AB 2879: Service Member Employment Protection Act.
- Session Year: 2015-2016
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2016-05-27
Existing law prohibits a person from discriminating against a member of the military forces because of his or her membership or service, as prescribed. Existing law makes a violation of those provisions a crime. Existing law also provides civil remedies for violations of those provisions.
This bill would prohibit a person from requiring a waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint, as specified. The bill would prohibit a person from retaliating against a person who refuses to waive his or her rights under those provisions, as prescribed. The bill would require any waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions to be knowing and voluntary, in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, as specified. The bill would require a person seeking to enforce such a that waiver to have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. The bill would apply its provisions to any waiver agreement entered into on or after January 1, 2017, including an agreement that requires private arbitration. A violation of these provisions would not constitute a crime. The bill would include a severability clause.
Existing law prohibits a person from discriminating against a member of the military forces because of his or her membership or service, as prescribed. Existing law makes a violation of those provisions a crime. Existing law also provides civil remedies for violations of those provisions.
This bill would prohibit a person from requiring a waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint, as specified. The bill would prohibit a person from retaliating against a person who refuses to waive his or her rights under those provisions, as prescribed. The bill would require any waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions to be knowing and voluntary, in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, as specified. The bill would require a person seeking to enforce such a waiver to have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. The bill would apply its provisions to any agreement entered into on or after January 1, 2017, including an agreement that requires private arbitration. A violation of these provisions would not constitute a crime. The bill would include a severability clause.
Because a violation of those provisions would constitute a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law prohibits a person from discriminating against a member of the military forces because of his or her membership or service, as prescribed. Existing law makes a violation of those provisions a crime. Existing law also provides civil remedies for violations of those provisions.
This bill would prohibit a person from requiring a waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint, as specified. The bill would prohibit a person from retaliating against a person who refuses to waive his or her rights under those provisions, as prescribed. The bill would require any waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions to be knowing and voluntary, in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, as specified. The bill would require a person seeking to enforce such a waiver to have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. The bill would apply its provisions to any agreement entered into on or after January 1, 2017, including an agreement that requires private arbitration. The bill would include a severability clause.
Because a violation of those provisions would constitute a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law prohibits a person from discriminating against a member of the military forces because of his or her membership or service, as prescribed. Existing law makes a violation of those provisions a crime. Existing law also provides civil remedies for violations of those provisions.
This bill would prohibit a person from requiring a waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint, as specified. The bill would prohibit a person from retaliating against a person who refuses to waive his or her rights under those provisions, as prescribed. The bill would require any waiver of the protections afforded under those provisions to be knowing and voluntary, in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, as specified. The bill would require a person seeking to enforce such a waiver to have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. The bill would apply its provisions to any agreement entered into on or after January 1, 2017, including an agreement that requires private arbitration. The bill would include a severability clause.
Because a violation of those provisions would constitute a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Existing federal law and state law recognizes the need to protect military service members from discrimination in employment. Under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), an employer may not deny initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any employment benefits based on an employees military service. Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code (Section 394), which enacts in state law employment protections that are very similar to USERRA, also prohibits discrimination against service members because of their membership or service in the military. Furthermore, Section 394 prohibits an employer from terminating or prejudicing in any manner a persons employment because of his or her duties or attendance at military places of drill or instruction for the California National Guard.
(b)In California, key protections in the Military and Veterans Code and the Fair Employment and Housing Act strictly prohibit discrimination on the basis of military and veteran status, and further prohibit any non-job-related inquiry of an employee or applicants military and veteran status except that employers may identify members of the military or veterans for the purpose of awarding a veterans preference as permitted by law.
(b)It is the policy of the State of California, through key protections in Section 394 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code), that employers shall not discriminate against an employee or job applicant on the basis of military and veteran status, and furthermore, that employers are prohibited from making any non-job-related inquiry of an employees or applicants military and veteran status, except in order to identify members of the military or veterans for the purpose of awarding a veterans preference as permitted by law.
(c)Because of the importance of these employment protections for the well-being of service members, it is also the policy of the State of California to ensure that all service members have the full benefit of the rights, penalties, remedies, forums, and procedures established to protect service members from discrimination in employment and that service members not be deprived of those rights, penalties, remedies, forums, or procedures through the use of involuntary or coerced waivers.
(d)Nevertheless, service members and reserve members in California have experienced wrongful termination or discrimination in the workplace, in violation of protections under USERRA and Section 394, such as termination when they informed their employers of their need to take time off from work in order to carry out their military reserve duties. Some of these service members have been required to waive their procedural rights under USERRA and Section 394 as a condition of employment.
(d)
(e)Therefore, it is the purpose of this act to ensure that a contract to waive any of the rights, penalties, remedies, forums, or procedures under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code, including any provision that has the effect of limiting the full application or enforcement of any right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure available under this section, is a matter of voluntary consent, not coercion.
(e)
(f)This act shall be known, and may be cited, as the Service Member Employment Protection Act.
SEC. 2.Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code is amended to read:394.(a)No person shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any person, employer, or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm with respect to that members employment, position, or status or be denied or disqualified for employment by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(b)No officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district with respect to that members employment, appointment, position, or status or be denied or disqualified for or discharged from that employment or position by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(c)No person shall prohibit or refuse entrance to any officer or enlisted member of the Army or Navy of the United States or of the military or naval forces of this state into any public entertainment or place of amusement or into any of the places described in Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code because that member wears the uniform of the organization to which he or she belongs.
(d)No employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty or training or by reason of being an officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of this state, or hinder or prevent that person from performing any military service or from attending any military encampment or place of drill or instruction he or she may be called upon to perform or attend by proper authority; prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty or attendance at military encampments or places of drill or instruction; or dissuade, prevent, or stop any person from enlistment or accepting a warrant or commission in the California National Guard or Naval Militia by threat or injury to him or her in respect to his or her employment, position, status, trade, or business because of enlistment or acceptance of a warrant or commission.
(e)(1)No private employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall restrict or terminate any collateral benefit for employees by reason of an employees temporary incapacitation incident to duty in the California National Guard or Naval Militia. As used in this subdivision, temporary incapacitation means any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less.
(2)As used in this subdivision, benefit includes, but is not limited to, health care which may be continued at the employees expense, life insurance, disability insurance, and seniority status.
(f)No person who provides lending or financing shall discriminate against any person with respect to the terms of a loan or financing, including, but not limited to, the finance charge, based on that persons membership in the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States. With respect to any loan or credit transaction covered by Section 670 of Public Law 109-364 and Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register, a person that does not market or extend those transactions to covered borrowers shall not be in violation of this section. For purposes of this section, a covered borrower has the same meaning as provided for in Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register.
(g)(1)A person shall not require another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(2)A person shall not threaten, retaliate, or discriminate against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(3)Except for any legal right, penalty, forum, or procedure that state or federal law prohibits from being waived, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment.
(4)Any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
(5)Any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
(6)This section shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this code, section, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
(h)Any person violating subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. In addition to injunctive relief and any other available remedies, any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be liable for actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the injured party.
(i)The remedies provided for in this section are not intended to be exclusive but are in addition to the remedies provided for in other laws, including Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.
(j)The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Existing federal law and state law recognizes the need to protect military service members from discrimination in employment. Under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), an employer may not deny initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any employment benefits based on an employees military service.
(b)In California, key protections in the Military and Veterans Code and the Fair Employment and Housing Act strictly prohibit discrimination on the basis of military and veteran status, and further prohibit any non-job-related inquiry of an employee or applicants military and veteran status except that employers may identify members of the military or veterans for the purpose of awarding a veterans preference as permitted by law.
(c)Because of the importance of these employment protections for the well-being of service members, it is the policy of the State of California to ensure that all service members have the full benefit of the rights, penalties, remedies, forums, and procedures established to protect service members from discrimination in employment and that service members not be deprived of those rights, penalties, remedies, forums, or procedures through the use of involuntary or coerced waivers.
(d)Therefore, it is the purpose of this act to ensure that a contract to waive any of the rights, penalties, remedies, forums, or procedures under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code, including any provision that has the effect of limiting the full application or enforcement of any right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure available under this section, is a matter of voluntary consent, not coercion.
(e)This act shall be known, and may be cited, as the Service Member Employment Protection Act.
SECTION 1.SEC. 2.Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code is amended to read:394.(a)No person shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any person, employer, or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm with respect to that members employment, position, or status or be denied or disqualified for employment by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(b)No officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district with respect to that members employment, appointment, position, or status or be denied or disqualified for or discharged from that employment or position by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(c)No person shall prohibit or refuse entrance to any officer or enlisted member of the Army or Navy of the United States or of the military or naval forces of this state into any public entertainment or place of amusement or into any of the places described in Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code because that member wears the uniform of the organization to which he or she belongs.
(d)No employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty or training or by reason of being an officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of this state, or hinder or prevent that person from performing any military service or from attending any military encampment or place of drill or instruction he or she may be called upon to perform or attend by proper authority; prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty or attendance at military encampments or places of drill or instruction; or dissuade, prevent, or stop any person from enlistment or accepting a warrant or commission in the California National Guard or Naval Militia by threat or injury to him or her in respect to his or her employment, position, status, trade, or business because of enlistment or acceptance of a warrant or commission.
(e)(1)No private employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall restrict or terminate any collateral benefit for employees by reason of an employees temporary incapacitation incident to duty in the National Guard or Naval Militia. As used in this subdivision, temporary incapacitation means any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less.
(2)As used in this subdivision, benefit includes, but is not limited to, health care which may be continued at the employees expense, life insurance, disability insurance, and seniority status.
(f)No person who provides lending or financing shall discriminate against any person with respect to the terms of a loan or financing, including, but not limited to, the finance charge, based on that persons membership in the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States. With respect to any loan or credit transaction covered by Section 670 of Public Law 109-364 and Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register, a person that does not market or extend those transactions to covered borrowers shall not be in violation of this section. For purposes of this section, a covered borrower has the same meaning as provided for in Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register.
(g)(1)A person shall not require another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(2)A person shall not threaten, retaliate, or discriminate against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(3)Except for any legal right, penalty, forum, or procedure that state or federal law prohibits from being waived, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment.
(4)Any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
(5)Any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
(6)This section shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this code, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
(h)Any person violating subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. In addition to injunctive relief and any other available remedies, any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be liable for actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the injured party.
(i)The remedies provided for in this section are not intended to be exclusive but are in addition to the remedies provided for in other laws, including Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.
(j)The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)No person shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any person, employer, or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm with respect to that members employment, position position, or status or be denied or disqualified for employment by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(b)No officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district with respect to that members employment, appointment, position position, or status or be denied or disqualified for or discharged from that employment or position by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(c)No person shall prohibit or refuse entrance to any officer or enlisted member of the Army or Navy of the United States or of the military or naval forces of this state into any public entertainment or place of amusement or into any of the places described in Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code because that member wears the uniform of the organization to which he or she belongs.
(d)No employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty or training or by reason of being an officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of this state, or hinder or prevent that person from performing any military service or from attending any military encampment or place of drill or instruction he or she may be called upon to perform or attend by proper authority; prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty or attendance at military encampments or places of drill or instruction; or dissuade, prevent, or stop any person from enlistment or accepting a warrant or commission in the California National Guard or Naval Militia by threat or injury to him or her in respect to his or her employment, position, status, trade, or business because of enlistment or acceptance of a warrant or commission.
(e)(1)No private employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall restrict or terminate any collateral benefit for employees by reason of an employees temporary incapacitation incident to duty in the National Guard or Naval Militia. As used in this subdivision, temporary incapacitation means any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less.
(2)As used in this subdivision, benefit includes, but is not limited to, health care which may be continued at the employees expense, life insurance, disability insurance, and seniority status.
(f)No person who provides lending or financing shall discriminate against any person with respect to the terms of a loan or financing, including, but not limited to, the finance charge, based on that persons membership in the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States. With respect to any loan or credit transaction covered by Section 670 of Public Law 109-364 and Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register, a person that does not market or extend those transactions to covered borrowers shall not be in violation of this section. For purposes of this section, a covered borrower has the same meaning as provided for in Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register.
(g)(1)A person shall not require another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(2)A person shall not threaten, retaliate, or discriminate against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(3)Except for any legal right, penalty, forum, or procedure that state or federal law prohibits from being waived, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment.
(4)Any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
(5)Any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
(6)This section shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this code, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
(h)Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. In addition to injunctive relief and any other remedies available, available remedies, any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be liable for actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the injured party.
(i)The remedies provided for in this section are not intended to be exclusive but are in addition to the remedies provided for in other laws, including Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.
(j)The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)No person shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any person, employer, or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm with respect to that members employment, position or status or be denied or disqualified for employment by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(b)No officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district shall discriminate against any officer, warrant officer or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the state or of the United States because of that membership. No member of the military forces shall be prejudiced or injured by any officer or employee of the state, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district with respect to that members employment, appointment, position or status or be denied or disqualified for or discharged from that employment or position by virtue of membership or service in the military forces of this state or of the United States.
(c)No person shall prohibit or refuse entrance to any officer or enlisted member of the Army or Navy of the United States or of the military or naval forces of this state into any public entertainment or place of amusement or into any of the places described in Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code because that member wears the uniform of the organization to which he or she belongs.
(d)No employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty or training or by reason of being an officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of this state, or hinder or prevent that person from performing any military service or from attending any military encampment or place of drill or instruction he or she may be called upon to perform or attend by proper authority; prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty or attendance at military encampments or places of drill or instruction; or dissuade, prevent, or stop any person from enlistment or accepting a warrant or commission in the California National Guard or Naval Militia by threat or injury to him or her in respect to his or her employment, position, status, trade, or business because of enlistment or acceptance of a warrant or commission.
(e)(1)No private employer or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or firm, or other person, shall restrict or terminate any collateral benefit for employees by reason of an employees temporary incapacitation incident to duty in the National Guard or Naval Militia. As used in this subdivision, temporary incapacitation means any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less.
(2)As used in this subdivision, benefit includes, but is not limited to, health care which may be continued at the employees expense, life insurance, disability insurance, and seniority status.
(f)No person who provides lending or financing shall discriminate against any person with respect to the terms of a loan or financing, including, but not limited to, the finance charge, based on that persons membership in the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States. With respect to any loan or credit transaction covered by Section 670 of Public Law 109-364 and Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register, a person that does not market or extend those transactions to covered borrowers shall not be in violation of this section. For purposes of this section, a covered borrower has the same meaning as provided for in Section 232 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as published on August 31, 2007, in Volume 72 of the Federal Register.
(g)(1)A person shall not require another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(2)A person shall not threaten, retaliate, or discriminate against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
(3)Except for any legal right, penalty, forum, or procedure that state or federal law prohibits from being waived, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment.
(4)Any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Nothing in this subdivision shall affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
(5)Any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
(6)This section shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this code, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
(g)
(h)Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. In addition, addition to injunctive relief and any other remedies available, any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be liable for actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the injured party.
(h)
(i)The remedies provided for in this section are not intended to be exclusive but are in addition to the remedies provided for in other laws, including Sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code.
(j)The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Jun 13, 2016 | Ordered to inactive file at the request of Assembly Member Mark Stone. |
| May 27, 2016 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to third reading. (Page 4944.) |
| May 27, 2016 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 9, 2016 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 5, 2016 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (May 4). |
| Apr 19, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on L. & E. (Ayes 7. Noes 3.) (April 19). Re-referred to Com. on L. & E. |
| Apr 12, 2016 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Apr 11, 2016 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 7, 2016 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 6, 2016 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 5, 2016 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 31, 2016 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and L. & E. |
| Feb 26, 2016 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 27. |
| Feb 25, 2016 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
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Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 4, 2016 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Labor and Employment |
Passed |
|
| Apr 19, 2016 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Labor and Employment] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 2879
Author:(Mark Stone)
As Amended Ver:May 27, 2016
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Judiciary | 7-3 | Mark Stone, Alejo, Chau, Chiu, Cristina Garcia, Holden, Ting | Wagner, Gallagher, Maienschein |
Labor | 5-2 | Roger Hernández, Chu, McCarty, O'Donnell, Thurmond | Patterson, Linder |
SUMMARY: Safeguards employment protections for active military service members and reserve guard members by, among other things, prohibiting the waiver of certain legal rights under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code as a condition of employment. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a person from requiring another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of the Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (Section 394), as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Prohibits a person from threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Requires any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 to be knowing and voluntary and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, including any waiver of the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable, and clarifies that these provisions do not affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
- Provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 would have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
- Establishes that the above provisions shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
- Clarifies that any violation of the above provisions does not make a person guilty of a misdemeanor. Further clarifies that injunctive relief and other remedies are available against any person violating any of the provisions of Section 394, and that these provisions are severable.
FISCAL EFFECT: None
COMMENTS: This bill would enact the Service Member Employment Protection Act, important legislation that provides several key protections to ensure that military service members do not involuntarily waive any of the employment rights afforded to them under the Military and Veterans Code Section 394. The cornerstone of this bill is a rule that prohibits employers from requiring an active or reserve duty service member, as a condition of employment, to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for violations of Section 394 – including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with an appropriate court, law enforcement, or other governmental entity.
According to the author, employers are increasingly requiring their employees to resolve disputes in private arbitration rather than by filing a civil action in court. Recent cases have identified examples of service members who were unable to enforce federal and state employment rights specifically established for their protection after being compelled into arbitration because, for example, the arbitrator in the case did not apply the law correctly regarding the employer's burden of proof. The author states: "AB 2879 will help ensure that service members are not prevented from going to court to enforce their employment rights under Section 394 as the result of any waiver or mandatory arbitration clause imposed as a condition of employment. The bill is intended to ensure that waivers of important employment rights and procedures arising under Section 394 are made voluntarily and with the consent of the service member employee." As recently amended, this bill is supported by a broad range advocates for service members and veterans, including the National Guard Association of California, American Legion (Department of CA), AMVETS (Department of CA), Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) (Department of CA), the Military Officers Association of America, CA Council of Chapters, and others.
Federal law, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), prohibits employment discrimination against a person on the basis of past military service, current military obligations, or intent to serve. (38 United States Code (U.S.C.) Sections 4301-4333.) Among other things, USERRA protects civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of the active and reserve components of the United States (U.S.) armed forces. Under USERRA, an employer may not deny initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment to a person on the basis of a past, present, or future service obligation. In addition, an employer must not retaliate against a person because of an action taken to enforce or exercise any USERRA right or for assisting in an USERRA investigation. (U.S. Department of Labor Web site; available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/ aboutuserra.htm.)
In addition to USERRA, service members are provided further protections under California Military and Veterans Code Section 394. Recent amendments to this bill clarify that California Military and Veterans Code Section 394 is very similar to the USERRA because both establish important job protections and anti-discrimination provisions for military service members. Among other things, Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership, and also provides that no employer or person shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty, or prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty. In short, Section 394 establishes important job protections for California service members because of the crucial role they play in defending our country and the sacrifices they make to carry out their military duties and training, including deployment overseas or being away from work and family for extended periods of time.
Private arbitration is essentially unregulated and highly controversial when it is mandatory, rather than voluntary. Proponents of this bill, including the Consumer Attorneys and the California Labor Federation, among others, contend that private arbitration is an "anything-goes" private justice industry with little, if any, regulation, oversight or legal accountability to the parties or the public. They note that arbitrators need not be trained in the law, need not render a decision consistent with the evidence presented to them, and are not even required to apply the law in a particular dispute.
A recent New York Times investigation neatly summarized some of the challenges that ordinary people face when they find themselves compelled into arbitration:
The Times, examining records from more than 25,000 arbitrations between 2010 and 2014 and interviewing hundreds of lawyers, arbitrators, plaintiffs and judges in 35 states, uncovered many troubling cases. Behind closed doors, proceedings can devolve into legal free-for-alls. Companies have paid employees to testify in their favor. ...Winners and losers are decided by a single arbitrator who is largely at liberty to determine how much evidence a plaintiff can present and how much the defense can withhold. To deliver favorable outcomes to companies, some arbitrators have twisted or outright disregarded the law, interviews and records show. "What rules of evidence apply?" one arbitration firm asks in the question and answer section of its Web site. "The short answer is none."
Like the arbitrator in [a case detailed in the piece], some have no experience as a judge but wield far more power. And unlike the outcomes in civil court, arbitrators' rulings are nearly impossible to appeal. When plaintiffs have asked the courts to intervene, court records show, they have almost always lost. Saying its hands were tied, one court in California said it could not overturn arbitrators' decisions even if they caused "substantial injustice." (New York Times, "In Arbitration, a 'Privatization of the Justice System'" (November 2, 2015).)
What evidence is presented may, in fact, be incomplete because parties in arbitration have no legal right to obtain evidence in support of their claims or defenses, or the claims or defenses of the other party, contrary to the longstanding discovery practice in public courts. Indeed, unlike judges, arbitrators need not explain or defend the rationale for their decisions.
Furthermore, a private arbitrator's award may be enforced by a court even if the decision is legally and factually erroneous. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal.4th 1, (1992). (See also Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation, 95 Cal.App.4th 730 (2002), allowing private arbitrators to issue binding decisions that are legally enforceable but essentially unreviewable by a court even if the arbitration agreement expressly provides for judicial review.) The Moncharsh court also stated that "arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decisions upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action." (Id. at 10-11.) Thus, under Moncharsh, there appears to be little need for an arbitrator to justify his or her decision because the law and the evidence need not be followed, and because there is no right for any party to appeal or obtain an independent review of the arbitrator's ruling unless expressly provided by contract.
This bill appears to be carefully crafted to focus on general contract formation issues that are not subject to preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Enacted in 1947, the Federal Arbitration Act generally provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." (9 U.S.C. Section 2.) Opponents, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, assert that the restrictions on waivers in this bill are likely preempted by the FAA because this bill conflicts with the FAA's policy of encouraging arbitration and disapproving special impediments to the enforcement of arbitration contracts. Opponents state that:
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) held that the FAA prohibits states from conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures as such a requirement would be inconsistent with the intent of the FAA. Specifically, the Court stated that, "when state law prohibits outrights the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA." Id. A state law that frustrates or interferes with a prime objective of arbitration to streamline proceedings and provide expeditious results is preempted by the FAA. Id. at 1749. While the Court specified that states could still regulate contractual defenses, those defenses must be applicable to all contracts, not just those targeted at arbitration.
In response, the author notes that the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Therefore, under this so-called "savings clause," states may regulate contracts under "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability." See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). In other words, states are not barred from establishing rules on the validity of arbitration agreements, as long as those rules apply to contracts generally and not just to agreements that include arbitration provisions.
Here, this bill prohibits a person from requiring another person "to waive any [emphasis added] legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code as a condition of employment," including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with specified law enforcement or other governmental entities. This bill applies equally to public employers as well as private employers. Contrary to opponents' characterizations of this bill, this bill does not "outright prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim", the author contends, nor does it particularly single out arbitration because this bill's restrictions apply equally to "waiver of any legal rights or procedure for a violation of Section 394", not just specifically an arbitration agreement. Instead, the author contends, this bill relies squarely on the general contract law principle of unconscionability to invalidate waivers that are required as a condition of employment. Committee staff notes that unconscionability is routinely applied by the courts to invalidate contracts, including arbitration or other waiver agreements. (See, e.g. Wherry v. Award, Inc., 192 Cal. App.4th 1242 (2011).)
This bill defines the level of consent that is necessary to support the waiver of rights, without prohibiting or disfavoring arbitration contrary to the FAA. While existing law may protect employees from unconscionable contracts, the author contends that it does not adequately protect workers from waivers of rights that are not knowing and voluntary. This bill seeks to establish general contract principles about the level of consent that is needed to support the waiver of rights—more specifically, it seeks to ensure that agreements to waive important statutory rights are made knowingly and voluntarily, and not required as a condition of employment.
First, this bill provides that, except where prohibited by federal or state law, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment. Second, this bill provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Third, this bill provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. In short, this bill seeks to establish that any waiver of legal rights under Section 394 must be knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment, in which case the waiver is deemed involuntary and unenforceable.
According to the author, these provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the FAA because that purpose follows the basic precept, emphasized numerous times by the Supreme Court, that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 US 52 (1995). Furthermore, the author notes that in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly left room for states to regulate the formation of arbitration agreements to address matters of consent. (131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); See Footnote 6.) Consequently, the author contends, this bill does not run afoul of Concepcion because it addresses in a broad and general way the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion — that is, that the contract is entered into knowingly and voluntarily and not as a condition of employment. According to the author:
AB 2879 is not a categorical prohibition on the enforcement on arbitration agreements. Indeed it actually permits knowing and voluntary agreements. Nor could the FAA authorize or require the enforcement of involuntary or coerced arbitration agreements. There are numerous constitutional rights waived by an agreement to arbitrate—the First Amendment right of petition, the Fifth Amendment right of Due Process and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. The law has always required that the waiver of those rights be knowing and voluntary. The FAA, a mere statute, does not have the power to reduce or conflict with constitutional guarantees. Indeed, because orders compelling arbitration and the entry of judgments based on arbitration awards are actions of the courts and thus 'state action', it would be plainly unconstitutional for the courts to participate in the involuntary or coerced deprivation of those rights. There is no Supreme Court case that remotely suggests that a state statute that merely requires a truly consensual agreement to arbitrate is preempted. What has been preempted are categorical refusals to enforce agreements that would be otherwise be enforceable under the FAA.
According to the author, this bill does not seek to bar arbitration or other waiver agreements; it simply makes it unlawful to seek an unknowing and involuntary waiver of rights or procedures regarding abuse laws prior to a dispute arising. The author reiterates that there is no state or federal policy favoring involuntary waiver or arbitration agreements. If this bill is pre-empted, it would seem that the FAA would logically also then pre-empt courts from applying unconscionability principles to any arbitration or other waiver agreement.
Opponents' concern about a "litigation predicament." Opponents argue that this bill forces employers into a situation where they are subject to increased risk of litigation no matter what they try to do to comply with this bill. They explain their concerns as follows:
Similar to other protected classification currently in California law, including age, marital status or disability, an applicant's status as member of the military forces is a subject employers seek to avoid when interviewing or reviewing a candidate for employment in order to avoid a discrimination claim if the applicant is ultimately not hired. AB 2879 would place employers in a litigation predicament. If they inquire into the status of the applicant for purposes of complying with AB 2879 and specifically ask the applicant whether they are a member of the military, the employer risks a discrimination claim [under [Fair Employment and Housing Act] FEHA] if the applicant is ultimately not hired. Conversely, if the employer does not inquire into the applicant's status as a member of the military and has the applicant sign an arbitration agreement just like every other employee, the employer is at risk for litigation under AB 2879. Such a predicament is entirely unfair to the employer.
According to the author, there is nothing in this bill that requires employers to treat military service members any differently than they otherwise would be treated under existing law. Recent amendments to this bill clarify that it is the policy of California that employers shall not discriminate against an employee or job applicant on the basis of military and veteran status, and furthermore, that employers are prohibited from making any non-job-related inquiry of an employee or applicant's military and veteran status (except in order to identify members of the military or veterans for the purpose of awarding a veteran's preference as permitted by law.) Whether or not an applicant is asked about his or her military status prior to being offered an employment contract, any waiver of legal rights that is required as a condition of employment would be deemed involuntary and made unenforceable under this bill. Finally, it should be noted that if the applicant wishes to knowingly and voluntarily waive any legal right with the employer, including the right to go to court for an employment dispute, and it is not a condition of employment, then this bill does not prohibit such waiver and there is no litigation predicament.
Analysis Prepared by: Anthony Lew / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0003068
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 2879
Author:(Mark Stone)
As Amended Ver:April 7, 2016
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Judiciary | 7-3 | Mark Stone, Alejo, Chau, Chiu, Cristina Garcia, Holden, Ting | Wagner, Gallagher, Maienschein |
Labor | 5-2 | Roger Hernández, Chu, McCarty, O'Donnell, Thurmond | Patterson, Linder |
SUMMARY: Safeguards employment protections for active military service members and reserve guard members by, among other things, prohibiting the waiver of certain legal rights under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code as a condition of employment. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a person from requiring another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of the Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (Section 394), as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Prohibits a person from threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Requires any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 to be knowing and voluntary and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, including any waiver of the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable, and clarifies that these provisions do not affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
- Provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 would have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
- Establishes that the above provisions shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
- Clarifies that any violation of the above provisions does not make a person guilty of a misdemeanor. Further clarifies that injunctive relief and other remedies are available against any person violating any of the provisions of Section 394, and that these provisions are severable.
FISCAL EFFECT: None
COMMENTS: This bill would enact the Service Member Employment Protection Act, important legislation that provides several key protections to ensure that military service members do not involuntarily waive any of the employment rights afforded to them under the Military and Veterans Code Section 394. The cornerstone of this bill is a rule that prohibits employers from requiring an active or reserve duty service member, as a condition of employment, to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for violations of Section 394—including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with an appropriate court, law enforcement, or other governmental entity.
According to the author, employers are increasingly requiring their employees to resolve disputes in private arbitration rather than by filing a civil action in court. Recent cases have identified examples of service members who were unable to enforce federal and state employment rights specifically established for their protection after being compelled into arbitration because, for example, the arbitrator in the case did not apply the law correctly regarding the employer's burden of proof. The author states: "AB 2879 will help ensure that service members are not prevented from going to court to enforce their employment rights under Section 394 as the result of any waiver or mandatory arbitration clause imposed as a condition of employment. The bill is intended to ensure that waivers of important employment rights and procedures arising under Section 394 are made voluntarily and with the consent of the service member employee."
Like the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) law, California Military and Veterans Code Section 394 establishes important job protections and anti-discrimination provisions for the benefit of military service members. Federal law, USERRA, prohibits employment discrimination against a person on the basis of past military service, current military obligations, or intent to serve. (38 United States Code (U.S.C.) Sections 4301-4333.) Among other things, USERRA protects civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of the active and reserve components of the United States (U.S.) armed forces. USERRA provides that returning service-members must be promptly reemployed in the same position that they would have attained had they not been absent for military service, with the same seniority, status and pay, as well as other rights and benefits determined by seniority. Under USERRA, an employer may not deny initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment to a person on the basis of a past, present, or future service obligation. In addition, an employer must not retaliate against a person because of an action taken to enforce or exercise any USERRA right or for assisting in an USERRA investigation. (U.S. Department of Labor Web site; available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/aboutuserra.htm.)
In addition to USERRA, service members are provided further protections under California Military and Veterans Code Section 394. Among other things, Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership, and also provides that no employer or person shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty, or prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty. In short, Section 394 establishes important job protections for California service members because of the crucial role they play in defending our country and the sacrifices they make to carry out their military duties and training, including deployment overseas or being away from work and family for extended periods of time.
Private arbitration is essentially unregulated and highly controversial when it is mandatory, rather than voluntary. Proponents of the bill, including the Consumer Attorneys and the California Employment Lawyers Association, contend that in their experience, private arbitration is an "anything-goes" private justice industry with little, if any, regulation, oversight or legal accountability to the parties or the public. They note that arbitrators need not be trained in the law, need not render a decision consistent with the evidence presented to them, and are not even required to apply the law in a particular dispute.
A recent New York Times investigation neatly summarized some of the challenges that ordinary people face when they find themselves compelled into arbitration:
The Times, examining records from more than 25,000 arbitrations between 2010 and 2014 and interviewing hundreds of lawyers, arbitrators, plaintiffs and judges in 35 states, uncovered many troubling cases. Behind closed doors, proceedings can devolve into legal free-for-alls. Companies have paid employees to testify in their favor. ...Winners and losers are decided by a single arbitrator who is largely at liberty to determine how much evidence a plaintiff can present and how much the defense can withhold. To deliver favorable outcomes to companies, some arbitrators have twisted or outright disregarded the law, interviews and records show. "What rules of evidence apply?" one arbitration firm asks in the question and answer section of its Web site. "The short answer is none."
Like the arbitrator in [a case detailed in the piece], some have no experience as a judge but wield far more power. And unlike the outcomes in civil court, arbitrators' rulings are nearly impossible to appeal. When plaintiffs have asked the courts to intervene, court records show, they have almost always lost. Saying its hands were tied, one court in California said it could not overturn arbitrators' decisions even if they caused "substantial injustice." (New York Times, "In Arbitration, a 'Privatization of the Justice System'" (November 2, 2015).)
What evidence is presented may, in fact, be incomplete because parties in arbitration have no legal right to obtain evidence in support of their claims or defenses, or the claims or defenses of the other party, contrary to the longstanding discovery practice in public courts. Indeed, unlike judges, arbitrators need not explain or defend the rationale for their decisions.
Furthermore, a private arbitrator's award may be enforced by a court even if the decision is legally and factually erroneous. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal.4th 1, (1992). (See also Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation, 95 Cal.App.4th 730 (2002), allowing private arbitrators to issue binding decisions that are legally enforceable but essentially unreviewable by a court even if the arbitration agreement expressly provides for judicial review.) The Moncharsh court also stated that "arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decisions upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action." (Id. at 10-11.) Thus, under Moncharsh, there appears to be little need for an arbitrator to justify his or her decision because the law and the evidence need not be followed, and because there is no right for any party to appeal or obtain an independent review of the arbitrator's ruling unless expressly provided by contract.
This bill appears to be carefully crafted to focus on general contract formation issues that are not subject to preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Enacted in 1947, the Federal Arbitration Act generally provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." (9 U.S.C. Section 2.) Opponents, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, assert that the restrictions on waivers in this bill are likely preempted by the FAA because the bill conflicts with the FAA's policy of encouraging arbitration and disapproving special impediments to the enforcement of arbitration contracts. Opponents state that:
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) held that the FAA prohibits states from conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures as such a requirement would be inconsistent with the intent of the FAA. Specifically, the Court stated that, "when state law prohibits outrights the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA." Id. A state law that frustrates or interferes with a prime objective of arbitration to streamline proceedings and provide expeditious results is preempted by the FAA. Id. at 1749. While the Court specified that states could still regulate contractual defenses, those defenses must be applicable to all contracts, not just those targeted at arbitration.
In response, the author notes that the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Therefore, under this so-called "savings clause," states may regulate contracts under "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability." See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). In other words, states are not barred from establishing rules on the validity of arbitration agreements, as long as those rules apply to contracts generally and not just to agreements that include arbitration provisions.
Here, the bill prohibits a person from requiring another person "to waive any [emphasis added] legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code as a condition of employment," including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with specified law enforcement or other governmental entities. The bill applies equally to public employers as well as private employers. Contrary to opponents' characterizations of the bill, this bill does not "outright prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim", the author contends, nor does it particularly single out arbitration because the bill's restrictions apply equally to "waiver of any legal rights or procedure for a violation of Section 394", not just specifically an arbitration agreement. Instead, the author contends, this bill relies squarely on the general contract law principle of unconscionability to invalidate waivers that are required as a condition of employment. Committee staff notes that unconscionability is routinely applied by the courts to invalidate contracts, including arbitration or other waiver agreements. (See, e.g. Wherry v. Award, Inc., 192 Cal. App.4th 1242 (2011).)
This bill defines the level of consent that is necessary to support the waiver of rights, without prohibiting or disfavoring arbitration contrary to the FAA. While existing law may protect employees from unconscionable contracts, the author contends that it does not adequately protect workers from waivers of rights that are not knowing and voluntary. This bill seeks to establish general contract principles about the level of consent that is needed to support the waiver of rights—more specifically, it seeks to ensure that agreements to waive important statutory rights are made knowingly and voluntarily, and not required as a condition of employment.
First, the bill provides that, except where prohibited by federal or state law, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment. Second, the bill provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Third, the bill provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. In short, the bill seeks to establish that any waiver of legal rights under Section 394 must be knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment, in which case the waiver is deemed involuntary and unenforceable.
According to the author, these provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the FAA because that purpose follows the basic precept, emphasized numerous times by the Supreme Court, that arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 US 52 (1995). Furthermore, the author notes that in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly left room for states to regulate the formation of arbitration agreements to address matters of consent. (131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); See Footnote 6.) Consequently, the author contends, this bill does not run afoul of Concepcion because it addresses in a broad and general way the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion — that is, that the contract is entered into knowingly and voluntarily and not as a condition of employment. According to the author:
AB 2879 is not a categorical prohibition on the enforcement on arbitration agreements. Indeed it actually permits knowing and voluntary agreements. Nor could the FAA authorize or require the enforcement of involuntary or coerced arbitration agreements. There are numerous constitutional rights waived by an agreement to arbitrate—the First Amendment right of petition, the Fifth Amendment right of Due Process and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. The law has always required that the waiver of those rights be knowing and voluntary. The FAA, a mere statute, does not have the power to reduce or conflict with constitutional guarantees. Indeed, because orders compelling arbitration and the entry of judgments based on arbitration awards are actions of the courts and thus 'state action', it would be plainly unconstitutional for the courts to participate in the involuntary or coerced deprivation of those rights. There is no Supreme Court case that remotely suggests that a state statute that merely requires a truly consensual agreement to arbitrate is preempted. What has been preempted are categorical refusals to enforce agreements that would be otherwise be enforceable under the FAA.
According to the author, this bill does not seek to bar arbitration or other waiver agreements; it simply makes it unlawful to seek an unknowing and involuntary waiver of rights or procedures regarding abuse laws prior to a dispute arising. The author reiterates that there is no state or federal policy favoring involuntary waiver or arbitration agreements. If this bill is pre-empted, it would seem that the FAA would logically also then pre-empt courts from applying unconscionability principles to any arbitration or other waiver agreement. According to the Judiciary Committee, its research did not find any court decision that lends support to such a far-reaching view of FAA pre-emption.
Opponents' concern about a "litigation predicament." Opponents argue that the bill forces employers into a situation where they are subject to increased risk of litigation no matter what they try to do to comply with the bill. They explain their concerns as follows:
AB 2879 is targeted at members of the military forces. Notably in 2014, members of the military were added as a protected classification under [Fair Employment and Housing Act] FEHA for purposed of employment discrimination (AB 556,[( Salas), Chapter 691]. Similar to other protected classification currently in California law, including age, marital status or disability, an applicant's status as member of the military forces is a subject employers seek to avoid when interviewing or reviewing a candidate for employment in order to avoid a discrimination claim if the applicant is ultimately not hired.
AB 2879 would place employers in a litigation predicament. If they inquire into the status of the applicant for purposes of complying with AB 2879 and specifically ask the applicant whether they are a member of the military, the employer risks a discrimination claim if the applicant is ultimately not hired. Conversely, if the employer does not inquire into the applicant's status as a member of the military and has the applicant sign an arbitration agreement just like every other employee, the employer is at risk for litigation under AB 2879. Such a predicament is entirely unfair to the employer.
The April 7, 2016, amendments to the bill clarify that violations of the proposed prohibitions against requiring another person to waive any legal right under Section 394 as a condition of employment are not punishable as a misdemeanor under current law. Accordingly, the author contends there is nothing in this bill that requires employers to treat military service members any differently than they otherwise would be treated under existing law. Furthermore, there is no need for the employer to inquire into the status of the job applicant in order to comply with this bill, because an employer could comply simply by not requiring an applicant to sign away his or her rights under Section 394 as a condition of employment. Whether or not an applicant is asked about his or her military status prior to being offered an employment contract, any waiver of legal rights that is required as a condition of employment would be deemed involuntary and made unenforceable under this bill. Finally, it should be noted that if the applicant wishes to knowingly and voluntarily waive any legal right with the employer, including the right to go to court for an employment dispute, and it is not a condition of employment, then the bill does not prohibit such waiver and there is no litigation predicament.
Analysis Prepared by: Anthony Lew/ JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0002927
Date of Hearing: May 4, 2016
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Roger Hernández, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2879 (
Author:Mark Stone) – As Amended Ver:April 7, 2016
SUBJECT: Service Member Employment Protection Act
SUMMARY: Enacts the Service Member Employment Protection Act to safeguard employment protections for active military service members and reserve guard members by, among other things, prohibiting the waiver of certain legal rights under existing state law as a condition of employment. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a person from requiring another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code ("Section 394"), as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Prohibits a person from threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Requires any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 to be knowing and voluntary and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, including any waiver of the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable, and clarifies that these provisions do not affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
- Provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 would have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
- Establishes that the above provisions shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
- Clarifies that any violation of the above provisions does not make a person guilty of a misdemeanor. Further clarifies that injunctive relief and other remedies are available against any person violating any of the provisions of Section 394, and that these provisions are severable.
- Makes legislative findings and declarations, as specified.
EXISTING LAW:
- Prohibits discrimination against any officer or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the State or of the United States because of that membership. Further provides that no military service member shall be prejudiced or injured by any person or employer with respect to that member’s employment, position, or status, or be denied or disqualified for employment by virtue of membership or service in the military. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (a).)
- Provides that the above provision also applies to prohibit discrimination by any officer or employee of the State, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district against a service member. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (b).)
- Prohibits an employer or other person from discharging any person from employment, or from retaliating against that person because of the performance of any ordered military duty or training or by reason of being a service member. Further prohibits an employer or other person from hindering or preventing that service member from performing any military service or from attending any military encampment or place of drill or instruction he or she may be called upon to perform or attend by proper authority. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (d).)
- Prohibits any private employer from restricting or terminating any collateral benefit for employees by reason of an employee’s temporary incapacitation incident or any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less to duty in the National Guard or Naval Militia. As used in this subdivision, “temporary incapacitation” means any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (e).)
- Provides that no person who provides lending or financing shall discriminate against any person with respect to the terms of a loan or financing, including, but not limited to, the finance charge, based on that person’s membership in the military or naval forces of this State or of the United States. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (f).)
- Provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer, because of a person's military or veterans status, (a) to refuse to hire or employ the person; (b) to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment; (c) to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment; or (d) to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Government Code Section 12940 (a).)
- Provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make any nonjob-related inquiry of an employee or applicant that expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to military and veteran status. (Government Code Section 12940 (d).)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: This bill would enact the Service Member Employment Protection Act to provide several key protections to ensure that military service members do not involuntarily waive any of the employment rights afforded to them under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code. According to the author, the cornerstone of this bill is a rule that prohibits employers from requiring an active or reserve duty service member, as a condition of employment, to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for violations of Section 394—including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with an appropriate court, law enforcement, or other governmental entity.
Members of this Committee will be familiar with the broad issues raised by this bill from the discussion of last year's AB 465 (Roger Hernández). AB 465 was substantially similar to this bill, and would have prohibited any person from requiring another person, as a condition of employment, to agree to the waiver of any legal right or procedure, but for employment law violations in the Labor Code rather than violations of Section 394 of the Military & Veterans Code. AB 465 would have provided that any such waiver required from an employee or potential employee as a condition of employment or continued employment is unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. The bill was vetoed by Governor Brown.
With respect to this bill, the author states that it is needed for the following reasons:
"California Military & Veterans Code Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership. Among other things, Section 394 also prohibits an employer from discharging any person from employment, or prejudicing or harming the person in any manner in his or her employment, because of that person's membership in the military or that person's performance of military service or duties.
These common-sense employment protections for our military service members are intended to ensure that they are not targeted for termination or discrimination in the workplace when, for example, they may be called away for deployment or reserve guard duties in service of their country. If they do face termination or any other violation of Section 394, the law allows them to file a civil action to enforce their rights.
Generally speaking, however, employers are increasingly requiring their employees to resolve disputes in private arbitration rather than by filing a civil action in court. Recent cases have identified examples of service members who were unable to enforce the employment rights specifically established for their protection after being compelled into arbitration. For example, recently a service member who had previously served two tours in Iraq was terminated from his job at an auto parts store when he had to leave for a two week-long training. When he challenged his termination, he was compelled to arbitration and lost. The arbitrator in his case did not apply the law correctly regarding the employer's burden of proof. Because the case was decided in binding arbitration, the service member had no opportunity to appeal or obtain judicial review of the decision.
[This bill] will help ensure that service members are not prevented from going to court to enforce their employment rights under Section 394 as the result of any waiver or mandatory arbitration clause imposed as a condition of employment. The bill is intended to ensure that waivers of important employment rights and procedures arising under Section 394 are made voluntarily and with the consent of the service member employee."
Background on Federal USERRA and California Military & Veterans Code Section 394
Federal law, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), prohibits employment discrimination against a person on the basis of past military service, current military obligations, or intent to serve. (38 U.S.C. Secs. 4301-4333) Among other things, USERRA protects civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of the active and reserve components of the U.S. armed forces. USERRA provides that returning service-members must be promptly reemployed in the same position that they would have attained had they not been absent for military service, with the same seniority, status and pay, as well as other rights and benefits determined by seniority. Under USERRA, an employer may not deny initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment to a person on the basis of a past, present, or future service obligation. In addition, an employer must not retaliate against a person because of an action taken to enforce or exercise any USERRA right or for assisting in an USERRA investigation. (U.S. Dept. of Labor website; available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/aboutuserra.htm.) USERRA's provisions are liberally construed in favor of the service member, while employer defenses are narrowly construed and contrary state laws or private agreements are prohibited.
In addition to USERRA, service members are provided further protections under California Military & Veterans Code Section 394. Among other things, Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership, and also provides that no employer or person shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty, or prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty. In short, Section 394 establishes important job protections for California service members and reserve members because of the crucial role they play in defending our country and the sacrifices they make to carry out their military duties and training, including deployment overseas or being away from work and family for extended periods of time.
Stated Need for This Bill
According to the author, the impetus for the bill arises out of recent examples brought to his attention in which military service members or guard members experienced wrongful termination or illegal discrimination in violation of USERRA and Military and Veterans Code Section 394. For example, the case of Maj. Steven Lively is illustrative of the type of injustice that the bill seeks to address. Rather than being able to enforce the employment protections afforded to him under Section 394, however, Maj. Lively tells an alarming story of being compelled into arbitration after being wrongfully terminated from his job, and ultimately suffering the loss of his job because the arbitrator in his case did not properly follow or apply the law—all arising, according to Maj. Lively, from the fact that he had involuntarily waived certain rights, including the right to go to court, as a condition of his employment contract.
On March 1, 2016, Maj. Lively, testified briefly about his experience before the Senate Judiciary Committee, at an informational hearing titled "The Federal Arbitration Act, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Impact of Mandatory Arbitration on Californian Consumers and Employees." Subsequently he was able to give a longer account of his experience to Assembly Judiciary Committee staff, which is recounted in more detail here.
According to Maj. Lively, he joined the United States Army after the terrorist attacks of September 11 because he felt a duty to serve his country in the wake of that horrific tragedy. Maj. Lively became a Captain in the United States Army, while he served three tours of duty overseas -- two in Iraq and one in Afghanistan -- before returning to California to his wife and family and civilian job. He was hired by Pick-N-Pull Auto Parts, as its Asset Manager, where he directed the logistics of its fleet of vehicles and other inventory. While he was employed at Pick-N-Pull, Maj. Lively continued to serve as a Reservist in the United States Army, which required him to attend drills one long weekend per month and two weeks per year.
According to Maj. Lively, at first he was asked seemingly innocuous questions, such as whether he had control over his military drill schedule. However, each time Maj. Lively missed a day of work for a military drill, he was subjected to discipline or other unfair treatment -- such as suddenly having four weeks to complete a major project, instead of eight weeks. The first time Maj. Lively missed a day of work to drill, he received a "Final Written Warning" just days after his return. Maj. Lively was told he needed to use his vacation days for military drill days. Despite the obstacles constantly being thrown towards Maj. Lively, he worked hard and achieved the highest bonus in his division during his first 6 months of employment with the company. Immediately after that achievement, Maj. Lively had to attend his annual two-week military drill. Right before he left, Maj. Lively's supervisor told him that he would "fish or cut bait" with respect to Maj. Lively's employment upon his return to duty.
The next time Maj. Lively was to attend a drill day, his supervisor suddenly remembered an urgent assignment Maj. Lively needed to complete, and he pulled over on the side of the road on his way to the drill to finish this assignment as requested. The next time Maj. Lively was to drill, his supervisor demanded he skip his drill day to complete an assignment or be fired.
Maj. Lively made a complaint of retaliation to the company, which was ignored. Just weeks after making the complaint, his employment was terminated. Maj. Lively was told the company was going through a "reduction in force," but he was the only employee laid off at the time. In addition, the company marked Maj. Lively ineligible for rehire. Just weeks later, another individual -- who was not a member of the armed forces -- was hired to perform Maj. Lively's job duties.
Maj. Lively brought a lawsuit in Sacramento County Superior Court, and sought a jury trial of all his claims. Instead, because of an arbitration agreement Maj. Lively was required to sign as a condition of employment, his case was sent to private, secret arbitration. Maj. Lively had only five hours to present all his witnesses, including himself and his wife to testify about the devastating effects his termination had on their family. At the conclusion of the arbitration, the arbitrator declined to follow the law and ruled in favor of the employer.
Criticism of Mandatory Arbitration as Essentially Unregulated and Highly Controversial
As discussed last year in this Committee's analysis of AB 465, recently there have been frequent discussions as to the merits and benefits of mandatory private arbitration as an alternative forum to the civil justice system. Supporters of mandatory arbitration generally assert that it is a more efficient and less costly manner of resolving legal disputes because they are able to limit discovery, set their own rules for presenting evidence, schedule proceedings at their own convenience, and select the third party who will decide their cases.
However, critics of private arbitration have argued that it is a mostly anything-goes private justice industry which can be costly and is allegedly unreceptive to consumers. There is little if any regulation, oversight or legal accountability to the parties or the public.
As a committee analysis of AB 2617 (Weber) from 2014 described the situation:
"Surprisingly to some, arbitrators are not regulated in any fashion; they need not be trained in the law, or even apply the law in a particular dispute, or render a decision consistent with the evidence presented to them. What evidence is presented may, in fact, be incomplete because parties in arbitration have no legal right to obtain evidence in support of their claims or defenses, or the claims or defenses of the other party, contrary to the longstanding discovery practice in public courts. Indeed, unlike judges, arbitrators need not explain or defend the rationale for their decisions. There is no need to justify his or her decision because the law and the evidence need not be followed and because there is no right for any party to appeal or obtain an independent review of the arbitrator's ruling unless the contract expressly so provides. Regardless of the level or type of mistake, or even misconduct, by the arbitrator, the most relief a court may grant to a party in arbitration is to vacate the award and return the parties to further arbitration, perhaps with the same arbitrator or arbitration company. The grounds on which an arbitrator's decision may be vacated, however, are extremely narrow and the standards for vacatur are stringent. Neither may the parties generally obtain any remedy against the arbitrator for misconduct because arbitrators are afforded substantial if not absolute immunity from civil liability for acts relating to their decisions, even in the case of bias, fraud, corruption or other violation of law."
In particular, critics of mandatory arbitration point to the following reported limitations of existing law:
- Existing law provides that trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all. (Cal. Const. Article 1, Section 16.)
- Existing law permits arbitrators to disregard the law and/or the evidence in rendering their decisions. Awards may be enforced by the court, even if they are legally and factually erroneous. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase et al (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1.)
- Existing law allows private arbitrators to issue binding decisions that are legally enforceable but essentially not reviewable by a court; there is no appeal from an arbitrator's decision to a public court unless the arbitration agreement expressly provides for judicial review. (Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 730; Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (2008).)
- Existing law permits enforcement of private arbitration agreements that preclude not only access to the courts but also access to other governmental bodies responsible for enforcing state laws, such as administrative complaint procedures regarding employment laws. (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 174 Cal. App. 4th 546 (2009), rev. granted, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 866 (2009).)
- Existing law allows arbitrators to conduct arbitrations without allowing for discovery, complying with the rules of evidence, or explaining their decisions in written opinions. (Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1283.1, 1282.2, 1283.4.)
- Existing law permits arbitrations to be conducted in private with no public scrutiny. (Ting v. AT&T (2002) 182 F.Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal.), affirmed, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir 2003).)
- Existing law allows arbitrators substantial if not absolute immunity from civil liability for acts relating to their decisions, even in the case of bias, fraud, corruption or other violation of law. (Baar v. Tigerman (1983) 140 Cal. App. 3d 979.)
- Existing law limits the relief that a court may grant to a party in arbitration, no matter what misconduct has taken place in the arbitration, to potential vacatur of the award and returning the parties to further arbitration, perhaps with the same arbitrator or arbitration company. The grounds on which an arbitrator's decision may be vacated are narrow and the standards for vacatur are high. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1282.6.)
"Take It Or Leave It" – Mandatory Arbitration in the Employment Context
The use of mandatory arbitration to settle employment claims has steadily risen since the early 1990s. In 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). That case involved a suit brought by an employee alleging age discrimination by the employer in which the employer moved to compel arbitration on the basis of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate. In Gilmer, the Court noted that parties may agree to arbitrate statutory claims via an enforceable agreement, thereby explicitly holding that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were both legitimate and enforceable.
Most commentators point to the Gilmer decision as "opening the floodgates" to the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment. In 2010, 27 percent of U.S. employers reported that they required arbitration of employment disputes – covering over 36 million employees. This percentage is likely even higher today.
Critics contend that forced waivers (including mandatory arbitration) of workplace claims are anathema to our public justice system because they eliminate important procedural guarantees of fairness and due process that are hallmarks of our judicial system. These clauses are often buried in the fine print of employment applications, employee handbooks and manuals. As a result, it is nearly impossible for an employee to evaluate and make an informed choice about the appropriateness of a resolution mechanism prior to the existence of an actual employment dispute.
Moreover, mandatory arbitration is generally imposed or required as a condition of employment. Employers often condition an employee's ability to obtain or keep a job on their "agreement" to submit claims which otherwise could have been presented in the civil court system to arbitration. In mandatory arbitration situations, an employee's job may depend on accepting such a provision – the only other choice is generally not to take the job.
Questions of Federal Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. Sec. 2) provides that an arbitration agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Opponents argue that (as evidenced by recent case law), this bill is preempted by the FAA as it discriminates against arbitration clauses and disfavors arbitration. Specifically, they state:
"[This bill] deems invalid any arbitration agreement that is made as a condition of employment for an individual who is a member of the military forces, which waives their right to pursue a claim in court, or with the Labor Commissioner or another state agency, for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code. This prohibition directly conflicts with rulings from both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the California Arbitration Act (CAA) evidence a strong preference for enforcement of arbitration agreements, so long as the underlying contract is fair. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) held that the FAA prohibits states from conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures as such a requirement would be inconsistent with the intent of the FAA. Specifically, the Court stated that, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.” Id.
A state law that frustrates or interferes with a prime objective of arbitration to streamline proceedings and provide expeditious results is preempted by the FAA. Id. at 1749. See also Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal.4th 1109 (2013) (reversing its initial holding and stating that an arbitration agreement that waived an employee’s right to pursue a claim with the Labor Commissioner was not per se unconscionable). While the Court specified that states could still regulate contractual defenses, those defenses must be applicable to all contracts, not just those targeted at arbitration.
In re-emphasizing this point, the U.S. Supreme Court recently issued another opinion in December 2015, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, that criticized California for discriminating against consumer arbitration agreements. In DIRECTV, a California court had applied a rule of law to invalidate an arbitration agreement, which the Supreme Court had already deemed unlawful. In the opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court stated that, because California applied an invalid state law to only arbitration agreements and no other contracts, such an application did not place arbitration agreements on “’equal footing’” with other contracts and, therefore, was pre-empted by the FAA. DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. 463 (2015); See also Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Cassarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (striking down a state requirement for a special notice required only for arbitration agreements, not contracts in general, as preempted by the FAA).
Similarly here, [this bill] only applies to mandatory employment arbitration clauses that waive an individual, who is a member of the military forces, to pursue civil litigation for any dispute arising from a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code, or Labor Code claims before the Labor Commissioner. There are numerous other mandatory provisions that an employer can require as a condition of employment that are not precluded, such as: compensation, at-will or “for cause” termination, trade-secret information, conflict of interest clauses, hours of work, attendance policies, etc. All of these provisions could still be made as a condition of employment without being statutorily deemed “unconscionable” and, therefore, [this bill] is targeted and discriminates against arbitration clauses. Moreover, banning arbitration clauses made as a condition of employment that include a waiver of the right to pursue a claim with the Labor Commissioner will interfere with and disfavor arbitration as a practical matter. Accordingly, [this bill] is likely preempted by the FAA."
In response, the author notes that the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Therefore, under this so-called "savings clause," states may regulate contracts under “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). In other words, states are not barred from establishing rules on the validity of arbitration agreements, as long as those rules apply to contracts generally and not just to agreements that include arbitration provisions.
The author contends that this bill relies squarely on the general contract law principle of unconscionability to invalidate waivers that are required as a condition of employment. Unconscionability is routinely applied by the courts to invalidate contracts, including arbitration or other waiver agreements. (See, e.g. Wherry v. Award, Inc., 192 Cal. App.4th 1242 (2011).)
As cited above, opponents assert, however, that there are many other mandatory provisions that an employer can require as a condition of employment that are not precluded, such as compensation, at-will or “for cause” termination, trade-secret information, conflict of interest clauses, hours of work, attendance policies, etc. They contend that all of these provisions could still be made as a condition of employment without being statutorily deemed “unconscionable” and, therefore, this bill is targeted and discriminates against arbitration clauses.
Opponents also contend that existing law already mandates all employment arbitration agreements, not just those for certain employees, be conscionable, and cite a number of cases in which courts have upheld mandatory arbitration agreements that were consented to by the employee as a condition of employment. (See, e.g. Armanderiz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).)
In response, the author contends that there are numerous constitutional rights waived by a mandatory arbitration clause —for example, the First Amendment right of petition and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Mandatory provisions about conflict of interest clauses or attendance policies aside, the mandatory arbitration provision at issue here is an altogether different concern. Given the important public policy of protecting service members from discrimination based on their military service, as established by USERRA and reflected in Section 394, it is hard to see where the waiver of such rights as a condition of employment does not rise to the level of unconscionable.
According to the author, the provisions of this bill do not frustrate the purpose of the FAA because that purpose follows the basic precept, emphasized numerous times by the Supreme Court, that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 US 52 (1995). Furthermore, the author notes that in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly left room for states to regulate the formation of arbitration agreements to address matters of consent. (131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); See Footnote 6.) Consequently, the author contends, this bill does not run afoul of Concepcion because it addresses in a broad and general way the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion — that is, that the contract is entered into knowingly and voluntarily and not as a condition of employment.
According to the author:
"[This bill] is not a categorical prohibition on the enforcement on arbitration agreements. Indeed it actually permits knowing and voluntary agreements. Nor could the FAA authorize or require the enforcement of involuntary or coerced arbitration agreements. There are numerous constitutional rights waived by an agreement to arbitrate—the First Amendment right of petition, the Fifth Amendment right of Due Process and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. The law has always required that the waiver of those rights be knowing and voluntary. The FAA, a mere statute, does not have the power to reduce or conflict with constitutional guarantees.
Indeed, because orders compelling arbitration and the entry of judgments based on arbitration awards are actions of the courts and thus ‘state action’, it would be plainly unconstitutional for the courts to participate in the involuntary or coerced deprivation of those rights. There is no Supreme Court case that remotely suggests that a state statute that merely requires a truly consensual agreement to arbitrate is preempted. What has been preempted are categorical refusals to enforce agreements that would be otherwise be enforceable under the FAA."
Arguments in Support
The bill is supported by the National Guard Association of California (NGAC), who writes in support:
"The National Guard Association of California was established in 1960 to represent the interests of the 17,000 current members of the California National Guard. The NGAC serves as the collective voice of the membership to advance and protect the interest of current and past members of the State Military Department as well as its federal active duty and reserve force comrades in arms.
[This bill] is needed to ensure that service members are not prevented from going to court to enforce their employment rights under Section 394 as the result of any waiver or mandatory arbitration clause imposed in an employment contract. [This bill] is part of a growing movement to ensure that consumer and employment rights afforded to service members cannot be waived by an arbitration clause. For example, Congress recently enacted the Military Lending Act to prohibit creditors from requiring active duty or reserve service members to submit their disputes to arbitration."
The California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO supports this bill, arguing that it safeguards employment protections for active military service members and reserve guard members by ensuring that any waiver of those rights is knowing, voluntary, and not a condition of employment. This bill prohibits employers from requiring an active or reserve duty service member from waiving employment rights and protections as a condition of employment. While this bill does not prohibit employers from using arbitration agreements, it does take necessary steps to ensure that California’s active military service members and reserve guard members have full protection and access to all remedies under the law.
The California Employment Lawyers Association supports this bill, stating "This bill will help shift back the balance of power, that is now increasingly within the hands of the employer, so that workers have have some meaningful choice in how disputes are to be resolved and that corporations are held accountable for their wrongdoing. These are bedrock principles that must be upheld in order to preserve the integrity of our justice system. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that arbitration is a matter of consent and not coercion. This bill follows this guiding principle in order to ensure that arbitration agreements are, in fact, made voluntarily and without the coercive threat of losing one’s employment. This bill creates no new substantive rights or remedies. Rather, it simply ensures full enforcement of the employment laws already on the books to help our service men and women. No principle is more basic to our constitutional system than that a person who has been hurt deserves his or her day in court."
Arguments in Opposition
In addition to the preemption arguments discussed above, opponents raise several other objections with this bill.
First, they note that existing law already mandates that all employment arbitration agreements, not just those for certain employees, be conscionable. Courts have repeatedly upheld mandatory arbitration agreements that are consented to by the employee as a condition of employment. See Armanderiz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000); Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991). However, the courts do recognize that an employee does not have the bargaining power to negotiate terms of the contract and, therefore, the courts have set forth mandatory provisions that must be included in the arbitration agreement to make the agreement fair. Arbitration agreements that have not included these mandatory provisions have regularly been struck down as unconscionable.
Next, opponents state that critics of arbitration have often alleged employers obtain some favorable advantage in arbitration because they pay for the arbitration and are often a “repeat player” so the arbitration provider wants to ensure their continued business. They claim that this allegation is factually unsupported.
Opponents also cite to studies that they claim prove that arbitration is the only avenue of justice for low-wage employees because attorneys will not take their case. They claim that multiple scholars have found that employees who earn mid- to lower-level wages simply cannot obtain legal representation in court and cannot afford to pursue a case on his/her own. Banning mandatory arbitration agreements for members of the military forces will eliminate this cost-effective avenue of justice for such individuals.
Finally, opponents argue that this bill places employers in a "litigation predicament," noting that in 2014, members of the military were added as a protected classification under the Fair Employment and Housing Act for purposes of employment discrimination with the enactment of AB 556 (Salas). Opponents argue that if employers inquire into the status of the applicant for purposes of complying with this bill and specifically ask the applicant whether they are a member of the military, the employer risks a discrimination claim if the applicant is ultimately not hired. Conversely, if the employer does not inquire into the applicant’s status as a member of the military and has the applicant sign an arbitration agreement just like every other employee, the employer is at risk for litigation under this bill. Opponents state that such a predicament is entirely unfair to the employer and will create a worse litigation environment and result in a lack of job creation.
Some veterans groups, including the American Legion – Department of California, oppose this bill and express concerns about unintended consequences: "An employer will now have [two] types of employees, veterans who, if hired, would not be required to sign an agreement not to sue and non-veteran employees who can be required to sign an arbitration agreement. Because of this disparity in treatment based upon military service, we believe most employers, once they become aware of this law, would decide not to hire veterans and would only hire non-veterans and there would be no way to determine if that was the reason veterans weren't hired."
Related and Prior Legislation
AB 2667 (Thurmond) of 2016 seeks to establish that a waiver or release of claims under the Unruh Civil Right Act is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable, unless the waiver or release of claims is knowing and voluntary. AB 2667 is pending on the Assembly Floor.
AB 465 (Roger Hernández) of 2015 was substantially similar to this bill, and would have prohibited any person from requiring another person, as a condition of employment, to agree to the waiver of any legal right or procedure, but for employment law violations in the Labor Code rather than violations of Section 394 of the Military & Veterans Code. AB 465 would have provided that any such waiver required from an employee or potential employee as a condition of employment or continued employment is unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. The bill was vetoed by Governor Brown.
AB 2617 (Weber), Chapter 910, Statutes of 2014, ensures that a contract to waive any of the rights, penalties, remedies, forums, or procedures under the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, including any provision that has the effect of limiting the full application or enforcement of any right, remedy, forum, or procedure available under the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, is a matter of voluntary consent, not coercion.
SB 1407 (Jackson) of 2014 would have provided that a waiver or release of claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable, unless the waiver or release of claims is knowing and voluntary. SB 1407 died on the Assembly Floor inactive file.
AB 2365 (Lieu), Chapter 385, Statutes of 2010, permits a service member, when enforcing his or her rights under selected sections of the Military and Veterans Code, to recover actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs from any person who violates those rights and consumer protections.
Committee Staff Comment
This bill was previously heard in the Assembly Judiciary Committee. For a more thorough discussion of some of the legal issues raised by this bill, including the federal preemption arguments, please see that Committee's policy analysis of this bill.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Employment Lawyers Association
California Labor Federation
California Professional Firefighters
Consumer Attorneys of California
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
National Guard Association of California
Opposition
Agricultural Council of California
American Insurance Association
American Legion-Department of California
AMVETS, Department of California
Association of California Insurance Companies
California Association of County Veterans Service Officers
California Chamber of Commerce
California Employment Law Council
California Farm Bureau Federation
California League of Food Processors
California Manufacturers & Technology Association
California New Car Dealers Association
California Newspaper Publishers Association
California State Commanders Veterans Council
Civil Justice Association of California
Military Officers Association of America, California Council Chapter
National Federation of Independent Business
Oxnard Chamber of Commerce
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Rancho Cordova Chamber of Commerce
Redondo Beach Chamber of Commerce & Visitors Bureau
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
South Bay Association of Chambers of Commerce
TechNet
VFW-Department of California
Vietnam Veterans of America-California State Council
West Coast Lumber & Building Material Association
Western Growers Association
Analysis Prepared by: Ben Ebbink / L. & E. / (916) 319-2091
Date of Hearing: April 19, 2016
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 2879
Author:(Mark Stone) – As Amended Ver:April 7, 2016
SUBJECT: SERVICE MEMBERS: EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS
KEY ISSUES:
- SHOULD ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THE BENEFIT OF cALIFORNIA MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS AND GUARD MEMBERS BE SAFEGUARDED AGAINST INVOLUNTARY WAIVER, often compelled as a condition of employment, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE IMPORTANT PUBLIC INTERESTS UNDERLYING THAT STATUTE?
- SHOULD CALIFORNIA LAW ENSURE THAT ANY WAIVER OF THOSE LEGAL RIGHTS OR PROCEDURES BE MADE BY the SERVICE MEMBER KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND NOT AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT IF THE WAIVER IS TO BE ENFORCEABLE?
SYNOPSIS
Federal law, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) prohibits employment discrimination against a person on the basis of past military service, current military obligations, or intent to serve. (38 U.S.C. Secs. 4301-4333) Among other things, USERRA protects civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of the active and reserve components of the U.S. armed forces. In addition to USERRA, California service members are provided further protections under Section 394 of the Military & Veterans Code. Among other things, Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership, and also provides that no employer or person shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty, or prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty.
This bill would enact the Service Member Employment Protection Act, important legislation that provides several key protections to ensure that military service members do not involuntarily waive any of the employment rights afforded to them under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code. The cornerstone of AB 2879 is a rule that prohibits employers from requiring an active or reserve duty service member, as a condition of employment, to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for violations of Section 394—including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with an appropriate court, law enforcement, or other governmental entity. While the bill would permit such waivers of service members' employment rights under Section 394, it would require that they be knowing and voluntary, in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment.
The bill is opposed by the Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of other business interests, who argue, among other things, that the bill is likely preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because it discriminates against arbitration clauses and disfavors arbitration generally. The opponents also voice their support for many purported benefits of private arbitration, including that it is fast, fair to both sides, and economical, and therefore superior to the public court system for the resolution of employment disputes. Opponents do not explain, however, why they believe the bill would effectively eliminate all private arbitration agreements for disputes under Section 394 if the employer and the service member employee could together voluntarily elect arbitration as an option, as they would be free to do under this bill.
The bill is supported by the National Guard Association of California, the California Labor Federation, and the California Employment Lawyers Association, among others. In contrast, these supporters contend that there is little if any regulation, fairness, or legal accountability to the parties or the public in the world of private arbitration, and point out that arbitrators need not be trained in the law, render a decision consistent with the evidence presented to them, or even use the law that would apply if the matter were heard before a court. They contend that this bill is crafted to successfully avoid questions of preemption because, without prohibiting or disfavoring arbitration contrary to the FAA, it simply defines the level of consent that is necessary to support the waiver of a service member's rights. Should this bill be approved by this Committee, it will be referred to the Assembly Labor & Employment Committee.
SUMMARY: Safeguards employment protections for active military service members and reserve guard members by, among other things, prohibiting the waiver of certain legal rights under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code as a condition of employment. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a person from requiring another person to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code ("Section 394"), as a condition of employment, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Prohibits a person from threatening, retaliating, or discriminating against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Requires any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 to be knowing and voluntary and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment, including any waiver of the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
- Provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable, and clarifies that these provisions do not affect the enforceability or validity of any other provision of the contract.
- Provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 would have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment.
- Establishes that the above provisions shall apply to any agreement to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including an agreement to accept private arbitration, entered into, altered, modified, renewed, or extended on or after January 1, 2017.
- Clarifies that any violation of the above provisions does not make a person guilty of a misdemeanor. Further clarifies that injunctive relief and other remedies are available against any person violating any of the provisions of Section 394, and that these provisions are severable.
- Makes legislative findings and declarations, as specified.
EXISTING LAW:
- Prohibits discrimination against any officer or enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the State or of the United States because of that membership. Further provides that no military service member shall be prejudiced or injured by any person or employer with respect to that member’s employment, position, or status, or be denied or disqualified for employment by virtue of membership or service in the military. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (a).)
- Provides that the above provision also applies to prohibit discrimination by any officer or employee of the State, or of any county, city and county, municipal corporation, or district against a service member. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (b).)
- Prohibits an employer or other person from discharging any person from employment, or from retaliating against that person because of the performance of any ordered military duty or training or by reason of being a service member. Further prohibits an employer or other person from hindering or preventing that service member from performing any military service or from attending any military encampment or place of drill or instruction he or she may be called upon to perform or attend by proper authority. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (d).)
- Prohibits any private employer from restricting or terminating any collateral benefit for employees by reason of an employee’s temporary incapacitation incident or any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less to duty in the National Guard or Naval Militia. As used in this subdivision, “temporary incapacitation” means any period of incapacitation of 52 weeks or less. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (e).)
- Provides that no person who provides lending or financing shall discriminate against any person with respect to the terms of a loan or financing, including, but not limited to, the finance charge, based on that person’s membership in the military or naval forces of this State or of the United States. (Military and Veterans Code Section 394 (f).)
- Provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer, because of a person's military or veterans status, (a) to refuse to hire or employ the person; (b) to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment; (c) to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment; or (d) to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Government Code Section 12940 (a).)
- Provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make any nonjob-related inquiry of an employee or applicant that expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to military and veteran status. (Government Code Section 12940 (d).)
- Establishes the California Arbitration Act which provides that agreements to arbitrate shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1280 et seq.)
- Similarly establishes the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) which provides that agreements to arbitrate shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (9 USC Section 1 et seq.)
- Permits arbitrators to disregard the law and/or the evidence in rendering their decisions. Awards may be enforced by the court, even if they are legally and factually erroneous. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase et al, 3 Cal.4th 1 (1992).)
- Allows private arbitrators to issue binding decisions that are legally enforceable but essentially not reviewable by a court; there is no appeal from an arbitrator's decision to a public court unless the arbitration agreement expressly provides for judicial review. (Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation, 95 Cal. App. 4th 730 (2002); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334 (2008).)
- Permits enforcement of private arbitration agreements that preclude not only access to the courts but also access to other governmental bodies responsible for enforcing state laws, such as administrative complaint procedures regarding employment laws. (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 174 Cal. App. 4th 546 (2009), rev. granted, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 866 (2009).)
- Allows arbitrators to conduct arbitrations without allowing for discovery, complying with the rules of evidence, or explaining their decisions in written opinions. (Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1283.1, 1282.2, 1283.4.)
- Permits arbitrations to be conducted in private with no public scrutiny. (Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affirmed, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir 2003).)
- Allows arbitrators substantial if not absolute immunity from civil liability for acts relating to their decisions, even in the case of bias, fraud, corruption or other violation of law. (Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979 (1983).)
- Limits the relief that a court may grant to a party in arbitration, no matter what misconduct has taken place in the arbitration, to potential vacatur of the award and returning the parties to further arbitration. Specifies the narrow grounds on which an arbitrator's decision may be vacated. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: This bill would enact the Service Member Employment Protection Act, important legislation that provides several key protections to ensure that military service members do not involuntarily waive any of the employment rights afforded to them under Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code (described in greater detail below.) The cornerstone of AB 2879 is a rule that prohibits employers from requiring an active or reserve duty service member, as a condition of employment, to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for violations of Section 394—including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with an appropriate court, law enforcement, or other governmental entity.
According to the author, the bill is needed for the following reasons:
California Military & Veterans Code Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership. Among other things, Section 394 also prohibits an employer from discharging any person from employment, or prejudicing or harming the person in any manner in his or her employment, because of that person's membership in the military or that person's performance of military service or duties.
These common-sense employment protections for our military service members are intended to ensure that they are not targeted for termination or discrimination in the workplace when, for example, they may be called away for deployment or reserve guard duties in service of their country. If they do face termination or any other violation of Section 394, the law allows them to file a civil action to enforce their rights.
Generally speaking, however, employers are increasingly requiring their employees to resolve disputes in private arbitration rather than by filing a civil action in court. Recent cases have identified examples of service members who were unable to enforce the employment rights specifically established for their protection after being compelled into arbitration. For example, recently a service member who had previously served two tours in Iraq was terminated from his job at an auto parts store when he had to leave for a two week-long training. When he challenged his termination, he was compelled to arbitration and lost. The arbitrator in his case did not apply the law correctly regarding the employer's burden of proof. Because the case was decided in binding arbitration, the service member had no opportunity to appeal or obtain judicial review of the decision.
AB 2879 will help ensure that service members are not prevented from going to court to enforce their employment rights under Section 394 as the result of any waiver or mandatory arbitration clause imposed as a condition of employment. The bill is intended to ensure that waivers of important employment rights and procedures arising under Section 394 are made voluntarily and with the consent of the service member employee.
Like the federal USERRA law, California Military &Veterans Code Section 394 establishes important job protections and anti-discrimination provisions for the benefit of military service members. Federal law, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), prohibits employment discrimination against a person on the basis of past military service, current military obligations, or intent to serve. (38 U.S.C. Secs. 4301-4333) Among other things, USERRA protects civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of the active and reserve components of the U.S. armed forces. USERRA provides that returning service-members must be promptly reemployed in the same position that they would have attained had they not been absent for military service, with the same seniority, status and pay, as well as other rights and benefits determined by seniority. Under USERRA, an employer may not deny initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment to a person on the basis of a past, present, or future service obligation. In addition, an employer must not retaliate against a person because of an action taken to enforce or exercise any USERRA right or for assisting in an USERRA investigation. (U.S. Dept. of Labor website; available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/aboutuserra.htm.) USERRA's provisions are liberally construed in favor of the service member, while employer defenses are narrowly construed and contrary state laws or private agreements are prohibited.
In addition to USERRA, service members are provided further protections under California Military & Veterans Code Section 394. Among other things, Section 394 prohibits discrimination against any enlisted member of the military or naval forces of the United States because of that membership, and also provides that no employer or person shall discharge any person from employment because of the performance of any ordered military duty, or prejudice or harm him or her in any manner in his or her employment, position, or status by reason of performance of military service or duty. In short, Section 394 establishes important job protections for California service members and reserve members because of the crucial role they play in defending our country and the sacrifices they make to carry out their military duties and training, including deployment overseas or being away from work and family for extended periods of time.
This bill responds to specific examples of military service members who were wrongfully terminated in violation of Section 394, but who were made to involuntarily waive important rights as a condition of employment. According to the author, the impetus for the bill arises out of recent examples brought to his attention in which military service members or guard members experienced wrongful termination or illegal discrimination in violation of USERRA and Military and Veterans Code Section 394. For example, the case of Maj. Steven Lively is illustrative of the type of injustice that the bill seeks to address. Rather than being able to enforce the employment protections afforded to him under Section 394, however, Maj. Lively tells an alarming story of being compelled into arbitration after being wrongfully terminated from his job, and ultimately suffering the loss of his job because the arbitrator in his case did not properly follow or apply the law—all arising, according to Maj. Lively, from the fact that he had involuntarily waived certain rights, including the right to go to court, as a condition of his employment contract.
On March 1, 2016, Maj. Lively, testified briefly about his experience before the Senate Judiciary Committee, at an informational hearing titled "The Federal Arbitration Act, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Impact of Mandatory Arbitration on Californian Consumers and Employees." Subsequently he was able to give a longer account of his experience to Committee staff, which is recounted in more detail here.
According to Maj. Lively, he joined the United States Army after the terrorist attacks of September 11 because he felt a duty to serve his country in the wake of that horrific tragedy. Maj. Lively became a Captain in the United States Army, while he served three tours of duty overseas -- two in Iraq and one in Afghanistan -- before returning to California to his wife and family and civilian job. He was hired by Pick-N-Pull Auto Parts, as its Asset Manager, where he directed the logistics of its fleet of vehicles and other inventory. While he was employed at Pick-N-Pull, Maj. Lively continued to serve as a Reservist in the United States Army, which required him to attend drills one long weekend per month and two weeks per year.
According to Maj. Lively, at first he was asked seemingly innocuous questions, such as whether he had control over his military drill schedule. However, each time Maj. Lively missed a day of work for a military drill, he was subjected to discipline or other unfair treatment -- such as suddenly having four weeks to complete a major project, instead of eight weeks. The first time Maj. Lively missed a day of work to drill, he received a "Final Written Warning" just days after his return. Maj. Lively was told he needed to use his vacation days for military drill days. Despite the obstacles constantly being thrown towards Maj. Lively, he worked hard and achieved the highest bonus in his division during his first 6 months of employment with the company. Immediately after that achievement, Maj. Lively had to attend his annual two-week military drill. Right before he left, Maj. Lively's supervisor told him that he would "fish or cut bait" with respect to Maj. Lively's employment upon his return to duty.
The next time Maj. Lively was to attend a drill day, his supervisor suddenly remembered an urgent assignment Maj. Lively needed to complete, and he pulled over on the side of the road on his way to the drill to finish this assignment as requested. The next time Maj. Lively was to drill, his supervisor demanded he skip his drill day to complete an assignment or be fired.
Maj. Lively made a complaint of retaliation to the company, which was ignored. Just weeks after making the complaint, his employment was terminated. Maj. Lively was told the company was going through a "reduction in force," but he was the only employee laid off at the time. In addition, the company marked Maj. Lively ineligible for rehire. Just weeks later, another individual -- who was not a member of the armed forces -- was hired to perform Maj. Lively's job duties.
Maj. Lively brought a lawsuit in Sacramento County Superior Court, and sought a jury trial of all his claims. Instead, because of an arbitration agreement Maj. Lively was required to sign as a condition of employment, his case was sent to private, secret arbitration. Maj. Lively had only five hours to present all his witnesses, including himself and his wife to testify about the devastating effects his termination had on their family. At the conclusion of the arbitration, the arbitrator declined to follow the law and ruled in favor of the employer.
Private arbitration is essentially unregulated and highly controversial when it is mandatory, rather than voluntary. Proponents of the bill, including the Consumer Attorneys and the California Employment Lawyers Association, contend that in their experience, private arbitration is an "anything-goes" private justice industry which can be costly and is allegedly unreceptive to consumers. There is little if any regulation, oversight or legal accountability to the parties or the public.
Surprisingly to some, arbitrators are not regulated in any fashion; they need not be trained in the law, or render a decision consistent with the evidence presented to them, or even apply the law in a particular dispute, as was the case in Maj. Lively's case. According to Maj. Lively's attorney in the case, the arbitrator declined to apply USERRA and Military and Veterans Code Section 394 properly, and refused to require the employer to meet its burden of proof to disprove retaliation after Lively had proved what he needed to prove under existing law. Despite the fact that the arbitrator refused to make the employer meet his burden, because the arbitration was binding and final, Maj. Lively had no way to remedy this wrong or seek judicial review of the arbitrator's decision.
A recent New York Times investigation neatly summarized some of the challenges that ordinary people like Maj. Lively face when they find themselves compelled into arbitration:
The Times, examining records from more than 25,000 arbitrations between 2010 and 2014 and interviewing hundreds of lawyers, arbitrators, plaintiffs and judges in 35 states, uncovered many troubling cases. Behind closed doors, proceedings can devolve into legal free-for-alls. Companies have paid employees to testify in their favor. A hearing that lasted six hours cost the plaintiff $150,000. Arbitrations have been conducted in the conference rooms of lawyers representing the companies accused of wrongdoing.
Winners and losers are decided by a single arbitrator who is largely at liberty to determine how much evidence a plaintiff can present and how much the defense can withhold. To deliver favorable outcomes to companies, some arbitrators have twisted or outright disregarded the law, interviews and records show.
“What rules of evidence apply?” one arbitration firm asks in the question and answer section of its website. “The short answer is none.”
Like the arbitrator in [a case detailed in the piece], some have no experience as a judge but wield far more power. And unlike the outcomes in civil court, arbitrators’ rulings are nearly impossible to appeal. When plaintiffs have asked the courts to intervene, court records show, they have almost always lost. Saying its hands were tied, one court in California said it could not overturn arbitrators’ decisions even if they caused “substantial injustice.” (New York Times, "In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System'" (November 2, 2015).)
What evidence is presented may, in fact, be incomplete because parties in arbitration have no legal right to obtain evidence in support of their claims or defenses, or the claims or defenses of the other party, contrary to the longstanding discovery practice in public courts. Indeed, unlike judges, arbitrators need not explain or defend the rationale for their decisions.
Furthermore, a private arbitrator’s award may be enforced by a court even if the decision is legally and factually erroneous. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal.4th 1, (1992). (See also Crowell v. Downey Community Hospital Foundation, 95 Cal.App.4th 730 (2002), allowing private arbitrators to issue binding decisions that are legally enforceable but essentially unreviewable by a court even if the arbitration agreement expressly provides for judicial review.) The Moncharsh court also stated that “arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decisions upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action.” (Id. at 10-11.) Thus, under Moncharsh, there appears to be little need for an arbitrator to justify his or her decision because the law and the evidence need not be followed, and because there is no right for any party to appeal or obtain an independent review of the arbitrator's ruling unless expressly provided by contract.
Regardless of the level or type of mistake, or even misconduct, by the arbitrator, the most relief a court may grant to a party in arbitration is to vacate the award and return the parties to further arbitration, perhaps with the same arbitrator or arbitration company. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2, the grounds on which an arbitrator's decision may be vacated are extremely narrow and the standards for vacatur stringent; the arbitrator's award may only be vacated if, for example, (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was corruption in any of the arbitrators; (3) the rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator; or one of three other conditions. Neither may the parties generally obtain any remedy against the arbitrator for misconduct because arbitrators are afforded substantial if not absolute immunity from civil liability for acts relating to their decisions, even in the case of bias, fraud, corruption or other violation of law.
Arbitration's dramatic differences from the public justice system are believed to be appropriate where parties with relatively equal bargaining power have voluntarily chosen to have their dispute and legal rights resolved by a method other than the courts. For example, the use of binding arbitration has a long and honored history in the resolution of labor-management disputes where both parties are repeat-players to whom arbitrators must be equally accountable in order to enjoy repeat employment. Private arbitration becomes more controversial, however, when it is imposed by more powerful parties without negotiation or the right to withhold consent to unfair terms.
This bill appears to be carefully crafted to focus on general contract formation issues that are not subject to preemption under the FAA. Enacted in 1947, the Federal Arbitration Act generally provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. Section 2.)
Opponents assert that the restrictions on waivers in this bill are likely preempted by the FAA because the bill conflicts with the FAA's policy of encouraging arbitration and disapproving special impediments to the enforcement of arbitration contracts. The coalition of opponents, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, state that:
AB 2879 deems invalid any arbitration agreement that is made as a condition of employment for an individual who is a member of the military forces, which waives their right to pursue a claim in court, or with the Labor Commissioner or another state agency, for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code. This prohibition directly conflicts with rulings from both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
The Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act (CAA) evidence a strong preference for the enforcement of arbitration agreements, so long as the underlying contract is fair. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) held that the FAA prohibits states from conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures as such a requirement would be inconsistent with the intent of the FAA. Specifically, the Court stated that, “when state law prohibits outrights the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.” Id.
A state law that frustrates or interferes with a prime objective of arbitration to streamline proceedings and provide expeditious results is preempted by the FAA. Id. at 1749. (See also Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109 (2013) (reversing its initial holding and stating that an arbitration agreement that waived an employee’s right to pursue a claim with the Labor Commissioner was not per se unconscionable.)) While the Court specified that states could still regulate contractual defenses, those defenses must be applicable to all contracts, not just those targeted at arbitration.
In response, the author notes that the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Therefore, under this so-called "savings clause," states may regulate contracts under “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). In other words, states are not barred from establishing rules on the validity of arbitration agreements, as long as those rules apply to contracts generally and not just to agreements that include arbitration provisions.
Here, the bill prohibits a person from requiring another person "to waive any [emphasis added] legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 of the Military and Veterans Code as a condition of employment," including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with specified law enforcement or other governmental entities. The bill applies equally to public employers as well as private employers. Contrary to opponents' characterizations of the bill, AB 2879 does not "outright prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim", the author contends, nor does it particularly single out arbitration because the bill's restrictions apply equally to "waiver of any legal rights or procedure for a violation of Section 394", not just specifically an arbitration agreement.
Instead, the author contends, this bill relies squarely on the general contract law principle of unconscionability to invalidate waivers that are required as a condition of employment. Committee staff notes that unconscionability is routinely applied by the courts to invalidate contracts, including arbitration or other waiver agreements. (See, e.g. Wherry v. Award, Inc., 192 Cal. App.4th 1242 (2011).)
Opponents assert, however, that there are many other mandatory provisions that an employer can require as a condition of employment that are not precluded, such as compensation, at-will or “for cause” termination, trade-secret information, conflict of interest clauses, hours of work, attendance policies, etc. They contend that all of these provisions could still be made as a condition of employment without being statutorily deemed “unconscionable” and, therefore, AB 2879 is targeted and discriminates against arbitration clauses.
Opponents also contend that existing law already mandates all employment arbitration agreements, not just those for certain employees, be conscionable, and cite a number of cases in which courts have upheld mandatory arbitration agreements that were consented to by the employee as a condition of employment. (See, e.g. Armanderiz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83 (2000).)
In response, the author contends that there are numerous constitutional rights waived by a mandatory arbitration clause —for example, the First Amendment right of petition and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Mandatory provisions about conflict of interest clauses or attendance policies aside, the mandatory arbitration provision at issue here is an altogether different concern. Given the important public policy of protecting service members from discrimination based on their military service, as established by USERRA and reflected in Section 394, it is hard to see where the waiver of such rights as a condition of employment does not rise to the level of unconscionable.
This bill defines the level of consent that is necessary to support the waiver of rights, without prohibiting or disfavoring arbitration contrary to the FAA. While existing law may protect employees from unconscionable contracts, the author contends that it does not adequately protect workers from waivers of rights that are not knowing and voluntary. This bill seeks to establish general contract principles about the level of consent that is needed to support the waiver of rights—more specifically, it seeks to ensure that agreements to waive important statutory rights are made knowingly and voluntarily, and not required as a condition of employment.
First, the bill provides that, except where prohibited by federal or state law, any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action shall be knowing and voluntary, and in writing, and expressly not made as a condition of employment. Second, the bill provides that any waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394 that is required as a condition of employment shall be deemed involuntary, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. Third, the bill provides that any person who seeks to enforce a waiver of any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of this section shall have the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment. In short, the bill seeks to establish that any waiver of legal rights under Section 394 must be knowing and voluntary and not made as a condition of employment, in which case the waiver is deemed involuntary and unenforceable.
According to the author, these provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the FAA because that purpose follows the basic precept, emphasized numerous times by the Supreme Court, that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 US 52 (1995). Furthermore, the author notes that in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly left room for states to regulate the formation of arbitration agreements to address matters of consent. (131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); See Footnote 6.) Consequently, the author contends, AB 2879 does not run afoul of Concepcion because it addresses in a broad and general way the concerns that attend contracts of adhesion — that is, that the contract is entered into knowingly and voluntarily and not as a condition of employment. According to the author:
AB 2879 is not a categorical prohibition on the enforcement on arbitration agreements. Indeed it actually permits knowing and voluntary agreements. Nor could the FAA authorize or require the enforcement of involuntary or coerced arbitration agreements. There are numerous constitutional rights waived by an agreement to arbitrate—the First Amendment right of petition, the Fifth Amendment right of Due Process and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. The law has always required that the waiver of those rights be knowing and voluntary. The FAA, a mere statute, does not have the power to reduce or conflict with constitutional guarantees.
Indeed, because orders compelling arbitration and the entry of judgments based on arbitration awards are actions of the courts and thus ‘state action’, it would be plainly unconstitutional for the courts to participate in the involuntary or coerced deprivation of those rights. There is no Supreme Court case that remotely suggests that a state statute that merely requires a truly consensual agreement to arbitrate is preempted. What has been preempted are categorical refusals to enforce agreements that would be otherwise be enforceable under the FAA.
Committee staff notes that this bill does not seek to bar arbitration or other waiver agreements; it simply makes it unlawful to seek an unknowing and involuntary waiver of rights or procedures regarding abuse laws prior to a dispute arising. The author reiterates that there is no state or federal policy favoring involuntary waiver or arbitration agreements. If this bill is pre-empted, it would seem that the FAA would logically also then pre-empt courts from applying unconscionability principles to any arbitration or other waiver agreement. No court decision has been brought to the attention of the Committee or discovered in the Committee's own research lending support to such a far-reaching view of FAA pre-emption.
This bill protects against retaliation by an employer for the refusal to waive any legal rights or procedures for violations of Section 394. According to the author, in order to ensure that service members do not face retaliation for refusing to waive any legal right that they may only waive knowingly and voluntarily, the bill contains additional protections. Specifically, the bill provides that a person shall not threaten, retaliate, or discriminate against another person on the basis that the other person refuses to waive any legal right, penalty, remedy, forum, or procedure for a violation of Section 394, including the right to file and pursue a civil action or complaint with, or otherwise notify, the Labor Commissioner, state agency, other public prosecutor, law enforcement agency, or any court or other governmental entity.
Committee staff notes that this provision prohibiting retaliation against workers who refuse to waive any substantive or procedural right under Military and Veterans Code 394 is likely not preempted by the FAA because the FAA preemption doctrine governs only the enforceability of arbitration agreements. If the worker refuses to sign an arbitration agreement, it is not an issue of enforcing the agreement. At that point, it appears instead to simply be an issue of protecting the worker against retaliation for his or her refusal to agree to contract provisions that take away legal rights—a protection well within the Legislature's province and outside the scope of FAA preemption analysis.
Opponents' concern about a "litigation predicament." Opponents argue that the bill forces employers into a situation where they are subject to increased risk of litigation no matter what they try to do to comply with the bill. They explain their concerns as follows:
AB 2879 is targeted at members of the military forces. Notably in 2014, members of the military were added as a protected classification under FEHA for purposed of employment discrimination (AB 556, Salas). Similar to other protected classification currently in California law, including age, marital status or disability, an applicant’s status as member of the military forces is a subject employers seek to avoid when interviewing or reviewing a candidate for employment in order to avoid a discrimination claim if the applicant is ultimately not hired.
AB 2879 would place employers in a litigation predicament. If they inquire into the status of the applicant for purposes of complying with AB 2879 and specifically ask the applicant whether they are a member of the military, the employer risks a discrimination claim if the applicant is ultimately not hired. Conversely, if the employer does not inquire into the applicant’s status as a member of the military and has the applicant sign an arbitration agreement just like every other employee, the employer is at risk for litigation under AB 2879. Such a predicament is entirely unfair to the employer.
Committee staff notes that, under existing law, any person who violates Section 394 is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable to the injured person for actual damages sustained and reasonable attorney fees incurred. (Section 394 (g).) Earlier versions of the bill would have expanded this misdemeanor liability to include violations of the proposed prohibitions against requiring another person to waive any legal right under Section 394 as a condition of employment, and so forth. The April 7, 2016 amendments to the bill clarify that this was not the author's intent, and in any case now restrict the misdemeanor liability only to violations of current law.
While opponents' concerns appear to be risk of litigation rather than being exposed to misdemeanor liability, Committee staff questions whether this bill, as suggested by the opponents, really requires employers to treat military service members any differently than they otherwise would be treated under existing law. There is no need to inquire into the status of the job applicant in order to comply with this bill because an employer could comply simply by not requiring an applicant to sign away his or her rights under Section 394 as a condition of employment. Committee staff also notes that whether or not the applicant is asked about his or her military status prior to being proffered an employment contract for signature, any waiver of legal rights that is required as a condition of employment is deemed involuntary and unenforceable. Since such a waiver is already unenforceable at that point, is there still an increased risk of additional litigation by the applicant at that point? Finally, staff notes that if the applicant wishes to knowingly and voluntarily waive any legal right with the employer, including the right to go to court for an employment dispute, and it is not a condition of employment, then the bill does not prohibit such waiver and there is no litigation predicament.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The bill is supported by the National Guard Association of California (NGAC), who writes in support:
The National Guard Association of California was established in 1960 to represent the interests of the 17,000 current members of the California National Guard. The NGAC serves as the collective voice of the membership to advance and protect the interest of current and past members of the State Military Department as well as its federal active duty and reserve force comrades in arms.
AB 2879 is needed to ensure that service members are not prevented from going to court to enforce their employment rights under Section 394 as the result of any waiver or mandatory arbitration clause imposed in an employment contract. AB 2879 is part of a growing movement to ensure that consumer and employment rights afforded to service members cannot be waived by an arbitration clause. For example, Congress recently enacted the Military Lending Act to prohibit creditors from requiring active duty or reserve service members to submit their disputes to arbitration.
We applaud your ongoing efforts to safeguard employment rights specifically established for the protection of service members in California.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The opponents' coalition also contends that the bill will create a worse litigation environment and result in a lack of job creation. They state:
Banning pre-dispute employment arbitration agreement for employees who are engaged in military forces will force those individuals into an already overburdened judicial system. Assuming an employee can find an attorney willing to pursue the case, an employee will potentially have to wait years for a resolution, as opposed to arbitration that is generally resolved in less than a year… AB 2789 will neither help California's litigation environment nor promote businesses' ability to create jobs as it will drive up California employers' litigation costs.
Previous and pending related legislation. AB 2667 (Thurmond) of 2016 seeks to establish that a waiver or release of claims under the Unruh Civil Right Act is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable, unless the waiver or release of claims is knowing and voluntary. AB 2667 is currently awaiting hearing in Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 465 (Hernández) of 2015, is substantially similar to this bill, and would have prohibited any person from requiring another person, as a condition of employment, to agree to the waiver of any legal right or procedure, but for employment law violations in the Labor Code rather than violations of Section 394 of the Military & Veterans Code. AB 465 would have provided that any such waiver required from an employee or potential employee as a condition of employment or continued employment is unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable. The bill was vetoed by Governor Brown.
AB 2617 (Weber), Ch. 910, Stats. 2014, ensures that a contract to waive any of the rights, penalties, remedies, forums, or procedures under the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, including any provision that has the effect of limiting the full application or enforcement of any right, remedy, forum, or procedure available under the Ralph Civil Rights Act or the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, is a matter of voluntary consent, not coercion.
SB 1407 (Jackson) of 2014 would have provided that a waiver or release of claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable, unless the waiver or release of claims is knowing and voluntary. SB 1407 died on the Assembly Floor inactive file.
AB 2365 (Lieu), Ch. 385, Stats. 2010, permits a service member, when enforcing his or her rights under selected sections of the Military and Veterans Code, to recover actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs from any person who violates those rights and consumer protections.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
National Guard Association of California
California Employment Lawyers Association
California Labor Federation
Consumer Attorneys of California
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
Opposition
California Chamber of Commerce
Agricultural Council of California
American Insurance Association
Association of California Companies
California Employment Law council
California Farm Bureau Federation
California League of Food Processors
California Manufacturers &Technology Association
California New Car Dealers & Association
Civil Justice Association of California
National Federation of Independent Business
Oxnard Chamber of Commerce
Property Causality Insurers Association of America
Rancho Cordova Chamber of Commerce
Redondo Beach Chamber of Commerce & Visitor’s Bureau
South Bay Association of Chambers of Commerce
TechNet
West Coast Lumber & Building Material Association
Western Growers Association
Analysis Prepared by: Anthony Lew / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
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