SB 843 (Committee on Budget), Ch. 43, Stats. 2016
SB 105 (Steinberg), Ch. 310, Stats. 2013
Support: Alianza, Sacramento; American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME); Amigos de Guadalupe Center for Justice and Empowerment; Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California; Berkeley/Oakland YWCA; ADEM District 41; California Alliance for Youth & Community Justice; California Alliance for Retired Americans; California Collaborative for Immigrant Justice; California Civil Liberties Advocacy; California Correctional Peace Officers Association; California Faculty Association; California For Progress; California Immigrant Youth Justice Alliance; California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation; California Immigrant Policy Center; California Public Defenders Association; California Sanctuary Campaign; California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Tony Thurmond; Central American Resource Center of Northern California; Central Valley Immigrant Integration Collaborative (CVIIC); Centro Legal de la Raza; Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights; Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto; Council on American-Islamic Relations – Sacramento Valley/Central California; Courage Campaign; Disability Rights California; Dolores Huerta Foundation; Dolores Street Community Services; Faith In The Valley; Freedom for Immigrant; Greater Long Beach Interfaith Community Organization; Haitian Bridge Alliance; Hand in Hand: The Domestic Employers Network; Human Impact Partners; Human Rights Defense Center; Immigrant Legal Defense; Immigration Task Force of Monterey County; Indivisible CA: State Strong; Indivisible CA-7; Indivisible Sacramento; Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Collective; Interfaith Council of Contra Costa County; Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity; La Raza Centro Legal; Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County; Legal Services for Children; LGBT Center OC; Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition; Long Beach Sacred Resistance; Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association; Mi Familia Vota; Mujeres Unidas y Activas; National Lawyers Guild – San Francisco; National Lawyers Guild SF Bay Area Chapter; NextGen California; Oakland Community Law Office; Oakland Privacy; Open Immigration Legal Services; Orange County Rapid Response Network; Organizing For Action - Contra Costa; Pacifica Social Justice; Pajaro Valley Rapid Response; Peace and Freedom Party of California; PICO California; Resilience Orange County; Root & Rebound; Saint John of God Church; San Diego Rapid Response Network; San Mateo Faith Leaders Solidarity Cohort; Secure Justice; Service Employees International Union (SEIU) California State Council; Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1000; SIREN (Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network); Simi Valley Democratic Club; Sisters of Mercy of the Americas; Social Action Committee, Unitarian Universalist Fellowship of Redwood City; Social Justice Collaborative; Social Justice Ministry, St. Jerome Catholic Church; St. MARY the Virgin Episcopal Church; Step Up! Sacramento; Time for Change Foundation; UC Irvine School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic; UDW/AFSCME Local 3930; Unitarian Universalists of San Mateo; Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club
Opposition: California State Sheriffs’ Association
Assembly Floor Vote: 61 - 13
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to prohibit the California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from entering into, or renewing contracts with for-profit private prisons after January 1, 2020, and eliminates their use by January 1, 2028; and prohibits the operation of a private detention facility within the state.
Existing law authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity within California. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (a) & (d).)
Existing law authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in another state. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b) & (d).)
Existing law prohibits CDCR from operating its own facility outside of California. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b).)
Existing law allows the Secretary of CDCR to enter into an agreement with a city, county, or city and county, to permit the transfer of prisoners in the custody of the secretary to a jail or other adult correctional facility. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2010 (a) & (h).)
Existing law anticipates, as outlined in the Budget Act of 2018, that all California inmates will be returned from out-of-state contract correctional facilities by February 2019. (Pen. Code, § 2067 (a).)
Existing law requires CDCR, to the extent that the adult offender population continues to decline, to begin reducing private in-state male contract correctional facilities in a manner that maintains sufficient flexibility to comply with the federal court order to maintain the prison population at or below 137.5 percent of design capacity. The private in-state male contract correctional facilities that are primarily staffed by non-Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation personnel shall be prioritized for reduction over other in-state contract correctional facilities. (Pen. Code, § 2067 (a).)
Existing law requires CDCR to consider the following factors in reducing the capacity of state-owned and operated prisons or in-state leased or contract correctional facilities:
- The cost to operate at the capacity;
- Workforce impacts;
- Subpopulation and gender-specific housing needs;
- Long-term investment in state-owned and operated correctional facilities, including previous investments;
- Public safety and rehabilitation; and,
- The durability of the state’s solution to prison overcrowding. (Pen. Code, § 2067 (b).)
This bill prohibits CDCR from entering into a contract with any private, for-profit prison, on or after January 1, 2020. Applies to both in-state and out-of-state facilities.
This bill prohibits CDCR from renewing contracts with any private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2020. Applies to both in-state and out-of-state facilities.
This bill requires all state prison inmates under the jurisdiction of CDCR to be removed from private, for-profit prison facilities on or before January 1, 2028.
This bill provides that, except as otherwise specified, a person shall not operate a private detention facility within the state.
This bill provides the following definitions:
- “Detention facility” means any facility in which persons are incarcerated or otherwise involuntarily confined for purposes of execution of a punitive sentence imposed by a court or detention pending a trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding.
- “Private detention facility” means a detention facility that is owned and operated by a private, nongovernmental, for-profit entity, and operating pursuant to a contract or agreement with a governmental entity.
This bill specifies that the prohibition on the operation of a private detention facility does not apply to any of the following:
- Any facility providing rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile that is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, as specified;
- Any facility providing evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court, as specified;
- Any facility providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency;
- A residential care facility, as specified;
- Any school facility used for the disciplinary detention of a pupil;
- Any facility used for the quarantine or isolation of persons for public health reasons, as specified; or,
- Any facility used for the temporary detention of a person detained or arrested by a merchant, private security guard, or other private person, as specified.
This bill provides that this prohibition does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
This bill provides that this prohibition shall not apply to any private detention facility that is operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by that contract.
This bill states that its provisions are severable; if any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Current law authorizes the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to contract with for-profit, private prison corporations to house Californians both in and out-of-state. This authority sunsets on January 1, 2020. Private prison corporations have not limited their business ventures to CDCR, but have expanded their profiteering to other populations as well.
Regarding CDCR, contracting with for-profit, private prisons was a temporary solution to address the severe problem of overcrowding, to comply with a federal court order to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of design capacity, and avoid the early release of Californians that pose a risk to public safety. On February 10, 2014 the Court also ordered the state to seek ways to reduce the number of inmates housed in for-profit state prisons to the extent feasible.
Regardless of the population, human rights abuses are inhering in any facility operated by the private prison industry. For-profit prison companies benefit from incarcerating Californians and have no incentive to invest in their rehabilitation. Their fiduciary duty, as a for-profit corporation, and mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the prisoners and staff. Private prison corporations have incentives to drive up reliance on incarceration, often lobbying to drive up policies which increase incarceration in order to drive up demand for their business. This presents a concerning conflict of interest with the state’s goals to invest in the rehabilitation and reintegration of people.
Private prisons in California have faced numerous lawsuits over substandard medical treatment of inmates. A 2016 report from the Justice Department found that private prisons regularly failed to ensure adequate medical care for inmates, and reported more than twice as many inmate-on-staff assaults as in state-run prisons.
As of May 2019, the State’s prison population is in compliance with the order at approximately 134.8 percent of design capacity. Now that we are under the court ordered cap and will continue to see inmate reductions due to Proposition 57, Prop 47, Prop 64, and other measures, it is time to establish a timeline to phase out the use of for-profit, private prisons.
AB 32 will begin to redirect our criminal justice system to invest in and prioritize effective rehabilitative programs, which will minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for Californians upon their reentry into society.
Our state’s commitment to pushing back on this harmful industry should not be limited just to CDCR. The problems inherent in the private prison industry apply to any population they currently house or could house in the future. AB 32 will thus ensure that in California, private prison companies will not simply shift their focus from CDCR to other populations.
AB 32 specifically will prohibit the renewal of contracts between the department and for-profit prisons by January 1, 2020 and will completely phase out their use by 2028. AB 32 additionally prohibits the operation of all other types of private detention facilities, with some exceptions. Private detention facilities operating under a valid contract in effect before January 1, 2020, will only be able to operate lawfully for the remainder of that contract’s duration.
- Private For-Profit Prisons
After the war on drugs in the 1980’s, the United States began to use private prisons to house those affected by mandatory sentencing. There were not enough beds for people. Between 2000 and 2016, the number of people in private prisons rose 47%. (Lacey, Private prisons are archaic and cruel. California needs to stop using them, Los Angeles Times (Mar. 19, 2019) <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-lacey-private-prisons-california-20190319-story.html> [as of June 27, 2019].)
In 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an investigation of private prisons and issued a report. The investigation found that private prisons were less safe than federal prisons, poorly administered, and provided limited long-term savings for the federal government. For example, the contract prisons confiscated eight times as many contraband cell phones annually on average as the federal institutions. Private prisons also had higher rates of assaults, both by inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff. Additionally, two of the three contract prisons inspected by the Inspector General’s Office discovered they were improperly housing new inmates in Special Housing Units (SHU), which are normally used for disciplinary or administrative segregation, until beds became available in general population housing. (Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Contract Prisons, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 2016).)
The Budget Act of 2018 required all out-of-state inmates to be returned to California. CDCR has informed this committee, as of June 21, 2019, that all inmates have been removed from out-of-state facilities. CDCR has four in-state contracts to house inmates in private prisons.
As of June 21, 2019, in-state private correctional facility numbers are as follows:
Facility and Location | Population as of 6/21/2019 |
Central Valley (MCCF) (McFarland, CA) | 660 |
Desert View MCCF (Adelanto, CA) | 660 |
Golden State MCCF (McFarland, CA) | 655 |
McFarland Female Community Reentry Facility (McFarland, CA) | 247 |
Total | 2,222 |
These contracts are set to expire June 30, 2023. This bill prohibits the renewal of contracts between CDCR and for-profit prisons by January 1, 2020 and will require the use of these private facilities to end by January 1, 2028.
- Prison Overcrowding
After continued litigation, on February 10, 2014, the federal court ordered California to reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5% of design capacity by February 28, 2016, as follows: 143% of design bed capacity by June 30, 2014; 141.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2015; and, 137.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2016. (Brown v. Plata (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1939; 179 L.Ed.2d 969, 999.) CDCR is currently in compliance with the three-judge panel’s order on the prison population. CDCR’s January 2019 monthly report on the prison population notes that the in-state adult institution population is currently 113,861 inmates, which amounts to 133.8% of design capacity.
This is in part due to California’s Public Safety Realignment, which shifted many correctional responsibilities for lower-level felons from the state to counties. And it was not until the passage of Proposition 47 in November 2014, which reduced penalties for many drug and property offenses, that California saw its biggest decline in the prison population. These pieces of legislation signified a switch in California from incarceration to rehabilitation. (Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), Public Safety Realignment: Impacts So Far (Sept. 2015) <https://www.ppic.org/publication/public-safety-realignment-impacts-so-far/> [as of June 27, 2019].)
Although California continues to reduce its prison population, with this migration of incarcerated peoples into CDCR after 2028, we cannot predict how AB 32 will impact California’s prison overcrowding problem. However, in a recent report from PPIC, recidivism rates have decreased for felony offenders. (Bird et al., Recidivism of Felony Offenders in California, PPIC (June 2019) <https://www.ppic.org/publication/recidivism-of-felony-offenders-in-california/> [as of June 27, 2019].) Meaning that the prison population could continue to decline. Yet, PPIC admits to not fully understanding this decrease in recidivism. Without more information it is hard to know what the future holds for California’s prison population.
- Attorney General’s Review of Civil Detention Centers
This bill prohibits the operation of any private detention facilities within the state, with specified exceptions. Private detention facilities would include civil detention centers housing immigrant detainees. A 2019 report by the California Attorney General (AG) reviewed the ten facilities that housed immigration detainees pursuant to AB 103 (Committee on Budget), Ch. 17, Stats. 2017. Four of these facilities are private.
The AG’s report found the following common issues among a number of the facilities are the following:
- Restrictions on liberty: Some detainees were confined to cells for 22 hours a day and the facilities’ use of force and search policies and disciplinary practices resulted in restrictions that were unnecessarily severe in relation to a detainee’s background or the purpose of detainment.
- Language barriers: There was a lack of bilingual staff and failure to access alternative language services which often compromised detainees’ confidentiality because they must rely on other detainees to communicate with staff.
- Issues with Access to Medical and Mental Health Care: Common issues were found involving medical record accuracy and accessibility, nurses practicing outside of their legal scope of practice, superficial medical examinations, delayed or inadequate medical care, inadequate mental health staffing and services, and unsafe suicide watch and disciplinary isolation practices.
- Obstacles to Contacting Family and Other Support Systems: Many of the facilities housing immigrants are located far from city centers, with limited access by public transportation. None of the facilities permit contact visits with family or friends. Contact via telephone was limited and subject to other barriers.
- Barriers to Adequate Representation: Detainees faced several challenges to obtaining counsel or adequately representing themselves. Many facilities do not facilitate confidential legal phone calls and legal materials provided to detainees are difficult to access, are rarely offered in languages other than English and Spanish and may be out of date.
(The California Department of Justice’s Review of Immigration Detention in California (Feb. 2019) <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/immigration-detention-2019.pdf> [as of June 27, 2019].)
- Constitutional Considerations
a. Commerce Clause
Whenever a state regulates activity that could economic activity or the flow of commerce, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution is implicated.
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate commerce “with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.” (U.S. Const., art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3.) The dormant Commerce Clause is inferred from that clause under the theory that this grant of power implies a negative converse—a restriction prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. While there is no constitutional amendment that expressly makes this declaration, the Supreme Court has inferred this principle from the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce among the states under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. The modern approach to the clause gives the court significant discretion and involves a balancing of the benefits of the law against the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce. How the balancing is done, however, depends on whether the law discriminates against out-of-staters or treats in-staters and out-of-staters alike. (Chemerinksy, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies (2011) 4th Edition, p.439-440.)
Accordingly, the dormant Commerce Clause usually involves the following analysis: First, does the state law discriminate against interstate commerce by treating out-of-staters differently than in-staters, and thus burden interstate commerce? Second, if the law does not discriminate, then the presumption is in favor of upholding the law and it will be invalidated only if it is shown that the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the benefits of the law. Third, if the law is discriminatory, then there is a strong presumption against the law and a court will uphold it only if it is necessary to achieve an important governmental purpose. The court will also look at whether there were alternative nondiscriminatory means available. (Id. at 441.)
This bill does not discriminate by treating out-of-state private prisons differently than in-state private prisons (both would be prohibited), thus the issue would hinge upon whether the bill’s burden on interstate commerce outweighs the benefits of the law. The burden on interstate commerce is the prohibition on sending inmates to out-of-state private facilities as well as the prohibition on businesses that are based in other states’ ability to operate such a facility within California. The stated benefit of the bill is an overall increase in the safety of inmates as well as safety of the community because inmates housed in private prisons tend to experience more abuse and are afforded less rehabilitative programming. The benefit is arguably an important one, but whether or not this bill’s benefits outweighs its burden on interstate commerce is ultimately a question for the courts.
b. Takings Clause
Both the Federal Government and the states have the authority to take private property when necessary for government activities. But there is a limitation on this power. The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution states "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." For a legal analysis under the takings clause one must consider the following: Is there a taking of property; if so, is it for public use; if so, is "just compensation" paid?
A taking occurs when the government confiscates, physically occupies property or deprives a property owner of all beneficial use of the property. The term “public use” has been expansively defined. A taking is for public use so long as the government acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking will benefit the public.
As applied to this bill, the third type of taking seems to be the most relevant – depriving an owner of all beneficial use of the property. An owner of in-state detention facility that is currently used for the housing of detainees would be negatively affected by this bill in that the facility would no longer be able to be used for such purposes. Whether the facility could be repurposed for another use or whether the property value would be affected by this law are factual questions that would depend on the circumstances. Again, a challenge brought on such grounds would ultimately be a question for the courts.
c. Contracts Clause
The U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts (U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10.), and the California Constitution specifies that a law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. (Cal. Const. art. 1, § 9.)
This bill does not interfere with any contract in effect prior to the enactment date of this bill which is January 1, 2020. The bill provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to those that operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by the contract. (See proposed Penal Code § 9505.) In other words, a contract that was in effect before January 1, 2020, cannot be extended after January 1, 2020, even if the extension is authorized in the contract. The bill also provides that on or after January 1, 2020, the CDCR: shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates; and shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates. Again, this prohibition on contracting does not impair an obligation in a contract. Rather, it prohibits a renewal of a contract after January 1, 2020. Further, it prohibits for-profit run prison facilities from entering into a new contract to incarcerate Californians on or after January 1, 2020. To the extent that the provision that prohibits extensions made to or authorized by a contract is challenged in court, it is important to understand that courts have not interpreted the Contracts Clause as imposing an absolute bar to the enactment of legislation that interferes with contracts (Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdel (1934) 290 U.S. 398, 428). Instead, courts examine “whether the state law is drawn in an “appropriate” and “reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.” (Sveen v. Melin (2018) ___U.S.___ [138 S.Ct. 1815]. Internal citations omitted.)
However, the bill’s provisions would prohibit parties from renewing a contract and extending a contract after January 1, 2020, even if the extension was specifically authorized in a contract that was enacted prior to December 31, 2019. If challenged and a court interprets this prohibition of a renewal and extension, as interference with an existing contractual obligation, the interference would be subject to the test described above.
d. Severability Clause
This bill contains a severability clause, thus if this bill is challenged in the courts and a provision is found to be unconstitutional, any remaining provisions may still be enacted.
- Argument in Support
According to Immigrant Legal Resource Center, a co-sponsor of this bill:
AB 32 will end the renewal of contracts with for-profit prisons and detention facilities by phasing out their use in a responsible manner. AB 32 will also help to redirect our criminal justice system to value and prioritize effective rehabilitative programs, which will ideally reduce recidivism rates and maximize opportunities for success for inmates upon their re-entry into society.
AB 32 will also end the use of for-profit facilities to detain and house other individuals subject to civil detention and confined in for-profit facilities. The abuses perpetrated by the private prison industry are not unique to criminal custody and we must ensure that these abuses are checked, wherever they occur. These facilities are rife with human rights abuses and lack proper oversight or transparency.
For-profit prison companies benefit from incarcerating and detaining California residents through government contracts. Our state is home to multiple facilities affiliated with two of the largest firms in the private-prison industry, GEO Group and Core Civic. Both of these firms have faced numerous lawsuits over the years for substandard medical care and conditions. GEO Group is currently being sued for human trafficking, wage theft and forced labor for its treatment of detainees in facilities across the United States.
For-profit prisons and facilities lack the oversight, transparency and accountability needed when depriving individuals of liberty. Human rights abuses are inhering in any facility operated by the private prison industry.
Their fiduciary duty, as a for-profit corporation, and mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the prisoners and staff. Private prison corporations have incentives to drive up reliance on incarceration, often lobbying to drive up policies which increase incarceration in order to drive up demand for their business. This presents a concerning conflict of interest with the state’s goals to invest in the rehabilitation and reintegration of people.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the California State Sheriffs’ Association:
Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multipronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
While there has been a significant reduction in state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three-judge panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious, offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials.
-- END –
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2019-2020 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 32 (Author:Bonta)
Version: June 25, 2019
Hearing Date: July 2, 2019
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: ME
SUBJECT
Detention facilities: private, for-profit administration services
DIGEST
In line with California’s interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of its residents, this bill abolishes the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect incarcerated individuals from serious harm within our state border.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AB 32 abolishes the private for-profit prison industry from our state in order to protect vulnerable individuals from serious harm within our state border. For-profit run private prison facilities hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal and civil laws. There are numerous documented abuses of people held in for-profit run prison facilities in California. For-profit prison companies have not limited their business ventures to profiting from the incarceration of Californians convicted of crimes. Private prison corporations also profit from incarcerating Californians in civil detention. The problems inherent in the private prison industry apply to any population they currently house or could house in the future. AB 32 was thus amended on June 25, 2019, to ensure that all Californians are protected. Until June 25, 2019, the bill only sought to end the operation of for-profit run private prison facilities that hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal laws.
These for-profit run private prison companies benefit from incarcerating Californians and have no incentive to invest in their rehabilitation or mental and physical health. For-profit prison companies owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Their mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the Californians who are held against their will. Every dollar spent in treating their prisoners and detainees in a way that promotes the health and welfare of the prisoners and detainees is a dollar less in profit for shareholders. Indeed, these for-profit corporations have a documented history of operating in a manner that is detrimental to the health and welfare of those detained against their will. This bill is sponsored by the California Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Riverside County Sheriffs’ Association, and is supported by numerous civil rights organizations. The bill is opposed by the California State Sheriffs’ Association. If the bill passes this Committee, it is scheduled to be heard in Senate Public Safety on July 9, 2019.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Authorizes the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity within California. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (a) & (d).)
- Authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in another state. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b) & (d).)
- Prohibits CDCR from operating its own facility outside of California. (Pen. Code, § 2915 (b).)
- Allows the Secretary of CDCR to enter into an agreement with a city, county, or city and county, to permit the transfer of prisoners in the custody of the secretary to a jail or other adult correctional facility. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2010 (a) & (h).)
- Anticipates, as outlined in the Budget Act of 2018, that all California inmates will be returned from out-of-state contract correctional facilities by February 2019. (Pen. Code § 2067 (a).)
- Requires CDCR, to the extent that the adult offender population continues to decline, to begin reducing private in-state male contract correctional facilities in a manner that maintains sufficient flexibility to comply with the federal court order to maintain the prison population at or below 137.5 percent of design capacity. The private in-state male contract correctional facilities that are primarily staffed by non-CDCR personnel shall be prioritized for reduction over other in-state contract correctional facilities. (Pen. Code § 2067(a).)
- Requires CDCR to consider the following factors in reducing the capacity of state-owned and operated prisons or in-state leased or contract correctional facilities: the cost to operate at the capacity; workforce impacts; subpopulation and gender-specific housing needs; long-term investment in state-owned and operated correctional facilities, including previous investments; public safety and rehabilitation; and the durability of the state’s solution to prison overcrowding. (Pen. Code § 2067 (b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state, as specified.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to any to the following:
- any facility providing rehabilitative, counseling, treatment, mental health, educational, or medical services to a juvenile that is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 100) of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code;
- any facility providing evaluation or treatment services to a person who has been detained, or is subject to an order of commitment by a court, pursuant to Section 1026, or pursuant to Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code;
- any facility providing educational, vocational, medical, or other ancillary services to an inmate in the custody of, and under the direct supervision of, the CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- a residential care facility licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code;
- any school facility used for the disciplinary detention of a pupil;
- any facility used for the quarantine or isolation of persons for public health reasons pursuant to Division 105 (commencing with Section 120100) of the Health and Safety Code; and
- any facility used for the temporary detention of a person detained or arrested by a merchant, private security guard, or other private person pursuant to Section 490.5 or 837.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement agency.
- Provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to those that operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by the contract.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2020, CDCR: shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates; and shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates.
- Provides that on or after January 1, 2028, a state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of the department shall not be incarcerated in a private, for-profit prison facility.
- Provides that a “private, for-profit prison facility” does not include a facility that is privately owned, but is leased and operated by the department.
- Contains a severability clause.
COMMENTS
1. Stated need for bill to protect Californians by stopping all privately run for-profit detention/prison facilities from operating in California
According to the author:
A for-profit, private company that’s traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important “costs” of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates.
These companies have a duty to their shareholders, not to California. These programs will minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society, outcomes best achieved in facilities run by governments.
AB 32 would prohibit the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into a contract or renewing a contract with a for-profit, private prison facility located in or outside of the state, on or after January 1, 2020, and completely phase-out their use by 2028.
As amended, AB 32 expands the scope of the bill to provide a general ban of for-profit, private detention facilities in California—including facilities used for immigration detention.
We’ve all seen the current humanitarian crisis play out along the southern border. No human being deserves to be held in the horrific conditions we’ve been seeing in these for-profit, private facilities. It’s clearly not enough to focus our legislation solely on criminal detention facilities.
Recent inspections by the California Department of Justice show concerning deficiencies.
AB 32 would address the complete scope of what’s going on in these Wall Street-run corporate detention facilities. This is inhumane and goes against who we are as Californians and Americans.
We are better than this and we cannot and must not be silent during this inflection moment in our history.
A coalition of 62 organizations that include the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Dolores Huerta Foundation, California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Asian Americans Advancing Justice-California, Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles, the California Immigrant Policy Center, and California Collaborative for Immigrant Justice, writes the following in support of AB 32:
On behalf of the members of our community and clients we served, we respectfully request the passage out of the Senate Judiciary Committee of AB 32, a bill that seeks to end the utilization of for-profit, private prisons and detention facilities.
AB 32 will end the renewal of contracts with for-profit prisons and detention facilities by phasing out their use in a responsible manner. AB 32 will also help to redirect our criminal justice system to value and prioritize effective rehabilitative programs, which will ideally reduce recidivism rates and maximize opportunities for success for inmates upon their re-entry into society.
AB 32 will also end the use of for-profit facilities to detain and house other individuals subject to civil detention and confined in for-profit facilities. The abuses perpetrated by the private prison industry are not unique to criminal custody and we must ensure that these abuses are checked, wherever they occur. These facilities are rife with human rights abuses and lack proper oversight or transparency.
For-profit prison companies benefit from incarcerating and detaining California residents through government contracts. Our state is home to multiple facilities affiliated with two of the largest firms in the private-prison industry, GEO Group and Core Civic. Both of these firms have faced numerous lawsuits over the years for substandard medical care and conditions. GEO Group is currently being sued for human trafficking, wage theft and forced labor for its treatment of detainees in facilities across the United States.
For-profit prisons and facilities lack the oversight, transparency and accountability needed when depriving individuals of liberty. Human rights abuses are inhering in any facility operated by the private prison industry.
Their fiduciary duty, as a for-profit corporation, and mission is to maximize profits for their investors. They are able to accomplish this by increasing their inmate population and cutting operational costs, which is dangerous and detrimental to the prisoners and staff. Private prison corporations have incentives to drive up reliance on incarceration, often lobbying to drive up policies which increase incarceration in order to drive up demand for their business. This presents a concerning conflict of interest with the state’s goals to invest in the rehabilitation and reintegration of people.
AB 32 will also save taxpayers tens, if not hundreds of millions by concluding these contracts. For-profit prisons have been paid billions over the last decade, but have failed to result in the expected cost-savings for California taxpayers when government services are “contracted-out.”
California should not be a home to for-profit prisons or detention of any sort. Members of our community are not commodities, and our values as a state must place people over profits.
In November of 2018, the Teachers’ Retirement Board voted to remove California State Teachers’ Retirement System’s holdings, which on November 6, 2018 were more than $12 million, in two U.S. companies that operate private for-profit prisons. (See https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/boardhighlights_nov2018.pdf (as of July 1, 2019)). Banks that provide funding to private for-profit private prison companies are also cutting their ties with the companies. For example, Bank of America announced on June 26, 2019 that they “would no longer finance operators of immigrant detention centers and private prisons.” (Bank of America to cut ties with companies that help run immigrant detention centers, private prisons, N’dea Yancey-Bragg, USA Today, (June 27, 2019) available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/06/27/bank-america-cut-ties-detention-centers-private-prisons/1589221001/ (as of June 30, 2019)). The article also reported that JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo made similar announcements earlier in the year. (Id.)
2. Documented serious abuses at for-profit detention facilities, including facilities in California
There are facilities run by for-profit companies in California that incarcerate criminal and civil detainees. For-profit run private prison facilities hold Californians against their will pursuant to criminal and civil laws. This bill is sponsored by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond and the Riverside Sheriffs’ Association. The Riverside Sheriffs’ Association writes the following in support:
Private, for-profit prisons and detention centers are an anathema to California values, especially in light of the almost daily news accounts of the horrors that occur within these private, for-profit facilities. [ . . . ] With a sordid history of prioritizing profits over people, these for-profit companies have become the darlings of the Wall Street investment bankers, generating billions in profits for them and their shareholders. [ . . . ] Dozens of media accounts have revealed the inhumane and often unconstitutional conditions that have become so prevalent within these private detention centers. [ . . . ]
Indeed, the United States Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (USDOJ) conducted an investigation of private prisons and issued a report in 2016. (Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Contract Prisons, August 2016, available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf (as of June 30, 2019)). The for-profit prisons inspected by the USDOJ were operated by the GEO Group, Inc., Management and Training Corporation, and Corrections Corporation of America. The GEO Group and the Corrections Corporation of America operate for-profit detention facilities in California. The GEO Group currently operates for-profit detention facilities in California that hold people against their will under criminal and civil laws. As explained by the Assembly Public Safety Committee in their analysis for AB 32, the “investigation found that private prisons were less safe than federal prisons, poorly administered, and provided limited long-term savings for the federal government.” The analysis further noted that “[p]rivate prisons also had higher assaults, both by inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff.” Additionally, the USDOJ discovered that new inmates in the for-profit facilities were improperly housed in the Special Housing Units (SHU), which are supposed to be for disciplinary or administrative segregation purposes. Numerous other studies and reports document problems with private for-profit prison facilities including the following: Justice Policy Institute, The Problem with Private Prisons, February 2, 2018, Tara Joy, available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/12006 (as of June 30, 2019); American Civil Liberties Union, Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration, November 2011, available at https://www.aclu.org/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration (as of June 30, 2019); and The Sentencing Project, Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: US Growth in Private Prisons, August 2, 2018, Kara Gotsch & Vinay Basti, available at https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/capitalizing-on-mass-incarceration-u-s-growth-in-private-prisons/ (as of June 30, 2019).
Disabilities Rights California (DRC), a supporter of this bill, has special access to and has documented serious abuses in for-profit run prison facilities. As explained by them, “DRC has broad authority to protect and advocate for the rights and interests of people with disabilities… That authority includes access to public and private entities providing services and supports to individuals with disabilities, and to information and records prepared or maintained by these entities pertaining to such individuals in carrying out their responsibilities.” DRC released a report in March 2019 detailing dangers for people with mental illness and other disabilities at a for-profit detention facility run by GEO Group.
A recent report by the Attorney General found general trends in detention facilities that included insufficient safety checks for individuals on suicide watch, inadequate mental health staffing, and untrained staff who play a role in whether or not an individual can access medical care.[1] DRC also released a report detailing a myriad of problems at a California civil detention facility. DRC, There Is No Safety Here: The Dangers for People with Mental Illness and Other Disabilities in Immigration Detention at GEO Group’s Adelanto ICE Processing Center, March 2019, available at https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/system/files/file-attachments/DRC_REPORT_ADELANTO-IMMIG_DETENTION_MARCH2019.pdf (as of June 30, 2019). Additionally, the Auditor of the State of California released the results of an audit of California civil detention facilities requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee. The Auditor wrote about serious health and safety problems at private for-profit detention facilities and about suicide attempts, inadequate dental care, and cursory medical assessments.[2] Several additional reports exist that detail deplorable conditions of detainees. See: Human Rights Watch, ACLU, National Immigrant Justice Center, Detention Watch Network, Code Red, The Fatal Consequences of Dangerously Substandard Medical Care in Immigration Detention, (June 2018) available at https://www.aclu.org/report/code-red-fatal-consequences-dangerously-substandard-medical-care-immigration-detention (as of July 1, 2019); Los Angeles Times, An immigrant detainee fell into a coma and died at 27, His family wants to know why, Paloma Esquivel, (April 10, 2019) available at https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-adelanto-detainee-death-20190410-story.html (as of July 1, 2019).
3. AB 32 protects Californians from serious harms, including harms to their safety and welfare
AB 32 protects Californians from the serious harms to their safety and welfare in for-profit detention centers, described in Comment 2 above, by abolishing for-profit run prison facilities in California. As explained by the author of AB 33 (Bonta, 2018), a measure he authored to have the California state pension funds divest from for-profit private prison companies: “Private prison companies have incentives to maximize their profits and to minimize their costs, including the important costs of investments in programs, services, and rehabilitation efforts for inmates. These companies have a duty to shareholders, not to California.”
As explained by the Riverside Sheriffs’ Association, a sponsor of this bill:
For profit, private prison corporations owe a legally binding, fiduciary obligation to maximize profits for their shareholders. The goal of maximizing profits sits in stark contrast to the goal of public, correctional professionals in California, whose sworn duty is to protect the public and the inmates they oversee.
These out-of-state corporations are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and must meet the financial targets of their institutional investors. As the CEO of Corrections Corporation of America once stated, “inmates are a commodity in our line of work.” Treating inmates like commodities may prove beneficial to the bottom-line of these corporations, but does little to rehabilitate inmates or promote public safety upon the release of their “commodities” back into our communities.
Moreover, the private for-profit detention facilities claim to be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, the Act that requires public disclosure of the business of the federal government. They argue that they are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act because they are private companies. These facilities also argue that they are exempt from the California Public Records Act. Accordingly there is very little sunshine into what transpires in for-profit private detention facilities. Because what happens in these for-profit run prison facilities is not likely to be exposed to the public, inmates in these facilities have a greater chance of being abused and mistreated. Some of this mistreatment is highlight in comment 2 above. Because there is little sunshine in these facilities, there are likely to be many more abuses than are known to the public.
4. AB 32 will likely be challenged in court and will likely survive the challenge
Since AB 32 regulates private for-profit companies that run facilities that detain people who are held against their will under criminal and civil law, including immigrants, this anti-immigrant President’s Administration will likely sue California to enjoin the bill’s enactment under various theories. The federal government will likely lose. The federal government will likely challenge AB 32 by arguing that AB 32 is preempted by federal immigration law, that AB 32 violates the Intergovernmental Immunity Doctrine, and that AB 32 interferes with existing contractual obligations. Relevant to the constitutional analysis, the bill provides for the following:
A person shall not operate a detention facility, defined as any facility in which persons are incarcerated or otherwise involuntarily confined for purposes of execution of a punitive sentence imposed by a court or detention pending a trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding, that is a private detention facility, defined as a facility that is owned and operated by a private, nongovernmental, for-profit entity, and operating pursuant to a contract or agreement with a governmental entity, within the state. The bill also provides that this prohibition does not apply if the for-profit detention facility is operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by that contract. Additionally, the prohibition does not apply to privately owned property or facilities that are leased and operated by any law enforcement agency.
After reviewing AB 32, as amended on June 25, 2019, constitutional law scholar and University of California, Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, wrote the following:
I have had the opportunity to closely review AB 32, which would abolish all paid detention in California. I believe that this is constitutional and within the power of California to enact. A state has broad power to act to protect all within its borders. The documented serious abuses with paid detention make clear that this is exactly what AB 32 is doing: protecting vulnerable individuals from serious harms. I do not believe that this is preempted by federal law or violates any intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Quite importantly, California is not regulating the federal government; it is regulating private companies, which is very much within the state’s constitutional authority. To the extent that this law affects existing contractual obligations, the Supreme Court has been clear that a state government may do so if its action serves a significant and legitimate public purpose and is reasonably related to achieving that goal. AB 32 clearly meets this standard in that it is a reasonable, indeed essential, way of protecting those in California from harm in paid detention centers.
- California has the power to act to protect all within its borders
It is within the state’s constitutional authority to regulate private companies and act to protect all within California. As explained by the 9th Circuit in US v. State of California, April 18, 2019, No. 18-16496; D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN, “the Supreme Court noted that [i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (citation omitted) The court further noted that in that case, the “United States [did] not dispute that California possesses the general authority to ensure the health and welfare of inmates and detainees in facilities within its borders, and neither the provisions of the INA that permit the federal government to contract with states and localities for detention purposes, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(11), 1231(g), nor the contracts themselves, demonstrate any intent, let alone ‘clear and manifest,’ that Congress intended to supersede this authority.” (US v. State of California, p. 36-37)
- Not preempted by federal law
The question that will be before a court if the Trump Administration sues the state of California to enjoin enactment of provisions in AB 32 is whether the bill is preempted by federal law. Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the federal and state governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. [citations omitted] (Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___ (2012) p. 7). From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes. (Id.) The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. (Id.) Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law. [citations omitted] (Id.) There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision. [citations omitted] (Id.). State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances.
First, the states are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. [citations omitted] (Id.) The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where there is a “federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” [citations omitted] (Id. at 7-8) Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards. (Id. at 10) The basic premise of field preemption—that states may not enter, in any respect, an area the federal government has reserved for itself. (Id.)
Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law. [citations omitted] (Id. at 8) This includes cases where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” [citation omitted] and those instances where the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373 (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects”). (Id. at 8)
To determine whether obstacle preemption exists, “the Supreme Court has instructed courts to employ their judgement, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effect. [citations and quotations omitted] (US v. State of California, p. 22-23) A high threshold must be met if a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal Act. [citations and quotations omitted] (Id. at 23) As explained by the 9th Circuit in US v. California, “it is a state’s historic police power – not preemption—that [the court] must assume, unless clearly superseded by federal statute.
Obstacle preemption, “attaches to any state law, regardless of whether it specifically targets the federal government, but only if it imposes an obstructive, not-insignificant burden on federal activities.” (Id. at 26) The provisions of this bill do not impose an obstructive burden on immigration law. The government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of immigrants.[3] (Arizona, at 2) The enactment and enforcement of immigration laws relates to who may enter the country, who may become lawfully present, who may be deported, and who may be detained. AB 32 does not interfere with any determinations regarding who may be lawfully present in the United States or who may be deported, or who may enter the county, or who may be detained. Congress has specified which immigrants may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so. Immigrants may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law. (See 8 U.S. Code §1227). A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. (Arizona at 4) When the provisions of this bill are enacted, the federal government would still equally be able to determine who can enter this country, who may become lawfully present, who may be deported, who may be detained and who may be released from detention, for example through an immigration bond. AB 32 simply prohibits for-profit private companies from being in the business of incarcerating immigrants in the state of California pursuant to a contract entered into on or after January 1, 2020, the enactment date of the bill.
The United States will likely contend that the abolition of for-profit detention facilities, although applicable to facilities that incarcerate people pursuant to criminal and civil laws, intrudes on the field of immigration. However, AB 32 does not regulate immigration. As stated above, the provisions of the bill do not interfere with the federal government’s determinations regarding the immigration status of immigrants within California. Moreover, AB 32 does not interfere with the federal government’s determinations of who is detained and who is not detained. Whether a person is mandatorily or permissibly detained is determined through federal law and court decision. Accordingly, California’s decision to abolish for-profit detention in California is not an “obstacle” to the United States making immigration decisions, is not in conflict with federal immigration law, and therefore AB 32 is likely not preempted by federal immigration law.
- Does not violate the intergovernmental immunity doctrine
“The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity is derived from the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI…” (US v. State of California, p. 22) As explained by the 9th Circuit in United States v. State of California, “simply put, intergovernmental immunity attaches only to state laws that discriminate against the federal government and burdens it in some way.” (Id. at 25) “Since the advent of the doctrine, intergovernmental immunity has attached where a state’s discrimination negatively affected federal activities in some way. It is not implicated when a state merely references or even singles out federal activities in an otherwise innocuous enactment.” (Id. at 26) The “Supreme Court has clarified that a state ‘does not discriminate against the Federal Government and those with whom it deals unless it treats someone else better than it treats them.’” [citation omitted] (Id. at 27) AB 32 does not treat someone else better than it treats the federal government. AB 32 does not regulate the federal government; it regulates private, for-profit companies that incarcerate people in California. That being said, even if a court analyzes the treatment of the federal government in comparison to the treatment of others, it would be clear that this bill does not treat someone else better than it treats the federal government. Specifically, the bill provides equal treatment of for-profit detention companies that contract with the state and for-profit detention companies that contract with the federal government. AB 32 prohibits for-profit private companies from being in the business of incarcerating people in the state of California pursuant to a contract entered into on or after January 1, 2020, the enactment date of the bill. (See proposed Penal Code § 9501). Proposed Penal Code § 9503 provides that proposed § 9501 does not apply to any privately owned property or facility that is leased and operated by CDCR or a county sheriff or other law enforcement. This provision applies equally to CDCR (the state), a sheriff (a county), and “other law enforcement,” which includes the federal law enforcement entities. Moreover, proposed Penal Code § 9505 provides that proposed § 9501 “shall not apply to any private detention facility operating pursuant to a valid contract with a governmental entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020.” A governmental entity includes the state, county, and federal government. Accordingly, the United States will not be able to demonstrate that for-profit run prison facilities that house state detainees are treated better than for-profit run prison facilities that house federal detainees when AB 32 becomes law.
- Does not interfere with existing contractual obligations
The U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts (U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10.), and the California Constitution specifies that a law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. (Cal. Const. art. 1, § 9.)
This bill does not interfere with any contract in effect prior to the enactment date of this bill which is January 1, 2020. The bill provides that the prohibition of the operation of a for-profit detention facility within the state does not apply to those that operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020, for the duration of that contract, not to include any extensions made to or authorized by the contract. (See proposed Penal Code § 9505.) In other words, a contract that was in effect before January 1, 2020, cannot be extended after January 1, 2020, even if the extension is authorized in the contract. The bill also provides that on or after January 1, 2020, the CDCR: shall not enter into a contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to provide housing for state prison inmates; and shall not renew an existing contract with a private, for-profit prison facility located in or outside of the state to incarcerate state prison inmates. (See proposed Penal Code § 5003.1 (a) & (b).) Again, this prohibition on contracting does not impair an obligation in a contract. Rather, it prohibits a renewal of a contract after January 1, 2020. Further, it prohibits for-profit run prison facilities from entering into a new contract to incarcerate Californians on or after January 1, 2020. To the extent that the provision that prohibits extensions made to or authorized by a contract is challenged in court, it is important to understand that courts have not interpreted the Contracts Clause as imposing an absolute bar to the enactment of legislation that interferes with contracts (Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdel (1934) 290 U.S. 398, 428). Instead, courts examine “whether the state law is drawn in an “appropriate” and “reasonable” way to advance “a significant and legitimate public purpose.” (Sveen v. Melin (2018) ___U.S.___ [138 S.Ct. 1815]. Internal citations omitted.)
Under the bill, the for-profit run private prison companies can operate for-profit detention facilities within the state after January 1, 2020, for the duration of the contract if they operate pursuant to a valid contract with a government entity that was in effect before January 1, 2020. The for-profit run private prison companies would be prohibited, however, from renewing a contract and extending a contract after January 1, 2020, even if the extension was specifically authorized in a contract that was enacted prior to December 31, 2019. If a court interprets this prohibition of a renewal and extension, as interference with an existing contractual obligation, the interference would be subject to the test described above. As explained best by constitutional law scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky: “To the extent that this law affects existing contractual obligations, the Supreme Court has been clear that a state government may do so if its action serves a significant and legitimate public purpose and is reasonably related to achieving that goal. AB 32 clearly meets this standard in that it is a reasonable, indeed essential, way of protecting those in California from harm in paid detention centers.”
5. Opposition
The California State Sheriffs’ Association writes the following in opposition to the bill that was in print prior to the June 25, 2019 amendments:
Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
While there has been a significant reduction in state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three judge-panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials and operations.
SUPPORT
California State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond (sponsor)
Riverside Sheriffs’ Association (sponsor)
Accountable
ADEM District 41
Alianza Sacramento
All Rise Alameda
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
Amigos de Guadalupe Center for Justice and Empowerment
Asian Americans Advancing Justice -- California
Audaz – Indivisible District 40
Berkeley/Oakland YWCA
Building the Base Face to Face
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California Alliance for Youth & Community Justice
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
California Collaborative for Immigrant Justice
California Correctional Peace Officers Association
California for Progress
California Immigrant Policy Center (CIPC)
California Immigrant Youth Justice Alliance
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California Public Defenders Association
California Sanctuary Campaign
Central American Resource Center of Northern California
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Central Valley Immigrant Integration Collaborative
Centro Legal de la Raza
Cloverdale Indivisible
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles (CHIRLA)
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto
Contra Costa MoveOn
Council on American-Islamic Relations - Sacramento Valley/Central California
Courage Campaign
Defending Our Future: Indivisible in CA
Disability Rights California
Dolores Huerta Foundation
Dolores Street Community Services
El Cerrito Progressives
ESG Transparency Initiative
Faith in the Valley
Feminists in Action Los Angeles
Freedom for Immigrants
Greater Long Beach Interfaith Community Organization
Haitian Bridge Alliance
Hand in Hand: The Domestic Employers Network
Hillcrest Indivisible
Human Impact Partners
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Immigration Task Force of Monterey County
Indi Squared
Indivisible Auburn CA
Indivisible Beach Cities
Indivisible California: StateStrong
Indivisible CA-3
Indivisible CA-7
Indivisible CA-25 Simi Valley-Porter Ranch
Indivisible CA 29
Indivisible CA 33
Indivisible CA 34 Womens
Indivisible CA-37
Indivisible CA-39
Indivisible CA-43
Indivisible East Bay
Indivisible Lorin
Indivisible Los Angeles
Indivisible Marin
Indivisible Media City Burbank
Indivisible Normal Heights
Indivisible North Oakland Resistance
Indivisible North San Diego County
Indivisible OC 46
Indivisible OC 48
Indivisible Petaluma
Indivisible Sacramento
Indivisible San Bernardino
Indivisible San Jose
Indivisible Santa Barbara
Indivisible Sausalito
Indivisible Sebastopol
Indivisible SF
Indivisible SF Peninsula CA-14
Indivisible Sonoma County
Indivisible South Bay LA
Indivisible Stanislaus
Indivisible Suffragists
Indivisible Ventura
Indivisible Windsor
Indivisible Yolo
Indivisible: San Diego Central
Indivisible 30/Keep Sherman
Indivisible 36
Indivisible 41
Indivisibles of Sherman Oaks
Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Collective
Interfaith Council of Contra Costa County
Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity
Legal Services for Children
Livermore Invisible
LGBTQ Center OC
Long Beach Immigrant Rights Coalition
Long Beach Sacred Resistance
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Mill Valley Community Action Network
Mi Familia Vota
Mountain Progressives
National Lawyers Guild SF Bay Area Chapter
Nothing Rhymes with Orange
Oakland Community Law Office
Oakland Privacy
Open Immigration Legal Services
Orange County Rapid Response Network
Orchard City Indivisible
Organizing for Action – Contra Costa
Orinda Progressive Action Alliance
Our Revolution Long Beach
Pacifica Social Justice
Pajaro Valley Rapid Response
Peace and Freedom Party of California
PICO California
Rapid Response Network of Monterey County
Resilience Orange County
RiseUp
Saint John of God Church
San Diego Indivisible Downtown
San Diego Rapid Response Network
San Mateo Faith Leaders Solidarity Cohort
Santa Cruz Indivisible
Secure Justice
Service Employees International Union Local 1000
Service Employees International Union California
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network (SIREN)
SFV Indivisible
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas
Social Justice Collaborative
Social Justice Ministry, St. Jerome Catholic Church
St. Mary the Virgin Episcopal Church
Step Up! Sacramento
Tehama Indivisible
The Resistance Northridge
The Resistance Sacramento/Elk Grove
Time for Change Foundation
Together We Will Contra Costa
TWW/Indivisible – Los Gatos
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Unitarian Universalists of San Mateo
Vallejo-Benicia Indivisible
Venice Resistance
Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club
Women’s Alliance Los Angeles
52nd District
OPPOSITION
California State Sheriffs’ Association
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation: AB 33 (Bonta, 2019) requires the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System to divest from private prison companies, from making new or renewing existing investments in such companies, and to constructively engage with private prison companies to establish whether the companies are transitioning their business model to another industry, among other provisions. The bill is currently pending consideration in the Assembly Public Employment and Retirement Committee.
Prior Legislation:
AB 1320 (Bonta, 2017) would have prohibited CDCR from entering into a contract with an out of state, private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2018, and would have prohibited CDCR from renewing a contract with an out-of-state, private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2020. The bill would also have prohibited, after January 1, 2021, any state prison inmate or other person under the jurisdiction of the department from being housed in any out-of-state, private, for-profit prison facility. The bill was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown.
SB 29 (Lara, Ch. 494, Stats. 2017) Established, after January 1, 2018, contracting restrictions and new notice and public hearing requirements, as specified, upon local governments and local law enforcement agencies with respect to contracts, building permits, and other official actions involving the federal government, federal agencies, or private corporations seeking to house or detain noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration detention.
AB 103 (Committee on Budget & Fiscal Review, Ch. 17, Stats. 2017) provided that the California Department of Justice must, until July 1, 2027, report on: conditions of confinement; the standard of care and due process provided to detainees; and the circumstances around the apprehension and transfer of detainees to facilities. The bill required the Attorney General, by March 1, 2019, to conduct a review of these facilities and to provide, the Legislature and the Governor with a comprehensive report by March 1, 2019, outlining the findings of that review. It required the comprehensive report to be posted on the Attorney General’s website and otherwise made available to the public upon its release to the Legislature and the Governor.
SB 1289 (Lara, 2016) would have prohibited local law enforcement agencies and local governments from contracting with for-profit entities to detain immigrants on behalf of federal immigration authorities. This bill would have required that immigrant detention facilities adhere to national immigration standards for the detention of immigrants. Further, this bill would have required that immigrants in detention be provided other legal rights, as specified. This bill would have authorized the Attorney General, district attorneys, and city attorneys to bring suits against detention facilities for violations of the national detention standards or violations of other legal rights created by this bill. The bill was vetoed by Governor Brown. Governor Brown subsequently signed SB 29 (Lara, Ch. 494, Stats. 2017).
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 61, Noes 13)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 13, Noes 5)
Assembly Public Safety Committee (Ayes 6, Noes 0)
**************
Attorney General of California, Immigration Detention in California, (Feb. 2019), available at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/immigration-detention-2019.pdf (as of Jun. 30, 2019). ↑
Auditor of the State of California, City and County Contracts with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Local Governments Must Improve Oversight to Address Health and Safety Concerns and Cost Overruns, (Feb. 2019), available at http://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2018-117.pdf (as of Jun. 30, 2019). ↑
The term “immigrant” is substituted for the term “alien.” ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 32
Author:(Bonta, et al.)
As Amended Ver:May 16, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from entering into, or renewing contracts with private for-profit prisons after January 1, 2020, and eliminates their use by January 1, 2028.
Major Provisions
- Prohibits CDCR from entering into a contract with any private, for-profit prison, on or after January 1, 2020. Applies to both in-state and out-of-state facilities.
- Prohibits CDCR from renewing contracts with any private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2020. Applies to both in-state and out-of-state facilities.
- Requires all state prison inmates under the jurisdiction of CDCR to be removed from private, for-profit prison facilities on or before January 1, 2028.
- States that a "private, for-profit prison" does not include a private facility that is leased and operated by CDCR.
COMMENTS:
According to the Author:
"The built-in incentives for these businesses are all wrong. A private, for-profit company that is traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important 'cost' of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates—through warehousing our inmates. These companies have a duty to shareholders, not to California. It's time we redirect our criminal justice system to value and prioritize effective prison rehabilitation programs, which will help minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society."
Arguments in Support:
According to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, "The accelerated use of for-profit, private prisons by California was in response to a court order from a three-judge panel ordering the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of capacity. Since peaking in 2006, California's prison population has been steadily declining, currently standing at 135% of design capacity. While more still needs to be done to further prison reform, California no longer needs to rely on private prisons to meet the demand of inmate housing.
"Private prisons are notorious for their use of exploitative practices on their inmates. Prisoners are forced to work for egregiously low wages, while the facilities enter into contracts with private companies which charge expensive rates for basic services. For instance, some private prisons have eliminated in-person visitation and have instead contracted with telecommunications companies to provide video calls with then charge inmates and their families exorbitant rates. These practices do nothing to further rehabilitation and instead only serve to increase the profits of the prison at the expense of the inmates and their families. In fact, studies have found that private prisons may increase the likelihood of recidivism by up to 22%.
"AB 32 prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into, or renewing, a contract with a private, for-profit prison. As the strain on our public correctional facilities begins to relax due to a decreasing prison population, the validity of the need for private prisons vanishes. Ending the contracting of private prisons will allow California to focus on rehabilitating inmates rather than warehousing them. When we shift these priorities, inmates will have the ability to complete their sentence with the tools that allow them to leave a life of crime and become productive members of society."
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the California State Sheriffs' Association, "Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
"While there has been a significant reduction in the state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three-judge panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR's authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious, offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee increased annual operating costs (GF) between $196 million dollars and $319 million dollars in to absorb inmates currently held in private, for-profit facilities.
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 6-0-2
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Bauer-Kahan, Kamlager-Dove, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Diep
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-5-0
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Diep, Fong, Obernolte
UPDATED:
VERSION: May 16, 2019
CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0000804
Date of Hearing: March 6, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 32
Author:(Bonta.) – As Introduced Ver:December 3, 2018
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 6 - 0 |
|
| ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
Prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from entering into, or renewing, contracts with private, for-profit prisons on or after January 1, 2020, and requires that all inmates under the jurisdiction of CDCR be removed from private, for-profit facilities on or before January 1, 2028.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Increased annual operating costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars (GF) to absorb approximately 4,252 inmates currently held in four private, for-profit facilities both in California and Arizona. CDCR pays on average $29,000 per contract bed annually ($26,462 per inmate on the low end; $35,232 per inmate on the high end). It costs approximately $75,000 a year to house an inmate in one of CDCR’s facilities. 4,252 inmates multiplied by $75,000 is approximately $319 million per year minus the possible savings of $29,000 per inmate annually because CDCR no longer contracts for beds with private, for profit prisons, results in a total annual increase of approximately $196 million.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author, for profit prisons are incentivized to warehouse inmates, and less incentivized to invest in rehabilitation. The author states,
“It’s time we redirect our criminal justice system to value and prioritize effective prison rehabilitation programs, which will help minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society.”
- Background. Current law authorizes the CDCR to contract with private, for-profit prisons to house inmates both in-state and out-of-state. There are four private, for-profit prisons housing CDCR inmates: two in McFarland, one in Adelanto, and one in Eloy, Arizona. CDCR plans to return 1,987 inmates housed in Eloy, Arizona, to custody in California by the end of 2019.
FACILITY | Site – Contract Expiration Date | Number of Inmates Housed |
Golden State Modified Community Corrections Facility (The Geo Group, Inc.) | McFarland – Contract ends June 30, 2023 | 656 |
Desert View Modified Community Correctional Facility (The GEO Group, Inc.) | Adelanto, California – Contract ends June 30, 2023 | 647 |
Central Valley Modified Community Correctional Facility (The GEO Group, Inc.) | McFarland, California – Contract ends June 30, 2023 | 662 |
La Palma (CoreCivic) | Eloy, Arizona – Contract ends June 30, 2019 | 1,987 |
CDCR is under a federally-ordered population cap. In January 2010, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling ordering the State of California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity because overcrowding was found to be the primary reason CDCR was unable to provide inmates with constitutionally adequate healthcare. CDCR is in compliance with the three-judge panel’s order on the prison population. CDCR’s June 2018 report on the prison population to the three judge panel notes that the in-state adult institution population is 114,964 inmates, which amounts to 135.1% of design capacity. This number fluctuates day to day based on the total population. CDCR estimates its January 2019 population is 130.4% of design capacity. However, almost half of CDCR’s prisons individually exceed the 137.5 % population cap.
Exceeding the court-ordered design capacity would most certainly prompt new court filings, renewed litigation, and possibly new court orders re-setting a more stringent population cap, ordering the release of inmates, or resulting in new prison construction. Overcrowding conditions and further litigation may endanger CDCR’s efforts to eliminate the use of private prison beds.
However, private, for profit prisons, like Geo Group, Inc., are arguably more concerned about increasing revenue while controlling costs than a public, not for profit state institution like CDCR would. Private, for-profit prison corporations may harbor corporate values not consistent with the values of the State of California. The California State Auditor recently reported in February 2019 that Geo Group, Inc., operates private facilities in McFarland and Adelanto that house Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainees in arguably unsafe and unhealthy facilities with no city, county, or state oversight.
Support. According to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
“Private prisons are notorious for their use of exploitative practices on their inmates. Prisons are forced to work for egregiously low wages, while the facilities enter into contracts with private companies which change expensive rates for basic services. For instance, some private prisons have eliminated in-person visitation and have instead contracting with telecommunications companies to provide video calls and then charge inmates their families exorbitant rates. These practices do nothing to further rehabilitation and instead only serve to increase the profits for the prison at the expense of their families. In fact, studies have found that private prisons may increase likelihood of recidivism by up to 22 percent.
- Opposition. According to the California State Sheriffs’ Association,
“While there has been a significant reduction in the prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three-judge panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison.
- Prior Legislation.
- AB 1320 (Bonta), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, is largely identical to this bill. AB 1320 was vetoed by Governor Brown.
- SB 105 (Steinberg), Chapter 310, Statutes of 2013, authorized the state to act expeditiously in contracting with private and public entities to house inmates inside of California as well as outside of California. SB 105 included a January 1, 2017, sunset provision.
- SB 843 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 43, Statutes of 2016, extended the authority of CDCR to contract with in-state, and out-of-state, for-profit prison through January 1, 2020.
- AB 1320 (Bonta), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, is largely identical to this bill. AB 1320 was vetoed by Governor Brown.
Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: February 26, 2019
Counsel: Sandra Uribe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 32
Author:(Bonta) – As Introduced Ver:December 3, 2018
REVISED
SUMMARY:
Prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from entering into, or renewing contracts with for-profit private prisons after January 1, 2020, and eliminates their use by January 1, 2028. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits CDCR from entering into a contract with any private, for-profit prison, on or after January 1, 2020. Applies to both in-state and out-of-state facilities.
- Prohibits CDCR from renewing contracts with any private, for-profit prison on or after January 1, 2020. Applies to both in-state and out-of-state facilities.
- Requires all state prison inmates under the jurisdiction of CDCR to be removed from private, for-profit prison facilities on or before January 1, 2028.
EXISTING LAW:
- Authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity within California. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2915, subds. (a) & (d).)
- Authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to enter into agreements with private entities to obtain secure housing capacity in another state. (Pen. Code, § 2915, subds. (b) & (d).)
- Prohibits CDCR from operating its own facility outside of California. (Pen. Code, § 2915, subd. (b).)
- Allows the Secretary of CDCR to enter into an agreement with a city, county, or city and county, to permit the transfer of prisoners in the custody of the secretary to a jail or other adult correctional facility. Sunsets this authority on January 1, 2020. (Pen. Code, § 2010, subds. (a) & (h).)
- Anticipates, as outlined in the Budget Act of 2018, that all California inmates will be returned from out-of-state contract correctional facilities by February 2019. (Pen. Code, § 2067, subd. (a).)
- Requires CDCR, to the extent that the adult offender population continues to decline, to begin reducing private in-state male contract correctional facilities in a manner that maintains sufficient flexibility to comply with the federal court order to maintain the prison population at or below 137.5 percent of design capacity. The private in-state male contract correctional facilities that are primarily staffed by non-Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation personnel shall be prioritized for reduction over other in-state contract correctional facilities. (Pen. Code, § 2067, subd. (a).)
- Requires CDCR to consider the following factors in reducing the capacity of state-owned and operated prisons or in-state leased or contract correctional facilities:
- The cost to operate at the capacity;
- Workforce impacts;
- Subpopulation and gender-specific housing needs;
- Long-term investment in state-owned and operated correctional facilities, including previous investments;
- Public safety and rehabilitation; and,
- The durability of the state’s solution to prison overcrowding. (Pen. Code, § 2067, subd. (b).)
- The cost to operate at the capacity;
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “The built-in incentives for these businesses are all wrong. A private, for-profit company that is traded on Wall Street will inherently be incentivized to maximize profits and minimize costs—including the important ‘cost’ of investments in programs, services and rehabilitation efforts for inmates—through warehousing our inmates. These companies have a duty to shareholders, not to California. It’s time we redirect our criminal justice system to value and prioritize effective prison rehabilitation programs, which will help minimize recidivism rates and maximize successes for inmates upon their reentry into society.”
- Court-Ordered Limits on Prison Overcrowding: In January 2010, a three-judge panel issued a ruling ordering the State of California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity because overcrowding was the primary reason that CDCR was unable to provide inmates with constitutionally adequate healthcare. (Coleman/Plata vs. Schwarzenegger (2010) No. Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM P/NO. C01-1351 THE.) The United State Supreme Court upheld the decision, declaring that “without a reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill” inmates in California’s prisons. (Brown v. Plata (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1939; 179 L.Ed.2d 969, 999.)
After continued litigation, on February 10, 2014, the federal court ordered California to reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5% of design capacity by February 28, 2016, as follows: 143% of design bed capacity by June 30, 2014; 141.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2015; and, 137.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2016.
CDCR is currently in compliance with the three-judge panel’s order on the prison population.
CDCR’s January 2019 monthly report on the prison population notes that the in-state adult institution population is currently 113,861 inmates, which amounts to 133.8% of design capacity. (https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1901.pdf.) However, the state needs to maintain a “durable solution” to prison overcrowding “consistently demanded” by the court. (Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request For Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, NO. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (2-10-14).
As of January 31, 2019, there are 1,821 prisoners being housed in Arizona. In addition, there are 6,371 inmates under the jurisdiction of CDCR housed at in-state contract beds. (https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1901.pdf.) CDCR has informed this committee that it does not consider the 2,400 contract beds at the California City Correctional Facility to qualify as private, for-profit prisons because it is a leased facility staffed and operated by CDCR.
This bill would prohibit the housing of prisoners in for-profit prisons, both in and out of state, by January 1, 2028. Additionally, the bill would prohibit CDCR from renewing or entering into new contracts after January 1, 2020. While CDCR does not consider the 2,400 contract beds at California City to fall within the parameters of this bill, arguably a lease is still a contract with a private, for-profit facility. Should this bill define a “private, for-profit prison facility” in order to clarify this ambiguity?
As to the aspect of the bill prohibiting a new contract or renewal after January 1, 2020, CDCR has provided this Committee with the following information regarding contract term dates:
CONTRACT | CONTRACT END DATE |
In-State Private | |
Golden State MCCF | June 30, 2023 |
Desert Valley MCCF | June 30, 2023 |
Central Valley MCCF | June 30, 2023 |
McFarland (Females) | June 30, 2023 |
Out-of-State Private | |
La Palma (Arizona) | June 30, 2019 |
The Governor’s January proposed budget for 2019-2020 “assumes all inmates will be returned from out-of-state facilities by the end of the current year. However, due to the higher-than-expected population in 2018-19, all inmates are now expected to return in June 2019 instead of January 2019 as projected in the 2018 Budget Act.” (http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2019-20/pdf/BudgetSummary/PublicSafety.pdf.) Thus, the question is whether CDCR will be able to maintain a durable solution to prison overcrowding without housing inmates at in-state private facilities within the timelines established in this bill?
- Concerns with Private Prisons: In 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an investigation of private prisons and issued a report. The investigation found that private prisons were less safe than federal prisons, poorly administered, and provided limited long-term savings for the federal government. For example, the contract prisons confiscated eight times as many contraband cell phones annually on average as the federal institutions. Private prisons also had higher rates of assaults, both by inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff. Additionally, two of the three contract prisons inspected by the Inspector General’s Office discovered they were improperly housing new inmates in Special Housing Units (SHU), which are normally used for disciplinary or administrative segregation, until beds became available in general population housing. (See Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Contract Prisons, August 2016, <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf#page=2.)
It should be noted that the for-profit prisons inspected by the U.S. Department of Justice were operated by three private corporations: Corrections Corporation of America[1], GEO Group, Inc., and Management and Training Corporation. CDCR has informed this Committee that it also contracts with GEO Group and the Corrections Corporation of America. The out of state prison is owned by Corrections Corporation of America, and the Geo Group has the contracts for all the in state beds. - Concerns Regarding Lack of Transparency: Private, for-profit detention facilities are accountable to their shareholders and not the people of the State of California. For example, these facilities claim exemptions to the public disclosure requirements under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552) because they are private corporations, which makes the potentially unlawful conduct occurring within the facility hidden from discovery. These facilities similarly claim an exemption to California’s State counterpart, the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq).
- Argument in Support: According to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, “The accelerated use of for-profit, private prisons by California was in response to a court order from a three-judge panel ordering the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of capacity. Since peaking in 2006, California’s prison population has been steadily declining, currently standing at 135 percent of design capacity. While more still needs to be done to further prison reform, California no longer needs to rely on private prisons to meet the demand of inmate housing.
“Private prisons are notorious for their use of exploitative practices on their inmates. Prisoners are forced to work for egregiously low wages, while the facilities enter into contracts with private companies which charge expensive rates for basic services. For instance, some private prisons have eliminated in-person visitation and have instead contracted with telecommunications companies to provide video calls with then charge inmates and their families exorbitant rates. These practices do nothing to further rehabilitation and instead only serve to increase the profits of the prison at the expense of the inmates and their families. In fact, studies have found that private prisons may increase the likelihood of recidivism by up to 22 percent.
“AB 32 prohibits the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation from entering into, or renewing, a contract with a private, for-profit prison. As the strain on our public correctional facilities begins to relax due to a decreasing prison population, the validity of the need for private prisons vanishes. Ending the contracting of private prisons will allow California to focus on rehabilitating inmates rather than warehousing them. When we shift these priorities, inmates will have the ability to complete their sentence with the tools that allow them to leave a life of crime and become productive members of society.” - Argument in Opposition: According to the California State Sheriffs’ Association, “Many different tools and approaches are included in California’s efforts to eliminate overcrowding in the state prison system. Over the past few years, private prisons have been but one part of a multi-pronged approach to reduce overcrowding, promote better outcomes, and protect public safety.
“While there has been a significant reduction in the state prison population since Realignment, it remains a challenge to continue to meet the federal three-judge panel mandate to relieve prison overcrowding. Removing CDCR’s authority to contract with private prisons takes away a tool and increases the likelihood of releases of dangerous inmates from state prison and heightens pressure to have county jails take on more custodial capacity that would otherwise be housed in state prison. Given the significant responsibilities and challenges already assumed by local entities under Realignment and the great pressure on local systems that would surely occur in the wake of an influx of new, serious, offenders in local custody, we are exceedingly concerned about hamstringing state prison officials.” - Prior Legislation:
- AB 1320 (Bonta), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, would have prohibited CDCR from entering into, or renewing contracts with private prisons after January 1, 2018, and eliminates their use by January 1, 2028. AB 1320 was vetoed.
- SB 1289 (Lara), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have prohibited local governments and law enforcement from contracting with companies that operate for-profit immigration detention facilities, starting January 1, 2018, and requires these facilities to uphold national standards for humane treatment of detainees. SB 1289 was vetoed.
- SB 843 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 43, Statutes of 2016, extended the authority of CDCR to contract with in-state, and out-of-state, for-profit prison through January 1, 2020.
- SB 105 (Steinberg), Chapter 310, Statutes of 2013, authorized the state to act expeditiously in contracting with private and public entities to house inmates inside of California as well as outside of California. Sunset this authority January 1, 2017.
- AB 1320 (Bonta), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, would have prohibited CDCR from entering into, or renewing contracts with private prisons after January 1, 2018, and eliminates their use by January 1, 2028. AB 1320 was vetoed.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees - AFL-CIO
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
California Public Defenders Association
Oakland Privacy
Pico California
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Oppose
California State Sheriffs' Association
Analysis Prepared by:
Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Corrections Corporation of America has changed its name to CoreCivic. (See http://www.correctionscorp.com/ ) ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):