SB 977: Health care system consolidation: Attorney General approval and enforcement.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2020-08-24
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Date
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Status
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| Aug 24, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 20, 2020 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 10. Noes 4.) (August 20). |
| Aug 18, 2020 | August 18 set for first hearing. Placed on suspense file. |
| Aug 6, 2020 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Aug 5, 2020 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 8. Noes 4.) (August 4). |
| Jul 27, 2020 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on HEALTH. |
| Jun 29, 2020 | Referred to Com. on HEALTH. |
| Jun 26, 2020 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Jun 26, 2020 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 21. Noes 11. Page 3874.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Jun 22, 2020 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jun 19, 2020 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2. Page 3768.) (June 18). |
| Jun 11, 2020 | Set for hearing June 18. |
| Jun 9, 2020 | June 9 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Jun 3, 2020 | Set for hearing June 9. |
| Jun 2, 2020 | Hearing rescheduled due to Capitol closure. |
| May 26, 2020 | Set for hearing June 1. |
| May 19, 2020 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| May 18, 2020 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 2. Page 3533.) (May 13). |
| May 11, 2020 | Re-referred to Com. on HEALTH. |
| May 11, 2020 | Set for hearing May 13 in HEALTH pending receipt. |
| Mar 16, 2020 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 20, 2020 | Referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 12, 2020 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 13. |
| Feb 11, 2020 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Aug 20, 2020 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Aug 4, 2020 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Health |
Passed |
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| Jun 26, 2020 | Senate 3rd Reading SB977 Monning | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Jun 18, 2020 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Jun 9, 2020 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| May 13, 2020 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Health |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 977
Author:(Monning)
As Amended Ver:August 24, 2020
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Requires the Attorney General (AG), beginning July 1, 2021, to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board (Board) for the purpose of evaluating and analyzing health care markets in California and providing recommendations to the AG's office. Requires a health care system, as defined, a private equity group, or hedge fund to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to a change in control, as defined, or an acquisition, as defined, between the entity and a health care facility or provider. Provides for an expedited review process for transactions under $1 million, county facilities, and academic centers, as defined. Requires a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund to provide advance written notice to the AG prior to a change of control or acquisition between a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund and a non-physician provider, as defined. Makes it unlawful for one or more health care systems, either independently or dependently, to use their market power to, among other things, cause anticompetitive effects, as described, and authorizes the AG to bring a civil action for a violation of this unlawful conduct. Sunsets the AG's authority to review changes of control on January 1, 2026.
Major Provisions
COMMENTS:
- Health Care Spending. The most recent data available for California indicate that health care spending in the state totaled $292 billion in 2014. According to the January 2020 California Health Care Foundation report entitled, "Getting to Affordability: Spending Trends and Waste in California's Health Care System," per capita spending has grown steadily over time for all sources of coverage, employer-sponsored insurance, Medi-Cal, Medicare and private health insurance. Private health insurance coverage faced the highest growth rates at 4% per year. The report points out that most of the spending comes from inpatient hospital stays and office-based medical provider services ($60 billion each), followed by prescription drugs ($45.6 billion).
- Impact of Mergers on Consumers. In a Commonwealth Fund-supported study in Health Affairs, researchers explored the effect of market consolidation across California between 2010 and 2016 on outpatient visit prices and premiums for individual coverage on the Covered California marketplace. Integration and consolidation among health care providers and health plans has the potential to improve the coordination and quality of patient care. However, when markets become highly concentrated, served by a single or a few large health care organizations, competition is curtailed and health care prices and insurance premiums tend to rise. The significant price increases in California markets with high hospital-physician employment and hospital consolidation point to the need for careful scrutiny of health care mergers and acquisitions. Additional research is needed to determine if the price increases are tied to improvements in patient care. For instance, if care is more expensive because it is more comprehensive, then overall utilization and spending should decrease. At the same time, regulatory laws and actions may be needed to prevent some health care organizations from attaining unfair market advantages that shut out rivals and raise prices.
A 2018 study published in the Journal of Health Economics titled, "The effect of hospital acquisitions of physician practices on prices and spending," noted that during the past decade, U.S. hospitals have acquired a large number of physician practices. For example, from 2007 to 2013, hospitals acquired nearly 10% of the physician practices in the study. The study found that the prices for the services provided by acquired physicians increased by an average of 14.1% post-acquisition. Nearly half of this increase is attributable to the exploitation of payment rules. Price increases are larger when the acquiring hospital has a larger share of its inpatient market. The study found that integration of primary care physicians increases enrollee spending by 4.9%.
- Hospital consolidation and price increases. A 2016 study published in the Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision and Financing examined hospital prices in California over time with a focus on hospitals in the largest multi-hospital systems. The data showed that hospital prices in California grew substantially (+76% per hospital admission) across all hospitals and all services between 2004 and 2013, and that prices at hospitals that are members of the largest, multi-hospital systems grew substantially more (113%) than prices paid to all other California hospitals (70%). The study noted that the substantial price differential was not driven by other factors such as case mix, payor mix, and changes in local wage costs and local market competition or other hospital characteristics. A University of California Berkeley Report from March 2018 detailed the rapid consolidation of the hospital, physician, and insurance markets in California from 2010 to 2016, and found evidence that highly concentrated markets are associated with higher prices for a number of hospital and physician services and Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act premiums.
- Antitrust Review of Mergers. Among the key provisions in U.S. antitrust law is one designed to prevent anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions. Three major federal anti-trust laws, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Act, are used by both state and federal government to review the effects on competition from health care entity conduct and consolidations. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the United States and are over a certain size, and either agency can take legal action to block deals that it believes would "substantially lessen competition." California has its own anti-trust law, the Cartwright Act.
- Existing AG oversight of nonprofit transactions. California law requires the AG's review and consent for any sale or transfer of a health care facility owned or operated by a nonprofit corporation whose assets are held in public trust. This requirement covers health care facilities that are licensed to provide 24-hour care, such as hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. The review process includes public meetings and, when necessary, preparation of expert reports. The AG's decision often requires the continuation of existing levels of charity care, continued operation of emergency rooms and other essential services, and other actions necessary to avoid adverse effects on healthcare in the local community. Specifically, the law provides the AG with the discretion to consent to, give conditional extent to, or not consent to any agreement or transaction involving a nonprofit health facility based on the consideration of any factors that the AG deems relevant, including but not limited to:
- Whether the agreement or transaction is at fair market value;
- Whether the proposed use of the proceeds from the transaction is consistent with the charitable trust on which the assets are held by the health facility or by the affiliated nonprofit health system;
- Whether the transaction would create significant effects on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community; or,
- Whether the transaction is in the public interest.
The law also prohibits the AG from consenting to a health facility transaction in which the seller restricts the type or level of medical services that may be provided at the health facility that is the subject of the transaction.
- Sutter Health Settlement. In December 2019, Sutter Health agreed to pay $575 million to settle claims of anti-competitive behavior brought by the AG, as well as unions and employers. The settlement will go to compensate employers, unions and the state and federal governments. Sutter Health will also be prohibited from engaging in several practices that the AG said the hospital system used to ensure its market power. Sutter will be barred from "all or nothing" agreements, which the AG said required insurers to include all of Sutter's medical facilities if they wanted to include some of the system's hospitals in their provider networks. The settlement also limits what Sutter Health can charge patients for out-of-network services, which will prevent people from facing surprise medical bills.
According to the Author:
This bill would ensure proper oversight of large healthcare systems and strengthen patient access to affordable, quality healthcare. The COVID-19 pandemic has created enormous financial strain on hospitals and physician practices statewide, making these providers more susceptible to changes in control and acquisition attempts by large healthcare systems, private equity groups, and hedge funds. This type of predatory practice, if left unchecked, will result in large healthcare systems continuing to grow and utilize abusive market practices to drive up prices and reduce access for patients.
Arguments in Support:
This bill is sponsored by AG Xavier Becerra, who notes that it would require large healthcare systems, as well as, private equity groups and hedge funds to obtain approval from the AG prior to any affiliation or acquisition with any other healthcare facility or provider. The Attorney General's review would focus on: a) whether the transaction would increase care coordination resulting in improved quality of care or lowers costs, or would increase access to care overall; and, b) whether the transaction is likely to result in anticompetitive effects in the market that outweigh its benefits. This bill also permits certain exemptions for hospitals in rural areas. In addition to reviewing the formation of new healthcare systems, SB 977 would strengthen the AG's authority to prohibit existing healthcare systems from engaging in abusive behavior that negatively impacts competition in the market. Healthcare systems engaging in anticompetitive behavior would be subject to civil actions and penalties for failure to comply. AG Becerra states that he is proud to sponsor this bill, and it will substantially strengthen the state's oversight over the formation and practices of large healthcare systems, helping to ensure access to affordable healthcare during a time when Californians need it the most.
California Labor Federation, Health Access, and Pacific Business Group on Health support this bill and note that this bill gives the AG authority to ensure that consolidation in the health care industry benefits consumers and purchasers. The supporters state that the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed another consequence of unchecked consolidation. The economic toll resulting from the pandemic will likely fuel consolidation trends as physician practices and independent hospitals face massive losses or bankruptcy and become targets for acquisition by large health systems. The supporters point to empirical studies that conclusively demonstrate that dominant providers are using their market power to engage in unfair contracting practices and negotiate higher-than competitive prices in the state.
Arguments in Opposition:
The California Hospital Association, California Medical Association, California Dental Association, and the California Chamber of Commerce are among the opposition to this bill. Opponents state that this bill undermines bedrock principles of fair due process within the legal system by creating presumptions that these transactions are anticompetitive, placing the burden of proof on health care providers and effectively creating a "guilty until proven innocent" system. The opponents note that a provider must demonstrate that the acquisition or affiliation will result in clinical integration or an increase in access and availability of services to an underserved population, but provides no clarity on how a provider may do so. The ability to regulate anticompetitive behavior is already governed by the AG's current review authority, as well as federal and state antitrust laws. The opponents contend that this proposal would place the burden on all health care providers to meet arbitrary standards of proof, with no right to a hearing or meaningful appeal process. The opponents state that passing this legislation during the ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency and growing health care financial crisis will only further restrict the flexibility and resources health care providers desperately need simply to keep their doors open and provide vital care to patients. The opponents state that now, more than ever, patients need a sense of predictability and reliability when it comes to their health care, and health care providers need to make difficult and prudent decisions to carry out their mission and deliver quality care. Opponents conclude that this bill will stifle this lifesaving work.
Arguments in Opposition Unless Amended: The County of Santa Clara (CSC) writes that this bill is currently ambiguous as to whether the definition of a health care system applies to county public hospital systems and seeks an amendment to make clear that counties will not be subject to this bill. CSC contends that the additional process in this bill would be burdensome and costly for counties and without any public benefit, given that county systems do not make a profit and are publicly subsidized. VSP Vision Care (VSP) states that this bill would trigger review and presumptive denial of any changes to leases, loans, grants, service agreements, or contracts that optometrists, optometric professional corporations and Independent Practice Groups, and physician medical groups undertake. VSP is seeking an amendment to clarify that "private equity group" does not include VSP's acquisition program. The California Optometric Association (COA), is opposed unless amended, to exclude the AG's review of small private practice sales to private equity groups. COA is concerned that this bill would trigger a review of very small transactions that could not possibly have an anticompetitive effect. The definition of "private equity groups" is so broad that it would include any transaction involving an individual or group providing funds for an acquisition and the review of these sales by the AG could take many months, which could derail the sale by the providers or devalue the practice because of the cost of review and the uncertainty of the outcome.
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee, costs to the Department of Justice of $1.2 million annually through calendar year 2026 for legal and analytical staff to review and approve or deny transactions (GF/Legal Services Revolving Fund). There could be additional workload if the AG decides to pursue civil action under new authority granted in the bill, but the AG could allocate existing resources if this was deemed a priority.
There is disagreement between the Office of the AG and the provider community as to the number and types of transactions that are to be captured by this bill. The provider community believes the bill is far broader and would cover far more transactions than does the Office of the AG. If a greater number of transactions are sent to the AG for review, costs could be commensurately higher. However, the AG can also simply choose to prioritize transactions of interest, as any transaction filed may proceed if the AG does not respond to within a certain period.
Potential cost pressure in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually through calendar year 2026 to contract for expertise necessary to assist the Health Policy Advisory Board in producing an annual report on health care market conditions and responding to inquiries from the AG about specific transactions.
VOTES:
SENATE FLOOR: 21-11-8
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Beall, Caballero, Dodd, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Hertzberg, Hueso, Jackson, Leyva, Mitchell, Monning, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Skinner, Stern, Wieckowski, Wiener
NO: Borgeas, Chang, Dahle, Glazer, Grove, Jones, Melendez, Moorlach, Morrell, Nielsen, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Bates, Bradford, Galgiani, Hill, Hurtado, McGuire, Rubio, Umberg
ASM HEALTH: 8-4-3
YES: Wood, Aguiar-Curry, Bonta, Carrillo, McCarty, Nazarian, Rodriguez, Santiago
NO: Mayes, Bigelow, Flora, Waldron
ABS, ABST OR NV: Burke, Limón, Ramos
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 10-4-4
YES: Gonzalez, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Megan Dahle, Fong, Voepel
ABS, ABST OR NV: Bauer-Kahan, Bloom, Diep, Petrie-Norris
UPDATED:
VERSION: August 24, 2020
CONSULTANT: Kristene Mapile, Lara Flynn / HEALTH / (916) 319-2097 FN: 0003314
Date of Hearing: August 18, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 977
Author:(Monning) – As Amended Ver:August 6, 2020
Policy Committee: | Health | Vote: | 8 - 4 |
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill provides the Attorney General (AG) additional authority to review and approve proposed acquisitions of health care facilities and practices by health care systems, hedge funds or private equity groups and requires the AG to study health care markets and provide recommendations. Specifically, this bill:
- Requires the AG to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board to analyze California health care markets and provide recommendations to the Attorney General’s office, including issuing an annual report on cost and quality in health care markets in California as those topics relate to acquisitions and changes of control. Sunsets this board in January 2027 and allows the AG to request the board to review a written notification.
- Requires a written notice to the AG and AG approval for transactions occurring before December 31, 2025:
- Requires a health care system, hedge fund or private equity group seeking to acquire or control a health care facility or provider to provide written notice and obtain approval from the AG based on specified criteria, and spells out timelines, exemptions and details of the notice and approval process. Sunsets this requirement in January 2026.
- Defines a health care system as an entity or system of entities that includes or owns three or more hospitals within the state of which at least one is a general acute care hospital, as defined.
- Allows the AG to deny consent to a change of control or an acquisition unless it is demonstrated to result in a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, as defined, a substantial likelihood of increasing or maintaining the availability and access of services to an underserved population, or both.
- Allows the AG to deny consent to a change of control or an acquisition if there is a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects that outweigh potential benefits, as specified.
- Requires the AG to apply the “public interest” standard in approving or denying transactions, as defined to include the public’s interest in the price, quality, choice, accessibility, and availability of all health care services, and states acquisitions shall not be presumed to be efficient for purposes of assessing compliance with this standard.
- Allows potential purchasers to move forward with the transaction if they do not receive a notice of denial, approval or waiver.
- Allows the AG to waive specified requirements for a transaction in a rural area and to provide an expedited review for small transactions (market value under $1 million) and transactions involving academic medical centers and county health facilities.
- Makes the conduct of a health care system unlawful if the health care system has substantial market power in any market for hospitals or nonhospital health care services and the health care system’s conduct has a substantial tendency to cause anticompetitive effects, as specified.
- Presumes a health care system is acting unlawfully if it has substantial market power and the health care system’s conduct involves “tying” (the seller coercively conditioning the sale of one or more services on the sale of a second distinct service or services, as specified) or “exclusive dealing” (an agreement in which a health plan or employer who buys health care services agrees implicitly or explicitly, whether coerced or voluntarily, to buy services exclusively from a health care system for a period of time).
- Allows the AG to bring a civil action on behalf of the state or of any of its political subdivisions or public agencies or in the name of the people of the State of California for any violation of the bill’s provisions.
- Allows the AG to issue regulations and to hold a public meeting regarding a transaction.
- Allows any party to the transaction to appeal the AG’s final determination by filing a writ of mandate in superior court.
- Specifies a four-year statute of limitation and specifies fines and penalties, including fines that double the gross gain to the health care system or gross loss to any other party.
- Requires a court to award the state as monetary relief three times the total damage sustained the interest on the total damages, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
- Allows a court to grant injunctions to prevent a defendant from committing future violations as well as grant injunctions as may be reasonably necessary to restore and preserve fair competition.
- Specifies fees or fines obtained are deposited in the Attorney General antitrust account within the General Fund.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs to the Department of Justice of $1.2 million annually through calendar year 2026 for legal and analytical staff to review and approve or deny transactions (GF/Legal Services Revolving Fund). There could be additional workload if the AG decides to pursue civil action under new authority granted in the bill, but the AG could allocate existing resources if this was deemed a priority.
There is disagreement between the Office of the AG and the provider community as to the number and types of transactions that are to be captured by this bill. The provider community believes the bill is far broader and would cover far more transactions than does the Office of the AG. If a greater number of transactions are sent to the AG for review, costs could be commensurately higher. However, the AG can also simply choose to prioritize transactions of interest, as any transaction filed may proceed if the AG does not respond to within a certain period.
- Potential cost pressure in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually through calendar year 2026 to contract for expertise necessary to assist the Health Policy Advisory Board in producing an annual report on health care market conditions and responding to inquiries from the AG about specific transactions.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill was introduced to address and prevent the public harm associated with health care transactions that increase consolidation and concentrate market power without providing commensurate public benefits like lower prices, higher quality or greater access. The author notes such transactions have been accelerating in recent years and that recent research continues to demonstrate the harm of continued consolidation and concentration of market power, including price inflation that does not improve quality of care.
- Background. In recent years, a trend of consolidation among health care providers has emerged. Hospitals have merged into ever-larger health systems, and health systems have also acquired outpatient settings such as physician offices, clinics and ambulatory surgery centers. Although efficiency and better integration and coordination of care within health systems can benefit patients, research also shows it can lead to significant price increases that appear to outweigh the benefits to patients and premium payers. For instance, one study found highly concentrated markets were associated with higher prices and premiums.
The AG already has authority to review sales or transfers of nonprofit health care facilities, including hospitals and nursing homes. The AG also enforces antitrust law. This bill builds on existing authority by expanding the AG’s oversight of transactions involving for-profit entities to ensure any potential anticompetitive effects from the transaction are outweighed by public benefit.
- Sutter Health Lawsuit and Settlement. The AG filed a lawsuit in March 2018 that follows an investigation into the practices of the state’s healthcare systems due to the wide disparities between Northern and Southern California healthcare costs. In December 2019, Sutter Health agreed to pay $575 million to settle claims of anti-competitive behavior brought by the AG, as well as unions and employers. The settlement will go to compensate employers, unions and the state and federal governments. Sutter Health will also be prohibited from engaging in several practices that the AG said the hospital system used to ensure its market power—practices also banned by this bill.
- Related Legislation. AB 2817 (Wood) of the 2019-20 Legislative Session creates the Office of Health Care Quality and Affordability (Office) to analyze the health care market for cost trends and drivers of spending, develop data-informed policies for lowering health care costs and create a strategy to control health care costs. AB 2817 was referred to Assembly Health Committee and not heard.
- Prior Legislation. SB 538 (Monning) of the 2017-18 Legislative Session would have prohibited specified hospital contracting practices. SB 538 was held at the request of the author in the Assembly Health Committee.
AB 595 (Wood), Chapter 292, Statutes of 2018, requires a health plan that intends to merge or consolidate with, or enter into an agreement resulting in its purchase, acquisition, or control by, any entity, as defined, including another health care service plan or a licensed health insurer, to give notice to, and secure prior approval from, the Director of the Department of Managed Health Care.
AB 3087 (Kalra) of the 2017-18 Legislative Session would have established the Health Care Cost, Quality and Equity Commission to, among other functions, control in-state health care costs and set the amounts accepted as payment by health plans, hospitals, physicians, physician groups and other healthcare providers. AB 3087 was held on the Suspense File of this committee.
SB 932 (Hernandez) of the 2015-16 Legislative Session would have banned seven specified provisions from contracts between health care providers and payers and would have required prior approval from DMHC for mergers and other transactions between health plans, risk-based and other organizations. SB 932 was held at the request of the author in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- Support. This bill is sponsored by AG Xavier Becerra to strengthen the AG’s authority to prohibit existing healthcare systems from engaging in abusive behavior that limits competition in the market.
California Labor Federation, Health Access and Pacific Business Group on Health, among others, support this bill and note that this bill gives the AG authority to ensure that consolidation in the health care industry benefits consumers and purchasers. The supporters point to empirical studies that demonstrate that dominant providers are using their market power to engage in unfair contracting practices and negotiate higher-than-competitive prices in the state. Supporters argue industry consolidation and anti-competitive practices have increased premiums for individuals, employers and workers, and that this bill will make health care markets work better for Californians.
- Oppose Unless Amended. The County of Santa Clara (CSC) seeks an amendment to make clear that counties will not be subject to this bill. CSC contends that the additional process in this bill would be burdensome and costly for counties and without any public benefit, given that county systems do not make a profit and are publicly subsidized.
VSP Vision Care (VSP) states this bill would trigger review and presumptive denial of any changes to leases, loans, grants, service agreements or contracts that optometrists, optometric professional corporations and Independent Practice Groups, and physician medical groups undertake. VSP seeks an amendment to clarify that “private equity group” does not include VSP’s acquisition program.
The California Optometric Association (COA), is opposed unless amended to exclude the AG’s review of small private practice sales to private equity groups. COA is concerned that this bill would trigger a review of very small transactions that could not possibly have an anticompetitive effect, derailing the sale by the providers or devaluing the practice because of the cost of review and the uncertainty of the outcome.
- Opposition. The California Hospital Association, California Medical Association, California Dental Association and the California Chamber of Commerce oppose this bill, in addition to a range of other provider, finance and business groups. Opponents state this bill undermines principles of fair due process within the legal system by creating presumptions that these transactions are anticompetitive, placing the burden of proof on health care providers and effectively creating a “guilty until proven innocent” system. The opponents note that a provider must demonstrate that the acquisition or affiliation will result in clinical integration or an increase in access and availability of services to an underserved population, but provides no clarity on how a provider may do so. They argue the ability to regulate anticompetitive behavior is already governed by the AG’s current review authority, as well as federal and state antitrust laws. The opponents contend that this proposal would place the burden on all health care providers to meet arbitrary standards of proof, with no right to a hearing or meaningful appeal process.
Analysis Prepared by: Lisa Murawski / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: August 4, 2020
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HEALTH
Jim Wood, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 977
Author:(Monning) – As Amended Ver:July 27, 2020
SENATE VOTE: 21-11
SUBJECT: Health care system consolidation: Attorney General approval and enforcement.
SUMMARY: Requires the Attorney General (AG), beginning July 1, 2021, to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board (Board), composed of specified appointed members, for the purpose of evaluating and analyzing health care markets in California and providing recommendations to the AG’s office. Requires a health care system, as defined, a private equity group, or hedge fund to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the (AG) prior to a change in control, as defined, or an acquisition between the entity and a health care facility or provider. Makes it unlawful for one or more health care systems, either independently or dependently, to use their market power to, among other things, cause anticompetitive effects, as described, and authorizes the AG to bring a civil action for a violation of this unlawful conduct. Specifically, this bill:
Board
- Requires the AG, beginning July 1, 2021, to establish the Board for the purpose of evaluating and analyzing health care markets in California and providing recommendations to the AG’s office, for purposes of this bill. Requires the Board to be comprised of the following members:
- The AG, or the AG’s designee;
- All of the following, who are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the AG:
- A university professor that specializes in health care systems, economics, and antitrust law;
- A representative from a health care system;
- A representative from a health care provider;
- A representative of health plans;
- A representative of employers as purchasers of health care services; and,
- A representative of organizations that represent union trustees of health care trusts.
- One member who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Governor;
- Two members who are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Senate Committee on Rules, one of whom to be a representative of a consumer group; and,
- Two members who are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Speaker of the Assembly, one of whom to be a representative of a consumer group.
- Requires the Board to annually produce or commission a report on the conditions in health care markets in California relating to acquisitions and changes in control, including, but not limited to, cost and quality analysis. Requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) to make the report publicly available on its internet website.
- Requires the Board to meet quarterly and comply with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act and the California Public Records Act.
Notice and Consent Requirements
- Requires a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund, except as provided in 10) below, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to a change in control or acquisition between the health care system and a health care facility or provider, or between the private equity group or hedge fund and a health care facility or provider. Requires the notice to contain information sufficient to evaluate the nature of the acquisition or change in control and information sufficient for the AG to determine that the criteria set forth in 17) below have been met or that a waiver may be granted pursuant to 21) below.
- Requires the AG, within 60 days of receipt of the written notice required by 4) above to do one of the following:
- Notify the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund whether the AG has cleared the transaction as meeting the requirements of 17) below;
- Grant the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund a waiver pursuant to 21) below; or,
- Issue a request for additional information from the parties to the acquisition or change in control.
- Allows the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund, notwithstanding the extension in 8) below, to proceed with the transaction, if after 60 days, a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund does not receive notice pursuant to 5) above.
- Requires the AG to grant or deny consent pursuant to 5) a) above, within 45 days of certification by the AG that the parties to the acquisition or change in control have substantially complied with the request for additional information pursuant to 5) c) above.
- Allows the AG to extend any time period set forth in 5) or 7) above by 14 days if the AG decides to hold a public meeting under 24) below.
- Allows the parties and the AG to consent to extend the time period in 7) by an additional 45 days if the acquisition or change in control is substantially changed or modified by the parties prior to the expiration of the period in 7) above or the acquisition involves health care facilities, or providers, servicing multiple communities.
Expedited Review
- Requires a health care system that is acquiring or making a change in control with a provider, group of providers, or health care facility for a transactional value of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or less or an academic medical center that is acquiring or making a change in control with a provider, group of providers, or health care facility for any transactional value to provide written notice to the AG. Requires the AG to do one of the following within 30 days for those notices:
- Notify the health care system that the AG does not object to the transaction;
- Notify the health care system that the AG has found the transaction to raise substantial competitive concerns that may impact competition in the market such that the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund is required to comply with 4) above.
- If, after 30 days, a health care system does not receive notice pursuant to 10) above, the health care system may proceed as if it received the notice of no objection pursuant to 10) a) above.
- Requires the standard of review for the AG to make determinations pursuant to 10) above to be whether the transaction presents substantial competitive concerns based on an analysis of market shares of the provider, group of providers, or health care facility in any relevant market, as set out in 32) below.
- Allows the Board, upon request by the AG, to review a written notification submitted by a health care system pursuant to 4) above and provide the AG with written information with regard to whether to grant or deny consent to the change in control or acquisition. Allows the AG to consider Board recommendation.
- Prohibits a Board member from receiving compensation for service on the Board, but allows the Board member to receive a per diem and reimbursement for travel and other necessary expenses, as provided in existing law, while engaged in the performance of official duties of the Board.
- Prohibits a Board member from making, participate in making, or in any way attempt to use their official position to influence the making of a decision that the member knows or has reason to know will have a reasonably foreseeable material financial effect, distinguishable from its effect on the public generally, on the member or a member of their immediate family, and requires a Board member to file a statement of economic interest pursuant to existing law.
- Allows the AG to adopt regulations to implement this bill, including, but not limited to, regulations that extend the time periods in 4) to 11) above, or regulations to provide a process for requesting a waiver pursuant to 20) below.
Standard of Review/Basis for Denials
- Requires, except as provided in 17) below, the AG to deny consent to a change in control or an acquisition between a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund and a health care facility, provider, or both, unless the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund demonstrates that the change in control or acquisition will result in a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increasing the availability and access of services to an underserved population, or both.
- Allows the AG to deny consent to a change in control or acquisition between a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund and a health care facility, provider, or both, if there is a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects that outweigh the benefits of a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increase in services to an underserved population, or both.
- Provides that a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects in providing hospital or health care services include, but not be limited to, a substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or health care services.
- Requires the AG, in making a determination to grant or deny consent pursuant to this bill, to apply the public interest standard. Defines the term “public interest” as being in the interests of the public in protecting competitive and accessible health care markets for prices, quality, choice, accessibility, and availability of all health care services for local communities, regions, or the state as a whole. Prohibits acquisitions or changes in control from being presumed to be efficient for the purpose of assessing compliance with the public interest standard.
Waiver
- Allows a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund located in a rural area to request, in writing, a waiver of the prohibition in 16) above.
- Authorizes the AG to grant a waiver if either of the following conditions exist:
- The change in control or acquisition would directly benefit consumers of health care services in rural areas by improving the access or availability of those services; or,
- The change in control or acquisition is needed to improve the health, safety, and well-being of consumers of health care services in rural areas.
- Authorizes the AG to adopt regulations regarding the process of requesting a waiver and the conditions the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund must meet to obtain that waiver.
Written determination and Public Meeting
- Requires the AG to make the determination required by 16) and 17) above in writing that provides the basis for the determination.
- Authorizes the AG, prior to issuing a written determination pursuant to 23) above, to hold a public meeting, which may be held in any of the counties in which the acquisition or change in control will take place, and to hear comments from interested parties. Requires the AG, prior to holding a public meeting, to provide notice of the time and place of any meetings by electronic publication, or publication in newspapers of general circulation, to consumers that may be affected by the acquisition or change in control. Allows the AG, if a substantive change or modification to the acquisition or change in control is submitted to the AG after a public meeting, to conduct an additional public meeting to hear from interested parties with respect to the change or modification. Allows the AG, to the extent that a public meeting has already occurred under existing non-profit corporation law, to waive a subsequent meeting requirement under this bill.
- Allows any of the parties to the acquisition or change in control to appeal the AG’s final determination by a writ of mandate to the superior court pursuant to existing law.
- Requires the AG’s determination in 23) above to be based on an administrative record that is be provided to the court and to the parties to the acquisition or change of control in the event that the parties notify the AG of their intent to appeal the AG’s final determination pursuant to 25) above. Requires the administrative record to consist of any evidence submitted by the parties to the acquisition or change of control, any comments offered by interested parties at a public meeting held pursuant to 24) above, any official reports by any experts hired by the AG to review the transaction, any evidence obtained by the AG from the parties to the acquisition or change of control or third parties, and any other evidence or information relied on by the AG in making the determination required by 23) above, including information required to be submitted as part of the notice required by 4) above. Allows the AG, to the extent that any evidence or other information is confidential, to take reasonable measures to ensure the confidentiality of that evidence or other information in the administrative record.
- Allows the AG to adopt regulations for the purpose of implementing these written determination provisions.
- Specifies that this bill does not operate to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any other law.
- Specifies that if a health facility is subject to existing law as it relates to non-profit public benefit hospitals, the review under those sections be concurrent with the review under this bill, to the extent practicable.
Market power provisions
- Specifies that it is unlawful for one or more health care systems, either independently or dependently, to use their market power as set forth in this bill.
- Provides that the conduct of a health care system to be unlawful pursuant to 30) above under any of the following conditions:
- The health care system has substantial market power in any market for hospitals or nonhospital health care services and the health care system’s conduct has a substantial tendency to cause anticompetitive effects. A substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects in providing hospital or nonhospital health care services includes a substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, increasing the total cost of care, or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services; or,
- The health care system to be presumed to be acting unlawfully if it has substantial market power in any market for any service in trade or commerce and the health care system’s conduct involves tying or exclusive dealing.
- Describes a market for any service in trade or commerce to be the state itself, northern California as comprised of the 48 northernmost counties, southern California as comprised of all other counties in the state, a county, a metropolitan statistical area as defined under the United States Census, a micropolitan statistical area as defined under the United States Census, a region in which insurance is offered under Covered California pursuant to existing law, or any other market supported by the evidence.
- Defines “tying” as the seller coercively conditioning the sale of one or more services on the sale of a second distinct service or services if the arrangement affects a more than trivial amount of sales of the second distinct service or services. Allows the conditions to be explicit, implicit, or as an economic imperative based on the pricing of those services. Defines “exclusive dealing” to be an agreement in which a health plan or employer who buys health care services agrees implicitly or explicitly, whether coerced or voluntarily, to buy services exclusively from a health care system for a period of time. Specifies that exclusive dealing is presumed to be anticompetitive whether or not pricing practices are a component of that conduct.
- Permits substantial market power to be shown in one of the following two ways:
- The conduct had an actual substantial anticompetitive effect, including, but not limited to, prices, quality, access, or availability of services, choice, or total cost of care. Defines “total cost of care” to mean the measurement of direct and indirect costs, including, but not limited to, price and utilization, associated with an episode of care for a period of health care coverage; or,
- The health care system has a sufficiently substantial market share in one or more markets for any service in trade or commerce after accounting for barriers to entry to exercise substantial market power in those markets. Specifies that the health care system is presumed to have substantial market power if, accounting for barriers to entry, it has greater than a 60% market share. Makes the presumption nonrebuttable if it has greater than a 75% market share.
- Provides that a health care system is not acting unlawfully if its conduct directly and significantly benefits consumers of any services in that same market in which the conduct is taking place, or the health care system, and the conduct that it is committing, are located entirely within a rural area as defined by 43) m) below, and if it otherwise meets the criteria of this bill and all of the following conditions exist:
- Any benefits are not achievable by less restrictive alternatives;
- Any benefits substantially outweigh any actual or likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct; and,
- No benefit is based on the need to meet a public federal, state, or local requirement or mandate of any kind.
- Authorizes the AG to bring a civil action on behalf of the state or of any of its political subdivisions or public agencies or in the name of the people of the State of California, as “parens patriae” on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, in the superior court of any county that has jurisdiction over a defendant for any violation of this bill.
- Requires a civil action to enforce a cause of action for a violation of this bill to be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued.
- Requires civil fines to be imposed for a violation of this bill and those fines may be calculated either as $1 million or as twice the gross gain to the health care system or gross loss to any other party multiplied by two, whichever is greater.
- Requires the court to award the state as monetary relief three times the total damage sustained as described in 30) above, the interest on the total damages, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
- Authorizes the court, in any civil action brought by the AG, in addition to granting those prohibitory injunctions and other restraints as it may deem expedient to deter the defendant from, and insure against, committing a future violation of this section, to grant those mandatory injunctions as may be reasonably necessary to restore and preserve fair competition in the trade or commerce affected by the violation.
- Authorizes any fees or fines obtained to be deposited in the AG antitrust account within the General Fund.
- Allows the AG to adopt regulations further defining these provisions. Specifies that this bill does not operate to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any other law. Specifies that this bill does not impose liability for the intracorporate actions of a health care system.
Definitions
- Defines the following terms:
- “Academic medical center” means either of the following:
- A health system that is operating with a medical school that is fully accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education as of June 9, 2017, and that is either of the following:
- A public university system, as defined in the Education Code; or,
- Governed by a four-year university accredited by the Western Association of State and Colleges Senior College and University Commission.
- A comprehensive cancer center and hospital that is so designated by the National Cancer Institute and that is located in the City of Duarte.
- A health system that is operating with a medical school that is fully accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education as of June 9, 2017, and that is either of the following:
- “Acquisition” means the direct or indirect purchase in any manner, including, but not limited to, lease, transfer, exchange, option, receipt of a conveyance, creation of a joint venture, or any other manner of purchase, by a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund of all, or any part of, the assets of a health care facility or provider. Defines a transfer to include, but is not limited to, any arrangement, written or oral, that alters voting control of, responsibility for, or control of the governing body of the health care provider.
- “Change in control” means arrangement in which a health care system establishes a change in governance or sharing of control over health care services provided by that health care facility or provider, or in which a health care system otherwise acquires direct or indirect control over the operations of a health care facility or provider in whole or in substantial part consistent with existing non-profit corporation law. Defines “arrangement” to include any agreement, association, partnership, joint venture, or other arrangement that results in a change of governance or control. Specifies that a change of control does not exist where a health care system only extends an offer of employment to, or hires, a provider.
- “Clinical integration” means a showing by the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund affiliating with or acquiring the health care facility that there will likely be a reduction in costs to the benefit of consumer care and outcomes or an increase in the quality of care as a result of the acquisition or change in control. An increase or improvement in quality of care shall include a showing of a reduction in morbidity or mortality, better population health care management, improvement in nationally recognized quality measures, including, but not limited to, measures used or endorsed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance, the National Quality Forum, the Physician Consortium for Performance Improvement, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, others recognized or used by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or any other commonly accepted metric or standard for improving consumer health and patient outcomes.
- “Health care facility” means a facility, nonprofit or for-profit corporation, institution, clinic, place, or building where health-related physician, surgery, or laboratory services are provided, including, but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, ambulatory surgery center, treatment center, or laboratory or physician office located outside of a hospital.
- “Health care system” means an entity or system of entities that includes or owns two or more hospitals within multiple counties, or three or more hospitals within one county.
- “Hedge fund” means a pool of funds by investors, including a pool of funds managed or controlled by private limited partnerships, if those investors or the management of that pool or private limited partnership employ investment strategies of any kind to earn a return on that pool of funds.
- “Hospital” means a general acute care hospital, acute psychiatric hospital, or special hospital, as those terms are defined in existing law.
- “Private equity group” means an investor or group of investors who engages in the raising or returning of capital and who invests, develops, or disposes of specified assets.
- “Provider” means an individual or group of individuals that provides health-related physician, surgery, or laboratory services to consumers, including, but not limited to, licensees, as defined.
- “Rural area” means a medical service study area with a population density of fewer than 250 persons per square mile and no population center in excess of 50,000 within the area, as determined by the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development.
- “Underserved population” means a population with an income threshold below 138% of the United States Department of Health and Human Services federal poverty guidelines, a population served by the Medi-Cal program, an uninsured population, a rural area, or a combination thereof.
- “Academic medical center” means either of the following:
- Prohibits these definitions from applying to acquisitions or changes entered into prior to January 1, 2021, including subsequent renewals, as long as those acquisitions or changes in controls do not involve a material change in the corporate relationship between a health care system and a health care facility or provider, or a material change in the corporate relationship between the private equity group or hedge fund and a health care facility or provider, on or after January 1, 2021.
EXISTING FEDERAL LAW:
- Establishes, under the Sherman Antitrust Act, which governs prohibitions against agreements and conduct that restrict trade; and, monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize. Establishes, under the federal Clayton Act, prohibitions of mergers and acquisitions where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
- Establishes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce the antitrust laws in health care markets to prevent anticompetitive conduct that would deprive consumers of the benefits of competition. Establishes the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act which requires the FTC and the DOJ to review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the United States and are over a certain size, and allows either agency to take legal action to block deals that it believes would substantially lessen competition.
- Exempts, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the business of insurance from antitrust enforcement to the extent that the particular insurance activities are regulated by state law.
EXISTING STATE LAW:
- Establishes the state DOJ and AG to bring civil and criminal legal actions against individuals and businesses acting in restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act, which is the state’s antitrust law prohibiting anti-competitive activity, mirroring the federal Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act.
- Requires any non-profit corporation that operates or controls a health facility, regardless of whether it is currently operating or providing health care services or has a suspended license, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to entering into any agreement or transaction to do either of the following:
- Sell, transfer, lease, exchange, option, convey, or otherwise dispose of, its assets to a for-profit corporation or entity, or another non-profit corporation; or,
- Transfer control, responsibility, or governance of a material amount of the assets or operations of the non-profit corporation to any for-profit corporation or entity, or another non-profit corporation.
- Requires the AG, within 90 days of the receipt of a written notice of a proposed transaction involving a non-profit health facility, to notify the non-profit corporation in writing of the decision to consent to, give conditional consent to, or not consent to the agreement or transaction. Permits the AG to extend the 90-day deadline for one additional 45-day period if any of the following conditions are satisfied: the extension is necessary to obtain specified information; the proposed transaction is substantially modified after the first public meeting conducted by the AG; or, the proposed transaction involves a multi-facility health system serving multiple communities.
- Requires the AG, prior to issuing any written decision described in 3) above, to conduct one or more public meetings, one of which must be in the county in which the facility is located. Requires the AG to provide written notice of the time and place of the meeting in one or more newspapers and to the board of supervisors of the county in which the facility is located. Requires the notice to be in English and in the primary languages spoken at the facility and the threshold languages for Medi-Cal beneficiaries in the county in which the facility is located.
- Grants the AG the discretion to consent to, give conditional consent to, or not consent to any agreement or transaction involving a nonprofit health facility based on the consideration of any factors that the AG deems relevant, including, but not limited to whether or not the terms and conditions of the agreement or transaction are fair and reasonable to the nonprofit corporation, the agreement or transaction is at fair market value, or the agreement or transaction may create a significant effect on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community.
- Prohibits the AG from consenting to any agreement in which the seller restricts the type or level of medical services that may be provided at the health facility.
- Licenses general acute care hospitals under the Department of Public Health. Defines general acute care hospitals as hospitals that provide 24-hour inpatient care, including the following basic services: medical; nursing; surgical; anesthesia; laboratory; radiology; pharmacy; and, dietary services.
- Authorizes a health care to district purchase, receive, have, take, hold, lease, use and enjoy property of every kind and description within and without the limits of the district, and to control, dispose of, convey, and encumber the same and create a leasehold interest in the same for the benefit of the district.
- Authorizes a health care district to transfer, at fair market value, any part of its assets to one or more corporations to operate and maintain the assets. Requires the Board of Directors, before a transfer of 50% or more of the district’s assets, to submit to the voters of the district a measure proposing the transfer.
- Establishes the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) to regulate health plans.
- Requires prior approval by the DMHC Director for a health plan that intends to merge or consolidate with, or enters into an agreement resulting in its purchase, acquisition or control by, any entity and allows the DMHC Director to disapprove a transaction if the transaction would substantially lessen competition.
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the AG will assume 20-25 qualifying transactions annually, $499,000 ($290,000 General Fund (GF), $209,0000 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in fiscal year (FY) 2020-21; $866,000 ($503,500 GF, $362,500 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2021-22, and ongoing, for 2.0 Deputy AG, 1.0 Legal Secretary, and 1.0 Associate Governmental Program Analyst. The Legal Services Revolving Fund would be reimbursable through direct billings to client agencies.
COMMENTS:
- PURPOSE OF THIS BILL. According to the author, this bill would ensure proper oversight of large healthcare systems and strengthen patient access to affordable, quality healthcare. The COVID-19 pandemic has created enormous financial strain on hospitals and physician practices statewide, making these providers more susceptible to changes in control and acquisition attempts by large healthcare systems, private equity groups, and hedge funds. This type of predatory practice, if left unchecked, will result in large healthcare systems continuing to grow and utilize abusive market practices to drive up prices and reduce access for patients. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, anticompetitive behavior in the healthcare market was a growing concern, particularly as a result of large, dominant healthcare systems that own multiple hospitals and other providers such as physician practices or outpatient surgical centers. The author states that in 2018, the Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare of U.C. Berkeley found the percentage of physicians in practices owned by hospitals increased from about 25% in 2010 to more than 40% in 2016, resulting in an estimated 12% increase in premiums from 2014 to 2016. In December 2019, the AG and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Employers Benefit Trust entered into a preliminary settlement agreement over litigation against Sutter Health. The lawsuits alleged Sutter Health abused its market power to raise prices throughout its entire system. The agreement is a ground-breaking $575 million settlement that includes broad injunctive relief to rebalance and restore competition in the market. The author concludes that while this landmark settlement agreement addressed Sutter Health’s specific market abuse, the Legislature must act now to ensure proper oversight of large healthcare systems across California.
- BACKGROUND.
- Health Care Spending. The most recent data available for California indicate that health care spending in the state totaled $292 billion in 2014. According to the January 2020 California Health Care Foundation (CHCF) report entitled, “Getting to Affordability: Spending Trends and Waste in California’s Health Care System (Getting to Affordability),” per capita spending has grown steadily over time for all sources of coverage, employer-sponsored insurance, Medi-Cal, Medicare and private health insurance. Private health insurance coverage faced the highest growth rates at 4% per year. The report points out that most of the spending comes from inpatient hospital stays and office-based medical provider services ($60 billion each), followed by prescription drugs ($45.6 billion).
- Impact of Mergers on Consumers. In a Commonwealth Fund-supported study in Health Affairs, researchers explored the effect of market consolidation across California between 2010 and 2016 on outpatient visit prices and premiums for individual coverage on the Covered California marketplace. Integration and consolidation among health care providers and health plans has the potential to improve the coordination and quality of patient care. However, when markets become highly concentrated, served by a single or a few large health care organizations, competition is curtailed and health care prices and insurance premiums tend to rise. The significant price increases in California markets with high hospital-physician employment and hospital consolidation point to the need for careful scrutiny of health care mergers and acquisitions. Additional research is needed to determine if the price increases are tied to improvements in patient care. For instance, if care is more expensive because it is more comprehensive, then overall utilization and spending should decrease. At the same time, regulatory laws and actions may be needed to prevent some health care organizations from attaining unfair market advantages that shut out rivals and raise prices.
A 2018 study published in the Journal of Health Economics titled, “The effect of hospital acquisitions of physician practices on prices and spending,” noted that during the past decade, U.S. hospitals have acquired a large number of physician practices. For example, from 2007 to 2013, hospitals acquired nearly 10% of the physician practices in the study. The study found that the prices for the services provided by acquired physicians increased by an average of 14.1% post-acquisition. Nearly half of this increase is attributable to the exploitation of payment rules. Price increases are larger when the acquiring hospital has a larger share of its inpatient market. The study found that integration of primary care physicians increases enrollee spending by 4.9%. - Hospital consolidation and price increases. A 2016 study published in the Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision and Financing examined hospital prices in California over time with a focus on hospitals in the largest multi-hospital systems. The data showed that hospital prices in California grew substantially (+76% per hospital admission) across all hospitals and all services between 2004 and 2013, and that prices at hospitals that are members of the largest, multi-hospital systems grew substantially more (113%) than prices paid to all other California hospitals (70%). The study noted that the substantial price differential was not driven by other factors such as case mix, payor mix, and changes in local wage costs and local market competition or other hospital characteristics. A University of California (UC) Berkeley Report from March 2018 detailed the rapid consolidation of the hospital, physician, and insurance markets in California from 2010 to 2016, and found evidence that highly concentrated markets are associated with higher prices for a number of hospital and physician services and Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act premiums.
- Cost Containment. The growth in health care spending and affordability challenges are not unique to California; many states are exploring multiples ways to control spending, and one method is through the creation of cost containment commissions. According to a January 2020 CHCF report entitled “Commissioning Change: How Four States Use Advisory Boards to Contain Health Spending,” cost-containment commissions establish targets to make health care more affordable to consumers and improve the delivery of care. For example, the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission, established in 1972, is the oldest commission of its kind in the U.S. Maryland’s commission was initially focused on setting payment rates for hospital services but its scope has been expanded to include total hospital budgets and targets for total statewide spending per capita. In 2012, the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission was established to monitor health care spending growth in Massachusetts and provides data-driven policy recommendations regarding health care delivery and payment system reform. Although the Oregon Health Authority is working on establishing a statewide growth benchmark for health care costs, since 2009, it has been focused on controlling costs for the state’s Medicaid program and premium costs for state employee health plans, and in 2012 received a federal waiver to cap its Medicaid cost growth to 3.4% per year, which was eventually applied to state employee health plans.
- Antitrust Review of Mergers. Among the key provisions in U.S. antitrust law is one designed to prevent anticompetitive mergers or acquisitions. Three major federal anti-trust laws, the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Act, are used by both state and federal government to review the effects on competition from health care entity conduct and consolidations. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the FTC and the DOJ review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the United States and are over a certain size, and either agency can take legal action to block deals that it believes would “substantially lessen competition.” California has its own anti-trust law, the Cartwright Act.
- Existing AG oversight of nonprofit transactions. As noted in existing law, above, California law requires the AG's review and consent for any sale or transfer of a health care facility owned or operated by a nonprofit corporation whose assets are held in public trust. This requirement covers health care facilities that are licensed to provide 24-hour care, such as hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. The review process includes public meetings and, when necessary, preparation of expert reports. The AG's decision often requires the continuation of existing levels of charity care, continued operation of emergency rooms and other essential services, and other actions necessary to avoid adverse effects on healthcare in the local community. Specifically, the law provides the AG with the discretion to consent to, give conditional extent to, or not consent to any agreement or transaction involving a nonprofit health facility based on the consideration of any factors that the AG deems relevant, including but not limited to:
- Whether the agreement or transaction is at fair market value;
- Whether the proposed use of the proceeds from the transaction is consistent with the charitable trust on which the assets are held by the health facility or by the affiliated nonprofit health system;
- Whether the transaction would create significant effects on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community; or,
- Whether the transaction is in the public interest.
The law also prohibits the AG from consenting to a health facility transaction in which the seller restricts the type or level of medical services that may be provided at the health facility that is the subject of the transaction. The AG is authorized to contract with experts when deciding whether to give consent to a transaction, or to monitor ongoing compliance with the terms and conditions of any transaction, and requires the nonprofit corporation to reimburse the AG for all reasonable and necessary costs to conduct the review or monitoring ongoing compliance.
This bill would expand that authority by extending the AG’s authority to review transactions to include non-profit, for-profit and governmental entities such as district hospitals when the transaction involves a health care system (three or more hospitals), private equity group, or hedge fund. The AG would review any change of control, or acquisition between the acquiring entity and a health care facility or provider when the transaction value is over $500,000. This bill requires the AG to deny consent unless the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund demonstrates that the change of control or acquisition will result in a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increasing the availability and access of services to an underserved population, or both.
- Sutter Health Lawsuit and Settlement. The AG filed a lawsuit in March 2018 that follows an investigation into the practices of the state’s healthcare systems due to the wide disparities between Northern and Southern California healthcare costs. Specifically, this lawsuit is meant to address allegations of anti-competitive behavior by Sutter Health, a large hospital system in Northern California. A UC Berkeley report found evidence that the consolidated market in Northern California has led to higher prices for consumers, finding that the average hospital inpatient procedure cost was $131,586 in Southern California and $223,278 in Northern California.
In December 2019, Sutter Health agreed to pay $575 million to settle claims of anti-competitive behavior brought by the AG, as well as unions and employers. The settlement will go to compensate employers, unions and the state and federal governments. Sutter Health will also be prohibited from engaging in several practices that the AG said the hospital system used to ensure its market power. Sutter will be barred from “all or nothing” agreements, which the AG said required insurers to include all of Sutter’s medical facilities if they wanted to include some of the system’s hospitals in their provider networks. The settlement also limits what Sutter Health can charge patients for out-of-network services, which will prevent people from facing surprise medical bills.
- Sutter Health Lawsuit and Settlement. The AG filed a lawsuit in March 2018 that follows an investigation into the practices of the state’s healthcare systems due to the wide disparities between Northern and Southern California healthcare costs. Specifically, this lawsuit is meant to address allegations of anti-competitive behavior by Sutter Health, a large hospital system in Northern California. A UC Berkeley report found evidence that the consolidated market in Northern California has led to higher prices for consumers, finding that the average hospital inpatient procedure cost was $131,586 in Southern California and $223,278 in Northern California.
- SUPPORT. This bill is sponsored by AG Xavier Becerra, who notes that it would require large healthcare systems, as well as, private equity groups and hedge funds to obtain approval from the AG prior to any affiliation or acquisition with any other healthcare facility or provider. The Attorney General’s review would focus on: a) whether the transaction would increase care coordination resulting in improved quality of care or lowers costs, or would increase access to care overall; and, b) whether the transaction is likely to result in anticompetitive effects in the market that outweigh its benefits. This bill also permits certain exemptions for hospitals in rural areas. In addition to reviewing the formation of new healthcare systems, SB 977 would strengthen the AG’s authority to prohibit existing healthcare systems from engaging in abusive behavior that negatively impacts competition in the market. For example, tying (i.e., conditioning the sale of one service on the sale of another) and exclusive dealing would be presumptively illegal under this bill. Healthcare systems could demonstrate compliance with if they can show their conduct directly and significantly benefits patients, or if their conduct occurs entirely within a rural area, and they meet specified criteria. Healthcare systems engaging in anticompetitive behavior would be subject to civil actions and penalties for failure to comply. Finally, this bill would also establish a Board to advise the AG on proposed consolidation transactions. The Board, made up of healthcare industry stakeholders, would evaluate and analyze California healthcare markets. The Board would also produce an annual report on acquisitions and affiliations and analyze their impacts on cost and quality of care. AG Becerra states that he is proud to sponsor this bill, and it will substantially strengthen the state’s oversight over the formation and practices of large healthcare systems, helping to ensure access to affordable healthcare during a time when Californians need it the most.
California Labor Federation, Health Access, and Pacific Business Group on Health support this bill and note that this bill gives the AG authority to ensure that consolidation in the health care industry benefits consumers and purchasers. The supporters state that the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed another consequence of unchecked consolidation. The economic toll resulting from the pandemic will likely fuel consolidation trends as physician practices and independent hospitals face massive losses or bankruptcy and become targets for acquisition by large health systems. The supporters point to empirical studies that conclusively demonstrate that dominant providers are using their market power to engage in unfair contracting practices and negotiate higher-than competitive prices in the state. The supporters also point to academic research that has shown that higher prices do not translate into higher quality health care and recent studies that have shown that hospitals are highly consolidated in Northern California, and hospital prices are 20% to 30% higher than in Southern California where there is more market competition. The supporters conclude that the bottom line is that high prices for health care services, driven by industry consolidation and anti-competitive practices, have increased premiums for individuals, employers, and workers, and the state needs legislation that will make health care markets work the way they are supposed to, resulting in lower prices and more affordable health care for Californians. - OPPOSE UNLESS AMENDED. The County of Santa Clara (CSC) writes that this bill is currently ambiguous as to whether the definition of a health care system applies to county public hospital systems and seeks an amendment to make clear that counties will not be subject to this bill. CSC contends that the additional process in this bill would be burdensome and costly for counties and without any public benefit, given that county systems do not make a profit and are publicly subsidized. VSP Vision Care (VSP) states that this bill would trigger review and presumptive denial of any changes to leases, loans, grants, service agreements, or contracts that optometrists, optometric professional corporations and Independent Practice Groups, and physician medical groups undertake. VSP is seeking an amendment to clarify that “private equity group” does not include VSP’s acquisition program. The California Optometric Association (COA), is opposed unless amended, to exclude the AG’s review of small private practice sales to private equity groups. COA is concerned that this bill would trigger a review of very small transactions that could not possibly have an anticompetitive effect. The definition of “private equity groups” is so broad that it would include any transaction involving an individual or group providing funds for an acquisition and the review of these sales by the AG could take many months, which could derail the sale by the providers or devalue the practice because of the cost of review and the uncertainty of the outcome.
- OPPOSITION. The California Hospital Association, California Medical Association, California Dental Association, and the California Chamber of Commerce are among the opposition to this bill. Opponents state that this bill undermines bedrock principles of fair due process within the legal system by creating presumptions that these transactions are anticompetitive, placing the burden of proof on health care providers and effectively creating a “guilty until proven innocent” system. The opponents note that a provider must demonstrate that the acquisition or affiliation will result in clinical integration or an increase in access and availability of services to an underserved population, but provides no clarity on how a provider may do so. The ability to regulate anticompetitive behavior is already governed by the AG’s current review authority, as well as federal and state antitrust laws. The opponents contend that this proposal would place the burden on all health care providers to meet arbitrary standards of proof, with no right to a hearing or meaningful appeal process.
The opponents state that passing this legislation during the ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency and growing health care financial crisis will only further restrict the flexibility and resources health care providers desperately need simply to keep their doors open and provide vital care to patients.
This approach will force smaller providers out of business, especially at a time when California must focus on preserving the current condition of the health care delivery system in order to meet pent-up post-COVID-19 demand, while still maintaining readiness through the current state of emergency with relentless COVID-19 cases and ahead of the 2020 school year and flu season. The opponents state that now, more than ever, patients need a sense of predictability and reliability when it comes to their health care, and health care providers need to make difficult and prudent decisions to carry out their mission and deliver quality care. Opponents conclude that this bill will stifle this lifesaving work.
- RELATED LEGISLATION. AB 2817 (Wood) of 2020 would have created the Office of Health Care Quality and Affordability (Office) to improve the affordability of private health care coverage. AB 2817 would have required the Office to, among other things, analyze the health care market for cost trends and drivers of spending, develop data-informed policies for lowering health care costs, and create a strategy to control health care costs. AB 2817 would have required the Office to be governed by a board with specified membership, and would have required the board to hire an executive director to organize, administer, and manage the operations of the Office. AB 2817 would have required health care entities to report specified data to the board, which the board would be required to keep confidential. AB 2817, based on that data, would have required the board to annually establish statewide health care cost growth targets beginning in the 2022 calendar year and sector-based health care cost growth targets beginning in the 2023 calendar year. AB 2817 would have allowed the board to refer its findings, including the totality of documents gathered and data analysis performed, to the AG for further review of unfair methods of competition or anticompetitive behavior. AB 2817 was not set for hearing in the Assembly Health Committee.
- PREVIOUS LEGISLATION.
- SB 538 (Monning) of 2018 would have established the Health Care Market Fairness Act of 2018, and would have prohibited contracts between hospitals, as defined, and contracting agents, health care service plans, or health insurers from containing certain provisions, including, but not limited to, setting payment rates or other terms for nonparticipating affiliates of the hospital, and requiring the contracting agent, plan, or insurer to keep the contract’s payment rates confidential from any payor, as defined, that is or may become financially responsible for the payment. SB 538 was held at the request of the author in the Assembly Health Committee.
- AB 595 (Wood), Chapter 292, Statutes of 2018, requires a health plan that intends to merge or consolidate with, or enter into an agreement resulting in its purchase, acquisition, or control by, any entity, as defined, including another health care service plan or a licensed health insurer, to give notice to, and secure prior approval from, the DMHC Director.
- AB 3087 (Kalra) of 2018 would have established the Health Care Cost, Quality, and Equity Commission, to among other functions, control in-state health care costs and set the amounts accepted as payment by health plans, hospitals, physicians, physician groups, and other healthcare providers. AB 3087 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 932 (Hernandez) of 2016 would have banned seven specified provisions from contracts between health care providers and payors and would have required prior approval from DMHC for mergers and other transactions between health plans, risk-based and other organizations. SB 932 was held at the request of the author in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS: To address various concerns raised in this bill, the Committee proposes the following amendments to:
- Add a sunset date to the provisions of this bill relating to the AG’s prior approval of changes in control or acquisitions;
- Change from “shall” to “may” the AG’s authority to deny consent to a change of control or an acquisition in Section 1190.25.
- Raise the expedited review threshold from $500,000 to $1,000,000 and add expedited review for county facilities in Section 1190.10(g).
- Expand criteria for approving a “change of control” to include maintaining access to care in Section 1190.25.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Attorney General Xavier Becerra (sponsor)
Business & Professional Women of Nevada County
California Labor Federation
California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO
California State Council of Service Employees International Union
Center for Public Interest Law
Citizens for Choice
Health Access California
Independent Physical Therapists of California
NARAL Pro-Choice California
Pacific Business Group on Health
United Nurses Associations of California/Union of Health Care Professionals
Opposition
Adventist Health
Alliance of Catholic Health Care, INC.
America's Physician Groups
American Association of Clinical Urologists
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists District Ix
American Investment Council
Association of California Healthcare Districts
Aurora Santa Rosa Hospital
Calchamber
California Ambulatory Surgery Association
California Association of Public Hospitals & Health Systems
California Chamber of Commerce
California Children's Hospital Association
California Dental Association
California Hospital Association
California Independent Physician Practice Association
California Medical Association
California Opioid Maintenance Providers (COMP)
California Orthopaedic Association
California Podiatric Medical AssociationCottage Health
Dignity Health
District Hospital Leadership Forum
Kaiser Permanente
Loma Linda University Health
Managed Funds Association
MemorialCare Health System
Northern California Behavioral Health System
Orange County Business Council
Pacific Grove Hospital
Private Essential Access Community Hospitals
Providence St. Joseph Health
San Bernardino County
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce
San Gabriel Valley Economic Partnership
San Jose Behavioral Health
Scripps Health
Sharp Healthcare
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Stanford Health Care
Stanford Health Care Valleycare
Sutter Health
Tenet Healthcare Corporation
United Hospital Association
University of California
University of Southern California
Vista Del Mar
Analysis Prepared by: Kristene Mapile and Lara Flynn / HEALTH / (916) 319-2097
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 977 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 977
Author: Monning (D)
Amended: 6/19/20
Vote: 21
SENATE HEALTH COMMITTEE: 7-2, 5/13/20
AYES: Pan, Lena Gonzalez, Hurtado, Leyva, Mitchell, Monning, Rubio
NOES: Nielsen, Grove
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 6/18/20
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Hill, Leyva, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
SUBJECT: Health care system consolidation: Attorney General approval and enforcement
SOURCE: Attorney General Xavier Becerra
DIGEST:
This bill requires a health care system (which is an entity or entities that includes or owns two or more hospitals within multiple counties or three or more hospitals in one county), private equity groups and hedge funds to provide written notice and obtain consent of, the Attorney General (AG) prior to an affiliation or acquisition between the health care system, private equity group or hedge fund and a health care facility or provider. This bill makes it unlawful conduct for a health system with substantial market power to engage in specified anticompetitive activities. This bill establishes the Health Policy Advisory Board to evaluate and analyze health care markets, advise the AG, and produce an annual report.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes the Department of Justice, led by the AG, who has charge of all legal matters in which California is interested, including enforcement against anticompetitive conduct through the Cartwright Act. [HSC §1340, et seq., INS §106, et seq., GOV §12500, et seq., BPC § 16700, et seq.]
- Requires any non-profit corporation that operates or controls a health facility, as defined, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to entering into any agreement or transaction to sell, transfer, lease, exchange, option, convey, or otherwise dispose of, its assets to a for-profit corporation or entity, or another non-profit corporation; or, transfer control, responsibility, or governance of a material amount of the assets or operations of the non-profit corporation to any for-profit corporation or entity, or another non-profit corporation. [CORP §5914, §5920]
- Provides the AG with the discretion to consent to, give conditional consent to, or not consent to any agreement or transaction involving a nonprofit health facility based on the consideration of any factors that the AG deems relevant, including but not limited to:
- Whether the agreement or transaction is at fair market value;
- Whether the proposed use of the proceeds from the transaction is consistent with the charitable trust on which the assets are held by the health facility or by the affiliated nonprofit health system;
- Whether the transaction would create significant effects on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community; or,
- Whether the transaction is in the public interest. [CORP §5917, §5923]
- Prohibits the AG from consenting to a health facility transaction in which the seller restricts the type or level of medical services that may be provided at the health facility that is the subject of the transaction. [CORP §5917.7]
This bill:
- Requires the AG to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board responsible for evaluating and analyzing health care markets in California and providing recommendations to the AG; and produce a report annually on healthcare markets in California. Prohibits board members from receiving compensation, and from using their position to influence decisions that will have a foreseeable material financial effect on the member or his or her family. Requires members to file a statement of economic interest, as specified.
- Requires a health care system, private equity group, and hedge funds to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to an affiliation or acquisition of a health care facility or provider.
- Establishes time frames for the AG to respond, as specified, and permits the AG to adopt regulations including that extend these time periods or regulations provide a process for requesting a waiver.
- Requires the AG to deny consent to an affiliation or acquisition of a health care facility, provider, or both, unless the health care system demonstrates that the affiliation or acquisition will result in a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increasing the availability and access of services to an underserved population, or both.
- Permits the AG to deny consent to an affiliation or acquisition of a health care facility, provider, or both, if there is a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects that outweigh the benefits of a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increase in services to an underserved population, or both. Includes as a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects in providing hospital or health care services, a substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services.
- Requires the AG to apply a public interest standard in making a determination to grant or deny consent, defined as being in the interests of the public in protecting competitive and accessible health care markets for prices, quality, choice, accessibility, and availability of health care services for local communities, regions, or the state as a whole.
- Permits a health care system that is acquiring or affiliating with a provider, group of providers, or health care facility for a transactional value of $500,000 or less, or an academic medical center, as defined, for any transactional value, to provide written notice to the AG, and requires AG to notify the health care system within 30 days, as specified.
- Permits a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund located in a rural area to request, in writing, a waiver of the prohibition in 4) above. Requires the AG to grant a waiver if specified conditions exists related to improving the access or availability services; or, improving the health, safety, and well-being of consumers of health care services in rural areas.
- Permits any of the parties to the acquisition or affiliation to appeal the AGs final determination by a writ of mandate to the superior court pursuant to the Civil Code, as specified.
- Makes the following unlawful conduct of a health care system:
- A health care system with substantial market power in any market for hospitals or nonhospital health care services where the health care system’s conduct has a substantial tendency to cause anticompetitive effects, including substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, increasing the total cost of care or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services.
- A health care system is presumed to be acting unlawfully if it has substantial market power in any market for any service in trade or commerce and the health care system’s conduct involves tying or exclusive dealing.
- Exempts from 10) a health care system if its conduct directly and significantly benefits consumers of any services in that same market in which the conduct is taking place, or the health care system, and the conduct that it is committing, are located entirely within a rural area, it otherwise meets the criteria of this bill, the benefits are not achievable by less restrictive alternatives, the benefits substantially outweigh any actual or likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct, and no benefit is based on the need to meet a public federal, state, or local requirement or mandate of any kind.
- Permits the AG to bring a civil action on behalf of the state or any of its political subdivisions or public agencies or in the name of the people of California. Requires any civil action to enforce any cause of action for a violation to be commenced within four years after the cause of action. Establishes civil fines and state monetary relief, interest on total damages, and the cost of suit.
- Includes several definitions including for: substantial market power, acquisition, affiliation, and academic medical center.
Comments
Author’s statement. According to the author, access to affordable, quality healthcare for Californians is more important than ever. As some hospitals and provider groups struggle financially during the COVID-19 crisis, action by the Legislature is crucial to protect the healthcare system for today as well as for the future. Large healthcare systems that own multiple hospitals, and other providers such as physician practices or outpatient surgical centers, can use anti-competitive practices to raise prices and limit services without increasing the quality of care. In an effort to stop these types of market abuses, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and union healthcare trust UEBT settled a landmark case against Sutter Health, Northern California’s largest healthcare system. The settlement prohibited Sutter Health from engaging in these types of practices and required it to make policy changes that would restore competition and choice in the market. While this settlement addressed Sutter Health’s specific market abuse, California must prevent new large healthcare systems from forming unless they increase care coordination to improve quality or lower costs and/or increase access to care. This bill ensures proper oversight of the growth of large healthcare systems and their impact on the healthcare market.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, staff indicates that according to the Department of Justice, assuming 20-25 qualifying transactions annually, $499,000 ($290,000 General Fund, $209,0000 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2020-21; $866,000 ($503,500 General Fund, $362,500 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2021-22, and ongoing, for 2.0 Deputy Attorney General, 1.0 Legal Secretary, and 1.0 Associate Governmental Program Analyst. The Legal Services Revolving Fund would be reimbursable through direct billings to client agencies.
SUPPORT: (Verified 6/23/20)
Attorney General Xavier Becerra (source)
American Civil Liberties Union of California
California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO
California State Council of Service Employees International Union
Center for Public Interest Law
Health Access California
NARAL Pro-choice California
Pacific Business Group on Health
United Nurses Associations of California/Union of Health Care Professionals
Western Center on Law & Poverty, Inc.
OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/19/20)
Adventist Health
America’s Physicians Groups
American Investment Council
Association of California Healthcare Districts
California Ambulatory Surgery Association
California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems
California Association of Public Hospitals & Health Systems
California Chamber of Commerce
California Children's Hospital Association
California Hospital Association
California Medical Association
Civil Justice Association of California
County of San Bernardino
Dignity Health
Economic Vitality Corporation, San Luis Obispo County
Kaiser Permanente
Keck Medicine of University of Southern California
Loma Linda University Health
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce
Orange County Business Council
Private Essential Access Community Hospitals
Providence St. Joseph Health
San Gabriel Valley Economic Partnership
San Ramon Chamber of Commerce
Scripps Health
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Southwest California Legislative Council
Stanford Health Care
Stanford Health Care Valleycare
Sutter Health
Templeton Chamber of Commerce
Tenet Healthcare Corporation
United Hospital Association
Valley Industry and Commerce Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The AG writes that the COVID-19 pandemic has created enormous financial strain on hospitals and physician practices statewide, making these providers more susceptible to affiliation and acquisition attempts by large healthcare systems, private equity groups, and hedge funds. This type of predatory practice, if left unchecked, will result in large healthcare systems continuing to grow and utilize abusive market practices to drive up prices and reduce access for patients. This bill ensures proper oversight of large healthcare systems and strengthen patient access to affordable, quality healthcare. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, anticompetitive behavior in the healthcare market was a growing concern, particularly as a result of large, dominant healthcare systems that own multiple hospitals and other providers such as physician practices or outpatient surgical centers. This bill substantially strengthens the state’s oversight over the formation and practices of large healthcare systems, helping to ensure access to affordable healthcare during a time when Californians need it the most. The California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO writes that while there is express antitrust law in California law, much of the statute dates back more than a century and much of the evolution of the law rests in case law. This bill is an effort to drag antitrust law into the 21st Century, using what the AG has learned in the process of recent litigation and merger oversight activity and what a resurgence of academic literature has demonstrated. This bill takes a comprehensive, reasonable, and flexible approach to addressing health care industry consolidation. It expands oversight over new mergers and acquisitions, including “vertical” integration of physician groups and hospitals. This bill also addresses the problem of already highly consolidated markets in parts of the state by increasing the ability of the AG to prevent anti-competitive and anti-trust practices of providers with market power, without breaking up existing systems. Consolidation drives up prices for all Californians without improving our health outcomes or the quality of care. Providers argue that consolidation is necessary for efficiency and for improving quality. However, a 2020 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that hospital consolidation resulted in modestly worse patient experiences and no significant improvements in readmission or mortality rates. The COVID-19 pandemic has also exposed another consequence of unchecked consolidation – a shortage of hospital beds, especially in rural areas. The economic toll resulting from the pandemic will likely fuel consolidation trends as physician practices face massive losses or bankruptcy and become targets for acquisition by large systems. Health Access California writes that in the world of anti-trust, it is often said that is hard to un-ring the bell once a transaction has occurred. Considerable consolidation of hospitals, health systems and physician organizations has already occurred in California. This bill takes steps to curb anticompetitive practices that some health systems have allegedly engaged in as a result of their market power.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The California Hospital Association (CHA) writes that this bill would strain access to the health care system by creating an extreme and burdensome process for transactions like mergers and affiliations. This, at a time when hospitals are already fighting to be there for their communities, would result in hospital closures and the loss of health care services throughout California. Although financial distress is a common reason for hospitals to merge or affiliate, these arrangements also occur for myriad other reasons such as financial efficiency, expanded access to services, clinical integration, better coordinated patient care, and bolstered support for nurses and physicians. Under existing law, the AG has broad authority to review all sales and significant asset transfers of not-for-profit hospitals. The AG may place conditions on these transactions or deny them all together. Additionally, the AG enforces The Cartwright Act, which describes and prohibits an array of anticompetitive activity. This bill creates a presumption that these transactions are anticompetitive, placing the burden of proof on the purchaser without due process and effectively creating a “guilty until proven innocent” system. Sales, affiliations, and mergers are complex and expensive investments that require thousands of hours of work from legal, financial, operational, and clinical experts. Because of this substantive investment of time and resources, purchasers need some degree of certainty surrounding the process before undertaking such a risk. This bill gives arbitrary and absolute discretion to the AG to determine whether criteria are met, without clear definitions or parameters. Sutter Health writes that this approach to the review of healthcare affiliations is inconsistent with generally accepted legal and economic principles of antitrust merger analysis and years of judicial precedent. The vast majority of mergers, acquisitions and comparable affiliations do not involve competitors and thus are unlikely to substantially lessen competition in the form of higher prices or inferior quality of or access to care. Sutter Health also writes that the proposed “substantial likelihood” standard is speculative and uncertain, given the difficulty of quantifying likely cost and quality effects before a transaction closes. This bill provides payers and large provider groups that do not own a hospital an unfair competitive advantage by excluding them from this process. This bill does not require a showing of significant market share in a properly defined relevant market, but instead permits a finding of “market power” based simply on a finding of “substantial anticompetitive effect.” The California Medical Association (CMA) believes this bill is broadly written to seemingly trigger review and presumptive denial of any lease, loan, grant, service agreement, or contract change a physician or medical group has, attaching new and uncertain process to the list of financial and administrative hurdles doctors are already facing. CMA writes that the process created seems to favor larger systems that can afford the legal counsel to hopefully get them necessary approvals for such agreements.
Prepared by: Teri Boughton / HEALTH / (916) 651-4111
6/23/20 17:13:42
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
SB 977 (Monning) - Health care system consolidation: Attorney General approval and enforcement
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
Senate Bill 977 would require a health care system, as defined, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the Attorney General (AG) prior to an affiliation or acquisition, as specified, between the health care system and a health care facility or provider. Would make it unlawful conduct for a health system with substantial market power to engage in specified anticompetitive activities. Would require the AG, by July 1, 2021, to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board to analyze health markets and produce an annual report. Would not apply to acquisitions or affiliations, as defined, entered into prior to January 1, 2021, including subsequent renewals, as long as those acquisitions or affiliations do not involve a material change in the corporate relationship, as specified.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on June 18, 2020
Fiscal Impact:
According to the Department of Justice, assuming 20-25 qualifying transactions annually, $499,000 ($290,000 General Fund, $209,0000 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2020-21; $866,000 ($503,500 General Fund, $362,500 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2021-22, and ongoing, for 2.0 Deputy Attorney General, 1.0 Legal Secretary, and 1.0 Associate Governmental Program Analyst. The Legal Services Revolving Fund would be reimbursable through direct billings to client agencies.
Committee Amendments:
The committee amendments would:
- Authorize the expedited review process for academic medical centers, as defined.
- Define “academic medical center” to include those operated by public universities, health systems with a medical school accredited as of June 9, 2017, and a National Cancer Institute – designated comprehensive cancer center and hospital located in the City of Duarte.
- Clarify conflict of interest provisions for Board members.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
SB 977 (Monning) - Health care system consolidation: Attorney General approval and enforcement
Version: May 19, 2020 | Policy Vote: HEALTH 7 - 2 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: June 9, 2020 | Consultant: Samantha Lui |
Bill Summary:
Senate Bill 977 would require a health care system, as defined, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the Attorney General (AG) prior to an affiliation or acquisition, as specified, between the health care system and a health care facility or provider. Would make it unlawful conduct for a health system with substantial market power to engage in specified anticompetitive activities. Would require the AG, by July 1, 2021, to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board to analyze health markets and produce an annual report. Would not apply to acquisitions or affiliations, as defined, entered into prior to January 1, 2021, including subsequent renewals, as long as those acquisitions or affiliations do not involve a material change in the corporate relationship, as specified.
Fiscal Impact:
According to the Department of Justice, assuming 20-25 qualifying transactions annually, $499,000 ($290,000 General Fund, $209,0000 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2020-21; $866,000 ($503,500 General Fund, $362,500 Legal Services Revolving Fund) in FY 2021-22, and ongoing, for 2.0 Deputy Attorney General, 1.0 Legal Secretary, and 1.0 Associate Governmental Program Analyst. The Legal Services Revolving Fund would be reimbursable through direct billings to client agencies.
Background:
According to the Senate Health Committee analysis: Federal and state governments review the competitive effects of health care entities’ conduct and consolidations pursuant to three federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Businesses may not merge with or acquire other businesses when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition. Under federal Hart-Scott-Rodina Act, the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the U.S. and are over a certain size.
While the Cartwright Act is a California specific antitrust statute, it does not give the AG the authority to approve or deny a merger. However, under California’s charitable trust law, the AG must consent to any sale or transfer of a health care facility owned or operated by a nonprofit corporation whose assets are held in public trust (Corp §5914, §5920). The AG must, within 90 days of receipt of such written notice of a proposed transaction, notify the nonprofit organization whether it consents, or does not consent, to the agreement or transaction. The AG may consider several factors, including whether the agreement or transaction is at fair market value, whether the proposed use of the proceeds from the transaction is consistent with the charitable trust, whether the transaction would create significant effects on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the community, or whether the transaction is in the public interest (Corp §5917, §5923). The 90-day review period may be extended for one additional 45-day period if certain conditions are met (Corp §5915, §5920). Statute also prohibits the AG from consenting to a health facility transaction in which the seller restricts the type or level of medical services that may be provided at the health facility that is subject of the transaction. Under the Cartwright Act, the following activities are illegal:
- Price-fixing. An informal understanding or agreement between competitors that affects price levels.
- Tying arrangements. When a seller requires a buyer to purchase a product that the buyer does not want in order to be allowed to buy a product that the buyer does want. Tying is generally illegal if the seller has some degree of control over the market for the product that the buyer wants.
- Monopoly. When a business unfairly keeps others from competing with it. Growth through superior ability and efficiency is not illegal. However, a business with significant market power may not, without legitimate business justification, take actions that exclude or handicap its competitors.
In April 2014, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and Employers Benefit Trust filed a lawsuit against Sutter, seeking compensation and injunctive relief for alleged anticompetitive business practices, which caused them to pay more than necessary for healthcare services and products. In March of 2018, the AG filed a similar lawsuit against Sutter. The two separate lawsuits were combined by the court into one case. In October 2019, the parties reached a preliminary settlement agreement where Sutter agreed to pay $575 million to compensate employers, union trusts, and state and local government entities and to reimburse fees and costs; requires Sutter to adhere to comprehensive injunctive relief to rebalance competition in healthcare markets in Northern California; requires Sutter to limit charges for out-of-network services, stop all-or-nothing contracting, cease anticompetitive bundling, and institutes a court-appointed monitor to review for compliance.
Proposed Law:
SB 977 would require a health care system, as defined, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the Attorney General (AG) prior to an affiliation or acquisition between the health care system and a health care facility or provider. Would make it unlawful conduct for a health system with substantial market power to engage in specified anticompetitive activities. In addition, the bill would include the following provisions, among others:
Health Policy Advisory Board. The bill requires the AG, beginning July 1, 2021, to establish the twelve-member Health Policy Advisory Board, for the purpose of evaluating and analyzing health care markets in California and providing recommendations to the AG’s office. In addition to meeting quarterly, the Board, whose composition and membership are specified in the bill, must annually produce or commission a report on the conditions in health care markets in California relating to acquisitions and affiliations, including, but not limited to, cost and quality analysis. The DOJ must post the report on its website.
The bill authorizes the Board, upon request by the AG, to review a written notification submitted by a health care system and provide the AG with written information with regard to whether to grant or deny consent to the affiliation or acquisition. The AG may consider the recommendation of the board.
The bill prohibits a member of the board from making, participating, or in attempting to use their position to influence a decision that will have a reasonably foreseeable material financial effect, distinguishable from its effect on the public generally, on them or a member of their immediate family, or on a business entity in which the member is a director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or holds any position of management.
Written notice to the AG. The bill requires, except for transactions valued at $500,000 or less (which have a different review process described below), a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to an affiliation or acquisition between the health care system and a health care facility or provider, or between the private equity group or hedge fund and a health care facility or provider. The bill requires the notice to contain information sufficient to evaluate the nature of the acquisition or affiliation and information sufficient for the AG, as specified.
The bill requires, within 60 days of receipt of the written notice, unless the AG holds a public meeting, the AG to do one of the following:
- Notify the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund whether the AG has cleared the transaction, as defined;
- Grant the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund a specified waiver related to the provision of services in rural areas; or
- Issue a request for additional information from the parties to the acquisition or affiliation.
Within 45 days of certification by the AG that the parties to the acquisition or affiliation have complied with the request for additional information, the AG must grant or deny consent. The bill authorizes the AG to extend the aforementioned time periods by 14 days if the AG holds a public meeting. The bill authorizes the parties and the AG may to extend the time period by an additional 45 days if the acquisition or affiliation is substantially changed or modified by the parties prior to the expiration of the period, or if the acquisition involves health care facilities, or providers, servicing multiple communities.
For transactions valued $500,000 or less. The bill requires a health care system that is acquiring or affiliating with a provider, group of providers, or health care facility for a transactional value of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or less to provide written notice to the AG. For those notices, the AG must do one of the following within 30 days:
- Notify the health care system the AG does not object to the transaction.
- Notify the health care system the AG found the transaction to raise substantial competitive concerns, and as such, the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund must comply with review processes, outlined above.
The bill provides, after 30 days, if a health care system does not receive notice, the health care system may proceed as if it received the notice of no objection.
Standard of review. The bill specifies the standard of review is whether the transaction presents substantial competitive concerns based on an analysis of market shares of the provider, group of providers, or health care facility in any relevant market.
Attorney General’s role. The bill requires the AG to deny consent, unless otherwise specified below, to an affiliation or acquisition between a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund and a health care facility, provider, or both, unless the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund demonstrates that the affiliation or acquisition will result in a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increasing the availability and access of services to an underserved population, or both.
The bill authorizes the AG to deny consent to an affiliation or acquisition, as specified, if there is a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects that outweigh the benefits of a clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increase in services to an underserved population, or both.
The bill requires the AG, in making a determination to grant or deny consent, to apply the public interest standard, as defined.
Rural areas. The bill authorizes a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund located in a rural area to request, in writing, a waiver, which the AG may grant if either of the following conditions exist:
- The affiliation or acquisition would directly benefit consumers of health care services in rural areas by improving the access or availability of those services.
- The affiliation or acquisition is needed to improve the health, safety, and well-being of consumers of health care services in rural areas.
The bill provides a health care system is not acting unlawfully if its conduct directly and significantly benefits consumers of any services in that same market in which the conduct is taking place, or the health care system, and the conduct that it is committing, are located entirely within a rural area, and if all of the following conditions exist, among others:
- Any benefits are not achievable by less restrictive alternatives.
- Any benefits substantially outweigh any actual or likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct.
- No benefit is based on the need to meet a public federal, state, or local requirement or mandate of any kind.
Public hearing. The bill authorizes the AG, prior to issuing a written determination, to hold a public meeting, which may be held in any of the counties in which the acquisition or affiliation will take place, to hear comments from interested parties. Prior to holding a public meeting, the Attorney General must provide public notice of the time and place.
Appeal of the AG’s determination. The bill authorizes any of the parties to the acquisition or affiliation to appeal the Attorney General’s final determination by a writ of mandate to the superior court.
Charitable trust review. The bill requires concurrent AG review, to the extent practicable, if a health facility is undergoing review under the state’s existing nonprofit charitable trust provisions.
Civil action, fines, monetary relief. The bill authorizes the AG to bring a civil action in the superior court of any county that has jurisdiction over a defendant for any violation of this section. The bill requires a civil action to enforce a cause of action for a violation of the bill to commence within four years after the cause of action accrued.
The bill requires civil fines be imposed either as $1 million, or as twice the gross gain to the health care system or gross loss to any other party multiplied by two, whichever is greater.
The bill requires the court to award the state monetary relief three times the total damage sustained, the interest on the total damages, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. In addition, the court may grant mandatory injunctions as may be reasonably necessary to restore and preserve fair competition in the trade or commerce affected by the violation.
Market power. The bill deems conduct of a health care system to be unlawful under any of the following conditions:
- The health care system has substantial market power in any market for hospitals or nonhospital health care services and the health care system’s conduct has a substantial tendency to cause anticompetitive effects (e.g., raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, increasing the total cost of care, or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services).
- The health care system must be presumed to be acting unlawfully if it has substantial market power in any market for any service in trade or commerce and the health care system’s conduct involves tying or exclusive dealing.
The bill provides that substantial market power can be shown in one of the following two ways:
- The conduct had an actual anticompetitive effect, including, but not limited to, prices, quality, access, or availability of services, choice, or total cost of care.
- The system has a substantial market share in one or more markets for any service in trade or commerce, after accounting for barriers to entry. The health care system is presumed to have substantial market power if it has greater than a 60 percent market share.
Antitrust account. The bill requires any fees or fines obtained to be deposited in the Attorney General antitrust account within the General Fund.
Other. The bill provides, notwithstanding any other law, the bill does not impose liability for the intracorporate actions of a health care system.
Regulations. The bill authorizes the AG to adopt regulations to implement the bill’s provisions.
Definitions. The bill includes definitions of key terms, such as:
- “Acquisition” means the direct or indirect purchase in any manner, including, but not limited to, lease, transfer, exchange, option, receipt of a conveyance, creation of a joint venture, or any other manner of purchase, by a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund of all, or any part of, the assets of a health care facility or provider. A transfer includes, but is not limited to, any arrangement, written or oral, that alters voting control of, responsibility for, or control of the governing body of the health care provider.
- “Affiliation” means an agreement, association, partnership, joint venture, or other arrangement in which a health care system establishes a change in governance or sharing of control over health care services provided by that health care facility or provider, or in which a health care system otherwise acquires direct or indirect control over the operations of a health care facility or provider in whole or in substantial part. An affiliation does not exist where a health care system only extends an offer of employment to, or hires, a provider.
- “Health care system” means an entity or system of entities that includes or owns two or more hospitals within multiple counties, or three or more hospitals within one county.
- “Hedge fund” means a pool of funds by investors, including a pool of funds managed or controlled by private limited partnerships, if those investors or the management of that pool or private limited partnership employ investment strategies of any kind to earn a return on that pool of funds.
- “Private equity group” means an investor or group of investors who engages in the raising or returning of capital and who invests, develops, or disposes of specified assets.
- “Provider” means an individual or group of individuals that provides health-related physician, surgery, or laboratory services to consumers.
The bill specifies the definitions do not apply to acquisitions or affiliations entered into prior to January 1, 2021, including subsequent renewals, as long as those acquisitions or affiliations do not involve a material change in the corporate relationship between a health care system and a health care facility or provider, or a material change in the corporate relationship between the private equity group or hedge fund and a health care facility or provider.
Related Legislation:
- SB 538 (Monning, 2018) would have prohibited contracts between hospitals or any affiliate of a hospital and certain types of third-party administrators, health plans, or health insurers to, directly or indirectly, set payment rates or terms for nonparticipating providers, require contracts with one or more affiliated providers, require payors to attest to the contract terms, require arbitration for antitrust claims, require same cost-sharing for out-of-network hospitals, or keep payment rates secret, as specified. SB 538 was scheduled but not heard in the Assembly Health Committee on June 26, 2018.
- AB 595 (Wood, Chapter 292, Statutes of 2018) requires prior approval by the DMHC Director for a health plan that intends to merge or consolidate with, or enters into an agreement resulting in its purchase, acquisition or control by, any entity and allows the DMHC director to disapprove a transaction if the transaction would substantially lessen competition.
- SB 932 (Hernandez of 2015) would have banned seven specified provisions from contracts between health care providers and payors and required prior approval from DMHC for mergers and other transactions between health plans, risk-based and other organizations. SB 932 was held at the request of the author in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Staff Comments:
According to the DOJ, the anticipated resources include 2.0 Deputy Attorneys General (DAGs) and the Legal Complement of 1.0 Legal Secretary, in the DOJ’s Public Rights Division, Healthcare Rights and Access Section, for review of hospital-related transactions; enforcement; and for pursuit of civil actions against violations. The workload was based on the number of hours its takes DAGs to review nonprofit healthcare transactions (which includes among hospitals skilled nursing facilities, residential treatment facilities, etc.), based on small and large transactions. In addition, the 1.0 AGPA will provide administrative support to establish and maintain the Health Policy Advisory Board.
In addition, the anticipated 20-25 acquisition/affiliation transactions per year, with two to three large transactions annually, is based on the DOJ’s experience within the Charitable Trust Section, which reviews nonprofit healthcare transactions, and the estimate of contacts with health systems.
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH
Senator Dr. Richard Pan, Chair
BILL NO: SB 977
AUTHOR: | Monning | ||
VERSION: | March 16, 2020 | ||
HEARING DATE: | May 13, 2020 | ||
CONSULTANT: | Teri Boughton | ||
Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic and the unprecedented nature of the 2020 Legislative Session, all Senate Policy Committees are working under a compressed timeline. This timeline does not allow this bill to be referred and heard by more than one committee as a typical timeline would allow. In order to fully vet the contents of this measure for the benefit of Senators and the public, this analysis includes information from the Senate Judiciary Committee.
SUBJECT: Health care system consolidation: Attorney General approval and enforcement.
SUMMARY:
Requires a health care system, which is an entity or entities that includes or owns two or more hospitals within multiple counties or three or more hospitals in one county, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the Attorney General prior to an affiliation or acquisition between the health care system and a health care facility or provider. Makes it unlawful conduct for a health system with substantial market power to engage in specified anticompetitive activities. Establishes the Health Policy Advisory Board to evaluate and analyze health care markets and produce an annual report.
Existing law:
- Establishes the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) to regulate health plans under the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 (Knox-Keene Act) and the California Department of Insurance (CDI) to regulate health insurance, and the Attorney General (AG), who has charge of all legal matters in which California is interested, including enforcement against anticompetitive conduct through the Cartwright Act. [HSC §1340, et seq., INS §106, et seq., GOV §12500, et seq., BPC § 16700, et seq.]
- Requires any non-profit corporation that operates or controls a health facility, as defined, to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to entering into any agreement or transaction to do either of the following:
- Sell, transfer, lease, exchange, option, convey, or otherwise dispose of, its assets to a for-profit corporation or entity, or another non-profit corporation; or,
- Transfer control, responsibility, or governance of a material amount of the assets or operations of the non-profit corporation to any for-profit corporation or entity, or another non-profit corporation. [CORP §5914, §5920]
- Requires the AG, within 90 days of the receipt of a written notice of a proposed transaction involving a non-profit health facility, to notify the non-profit corporation in writing of the decision to consent to, give conditional consent to, or not consent to the agreement or transaction. [CORP §5915§5920]
- Permits the AG to extend the 90-day deadline described above for one additional 45-day period if any of the following conditions are satisfied: the extension is necessary to obtain specified information, the proposed transaction is substantially modified after the first public meeting conducted by the AG, or the proposed transaction involves a multi-facility health system serving multiple communities. [CORP §5915§5920]
- Requires the AG to conduct one or more public meetings to hear comments from interested parties prior to issuing any written decision regarding a transaction involving a nonprofit health facility. [CORP §5916,§5922]
- Provides the AG with the discretion to consent to, give conditional consent to, or not consent to any agreement or transaction involving a nonprofit health facility based on the consideration of any factors that the AG deems relevant, including but not limited to:
- Whether the agreement or transaction is at fair market value;
- Whether the proposed use of the proceeds from the transaction is consistent with the charitable trust on which the assets are held by the health facility or by the affiliated nonprofit health system;
- Whether the transaction would create significant effects on the availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community; or,
- Whether the transaction is in the public interest. [CORP §5917, §5923]
- Prohibits the AG from consenting to a health facility transaction in which the seller restricts the type or level of medical services that may be provided at the health facility that is the subject of the transaction. [CORP §5917.7]
This bill:
- Requires the AG to establish the Health Policy Advisory Board, which is a 12 member board, responsible for evaluating and analyzing health care markets in California and providing recommendations to the AG; and producing a report annually on healthcare markets in California. Requires members of the board to be appointed by the AG, Senate Committee on Rules and the Speaker of the Assembly and include representatives from a health care system, health care provider, health plans, employer purchasers, union trusts, consumers and a university expert.
- Requires a health care system to provide written notice to, and obtain the written consent of, the AG prior to an affiliation or acquisition between the health care system and a health care facility or provider. Requires the notice to contain information sufficient to evaluate the nature of the acquisition or affiliation or a waiver request.
- Requires within 60 days, the AG to notify the health care system whether the AG has cleared the transaction, granted a waiver, or needs additional information. Requires within 45 days of certification that the parties have substantially complied with the request for additional information, the AG to grant or deny consent. Permits the AG to extend the timeframe by 14 days if a public hearing is held. Permits the parties and AG to consent to extend the timeframe by 45 days if the acquisition or affiliation is substantially changed or modified by the parties, or the acquisition involves health care facilities, or provider in multiple communities.
- Permits the Health Policy Advisory Board, upon request of AG or otherwise in its discretion, to review a written notification from a health care system, and provide the AG with a written recommendation.
- Permits the AG to adopt regulations including that extend the time periods in 3) above or regulations to provide a process for requesting a waiver.
- Requires the AG to deny consent to an affiliation or acquisition of nonhospital health care facility, provider, or both, unless the health care system demonstrates that the affiliation or acquisition will result in a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increasing the availability and access of services to an underserved population, or both.
- Permits the AG to deny consent to an affiliation or acquisition of a nonhospital health care facility, provider, or both, if there is a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects that outweigh the benefits of a substantial likelihood of clinical integration, a substantial likelihood of increase in services to an underserved population, or both.
- Permits the AG to deny consent to an affiliation or acquisition if there is a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects in providing hospital or health care services which include, but are not limited to, a substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services.
- Requires the AG to apply the public interest standard in making a determination to grant or deny consent. The public interest standard is defined as being in the interests of the public in protecting competitive and accessible health care markets for prices, quality, choice, accessibility, and availability of health care services for local communities, regions, or the state as a whole. Prohibits acquisitions or affiliations from being presumed to be efficient for the purpose of assessing compliance with the public interest standard.
- Permits a health care system located in a rural area to request, in writing, a waiver of the prohibition in 6) above. Requires the AG to grant a waiver if either of the following exists:
- The affiliation or acquisition would directly benefit consumers of health care services in rural areas by improving the access or availability of those services; or,
- The affiliation or acquisition is needed to improve the health, safety, and well-being of consumers of health care services in rural areas.
- Requires the AG to put in writing the basis for the determinations in 6) – 10) above.
- Permits the AG to hold a public meeting, which may be held in any of the counties in which the acquisition or affiliation will take place, to hear comments from interested parties. Requires the AG to provide public notice of the time and place of the hearing, as specified. Permits a second hearing if a substantive change or modification to the acquisition or affiliation is submitted to the AG after the first public meeting.
- Permits any of the parties to the acquisition or affiliation to appeal the AGs final determination by a writ of mandate to the superior court pursuant to the Civil Code, as specified.
- Requires any reviews required under existing law to be concurrent with the review under this bill, to the extent practicable.
- Makes the following unlawful conduct of a health care system:
- A health care system with substantial market power in any market for hospitals or nonhospital health care services where the health care system’s conduct has a substantial tendency to cause anticompetitive effects, including substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, increasing the total cost of care or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services.
- A health care system is presumed to be acting unlawfully if it has substantial market power in any market for any service in trade or commerce and the health care system’s conduct involves tying or exclusive dealing.
- A health care system with substantial market power in any market for hospitals or nonhospital health care services where the health care system’s conduct has a substantial tendency to cause anticompetitive effects, including substantial likelihood of raising market prices, diminishing quality, reducing choice, increasing the total cost of care or diminishing availability of, or diminishing access to, hospital or nonhospital health care services.
- Exempts from 15) a health care system if its conduct directly and significantly benefits consumers of any services in that same market in which the conduct is taking place, or the health care system, and the conduct that it is committing, are located entirely within a rural area, it otherwise meets the criteria of this bill, the benefits are not achievable by less restrictive alternatives, the benefits substantially outweigh any actual or likely anticompetitive effects of the conduct, and no benefit is based on the need to meet a public federal, state, or local requirement or mandate of any kind.
- Permits the AG to bring a civil action on behalf of the state or any of its political subdivisions or public agencies or in the name of the people of California. Requires any civil action to enforce any cause of action for a violation to be commenced within four years after the cause of action. Establishes civil fines and state monetary relief, interest on total damages, and the cost of suit.
- Permits in any civil action brought by the AG, the court to, in addition to granting prohibitory injunctions and other restraints, grant those mandatory injunctions as may be reasonably necessary to restore and preserve fair competition in the trade or commerce affected by the violation.
- Includes several definitions including:
- “Tying” is defined as the seller coercively conditioning the sale of one or more services on the sale of a second distinct service or services if the arrangement affects a more than trivial amount of sales of the second distinct service or services. The conditioning can be explicit, implicit, or as an economic imperative based on the pricing of those services;
- “Exclusive dealing” is defined as an agreement in which a health plan or employer who buys health care services agrees implicitly or explicitly, whether coerced or voluntarily, to buy services exclusively from a health care system for a period of time. Exclusive dealing is presumed to be anticompetitive whether or not pricing practices are a component of that conduct;
- “Substantial market power” can be shown in one of the following ways:
- Conduct has an actual substantial anticompetitive effect, including, but not limited to, prices, quality, access, or availability of services, choice, or total cost of care. “Total cost of care” is defined as the measurement of direct and indirect costs, including, but not limited to, price and utilization, associated with an episode of care for a periods of health care coverage; and,
- The health care system has a sufficiently substantial market share in one or more markets for any service in trade or commerce after accounting for barriers to entry to exercise substantial market power in those markets. The health care system is presumed to have substantial market power if, accounting for barriers to entry, it has greater than a 60% market share. Prohibits the presumption from being rebuttable if it has greater than a 75% market share.
- “Health care system” is any entity or system of entities that includes or owns two or more hospitals within multiple counties, or three or more hospitals within one county;
- “Acquisition” is the direct or indirect purchase in any manner, including, but not limited to, lease, transfer, exchange, option, receipt of a conveyance, creation of a joint venture, or any other manner of purchase, by a health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund of all, or any part of, the assets of a health care facility or provider. Includes any arrangement, written or oral, that alters voting control of, responsibility for, or control of the governing body of the health care provider;
- “Affiliation” is an agreement, association, partnership, joint venture, or other arrangement in which a health care system sets up a cooperative relationship involving a bundling of health care services, a sharing of control over health care services provided by that health care facility or provider, or in which a health care system otherwise acquires direct or indirect control over the operations of a health care facility or provider in whole or substantial part; and,
- “Clinical integration” is a showing by the health care system affiliating with or acquiring the healthcare facility that there will likely be a reduction in costs to the benefit of consumer care and outcomes or an increase in the quality of care. An increase or improvement in quality of care may include a showing or a reduction in morbidity or mortality, better population healthcare management, or any other commonly accepted metric or standard for improving consumer health and patient outcomes.
- “Provider” is an individual or group of individuals that provides health related services to consumers, including, but not limited to, licensees as defined under the Business and Professions Code.
- “Health care facility” is a facility, nonprofit or for-profit corporation, institution, clinic, place, or building where health-related services are provided, including but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, ambulatory surgery center, treatment center, or laboratory or physician office located outside of a hospital.
FISCAL EFFECT:
This bill has not been analyzed yet by a fiscal committee.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s statement. According to the author, access to affordable, quality healthcare for Californians is more important than ever. As some hospitals and provider groups struggle financially during the COVID-19 crisis, action by the Legislature is crucial to protect the healthcare system for today as well as for the future. Large healthcare systems that own multiple hospitals, and other providers such as physician practices or outpatient surgical centers, can use anti-competitive practices to raise prices and limit services without increasing the quality of care. In an effort to stop these types of market abuses, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and union healthcare trust UEBT settled a landmark case against Sutter Health, Northern California’s largest healthcare system. The settlement prohibited Sutter Health from engaging in these types of practices and required it to make policy changes that would restore competition and choice in the market. While this settlement addressed Sutter Health’s specific market abuse, California must prevent new large healthcare systems from forming unless they increase care coordination to improve quality or lower costs and/or increase access to care. This bill would ensure proper oversight of the growth of large healthcare systems and their impact on the healthcare market.
- Federal antitrust enforcement. Antitrust authorities examine consolidated entities because antitrust offenses almost always raise the prices paid by consumers for goods or services. Even relatively small price increases can have tremendous overall effects statewide. When state or local governments pay too much for goods or services because of antitrust violations, either taxes must be increased or government services must be reduced. There are three bodies of federal antitrust laws: The Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. All are used by state and federal governments to review the effects on competition from health care entity conduct and consolidations. Another federal law, the Hart-Scott-Rodina Act (HSR), requires advanced notification to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) of large proposed mergers and acquisitions before they are finalized. Businesses may not merge with or acquire other businesses when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition. Under HSR, the FTC and the U.S. DOJ review most of the proposed transactions that affect commerce in the U.S. and are over a certain size, and either agency can take legal action to block deals that it believes would “substantially lessen competition.” Because the FTC and U.S. DOJ share jurisdiction over merger review, transactions requiring further review are assigned on a case-by-case basis depending on which agency has more expertise with the industry involved. The FTC and U.S. DOJ have issued Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care that provide guidance on activities that are violations and activities that will not be challenged under antitrust laws.
- California’s Department of Justice (DOJ). California’s DOJ, headed by the AG, houses an antitrust division where attorneys, investigators, and legal analysts are devoted to antitrust investigations and litigation. California and federal antitrust laws prohibit unwarranted restraints on free and open competition in commerce. These laws allow the AG to bring civil and criminal legal actions against individuals and businesses acting in restraint of trade. Anyone injured by an antitrust offense may recover from the wrongdoer an amount that is three times the damages suffered. In 2012, California DOJ issued civil investigative demands to a number of California plans and providers as part of the AG’s focus on the impact of consolidation of services on medical care costs to consumers. The Wall Street Journal reported that Dignity Health, Scripps, Sharp, Sutter and Cottage health systems were all sent subpoenas. The article states that the AG appears to be focusing on whether the systems’ “tie-ups with physicians, as well as ownership of hospitals, have given them the market power to boost prices in a way that violates antitrust law.”
The Cartwright Act is a California specific antitrust statute, but it does not give the AG the authority to approve or deny a merger. The following three activities are examples of activities that are illegal under the Cartwright Act:
Price-fixing. An informal understanding between competitors concerning prices is illegal. The agreement need not set specific prices; any agreement affecting price levels is illegal.
Tying arrangements. When a seller requires a buyer to purchase a product that the buyer does not want in order to be allowed to buy a product that the buyer does want. Tying is generally illegal if the seller has some degree of control over the market for the product that the buyer wants.
Monopoly. When a business unfairly keeps others from competing with it. Growth through superior ability and efficiency is not illegal. However, a business with significant market power may not, without legitimate business justification, take actions that exclude or handicap its competitors.
The AG also is required to review and make recommendations with regard to public utility mergers and acquisitions. The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approves mergers and acquisitions of public utilities. Public Utilities Code section 854(b)(3) requires the PUC to request an advisory opinion from the AG regarding whether competition will be adversely affected and what mitigation measures could be adopted to avoid this result when approving mergers, acquisitions or direct or indirect control of any public utility organized and doing business in California.
- Nonprofit Hospital Mergers. California’s charitable trust law, unlike the Cartwright Act, requires the AG’s consent for any sale or transfer of a health care facility owned or operated by a nonprofit corporation whose assets are held in public trust. The charitable trusts section of the DOJ is tasked with protecting the public’s interest in the property and assets committed to charitable purposes in California through registration, education and enforcement. The AG must consider whether the transaction may tend to create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition.
- Daughters of Charity. In December of 2015, the AG granted conditional approval of a change of control and governance of the Daughters of Charity Health System to Integrity Inc., with conditions to ensure essential healthcare services for the communities serving the six health facilities included in the transaction. This has been described by the AG as the largest and most complex nonprofit hospital transactions in California history. DOJ conducted an in-depth review of the transaction, including five Health Care Impact Statements by an independent health care expert, six public meetings, and a public comment period. Under the system restructuring and support agreement, for at least the first three years of the 15-year agreement, the health system will continue to operate as a nonprofit public benefit corporation. After three years and before the expiration of the agreement, Integrity Inc. can exercise their option to purchase the health system. Conditions of the agreement include requirements for facilities to operate as hospitals offering emergency services and other facilities to operate as nursing homes for specified periods of time, investments in capital improvements, commitments to serve Medi-Cal and charity care patients, and all of the facilities will be required to submit an annual report to the AG describing in detail their compliance with the conditions.
- Sutter-Summit Merger. A past merger between Sutter and Summit hospitals (two hospitals located 2.5 miles apart in the Oakland-Berkley region of the San Francisco Bay Area) which resulted in price increases and may be anticompetitive according to a 2008 working paper titled “The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction.” This retrospective study by the Bureau of Economics of the FTC assessed whether antitrust enforcement matter was appropriate. Claims data from three large health insurers were used to compare the post-merger price change for Sutter and Summit to the price change for a set of control group hospitals. The results of the retrospective show that Summit’s price increase was among the largest of any comparable hospital in California, indicating this transaction may have been anticompetitive. The study found that the contracted price increases for Summit following the merger ranged from approximately 29% to 72%, compared to approximately 10% to 21% at Alta Bates. However, a full determination of whether antitrust enforcement was appropriate would require an analysis of impact on quality and if Summit was a “failing firm.” This additional analysis was beyond the scope of the retrospective.
- Daughters of Charity. In December of 2015, the AG granted conditional approval of a change of control and governance of the Daughters of Charity Health System to Integrity Inc., with conditions to ensure essential healthcare services for the communities serving the six health facilities included in the transaction. This has been described by the AG as the largest and most complex nonprofit hospital transactions in California history. DOJ conducted an in-depth review of the transaction, including five Health Care Impact Statements by an independent health care expert, six public meetings, and a public comment period. Under the system restructuring and support agreement, for at least the first three years of the 15-year agreement, the health system will continue to operate as a nonprofit public benefit corporation. After three years and before the expiration of the agreement, Integrity Inc. can exercise their option to purchase the health system. Conditions of the agreement include requirements for facilities to operate as hospitals offering emergency services and other facilities to operate as nursing homes for specified periods of time, investments in capital improvements, commitments to serve Medi-Cal and charity care patients, and all of the facilities will be required to submit an annual report to the AG describing in detail their compliance with the conditions.
- Consolidation. A March 2018 UC Berkeley report on health care consolidation details the rapid consolidation of the hospital, physician, and insurance markets in California from 2010 to 2016. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 44 counties had highly concentrated hospital markets. For physician markets, 12 counties had highly concentrated primary care markets, 20 counties had highly concentrated orthopedics markets, 22 counties had highly concentrated cardiology markets, 24 counties had highly concentrated hematology/oncology markets, and 26 counties had highly concentrated radiology markets. The commercial insurance market was also highly concentrated with 42 counties considered highly concentrated according to the Guidelines. There was also an increasing trend of hospitals purchasing physician practices. The percent of physicians working for foundations owned by hospitals increased from 24% to 39% between 2010 and 2016. The report found evidence that highly concentrated markets are associated with higher prices for a number of hospital and physician services and ACA premiums. In Northern California – which is considerably more concentrated than Southern California across all measures of health care market concentration that were analyzed – inpatient prices were 70% higher, outpatient prices were 17- 55% higher (depending on the specialty of physician performing the procedure), and ACA premiums were 35% higher than they were in Southern California. Even after adjusting for input cost differences (i.e. wages) between Northern California and Southern California, procedure prices are still often 20-30% higher in Northern California than Southern California. In sum, the pace of market consolidation in California has increased significantly. The vast majority of counties in California warrant concern and scrutiny according to the DOJ/FTC Guidelines. Consumers are paying more for health care as a result of market consolidation.
- Sutter litigation. In April 2014, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and Employers Benefit Trust filed a lawsuit against Sutter on behalf of themselves and a class of other union trusts, local government entities, and employers. The plaintiffs sought compensation and injunctive relief for what they alleged were unlawful, anticompetitive business practices, which caused them to pay more than necessary for healthcare services and products. In March of 2018, AG Becerra, filed a similar lawsuit against Sutter on behalf of the people of California principally seeking injunctive relief to compel Sutter to correct its anticompetitive business practices moving forward, and to restore competition to healthcare markets in California, but also seeking disgorgement of funds unlawfully acquired. The two separate lawsuits were combined by the court into one case.
- Sutter settlement. In October of 2019, on the eve of trial, the parties reached a preliminary settlement agreement to settle the lawsuits. The settlement agreement requires Sutter to pay $575 million to compensate employers, union trusts, and state and local government entities and to reimburse fees and costs. It also requires Sutter to adhere to comprehensive injunctive relief to rebalance competition in healthcare markets in Northern California. The injunctive relief requires Sutter to limit charges for out-of-network services, stop all-or-nothing contracting, cease anticompetitive bundling, and institutes a court-appointed monitor to review Sutter's conduct for compliance with the settlement and report back to the Court. The settlement restrains Sutter from engaging in the practices that allowed it to charge higher prices for hospital and physician services. The settlement requires Sutter to make their facilities generally available to participate in the networks of any commercial insurance plans, and generally prohibits Sutter from using some of its hospitals as leverage to get insurance providers to include other hospitals in their networks or in preferred tiers. The settlement sets caps on the rates that Sutter hospitals can charge for services provided at a Sutter hospital that is out-of-network, and it increases price transparency by allowing insurers and self-funded payers to share pricing terms in contracts with Sutter. Insurers and self-funded payers will be allowed to share pricing and quality information with individual members. A compliance monitor will ensure that Sutter is following the terms of the settlement. The settlement terms will last for ten years, with the possibility of one three-year extension. During this time, San Francisco Superior Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and to punish any violations. The settlement agreement is currently pending approval by the court.
- Prior legislation. SB 538 (Monning of 2018) would have prohibited contracts between hospitals or any affiliate of a hospital and certain types of third-party administrators, health plans or health insurers from containing provisions that set payment rates or terms for nonparticipating providers, requiring contracts with one or more affiliated providers, requiring payors to attest to the contract terms, requiring arbitration for antitrust claims, requiring same cost-sharing for out-of-network hospitals, or keeping payment rates secret, as specified. Would have made any of these contract provisions void and unenforceable. SB 538 was scheduled but not heard in the Assembly Health Committee on June 26, 2018.
AB 595 (Wood, Chapter 292, Statutes of 2018) requires prior approval by the DMHC Director for a health plan that intends to merge or consolidate with, or enters into an agreement resulting in its purchase, acquisition or control by, any entity and allows the DMHC director to disapprove a transaction if the transaction would substantially lessen competition.
SB 932 (Hernandez of 2015) would have banned seven specified provisions from contracts between health care providers and payors and required prior approval from DMHC for mergers and other transactions between health plans, risk-based and other organizations. SB 932 was held at the request of the author in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- Support. The AG writes that the COVID-19 pandemic has created enormous financial strain on hospitals and physician practices statewide, making these providers more susceptible to affiliation and acquisition attempts by large healthcare systems, private equity groups, and hedge funds. This type of predatory practice, if left unchecked, will result in large healthcare systems continuing to grow and utilize abusive market practices to drive up prices and reduce access for patients. This bill would ensure proper oversight of large healthcare systems and strengthen patient access to affordable, quality healthcare. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, anticompetitive behavior in the healthcare market was a growing concern, particularly as a result of large, dominant healthcare systems that own multiple hospitals and other providers such as physician practices or outpatient surgical centers. The bill would substantially strengthen the state’s oversight over the formation and practices of large healthcare systems, helping to ensure access to affordable healthcare during a time when Californians need it the most. The California Labor Federation writes that while there is express antitrust law in California law, much of the statute dates back more than a century and much of the evolution of the law rests in case law. This bill is an effort to drag antitrust law into the 21st Century, using what the AG has learned in the process of recent litigation and merger oversight activity and what a resurgence of academic literature has demonstrated. This bill takes a comprehensive, reasonable, and flexible approach to addressing health care industry consolidation. It expands oversight over new mergers and acquisitions, including “vertical” integration of physician groups and hospitals. The bill also addresses the problem of already highly consolidated markets in parts of the state by increasing the ability of the AG to prevent anti-competitive and anti-trust practices of providers with market power, without breaking up existing systems. Consolidation drives up prices for all Californians without improving our health outcomes or the quality of care. Providers argue that consolidation is necessary for efficiency and for improving quality. However, a 2020 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found that hospital consolidation resulted in modestly worse patient experiences and no significant improvements in readmission or mortality rates. The COVID-19 pandemic has also exposed another consequence of unchecked consolidation – a shortage of hospital beds, especially in rural areas. The economic toll resulting from the pandemic will likely fuel consolidation trends as physician practices face massive losses or bankruptcy and become targets for acquisition by large systems. Health Access California writes that in the world of anti-trust, it is often said that is hard to un-ring the bell once a transaction has occurred. Considerable consolidation of hospitals, health systems and physician organizations has already occurred in California. This bill takes steps to curb anticompetitive practices that some health systems have allegedly engaged in as a result of their market power.
- Opposition. The California Hospital Association (CHA) writes that this bill would strain access to the health care system by creating an extreme and burdensome process for transactions like mergers and affiliation. This, at a time when hospitals are already fighting to be there for their communities, would result in hospital closures and the loss of health care services throughout California. Although financial distress is a common reason for hospitals to merge or affiliate, these arrangements also occur for myriad other reasons such as financial efficiency, expanded access to services, clinical integration, better coordinated patient care, and bolstered support for nurses and physicians. Under existing law, the AG has broad authority to review all sales and significant asset transfers of not-for-profit hospitals. The AG may place conditions on these transactions or deny them all together. Additionally, the AG enforces The Cartwright Act, which describes and prohibits an array of anticompetitive activity. This bill would create a presumption that these transactions are anticompetitive, placing the burden of proof on the purchaser without due process and effectively creating a “guilty until proven innocent” system. Sales, affiliations, and mergers are complex and expensive investments that require thousands of hours of work from legal, financial, operational, and clinical experts. Because of this substantive investment of time and resources, purchasers need some degree of certainty surrounding the process before undertaking such a risk. The bill gives arbitrary and absolute discretion to the AG to determine whether criteria are met, without clear definitions or parameters. Sutter Health writes that this approach to the review of healthcare affiliations is inconsistent with generally accepted legal and economic principles of antitrust merger analysis and years of judicial precedent. The vast majority of mergers, acquisitions and comparable affiliations do not involve competitors and thus are unlikely to substantially lessen competition in the form of higher prices or inferior quality of or access to care. Sutter Health also writes that the proposed “substantial likelihood” standard is speculative and uncertain, given the difficulty of quantifying likely cost and quality effects before a transaction closes. This bill provides payers and large provider groups that do not own a hospital an unfair competitive advantage by excluding them from this process. This bill does not require a showing of significant market share in a properly defined relevant market, but instead permits a finding of “market power” based simply on a finding of “substantial anticompetitive effect.” The California Medical Association (CMA) believes this bill is broadly written to seemingly trigger review and presumptive denial of any lease, loan, grant, service agreement, or contract change a physician or medical group has, attaching new and uncertain process to the list of financial and administrative hurdles doctors are already facing. CMA writes that the process created seems to favor larger systems that can afford the legal counsel to hopefully get them necessary approvals for such agreements.
- Policy comments. This bill touches upon various issues within the jurisdiction of the Senate Judiciary Committee, including, but not limited
to consumer protection, due process, and civil actions. The Senate Judiciary Committee has historically tended to favor policies that fortify consumer protections and prohibit anticompetitive activities that result in harm to Californians. Last year, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed AB 824 (Wood, Chapter 531, Statutes of 2019) that codifies standards articulated by the California Supreme Court in which reverse payment settlements in pharmaceutical patent infringement cases are presumed to be anticompetitive unless procompetitive effects can be clearly and convincingly demonstrated, and subjects parties who engage in anticompetitive reverse payment settlements to a civil penalty. This bill contains some similar provisions from AB 824.- As written, the range of transactions that could fall under the AG’s purview are not entirely clear, and could include transactions involving a single physician. The committee may wish to request amendments to refine these details and ensure that this review and approval process is transparent and focused on those transactions at risk of significant anticompetitive activities.
- Regular monitoring and review of California’s health care market can be a valuable mechanism for the state to identify gaps in services and unreasonable pricing. A Health Care Affordability office has been proposed in the Governor’s 2020-21 budget. It is unclear if and when this office may be established. The advisory board proposed in this bill would appear to duplicate some of the functions of the Governor’s proposed office. The board would also advise the AG on these reviews. As such, the committee may wish to ensure appropriate conflict of interest standards as members of the advisory board could potentially have an interest in the outcome of the reviews.
- Amendments.
- The author requests amendments to require private equity group or hedge funds to obtain consent from the AG prior to affiliation or acquisition between the private equity group or hedge fund and a health care facility or provider; and,
- To permit, instead of require, the AG to grant a waiver under specified conditions, and permit the AG to adopt regulations regarding the process of requesting a waiver and the conditions the health care system, private equity group, or hedge fund are required to meet for obtaining a waiver.
SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION:
Support: Attorney General Becerra (sponsor)
California Labor Federation
Health Access California
Western Center on Law and Poverty
Oppose: California Chamber of Commerce
California Medical Association
California Hospital Association
Scripps Health
Sutter Health
United Hospital Association
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Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):