SB 350: The Golden State Energy Act.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2020-06-30
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Jul 1, 2020 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Jun 29, 2020 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4 p.m. |
| Jun 29, 2020 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 30. Noes 8. Page 3896.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Jun 29, 2020 | From committee: That the Assembly amendments be concurred in. (Ayes 9. Noes 3. Page 3913.) |
| Jun 26, 2020 | Set for hearing June 29. |
| Jun 24, 2020 | From committee: Be re-referred to Com. on E., U. & C. pursuant to Senate Rule 29.10(d). (Ayes 5. Noes 0. Page 3813.) Re-referred to Com. on E., U. & C. |
| Jun 18, 2020 | Re-referred to Com. on RLS. pursuant to Senate Rule 29.10(d). |
| Jun 16, 2020 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Jun 15, 2020 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 57. Noes 17. Page 4891.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Jun 11, 2020 | Read third time and amended. |
| Jun 11, 2020 | Assembly Rule 69 suspended. |
| Jun 11, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jun 10, 2020 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Jun 10, 2020 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 10. Noes 3.) (June 10). |
| Jun 9, 2020 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 12. Noes 2.) (June 9). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 8, 2020 | Joint Rule 62(a) suspended. |
| May 28, 2020 | May 28 set for second hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| May 14, 2020 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Jul 10, 2019 | July 10 set for first hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| May 9, 2019 | Referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Apr 25, 2019 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Apr 25, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 37. Noes 0.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Apr 23, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 22, 2019 | From committee: Be ordered to second reading pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8. |
| Apr 5, 2019 | Set for hearing April 22. |
| Mar 27, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 13. Noes 0.) (March 27). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 15, 2019 | Set for hearing March 27. |
| Feb 28, 2019 | Referred to Com. on E., U. & C. |
| Feb 20, 2019 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 22. |
| Feb 19, 2019 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 29, 2020 | Unfinished Business SB350 Hill et al. Concurrence | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Jun 29, 2020 | That the Assembly amendments be concurred in | Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications |
Passed |
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| Jun 15, 2020 | SB 350 Hill Senate Third Reading By Holden | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Jun 10, 2020 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Jun 9, 2020 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Utilities and Energy |
Passed |
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| Apr 25, 2019 | Senate 3rd Reading SB350 Hertzberg | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Mar 27, 2019 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 350 |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 350
Author: Hill (D), et al.
Amended: 6/11/20
Vote: 21
PRIOR VOTES NOT RELEVANT
SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 9-3, 6/29/20 (Pursuant to Senate Rule 29.10)
AYES: McGuire, Bradford, Dodd, Hertzberg, Hill, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Wiener
NO: Moorlach, Chang, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 57-17, 6/15/20 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: The Golden State Energy Act
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill authorizes the creation of a non-profit public benefit corporation, Golden State Energy (GSE), to acquire the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) Corporation under specified circumstances, including in the event PG&E does not emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This bill provides specified actions should PG&E not emerge from bankruptcy or have its CPUC-issued license revoked.
Assembly Amendments
gut the language in this bill related to resource adequacy and replace the language with the current provisions related to the establishment of GSE and the related provisions.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes that the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. (California Constitution, Article XII)
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix just and reasonable rates and charges for public utilities. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Prohibits electrical corporations and gas corporations from recovering fines and penalties through rates approved by the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §748.1)
- Authorizes electrical corporations and gas corporations to use eminent domain to acquire any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of their electric or gas plants. (Public Utilities Code §§612 and 613)
- Provides mechanisms for electrical corporations subject of a bankruptcy proceeding to recover costs and expenses arising from covered wildfires, as defined, from the Wildfire Fund, if specified actions are taken by June 30, 2020, including that the bankruptcy has been resolved pursuant to a reorganization plan not subject to a stay, approved by the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §3292)
- Prohibits a person or corporation from merging, acquiring, or controlling, either directly or indirectly, any public utility organized and doing business in this state without first securing authorization to do so from the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §§851, 854)
- Subjects nonprofit public benefit corporations to an examination by the Attorney General to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what extent it has departed from the purposes for which it is formed. (Corporations Code §5250)
This bill:
- Authorizes the CPUC to petition a court to appoint a receiver to assume possession of PG&E’s property and to operate its electrical and gas systems if the CPUC determines that the appointment of a receiver is warranted pursuant to the processes or procedures set forth in a specified CPUC investigation.
- Authorizes the Governor, or the Governor’s designee, to incorporate GSE as a nonprofit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for its ratepayers and for the benefit of all Californians. Establishes a nine-member board of directors for GSE and provides for the appointment of the initial board members, as provided, and requires procedures for the transition to a board consisting of six board members who are elected by GSE’s customers, as specified, and three board members who are appointed, as provided.
- Provides, expressly, that GSE is a nonprofit public benefit corporation, subject to all statutory provision and regulatory authority of the CPUC as an electrical corporation and gas corporation, except as specified. Requires the CPUC, upon a specified event occurring, to initiate a proceeding to modify the rules and processes that apply to PG&E Company as necessary to reflect the differences in GSE’s capital structure to ensure continued regulation of rates, electrical and gas safety, wildfire mitigation, climate change mitigation and adaption, public purpose programs, and any other CPUC requirements applicable to an electrical corporation or gas corporation.
- Requires GSE, in each general rate case or attrition year adjustment application, to apply for a revenue requirement sufficient to pay for operations and maintenance costs, pay for administrative and general expenses, service debt, pay the costs of CPUC approved capital expenditures not funded from debt, and fund and maintain necessary financial and operating reserves.
- Authorizes GSE to issue debt to facilitate the acquisition of the property, as defined, of PG&E, as specified.
- Authorizes GSE to recover fines and penalties through rates approved by the CPUC, thereby, excluding GSE from the existing prohibition applicable to gas and electric utilities.
- Authorizes GSE to commence an eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E Company’s certificate of public convenience and necessity for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked pursuant to any processes or procedures adopted by the CPUC in a specified CPUC investigation. Authorizes GSE to take possession of PG&E Company upon deposit in court, and prompt release, of an amount determined by the court to be the probable amount of just compensation.
- Authorizes GSE to participate in the Wildfire Fund which provides mechanisms for electrical corporations to recover costs and expenses arising from covered wildfires, as defined, following the closing of its acquisition of PG&E Company, as specified.
- Specifies that the financing of energy and project costs on behalf of GSE is in the public interest and eligible for financing by the I-Bank or by a special purpose trust, as specified. Authorizes the I-Bank to issue bonds and loan the proceeds to GSE, as specified. Specifies that bonds or other indebtedness issued pursuant to this financing do not constitute a debt or liability of the state or of any political subdivision of the state other than the I-Bank or the special purpose trust, and are payable solely from the funds of, and any security provided by, GSE.
- Provides that any, and all, GSE indebtedness, their transfer, and the payments or income therefrom are at all times free from income taxation of every kind by the state.
Background
PG&E bankruptcy. On January 29, 2019, PG&E Corporation, the holding company of the state’s largest energy utility, voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. PG&E filed their case in the Northern California District Court San Francisco Division (Case No. 19-30088-DM). According to the company’s first day filings, PG&E’s decision to seek relief under Chapter 11 “were necessitated by a confluence of factors resulting from the catastrophic and tragic wildfires that occurred in Northern California in 2017 and 2018, and PG&E’s potential liabilities arising therefrom.” The company noted its potential liability related to the fires could exceed $30 billion, including liabilities from the deadly Camp Fire. The Chapter 11 filing provides a company with the opportunity to develop a “reorganization plan” that addresses their debt. The preparation, confirmation, and implementation of a reorganization plan is at the heart of a Chapter 11 case and is usually proposed by the debtor to keep its business alive and pay creditors over time and, potentially, at a reduced settled amount. The confirmation of a plan discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the date of confirmation. After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments and is bound by its provisions. The confirmed plan creates new contractual rights, replacing or superseding pre-bankruptcy contracts. A key requirement of PG&E reorganization is to provide compensation to wildfire victims as part of any plan in the Chapter 11 case to allow the utility to exit bankruptcy. This is PG&E’s second Chapter 11 bankruptcy in less than twenty years. The previous bankruptcy was filed in 2001 as a response to the restructuring of the energy markets towards deregulated markets, authorized by the CPUC and the Legislature in 1996, which resulted in an energy crisis involving market manipulation of participants such as Enron.
PG&E Plan of Reorganization. PG&E’s plan (dated March 16th) can generally be broken down into categories of safety-related, financial, and other issues. According to PG&E, its plan has the four main components: wildfire claims, other claims, non-tax claims, contributions for participation in the Wildfire Fund, and assumption of agreements (see Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communication’s policy analysis for more detail).
CPUC approval. AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) required the CPUC to determine whether the plan, including the resulting governance structure, is acceptable. The criteria that AB 1054 requires the CPUC to consider in making that determination are PG&E’s safety history, criminal probation, recent financial condition, and other factors. In addition, AB 1054 required the CPUC to determine if the plan is (1) consistent with the state’s climate goals (pursuant to the California Renewable Portfolio Standard), (2) is neutral, on average, to PG&E ratepayers, and (3) recognizes the contribution of ratepayers. These express approvals required under AB 1054 are in addition to the CPUC’s general ratemaking authority, as the Bankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes, any rate change proposed in a plan must be approved by the governmental regulatory commission with proper jurisdiction. AB 1054 also set a very short deadline for PG&E to participate in the Wildfire Fund – the bankruptcy court and the CPUC must approve the plan and other documents resolving the insolvency proceeding by June 30, 2020.
CPUC approves Reorganization Plan. On Thursday, May 28th, the CPUC approved PG&E’s plan, with conditions and modifications (D.20-05-053). In addition to approving the financial plan to pay debts, which includes a trust valued at $13.5 billion to pay wildfire victims, the decision requires PG&E to modify its governance structure, submit to an enhanced oversight and enforcement process if it fails to improve safety, and create local operating regions. These new oversight tools and changes to PG&E’s board of directors and management are designed to ensure PG&E will emerge from bankruptcy as a transformed company that has a commitment and ability to provide safe and reliable service and can simultaneously continue needed improvements to mitigate wildfire risk and achieve the state’s climate goals.
Receivership. Under its authority, the CPUC issues licenses to operate as a regulated utility, known as a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN). CPCN licenses are issued to privately-owned companies afforded the privilege and responsibility to provide monopoly utility service. In exchange for the license to operate, the company providing the utility service is subject to all CPUC oversight and regulation to ensure safe, reliable, and affordable service. Current law authorizes the CPUC to petition the local superior court to appoint a receiver for a water corporation, after notice and hearing, when the water corporation is unable or unwilling to adequately serve its ratepayers or is unresponsive to CPUC rules or order, or is abandoned. The receivership provides the ability to protect assets and property interest pending the outcome of litigation or other legal dispute, generally with the goal of transferring ownership to a more able owner. According to the CPUC, the authority to petition the court to appoint a receiver has only occurred for a handful of Class D water corporations, those with fewer than 500 service connections. The CPUC’s efforts in these cases has been varied as in the rare occasion establishing a receivership took less than 30 days, but most efforts to establish a receivership take several months or years to have processed through the courts.
Comments
SB 350. This bill establishes the GSE as a nonprofit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for the current customers of PG&E. This bill establishes several areas of operation related to GSE, including governance, regulation, and financing. This bill establishes GSE as an electrical corporation subject the regulatory authority of the CPUC. This bill requires the governor to appoint five members, the Senate Committee on Rules two members, and the Assembly Speaker two members to form the initial board of GSE, with staggered terms. Future boards would consist of three members appointed (one each by each appointing entity) and the remaining six members elected by GSE customers. This bill provides GSE with the power commence eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E’s CPCN for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked, as specified.
Plan B. This bill effectuates the acquisition of PG&E by GSE under three scenarios: (1) failure to get reorganization plan confirmation by June 30, 2020 in the bankruptcy court or, fails to secure financing and subsequent exit from bankruptcy by September 30, 2020; (2) if PG&E attempts to sell the utility to a third party before it exits bankruptcy; and (3) after exit from bankruptcy, if at some future date PG&E fails in its safety obligations (reflected in the CPUC’s decision), the CPUC could ultimately revoke PG&E’s CPCN which would trigger the sale of the PG&E to GSE. However, PG&E’s plan has since been confirmed by the court on Saturday, June 20th. Therefore, the failure to secure financing and exit from bankruptcy by September 30, 2020 may prove to be the more salient current lever.
PG&E has agreed, as part of its plan, that it will sell the utility to GSE.
Fire victims’ settlement claims. This bill attempts to provide a safety net to allow the state and GSE to step-in and try to gain control of PG&E, settle all debt, particularly that of fire victims, and get a new utility out of bankruptcy as soon as possible. This bill incorporates language that states the intent of the Legislature for GSE to compensate fire victims.
Governance. This bill establishes a board of directors for GSE similar to that of an IOU. To initially stand up GSE, the governor would appoint five members to staggered terms and an additional two members each by the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Committee on Rules. The board would serve staggered terms and transition to a board composed of six members elected by the customers of GSE, and one appointment by each of the three appointing entities, for a total of nine members. The election procedures of the directors adopted by the board would be required to include nomination of members for election with specified skills, expertise, and experience. These include: wildfire safety, workforce safety, leadership in utility or energy industry, risk management, and climate change mitigation, and others. Some of the parties that “support, if amended”, would like to see environmental justice expertise/representation included among the list of skills and expertise noted in this bill. It is unclear whether a nine-member board with six elected members from the large terrain served by PG&E will be sufficiently be responsive to the interests of its customers. Nonetheless, this is an effort to incorporate more customer voice into the decision-making of the utility should GSE come to be as specified by this bill.
Preserving CPUC safety orders. Amendments taken in the Assembly appropriately preserve the safety reorganization measures so carefully crafted through the CPUC’s investigatory proceeding for the approval of PG&E’s plan, if GSE were to successfully bid for PG&E before it exits bankruptcy. These include measures to: establish and executive-level Chief Risk Officer and Chief Safety Officer, appoint an Independent Safety Advisor, appoint regional executive officers to manage specified regions of the utility, and continue Safety and Nuclear Oversight Committees, among others.
Regulatory oversight. This bill includes provisions that exempt GSE from some provisions of nonprofit corporation statutes that require oversight by the Attorney General. Many of these provisions are areas would be presumed to be handled by the CPUC which has broad authority over regulated utilities, including electrical corporations. These include: notices typically provided to the Attorney General, issues related to sales or mergers or dissolution of the public benefit corporation, examination by the Attorney General, and others.
Impacts to ratepayers. In the event GSE acquires ownership of PG&E gas and electrical service (and associated assets), the cost to transition is expected to be significant. However, as a public benefit corporation, GSE will have the advantage of not paying state or income taxes, and, significantly, not paying shareholders. Nonetheless, the costs to transition, particularly in the initial years, may require an overall increase in rates for utility customers of an unknown amount. This bill appropriately carries over all revenue requirements and rates in place at the time of acquisition of PG&E to GSE. However, this bill ensures continued oversight by the CPUC to ensure the rates are just and reasonable to what will be necessary to operate GSE and ensure safe, reliable, and affordable service. This bill authorizes GSE to provide rate covenants to all of its debt holders and prohibits the CPUC from setting the revenue requirements below the amount necessary to satisfy the rate covenants’ requirements. This provision limits the CPUC’s ability to reduce these costs for ratepayers. However, amendments taken in the Assembly ensure that the CPUC is required to only approve just and reasonable rates, while requiring specified expedited timeframes by which the CPUC must approve applications submitted by GSE concerning issued debt. Additionally, GSE must apply to the CPUC in each general rate case or attrition year adjustment application for a revenue requirement sufficient to pay for all operations, debt service, CPUC-approved capital expenditures funded from debt, fund and operating reserves, and others. The culmination of these costs is the unknown, but likely significant, costs that would need to be recovered to fund the transition to GSE. Additionally, this bill allows the continued participation, and collection of funds, to participate in the Wildfire Fund established by AB 1054 (Holden, 2019). In the event PG&E does not exit bankruptcy and make its initial required and committed contributions to the fund, GSE could notify the CPUC of its commitment to make the initial and annual contributions which would be funded by ratepayers.
Fines and penalties. In the event there are fines and penalties imposed on GSE, those costs would be recoverable in rates. Currently, statute prohibits electrical corporations from recovering fines and penalties in rates. However, GSE, similar to a municipal utility, would not have any shareholders from whom to collect the funds to pay the fines.
Related/Prior Legislation
AB 89 (Committee on Budget, 2020) authorizes the director of the Office of Emergency Services to contract with an operational observer to monitor the efforts of PG&E to prepare for the 2020 wildfire season. The bill has been sent to the Governor.
SB 917 (Wiener, 2020) would have established the Northern California Energy Utility District as a municipal utility to provide electric and gas service within the territories currently served by PG&E, among other provisions. The bill was held by the author in the Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities, and Communications.
AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) established requirements for the participation of PG&E to participate in the Wildfire Fund, in order to recover costs associated with wildfires, as specified.
SB 901 (Dodd, Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018) established the requirement that the wildfire mitigation plans of each electrical corporation meet a number of specified requirements, among other provisions.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- No direct state costs. This is because the bill’s requirements are contingent upon any one of several events, including PG&E’s failure to win approval of its bankruptcy plan or to put the plan into effect, PG&E’s decision to sell its assets and stock, or the CPUC’s decision to revoke PG&E’s license to operate. Should any one of these events, or other related events, occur, the CPUC and, likely, other state entities will face considerable workload. This bill prescribes and directs that workload; however, the bill does not create that workload.
- Potential reduction in property tax revenue of an unknown, but likely significant, amount, as a result of the bill’s exemption GSE indebtedness from all state taxation. Property tax revenue generally goes to local governments.
SUPPORT: (Verified 6/29/20)
350 Bay Area Action
California Environmental Justice Alliance
Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign
The Utility Reform Network
OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/29/20)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
SB 350 provides the statutory authorization for the California Public Utilities Commission to enhance its oversight and enforcement, in the event that PG&E does not comply with the terms of its bankruptcy restructuring. SB 350 additionally enables the State to swiftly take the necessary steps for PG&E to transform into GSE, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, should the CPUC determine the enhanced oversight and enforcement actions have not led to the necessary changes at PG&E.
The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the Company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 57-17, 6/15/20
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Daly, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Obernolte, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Chen, Choi, Cunningham, Megan Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Gray, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, O'Donnell, Patterson, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cervantes, Diep, Nazarian, Ramos, Salas
Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U., & C. / (916) 651-4107
6/29/20 13:31:44
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Senator Ben Hueso, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: Hearing Date: 6/29/2020
Author: | |||
Version: | Amended | ||
Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
SUBJECT:
DIGEST: This bill authorizes the creation of a non-profit public benefit corporation, Golden State Energy (GSE), to acquire the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) Corporation under specified circumstances, including in the event PG&E does not emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This bill provides specified actions should PG&E not emerge from bankruptcy or have its CPUC-issued license revoked.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. (California Constitution, Article XII)
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix just and reasonable rates and charges for public utilities. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Authorizes the CPUC to petition a court to appoint a receiver when the CPUC determines, after notice and hearing, that a water or sewer system corporation is unable or unwilling to adequately serve its ratepayers, has been actually or effectively abandoned by its owners, or is unresponsive to the CPUC’s rules or orders. (Public Utilities Code §855)
- Authorizes a public utility to issue stocks and stock certificates or other evidence of interest or ownership, and bonds, notes, and other evidence of indebtedness for specified purposes, including for the acquisition of property. (Public Utilities Code §817)
- Prohibits electrical corporations and gas corporations from recovering fines and penalties through rates approved by the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §748.1)
- Authorizes electrical corporations and gas corporations to use eminent domain to acquire any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of their electric or gas plants. (Public Utilities Code §§612 and 613)
- Provides mechanisms for electrical corporations to recover costs and expenses arising from covered wildfires, as defined, and establishes the Wildfire Fund to pay eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire. Specifies the funding sources for the fund, which include, among other sources, contributions from electrical corporations and revenues generated from a specified charge imposed on the ratepayers of an electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §§451.1, 3280 et seq.)
- Provides mechanisms for electrical corporations subject of a bankruptcy proceeding to recover costs and expenses arising from covered wildfires, as defined, from the Wildfire Fund, if by, June 30, 2020:
- the bankruptcy has been resolved pursuant to a reorganization plan not subject to a stay;
- the bankruptcy court has determined that resolution of the bankruptcy will provide the means to satisfy any prepetition wildfire claims asserted against the electric corporation, and the CPUC has:
- approved the plan;
- determined the plan is consistent with the state’s climate goals as required pursuant to the California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program;
- neutral, on average, to the ratepayers of the electrical corporation;
- determined the plan and other documents recognize the contributions of ratepayers, if any, and compensate them accordingly through mechanisms approved the CPUC.
(Public Utilities Code §3292)
- Prohibits a public utility from purchasing or acquiring, any part of the capital stock of any other public utility without having been first authorized to do so by the CPUC, as specified. (Public Utilities Code §852)
- Prohibits a person or corporation from merging, acquiring, or controlling, either directly or indirectly, any public utility organized and doing business in this state without first securing authorization to do so from the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §§851, 854)
- Establishes The Bergeson-Peace Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank Act which establishes the California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank (I-Bank) in the Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development. Authorizes, among other things, the I-Bank to make loans, issue bonds, and provide financial assistance for various types of projects that qualify as economic development or public development facilities. (Government Code §63000 et seq.)
- Subjects nonprofit public benefit corporations to an examination by the Attorney General to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what extent it has departed from the purposes for which it is formed. (Corporations Code §5250)
This bill:
- Authorizes the CPUC to petition a court to appoint a receiver to assume possession of PG&E’s property and to operate its electrical and gas systems if the CPUC determines in a proceeding that the appointment of a receiver is warranted pursuant to the processes or procedures set forth in a specified CPUC investigation. This bill would authorize a court to appoint such a receiver and would require the receiver to control and operate PG&E Company upon such terms and conditions as the court prescribes.
- Authorizes the governor, or the governor’s designee, to incorporate Golden State Energy (GSE) as a nonprofit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for its ratepayers and for the benefit of all Californians. Establishes a nine-member board of directors for GSE and would provide for the appointment of the initial board members, as provided. Requires the initial board to amend GSE’s bylaws to include procedures for the transition to a board consisting of six board members who are elected by GSE’s customers, as specified, and three board members who are appointed, as provided.
- Expressly provides that GSE is a nonprofit public benefit corporation, subject to all statutory provision and regulatory authority of the CPUC as an electrical corporation and gas corporation, except as specified. Requires the CPUC, upon a specified event occurring, to initiate a proceeding to modify the rules and processes that apply to PG&E Company as necessary to reflect the differences in GSE’s capital structure to ensure continued regulation of rates, electrical and gas safety, wildfire mitigation, climate change mitigation and adaption, public purpose programs, and any other CPUC requirements applicable to an electrical corporation or gas corporation.
- Requires GSE, in each general rate case or attrition year adjustment application, to apply for a revenue requirement sufficient to pay for operations and maintenance costs, pay for administrative and general expenses, service debt, pay the costs of CPUC approved capital expenditures not funded from debt, and fund and maintain necessary financial and operating reserves. Requires the CPUC, in each GSE general rate case or attrition year adjustment, to consider, modify if necessary, and adopt a general rate case revenue requirement adequate to furnish and maintain efficient, just and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of GSE’s customers, employees, and the public, and to authorize GSE to issue debt as necessary to maintain and operate its assets consistent with the applicable revenue requirement.
- Authorizes GSE to issue debt to facilitate the acquisition of the property, as defined, of PG&E Company, as specified.
- Authorizes GSE to recover fines and penalties through rates approved by the CPUC, thereby, excluding GSE from the existing prohibition applicable to gas and electric utilities.
- Authorizes GSE to commence an eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E Company’s certificate of public convenience and necessity for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked pursuant to any processes or procedures adopted by the CPUC in a specified CPUC investigation. Authorizes GSE to take possession of PG&E Company upon deposit in court, and prompt release, of an amount determined by the court to be the probable amount of just compensation.
- Authorizes GSE to participate in the Wildfire Fund which provides mechanisms for electrical corporations to recover costs and expenses arising from covered wildfires, as defined, following the closing of its acquisition of PG&E Company, as specified.
- Specifies that the financing of energy and project costs on behalf of GSE is in the public interest and eligible for financing by the I-Bank or by a special purpose trust, as specified. Authorizes the I-Bank to issue bonds and loan the proceeds to GSE, as specified. Specifies that bonds or other indebtedness issued pursuant to this financing do not constitute a debt or liability of the state or of any political subdivision of the state other than the I-Bank or the special purpose trust, and are payable solely from the funds of, and any security provided by, GSE.
- Provides that any, and all, GSE indebtedness, their transfer, and the payments or income therefrom are at all times free from income taxation of every kind by the state.
- Exempts the acquisition of PG&E Company by GSE from the prohibitions related to acquiring any part of the capital stock of any other public utility without having been first authorized by the CPUC or merging, acquiring, or controlling any public utility organized and doing business in California without first securing authorization to do so from the CPUC, if GSE, or its subsidiary, agrees to assume, take assignment of, and be bound by all collective bargaining agreements and related obligations, assume any obligations for funding under pension plans then in effect, and, in the event the transfer is made as part of PG&E Company’s and PG&E Corporation’s bankruptcy cases, adopt and be bound by the terms and provisions set forth in a specified reorganization plan.
Background
About PG&E. PG&E Corporation is an energy-based holding company, headquartered in San Francisco. PG&E Corporation is the parent company of PG&E Company, an investor-owned public utility providing gas and electric service to about two-thirds of California, from Bakersfield to the Oregon border. The utility serves about 16 million customers across a 70,000 square-mile service area in Northern and Central California. PG&E has a workforce of about 24,000 regular employees, 20 of whom are employed by PG&E Corp., 15,000 are covered by collective bargaining agreements with local chapters of three labor unions: the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the Engineers and Scientists of California, and the Service Employees International Union. As of September 30, 2018, the company had reported approximately $71.4 billion in assets and approximately $51.7 billion in liabilities, and $370 million of cash on hand for the PG&E Corporation and $240 million of cash on hand, net of $250 million of customer deposits, for PG&E Company (the utility). The company has been under criminal probation following its conviction on six felonies related to the 2010 San Bruno natural gas pipeline explosion that killed eight people. In addition to fines and other penalties, in 2017, then-U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson placed the utility on five years of probation, during which time PG&E was ordered not to “commit another federal, state, or local crime.”
PG&E bankruptcy. On January 29, 2019, PG&E Corporation, the holding company of the state’s largest energy utility, voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. PG&E filed their case in the Northern California District Court San Francisco Division (Case No. 19-30088-DM). According to the company’s first day filings, PG&E’s decision to seek relief under Chapter 11 “were necessitated by a confluence of factors resulting from the catastrophic and tragic wildfires that occurred in Northern California in 2017 and 2018, and PG&E’s potential liabilities arising therefrom.” The company noted its potential liability related to the fires could exceed $30 billion, including liabilities from the deadly Camp Fire. The Chapter 11 filing provides a company with the opportunity to develop a “reorganization plan” that addresses their debt. The preparation, confirmation, and implementation of a reorganization plan is at the heart of a Chapter 11 case and is usually proposed by the debtor to keep its business alive and pay creditors over time and, potentially, at a reduced settled amount. The confirmation of a plan discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the date of confirmation. As stated to this committee by University of California Hastings Law Professor Jared Ellias, “bankruptcy law is considered the law of broken promises.” After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments and is bound by its provisions. The confirmed plan creates new contractual rights, replacing or superseding pre-bankruptcy contracts. A key requirement of PG&E reorganization is to provide compensation to wildfire victims as part of any plan in the Chapter 11 case to allow the utility to exit bankruptcy. This is PG&E’s second Chapter 11 bankruptcy in less than twenty years. The previous bankruptcy was filed in 2001 as a response to the restructuring of the energy markets towards deregulated markets, authorized by the CPUC and the Legislature in 1996, which resulted in an energy crisis involving market manipulation of participants such as Enron.
PG&E Plan of Reorganization. PG&E’s plan (dated March 16th) can generally be broken down into categories of safety-related, financial, and other issues. According to PG&E, its plan has the following financial components:
- Wildfire Claims. PG&E’s plan provides for payment of $25.5 billion in settlement of fire claims, defined as any past, present, or future claims related to specified wildfires that occurred in Northern California in 2015 through 2018, and includes four different classes of fire claims: fire victim claims; public entities wildfire claims; subrogation wildfire claims; and subrogation Butte fire claims;
- Other Claims. PG&E’s plan resolves other pre-petition claims against PG&E in the following areas: funded debt claims; employee-related claims; general unsecured claims; Ghost Ship fire claims; priority tax and priority non-tax claims; subordinated debt claims; common interests; administrative expense claims; and environmental claims;
- Participation in the Wildfire Fund. PG&E believes that its plan will enable it to participate in AB 1054’s Wildfire Fund upon its emergence from bankruptcy; and
- Assumption of Agreements. PG&E’s plan provides for the assumption of all power purchase agreements, renewable energy power purchase agreements and community choice aggregation servicing agreements, as well as all employee benefit plans and collective bargaining agreements.
CPUC approval. AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) required the CPUC to determine whether the plan, including the resulting governance structure, is acceptable. The criteria that AB 1054 requires the CPUC to consider in making that determination are PG&E’s safety history, criminal probation and recent financial condition. Under AB 1054 the CPUC may also consider other factors that it deems to be relevant. In addition, AB 1054 required the CPUC to determine if the plan is (1) consistent with the state’s climate goals (pursuant to the California Renewable Portfolio Standard), (2) is neutral, on average, to PG&E ratepayers, and (3) recognizes the contribution of ratepayers. These express approvals required under AB 1054 are in addition to the CPUC’s general ratemaking authority, as the Bankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes, any rate change proposed in a plan must be approved by the governmental regulatory commission with proper jurisdiction. AB 1054 also set a very short deadline for PG&E to participate in the Wildfire Fund – the bankruptcy court and the CPUC must approve the plan and other documents resolving the insolvency proceeding by June 30, 2020.
CPUC approves Reorganization Plan. In its review of PG&E’s plan the CPUC additionally considered: how the plan and proposed governance structure will affect public safety on a going forward basis, both short term and long term; the ratemaking implications of the plan; whether the plan provides satisfactory resolution of claims for monetary fines or penalties for PG&E’s pre-petition conduct; whether the plan maintains or improves PG&E’s financial condition; whether the plan maintains or improves the quality of service to PG&E ratepayers; whether the plan maintains or improves the quality of management of PG&E; potential effects of the plan on local communities and PG&E employees; whether the plan is fair and reasonable to PG&E employees; and whether the plan is beneficial on an overall basis to state and local economies and to the communities in the area served by PG&E. On Thursday, May 28th, the CPUC approved PG&E’s plan, with conditions and modifications (D.20-05-053). In addition to approving the financial plan to pay debts, which includes a trust valued at $13.5 billion to pay wildfire victims, the decision requires PG&E to modify its governance structure, submit to an enhanced oversight and enforcement process if it fails to improve safety, and create local operating regions. These new oversight tools and changes to PG&E’s board of directors and management are designed to ensure PG&E will emerge from bankruptcy as a transformed company that has a commitment and ability to provide safe and reliable service and can simultaneously continue needed improvements to mitigate wildfire risk and achieve the state’s climate goals.
CPUC on PG&E Safety Culture. Relatedly, as part of the post-San Bruno pipeline explosion, the CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division evaluated PG&E’s and PG&E Corporation’s organizational culture, governance, policies, practices, and accountability metrics in relation to PG&E’s record of operations, including its record of safety incidents. The Safety and Enforcement Division produced a report on the issues with the assistance of an independent consultant, NorthStar Consulting Group. The recommendations that PG&E is ordered to implement include: development of a comprehensive safety strategy, with associated timelines/deliverables, resource requirements and budgets, personnel qualifications, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities; action plans, assignment of responsibility for initiatives; and associated metrics to assess effectiveness. Additionally, the CPUC opened a new phase of the proceeding requiring the safety review of PG&E via an Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) to examine the corporate governance, structure, and operation of PG&E to determine the best path forward for Northern California to receive safe electrical and natural gas service. The OIR remains open with pending related safety issues.
Receivership. Under its authority, the CPUC issues licenses to operate as a regulated utility, known as a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN). CPCN licenses are issued to privately-owned companies afforded the privilege and responsibility to provide monopoly utility service. In exchange for the license to operate, the company providing the utility service is subject to all CPUC oversight and regulation to ensure safe, reliable, and affordable service. Current law authorizes the CPUC to petition the local superior court to appoint a receiver for a water corporation, after notice and hearing, when the water corporation is unable or unwilling to adequately serve its ratepayers or is unresponsive to CPUC rules or order, or is abandoned. The receivership is a way to protect assets and property interest pending the outcome of litigation or other legal dispute, generally with the goal of transferring ownership to a more able owner. According to the CPUC, the authority to petition the court to appoint a receiver has only occurred for a handful of Class D water corporations, those with fewer than 500 service connections. The CPUC’s efforts in these cases has been varied as in the rare occasion establishing a receivership took less than 30 days, but most efforts to establish a receivership take several months or years to have processed through the courts.
Comments
SB 350. This bill would establish the GSE as a nonprofit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for the current customers of PG&E. This bill establishes several areas of operation related to GSE, including governance, regulation, and financing. This bill establishes GSE as an electrical corporation subject the regulatory authority of the CPUC. This bill requires the governor to appoint five members, the Senate Committee on Rules two members, and the Assembly Speaker two members to form the initial board of GSE, with staggered terms. Future boards would consist of three members appointed (one each by each appointing entity) and the remaining six members elected by GSE customers. This bill provides GSE with the power commence eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E’s CPCN for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked, as specified.
Plan B. This bill would effectuate the acquisition of PG&E by GSE under three scenarios:
- According to this bill, if PG&E fails to get reorganization plan confirmation by June 30, 2020 in the bankruptcy court or, fails to secure financing and subsequent exit from bankruptcy by September 30, 2020. However, PG&E’s plan has since been confirmed by the court on Saturday, June 20th. Therefore, the failure to secure financing and exit from bankruptcy by September 30, 2020 may prove to be the more salient current lever. As a result the bankruptcy court would oversee a bidding process for acquisition of PG&E. It would be open; GSE would not be the guaranteed winner. However, if the state demonstrates it wants to move away from an investor-owned utility (IOU) model, it is expected that investors would be unlikely to bid against the state. The ability of any other entity to be up and running and able to secure financing for the transaction in such a short turnaround is also not likely. Consequently, GSE would be well-situated with the authority of this bill, market capital, and I-Bank financing authority to acquire the utility. In either of these situations, the PG&E reorganization plan would be set aside, including the settlement agreement with fire victims which was just voted on and approved by the victims May 15, 2020. All debt would have to be considered as part of the bid and settlements renegotiated with the parties.
- Second and additionally, if PG&E attempts to sell the utility to a third party before it exits bankruptcy, GSE would be situated to bid on the utility which is the only process available for a sale initiated by the utility while in bankruptcy.
- Third, after exit from bankruptcy, if at some future date PG&E fails in its safety obligations (reflected in the CPUC’s decision), the CPUC could ultimately revoke PG&E’s CPCN which would trigger the sale of the PG&E to GSE. PG&E has agreed, as part of its plan, that it will sell the utility to GSE. The state would have the option to purchase all of the issued and outstanding equity interests of PG&E directly or via GSE at an aggregate price. If PG&E reneges on the sale agreement, GSE would have the authority to use eminent domain under the terms of this bill.
Fire victims’ settlement claims. This bill attempts to provide a safety net to allow the state and GSE to step-in and try to gain control of PG&E, settle all debt, particularly that of fire victims, and get a new utility out of bankruptcy as soon as possible. This bill incorporates language that states the intent of the Legislature for GSE to compensate fire victims.
Governance. This bill would establish a board of directors for GSE similar to that of an IOU. To initially stand up GSE, the governor would appoint five members to staggered terms and an additional two members each by the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Committee on Rules. The board would serve staggered terms and transition to a board composed of six members elected by the customers of GSE, and one appointment by each of the three appointing entities, for a total of nine members. The election procedures of the directors adopted by the board would be required to include nomination of members for election with specified skills, expertise, and experience. These include: wildfire safety, workforce safety, leadership in utility or energy industry, risk management, and climate change mitigation, and others. Some of the parties that support, if amended, would like to see environmental justice expertise/representation included among the list of skills and expertise noted in this bill. It is unclear whether a nine-member board with six elected members from the large terrain served by PG&E will be sufficiently responsive to the interests of its customers. Nonetheless, this is an effort to incorporate more customer voice into the decision-making of the utility should GSE come to be as specified by this bill.
Preserving CPUC safety orders. Amendments taken in the Assembly appropriately preserve the safety reorganization measures so carefully crafted through the CPUC’s investigatory proceeding for the approval of PG&E’s plan, if GSE were to successfully bid for PG&E before it exits bankruptcy. These include measures to:
- Establish an executive-level Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Chief Safety Officer (CSO) with specific lines of reporting, for the CRO to appear before the CPUC or meet with CPUC staff at least quarterly, and provide semi-annual performance reports to CPUC staff;
- Appoint an Independent Safety Advisor that would functionally act in the same capacity as the federal court monitor in PG&E’s federal criminal probation, and would work with the CRO, CSO and GSE’s management team and board to enhance the utility’s safety performance;
- Appoint regional executive officers to manage specified regions of the utility and report directly to GSE’s executive leadership, and to appoint regional safety officers that report to the CSO, intended to result in local operating regions led by an officer of the utility that reports directly to the executive team and bring management closer to customers; and
- Continue the Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committees (which is currently part of PG&E’s board of directors). Specifically, the SNO Committees would have oversight of the utility’s wildfire mitigation plan, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program, compliance with the safety and operational metrics (to be developed) and periodic reporting to the board of directors and CPUC staff.
Regulatory oversight. This bill includes provisions that exempt GSE from some provisions of nonprofit corporation statutes that require oversight by the Attorney General. Many of these provisions are areas would be presumed to be handled by the CPUC which has broad authority over regulated utilities, including electrical corporations. These include: notices typically provided to the Attorney General, issues related to sales or mergers or dissolution of the public benefit corporation, examination by the Attorney General, and others.
Impacts to ratepayers. In the event GSE acquires ownership of PG&E gas and electrical service (and associated assets), the cost to transition is expected to be significant. However, as a public benefit corporation, GSE will have the advantage of not paying state or income taxes, and, significantly, not paying shareholders. Nonetheless, the costs to transition, particularly in the initial years, may require an overall increase in rates for utility customers of an unknown amount. This bill appropriately carries over all revenue requirements and rates in place at the time of acquisition of PG&E to GSE. However, this bill ensures continued oversight by the CPUC to ensure the rates are just and reasonable to what will be necessary to operate GSE and ensure safe, reliable, and affordable service. This bill authorizes GSE to provide rate covenants to all of its debt holders. This bill provides prohibits the CPUC from setting the revenue requirements below the amount necessary to satisfy the rate covenants’ requirements. This provision limits the CPUC’s ability to reduce these costs for ratepayers. However, amendments taken in the Assembly ensure that the CPUC is required to only approve just and reasonable rates, while requiring specified expedited timeframes by which the CPUC must approve applications submitted by GSE concerning issued debt. Additionally, GSE must apply to the CPUC in each general rate case or attrition year adjustment application for a revenue requirement sufficient to pay for all operations, debt service, CPUC-approved capital expenditures funded from debt, fund and operating reserves, and others. The culmination of these costs is the unknown, but likely significant, costs that would need to be recovered to fund the transition to GSE.
Fines and penalties. In the event there are fines and penalties imposed on GSE, those costs would be recoverable in rates. Currently, statute prohibits electrical corporations from recovering fines and penalties in rates. However, GSE, similar to a municipal utility, would not have any shareholders from whom to collect the funds to pay the fines. This bill allows the continued participation, and collection of funds, to participate in the Wildfire Fund established by AB 1054 (Holden, 2019). In the event PG&E does not exit bankruptcy and make its initial required and committed contributions to the fund, GSE could notify the CPUC of its commitment to make the contributions which would be funded by ratepayers.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 917 (Wiener, 2020) would establish the Northern California Energy Utility District as a municipal utility to provide electric and gas service within the territories currently served by PG&E, among other provisions. The bill was held by the author in this committee.
AB 89 (Committee on Budget, 2020) authorized the director of the Office of Emergency Services to contract with an operational observer to monitor the efforts of PG&E to prepare for the 2020 wildfire season.
AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) established requirements for the participation of PG&E to participate in the Wildfire Fund, in order to recover costs associated with wildfires, as specified.
SB 901 (Dodd, Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018) established the requirement that the wildfire mitigation plans of each electrical corporation meet a number of specified requirements, among other provisions.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
SUPPORT:
350 Bay Area Action
California Environmental Justice Alliance
Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign, if amended
The Utility Reform Network, if amended
OPPOSITION:
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
PG&E’s emergence from its second bankruptcy has provided an opportunity for the State to demand necessary reforms to ensure safe, reliable, and affordable energy is provided to PG&E’s customers. Many of these reforms have been outlined in regulatory filings, court documents, and legislation – last year’s AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019). However, the State has yet to offer its contingency plan – its “Plan B” – should PG&E fail to adopt the required reforms and fail to correct its behavior. The State cannot risk this failure. SB 350 provides the much-needed safety net should PG&E fail to reform its governance, regulatory oversight, risk management, safety investments and safety performance.
SB 350 provides the statutory authorization for the California Public Utilities Commission to enhance its oversight and enforcement, in the event that PG&E does not comply with the terms of its bankruptcy restructuring. SB 350 additionally enables the State to swiftly take the necessary steps for PG&E to transform into GSE, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, should the CPUC determine the enhanced oversight and enforcement actions have not led to the necessary changes at PG&E.
The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the Company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.
-- END --
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 350
Author:(Hill)
As Amended Ver:June 11, 2020
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Authorizes the creation of a non-profit public benefit corporation to acquire the Pacific Gas & Electric Company and the Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (collectively PG&E) under specified circumstances including its failure to exit its pending bankruptcy and if it fails in its safety performance under the terms of an enhanced oversight and enforcement process adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
Major Provisions
- Permits the Governor or his designee to incorporate Golden State Energy (GSE) as a non-profit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for the current customers of PG&E and for the benefit of all Californians.
- Initially requires the appointment of a nine-member board of directors (board) with staggered terms: five by the Governor; two by the Senate Rules Committee; and two by the Speaker of the Assembly. A transition would occur to a nine-member board with six members elected by customers (based on a slate of candidates meeting specified skills, and selected by the board, based on recommendations from a search firm) and one appointment each by the Governor, Senate Rules Committee and Speaker of the Assembly.
- Establishes GSE as an electrical and gas corporation under the regulatory authority of the CPUC, with specific and limited exceptions which are under the oversight of the Attorney General for nonprofit corporations.
- Authorizes the appointment of a receiver by a superior court, upon application of the CPUC, to control and operate PG&E under terms and conditions prescribed by the court if the CPUC determines that appointment of a receiver is warranted pursuant its enhanced safety and enforcement process.
- Authorizes the GSE to commence an eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E's certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN or license to operate) for the provision of gas or electrical service should be revoked.
- Extends the revenue requirement in effect for PG&E customers at the time of the closing of acquisition by GSE for three years; requires the filing of an attrition year adjustment with the CPUC; authorizes rate increases GSE for the first three years of operation but requires a concurrent filing of an application for review of those increases with the CPUC.
- Requires the CPUC to approve rates for GSE customers only if found to be just and reasonable but in an amount needed to cover indebtedness.
- Permits fines and penalties levied on GSE to be recovered from its ratepayers.
- Authorizes GSE to utilize financing mechanisms available to economic development facilities through the California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank (IBank).
- Restates that GSE would be exempt from income taxation, would continue to be responsible for property taxation, and its indebtedness would be free from state income taxation.
- Requires administrators of the California Wildfire Fund (Wildfire Fund) to authorize GSE to participate as a successor to PG&E, continues a previously imposed surcharge on PG&E customers, to GSE customers, to participate, and adjusts required contributions and the liability cap established for PG&E.
COMMENTS:
This bill would effectuate the acquisition of PG&E by GSE under three scenarios:
First, if PG&E fails to get confirmation of its reorganization plan by June 30, 2020 in the bankruptcy or, fails to secure financing and subsequent exit from bankruptcy by September 30,. 2020. As a result the bankruptcy court would oversee a bidding process for acquisition of PG&E. It would be open; GSE would not be the guaranteed winner. However, if the state demonstrates it wants to move away from an IOU model, it is expected that investors would be unlikely to bid against the state. The ability of any other entity to be up and running and able to secure financing for the transaction in such a short turnaround is also not likely. Consequently, GSE would be well-situated with the authority of this bill, market capitol, and IBank authority to acquire the utility.
In either of these situations, the PG&E reorganization plan would be set aside, including the settlement agreement with fire victims which was just voted on and approved by the victims May 15, 2020. All debt would have to be considered as part of the bid and settlements renegotiated with the parties.
Second and additionally, if PG&E attempts to sell the utility to a third party before it exits bankruptcy, GSE would be situated to bid on the utility which is the only process available for a sale initiated by the utility while in bankruptcy.
Third, after exit from bankruptcy, if at some future date PG&E fails in its safety obligations (reflected in the CPUC's May 27th decision approving PG&E's reorganization plan), the CPUC could ultimately revoke PG&E's CPCN (aka license to operate). In this event, the utility has agreed, as part of its reorganization plan, that it will sell the utility to GSE. The state would have the option to purchase all of the issued and outstanding equity interests of PG&E directly or via GSE at an aggregate price.
If PG&E reneges on the sale agreement, GSE would have the authority to use eminent domain under the terms of this bill.
If the formation of GSE is triggered, it would basically "lift and shift" PG&E to GSE which would be defined as an electrical and gas corporation and subsume all statutory and regulatory responsibilities currently required of investor-owned utilities in California. By taking ownership of PG&E's transmission lines, it would also be subject to the regulation of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The measure also extends the protections of the Wildfire Fund created last year by AB 1054 (Holden), Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019 to GSE along with applicable utility and ratepayer contributions and authorizes the use of financing mechanisms of the IBank,
According to the Author:
According to the author, "PG&E's emergence from its second bankruptcy has provided an opportunity for the state to demand necessary reforms to ensure safe, reliable, and affordable energy is provided to PG&E's customers. Many of these reforms have been outlined in regulatory filings, court documents, and legislation – last year's AB 1054. However, the state has yet to offer its contingency plan – it's 'Plan B' – should PG&E fail to adopt the required reforms and fail to correct its behavior. The state cannot risk this failure. SB 350 provides the much-needed safety net should PG&E fail to reform its governance, regulatory oversight, risk management, and safety investments and safety performance."
"SB 350 provides the statutory authorization for the CPUC to enhance its oversight and enforcement, in the event that PG&E does not comply with the terms of its bankruptcy restructuring. SB 350 additionally enables the state to swiftly take the necessary steps for PG&E to transform into GSE, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, should the CPUC determine the enhanced oversight and enforcement actions have not led to the necessary changes at PG&E."
"The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.
Arguments in Support:
350 Bay Area Action supports the measure and opines that it "puts teeth into PG&E's reorganization plan by providing the PUC authority to appoint a receiver for PG&E, which sends another and necessary signal to PG&E that its post-bankruptcy behavior can be subject to loss of control or ownership of its assets."
Arguments in Opposition:
There is no opposition to this bill.
Concerns:
A few groups have expressed concern that generally the bill doesn't go far enough and should require an immediate takeover of PG&E. Mayor Sam Liccardo writes that his coalition of mayors supports the nonprofit model and regulation by the state of labor, environmental, and safety mandates but that GSE should set its own rates and revenue requirements. He also opposes appointments by the Governor, Assembly Speaker, and Senate Rules Committee to the governing board. Similarly, the Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign supports a model to replace PG&E which is decentralized, has democratic control and accountability, and community energy and doesn't want to wait until PG&E fails.
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee,
- No direct state costs. This is because the bill's requirements are contingent upon any one of several events, including PG&E's failure to win approval of its bankruptcy plan or to put the plan into effect, PG&E's decision to sell its assets and stock, or the CPUC's decision to revoke PG&E's license to operate. Should any one of these events, or other related events, occur, the CPUC and, likely, other state entities will face considerable workload. This bill prescribes and directs that workload; however, the bill does not create that workload.
- Potential reduction in property tax revenue of an unknown, but likely significant, amount, as a result of the bill's exemption GSE indebtedness from all state taxation. Property tax revenue generally goes to local governments. Amendments described in the Assembly Utilities and Energy Committee (UEC) analysis of the bill, and agreed to by the author and UEC during UEC's hearing of the bill, eliminate this potential reduction in property tax revenue. This committee will adopt the UEC amendments, as outlined below.
VOTES:
SENATE FLOOR: 37-0-1
YES: Allen, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Borgeas, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Grove, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Jones, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Morrell, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Stone, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Archuleta
ASM UTILITIES AND ENERGY: 12-2-1
YES: Holden, Burke, Carrillo, Eggman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Mayes, Muratsuchi, Aguiar-Curry, Reyes, Santiago, Ting
NO: Chen, Cunningham
ABS, ABST OR NV: Patterson
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 10-3-5
YES: Gonzalez, Bauer-Kahan, Bloom, Bonta, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Petrie-Norris, McCarty
NO: Bigelow, Fong, Voepel
ABS, ABST OR NV: Calderon, Megan Dahle, Diep, Eduardo Garcia, Robert Rivas
UPDATED:
VERSION: June 11, 2020
CONSULTANT: Kellie Smith / U. & E. / (916) 319-2083 FN: 0003078
Date of Hearing: June 10, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 350
Author:(Hill) – As Amended Ver:May 14, 2020
Policy Committee: | Utilities and Energy | Vote: | 12-2 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
The bill authorizes the creation of Golden State Energy (GSE), a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to acquire and operate the Pacific Gas and Electric Company and the Pacific Gas and Electric Corporation (together, PG&E) as an electric utility and a gas utility.
Specifically, this bill, among other things:
- Authorizes the Governor, or the Governor’s designee, to incorporate GSE as a nonprofit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating or managing electrical and gas service for GSE’s ratepayers and for the benefit of all Californians.
- Provides a process for the creation and appointment of an initial nine-member board of GSE and for selection of subsequent board members.
- Subjects GSE operations, including issuance of debt to acquire PG&E and setting of rates, to the regulatory authority of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
- Directs the CPUC, no later than 45 days after certain events, to initiate a proceeding to develop and adopt rules governing GSE’s operation as an electric utility and gas utility. Those events include:
- A “material bankruptcy event”—meaning, among other things, PG&E’s failure to receive approval of its bankruptcy plan by June 30, 2020, or the failure of PG&E’s approved bankruptcy plan to become effective by September 30, 2020.
- The CPUC determines PG&E’s license to operate (its “certificate of public convenience and necessity”) should be revoked.
- The initiation by PG&E of a process to sell its assets and stock.
- Authorizes the appointment of a receiver by a superior court, upon CPUC application, to control and operate PG&E under terms and conditions prescribed by the court if the CPUC determines that appointment of a receiver is warranted pursuant to its investigation of PG&E’s bankruptcy.
- Authorizes GSE to commence an eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E’s license to operate should be revoked.
- Deems GSE financing of energy and project costs as “in the public interest” and eligible for financing by the California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank (IBank).
- Extends the revenue requirement in effect for PG&E customers at the time of the closing of acquisition by GSE for three years and permits GSE to increase rates for those three years without CPUC approval; and prohibits CPUC from adopting a new revenue requirement for GSE for three years from the date of acquisition of PG&E.
- Provides a process for rehearing of a decision of the CPUC.
- Permits fines and penalties levied on GSE to be recovered from its ratepayers.
- Restricts judicial appeals of decisions by the CPUC, concerning rates and charges of GSE, to the California Supreme Court.
- Exempts GSE indebtedness from all state taxation.
- Deems a debt or liability of GSE is neither a debt nor liability of the state, nor is it a pledge of the faith and credit of the state.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- No direct state costs. This is because the bill’s requirements are contingent upon any one of several events, including PG&E’s failure to win approval of its bankruptcy plan or to put the plan into effect, PG&E’s decision to sell its assets and stock, or the CPUC’s decision to revoke PG&E’s license to operate. Should any one of these events, or other related events, occur, the CPUC and, likely, other state entities will face considerable workload. This bill prescribes and directs that workload; however, the bill does not create that workload.
- Potential reduction in property tax revenue of an unknown, but likely significant, amount, as a result of the bill’s exemption GSE indebtedness from all state taxation. Property tax revenue generally goes to local governments. Amendments described in the Assembly Utilities and Energy Committee (UEC) analysis of the bill, and agreed to by the author and UEC during UEC’s hearing of the bill, eliminate this potential reduction in property tax revenue. This committee will adopt the UEC amendments, as outlined below.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. The author describes this bill as a “plan B,” should PG&E fail to successfully exit bankruptcy as a reformed energy utility or if PG&E continues to operate unsafely. According to the author:
SB 350 provides the much-needed safety net should PG&E fail to reform its governance, regulatory oversight, risk management, and safety investments and safety performance.
SB 350 provides the statutory authorization for the CPUC to enhance its oversight and enforcement, in the event that PG&E does not comply with the terms of its bankruptcy restructuring. SB 350 additionally enables the state to swiftly take the necessary steps for PG&E to transform into GSE, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, should the CPUC determine the enhanced oversight and enforcement actions have not led to the necessary changes at PG&E.
The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.
- Background. Over recent years, PG&E has caused several destructive and deadly events. In 2008, a PG&E gas pipeline in Rancho Cordova exploded, destroying a home and killing one person. In 2010, another PG&E gas pipeline exploded in San Bruno, killing eight people, injuring dozens more and destroying 38 homes. As a result of the San Bruno explosion, PG&E was convicted of several criminal felonies and placed on probation. The company undertook an effort to institute reforms to create a “culture of safety.” In 2015, PG&E blew up a home in Carmel.
Perhaps more infamously, PG&E electrical equipment has been responsible for starting massive, catastrophic wildfires: the 2015 Butte Fire, in which two people burned to death; the 2017 Redwood Fire, in which nine died; and the 2017 Atlas Fire, in which six died. Then, in 2018, faulty PG&E equipment ignited the Camp Fire, which killed 86 people.
Sagging under the prospect of liabilities associated with the fires, PG&E, on January 29, 2019, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Subsequently, the Legislature approved AB 1054 (Holden), Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019. Among other things, AB 1054 established the Wildfire Fund to pay eligible costs arising from a covered wildfire caused by an electrical corporation. Monies in the fund come from both electrical corporation shareholders and ratepayers. AB 1054 conditioned PG&E’s access to the fund upon, by June 30, 2020, (a) PG&E’s bankruptcy having been resolved pursuant to a plan or a similar document not subject to a stay, (b) the bankruptcy court having determined that resolution of the bankruptcy will provide the means to satisfy any wildfire claims asserted against PG&E prior to the bankruptcy claim, and (c) the CPUC having approved the bankruptcy plan, based on specified criteria, including PG&E’s safety history, criminal probation and recent financial condition, as well as other factors as determined by the CPUC.
On May 28 of this year, CPUC approved PG&E’s bankruptcy plan. In doing so, CPUC found the plan to be acceptable in light of PG&E’s safety history, criminal probation, recent financial condition and other factors. The CPUC also found the plan to be consistent with the state’s climate goals and to be neutral, on average, to PG&E ratepayers, among other findings. As part of its approval of PG&E’s plan, the CPUC imposed on PG&E several terms and conditions, notable among them that PG&E be subject to an “enhanced oversight and enforcement process.” The process, as described in the CPUC decision, consists of six increasingly stringent monitoring and oversight steps, activated by certain “triggering events,” such as PG&E’s failure to implement an approved wildlife mitigation plan. The sixth step is the most extreme: CPUC review of PG&E’ license to operate as an electrical or gas utility.
Most immediately, it is unclear the court will approve PG&E’s bankruptcy plan. In addition, nothing stops PG&E from trying to offer its assets and stocks for sale. Down the road, depending upon PG&E’s ability to operate its electrical and gas systems safely, the CPUC may revoke PG&E’s operating license. Should any of these events occur, SB 350 sets up processes by which a successor to PG&E, namely, GSE, would own and operate PG&E electrical systems. Like PG&E, GSE—its rates and general operation—would be subject to regulation by the CPUC. Unlike PG&E, GSE, as a nonprofit public benefit corporation, would have no shareholders.
- Amendments. When SB 350 was heard by UEC, on Tuesday, June 9, 2020, the author and the chair of UEC agreed to certain amendments to the bill. However, because of time constraints, the author and chair requested the amendments be made in this committee. The amendments, as described in UEC analysis of the bill, are shown below. In no case do the amendments increases state costs or create state costs.
- Fire Victim Recover. At page 21, between lines 36 and 37, add:
A failure of Pacific Gas and Electric Company to exit bankruptcy will result in a risk to or delay of fair compensation to the victims that have already been waiting years to put their lives back together. It is therefore the intent of the Legislature that, should Pacific Gas and Electric Company not exit its bankruptcy, Golden State Energy be positioned to take over the utility and compensate victims.
- Governance. Amend the bill at page 24, to strike lines 28-32, and on page 25, strike lines 1 through 13, and instead require board appointments initially by the Governor who would select five members, the Senate Rules Committee two members, and the Speaker of the Assembly two members, all with staggered terms, and transition the board to one with six directors elected by its members and one appointment each by the Governor, Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly. Additionally, specify the types of experience and expertise intended (e.g. safety, financing, utility management).
- Risk and Safety Oversight. Amend the bill to require GSE to commence its takeover with the following structural and board changes in place unless and until the time that GSE has an improved plan to address safety to present to the CPUC for its consideration:
- Establish an executive-level Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Chief Safety Officer (CSO) with specific lines of reporting, for the CRO to appear before the CPUC or meet with CPUC staff at least quarterly, and provide semi-annual performance reports to CPUC staff.
- Appoint an Independent Safety Advisor that would functionally act in the same capacity as the federal court monitor in PG&E’s federal criminal probation, and would work with the CRO, CSO and GSE’s management team and board to enhance the utility’s safety performance.
- Appoint regional executive officers to manage specified regions of the utility and report directly to GSE’s executive leadership, and to appoint regional safety officers that report to the CSO, intended to result in local operating regions led by an officer of the utility that reports directly to the executive team and bring management closer to customers.
- Continue the Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committees (which is currently part of PG&E’s board of directors). Specifically, the SNO Committees would have oversight of the utility’s wildfire mitigation plan, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program, compliance with the safety and operational metrics (to be developed) and periodic reporting to the board of directors and CPUC staff.
- Transparency. Amend the bill to require GSE to include in its bylaws provisions which ensure that duties of care and conflict-of-interest standards for officers and directors are in place; that it maintains open meeting standards, meeting notice requirements, and public records access consistent with the general policies of the State of California.
- Rates. Rate increases should be reviewed by the CPUC and at some point after start-up. GSE should also be required to justify any rate increases and file an attrition year adjustment. Therefore, amend the bill to:
- Page 28, line 10: after “the” insert: general rate case.
- Page 28, strike line 14, and insert: (2) The test year for the initial.
- Page 28, line 20, after “new” insert: general rate case
- Page 28, line 23, strike “may” and insert: shall
- Page 28, strike lines 25-31 and insert:
(B) Golden State Energy may make interim modifications to the existing revenue requirement to satisfy the rate covenant, including factoring in capital expenses, debt issuances, operation and maintenance of the utility, funding reserves, and working capital needs and collection of amounts recorded in balancing accounts after the date of the acquisition of Pacific Gas & Electric by Golden State Energy. Any such interim modifications to the revenue requirement shall be subject to approval of and prospective modification by the commission consistent with subdivision (f). Golden State Energy shall file an application for review of any interim modifications to its revenue requirement concurrently with the implementation of such modification.
f) Taxation. Amendments to clarify GSE will still have property tax obligations with the following amendments:
- Page 28, strike lines 35 through 37.
- Insert: 3440. (a) Golden State Energy shall be exempt from franchise and corporate income tax pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 23701. Indebtedness issued by Golden State Energy and any transfer thereof shall be exempt from income taxation of every kind by the state.
(b) Property used exclusively by Golden State Energy in carrying out its purposes in Section 3402 shall not be exempt from taxation under subdivision (b) of Section 4 and Section 5 of Article XIII of the California Constitution and Section 214 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code.
(c) Indebtedness issued by Golden State Energy and any transfer thereof shall at all times be free from income taxation of every kind by the state.
g) Ratification. Limit broad authority so it applies only to the Governor or his designees and to those administrative actions needed to successfully position GSE.
- Page 29, line 40, strike “representatives of the state” and insert: “the Governor or his designees.”
- Page 30, strike lines 2 through 5 and insert: Energy.
h) Clarifying & Technical Issues. Amendments as described on pages 10 and 11 of the UEC analysis of this bill.
Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: June 9, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY
Chris Holden, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 350
Author:(Hill) – As Amended Ver:May 14, 2020
SENATE VOTE: Not relevant
SUBJECT: The Golden State Energy Act
SUMMARY: Authorizes the creation of a non-profit public benefit corporation to acquire the Pacific Gas & Electric Company and the Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (collectively PG&E) under specified circumstances. Specifically, this bill:
- Permits the Governor or his designee to incorporate Golden State Energy (GSE) as a non-profit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for the current customers of PG&E and for the benefit of all Californians.
- Requires the Governor to appoint an initial nine-member board of directors (directors) with staggered terms, confirmed by the Senate, which will establish procedures for the election of subsequent directors by GSE’s members (ratepayers/customers). A slate of candidates would be selected by the directors from the results of a search firm seeking the most qualified candidates.
- Establishes GSE as an electrical and gas corporation under the regulatory authority of the CPUC, with specific exceptions.
- Applies California’s Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law to the GSE, with specific exemptions, and under the authority of the Attorney General, except where overlap of oversight authority is in conflict with the CPUC whose oversight will prevail.
- Prohibits the recall of directors of the board or a shareholder derivative lawsuit by members of the corporation (ratepayers).
- Requires the CPUC to initiate a proceeding to develop and adopt rules and processes to regulate GSE as a successor to PG&E, no later than 45 days after:
- A material event occurs in the PG&E bankruptcy proceeding which includes failure to secure confirmation of its plan of reorganization (plan) by June 30, 2020, or its failure to exit bankruptcy by September 30, 2020; or
- PG&E’s certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to provide gas or electrical service is revoked by the CPUC at any time for failure to achieve safe operation of its system; or
- The initiation of a sale process by PG&E for its assets or stock before the conclusion of the bankruptcy.
- Authorizes the appointment of a receiver by a superior court, upon application of the CPUC, to control and operate PG&E under terms and conditions prescribed by the court if the CPUC determines that appointment of a receiver is warranted pursuant to process or procedures in its investigation of PG&E (I.19-09-016).
- Authorizes the GSE to commence an eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E’s CPCN for the provision of gas or electrical service should be revoked.
RATES
- Extends the revenue requirement in effect for PG&E customers at the time of the closing of acquisition by GSE for three years; permits GSE to increase rates for three years without CPUC approval; permits the CPUC to direct GSE to file for an attrition year adjustment; and prohibits the CPUC from adopting a new revenue requirement for GSE for three years from the date of acquisition of PG&E.
- Requires GSE to apply for a revenue requirement, in each general rate case or attrition year adjustment application, sufficient to cover specified costs and expenses, service and satisfy debt, pay capital expenditures not funded from debt, and fund and maintain necessary financial and operating reserves, and concurrently file a debt issuance and retirement forecast.
- Requires the CPUC to approve rates only if just and reasonable but it must set the revenue requirement at the amount necessary to satisfy rate covenant requirements.
- Permits fines and penalties levied on GSE to be recovered from its ratepayers.
- Restricts judicial appeals of decisions by the CPUC, concerning rates and charges of GSE, to the California Supreme Court.
FINANCES
- Permits GSE to issue debt to facilitate the acquisition of PG&E, with approval of the CPUC, and to provide a rate covenant to debt holders.
- Authorizes GSE to fund energy and project costs utilizing financing mechanisms available to economic development facilities through the California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank (IBank).
- Exempts GSE indebtedness: from all state taxation; from being a debt or liability of the state, or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state; is payable solely by the funds available to GSE; and does not obligate the state to levy or pledge any form of taxation or appropriation for its repayment.
- Affirms that GSE, as a nonprofit, can select and retain any conduit issuer of bonds or indebtedness, and is not required to use the State Treasurer to issue bonds and any related processes or requirements.
- Pledges that the State of California will not limit or alter the rights of GSE to fulfill the terms of any loan agreement, lease or other contract of indebtedness in any way impair the rights or remedies of debt holders related to the financial agreements.
WILDFIRE FUND
- Requires administrators of the California Wildfire Fund (Fund) to authorize GSE to participate in the Fund as a successor to PG&E.
- Continues the nonbypassable charge previously imposed on PG&E ratepayers to participate in the Fund on the ratepayers of GSE.
- Authorizes the initial and annual contributions required to be paid by the shareholders of electrical and gas corporation to participate in the Fund, to be recovered from ratepayers of the GSE if not previously paid by PG&E.
- Authorizes the CPUC to calculate a liability cap for GSE equivalent to the cap established for PG&E.
OTHER PROVISIONS
- Ratifies and deems proper all acts by representatives of the state before the effective date of the Golden State Act taken in furtherance of the establishment of GSE.
- Exempts the acquisition of PG&E by GSE from CPUC review regarding the merits of the acquisition and impacts on California and its ratepayers, as long as GSE:
- Assumes all collective bargaining agreements; and
- Assumes all pension plan funding obligations; and
- Assumes the agreement reflected in Exhibit B of PG&E’s plan dated March 16, 2020 which extends IBEW 1245 collective bargaining agreements, health benefits, and worker protections through 2025.
- Exempts GSE from oversight by the Attorney General for specified provisions of California’s Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law and The Supervision of Trustees and Fundraisers for Charitable Purposes Act.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Fund to provide funding to pay or reimburse eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire caused by an electrical corporation which is jointly funded by the shareholders of electrical corporations and ratepayers of those corporations. (Public Utilities Code § 3280 et seq.)
- Authorizes an IOU which has been the subject of a bankruptcy to participate in the Fund if, by June 30, 2020:
- The bankruptcy has been resolved pursuant to a plan or a similar document not subject to a stay;
- The bankruptcy court has determined that resolution of the bankruptcy will provide the means to satisfy any prepetition wildfire claims asserted against the IOU, and the CPUC has:
- Approved the plan and other documents resolving the bankruptcy, including the IOU’s resulting governance structure as being acceptable in light of the IOU’s safety history, criminal probation, recent financial condition, and other factors deemed relevant by the CPUC;
- Determined that the plan and other documents resolving the bankruptcy are (i) consistent with the state’s climate goals as required pursuant to the California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program and related procurement requirements of the state and, (ii) neutral, on average, to the ratepayers of the IOU; and
- Determined that the plan and other documents recognize the contributions of ratepayers, if any, and compensate them accordingly through mechanisms approved by the CPUC, which may include sharing of value appreciation. (Public Utilities Code § 3292)
- Requires the CPUC to review mergers, acquisitions or changes in control of an IOU, or the sale of IOU assets, and conditions approval on a finding that, on balance, the transaction is in the public interest relative to specified elements. (Public Utilities Code §§ 851, 854)
- Establishes the IBank for the purpose of providing a financing entity structured with broad authority to issue bonds, provide guarantees, and leverage state and federal funds to provide mechanisms for financing public improvements. (Government Code § 63000 et seq.)
- Subjects nonprofit public benefit corporations to examination by the Attorney General to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what extent it has departed from the purposes for which it is formed. (Corporations Code § 5250)
- Allows the CPUC to petition a local superior court to appoint a receiver to assume possession and operate a water corporation system if the CPUC determines, after notice and hearing, that the water corporation is unable or unwilling to adequately serve its ratepayers, has been actually or effectively abandoned by its owners, or is unresponsive to CPUC rules or orders. (Code of Civil Procedure § 564[b][8])
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
BACKGROUND:
Bankruptcy – PG&E filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions on January 29, 2019, under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The filings came after a series of major wildfires, for which PG&E expected to be held liable. A case filed under Chapter 11 is frequently referred to as a "reorganization" bankruptcy. The preparation, confirmation, and implementation of a plan is at the heart of a Chapter 11 case and is usually proposed by the debtor to keep its business alive and pay creditors over time. A key requirement of PG&E is to provide compensation to wildfire victims as part of any plan in the Chapter 11 case to allow the utility to exit bankruptcy. The confirmation of a plan discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the date of confirmation. After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments and is bound by its provisions. The confirmed plan creates new contractual rights, replacing or superseding pre-bankruptcy contracts.
PG&E Plan of Reorganization – PG&E’s plan dated March 16th can generally be broken down into categories of safety-related, financial, and other issues. According to PG&E, its plan has the following financial components:
- Wildfire Claims. PG&E’s plan provides for payment of $25.5 billion in settlement of fire claims, defined as any past, present, or future claims related to specified wildfires that occurred in Northern California in 2015 through 2018, and includes four different classes of fire claims: fire victim claims; public entities wildfire claims; subrogation wildfire claims; and subrogation Butte fire claims;
- Other Claims. PG&E’s plan resolves other pre-petition claims against PG&E in the following areas: funded debt claims; employee-related claims; general unsecured claims; Ghost Ship fire claims; priority tax and priority non-tax claims; subordinated debt claims; common interests; administrative expense claims; and environmental claims;
- Participation in the Wildfire Fund. PG&E believes that its plan will enable it to participate in AB 1054’s statewide Fund upon its emergence from bankruptcy; and
- Assumption of Agreements. PG&E’s plan provides for the assumption of all power purchase agreements, renewable energy power purchase agreements and community choice aggregation servicing agreements, as well as all employee benefit plans and collective bargaining agreements.
CPUC Approval – Assembly Bill 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) requires the CPUC to determine whether the plan, including the resulting governance structure, is acceptable. The criteria that AB 1054 requires the CPUC to consider in making that determination are PG&E’s safety history, criminal probation and recent financial condition. Under AB 1054 the CPUC may also consider other factors that it deems to be relevant. In addition, AB 1054 requires the CPUC to determine if the plan is consistent with the state’s climate goals, is neutral, on average, to PG&E ratepayers, and recognizes the contribution of ratepayers. These express approvals required under AB 1054 are in addition to the CPUC’s general ratemaking authority, as the Bankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes, any rate change proposed in a plan must be approved by the governmental regulatory commission with proper jurisdiction.
AB 1054 also set a very short deadline for PG&E to participate in the Fund – the bankruptcy court and the CPUC must approve the plan and other documents resolving the insolvency proceeding by June 30, 2020.
In its review of PG&E’s plan the CPUC additionally considered: how the plan and proposed governance structure will affect public safety on a going forward basis, both short term and long term; the ratemaking implications of the plan; whether the plan provides satisfactory resolution of claims for monetary fines or penalties for PG&E’s pre-petition conduct; whether the plan maintains or improves PG&E’s financial condition; whether the plan maintains or improves the quality of service to PG&E ratepayers; whether the plan maintains or improves the quality of management of PG&E; potential effects of the plan on local communities and PG&E employees; whether the plan is fair and reasonable to PG&E employees; and whether the plan is beneficial on an overall basis to state and local economies and to the communities in the area served by PG&E.
CPUC Approves Plan – The CPUC approved PG&E’s plan, with conditions and modifications on Thursday, May 28th (D.20-05-053). In addition to approving the financial plan to pay debts, which includes a trust valued at $13.5 billion to pay wildfire victims, the decision requires PG&E to modify its governance structure, submit to an enhanced oversight and enforcement process if it fails to improve safety, and create local operating regions. These new oversight tools and changes to PG&E’s board of directors and management are designed to ensure PG&E will emerge from bankruptcy as a fundamentally changed company that has a commitment and ability to provide safe and reliable service and can simultaneously continue needed improvements to mitigate wildfire risk and achieve the state’s climate goals.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s Statement. According to the author, “PG&E’s emergence from its second bankruptcy has provided an opportunity for the state to demand necessary reforms to ensure safe, reliable, and affordable energy is provided to PG&E’s customers. Many of these reforms have been outlined in regulatory filings, court documents, and legislation – last year’s AB 1054. However, the state has yet to offer its contingency plan – it’s ‘Plan B’ – should PG&E fail to adopt the required reforms and fail to correct its behavior. The state cannot risk this failure. SB 350 provides the much-needed safety net should PG&E fail to reform its governance, regulatory oversight, risk management, and safety investments and safety performance.”
“SB 350 provides the statutory authorization for the CPUC to enhance its oversight and enforcement, in the event that PG&E does not comply with the terms of its bankruptcy restructuring. SB 350 additionally enables the state to swiftly take the necessary steps for PG&E to transform into GSE, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, should the CPUC determine the enhanced oversight and enforcement actions have not led to the necessary changes at PG&E.”
“The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.”
- What Would Actually Happen & When. This bill would effectuate the acquisition of PG&E by GSE under three scenarios:
First, if PG&E fails to get plan confirmation by June 30, 2020 in the bankruptcy or, fails to secure financing and subsequent exit from bankruptcy by September 30,. 2020. As a result the bankruptcy court would oversee a bidding process for acquisition of PG&E. It would be open; GSE would not be the guaranteed winner. However, if the state demonstrates it wants to move away from an IOU model, it is expected that investors would be unlikely to bid against the state. The ability of any other entity to be up and running and able to secure financing for the transaction in such a short turnaround is also not likely. Consequently, GSE would be well-situated with the authority of this bill, market capitol, and IBank authority to acquire the utility.
In either of these situations, the PG&E plan would be set aside, including the settlement agreement with fire victims which was just voted on and approved by the victims May 15, 2020. All debt would have to be considered as part of the bid and settlements renegotiated with the parties.
Second and additionally, if PG&E attempts to sell the utility to a third party before it exits bankruptcy, GSE would be situated to bid on the utility which is the only process available for a sale initiated by the utility while in bankruptcy.
Third, after exit from bankruptcy, if at some future date PG&E fails in its safety obligations (reflected in the CPUC’s decision), the CPUC could ultimately revoke PG&E’s CPCN (aka license to operate). The utility has agreed, as part of its plan, that it will sell the utility to GSE. The state would have the option to purchase all of the issued and outstanding equity interests of PG&E directly or via GSE at an aggregate price.
If PG&E reneges on the sale agreement, GSE would have the authority to use eminent domain under the terms of this bill.
- Fire Victim’s Recovery. The state can do very little by way of statute to dictate events if PG&E fails to exit bankruptcy. However, this bill will provide a safety net to allow the state and GSE to step in and try to gain control of the utility, settle all debt, particularly that of fire victims, and get a new utility out of bankruptcy as soon as possible. The committee however may want to consider amendments to acknowledge the priority of addressing victims claims. At page 21, between lines 36 and 37, add:
A failure of Pacific Gas and Electric Company to exit bankruptcy will result in a risk to or delay of fair compensation to the victims that have already been waiting years to put their lives back together. It is therefore the intent of the Legislature that, should Pacific Gas and Electric Company not exit its bankruptcy, Golden State Energy be positioned to take over the utility and compensate victims.
- Governance. This measure proposes a board of directors similar in structure to that of investor owned utilities. To initially stand up GSE the Governor would appoint nine members to staggered terms who would be confirmed by the Senate. The selection of subsequent directors would be under the direction of the board which would amend its bylaws to include procedures to develop a slate of candidates through use of search firms to “identify, evaluate, and recommend the most qualified candidates for election.” It is inferred that a slate would be presented to an unknown group of member/ratepayers for an up or down vote.
Although nominations are to be made based on a “skills matrix” and to “maximize board member diversity and the selection of California residents” these decisions are left to a search firm and the board. With the possibility of a new utility comes an expectation of many that it would better reflect California. The committee may wish to consider amending the bill at page 24, to strike lines 28-32, and on page 25, strike lines 1 through 13, and instead require board appointments initially by the Governor who would select five members, the Senate Rules Committee two members, and the Speaker of the Assembly two members, all with staggered terms, and transition the board to one with six directors elected by its members and one appointment each by the Governor, Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly. Additionally, to clarify what is intended for the skills matrix, specify the types of experience and expertise intended (e.g. safety, financing, utility management).
- Clean Slate? If GSE were to successfully bid for PG&E before it exits bankruptcy, application of this bill would unintentionally result in severing the new utility’s management and operations from any of the safety reorganization measures so carefully crafted through the CPUC’s investigatory proceeding for the approval of PG&E’s plan. Although the shareholder interest would be gone, the same company, structure, assets, and all of its safety challenges would be with GSE.
The “lift and shift” of PG&E from an IOU to a nonprofit public benefit corporation would not magically remedy decades of safety issues.
The CPUC’s decision on PG&E’s plan requires the following structural and board changes as conditions to approval of the plan. However, these safety measures would not apply to GSE. It seems that the structural reforms should apply regardless of a change in the board (which has been done many times over the last 20 years) or its legal form. The committee may wish to consider amendments which would require GSE to commence its takeover with the following structural and board changes in place unless and until the time that GSE has an improved plan to address safety to present to the CPUC for its consideration.
- Establish an executive-level Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Chief Safety Officer (CSO) with specific lines of reporting, for the CRO to appear before the CPUC or meet with CPUC staff at least quarterly, and provide semi-annual performance reports to CPUC staff;
- Appoint an Independent Safety Advisor that would functionally act in the same capacity as the federal court monitor in PG&E’s federal criminal probation, and would work with the CRO, CSO and GSE’s management team and board to enhance the utility’s safety performance;
- Appoint regional executive officers to manage specified regions of the utility and report directly to GSE’s executive leadership, and to appoint regional safety officers that report to the CSO, intended to result in local operating regions led by an officer of the utility that reports directly to the executive team and bring management closer to customers; and
- Continue the Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committees (which is currently part of PG&E’s board of directors). Specifically, the SNO Committees would have oversight of the utility’s wildfire mitigation plan, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program, compliance with the safety and operational metrics (to be developed) and periodic reporting to the board of directors and CPUC staff.
- Transparency. Because GSE would not be a state or government entity, it would also not be subject to transparency standards that most residents expect related to meeting notices, records requests, and other policies. Notably, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is also not a state agency but is organized as a nonprofit public benefit corporation. These same provisions are in the statutory framework for the CAISO. The committee may wish to consider amending the bill to require GSE to include in its bylaws provisions which ensure that duties of care and conflict-of-interest standards for officers and directors are in place; that it maintains open meeting standards, meeting notice requirements, and public records access consistent with the general policies of the State of California.
- Rates. Appropriately this measure carries over all revenue requirements and rates in place at the time of acquisition of PG&E to GSE. Although the resources needed for support of GSE will be different, there is not sufficient time for CPUC approvals, nor would the GSE leadership be sufficiently established at the time of acquisition, to develop a new rate structure.
However, the bill goes further and permits the rates and revenue requirements to remain in place for three years with no adjustment. Additionally, GSE would be permitted to increase rates without CPUC approval for three years. As a nonprofit corporation GSE would have no income taxes or return on equity for shareholders. Rates should be lower although the reductions may not accrue immediately. GSE will have no funds on start-up and will have unique start-up costs relative to financing of the asset acquisition and debt. But allowing rates to continue unchecked and also permitting GSE to increase rates, unchecked for three years, does not seem prudent. Increases should be reviewed by the CPUC and at some point after start-up, and certainly sooner than three years, GSE should also be required to justify any rate increases and file an attrition year adjustment. To achieve these results, the committee may wish to consider the following amendments:
- Page 28, line 10: after “the” insert: general rate case
- Page 28, strike line 14, and insert: (2) The test year for the initial
- Page 28, line 20, after “new” insert: general rate case
- Page 28, line 23, strike “may” and insert: shall
- Page 28, strike lines 25-31 and insert:
(B) Golden State Energy may make interim modifications to the existing revenue requirement to satisfy the rate covenant, including factoring in capital expenses, debt issuances, operation and maintenance of the utility, funding reserves, and working capital needs and collection of amounts recorded in balancing accounts after the date of the acquisition of Pacific Gas & Electric by Golden State Energy. Any such interim modifications to the revenue requirement shall be subject to approval of and prospective modification by the commission consistent with subdivision (f). Golden State Energy shall file an application for review of any interim modifications to its revenue requirement concurrently with the implementation of such modification.
- Taxation. As a nonprofit entity, GSE will have different tax liabilities than PG&E. Very clearly it would not be subject to income tax but there are some taxes paid by PG&E now that are critical to the support of local communities particularly property taxes. To ensure that those revenue streams continue, the committee may wish to consider amendments that clarify that GSE will still have property tax obligations with the following amendments:
Page 28, strike lines 35 through 37, and insert:
3440. (a) Golden State Energy shall be exempt from franchise and corporate income tax pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 23701. Indebtedness issued by Golden State Energy and any transfer thereof shall be exempt from income taxation of every kind by the state.
(b) Property used exclusively by Golden State Energy in carrying out its purposes in Section 3402 shall not be exempt from taxation under subdivision (b) of Section 4 and Section 5 of Article XIII of the California Constitution and Section 214 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code.
(c) Indebtedness issued by Golden State Energy and any transfer thereof shall at all times be free from income taxation of every kind by the state.
- Ratification. The bill provides broad authority for any state representative to act to facilitate the formation of GSE by ratifying any actions taken in advance of the bill’s enactment to ensure that the state is ready to respond to the bankruptcy court should PG&E not be able to exit this summer. The committee may wish to consider modifying this authority to ensure that those actions are limited to the Governor or his designees and to those administrative actions needed to position GSE.
- Page 29, line 40, strike “representatives of the state” and insert: “the Governor or his designees”; and
- Page 30, strike lines 2 through 5 and insert: Energy.
- Clarifying & Technical Issues. The committee may wish to consider the following amendments which clarify, enhance, and/or strengthen the bill as well as address technical issues.
- Page 11, strike lines 3 through 9, and insert:
Golden State Energy may commence an eminent domain action to acquire all or substantially all of Pacific Gas and Electric Company only if the commission determines that Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s certificate of public convenience and necessity for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked pursuant to any process or procedures adopted by the commission in its Decision 20-05-053.
- Page 12, strike lines 18 to 40 and on page 13, strike lines 1 through 10. This provision limits the appeal of CPUC rate decisions to the State Supreme Court. The amendment to strike this section would maintain the existing review structure for all IOUs which permits appeals to the State Supreme or appellate courts.
- Page 22, at the end of line 2, add “some” to clarify intent language that changes to alternative procedures for the regulation of GSE are limited.
- Page 24, line 16, insert: “and the commission.”
- Page 24, line 28, strike “to the” and insert: all statutory provisions and
- Page 24, line 29, strike “as such” and insert: applicable to electrical and gas corporations
- Page 25 strike lines 7 through 10, and insert: Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 6610) of Part 2 of Division 2 of Title 1 of the Corporations Code.
- Clarify the scope of regulatory authority the CPUC would have over GSE: at page 27, line 18, strike “develop and adopt rules” and strike lines 19 through 22, and insert:
modify the rules and processes that apply to Pacific Gas and Electric Company as necessary to reflect the differences in Golden State Energy’s capital structure to ensure continued regulation of rates, electrical and gas safety, wildfire mitigation, climate change mitigation and adaption, public purpose programs, and any other commission requirements applicable to an electrical corporation or gas corporation.
- Clarification of assets that can be acquired:
Page 9, at the end of line 37, insert: provided Golden State Energy may exclude from the acquisition only property not directly related to providing electrical or gas service.
Page 11, at the end of line 9, insert: Golden State Energy may exclude from the acquisition only property not directly related to providing electrical or gas service.
- Throughout the bill PG&E’s holding company is referenced as “Pacific Gas and Electric Corporation” which should be changed to the legal name of the entity “PG&E Corporation.”
- Throughout the bill strike reference to the entirety of the proceeding to investigate and consider the CPUC’s plan, and instead refer to the decision to be adopted by the CPUC at its May 28th meeting. This change would lock-in the safety framework and prevent subsequent changes by the CPUC which might be contrary to legislative intent or knowledge.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
350 Bay Area Action
Support if amended
Reclaim Our Power: Utility Justice Campaign
The Utility Reform Network (TURN)
Concerns
Agricultural Council of California
Agricultural Energy Consumers Association
American Pistachio Growers
California Farm Bureau Federation
California Fresh Fruit Association
California Large Energy Consumers Association
California Manufacturers & Technology Association
The Honorable Sam Liccardo,
Mayor, City of San Jose
Member, Steering Committee of Local Leaders Coalition for a Customer-Owned Utility
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Western States Petroleum Association
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: Kellie Smith / U. & E. /
Date of Hearing: May 28, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY
Chris Holden, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 350
Author:(Hill) – As Amended Ver:May 14, 2020
SENATE VOTE: Not relevant
SUBJECT: The Golden State Energy Act
SUMMARY: Authorizes the creation of a non-profit public benefit corporation to acquire the Pacific Gas & Electric Company and the Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (collectively PG&E) under specified circumstances. Specifically, this bill:
- Permits the Governor or his designee to incorporate Golden State Energy (GSE) as a non-profit public benefit corporation for the purpose of owning, controlling, operating, or managing electrical and gas services for the current customers of PG&E and for the benefit of all Californians.
- Requires the Governor to appoint an initial nine-member board of directors (directors) with staggered terms, confirmed by the Senate, which will establish procedures for the election of subsequent directors by GSE’s members (ratepayers/customers). A slate of candidates would be selected by the directors from the results of a search firm seeking the most qualified candidates.
- Establishes GSE as an electrical and gas corporation under the regulatory authority of the CPUC, with specific exceptions.
- Applies California’s Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law to the GSE, with specific exemptions, and under the authority of the Attorney General, except where overlap of oversight authority is in conflict with the CPUC whose oversight will prevail.
- Prohibits the recall of directors of the board or a shareholder derivative lawsuit by members of the corporation (ratepayers).
- Requires the CPUC to initiate a proceeding to develop and adopt rules and processes to regulate GSE as a successor to PG&E, no later than 45 days after:
- A material event occurs in the PG&E bankruptcy proceeding which includes failure to secure confirmation of its plan of reorganization (plan) by June 30, 2020, or its failure to exit bankruptcy by September 30, 2020; or
- PG&E’s certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to provide gas and electrical service is revoked by the CPUC at any time for failure to achieve safe operation of its system; or
- The initiation of a sale process by PG&E for its assets or stock before the conclusion of the bankruptcy.
- Authorizes the appointment of a receiver by a superior court, upon application of the CPUC, to control and operate PG&E under terms and conditions prescribed by the court if the CPUC determines that appointment of a receiver is warranted pursuant to process or procedures in its investigation of PG&E (I.19-09-016).
- Authorizes the GSE to commence an eminent domain action to acquire PG&E if the CPUC determines that PG&E’s CPCN for the provision of gas or electrical service should be revoked.
RATES
- Extends the revenue requirement in effect for PG&E customers at the time of the closing of acquisition by GSE for three years; permits GSE to increase rates for three years without CPUC approval; permits the CPUC to direct GSE to file for an attrition year adjustment; and prohibits the CPUC from adopting a new revenue requirement for GSE for three years from the date of acquisition of PG&E.
- Requires GSE to apply for a revenue requirement, in each general rate case or attrition year adjustment application, sufficient to cover specified costs and expenses, service and satisfy debt, pay capital expenditures not funded from debt, and fund and maintain necessary financial and operating reserves, and concurrently file a debt issuance and retirement forecast.
- Requires the CPUC to approve rates only if just and reasonable but it must set the revenue requirement at the amount necessary to satisfy rate covenant requirements.
- Permits fines and penalties levied on GSE to be recovered from its ratepayers.
- Restricts judicial appeals of decisions by the CPUC, concerning rates and charges of GSE, to the California Supreme Court.
FINANCES
- Permits GSE to issue debt to facilitate the acquisition of PG&E, with approval of the CPUC, and to provide a rate covenant to debt holders.
- Authorizes GSE to fund energy and project costs utilizing financing mechanisms available to economic development facilities through the California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank (IBank).
- Exempts GSE indebtedness and income from all state taxation; from being a debt or liability of the state, or a pledge of the faith and credit of the state; is payable solely by the funds available to GSE; and does not obligate the state to levy or pledge any form of taxation or appropriation for its repayment.
- Affirms that GSE, as a nonprofit, can select and retain any conduit issuer of bonds or indebtedness, and is not required to use the State Treasurer to issue bonds and any related processes or requirements.
- Pledges that the State of California will not limit or alter the rights of GSE to fulfill the terms of any loan agreement, lease or other contract of indebtedness in any way impair the rights or remedies of debt holders related to the financial agreements.
WILDFIRE FUND
- Requires administrators of the California Wildfire Fund (Fund) to authorize GSE to participate in the Fund as a successor to PG&E.
- Continues the nonbypassable charge previously imposed on PG&E ratepayers to participate in the Fund on ratepayers of GSE.
- Authorizes the initial and annual contributions required to be paid by the shareholders of electrical and gas corporation to participate in the Fund, to be recovered from ratepayers of the GSE if not previously paid by PG&E.
- Authorizes the CPUC to calculate a liability cap for GSE equivalent to the cap established for PG&E.
OTHER PROVISIONS
- Ratifies and deems proper all acts by representatives of the state before the effective date of the Golden State Act taken in furtherance of the establishment of GSE.
- Exempts the acquisition of PG&E by GSE from statutory requirements that the CPUC make findings regarding the merits of the acquisition and impacts on California and its ratepayers, as long as GSE:
- Assumes all collective bargaining agreements; and
- Assumes all pension plan funding obligations; and
- Assumes the agreement reflected in Exhibit B of PG&E’s plan dated March 16, 2020 which extends IBEW 1245 collective bargaining agreements, health benefits, and worker protections through 2025.
- Exempts GSE from oversight by the Attorney General for specified provisions of California’s Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law and The Supervision of Trustees and Fundraisers for Charitable Purposes Act.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Fund to provide funding to pay or reimburse eligible claims arising from a covered wildfire caused by an electrical corporation which is jointly funded by the shareholders of electrical corporations and ratepayers of those corporations. (Public Utilities Code § 3280 et seq.)
- Authorizes an IOU which has been the subject of a bankruptcy to participate in the Fund if, by June 30, 2020:
- The bankruptcy has been resolved pursuant to a plan or a similar document not subject to a stay;
- The bankruptcy court has determined that resolution of the bankruptcy will provide the means to satisfy any prepetition wildfire claims asserted against the IOU, and the CPUC has:
- Approved the plan and other documents resolving the bankruptcy, including the IOU’s resulting governance structure as being acceptable in light of the IOU’s safety history, criminal probation, recent financial condition, and other factors deemed relevant by the CPUC;
- Determined that the plan and other documents resolving the bankruptcy are (i) consistent with the state’s climate goals as required pursuant to the California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program and related procurement requirements of the state and, (ii) neutral, on average, to the ratepayers of the IOU; and
- Determined that the plan and other documents recognize the contributions of ratepayers, if any, and compensate them accordingly through mechanisms approved by the CPUC, which may include sharing of value appreciation. (Public Utilities Code § 3292)
- Requires the CPUC to review mergers, acquisitions or changes in control of an IOU, or the sale of IOU assets, and conditions approval on a finding that, on balance, the transaction is in the public interest relative to specified elements. (Public Utilities Code §§ 851, 854)
- Establishes the IBank for the purpose of providing a financing entity structured with broad authority to issue bonds, provide guarantees, and leverage state and federal funds to provide mechanisms for financing public improvements. (Government Code § 63000 et seq.)
- Subjects nonprofit public benefit corporations to examination by the Attorney General to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what extent it has departed from the purposes for which it is formed. (Corporations Code § 5250)
- Allows the CPUC to petition a local superior court to appoint a receiver to assume possession and operate a water corporation system if the CPUC determines, after notice and hearing, that the water corporation is unable or unwilling to adequately serve its ratepayers, has been actually or effectively abandoned by its owners, or is unresponsive to CPUC rules or orders. (Code of Civil Procedure § 564[b][8])
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
BACKGROUND:
Bankruptcy – PG&E filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions on January 29, 2019, under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The filings came after a series of major wildfires, including fires for which PG&E expected to be held liable. A case filed under Chapter 11 is frequently referred to as a "reorganization" bankruptcy. The preparation, confirmation, and implementation of a plan is at the heart of a Chapter 11 case and is usually proposed by the debtor to keep its business alive and pay creditors over time. A key requirement of PG&E is to provide compensation to wildfire victims as part of any plan in the Chapter 11 case to allow the utility to exit bankruptcy. The confirmation of a plan discharges a debtor from any debt that arose before the date of confirmation. After the plan is confirmed, the debtor is required to make plan payments and is bound by its provisions. The confirmed plan creates new contractual rights, replacing or superseding pre-bankruptcy contracts.
PG&E Plan of Reorganization – PG&E’s plan dated March 16th can generally be broken down into categories of safety-related issues, financial issues, and other issues. According to PG&E, its plan addresses the following elements:
- Wildfire Claims. PG&E’s plan provides for payment of $25.5 billion in settlement of Fire Claims, defined as any past, present, or future claims related to specified wildfires that occurred in Northern California in 2015 through 2018, and includes four different classes of Fire Claims: Fire Victim Claims; Public Entities Wildfire Claims; Subrogation Wildfire Claims; and Subrogation Butte Fire Claims;
- Other Claims. PG&E’s plan resolves other pre-petition claims against PG&E in the following areas: Funded Debt Claims; Employee-Related Claims; General Unsecured Claims; Ghost Ship Fire Claims; Priority Tax And Priority Non-Tax Claims; Subordinated Debt Claims; Common Interests; Administrative Expense Claims; and Environmental Claims;
- Participation in the Wildfire Fund. PG&E believes that its plan will enable it to participate in AB 1054’s statewide Wildfire Fund upon its emergence from bankruptcy; and
- Assumption of Agreements. PG&E’s plan provides for the assumption of all power purchase agreements, renewable energy power purchase agreements and Community Choice Aggregation servicing agreements, as well as all Employee Benefit Plans and Collective Bargaining Agreements.
CPUC Approval – Assembly Bill 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) requires the CPUC to determine whether the plan, including the resulting governance structure, is acceptable. The criteria that AB 1054 requires the CPUC to consider in making that determination are PG&E’s safety history, criminal probation and recent financial condition. Under AB 1054 the CPUC may also consider other factors that it deems to be relevant. In addition, AB 1054 requires the CPUC to determine if the plan is consistent with the state’s climate goals, is neutral, on average, to PG&E ratepayers, and recognizes the contribution of ratepayers. These express approvals required under AB 1054 are in addition to the CPUC’s general ratemaking authority, as the Bankruptcy Code explicitly recognizes, any rate change proposed in a plan must be approved by the governmental regulatory commission with proper jurisdiction.
AB 1054 set a very short deadline – for PG&E to participate in the Fund, the bankruptcy court and the CPUC must approve the plan and other documents resolving the insolvency proceeding by June 30, 2020.
In its review of PG&E’s plan the CPUC additionally considered: how the plan and proposed governance structure will affect public safety on a going forward basis, both short term and long term; the ratemaking implications of the plan; whether the plan provides satisfactory resolution of claims for monetary fines or penalties for PG&E’s pre-petition conduct; whether the plan maintains or improves PG&E’s financial condition; whether the plan maintains or improves the quality of service to PG&E ratepayers; whether the plan maintains or improves the quality of management of PG&E; potential effects of the plan on local communities and PG&E employees; whether the plan is fair and reasonable to PG&E employees; and whether the plan is beneficial on an overall basis to state and local economies and to the communities in the area served by PG&E.
Proposed Decision Recommends Approval – The CPUC has issued a proposed decision with conditions and modifications to approve the plan and is scheduled for a vote on Thursday, May 28th. In addition to approving the financial plan to pay debts, which includes a trust valued at $13.5 billion to pay wildfire victims, the proposed decision will require PG&E to modify its governance structure, submit to an enhanced oversight and enforcement process if it fails to improve safety, and create local operating regions. These new oversight tools and changes to PG&E’s Board of Directors and management are designed to ensure PG&E will emerge from bankruptcy as a fundamentally changed company that has a commitment and ability to provide safe and reliable service and can simultaneously continue needed improvements to mitigate wildfire risk and achieve the state’s climate goals.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s Statement. According to the author, “PG&E’s emergence from its second bankruptcy has provided an opportunity for the state to demand necessary reforms to ensure safe, reliable, and affordable energy is provided to PG&E’s customers. Many of these reforms have been outlined in regulatory filings, court documents, and legislation – last year’s AB 1054. However, the state has yet to offer its contingency plan – it’s ‘Plan B’ – should PG&E fail to adopt the required reforms and fail to correct its behavior. The state cannot risk this failure. SB 350 provides the much-needed safety net should PG&E fail to reform its governance, regulatory oversight, risk management, and safety investments and safety performance.”
“SB 350 provides the statutory authorization for the CPUC to enhance its oversight and enforcement, in the event that PG&E does not comply with the terms of its bankruptcy restructuring. SB 350 additionally enables the state to swiftly take the necessary steps for PG&E to transform into Golden State Energy, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, should the CPUC determine the enhanced oversight and enforcement actions have not led to the necessary changes at PG&E.”
“The processes put forward in SB 350 are ones I hope we never need. I hope PG&E never starts another wildfire or causes another pipeline explosion. I hope the company improves its safety record and public image. But the State cannot rely on hope alone. We require overdue reforms and accountability, and will have a contingency plan – SB 350 – ready, should the need arise.”
- What Would Actually Happen & When. This bill would effectuate the acquisition of PG&E by GSE under three scenarios:
First, if PG&E fails to get plan confirmation by June 30, 2020 in the bankruptcy or, fails to secure financing and subsequent exit from bankruptcy by September 30,. 2020. As a result the bankruptcy court would oversee a bidding process for acquisition of PG&E. It would be open; GSE would not be the guaranteed winner. However, if the state demonstrates it wants to move away from an IOU model, it is expected that investors would be unlikely to bid against the state. The ability of any other entity to be up and running and able to secure financing for the transaction in such a short turnaround is also not likely. Consequently, GSE would be well-situated with the authority of this bill, market capitol, and IBank authority to acquire the utility.
In either of these situations, the PG&E plan would be set aside, including the settlement agreement with fire victims which was just voted on and approved by the victims May 15, 2020. All debt would have to be considered as part of the bid and settlements renegotiated with the parties.
Second and additionally, if PG&E attempts to sell the utility to a third party before it exits bankruptcy, GSE would be situated to bid on the utility which is the only process available for a sale initiated by the utility while in bankruptcy.
Third, after exit from bankruptcy, if at some future date PG&E fails in its safety obligations (reflected in the CPUC’s decision), the CPUC could ultimately revoke PG&E’s CPCN (aka license to operate). The utility has agreed, as part of its plan, that it will sell the utility to GSE. The state would have the option to purchase all of the issued and outstanding equity interests of PG&E directly or via GSE at an aggregate price.
If PG&E reneged on the sale agreement, GSE would have the authority to use eminent domain under the terms of this bill.
- Fire Victim’s Recovery. The state can do very little by way of statute to dictate events if PG&E fails to exit bankruptcy. However, this bill will provide a safety net to allow the state and GSE to step in and try to gain control of the utility, settle all debt, particularly that of fire victims, and get a new utility out of bankruptcy as soon as possible. The committee however may want to consider amendments to acknowledge the priority of addressing victims claims. At page 21, between lines 36 and 37, add:
A failure of Pacific Gas and Electric Company to exit bankruptcy will result in a risk to or delay of fair compensation to the victims that have already been waiting years to put their lives back together. It is therefore the intent of the Legislature that, should Pacific Gas and Electric Company not exit its bankruptcy, Golden State Energy be positioned to take over the utility and compensate victims.
- Governance. This measure proposes a board of directors similar in structure to that of investor owned utilities. But to initially stand up GSE the Governor would appoint nine members to staggered terms who would be confirmed by the Senate. The selection of subsequent directors would be under the direction of the board which would amend its bylaws to include procedures to develop a slate of candidates through use of search firms to “identify, evaluate, and recommend the most qualified candidates for election.” It is inferred that a slate would be presented to an unknown group of member/ratepayers for an up or down vote.
Although nominations are to be made based on a “skills matrix” and to “maximize board member diversity and the selection of California residents” these decisions are left to a search firm and the board. With the possibility of a new utility comes an expectation of many that it would better reflect California. The committee may wish to consider amending the bill at page 24, to strike lines 28-32, and on page 25, strike lines 1 through 13, and instead require board appointments initially and into the future by the Governor who would select five members, the Senate two members, and the Assembly two members all with staggered terms.
- Clean Slate? If GSE were to successfully bid for PG&E before it exits bankruptcy, application of this bill would unintentionally result in severing the new utility (GSE) management and operations any of the safety reorganization measures so carefully crafted through the CPUC’s investigatory proceeding for the approval of PG&E’s plan. Although the shareholder interest would be gone, the same company, structure, assets, and all its safety challenges would still be there.
The “lift and shift” of PG&E from an IOU to a nonprofit public benefit corporation would not magically remedy decades of safety issues.
The CPUC’s proposed decision on PG&E’s plan would require the following structural and board changes as conditions to approval of the plan. However, they would not apply to GSE. It seems that the structural reforms should apply regardless of a change in the board (which has been done many times over the last 20 years) or its legal form. The committee may wish to consider amendments which would require GSE to commence its takeover with the following structural and board changes in place unless and until the time that GSE has an improved plan to address safety to present to the CPUC for its consideration.
- Establish an executive-level Chief Risk Officer (CRO and Chief Safety Officer (CSO) with specific lines of reporting, for the CRO to appear before the CPUC or meet with CPUC staff at least quarterly, plus the CSO would provide semi-annual performance reports to CPUC staff;
- Appoint an Independent Safety Advisor that would functionally act in the same capacity as the federal court monitor in PG&E’s federal criminal probation, and would work with the CRO, CSO and GSE’s management team and board to enhance the utility’s safety performance;
- Appoint regional executive officers to manage specified regions of the utility and report directly to GSE’s executive leadership, and to appoint regional safety officers that report to the CSO intended to result in local operating regions led by an officer of the utility that reports directly to the executive team and bring management closer to customers; and
- Continue the Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committees (which is currently part of PG&E’s boards of directors). Specifically, the SNO Committees would have oversight of the utility’s Wildfire Mitigation Plan, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) program, compliance with the Safety and Operational Metrics (to be developed) and periodic reporting to the board of directors and CPUC staff.
- Transparency. Because GSE would not be a state or government entity, it would also not be subject to transparency standards that most residents expect related to meeting notices, records requests, and related policies. Notably, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is also not a state agency and is also organized as a nonprofit public benefit corporation. These same provisions are in the statutory framework for the CAISO. The committee may wish to consider amending the bill to require GSE to include in its bylaws provisions which ensure that duties of care and conflict-of-interest standards for officers and directors are in place; that it maintains open meeting standards, meeting notice requirements, and public records access consistent with the general policies of the State of California.
- Rates. Appropriately this measure carries over all revenue requirements and rates in place at the time of acquisition of PG&E to GSE. Although the resources needed for support of GSE will be different, there is not sufficient time for CPUC approvals, nor would the leadership be sufficiently established at the time of acquisition, to develop a new rate structure.
However, the bill goes further and permits the rates and revenue requirements to remain in place for three years with no adjustment. Additionally, GSE would be permitted to increase rates without CPUC approval for three years. As a nonprofit corporation GSE would have no income taxes or return on equity for shareholders. Rates should be lower. But the reductions may not accrue immediately. GSE will have no funds on start-up and will have unique start-up costs relative to financing of the asset acquisition and debt. But allowing rates to continue unchecked and also permitting GSE to increase rates, unchecked for three years, does not seem prudent. Increases should be reviewed by the CPUC and at some point after start-up, and certainly sooner than three years, GSE should also be required to justify any rate increases and file an attrition year adjustment. To achieve these results, the committee may wish to consider the following amendments:
- Page 28, line 10: after “the” insert: general rate case
- Page 28, strike line 14, and insert: (2) The test year for the initial
- Page 28, line 20, after “new” insert: general rate case
- Page 28, line 23, strike “may” and insert: shall
- Page 28, strike lines 25-31 and insert:
(B) Golden State Energy may make interim modifications to the existing revenue requirement to satisfy the rate covenant, including factoring in capital expenses, debt issuances, operation and maintenance of the utility, funding reserves, and working capital needs and collection of amounts recorded in balancing accounts after the date of the acquisition of Pacific Gas & Electric by Golden State Energy. Any such interim modifications to the revenue requirement shall be subject to approval of and prospective modification by the commission consistent with subdivision (f). Golden State Energy shall file an application for review of any interim modifications to its revenue requirement concurrently with the implementation of such modification.
- Taxation. As a nonprofit entity, GSE will have different tax liabilities than PG&E. Very clearly it would not be subject to income tax but there are some taxes paid by PG&E now that are critical to support local communities particularly property taxes. To ensure that those streams continue, the committee may wish to consider amendments that clarify that GSE will still have property tax responsibility with the following amendments:
Page 28, strike lines 35 through 37, and insert:
3440. (a) Golden State Energy shall be exempt from franchise and corporate income tax pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 23701. Indebtedness issued by Golden State Energy and any transfer thereof shall be exempt from income taxation of every kind by the state.
(b) Property used exclusively by Golden State Energy in carrying out its purposes in Section 3402 shall not be exempt from taxation under subdivision (b) of Section 4 and Section 5 of Article XIII of the California Constitution and Section 214 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code.
(c) Indebtedness issued by Golden State Energy and any transfer thereof shall at all times be free from income taxation of every kind by the state.
- Ratification. Broad authority for any state representative is included in this measure intended to ratify any actions taken in advance by a state representative to ensure that the state is ready to respond to the bankruptcy court should PG&E not be able to exit bankruptcy this summer. The committee may wish to consider modifying this authority to ensure that those actions are limited to the Governor or his designees and to those administrative actions needed to position GSE.
- Page 29, line 40, strike “representatives of the state” and insert: “the Governor or his designees”
- Page 30, strike lines 2 through 5 and insert: Energy.
- Clarifying & Technical Issues. The committee may wish to consider the following amendments which clarify, enhance, and/or strengthen the bill as well as address technical issues.
- Page 11, strike lines 3 through 9, and insert:
Golden State Energy may commence an eminent domain action to acquire all or substantially all of Pacific Gas and Electric Company only if the commission determines that Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s certificate of public convenience and necessity for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked pursuant to any process or procedures adopted by the commission in its Decision 20-05-XXX.
- Page 12, strike lines 18 to 40 and on page 13, strike lines 1 through 10. This provision limits the appeal of CPUC rate decisions to the State Supreme Court. The amendment to strike this section would maintain the existing review structure for all IOUs which permits appeals to the State Supreme or appellate courts.
- Page 22, at the end of line 2, add “some” to clarify intent language that changes to alternative procedures for the regulation of GSE are limited.
- Page 24, line 16, insert: “and the commission.”
- Page 24, line 28, strike “to the” and insert: all statutory provisions and
- Page 24, line 29, strike “as such” and insert: applicable to electrical and gas corporations
- Page 25 strike lines 7 through 10, and insert: Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 6610) of Part 2 of Division 2 of Title 1 of the Corporations Code.
- Clarify the scope of regulatory authority the CPUC would have over GSE: at page 27, line 18, strike “develop and adopt rules” and strike lines 19 through 22, and insert:
modify the rules and processes that apply to Pacific Gas and Electric Company as necessary to reflect the differences in Golden State Energy’s capital structure to ensure continued regulation of rates, electrical and gas safety, wildfire mitigation, climate change mitigation and adaption, public purpose programs, and any other commission requirements applicable to an electrical corporation or gas corporation.
- Clarification of assets that can be acquired:
Page 9, at the end of line 37, insert: provided Golden State Energy may exclude from the acquisition only property not directly related to providing electrical or gas service.
Page 11, at the end of line 9, insert: Golden State Energy may exclude from the acquisition only property not directly related to providing electrical or gas service.
- Throughout the bill PG&E’s holding company is referenced as “Pacific Gas and Electric Corporation” which should be changed to the legal name of the entity “PG&E Corporation.”
- Throughout the bill strike reference to the entirety of the proceeding to investigate and consider the CPUC’s plan, and instead refer to the decision to be adopted by the CPUC at its May 28th meeting. This change would lock-in the safety framework and prevent subsequent changes by the CPUC which might be contrary to legislative intent or knowledge.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
350 Bay Area Action
Support if amended
The Honorable Sam Liccardo,
Mayor, City of San Jose
Member, Steering Committee of Local Leaders Coalition for a Customer-Owned Utility
The Utility Reform Network (TURN)
Concerns
Agricultural Council of California
Agricultural Energy Consumers Association
American Pistachio Growers
California Farm Bureau Federation
California Fresh Fruit Association
California Large Energy Consumers Association
California Manufacturers & Technology Association
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Western States Petroleum Association
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: Kellie Smith / U. & E. /
Date of Hearing: July 10, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY
Chris Holden, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 350
Author:(Hertzberg) – As Introduced Ver:February 19, 2019
SENATE VOTE: 37-0
SUBJECT: Electricity: resource adequacy: multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism.
SUMMARY: Specifically, this bill:
- Authorizes the CPUC to consider a multiyear centralized resource adequacy (RA) mechanism, among other options, to most efficiently and equitably meet specified resource adequacy objectives.
- Suspends the requirement to allocate costs on a fully nonbypassable basis for the net capacity costs of generation resources meeting a system or local reliability need, if the CPUC approves a multiyear resource adequacy mechanism, and only if the mechanism, does not include a central procurement entity.
EXISTING LAW:
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix rates, establish rules, examine records, issue subpoenas, administer oaths, take testimony, punish for contempt, and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public utilities, including electrical corporations, subject to its jurisdiction. (Article 12 of the California Constitution).
- Requires that all charges demanded or received by any public utility for any product, commodity or service be just and reasonable, and that every unjust or unreasonable charge is unlawful. (Public Utilities Code §451).
- Requires the CPUC, to establish RA requirements for all load-serving entities (LSEs), including electrical corporations, electric service providers (ESPs), and community choice aggregators (CCAs), in accordance with specified objectives. This provision specifically requires each LSE to maintain physical generating capacity adequate to meet its load requirements. This RA requirement includes procuring generation to cover peak demand and planning and operating reserves which are deliverable to locations and at times as may be necessary to provide reliable electric service. The CPUC is required to determine and authorize the most efficient and equitable means for LSEs to achieve specified purposes when meeting their RA requirements. (Public Utilities Code §380).
- The CPUC may authorize or orders an electrical corporation to obtain generation resources that the CPUC determines are needed to meet system or local area reliability needs for the benefit of all customers in the electrical corporation’s distribution services territory. The provisions of this section require the CPUC to ensure that net capacity costs of those generation resources are allocated on a fully nonbypassable basis consistent with specified departing load provisions. However, existing law suspends this requirement if the CPUC approves a centralized resources adequacy mechanism. (Public Utilities Code §365.1).
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
BACKGROUND:
Collectively Meeting Local and System Energy Demands– The CPUC is mandated to ensure that collectively the LSEs under their jurisdiction, which serve approximately 75% of California’s energy needs operate reliably, safely and meet a multitude of state mandates including the renewable portfolio standard and emission reduction targets for greenhouse gas (GHG). California’s current energy mix and demands differs greatly from the generation that we relied upon to run the grid a decade ago. Today, large scale solar on the wholesale side of grid and distribution side solar generation dominate generation procurement. A critical component in meeting California’s climate is for LSE’s portfolio’s to achieve 60% renewables by 2030 with a goal of achieving zero-carbon electricity by 2045. The variability of many of those generation resources has introduced challenges for grid operation and the introduction of innovative technologies to meet those demands.
Resource adequacy. Following the California energy crisis of 2000-01, the California Legislature enacted legislation to prevent future incidents of widespread black outs and rolling brown outs due to lack of electric generating capacity. Among the reforms was the adoption of Public Utilities Code §380 as an effort to better ensure reliability of electric supply. The statute directs the CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, to establish RA requirements for all LSEs, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), ESPs, and now includes CCAs, which did not exist at the time of the crisis. The current RA program consists of system, local, and flexible requirements for each month of a compliance year. In October of each year, LSEs must demonstrate that they have procured 90 percent of their system RA obligations for the five summer months (May-September) of the following year, as well as 100 percent of their local requirements, and 90 percent of their flexible requirements for each month of the coming compliance year.
Cost Allocation Mechanism (CAM). The CAM is a regulatory process for allocating capacity costs of utility procurement across all benefitting customers. Conceived in a 2004 CPUC decision, adopted in a 2006 CPUC decision, affected by changes in law (SB 695, Kehoe, Chapter 337, Statues of 2009), and continuing to be adapted to new issues and circumstances, the CAM remains a contentious issue in law and regulation. It is a fixture of the CPUC’s Long Term Procurement policy and is based on the principle that costs and benefits of new generation should be shared by all benefitting customers within an investor-owned utility’s service territory. The mechanism for CAM is a one-way tool; it exists for the IOUs to purchase resources on behalf of all who rely on the electric grid, including direct access customers and the customers of the CCAs. CAM allows the IOUs to spread costs of generation resources to the other LSEs.
CAISO backstop procurement. If California RA rules fail to provide sufficient resources, the CAISO is compelled to utilize centralized backstop procurement mechanisms in order to maintain electric system reliability. Centralized backstop procurement the process is whereby the CAISO contracts with a generator to address the shortfall. Under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules, the CAISO, like all other balancing authorities, must ensure system reliability or face penalties by FERC. The CAISO has two mechanisms for centralized backstop procurement: Reliability Must Run (RMR) and Capacity Procurement Mechanism (CPM). A resource receiving RMR designation must continue to operate and is compensated by a rate set by the CAISO, per FERC approved tariffs. RMR contracts are expensive relative to procurement through the CPUC process, especially considering their limited operating parameters. The use of RMR contracts declined after implementation of the local RA program, except RMR for the Oakland peaker powerplants (~150 megawatts (MWs)). CPM can be used for resources that may be needed in the following year and where the resource is at risk of retirement. Like RMR contracts, CPM contracts are also at a higher price relative to generation procured through the CPUC process. These costs are generally shouldered by ratepayers in the insufficient Local Capacity Area or by all ratepayers of the LSE(s) lacking the adequate RA.
Recent challenges meeting local RA. Local RA requirements provide measures to mitigate market power and to address resource availability. For example, LSEs can request a waiver for the deficiency in cases where the LSE is unable to secure enough capacity to meet its local RA requirements, subject to specified conditions. The conditions include a demonstration that the LSE made a good faith effort to solicit bids and that no bids were received or bids with unreasonable terms were received. These provisions had rarely been exercised. However, in the fall of 2017, 11 LSEs filed waiver requests to cover local deficiencies totaling roughly 270 MWs. Backstop procurement had generally been on the decline. In 2017, the CAISO contracted for resources, mostly to address local reliability shortfalls. In the fall of 2018, there were additional waivers filed, however, the full list is currently not available. It’s unclear whether the increase in waiver requests is a short-term issue due to the transitions in the energy landscape, particularly with load migrating away from IOUs to other LSEs (especially CCAs) and the retirement of natural gas power plants which have historically (and currently) served the capacity for local RA.
Initiating Procurement. On 6/20/19, the CPUC’s assigned Commissioner and Administrative Law Judge initiated a procurement track to develop an electricity integrated resource planning framework and to coordinate and refine long-term procurement planning requirements. The first priority task of the procurement track identified is to seek comments on the potential for near-term reliability challenges as analyzed by the CPUC. The document states,” First, many market participants have informally observed a tightening of the bilateral market. In addition, according to Commission staff, there is a decline in the robustness of competitive solicitations. Finally, a number of LSEs have not been able to comply with the system requirements for the 2019 resource adequacy compliance year.”[1] The document goes on to express increasing concern with the ability of the bilateral markets to transact and meet 2021 resources adequacy requirements, given limited in-state supply. Also, there is the possibility that additional conventional generating units (natural gas) may mothball/or retire, exacerbating the tightness of in-state supply.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s Statement. SB 350 ensures that California’s leadership on renewable energy and reliability continues in a cost-effective manner. The bill authorizes a central procurement mechanism for electricity that will efficiently and equitably meet customer needs and our statewide climate goals across all customer bases.
- CPUC RA proceeding. The RA rules had largely worked in a landscape that was designed to have the three large IOUs procure the RA. However, the recent increased migration of energy load to non-IOU entities has posed challenges to the existing RA framework. Specifically, CCAs have launched or expanded at times of the year that do not necessarily correspond with the year-ahead RA process. Without CCA’s participation in the year-ahead process, it was assumed that the departing load would continue to be served by IOUs, and associated RA requirements were assigned to those utilities, who then had to procure for that load. For example, by the end of 2017, the CPUC had approved 11 CCA implementation plans for launch or expansion in 2018, corresponding to over 3,100 MWs, but none of this load migration was captured in the year-ahead RA process. In response to these and other challenges, the CPUC has proposed new rules for RA, including a multi-year local RA requirement to ensure that resources needed for reliability are procured in the hopes providing better incentives to generators to enter into contracts with LSEs, instead of relying on CAISO backstop procurement.
The CPUC had also proposed a central buyer, namely the IOU, to procure the local RA. However, in a recent decision, the CPUC has delayed adopting the central buyer framework, opting for continued workshops and a final decision in the fourth quarter of 2019. In the same decision, the CPUC declined to make changes to the use of the CAM to allocate for costs of capacity for non-renewable local resources absent adoption of a central procurement mechanism. As noted, CPUC is scheduled to make a decision pertaining to the central buyer towards the end of this year. This bill relates to the subject of those workshops. With that in mind, the committee may wish to bring the bill back to the Assembly Utilities and Energy Committee should significant amendments be made to this measure after it leaves this policy Committee.
- Prior/Related Legislation
AB 56 (E. Garcia, 2019) authorizes the Public Utilities Commission to empower the California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority to undertake backstop procurement of electricity that would otherwise be performed by an electrical corporation, to meet the state resource planning and reliability goals not satisfied by individual load-serving entities.
SB 520 (Hertzberg, 2019) establishes a provider of last resort as an electric load-serving entity (LSE) that meets specified requirements, including those determined by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), to ensure electric service for customers not otherwise served by another LSE.
SB 1136 (Hertzberg, Chapter 851, Statutes of 2018) required the CPUC, in establishing resource adequacy requirements, to ensure the reliability of electrical service in California while advancing the state’s goals for clean energy, reducing air pollution, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The bill adds as a specified purpose minimizing the need for backstop procurement by the CAISO.
SB 695 (Kehoe, Chapter 337, Statutes of 2009), required that the net capacity costs of new generation resources deemed “needed to meet system or local area reliability needs for the benefit of all customers in the electrical corporation’s distribution service territory” must be passed on to bundled service customers, DA and CCA customers.
AB 380 (Nunez, Chapter 380, Statutes of 2005) requires the CPUC in consultation with the CAISO to establish RA requirements.
SB 57 (Wright, Chapter 835, Statutes of 2002), Established a regulatory framework that required the three large IOUs to resume full procurement responsibilities, and to file procurement plans with the CPUC that include assessments of portfolio price risk. The framework also included an expedited review process and timely cost recovery.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None on file
Support If Amended
Environmental Defense Fund
Opposition
California Alliance for Community Energy
Analysis Prepared by: Mary McDonald / U. & E. /
CPUC: Order Instituting Rulemaking to Develop an Electricity Integrated Resource Planning Framework and to Coordinate and Refine Long-Term Procurement Planning Requirements. ↑
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 350 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 350
Introduced: 2/19/19
SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 13-0, 3/27/19
AYES: Hueso, Moorlach, Bradford, Chang, Dodd, Hertzberg, Hill, McGuire, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Stone, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
SUBJECT: Electricity: resource adequacy: multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism
DIGEST:
This bill authorizes the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to consider changes within the resource adequacy (RA) program, including the use of a multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism, among other options.
Existing law:
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix rates, establish rules, examine records, issue subpoenas, administer oaths, take testimony, punish for contempt, and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public utilities, including electrical corporations, subject to its jurisdiction. (Article 12 of the California Constitution)
- Requires that all charges demanded or received by any public utility for any product, commodity or service be just and reasonable, and that every unjust or unreasonable charge is unlawful. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Requires the CPUC, in consultation with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), to establish RA requirements for all load-serving entities (LSEs), including electrical corporations, electric service providers (ESPs), and community choice aggregators (CCAs), in accordance with specified objectives. Further requires each LSE to maintain physical generating capacity adequate to meet its load requirements, including peak demand and planning and operating reserves, deliverable to locations and at times as may be necessary to provide reliable electric service. Requires the CPUC to determine and authorize the most efficient and equitable means for LSEs to achieve specified purposes when meeting their RA requirements. (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the CPUC to authorize and facilitate direct transactions between electricity suppliers and retail end-use customers, but suspends direct transactions, except as expressly authorized. Requires the CPUC to ensure that net capacity costs of those generation resources are allocated on a fully nonbypassable basis consistent with specified departing load provisions and to ensure that those resources meet a system or local reliability need in a manner that benefits all customers of the electrical corporation, if the CPUC authorizes or orders an electrical corporation to obtain generation resources that the CPUC determines are needed to meet system or local area reliability needs for the benefit of all customers in the electrical corporation’s distribution services territory. However, the existing law suspends this requirement if the CPUC approves a centralized resources adequacy mechanism. (Public Utilities Code §365.1)
This bill:
- Authorizes the CPUC to consider a multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism, among other options, to most efficiently and equitably meet specified resource adequacy objectives.
- Suspends the requirement to allocate costs on a fully nonbypassable basis for the net capacity costs of generation resources meeting a system or local reliability need, if the CPUC approves a multiyear resource adequacy mechanism, and only if the mechanism, does not include a central procurement entity.
Background
Resource adequacy. Following the California energy crisis of 2000-01, the California Legislature enacted legislation to prevent future incidents of widespread black outs and rolling brown outs due to lack of electric generating capacity. Among the reforms was the adoption of Public Utilities Code §380 as an effort to better ensure reliability of electric supply. The statute directs the CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, to establish RA requirements for all LSEs, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), ESPs, and now includes CCAs, which did not exist at the time of the crisis. The current RA program consists of system, local, and flexible requirements for each month of a compliance year. In October of each year, LSEs must demonstrate that they have procured 90 percent of their system RA obligations for the five summer months (May-September) of the following year, as well as 100 percent of their local requirements, and 90 percent of their flexible requirements for each month of the coming compliance year.
Cost Allocation Mechanism (CAM). The CAM is a regulatory process for allocating capacity costs of utility procurement across all benefitting customers. Conceived in a 2004 CPUC decision, adopted in a 2006 CPUC decision, affected by changes in law (SB 695, Kehoe, Chapter 337, Statues of 2009), and continuing to be adapted to new issues and circumstances, the CAM remains a contentious issue in law and regulation. It is a fixture of the CPUC’s Long Term Procurement policy and is based on the principle that costs and benefits of new generation should be shared by all benefitting customers within an investor-owned utility’s service territory. The mechanism for CAM is a one-way tool; it exists for the IOUs to purchase resources on behalf of all who rely on the electric grid, including direct access customers and the customers of the CCAs. CAM allows the IOUs to spread costs of generation resources to the other LSEs.
CAISO backstop procurement. If California RA rules fail to provide sufficient resources, the CAISO is compelled to utilize centralized backstop procurement mechanisms in order to maintain electric system reliability. Centralized backstop procurement is whereby the CAISO contracts with a generator to address the shortfall. Under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules, the CAISO, like all other balancing authorities, must ensure system reliability or face penalties by FERC. The CAISO has two mechanisms for centralized backstop procurement: Reliability Must Run (RMR) and Capacity Procurement Mechanism (CPM). A resource receiving RMR designation must continue to operate and is compensated by a rate set by the CAISO, per FERC approved tariffs. RMR contracts are expensive relative to procurement through the CPUC process, especially considering their limited operating parameters. The use of RMR contracts declined after implementation of the local RA program, except RMR for the Oakland peaker powerplants (~150 megawatts (MWs)). CPM can be used for resources that may be needed in the following year and where the resource is at risk of retirement. Like RMR contracts, CPM contracts are also at a higher price relative to generation procured through the CPUC process. These costs are generally shouldered by ratepayers in the insufficient Local Capacity Area or by all ratepayers of the LSE(s) lacking the adequate RA.
Recent challenges meeting local RA. Of important note, the local RA requirements provide measures to mitigate market power and to address resource availability. For example, LSEs can request a waiver for the deficiency in cases where the LSE is unable to secure enough capacity to meet its local RA requirements, subject to specified conditions. The conditions include a demonstration that the LSE made a good faith effort to solicit bids and that no bids were received or bids with unreasonable terms were received. These provisions had rarely been exercised. However, in the fall of 2017, 11 LSEs filed waiver requests to cover local deficiencies totaling roughly 270 MWs. Backstop procurement had been on the decline, except for the above noted contract for the Oakland peaker powerplants. However, in 2017, the CAISO contracted for resources, mostly to address local reliability shortfalls. In the fall of 2018, there were additional waivers filed, however, the full list is currently not available. It’s unclear whether the increase in waiver requests is a short-term issue due to the transitions in the energy landscape, particularly with load migrating away from IOUs to other LSEs (especially CCAs) and the retirement of natural gas power plants which have historically (and currently) served the capacity for local RA.
CPUC RA proceeding. The RA rules had largely worked in a landscape that was designed to have the three large IOUs procure the RA. However, the recent increased migration of energy load to non-IOU entities has posed challenges to the existing RA framework. Specifically, CCAs have launched or expanded at times of the year that do not necessarily correspond with the year-ahead RA process. Without CCA’s participation in the year-ahead process, it was assumed that the departing load would continue to be served by IOUs, and associated RA requirements were assigned to those utilities, who then had to procure for that load. For example, by the end of 2017, the CPUC had approved 11 CCA implementation plans for launch or expansion in 2018, corresponding to over 3,100 MWs, but none of this load migration was captured in the year-ahead RA process. In response to these and other challenges, the CPUC has proposed new rules for RA, including a multi-year local RA requirement to ensure that resources needed for reliability are procured in the hopes providing better incentives to generators to enter into contracts with LSEs, instead of relying on CAISO backstop procurement. The CPUC had also proposed a central buyer, namely the IOU, to procure the local RA. However, in a recent decision, the CPUC has delayed adopting the central buyer framework, opting for continued workshops and a final decision in the fourth quarter of 2019. In the same decision, the CPUC declined to make changes to the use of the CAM to allocate for costs of capacity for non-renewable local resources absent adoption of a central procurement mechanism.
Need for bill. According to the author, SB 350 would modify existing RA law to ensure, if the CPUC implements a multiyear central RA mechanism that includes a central procurement entity, that the CAM would not be suspended. As such this bill, attempts to largely reflect the current changes being considered at the CPUC for the RA program. However, the CPUC RA proceedings remain active and may result in additional changes. With that in mind, the committee may wish to pull the bill back for further review should additional changes be necessary to reflect or inform changes in the RA program. As such, this bill may still be a work in progress.
Related/Prior Legislation
SB 1136 (Hertzberg, Chapter 851, Statutes of 2018) required the CPUC, in establishing resource adequacy requirements, to ensure the reliability of electrical service in California while advancing the state’s goals for clean energy, reducing air pollution, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The bill adds as a specified purpose minimizing the need for backstop procurement by the CAISO.
SB 695 (Kehoe, Chapter 337, Statutes of 2009) required that the net capacity costs of new generation resources deemed “needed to meet system or local area reliability needs for the benefit of all customers in the electrical corporation’s distribution service territory” must be passed on to bundled service customers, DA and CCA customers.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
Environmental Defense Fund
OPPOSITION: (Verified 4/22/19)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
“SB 350 ensures that California’s leadership on renewable energy and reliability continues in a cost-effective manner. The bill authorizes a central procurement mechanism for electricity that will efficiently and equitably meet customer needs and our statewide climate goals across all customer bases.”
Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U., & C. / (916) 651-4107
4/24/19 16:25:13
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Senator Ben Hueso, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: SB 350 Hearing Date: 3/27/2019
Author: | Hertzberg | ||
Version: | 2/19/2019 As Introduced | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | Nidia Bautista | ||
SUBJECT: Electricity: resource adequacy: multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism
DIGEST: This bill authorizes the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to consider changes within the resource adequacy (RA) program, including the use of a multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism, among other options.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix rates, establish rules, examine records, issue subpoenas, administer oaths, take testimony, punish for contempt, and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public utilities, including electrical corporations, subject to its jurisdiction. (Article 12 of the California Constitution)
- Requires that all charges demanded or received by any public utility for any product, commodity or service be just and reasonable, and that every unjust or unreasonable charge is unlawful. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Requires the CPUC, in consultation with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), to establish RA requirements for all load-serving entities (LSEs), including electrical corporations, electric service providers (ESPs), and community choice aggregators (CCAs), in accordance with specified objectives. Further requires each LSE to maintain physical generating capacity adequate to meet its load requirements, including peak demand and planning and operating reserves, deliverable to locations and at times as may be necessary to provide reliable electric service. Requires the CPUC to determine and authorize the most efficient and equitable means for LSEs to achieve specified purposes when meeting their RA requirements. (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the CPUC to authorize and facilitate direct transactions between electricity suppliers and retail end-use customers, but suspends direct transactions, except as expressly authorized. Requires the CPUC to ensure that net capacity costs of those generation resources are allocated on a fully nonbypassable basis consistent with specified departing load provisions and to ensure that those resources meet a system or local reliability need in a manner that benefits all customers of the electrical corporation, if the CPUC authorizes or orders an electrical corporation to obtain generation resources that the CPUC determines are needed to meet system or local area reliability needs for the benefit of all customers in the electrical corporation’s distribution services territory. However, the existing law suspends this requirement if the CPUC approves a centralized resources adequacy mechanism. (Public Utilities Code § 365.1)
This bill:
- Authorizes the CPUC to consider a multiyear centralized resource adequacy mechanism, among other options, to most efficiently and equitably meet specified resource adequacy objectives.
- Suspends the requirement to allocate costs on a fully nonbypassable basis for the net capacity costs of generation resources meeting a system or local reliability need, if the CPUC approves a multiyear resource adequacy mechanism, and only if the mechanism, does not include a central procurement entity.
Background
Resource adequacy. Following the California energy crisis of 2000-01, the California Legislature enacted legislation to prevent future incidents of widespread black outs and rolling brown outs due to lack of electric generating capacity. Among the reforms was the adoption of Public Utilities Code §380 as an effort to better ensure reliability of electric supply. The statute directs the CPUC, in consultation with the CAISO, to establish RA requirements for all LSEs, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs), ESPs, and now also includes CCAs which did not exist at the time of the crisis. The current RA program consists of system, local, and flexible requirements for each month of a compliance year. In October of each year, LSEs must demonstrate that they have procured 90 percent of their system RA obligations for the five summer months (May-September) of the following year, as well as 100 percent of their local requirements, and 90 percent of their flexible requirements for each month of the coming compliance year.
Cost Allocation Mechanism (CAM). The CAM is a regulatory process for allocating capacity costs of utility procurement across all benefitting customers. Conceived in a 2004 CPUC decision, adopted in a 2006 CPUC decision, affected by changes in law (SB 695, Kehoe, Chapter 337, Statues of 2009), and continuing to be adapted to new issues and circumstances, the CAM remains a contentious issue in law and regulation. It is a fixture of the CPUC’s Long Term Procurement policy and is based on the principle that the costs and benefits of new generation should be shared by all benefitting customers in an investor-owned utility’s service territory. The mechanism for CAM is a one-way tool only. It exists for the IOUs to purchase resources on behalf of all who rely on the electric grid, including direct access customers and the customers of the CCAs. It allows for the IOUs to spread costs of generation resources to the other LSEs.
CAISO backstop procurement. If California RA rules fail to provide sufficient resources, the CAISO is compelled to utilize centralized backstop procurement mechanisms in order to maintain electric system reliability. Centralized backstop procurement is whereby the CAISO contracts with a generator to address the shortfall. Under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules, the CAISO, like all other balancing authorities, must ensure system reliability or face penalties by FERC. The CAISO has two mechanisms for centralized backstop procurement: Reliability Must Run (RMR) and Capacity Procurement Mechanism (CPM). A resource receiving RMR designation must continue to operate and is compensated by a rate set by the CAISO, per FERC approved tariffs. RMR contracts are expensive relative to procurement through the CPUC process, especially considering their limited operating parameters. The use of RMR contracts declined after implementation of the local RA program, except RMR for the Oakland peaker powerplants (~150 megawatts (MW)). CPM can be used for resources that may be needed in the following year and where the resource is at risk of retirement. Like RMR contracts, CPM contracts are also at a higher price relative to generation procured through the CPUC process. These costs are generally shouldered by ratepayers in the insufficient Local Capacity Area or by all ratepayers of the LSE(s) lacking the adequate RA.
Recent challenges meeting local RA. Of important note, the Local RA requirements provide measures to mitigate market power and to address resource availability. For example, LSEs can request a waiver for the deficiency in cases where the LSE is unable to secure enough capacity to meet its local RA requirements, subject to specified conditions. The conditions include a demonstration that the LSE made a good faith effort to solicit bids and that no bids were received or bids with unreasonable terms were received. These provisions had rarely been exercised. However, in the fall of 2017, 11 LSEs filed waiver requests to cover local deficiencies totaling roughly 270 MW. Backstop procurement had been on the decline, except for the above noted contract for the Oakland peaker powerplants. However, in 2017, the CAISO contracted for resources, mostly to address local reliability shortfalls. In the fall of 2018, there were additional waivers filed, however, the full list is currently not available. It’s currently unclear whether the increase in waiver requests is a short-term issue due to the transitions in the energy landscape, particularly with load migrating away from IOUs to other LSEs (especially CCAs) and the retirement of natural gas power plants which have historically (and currently) served the capacity for local RA.
CPUC RA proceeding. The RA rules had largely worked in a landscape that was designed to have the three large IOUs procure the RA. However, the recent migration of energy load to non-IOU entities has posed challenges to the existing RA framework. Specifically, CCAs have launched or expanded at times of the year that do not necessarily correspond with the year-ahead RA process. Without CCA’s participation in the year-ahead process, it was assumed that the departing load would continue to be served by IOUs, and associated RA requirements were assigned to those utilities, who then had to procure for that load. For example, by the end of 2017, the CPUC had approved 11 CCA implementation plans for launch or expansion in 2018, corresponding to over 3,100 MW, but none of this load migration was captured in the year-ahead RA process. In response to these and other challenges, the CPUC has proposed new rules for RA, including a multi-year local RA requirement to ensure that resources needed for reliability are procured in the hopes providing better incentives to generators to enter into contracts with LSEs, instead of relying on CAISO backstop procurement. The CPUC had also proposed a central buyer, namely the IOU, to procure the local RA. However, in a recent decision, the CPUC has delayed adopting the central buyer framework, opting for continued workshops and a final decision in the fourth quarter of 2019. In the same decision, the CPUC declined to make changes to the use of the CAM to allocate for costs of capacity for non-renewable local resources absent adoption of a central procurement mechanism.
Need for bill. According to the author, SB 350 would modify existing Resource Adequacy law to ensure, if the CPUC implements a multiyear central RA mechanism that includes a central procurement entity, that the CAM would not be suspended. As such this bill, attempts to largely reflect the current changes being considered at the CPUC for the RA program. However, the CPUC RA proceedings remain active and may result in additional changes. With that in mind, the committee may wish to pull the bill back further review should additional changes be necessary to reflect or inform changes in the RA program. As such, this bill may still be a work in progress.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 1136 (Hertzberg, Chapter 851, Statutes of 2018) required the CPUC, in establishing resource adequacy requirements, to ensure the reliability of electrical service in California while advancing the state’s goals for clean energy, reducing air pollution, and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The bill adds as a specified purpose minimizing the need for backstop procurement by the CAISO.
SB 695 (Kehoe, Chapter 337, Statutes of 2009), required that the net capacity costs of new generation resources deemed “needed to meet system or local area reliability needs for the benefit of all customers in the electrical corporation’s distribution service territory” must be passed on to bundled service customers, DA and CCA customers.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
SUPPORT:
Environmental Defense Fund, support if amended
OPPOSITION:
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
“SB 350 ensures that California’s leadership on renewable energy and reliability continues in a cost-effective manner. The bill authorizes a central procurement mechanism for electricity that will efficiently and equitably meet customer needs and our statewide climate goals across all customer bases.”
-- END --
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):