AB 904: Search warrants: tracking devices.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2020-09-11
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Sep 11, 2020 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 63, Statutes of 2020. |
| Sep 11, 2020 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 8, 2020 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4:30 p.m. |
| Aug 30, 2020 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 75. Noes 0. Page 5351.). |
| Aug 28, 2020 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 28, 2020 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 4373.). |
| Aug 3, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to Consent Calendar. |
| Aug 1, 2020 | From committee: Do pass. To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (July 31). |
| Jun 29, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 23, 2020 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jan 28, 2020 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| Jan 27, 2020 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 78. Noes 0. Page 3888.) |
| Jan 17, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jan 16, 2020 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Jan 15, 2020 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (January 14). |
| Jan 14, 2020 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 8. Noes 0.) (January 14). Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jan 9, 2020 | Assembly Rule 56 suspended. (Page 3769.) |
| Jan 7, 2020 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jan 6, 2020 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 9, 2019 | In committee: Set, second hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Apr 2, 2019 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| Apr 1, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 28, 2019 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 26, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Mar 7, 2019 | Referred to Coms. on PUB. S. and P. & C.P. |
| Feb 21, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 23. |
| Feb 20, 2019 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Aug 30, 2020 | AB 904 Chau Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Aug 28, 2020 | Consent Calendar AB904 | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Jul 31, 2020 | Do pass and be ordered to the Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
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| Jan 27, 2020 | AB 904 Chau Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Jan 14, 2020 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
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| Jan 14, 2020 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 904
Author:(Chau)
As Amended Ver:June 29, 2020
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Provides that if a law enforcement agency utilizes software to track a person's movements, whether in conjunction with a third party or by interacting directly with a person's electronic device, the provisions for obtaining a tracking device search warrant apply.
The Senate Amendments:
Clarify that nothing in this bill shall be construed to authorize the use of any device or software for the purpose of tracking the movement of a person or object.
COMMENTS:
According to the Author:
According to the author, "The rights of individuals against unlawful search and seizure are enshrined in both the Constitutions of the United States (through the Fourth Amendment) and the State of California. Having stood for over 200 years, this basic human right has consistently been reinterpreted to account for changes in government, technology, and society. Judicial understanding of this right has morphed from an explicit right of privacy within the home and personal documents, to an expansive protection against the collection of information by the government in a great many applications. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Carpenter v. United States that the use of cell phone location information by law enforcement is an invasion of personal privacy, which requires the granting of a search warrant.
"This decision certainly represents a landmark case in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but had limited applicability to the residents of California because this specific requirement has been applied to law enforcement agencies in California since 2012. With the rest of the country following suit, it is important that California continues to look ahead at the changing landscape of technology and maintains the lead in protecting our residents against unlawful search and seizure.
"Penal Code Section 1534 currently requires search warrants prior to an officer 'installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data.' It is, however, no longer necessary for an officer to make physical contact with a device, person, or vehicle to 'install' a 'device' in order to track an individual. On the contrary, a government official need only have wireless access to download tracking software that will provide investigators with far more information than just a person's or a vehicle's location.
"AB 904 would make clear that a tracking device includes any software that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object for purposes of the statute."
Arguments in Support:
According to the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, "This bill closes a loophole in the law that could allow for the software-based tracking of individuals by law enforcement without a warrant. Search warrants protect the public from unreasonable searches and seizures, a constitutional right that CACJ supports and believes should be expanded in the face of new technology."
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation¸ "[AB] 904 would amend the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act ('CalECPA'), a watershed statute that established bright-line rules for California government entities seeking to obtain, retain, and use digital information. CalECPA was drafted with the specific intention of reinforcing the privacy rights set forth at Article 1, Section 1, of the California Constitution—a response to the 'modern threat to personal privacy' posed by increased surveillance and then-emerging data collection technology. White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774 (1975).
"We are extremely concerned that [AB] 904 would create and authorize, for any California government entity, an entirely new 'procedure for accessing or installing software into an electronic device.' CalECPA already allows access to information stored on a device. A.B. 904's new procedure would seem to expressly authorize the government to 'access' applications like cameras, microphones, or electronic mail on a person's smartphone, tablet, or computer. At the very least, this could allow the government to use a person's device as a hidden camera or microphone, or as a launching pad to covertly access email or other documents or communications that are not stored on the device."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
Unknown. This bill is keyed non-fiscal by the Legislative Counsel.
VOTES:
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 11-0-0
YES: Chau, Kiley, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Calderon, Kalra, Gallagher, Irwin, Obernolte, Smith, Wicks
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-0
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Bauer-Kahan, Diep, Kamlager, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0-2
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Megan Dahle, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Obernolte, Patterson, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood
ABS, ABST OR NV: Cervantes, Rendon
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Borgeas, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Grove, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Leyva, McGuire, Melendez, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Morrell, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Jones
UPDATED:
VERSION: June 29, 2020
CONSULTANT: Nikki Moore / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003184
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 904 |
CONSENT
Bill No: AB 904
Author: Chau (D)
Amended: 6/29/20 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 7-0, 7/31/20
AYES: Skinner, Moorlach, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Morrell, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 1/27/20 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Search warrants: tracking devices
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill clarifies that if a law enforcement agency utilizes software to track a person’s movements, whether in conjunction with a third party or by interacting with a person’s electronic device, the provisions for obtaining a tracking device search warrant apply.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., Art. I, § 13.)
- Provides that a search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and, in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 1523.)
- Provides that a search warrant may be issued for specified grounds. (Pen. Code § 1524 (a)(1)- (19).)
- Permits a tracking device search warrant to be issued when the information to be received from the use of a tracking device constitutes evidence that tends to show that either a felony, or a misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code and the Public Resources Code, and the device will assist in locating an individual who has committed or is committing a felony, or a misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code or Public Resources Code. (Pen. Code § 1534.)
- Provides that a tracking device search warrant may be issued as specified, and that the warrant shall identify the person or property to be tracked, and shall specify a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days from the date the warrant is issued, that the device may be used. Permits the court to, for good cause, grant one or more extensions for the time that the device may be used. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b).)
- Requires that the search warrant command the officer to execute the warrant by installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data, and requires the officer to perform any installation authorized by the warrant during the daytime unless the magistrate, for good cause, expressly authorizes installation at another time. Requires execution of the warrant be completed no later than 10 days immediately after the date of issuance. (Pen. Code, § 1534 (b).)
- Provides that an officer executing a tracking device search warrant shall not be required to knock and announce his or her presence before executing the warrant. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(2).)
- Requires, no later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant to file a return to the warrant. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b) (3).)
- Requires, no later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer who executed the tracking device warrant to notify the person who was tracked or whose property was tracked as specified, and permits delay as specified. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(4).)
- Authorizes an officer installing a device authorized by a tracking device search warrant to install and use the device only within California. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(5).)
- Defines “tracking device” to mean any electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(6).)
- Enacts the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), which generally prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of or access to electronic communication information or electronic device information without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions, except for emergency situations. (Pen. Code §§ 1546-1546.4.)
- Provides that a government entity may access electronic device information by means of a physical interaction or electronic communication device only: pursuant to a warrant; wiretap; with authorization of the possessor of the device; with consent of the owner of the device; in an emergency; if seized from an inmate. (Pen. Code § 1546.1(b).)
- Specifies the conditions under which a government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device, such as pursuant to a search warrant, wiretap order, tracking device search warrant, or consent of the owner of the device. (Pen. Code § 1546.1 (c).)
- Allows a service provider to voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information, when the disclosure is not otherwise prohibited under state or federal law. (Pen. Code § 1546.1 (f).)
- Provides that if a government entity receives electronic communication voluntarily it shall destroy that information within 90 days except under specified circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1 (g).)
- Provides for notice to the target of a warrant or an emergency obtaining electronic information to be provided either contemporaneously with the service of the warrant or within three days in an emergency situation. (Pen. Code, § 1546.2 (a).)
- Allows a person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding to move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the CalECPA. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4 (a).)
- Makes it a public offense to knowingly access and without permission take, copy, or make use of any data from a computer, computer system, or computer network, or take or copy any supporting documentation, whether existing or residing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network. (Pen. Code § 502 (b)(2).)
This bill:
- Clarifies that the definition of “tracking device” includes the software used in tracking.
- Provides that it shall not be construed to authorize the use of any device or software for the purpose of tracking the movement of a person or object.
Background
Existing Law Requires a Warrant to Track a Person’s Movements
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones that the use of a self-contained GPS tracking device (“slap-on”) on a motor vehicle to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a “search.” Thus a warrant is required to utilize such technology. That year, California passed AB 2055 (Fuentes) Chapter 818 to codify and expand the case, and require a warrant when a government entity utilizes such tracking device. Now, Pen. Code, §1534 sets forth specific procedures for obtaining a tracking device search warrant. Tracking devices may only be used to investigate felony violations, or misdemeanor violations of the Public Resources Code and the Fish and Game Code. A tracking device warrant is not authorized for other misdemeanor conduct for which a warrant for historical information is permitted, like to investigate a misdemeanor offense involving a motor vehicle.[1]
After CalECPA was passed by the Legislature in 2015, there was concern that the law nullified existing provisions of law permitting the use of pen registers and tracking devices. The next year, the Legislature passed AB 1924 (Low) Chapter 511 to incorporate existing laws permitting the use of pen registers and tracking devices into CalECPA. The result of amending CalECPA to include the tracking device search warrant procedures was to establish that any time a law enforcement agent seeks to obtain a person’s real-time location data, that a warrant complying with Pen. Code, §1534 is required, whether the tracking occurs by utilizing a “slap-on” device or by compelling production of that information from a service provider through CalECPA, or by physically interacting with an electronic device, or by electronically communicating with an electronic device.
CalECPA sets forth rules when a government agency seeks to access a person’s information from a third party, like Google, or when an official seeks to seize a person’s cellphone and search it. The plain language of CalECPA encompasses activity that may arguably constitute certain types of hacking activity of an electronic device by specifying that the law’s dictates apply when government engages in “physical interaction or electronic communication with the device.” Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c).
Cellphones, vehicle computer systems, and other electronic devices are susceptible to being hacked, and also to receiving malware, a virus, or software which exploit a vulnerability in a device’s operating system and provide the entity exploiting the vulnerability the ability to access, among other things, a person’s location data.
This bill clarifies that the procedures for employing a tracking device, including heightened and specified warrant requirements, must be complied with if a law enforcement agency uses software by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with an electronic device, to track a person’s movements. The most recent amendments clarify that it is not intended to authorize the use of a device to track an individual.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 7/31/20)
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
OPPOSITION: (Verified 7/31/20)
None received
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 1/27/20
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Megan Dahle, Daly, Diep, Eggman, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Patterson, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wicks, Wood
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cervantes, Rendon
Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /
8/5/20 12:01:35
**** END ****
Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (a)(19). ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: AB 904 Hearing Date: July 31, 2020
Author: | Chau | ||
Version: | June 29, 2020 Amended | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | No |
Consultant: | MK | ||
Subject: Search warrants: tracking devices
HISTORY
Source: Author
Prior Legislation: AB 1638 (Obernotle) Chapter 196, Stats. 2019
AB 1924 (Low) Chapter 511, Stats. 2016
AB 929 (Chau) Chapter 204, Stats. 2015
SB 178 (Leno) Chapter 651, Stats. 3025
Support: California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Opposition: None known (all prior opposition removed)
Assembly Floor Vote: 78 - 0
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to clarify that if a law enforcement agency utilizes software to track a person’s movements, whether in conjunction with a third party or by interacting with a person’s electronic device, the provisions for obtaining a tracking device search warrant apply.
Existing law provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
Existing law provides that a search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and, in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 1523.)
Existing law provides that a search warrant may be issued upon any of the following grounds:
- When the property was stolen or embezzled;
- When the property or things were used as the means of committing a felony;
- When the property or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a public offense, or in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the purpose of concealing them or preventing them from being discovered;
- When the property or things to be seized consist of any item or evidence that tends to show that a felony has been committed or that a particular person has committed a felony;
- When the property or things to be seized consist of evidence that tends to show sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography;
- When there is a warrant to arrest a person;
- When a provider of electronic communication or remote computing service has records or evidence showing that property was stolen or embezzled constituting a misdemeanor, or that property or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a misdemeanor, or in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the purpose of concealment;
- When the things to be seized include evidence showing failure to secure workers compensation;
- When the property includes a firearm or deadly weapon and specified circumstances related to domestic violence, examination of a person's mental condition; protective orders, as specified;
- When the information to be received from the use of a tracking device tends to show a felony or misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code, or a misdemeanor violation of the Public Resources Code;
- For purposes of obtaining a sample of the blood of a person in a driving under the influence matter when the person has refused to submit or complete, a blood test as required, as limited and specified;
- The property or things to be seized are firearms or ammunition or both that are owned by, in the possession of, or in the custody or control of a person who is the subject of a gun violence restraining order, as specified;
- When the property or things to be seized include a firearm that is owned by, or in the possession of, or in the custody or control of, a person who is subject to the prohibitions regarding firearms pursuant to Section 29800 or 29805, and the court has made a finding pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 29810 that the person has failed to relinquish the firearm as required by law;
- When the property or things to be seized are controlled substances or a device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia used for unlawfully using or administering a controlled substance pursuant to the authority described in Section 11472 of the Health and Safety Code.
- When there is evidence that tends to show a violation of the Harbors and Navigation Code;
- When the property or things to be seized consists of evidence that tends to show a specified misdemeanor offense of invasion of privacy; and,
- When there is a vehicle collision resulting in death or serious bodily injury to a person which tends to show the commission of a felony or misdemeanor offense. (Pen. Code § 1524 (a)(1)- (19).)
- When the property was stolen or embezzled;
Existing law permits a tracking device search warrant to be issued when the information to be received from the use of a tracking device constitutes evidence that tends to show that either a felony, or a misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code and the Public Resources Code, and the device will assist in locating an individual who has committed or is committing a felony, or a misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code or Public Resources Code. (Pen. Code § 1534.)
Existing law provides that a tracking device search warrant may be issued as specified, and that the warrant shall identify the person or property to be tracked, and shall specify a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days from the date the warrant is issued, that the device may be used. Permits the court to, for good cause, grant one or more extensions for the time that the device may be used. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b).)
Existing law requires that the search warrant command the officer to execute the warrant by installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data, and requires the officer to perform any installation authorized by the warrant during the daytime unless the magistrate, for good cause, expressly authorizes installation at another time. Requires execution of the warrant be completed no later than 10 days immediately after the date of issuance. (Pen. Code, § 1534 (b).)
Existing law provides that an officer executing a tracking device search warrant shall not be required to knock and announce his or her presence before executing the warrant. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(2).)
Existing law requires, no later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant to file a return to the warrant. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b) (3).)
Existing law requires, no later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer who executed the tracking device warrant to notify the person who was tracked or whose property was tracked as specified, and permits delay as specified. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(4).)
Existing law authorizes an officer installing a device authorized by a tracking device search warrant to install and use the device only within California. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(5).)
Existing law defines “tracking device” to mean any electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object. (Pen. Code § 1534 (b)(6).)
Existing law enacts the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”), which generally prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of or access to electronic communication information or electronic device information without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions, except for emergency situations. (Pen. Code §§ 1546-1546.4.)
Existing law provides that a government entity may access electronic device information by means of a physical interaction or electronic communication device only: pursuant to a warrant; wiretap; with authorization of the possessor of the device; with consent of the owner of the device; in an emergency; if seized from an inmate. (Pen. Code § 1546.1(b).)
Existing law specifies the conditions under which a government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device, such as pursuant to a search warrant, wiretap order, tracking device search warrant, or consent of the owner of the device. (Pen. Code § 1546.1 (c).)
Existing law allows a service provider to voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information, when the disclosure is not otherwise prohibited under state or federal law. (Pen. Code § 1546.1 (f).)
Existing law provides that if a government entity receives electronic communication voluntarily it shall destroy that information within 90 days except under specified circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1 (g).)
Existing law provides for notice to the target of a warrant or an emergency obtaining electronic information to be provided either contemporaneously with the service of the warrant or within three days in an emergency situation. (Pen. Code, § 1546.2 (a).)
Existing law allows a person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding to move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the CalECPA. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4 (a).)
Existing law makes it a public offense to knowingly access and without permission take, copy, or make use of any data from a computer, computer system, or computer network, or take or copy any supporting documentation, whether existing or residing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network. (Pen. Code § 502 (b)(2).)
This bill clarifies that the definition of “tracking device” includes the software used in tracking.
This bill provides that it shall not be construed to authorize the use of any device or software for the purpose of tracking the movement of a person or object.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Current statute does not explicitly preclude the tracking of an individual or their vehicle without a warrant unless a “device” is used. Current statute does not explicitly define what a “device” is, but the intimation (based on surrounding language and obligations) is that it must be a physical mechanical object that is itself attached to something. This bill would clarify, by adding “device, or software” to the code, explicitly requiring the preapproval of a neutral magistrate before law enforcement may actively track an individual suspected of a crime. The rights of individuals against unlawful search and seizure are enshrined in both the Constitutions of the United States (through the Fourth Amendment)[1] and the State of California[2]. Having stood for over 200 years, this basic human right has consistently been reinterpreted to account for changes in government, technology, and society. Judicial understanding of this right has morphed from an explicit right of privacy within the home and personal documents, to an expansive protection against the collection of information by the government in a great many applications. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Carpenter v. United States[3] that the use of cell phone location information by law enforcement is an invasion of personal privacy, which requires the granting of a search warrant. This decision certainly represents a landmark case in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but had limited applicability to the residents of California because this specific requirement has been applied to law enforcement agencies in California since 2012[4]. With the rest of the country following suit, it is important that California continues to look ahead at the changing landscape of technology and maintains the lead in protecting our residents against unlawful search and seizure. Penal Code Section 1534 currently requires search warrants prior to an officer “installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data.” It is, however, no longer necessary for an officer to make physical contact with a device, person, or vehicle to “install” a “device” in order to track an individual. On the contrary, a government official need only have wireless access to download tracking software that will provide investigators with far more information than just a person’s or a vehicle’s location.[5] |
2. Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The government’s ability to obtain a warrant to search a place or thing is generally limited to offenses that warrant such invasion in the first place. California law specifies the types of crimes that permit intrusion into a person’s places or things including: when property is stolen or embezzled, among other specified offenses; when there is probable cause that a felony was committed and for a limited list of specified misdemeanors; and when there is a warrant to arrest a person. In the last five years, the Legislature has expanded the crimes that will allow the issuance of a warrant, and continues to suggest additions to the list. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has developed to permit a government entity to access information held by a third party, in some cases with a warrant and in some, without. The third-party doctrine is grounded in the idea that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy when knowingly sharing information with another. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records, which may be subpoenaed by law enforcement with reasonable suspicion that those records will reveal that a crime has been committed.[6] More recently, however, the court has said that for law enforcement to obtain location information from a third party through use of a cellphone likely requires a warrant, except in exigent circumstances. As technology advances, the courts and lawmakers should be careful not to “embarrass the future” by making decisions that are in discord with the “progress of science.”[7] This sentiment is at the core of the holdings in three recent United States Supreme Court cases, Jones,[8] Riley[9] and Carpenter[10] which establish warrant requirements for use of and access to electronic communications and devices to surveil a person. In tandem with the evolving Supreme Court case law, California passed the CalECPA with SB 178 (Leno) Chapter 651 in 2015. SB 178 established in statute that law enforcement officials are required to obtain a warrant before “searching” a third party’s electronic records for law enforcement purposes, either by actually searching a person’s cellphone or electronic device, or by requesting that information from a third party which holds it. Any California court issuing a warrant must decide whether to grant that warrant on a case by case basis. Under CalECPA, a law enforcement agency must have probable cause to search electronic records held by a third party, including tech companies that host untold terabytes of data about their users and subscribers. The law limits the reach of any warrant to information described with particularity, under specific time periods, identifying the “target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought.” The law also specifies that any information unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and not subject to further review, use, or disclosure without a court order. CalECPA states that any warrant applied for shall comply with California and federal law, and that the normal procedures for a warrant apply including a typical warrant for records or things, or an arrest; a wiretap order; a tracking device search warrant; and a pen register or trace device; among others. When CalECPA was initially passed, it did not include reference to a tracking devices or pen registers. In 2016, the Legislature passed AB 1924 (Low) to authorize the use of a tracking device and pen register pursuant to CalECPA with a warrant. 3. Existing Law Requires a Warrant to Track a Person’s Movements In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones that the use of a self-contained GPS tracking device (“slap-on”) on a motor vehicle to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a “search.” Thus a warrant is required to utilize such technology. That year, California passed AB 2055 (Fuentes) Chapter 818 to codify and expand the case, and require a warrant when a government entity utilizes such tracking device. Now, Pen. Code, §1534 sets forth specific procedures for obtaining a tracking device search warrant. Tracking devices may only be used to investigate felony violations, or misdemeanor violations of the Public Resources Code and the Fish and Game Code. A tracking device warrant is not authorized for other misdemeanor conduct for which a warrant for historical information is permitted, like to investigate a misdemeanor offense involving a motor vehicle.[11] After CalECPA was passed by the Legislature in 2015, there was concern that the law nullified existing provisions of law permitting the use of pen registers and tracking devices. The next year, the Legislature passed AB 1924 (Low) Chapter 511 to incorporate existing laws permitting the use of pen registers and tracking devices into CalECPA. The result of amending CalECPA to include the tracking device search warrant procedures was to establish that any time a law enforcement agent seeks to obtain a person’s real-time location data, that a warrant complying with Pen. Code, §1534 is required, whether the tracking occurs by utilizing a “slap-on” device or by compelling production of that information from a service provider through CalECPA, or by physically interacting with an electronic device, or by electronically communicating with an electronic device. CalECPA sets forth rules when a government agency seeks to access a person’s information from a third party, like Google, or when an official seeks to seize a person’s cellphone and search it. The plain language of CalECPA encompasses activity that may arguably constitute certain types of hacking activity of an electronic device by specifying that the law’s dictates apply when government engages in “physical interaction or electronic communication with the device.” Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c). Cellphones, vehicle computer systems, and other electronic devices are susceptible to being hacked, and also to receiving malware, a virus, or software which exploit a vulnerability in a device’s operating system and provide the entity exploiting the vulnerability the ability to access, among other things, a person’s location data. This bill clarifies that the procedures for employing a tracking device, including heightened and specified warrant requirements, must be complied with if a law enforcement agency uses software by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with an electronic device, to track a person’s movements. The most recent amendments clarify that it is not intended to authorize the use of a device to track an individual. 4. Argument in Support CACJ supports this bills stating: AB 904 would clarify that the prohibition on accessing an electronic device without a search warrant includes any software that permits the tracking of a person or object. This bill closes a loophole in the law that could allow for the software-based tracking of individuals by law enforcement without a warrant. Search warrants protect the public from unreasonable searches and seizures, a constitutional right that CACJ supports and believes should be expanded in the face of new technology. |
-- END –
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CONS§ionNum=SEC.%2013.&article=I ↑
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/carpenter-v-united-states-2/ ↑
Codified in California on September 30, 2012 following the passage of AB 2055. ↑
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-spying-karma-exclusive/exclusive-uae-used-cyber-super-weapon-to-spy-on-iphones-of-foes-idUSKCN1PO1AN ↑
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). ↑
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. _ (2018) (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944), and Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U. S. 438, 473-474 (1928)). ↑
United States v. Jones, 564 U.S. 400 (2012) (Holding that the attachment of a global-positioning-system tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and monitoring of the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constituted a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.) ↑
Riley v. California. 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (Holding that police may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.) ↑
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. _ (2018) (Holding that the government's acquisition from wireless carriers of defendant's historical cell-site location information was a search under the Fourth Amendment.) ↑
Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (a)(19). ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 904
Author:(Chau)
As Amended Ver:January 16, 2020
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Clarifies that if a law enforcement agency utilizes software to track a person's movements, whether in conjunction with a third party or by interacting with a person's electronic device, the provisions for obtaining a tracking device search warrant apply.
Major Provisions
Specify that the reference to "software" is not intended to expand the authority of a government entity to use software for surveillance purposes under any law.
COMMENTS:
Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." (United Constitution, 4th Amendment)
As technology advances, the courts and lawmakers should be careful not to "embarrass the future" by making decisions that are in discord with the "progress of science." This sentiment is at the core of the holdings in three recent United States Supreme Court cases, Jones, Riley and Carpenter which establish warrant requirements for use of and access to electronic communications and devices to surveil a person.
In tandem with the evolving Supreme Court case law, California passed the CalECPA with SB 178 (Leno), Chapter 651, Statutes of 2015. SB 178 established in statute that law enforcement officials are required to obtain a warrant before "searching" a third party's electronic records for law enforcement purposes, either by actually searching a person's cellphone or electronic device, or by requesting that information from a third party which holds it.
According to the Author:
According to the author, "The rights of individuals against unlawful search and seizure are enshrined in both the Constitutions of the United States (through the Fourth Amendment) and the State of California. Having stood for over 200 years, this basic human right has consistently been reinterpreted to account for changes in government, technology, and society. Judicial understanding of this right has morphed from an explicit right of privacy within the home and personal documents, to an expansive protection against the collection of information by the government in a great many applications. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Carpenter v. United States that the use of cell phone location information by law enforcement is an invasion of personal privacy, which requires the granting of a search warrant.
"This decision certainly represents a landmark case in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but had limited applicability to the residents of California because this specific requirement has been applied to law enforcement agencies in California since 2012. With the rest of the country following suit, it is important that California continues to look ahead at the changing landscape of technology and maintains the lead in protecting our residents against unlawful search and seizure.
"Penal Code Section 1534 currently requires search warrants prior to an officer 'installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data.' It is, however, no longer necessary for an officer to make physical contact with a device, person, or vehicle to 'install' a 'device' in order to track an individual. On the contrary, a government official need only have wireless access to download tracking software that will provide investigators with far more information than just a person's or a vehicle's location.
"AB 904 would make clear that a tracking device includes any software that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object for purposes of the statute."
Arguments in Support:
According to the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, "This bill closes a loophole in the law that could allow for the software-based tracking of individuals by law enforcement without a warrant. Search warrants protect the public from unreasonable searches and seizures, a constitutional right that CACJ supports and believes should be expanded in the face of new technology."
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation¸ "A.B. 904 would amend the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), a watershed statute that established bright-line rules for California government entities seeking to obtain, retain, and use digital information. CalECPA was drafted with the specific intention of reinforcing the privacy rights set forth at Article 1, Section 1, of the California Constitution—a response to the 'modern threat to personal privacy' posed by increased surveillance and then-emerging data collection technology. White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774 (1975).
"We are extremely concerned that A.B. 904 would create and authorize, for any California government entity, an entirely new 'procedure for accessing or installing software into an electronic device.' CalECPA already allows access to information stored on a device. A.B. 904's new procedure would seem to expressly authorize the government to 'access' applications like cameras, microphones, or electronic mail on a person's smartphone, tablet, or computer. At the very least, this could allow the government to use a person's device as a hidden camera or microphone, or as a launching pad to covertly access email or other documents or communications that are not stored on the device."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
Unknown. This bill is keyed non-fiscal by the Legislative Counsel.
VOTES:
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 11-0-0
YES: Chau, Kiley, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Calderon, Kalra, Gallagher, Irwin, Obernolte, Smith, Wicks
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-0
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Bauer-Kahan, Diep, Kamlager, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks
UPDATED:
VERSION: January 16, 2020
CONSULTANT: Nikki Moore / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002614
Date of Hearing: January 14, 2020
Counsel: Nikki Moore
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:
Author:() – As Ver:
SUMMARY:
Clarifies that if a law enforcement agency utilizes software to track a person’s movements, whether in conjunction with a third party or by interacting with a person’s electronic device, the provisions for obtaining a tracking device search warrant apply.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
- Provides that a search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and, in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 1523.)
- Provides that a search warrant may be issued upon any of the following grounds:
- When the property was stolen or embezzled;
- When the property or things were used as the means of committing a felony;
- When the property or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a public offense, or in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the purpose of concealing them or preventing them from being discovered;
- When the property or things to be seized consist of any item or evidence that tends to show that a felony has been committed or that a particular person has committed a felony;
- When the property or things to be seized consist of evidence that tends to show sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography;
- When there is a warrant to arrest a person;
- When a provider of electronic communication or remote computing service has records or evidence showing that property was stolen or embezzled constituting a misdemeanor, or that property or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a misdemeanor, or in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the purpose of concealment;
- When the things to be seized include evidence showing failure to secure workers compensation;
- When the property includes a firearm or deadly weapon and specified circumstances related to domestic violence, examination of a person's mental condition; protective orders, as specified;
- When the information to be received from the use of a tracking device tends to show a felony or misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code, or a misdemeanor violation of the Public Resources Code;
- For purposes of obtaining a sample of the blood of a person in a driving under the influence matter when the person has refused to submit or complete, a blood test as required, as limited and specified;
- The property or things to be seized are firearms or ammunition or both that are owned by, in the possession of, or in the custody or control of a person who is the subject of a gun violence restraining order, as specified;
- When the property or things to be seized include a firearm that is owned by, or in the possession of, or in the custody or control of, a person who is subject to the prohibitions regarding firearms pursuant to Section 29800 or 29805, and the court has made a finding pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 29810 that the person has failed to relinquish the firearm as required by law;
- When the property or things to be seized are controlled substances or a device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia used for unlawfully using or administering a controlled substance pursuant to the authority described in Section 11472 of the Health and Safety Code.
- When there is evidence that tends to show a violation of the Harbors and Navigation Code;
- When the property or things to be seized consists of evidence that tends to show a specified misdemeanor offense of invasion of privacy; and,
- When there is a vehicle collision resulting in death or serious bodily injury to a person which tends to show the commission of a felony or misdemeanor offense. (Pen. Code § 1524, subd. (a)(1)- (19).)
- When the property was stolen or embezzled;
- Permits a tracking device search warrant to be issued when the information to be received from the use of a tracking device constitutes evidence that tends to show that either a felony, or a misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code and the Public Resources Code, and the device will assist in locating an individual who has committed or is committing a felony, or a misdemeanor violation of the Fish and Game Code or Public Resources Code. (Pen. Code, § 1534.)
- Provides that a tracking device search warrant may be issued as specified, and that the warrant shall identify the person or property to be tracked, and shall specify a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days from the date the warrant is issued, that the device may be used. Permits the court to, for good cause, grant one or more extensions for the time that the device may be used. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b).)
- Requires that the search warrant command the officer to execute the warrant by installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data, and requires the officer to perform any installation authorized by the warrant during the daytime unless the magistrate, for good cause, expressly authorizes installation at another time. Requires execution of the warrant be completed no later than 10 days immediately after the date of issuance. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b).)
- Provides that an officer executing a tracking device search warrant shall not be required to knock and announce his or her presence before executing the warrant. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b)(2).)
- Requires, no later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant to file a return to the warrant. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b) (3).)
- Requires, no later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer who executed the tracking device warrant to notify the person who was tracked or whose property was tracked as specified, and permits delay as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b)(4).)
- Authorizes an officer installing a device authorized by a tracking device search warrant to install and use the device only within California. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b)(5).)
- Defines “tracking device” to mean any electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object. (Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (b)(6).)
- Enacts the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”), which generally prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of or access to electronic communication information or electronic device information without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions, except for emergency situations. (Pen. Code, §§ 1546-1546.4.)
- Provides that a government entity may access electronic device information by means of a physical interaction or electronic communication device only: pursuant to a warrant; wiretap; with authorization of the possessor of the device; with consent of the owner of the device; in an emergency; if seized from an inmate. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (b).)
- Specifies the conditions under which a government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device, such as pursuant to a search warrant, wiretap order, tracking device search warrant, or consent of the owner of the device. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c).)
- Allows a service provider to voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information, when the disclosure is not otherwise prohibited under state or federal law. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (f).)
- Provides that if a government entity receives electronic communication voluntarily it shall destroy that information within 90 days except under specified circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (g).)
- Provides for notice to the target of a warrant or an emergency obtaining electronic information to be provided either contemporaneously with the service of the warrant or within three days in an emergency situation. (Pen. Code, § 1546.2, subd. (a).)
- Allows a person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding to move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the CalECPA. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4, subd. (a).)
- Makes it a public offense to knowingly access and without permission take, copy, or make use of any data from a computer, computer system, or computer network, or take or copy any supporting documentation, whether existing or residing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network. (Pen. Code, § 502, subd. (b)(2).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “The rights of individuals against unlawful search and seizure are enshrined in both the Constitutions of the United States (through the Fourth Amendment) and the State of California. Having stood for over 200 years, this basic human right has consistently been reinterpreted to account for changes in government, technology, and society. Judicial understanding of this right has morphed from an explicit right of privacy within the home and personal documents, to an expansive protection against the collection of information by the government in a great many applications. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Carpenter v. United States that the use of cell phone location information by law enforcement is an invasion of personal privacy, which requires the granting of a search warrant.
“This decision certainly represents a landmark case in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but had limited applicability to the residents of California because this specific requirement has been applied to law enforcement agencies in California since 2012. With the rest of the country following suit, it is important that California continues to look ahead at the changing landscape of technology and maintains the lead in protecting our residents against unlawful search and seizure.
“Penal Code Section 1534 currently requires search warrants prior to an officer ‘installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data.’ It is, however, no longer necessary for an officer to make physical contact with a device, person, or vehicle to ‘install’ a ‘device’ in order to track an individual. On the contrary, a government official need only have wireless access to download tracking software that will provide investigators with far more information than just a person’s or a vehicle’s location.
“AB 904 would make clear that a tracking device includes any software that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object for purposes of the statute.”
- Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
The Fourth Amendment was borne from the concern that government officials would arbitrarily and unreasonably rummage through the homes and belongings of its citizens; it acts as a shield to protect the privacy and security of individuals against the arbitrary invasion of governmental officials. When society deems a place or thing to be covered by a reasonable expectation of privacy, a warrant supported by probable cause is required to search or inspect that place or thing. No single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment, but a fundamental purpose in imposing limitations on government intrusions has long been to prevent too pervasive a state of police surveillance.
The government’s ability to obtain a warrant to search a place or thing is generally limited to offenses that warrant such invasion in the first place. California law specifies the types of crimes that permit intrusion into a person’s places or things including: when property is stolen or embezzled, among other specified offenses; when there is probable cause that a felony was committed and for a limited list of specified misdemeanors; and when there is a warrant to arrest a person. In the last five years, the Legislature has expanded the crimes that will allow the issuance of a warrant, and continues to suggest additions to the list.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has developed to permit a government entity to access information held by a third party, in some cases with a warrant and in some, without. The third-party doctrine is grounded in the idea that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy when knowingly sharing information with another. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records, which may be subpoenaed by law enforcement with reasonable suspicion that those records will reveal that a crime has been committed.[1] More recently, however, the court has said that for law enforcement to obtain location information from a third party through use of a cellphone likely requires a warrant, except in exigent circumstances.
As technology advances, the courts and lawmakers should be careful not to “embarrass the future” by making decisions that are in discord with the “progress of science.”[2] This sentiment is at the core of the holdings in three recent United States Supreme Court cases, Jones,[3] Riley[4] and Carpenter[5] which establish warrant requirements for use of and access to electronic communications and devices to surveil a person.
In tandem with the evolving Supreme Court case law, California passed the CalECPA with SB 178 (Leno) Chapter 651 in 2015. SB 178 established in statute that law enforcement officials are required to obtain a warrant before “searching” a third party’s electronic records for law enforcement purposes, either by actually searching a person’s cellphone or electronic device, or by requesting that information from a third party which holds it.
Any California court issuing a warrant must decide whether to grant that warrant on a case by case basis. Under CalECPA, a law enforcement agency must have probable cause to search electronic records held by a third party, including tech companies that host untold terabytes of data about their users and subscribers. The law limits the reach of any warrant to information described with particularity, under specific time periods, identifying the “target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought.” The law also specifies that any information unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and not subject to further review, use, or disclosure without a court order.
CalECPA states that any warrant applied for shall comply with California and federal law, and that the normal procedures for a warrant apply including a typical warrant for records or things, or an arrest; a wiretap order; a tracking device search warrant; and a pen register or trace device; among others. When CalECPA was initially passed, it did not include reference to a tracking devices or pen registers. In 2016, the Legislature passed AB 1924 (Low) to authorize the use of a tracking device and pen register pursuant to CalECPA with a warrant.
- Existing Law Requires a Warrant to Track a Person’s Movements: In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones that the use of a self-contained GPS tracking device (“slap-on”) on a motor vehicle to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a “search.” Thus a warrant is required to utilize such technology. That year, California passed AB 2055 (Fuentes) Chapter 818 to codify and expand the case, and require a warrant when a government entity utilizes such tracking device. Now, Pen. Code, §1534 sets forth specific procedures for obtaining a tracking device search warrant. Tracking devices may only be used to investigate felony violations, or misdemeanor violations of the Public Resources Code and the Fish and Game Code. A tracking device warrant is not authorized for other misdemeanor conduct for which a warrant for historical information is permitted, like to investigate a misdemeanor offense involving a motor vehicle.[6]
After CalECPA was passed by the Legislature in 2015, there was concern that the law nullified existing provisions of law permitting the use of pen registers and tracking devices. The next year, the Legislature passed AB 1924 (Low) Chapter 511 to incorporate existing laws permitting the use of pen registers and tracking devices into CalECPA. The result of amending CalECPA to include the tracking device search warrant procedures was to establish that any time a law enforcement agent seeks to obtain a person’s real-time location data, that a warrant complying with Pen. Code, §1534 is required, whether the tracking occurs by utilizing a “slap-on” device or by compelling production of that information from a service provider through CalECPA, or by physically interacting with an electronic device, or by electronically communicating with an electronic device.
CalECPA sets forth rules when a government agency seeks to access a person’s information from a third party, like Google, or when an official seeks to seize a person’s cellphone and search it. The plain language of CalECPA encompasses activity that may arguably constitute certain types of hacking activity of an electronic device by specifying that the law’s dictates apply when government engages in “physical interaction or electronic communication with the device.” Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c).
Cellphones, vehicle computer systems, and other electronic devices are susceptible to being hacked, and also to receiving malware, a virus, or software which exploit a vulnerability in a device’s operating system and provide the entity exploiting the vulnerability the ability to access, among other things, a person’s location data.
This bill clarifies that the procedures for employing a tracking device, including heightened and specified warrant requirements, must be complied with if a law enforcement agency uses software by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with an electronic device, to track a person’s movements.
- Concerns that this Bill Authorizes Law Enforcement to Hack a Person’s Cellphone or Device: Whether government officials are permitted to “exploit vulnerabilities in software and hardware products to gain remote access to computers”[7] or other electronic devices to “remotely search, monitor user activity on, or even interfere with the operation of those machines” is not squarely addressed by California law.
Pen. Code, § 502 prohibits hacking activity generally, including the right to be free “from tampering, interference, damage, and unauthorized access to lawfully created computer data and computer system.” There is no exception for law enforcement officials. In contrast, Pen. Code, § 632 which prohibits recording a private communication without all parties consent to record has a specified exemption for law enforcement to record for investigatory purposes. Thus, Pen. Code, § 502 does not appear to authorize law enforcement hacking activity.
Turning to the plain language of CalECPA, the law recognizes that a government entity may have the ability to access a person’s electronic information “by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with” an electronic device, and also may compel a service provider to provide records, electronic information, and subscriber information, including things like emails, text messages, and historical location data.
The legislative history of SB 178 (Leno) does not state that a possible intent of CalECPA is to authorize the hacking of an electronic device. (See bill analyses for SB 178 from the Assembly and Senate Public Safety Committees and the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.) However the plain language of the statute states that a physical interaction or communication with an electronic device is permitted with a warrant. Arguably, this may encompass activity that is similar to hacking or the sending of malware or a virus to an electronic device.[8] CalECPA recognizes that the proper type of warrant is required to access information. For example, if a police department is coordinating with AT&T to track the real-time movements of a person through their cellphone with a search warrant, the specified tracking device search warrant procedures would apply in addition to any other provisions of CalECPA.
Whether a judge would authorize activity that constitutes the hacking of a person’s cellphone or otherwise engage in conduct that violates Pen. Code, § 502, for which law enforcement officials have no exception, is another question. And if a judge did so authorize such activity, would reviewing courts deem that to be a reasonable search under Fourth Amendment scrutiny?
- Argument in Support: According to the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, “This bill closes a loophole in the law that could allow for the software-based tracking of individuals by law enforcement without a warrant. Search warrants protect the public from unreasonable searches and seizures, a constitutional right that CACJ supports and believes should be expanded in the face of new technology.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation¸ “A.B. 904 would amend the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (‘CalECPA’), a watershed statute that established bright-line rules for California government entities seeking to obtain, retain, and use digital information. CalECPA was drafted with the specific intention of reinforcing the privacy rights set forth at Article 1, Section 1, of the California Constitution—a response to the ‘modern threat to personal privacy’ posed by increased surveillance and then-emerging data collection technology. White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774 (1975).
“We are extremely concerned that A.B. 904 would create and authorize, for any California government entity, an entirely new ‘procedure for accessing or installing software into an electronic device.’ CalECPA already allows access to information stored on a device. A.B. 904’s new procedure would seem to expressly authorize the government to ‘access’ applications like cameras, microphones, or electronic mail on a person’s smartphone, tablet, or computer. At the very least, this could allow the government to use a person’s device as a hidden camera or microphone, or as a launching pad to covertly access email or other documents or communications that are not stored on the device.
“Even worse, the bill expressly authorizes ‘installing software,’ which appears to authorize government ‘hacking’ into people’s devices in order to install malware. This would constitute a broad new surveillance authority that presents serious risks to computer security. At this point, it is an all-too-familiar story when even elite intelligence and law enforcement agencies are unable to maintain control of their hacking tools and they are exploited by outside actors.” - Prior Legislation:
- SB 178 (Leno), Chapter 651, Statutes of 2015, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic-communication information or electronic-device information without a search warrant or wiretap order, except under specified emergency situations.
- AB 929 (Chau), Chapter 204, Statutes of 2015, authorizes state and local law enforcement to use pen register and trap and trace devices under state law, and permits the issuance of emergency pen registers and trap and trace devices.
- AB 1924 (Low), Chapter 511, Statutes of 2016, requires an order or extension order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device direct that the order be sealed until the order, including any extensions, expires, and would require that the order or extension direct that the person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is attached not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber or to any other person.
- AB 1638 (Olbernolte), Chapter 196, Statutes of 2019, expands authorization for the issuance of a search warrant to obtain information from a motor vehicle’s software that tends to show the commission of a felony or misdemeanor offense involving a motor vehicle, resulting in death or serious bodily injury.
- SB 178 (Leno), Chapter 651, Statutes of 2015, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic-communication information or electronic-device information without a search warrant or wiretap order, except under specified emergency situations.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Oppose
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Analysis Prepared by:
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). ↑
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. _ (2018) (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944), and Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U. S. 438, 473-474 (1928)). ↑
United States v. Jones, 564 U.S. 400 (2012) (Holding that the attachment of a global-positioning-system tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and monitoring of the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constituted a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.) ↑
Riley v. California. 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (Holding that police may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.) ↑
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. _ (2018) (Holding that the government's acquisition from wireless carriers of defendant's historical cell-site location information was a search under the Fourth Amendment.) ↑
Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (a)(19). ↑
Riana Pfefferkorn, Security Risks of Government Hacking (Sept. 2018) Stanford Law School: The Center for Internet and Society, available at: https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/publication/files/2018.09.04_
Security_Risks_of_Government_Hacking_Whitepaper.pdf [last accessed Jan. 8, 2020]. ↑
The only reported hacking activities have been accomplished by federal authorities in a highly controversial public case where a private company was hired to hack an iPhone of a California resident. See Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino iPhone, Washington Post (April 12, 2016), available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html [last accessed Jan. 8, 2020]. ↑
Date of Hearing: January 14, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Ed Chau, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 904 (
Author:Chau) – As Amended Ver:January 6, 2020
SUBJECT: Search warrants: tracking devices
SUMMARY: This bill would specify that a “tracking device” includes any software that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object for purposes of existing law, which allows a search warrant to be issued when the information to be received from the use of a tracking device constitutes evidence that: (1) tends to show that either a felony, or certain misdemeanors, has been committed or is being committed; (2) tends to show that a particular person has committed or is committing a felony or certain misdemeanors; or, (3) will assist in locating an individual who has committed or is committing a felony or certain misdemeanors.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
- Governs search warrants, including the grounds upon which a search warrant may be issued. (Pen. Code Sec. 1523 et seq.) Among other things, existing law authorizes a search warrant to be issued when the information to be received from the use of a tracking device constitutes evidence that tends to show that either a felony, or a misdemeanor under the Fish and Game Code or Public Resources Code, has been committed or is being committed; tends to show that a particular person has committed or is committing a felony or such misdemeanor violations; or will assist in locating an individual who has committed or is committing a felony or such misdemeanor violations. (Pen. Code Sec. 1524(a)(12).)
- Provides that a tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to the above provision must identify the person or property to be tracked and must specify a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days from the date the warrant is issued, that the device may be used. Authorizes courts to grant one or more extensions for good cause, as specified. The search warrant must command the officer to execute the warrant by installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data, as specified, and requires the execution of the warrant to be completed no later than 10 days immediately after the date of issuance. As used in this section, “tracking device” means any electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object. (Pen. Code Sec. 1534(b).)
- Enacts the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), which generally prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider or electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device, absent a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions, or pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, as specified. CalECPA also generally specifies the only conditions under which a government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device, such as pursuant to a search warrant, wiretap order, consent of the owner of the device, or emergency situations, as specified. (Pen. Code Sec. 1546 et seq.)
- Defines various terms for purposes of CalECPA, including the following:
- “Electronic communication” means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.
- “Electronic communication information” means any information about an electronic communication or the use of an electronic communication service, including, but not limited to, the contents, sender, recipients, format, or location of the sender or recipients at any point during the communication, the time or date the communication was created, sent, or received, or any information pertaining to any individual or device participating in the communication, including, but not limited to, an IP address. “Electronic communication information” does not include subscriber information, as defined.
- “Electronic communication service” means a service that provides to its subscribers or users the ability to send or receive electronic communications, including any service that acts as an intermediary in the transmission of electronic communications, or stores electronic communication information.
- “Electronic device” means a device that stores, generates, or transmits information in electronic form. An electronic device does not include the magnetic strip on a driver’s license or an identification card issued by this state or a driver’s license or equivalent identification card issued by another state.
- “Electronic device information” means any information stored on or generated through the operation of an electronic device, including the current and prior locations of the device.
- “Electronic information” means electronic communication information or electronic device information. (Pen. Code Sec. 1546(c)-(h).)
FISCAL EFFECT: None. This bill has been keyed nonfiscal by the Legislative Counsel.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose of this bill: In addition to the existing prohibition on the use of tracking devices unless certain conditions are met, this bill seeks to ensure that government entities cannot use tracking software that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object unless certain conditions are met. This bill is author-sponsored.
- Author’s statement: According to the author:
The rights of individuals against unlawful search and seizure are enshrined in both the Constitutions of the United States (through the Fourth Amendment) and the State of California. Having stood for over 200 years, this basic human right has consistently been reinterpreted to account for changes in government, technology, and society. Judicial understanding of this right has morphed from an explicit right of privacy within the home and personal documents, to an expansive protection against the collection of information by the government in a great many applications. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Carpenter v. United States that the use of cell phone location information by law enforcement is an invasion of personal privacy, which requires the granting of a search warrant.
This decision certainly represents a landmark case in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, but had limited applicability to the residents of California because this specific requirement has been applied to law enforcement agencies in California since 2012. With the rest of the country following suit, it is important that California continues to look ahead at the changing landscape of technology and maintains the lead in protecting our residents against unlawful search and seizure.
Penal Code Section 1534 currently requires search warrants prior to an officer “installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data.” It is, however, no longer necessary for an officer to make physical contact with a device, person, or vehicle to “install” a “device” in order to track an individual. On the contrary, a government official need only have wireless access to download tracking software that will provide investigators with far more information than just a person’s or a vehicle’s location. AB 904 closes this loophole by specifically prohibiting software-based tracking of individuals by law enforcement without a warrant. (Footnote citations omitted.)
- The Fourth Amendment and innovations in surveillance tools: The Fourth Amendment states, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (U.S. Const. 4th Amend.) Stated another way, it prohibits Government from intruding on a person’s right of privacy in their person, home, papers, and effects, unless the Government first obtains a warrant issued upon probable cause supported by sworn testimony and stating the place to be searched and the persons or things to be taken possession of. A warrant, thus, demonstrates that the search and seizure is “reasonable” as required by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
While much of the early Fourth Amendment search doctrine focused on whether the Government “obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area,” more recent judicial precedent recognizes that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment protections.” (See Carpenter v. United States (2018) 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213, citing (U.S. v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400 and Soldal v. Cook County (1992) 506 U.S. 56.) In the seminal case of Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 351, the U.S. Supreme Court established that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” In doing so, the Court “expanded our conception of the Amendment to protect certain expectations of privacy as well. When an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ [the Supreme Court] has held that official intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.” (Carpenter, 128 S.Ct. at 2213.)
As described most recently by the Supreme Court in the case of Carpenter (discussed further in Comment 4, below) Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reflects certain basic guideposts in the Court’s analysis of what is an unreasonable search and seizure, as informed by a historical understanding of that concept when the Fourth Amendment was first adopted. First, the amendment seeks “to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” Second, and related, that a central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” (Id. at 2214, internal citations omitted.) These guideposts apply when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. “As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach on areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, [the] Court has sought to ‘assure [ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (Id., internal citations omitted.)
By way of examples, the Court has applied the Fourth Amendment as follows to various emerging technologies:
- In Smith v. Maryland (1979) 442 U.S. 735, the court ruled that the Government’s use of a pen register (a device that records the outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline phone) was not a search. Noting the pen register’s limited capabilities, the Court “doubt[ed] that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.” As such, when Smith placed a call, he was said to have “voluntarily conveyed” the dialed numbers to the phone company by “expos[ing] that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.” (Id. at 742, 744).
- In United States v. Knotts (1983) 460 U.S. 276, 281, 282, the Court considered the Government’s use of a “beeper” to aid in tracking a vehicle through traffic as officers (with intermittent aerial assistance) followed the vehicle relying on the beeper’s signal to keep the vehicle in view. There, the Court concluded that the “augment[ed]” visual surveillance did not constitute a search because a “person traveling in an automobile of public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”
- In Kyllo v. United States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, the Court determined that the Government could not capitalize on new sense-enhancing technology (thermal imaging) to explore what was happening within the home, absent a warrant.
- In United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400, the Court was faced with a case wherein FBI agents installed a GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and remotely monitored the vehicle’s movements for almost 30 days. Based on the Government’s physical trespass of the vehicle, five justices agreed that related privacy concerns would be raised by, for example, “surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection system” in Jones’s car to track him, or conducting GPS tracking of his cell phone. Since GPS monitoring of a vehicle tracks every movement that a person makes in the vehicle, the concurring Justices in Jones concluded that “‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy’—regardless whether those movements were disclosed to the public at large.” (Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2215, internal citations omitted.)
- In Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, the Court recognized the immense storage capacity of modern cell phones in holding that police officers must generally obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a phone.
Like the holdings in many of these cases, this bill recognizes that laws require periodic updating to ensure that rights are protected in as new technologies become available. The California Attorneys for Criminal Justice (CACJ), a statewide association of criminal defense attorneys in private practice and working in public defender offices, writes in support of this bill:
AB 904 would clarify that the prohibition on accessing an electronic device without a search warrant includes any software that permits the tracking of a person or object. This bill closes a loophole in the law that could allow for the software-based tracking of individuals by law enforcement without a warrant. Search warrants protect the public from unreasonable searches and seizures, a constitutional right that CACJ supports and believes should be expanded in the face of new technology.
- Carpenter v. United States: Most recently, in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a question of how the Fourth Amendment applies “to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals” in the case of Carpenter v. United States (2018) 138 S. Ct. 2206. Using the guidelines of the cases described in Comment 3, above, the Court analogized that the “tracking partakes of many of the qualities of the GPS monitoring [the Court] considered in Jones. Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.” (Id. at 2216.)
In Carpenter, the Court examined the issue under two lines of Fourth Amendment cases. First, it outlined a line of Fourth Amendment cases (including Knotts and Jones, discussed in Comment 3, above) that addressed a person’s expectation of privacy in his or her physical location and movements. Second, it reviewed another line of decisions (including Miller and Smith) wherein the Court has drawn a line between what a person keeps to himself and what he shares with others, which has come to be known as the third party doctrine[1]. The Carpenter Court ultimately held that the government's acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and required a warrant.
- The California Electronic Communications Protection Act: As noted by the author above, while instructive on how the Supreme Court may apply existing protections to emerging technologies in the near future, Carpenter had limited applicability in this state, as California has protected this information for a number of years. California also provides extensive protection to Californians by way of the California Electronic Communications Protection Act (CalECPA), but there does appear to be some question of whether the protection is comprehensive.
Enacted in 2015 by SB 178 (Leno, Ch. 651, Stats. 2015), CalECPA generally prohibits government entities from either: (1) compelling the production of or access to “electronic communication information” from a service provider; or, (2) compelling the production of or access to “electronic device information” from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device. CalECPA authorizes such actions only in limited circumstances. Chief among these authorized circumstances is where the government entity properly obtains a warrant pursuant to existing state law generally governing the issuance of warrants and additional CalECPA warrant requirements. (See Pen. Code Sec. 1946.1(a)(1)-(2), (b) and (d).)
Further, CalECPA specifically prohibits government entities from accessing electronic device information by any means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device, outside of limited circumstances, which include where a warrant has been obtained consistent with those same laws. “Electronic device information” means any information stored on or generated through the operation of an electronic device. “Electronic communication” means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. “Electronic device” includes any information stored on or generated through the operation of an electronic device.
Notably, this provision does not appear to limit the ability of government entities from accessing “electronic communication information” by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. “Electronic communication information” generally means any information about an electronic communication or the use of an electronic communication service, including, but not limited to, the contents, sender, recipients, format, or location of the sender or recipients at any point during the communication, the time or date the communication was created, sent, or received, or any information pertaining to any individual or device participating in the communication, including, but not limited to, an IP address.
Stated another way, because CalECPA only: (1) limits the ability of a government entity from obtaining “electronic communication information” from a service provider; (2) limits the ability of a government entity to obtain “electronic device information” from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device; and (3) only limits the ability of a government entity to access “electronic device information” by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device, it appears possible for law enforcement to obtain “electronic communication information” by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with an electronic device.
Additionally, CalECPA appears entirely silent on the issue of the ability of government to compel access to or surreptitiously access by physical interaction with software on a device. Because of this ambiguity, AB 904 seeks to ensure that the law is absolutely clear, by prohibiting the tracking of individuals through software without a warrant.
Two civil liberties groups, the American Civil Liberties Union of California (ACLU) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, interpret the bill differently and are concerned that the bill would instead authorize software-based tracking by law enforcement. Writing in opposition, the ACLU argues:
Allowing law enforcement use of tracking software that can be installed on a person’s telephone or other electronic equipment without the person’s knowledge poses a host of dangers to the privacy rights of Californians. Such software might also allow law enforcement access to more than just location information. For example, if spyware were installed on an individual’s phone, that software could not only allow law enforcement to tack that person’s location but also to access the phone’s camera, listen in on conversations, see the person’s activity on the phone, and collect other sensitive information.
While we appreciate [the author’s] intent to ensure that any law enforcement use of tracking software be carefully restricted under the law, in its current form, AB 904 unfortunately appears instead to authorize the use of software for tracking purposes when it is unclear whether law enforcement has the authority to install such software for that purpose under existing law. At a minimum, we believe that the bill should be amended to clarify that it does not authorize law enforcement installation or use of any software that was not previously authorized under law.
In response to these concerns, the author offers the following amendment which would clarify that the bill does not authorize the use of tracking software, but instead safeguards against it.
Author’s amendment:
On Page 3, after line 18 insert “(7) As used in this section, the reference to “software” is not intended to expand the authority of a government entity to use software for surveillance purposes under this chapter or any other law.” and renumber accordingly.
This amendment is consistent with the intent of the bill which seeks to strengthen and update California law by ensuring that: (1) government entities cannot obtain “electronic communication information” by way of physical interaction or electronic communication with an electronic device; and (2) government entities cannot obtain access to software on an individual’s electronic device by either physical interaction or compelling a third party to provide that access, surreptitiously, unless the government entity follows California law governing wiretaps.
- Prior legislation: AB 1924 (Low, Ch. 511, Stats. 2016) provided an exemption from CalECPA for pen registers and trap and trace devices to permit authorization for the devices to be used for 60 days.
SB 178 (Leno, Ch. 651, Stats. 2015) enacted CalECPA, which generally requires law enforcement entities to obtain a search warrant before accessing data on an electronic device or from an online service provider.
AB 929 (Chau, Ch. 204, Stats. 2015) authorized state and local law enforcement to use pen register and trap and trace devices under state law, and permitted the issuance of emergency pen registers and trap and trace devices. The authorization for the use of a trap and trace device or a pen register was for 60 days from the date of issuance, with extensions of up to 60 days. However, the governor signed AB 929 prior to signing the ECPA and as a result, the authorization was chaptered out by the ECPA's 10-day authorizations.
SB 467 (Leno, 2013) would have required a search warrant when a governmental agency is seeking the contents of a wire or electronic communication that is stored, held, or maintained by a provider. SB 467 was vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: “The bill, however, imposes new notice requirements that go beyond those required by federal law and could impede ongoing criminal investigations. I do not think that is wise.”
SB 1434 (Leno, 2012) would have required a government entity to get a search warrant to obtain the location information of an electronic device. SB 1434 was vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: “It may be that legislative action is needed to keep the law current in our rapidly evolving electronic age. But I am not convinced that this bill strikes the right balance between the operational needs of law enforcement and individual expectations of privacy.”
SB 914 (Leno, 2011) would have required a search warrant to search the contents of a portable electronic device that is found during a search incident to an arrest. SB 914 was vetoed by Governor Brown, who wrote: “This measure would overturn a California Supreme Court decision that held that police officers can lawfully search the cell phones of people who they arrest. The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizures protections.”
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Opposition
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Analysis Prepared by: Nichole Rocha / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
A doctrine stating that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties” (Smith v. Maryland (1979) 442 U.S. 735, 743-744), “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will only be used for a limited purpose.” (United States v. Miller (1976) 425 U.S. 435, 443). In those cases, the Government is typically free to obtain such information from the recipient without triggering the Fourth Amendment requirement for a warrant. ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):