AB 3039: Juries: peremptory challenges.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2024-02-16
Current Status:
Failed
(2024-05-29: From committee: Without further action pursuant to Joint Rule 62(a).)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law provides for the exclusion of a prospective juror from a trial jury by peremptory challenge. Existing law prohibits a party from using a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assumption that the prospective juror is biased merely because of the sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation of the prospective juror, or on similar grounds. Existing law presumes a peremptory challenge for specified reasons, including views related to law enforcement, to be invalid unless a party can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective jurors race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national orientation, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups.
This bill would remove a prospective jurors views related to law enforcement as a presumptively invalid basis for exercising a peremptory challenge.
(a)A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective jurors race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.
(b)A party, or the trial court on its own motion, may object to the improper use of a peremptory challenge under subdivision (a). After the objection is made, any further discussion shall be conducted outside the presence of the panel. The objection shall be made before the jury is impaneled, unless information becomes known that could not have reasonably been known before the jury was impaneled.
(c)Notwithstanding Section 226, upon objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this section, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.
(d)(1)The court shall evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection. The court shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record. A motion brought under this section shall also be deemed a sufficient presentation of claims asserting the discriminatory exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States and California Constitutions.
(2)(A)For purposes of this section, an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.
(B)For purposes of this section, a substantial likelihood means more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.
(C)For purposes of this section, unconscious bias includes implicit and institutional biases.
(3)In making its determination, the circumstances the court may consider include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(A)Whether any of the following circumstances exist:
(i)The objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the challenged juror.
(ii)The alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group.
(iii)Witnesses or the parties are not members of that perceived cognizable group.
(B)Whether race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, bear on the facts of the case to be tried.
(C)The number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, including, but not limited to, any the following:
(i)Consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the concerns later stated by the party as the reason for the peremptory challenge pursuant to subdivision (c).
(ii)Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in cursory questioning of the challenged potential juror.
(iii)Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to questions asked of other jurors from different perceived cognizable groups about the same topic or whether the party phrased those questions differently.
(D)Whether other prospective jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, provided similar, but not necessarily identical, answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party.
(E)Whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups.
(F)Whether the reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge was contrary to or unsupported by the record.
(G)Whether the counsel or counsels office exercising the challenge has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, in the present case or in past cases, including whether the counsel or counsels office who made the challenge has a history of prior violations under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, Section 231.5, or this section.
(e)A peremptory challenge for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective jurors race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective jurors ability to be fair and impartial in the case:
(1)Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.(2)Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner. (3)(1)Having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.
(4)(2)A prospective jurors neighborhood.
(5)(3)Having a child outside of marriage.
(6)(4)Receiving state benefits.
(7)(5)Not being a native English speaker.
(8)(6)The ability to speak another language.
(9)(7)Dress, attire, or personal appearance.
(10)(8)Employment in a field that is disproportionately occupied by members listed in subdivision (a) or that serves a population disproportionately comprised of members of a group or groups listed in subdivision (a).
(11)(9)Lack of employment or underemployment of the prospective juror or prospective jurors family member.
(12)(10)A prospective jurors apparent friendliness with another prospective juror of the same group as listed in subdivision (a).
(13)(11)Any justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party. The unchallenged prospective juror or jurors need not share any other characteristics with the challenged prospective juror for peremptory challenge relying on this justification to be considered presumptively invalid.
(f)For purposes of subdivision (e), the term clear and convincing refers to the degree of certainty the factfinder must have in determining whether the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to the prospective jurors cognizable group membership, bearing in mind conscious and unconscious bias. To determine that a presumption of invalidity has been overcome, the factfinder shall determine that it is highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that jurors ability to be fair and impartial in the case.
(g)(1)The following reasons for peremptory challenges have historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection:
(A)The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact.
(B)The prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.
(C)The prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.
(2)The reasons set forth in paragraph (1) are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the courts own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.
(h)Upon a court granting an objection to the improper exercise of a peremptory challenge, the court shall do one or more of the following:
(1)Quash the jury venire and start jury selection anew. This remedy shall be provided if requested by the objecting party.
(2)If the motion is granted after the jury has been impaneled, declare a mistrial and select a new jury if requested by the defendant.
(3)Seat the challenged juror.
(4)Provide the objecting party additional challenges.
(5)Provide another remedy as the court deems appropriate.
(i)This section applies in all jury trials in which jury selection begins on or after January 1, 2022.
(j)The denial of an objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial courts express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a prospective jurors demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the partys use of the peremptory challenge or the partys failure to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
(k)This section shall not apply to civil cases.
(l)It is the intent of the Legislature that enactment of this section shall not, in purpose or effect, lower the standard for judging challenges for cause or expand use of challenges for cause.
(m)The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
(n)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2026, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 231.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as added by Section 3 of Chapter 318 of the Statutes of 2020, is amended to read:231.7.(a)A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective jurors race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.
(b)A party, or the trial court on its own motion, may object to the improper use of a peremptory challenge under subdivision (a). After the objection is made, any further discussion shall be conducted outside the presence of the panel. The objection shall be made before the jury is impaneled, unless information becomes known that could not have reasonably been known before the jury was impaneled.
(c)Notwithstanding Section 226, upon objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this section, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.
(d)(1)The court shall evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection. The court shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record. A motion brought under this section shall also be deemed a sufficient presentation of claims asserting the discriminatory exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States and California Constitutions.
(2)(A)For purposes of this section, an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.
(B)For purposes of this section, a substantial likelihood means more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.
(C)For purposes of this section, unconscious bias includes implicit and institutional biases.
(3)In making its determination, the circumstances the court may consider include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(A)Whether any of the following circumstances exist:
(i)The objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the challenged juror.
(ii)The alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group.
(iii)Witnesses or the parties are not members of that perceived cognizable group.
(B)Whether race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, bear on the facts of the case to be tried.
(C)The number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, including, but not limited to, any the following:
(i)Consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the concerns later stated by the party as the reason for the peremptory challenge pursuant to subdivision (c).
(ii)Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in cursory questioning of the challenged potential juror.
(iii)Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to questions asked of other jurors from different perceived cognizable groups about the same topic or whether the party phrased those questions differently.
(D)Whether other prospective jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, provided similar, but not necessarily identical, answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party.
(E)Whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups.
(F)Whether the reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge was contrary to or unsupported by the record.
(G)Whether the counsel or counsels office exercising the challenge has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, in the present case or in past cases, including whether the counsel or counsels office who made the challenge has a history of prior violations under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, Section 231.5, or this section.
(e)A peremptory challenge for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective jurors race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective jurors ability to be fair and impartial in the case:
(1)Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.(2)Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner. (3)(1)Having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.
(4)(2)A prospective jurors neighborhood.
(5)(3)Having a child outside of marriage.
(6)(4)Receiving state benefits.
(7)(5)Not being a native English speaker.
(8)(6)The ability to speak another language.
(9)(7)Dress, attire, or personal appearance.
(10)(8)Employment in a field that is disproportionately occupied by members listed in subdivision (a) or that serves a population disproportionately comprised of members of a group or groups listed in subdivision (a).
(11)(9)Lack of employment or underemployment of the prospective juror or prospective jurors family member.
(12)(10)A prospective jurors apparent friendliness with another prospective juror of the same group as listed in subdivision (a).
(13)(11)Any justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party. The unchallenged prospective juror or jurors need not share any other characteristics with the challenged prospective juror for peremptory challenge relying on this justification to be considered presumptively invalid.
(f)For purposes of subdivision (e), the term clear and convincing refers to the degree of certainty the factfinder must have in determining whether the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to the prospective jurors cognizable group membership, bearing in mind conscious and unconscious bias. To determine that a presumption of invalidity has been overcome, the factfinder shall determine that it is highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on that jurors ability to be fair and impartial in the case.
(g)(1)The following reasons for peremptory challenges have historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury selection:
(A)The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact.
(B)The prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.
(C)The prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.
(2)The reasons set forth in paragraph (1) are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the courts own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.
(h)Upon a court granting an objection to the improper exercise of a peremptory challenge, the court shall do one or more of the following:
(1)Quash the jury venire and start jury selection anew. This remedy shall be provided if requested by the objecting party.
(2)If the motion is granted after the jury has been impaneled, declare a mistrial and select a new jury if requested by the defendant.
(3)Seat the challenged juror.
(4)Provide the objecting party additional challenges.
(5)Provide another remedy as the court deems appropriate.
(i)This section applies in all jury trials in which jury selection begins on or after January 1, 2022.
(j)The denial of an objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial courts express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a prospective jurors demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the partys use of the peremptory challenge or the partys failure to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
(k)It is the intent of the Legislature that enactment of this section shall not, in purpose or effect, lower the standard for judging challenges for cause or expand use of challenges for cause.
(l)The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
(m)This section shall become operative January 1, 2026.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| May 29, 2024 | From committee: Without further action pursuant to Joint Rule 62(a). |
| Apr 16, 2024 | In committee: Set, second hearing. Failed passage. |
| Mar 27, 2024 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Mar 11, 2024 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and PUB. S. |
| Feb 17, 2024 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 18. |
| Feb 16, 2024 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 16, 2024 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Public Safety] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Failed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| alameda county public defender's office | ** Against | |
| Arcadia Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Burbank Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Attorneys For Criminal Justice | ** Against | |
| California Coalition for Women Prisoners | ** Against | |
| California Coalition of School Safety Professionals | ** Support | |
| California Innocence Coalition | ** Against | |
| California Narcotic Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Californians for Safety and Justice | ** Against | |
| Californians United for a Responsible Budget | ** Against | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Against | |
| California Reserve Peace Officers Association | ** Support | |
| California State Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Corona Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Culver City Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Deputy Sheriffs Association of Monterey County | ** Support | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Against | |
| Felony Murder Elimination Project | ** Against | |
| Fullerton Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Initiate Justice | ** Against | |
| Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area | ** Against | |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Against | |
| Los Angeles School Police Management Association | ** Support | |
| los angeles school police officers association | ** Support | |
| Murrieta Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Newport Beach Police Association | ** Support | |
| Novato Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Palos Verdes Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| PLACER COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Pomona Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| RIVERSIDE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Riverside Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| Rubicon Programs | ** Against | |
| San Bernardino County Sheriff'S Department | ** Support | |
| san bernardino county sheriff's employees' benefit association | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Public Defender | ** Against | |
| Santa Ana Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Santa Cruz County Public Defender | ** Against | |
| Smart Justice California, a project of Tides Advocacy | ** Against | |
| Sonoma County Public Defender | ** Against | |
| The Home Gardens Community | ** Support | |
| Upland Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Western Center on Law & Poverty, INC. | ** Against | |
| Yolo County Public Defender's Office | ** Against |
Date of Hearing: April 16, 2024
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 3039
Author:(Essayli) – As Introduced Ver:February 16, 2024
SUBJECT: Juries: peremptory challenges
KEY ISSUE: should the expression of distrust in law enforcement, or that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or enforce laws in a discriminatory manner, no longer be presumed to be invalid basEs for the exercise of a peremptory challenge in the jury selection process for a criminal trial (and a civil trial as of the date when the bill takes effect)?
SYNOPSIS
In 2020, the California Legislature passed and the Governor signed ground-breaking legislation to address the shortcomings of the Batson/Wheeler process in jury selection with AB 3070 ((Weber), Chap. 318, Stats. 2020). AB 3070 improved upon then-existing court procedures to evaluate whether the dismissal of a prospective juror via a peremptory challenge is unlawfully discriminatory. Most relevant to this bill, AB 3070 provides a list of reasons for excusing a prospective juror that are presumed to be invalid, unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case. This rule is codified in CCP Section 231.7. Two of the reasons specified in CCP Section 231.7 as presumptively invalid bases for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are the following: (1) expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system; and (2) expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner. (CCP Section 231.7 (e)(1)-(2).)
This bill seeks to remove these two reasons from CCP 231.7’s list, arguably undermining a key component of the reforms implemented by AB 3070. Prior to the enactment of AB 3070, a negative experience with law enforcement or distrust of law enforcement was a top proxy for race used by prosecutors in a discriminatory manner to excuse jurors of color from serving on juries. Indeed, prosecutors are trained to dismiss jurors who have had negative experiences with law enforcement. So arguably the Legislature should only reverse its choice to include these important provisions in CCP Section 231.7 if there is strong evidence that these provisions have had a detrimental effect on the jury selection and trial process and its outcomes. While the state lacks data about how AB 3070 has effected the composition of juries and their verdicts in the past two years, there is strong anecdotal evidence of the success of AB 3070 that is discussed below.
The bill is supported by a large number of law enforcement organizations. It is strongly opposed by criminal justice reform, civil rights, prison reform, anti-poverty, and legal aid advocates, as well as public defender offices and organizations. Should it be approved by this Committee, it would be referred to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety.
SUMMARY: As of January 1, 2026, makes the expression of distrust in law enforcement, or that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or enforce laws in a discriminatory manner no longer a presumptively invalid basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge in the jury selection process for a criminal (or civil) trial. Specifically, this bill removes the following from the list of presumptively invalid bases for exercising a peremptory challenge:
- Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.
- Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner.
EXISTING LAW:
- Requires that all persons selected for jury service, for both civil and criminal cases, be selected at random from the population of the area served by the court and that all qualified persons have an equal opportunity to be considered for jury service in the state. (Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Sections 191 and 192.)
- Prohibits a party from using a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the assumption that the prospective juror is biased merely because they have a characteristic listed or defined in Government Code Section 11135, or on similar grounds. (CCP Section 231.5.)
- Prohibits any state or state-funded program or activity from unlawfully subjecting to discrimination, or unlawfully denying full and equal access to the benefits to, any person in the State of California on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation. (Government Code Section 11135 (a).)
- Provides that after any jurors have been removed from the panel for cause, the parties may remove a specified number of jurors peremptorily (without giving any reason), and provides a specified number of peremptory challenges to which each party is entitled depending on the number of parties in the litigation and whether the case is criminal or civil in nature. (CCP Section 231.)
- Provides that a defendant’s right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 16, of the California Constitution, is violated when a “cognizable group” within that community is excluded from the jury venire. In order for a group to be considered cognizable, two requirements must be met: (1) the group’s members must share a common perspective arising from their life experience in the group; and (2) it must be shown by the party seeking to prove a violation of the representative cross section rule that no other members of the community are capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group assertedly excluded. (Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 97-98, citing People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272; see also People v. Garcia (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1274.)
- Prohibits the State from excluding members of the defendant’s race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of their race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 85-88.)
- Prohibits peremptory challenges based on group bias in civil lawsuits in federal district court. (Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (1991) 500 U.S. 614, 630-631.)
- Establishes a procedure (a “Batson-Wheeler hearing”) whereby the court can address the use of a peremptory challenge (sometimes referred to as a “strike”) that is believed to have been made in a discriminatory manner:
- Requires a party to make a timely objection if they believe the striking party is exercising their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. (People v. Perez (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.)
- Requires the trial court to resolve whether or not the objecting party has raised a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 168.) In reaching this conclusion, many factors may raise an inference of discriminatory intent, including the following:
- Where a party has struck most or all members of an identified group or has used a disproportionate number of their peremptory challenges against members of that group. (People v. Wheeler, supra at p. 280.)
- Where a party has failed to engage the prospective juror in meaningful questioning. (Id. at pp. 280-281.)
- Requires, if the court finds a prima facie inference of discriminatory action, the striking party to provide a justification for each challenged peremptory. Valid justifications need only be genuine and neutral, not necessarily justification of challenge for cause (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 136), and may include the following:
- Antipathy towards prosecutor or criminal justice system. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 724.)
- Bad feelings towards law enforcement. (People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1217.)
- Family member with criminal conviction. (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1282.)
- Juror’s occupation. (People v. Semien (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 701, 708.)
- Hostile looks. (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1125.)
- Hunches. (People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 170.)
- Manner of dress. (People v. Barber (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 378, 396.)
- Requires the court to decide if the proffered reasons are true or merely a pretext cloaking discriminatory intent. In making this decision, the court may consider the following:
- An evaluation of the striking party’s “state of mind” based on demeanor and credibility. (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 365.)
- Comparison of the dismissed juror against similar jurors who were not members of the cognizable group, whom the attorney did not dismiss. (Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241.)
- Whether or not the striking party failed to fully question the juror they now seek to dismiss. (Id. at p. 246.)
- Requires the court, if it concludes that a juror has been improperly dismissed, to find an agreeable remedy, including:
- Dismissing the panel and commencing jury selection again with a completely new venire. (People v. Wheeler, supra at p. 282.)
- Ordering the improperly dismissed juror reseated if they are able to serve. (People v. Willis (2002) 27 Cal.4th 811.)
- Giving the aggrieved party additional peremptory challenges. (Id. at p. 821.)
- Imposing monetary sanctions on the striking attorney, if the judge warned the attorneys before starting jury selection to comply with Batson-Wheeler. (People v. Muhammad (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 313, 324-325.)
- Reversing a judgement and ordering a retrial. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386.)
- Prohibits a party from using a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups. (CCP 231.7 (a).)
- Permits a party to object to the use of a peremptory challenge in order to raise the issue of improper bias based on the specified identity groups in 9), above. (Id., at (b).)
- Requires the party exercising the peremptory challenge to state the reason for the peremptory challenge. (Id., at (c).)
- Requires the court to evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection. The court shall explain the reasons for its ruling on the record. A motion brought under this section shall also be deemed a sufficient presentation of claims asserting the discriminatory exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States and California Constitutions. (Id., at (d)(1).)
- Provides that for purposes of 12), an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California; a “substantial likelihood” means more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not; and “unconscious bias” includes implicit and institutional biases. (Id., at (d)(2).)
- Allows a court, in making this decision, to consider circumstances that include, but are not limited to the following:
- Whether any of the following circumstances exist:
- The objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the challenged juror.
- The alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group.
- Witnesses or the parties are not members of that perceived cognizable group.
- Whether race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, bear on the facts of the case to be tried.
- The number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, including, but not limited to, any the following:
- Consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the concerns later stated by the party as the reason for the peremptory challenge pursuant to subdivision (c).
- Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in cursory questioning of the challenged potential juror.
- Whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to questions asked of other jurors from different perceived cognizable groups about the same topic or whether the party phrased those questions differently.
- Whether other prospective jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, provided similar, but not necessarily identical, answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party.
- Whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups.
- Whether the reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge was contrary to or unsupported by the record.
- Whether the counsel or counsel’s office exercising the challenge has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, in the present case or in past cases, including whether the counsel or counsel’s office who made the challenge has a history of prior violations under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, Section 231.5, or this section. (Id., at (d)(3).)
- Whether any of the following circumstances exist:
- Provides that peremptory challenge for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case:
- Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.
- Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner.
- Having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.
- A prospective juror’s neighborhood.
- Having a child outside of marriage.
- Receiving state benefits.
- Not being a native English speaker.
- The ability to speak another language.
- Dress, attire, or personal appearance.
- Employment in a field that is disproportionately occupied by members listed in 15) or that serves a population disproportionately comprised of members of a group or groups listed in 15), above.
- Lack of employment or underemployment of the prospective juror or prospective juror’s family member.
- A prospective juror’s apparent friendliness with another prospective juror of the same group as listed in 15), above.
- Any justification that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective juror, but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party. The unchallenged prospective juror or jurors need not share any other characteristics with the challenged prospective juror for peremptory challenge relying on this justification to be considered presumptively invalid. (Id., at (e).)
- Requires a court, upon a court granting an objection to the improper exercise of a peremptory challenge, shall do one or more of the following:
- Quash the jury venire and start jury selection anew. This remedy shall be provided if requested by the objecting party.
- If the motion is granted after the jury has been impaneled, declare a mistrial and select a new jury if requested by the defendant.
- Seat the challenged juror.
- Provide the objecting party additional challenges.
- Provide another remedy as the court deems appropriate. (Id., at (h).)
- Applies these procedures to all jury trials in which jury selection has not been completed as of January 1, 2022. (Id., at (i).)
- Provides that 9) – 17) do not apply to civil cases (Id., at (k)); however, as of January 1, 2026, when the delayed implementation of AB 3070 takes effect, applies these provisions to all jury trials. (See AB 3070, Chap. 318, Stats. 2020, Sec. 3.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: This bill seeks to weaken a key component of AB 3070, a ground-breaking bill that was signed into law in 2021 and went into effect in 2022 and sought to address the shortcomings of the jury selection process in jury trials conducted in California. According to the author:
I am proud to be authoring AB 3039 which will reduce bias in criminal trials by allowing peremptory challenges against potential jurors who harbor bias against law enforcement or the criminal legal system. AB 3070 put us on a dangerous path two years ago allowing bias against law enforcement in criminal trials, and my bill will remove those provisions to keep criminal trials fair and unbiased.
The voir dire process. Under California law, every citizen over 18 years of age is eligible and qualified to be a prospective juror, unless they fail to meet certain minimal requirements. For example, they must be a resident of the jurisdiction in which they are summoned to serve, be possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language, not be convicted of a felony and on parole, post-release community supervision, felony probation, or mandated supervision, and not be subject to a conservatorship. Aside from these threshold qualification requirements that must be met for a person to be eligible, every California resident is qualified and obligated, when called, to serve on a jury. California law prohibits any person from being excluded from eligibility for jury service. While otherwise eligible persons may be excused by the courts on a case-by-case basis for hardship, be challenged for cause (such as for express or implied bias), or otherwise be subject to a peremptory challenge, California law prohibits the exemption of any eligible person from service by reason of occupation, economic status, or any protected characteristic listed or defined by existing law (i.e. race, national origin, ethnic group identification, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, color, genetic information, or disability), or for any other reason. (See Code of Civil Procedure Section 204.)
Existing law allows the parties in criminal and civil cases to remove jurors from the jury panel (also called a venire) by exercising challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. Challenges are made during the voir dire process during which the court, with the assistance of the attorneys, inquires of the prospective jurors to determine the suitability of individuals to render a fair judgment about the facts of the case.
Challenges for cause are statutory and include: incapacity; consanguinity or affinity; fiduciary, domestic or business relationship; serving as a juror or witness in previous trial involving parties; interest in the action; opinion on the merits; bias or prejudice; or being a party to another action. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 129; see also 7 Witkin Cal. Proc. Trial Sec. 130.) In contrast, peremptory challenges are made without need to state a cause. California court procedural manuals note, “the purpose of the peremptory challenge is to insure an impartial jury by allowing a specific number of jurors to be excused even though no statutory challenge for cause can be made; e.g., where a juror is believed to be biased but the bias cannot be proved.” (7 Witkin Cal. Proc. Trial Sec. 125.) That being said, while peremptory challenges are permitted without initially stating a reason, “it has long been made clear in criminal cases that those challenges may not be made for the purpose of excluding a cognizable group. [ . . . ] More recently this principle, grounded on the guaranties of equal protection and trial by a jury drawn by a fair cross-section of the community, has been applied in civil cases as well.” (7 Witkin Cal. Proc. Trial Sec. 127.) In that light, the Code of Civil Procedure expressly prohibits the exercise of a peremptory challenge “to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assumption that the prospective juror is biased merely because of their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation. (Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 231.5.)
Procedure to address discrimination in preemptory challenges prior to AB 3070: Batson-Wheeler motions. Peremptory challenges to prospective jurors during the jury selection process have been part of the civil law of California since 1851, and were codified in the original Field Codes in 1872. Their previous history in England dates back to at least the Fifteenth Century when persons charged with felonies were entitled to 35 peremptory challenges to members of the jury panel.
It is important to keep in mind… that jury selection strategies used in the late 1800s were novel and are not deeply rooted in our common law heritage. Viewing them in historical context, we see that as soon as American procedures permitted any real use of peremptory challenges, they took on the character they have retained, permitting lawyers to play on stereotypes, allegiances, prejudices, and distrust to maximize their chances of winning. Some of the ugliness derided in present day practices, including the use of race, ethnicity, religion, politics, and class, has existed from these procedures’ first use. (April J. Anderson, “Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners’ Trial Manuals”, Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 2020 (forthcoming).)
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, recognizing that the peremptory challenge could be a vehicle for discrimination. (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at p. 89.) Prior to that, in 1978, the California Supreme Court, in deciding People v. Wheeler, had forbidden the use of peremptory challenges based on the belief that certain individuals are biased because they are members of a specific racial, ethnic, or religious group. (People v. Wheeler, supra, at p. 276.) Subsequent cases have sought, with some difficulty, to define the limits of inquiry into the motives of the parties in exercise of peremptory challenges which are suspected to be based on race or gender.
Out of these cases, a three-part Batson/Wheeler process for evaluating peremptory challenges for evidence of discrimination has emerged. First, after a party objects to the use of peremptory challenge for a discriminatory purpose, the trial court must first resolve whether or not the proponent has raised a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” (Johnson v. California, supra, at p. 168.) Evidence of discriminatory intent may include a party using a disproportionate number of their peremptory challenges against members of a specific group, or a party has failed to engage the prospective juror in meaningful questioning. (People v. Wheeler, supra, at pp. 280-281.)
If the court makes a prima facie inference of discriminatory action, the judge then asks the striking party to provide a justification for each peremptory challenge. To be considered valid, the reason given must be facially neutral (i.e., not expressly related to the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, or other specified characteristic). The reason may be “trivial”, so long as it is facially neutral. (People v. Arias, supra, at p. 136.) Examples of reasons considered valid and non-discriminatory include: antipathy towards prosecutors or criminal justice system, bad feelings towards law enforcement, family member with criminal conviction, juror’s occupation, hostile looks, hunches, or manner of dress. (People v. Mayfield, supra, at p. 724; People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 1217; People v. Cummings, supra, at p. 1282; People v. Semien, supra, at p. 708; People v. Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1125; People v. Hall, supra, at p. 170; People v. Barber, supra, at p. 396, respectively.)
Finally, following the attorney’s explanation, the trial court must decide if their reasons are genuine or merely a pretext cloaking discriminatory intent. In making this decision, the court may consider an evaluation of the striking party’s “state of mind” based on demeanor and credibility; comparison of the dismissed juror against similar jurors who are not members of the cognizable group whom the attorney did not dismiss; or whether or not the striking party failed to fully question the juror they now seek to dismiss. (Hernandez v. New York, supra, at p. 365; Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, at p. 241; Id. at p. 246, respectively.) If a peremptory challenge is ultimately determined to have been made with discriminatory intent, the court may decide to reseat the prospective juror, dismiss the panel and recommence voir dire, or give the aggrieved party additional peremptory challenges.
Prior to AB 3070, the Batson/Wheeler process did not adequately prevent discrimination in jury selection. Multiple studies of criminal and civil jury trials have shown that, even after Batson, peremptory challenges were used at different rates depending on the race of the prospective jurors. From a study of the jury selection in capital cases in North Carolina:
Over the twenty-year period we examined, prosecutors struck eligible black venire members at about 2.5 times the rate they struck eligible venire members who were not black. These disparities remained consistent over time and across the state, and did not diminish when we controlled for information about venire members that potentially bore on the decision to strike them, such as views on the death penalty or prior experience with crime. (Grosso, O'Brien and Woodworth. “A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials” (2012). Iowa Law Review, Forthcoming.)
In 2013, Justice Liu of the California Supreme Court questioned whether the Batson procedure stands up to its mandate of preventing discrimination in jury selection:
In adjudicating Batson claims in more than 100 cases over the past two decades, this court has found unlawful discrimination in jury selection only once—and that was a case more than 12 years ago in which the prosecutor struck all five Hispanic members of the venire and through his own words “revealed an acute sensitivity to the presence of Hispanics on the jury panel and an evident belief that Hispanics would not be favorable jurors for the prosecution.” (People v. Silva, supra, at p. 375 (Silva).) […] One need not question the overall excellence and integrity of our prosecutors and trial courts in order to pause and wonder, in light of the remarkable uniformity of this court's Batson decisions over the past 20 years, whether we have maintained the proper level of vigilance. Today, as when Batson was decided, it is a troubling reality, rooted in history and social context, that our black citizens are generally more skeptical about the fairness of our criminal justice system than other citizens. Yet it is precisely to ensure public confidence in our courts and their verdicts that Batson “forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.” (Batson v. Kentucky, supra at 89.) I have serious doubts as to whether our jurisprudence has held true to Batson's mandate. (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 865-866.)
Other studies have noted a pattern of racial bias in peremptory challenges and juror dismissals by defense attorneys and trial judges as well as prosecutors. From a study of felony trials in 2011 in North Carolina:
Our analysis shows that prosecutors in North Carolina—a state with demographics and legal institutions similar to those in many other states—exclude non-white jurors about twice as often as they exclude white jurors. Defense attorneys lean in the opposite direction: they exclude white jurors a little more than twice as often as non-white jurors. Trial judges, meanwhile, remove non-white jurors for ‘cause’ about 30% more often than they remove white jurors. The net effect is for non-white jurors (especially black males) to remain on juries less often than their white counterparts.” (Wright, Chavis, and Parks. “The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury Selection Data as a Political Issue” (2017), University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2018, No. 4, 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994288.)
Further studies have noted that racial bias in jury selection is also present in civil cases, with racial stereotypes including “the general belief that black jurors are more sympathetic toward civil plaintiffs.” (Bellin and Semitsu, "Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney" (2011). Cornell L. Rev., Vol 96, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol96/iss5/7 .) This study of all federal criminal and civil jury trials between 2000-2009 led the researchers to conclude that, because Batson motions are so easily avoided through the use of a purportedly race-neutral reason, there is no reason to believe that Batson is “achieving its goal of eliminating race-based jury exclusion and little hope that it will ever do so.”
The Washington Supreme Court developed new rules of court to address these concerns. A workgroup consisting of judges, attorneys, and representatives of legal rights organizations developed a set of rules for juror selection. The final workgroup report emphasized the importance of addressing implicit bias in the jury selection process, and made several very important suggestions, including that the burden of proof should rest with the party opposing the juror (the person exercising their peremptory challenge) to remove the juror for a non-discriminatory reason. Recognizing the need to place the burden of defending the peremptory challenge on the party seeking to remove a juror, the Washington State workgroup noted, “instead of requiring the defendant or objecting party to prove a prima facie case of discrimination against a particular juror, workgroup members generally agreed the burden should be carried by the striking party to give reasons to justify the peremptory challenge for the judge’s determination.” (Washington Supreme Court, “Proposed New GR 37—Jury Selection Workgroup Final Report”, (2018), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/OrderNo25700-A-1221Workgroup.pdf .) The new Washington rule regarding jury selection, GR 37, went into effect in April 2018. There are no formal studies available describing the effect of the new rule.
The California Supreme Court announced in January 2020 that they were launching a similar workgroup, the California Jury Selection Work Group. The group was tasked with “undertak[ing] a thoughtful, inclusive study of how Batson/Wheeler operates in practice in California and whether modifications or additional measures are warranted to address impermissible discrimination against cognizable groups in jury selection.” Specific questions touch on the effects of the purposeful discrimination standard and unconscious bias as well as standards of appellate review.
The Work Group’s final report was released in July of 2022. “Ultimately, the work group decided to highlight this important issue but not to propose any changes at this time. The Legislature, in enacting AB 3070, opted to change the Batson/Wheeler framework instead of eliminating or reducing peremptory challenges. Thus, the group agreed to defer further discussion of this issue to allow time for the impact of this legislation to be realized.” (Jury Selection Work Group: Final Report to the Supreme Court of California (July 2022), at p. 26, available at https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/2022-09/Jury%20Selection%20Work%20Group%20Final%20Report.pdf.)
AB 3070. In 2020, the California Legislature passed and the Governor signed ground-breaking legislation to address the shortcomings of the Batson/Wheeler process in jury selection with AB 3070 ((Weber), Chap. 318, Stats. 2020). As a result of AB 3070, California law now prohibits the use of peremptory challenges in jury selection on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, and outlines court procedures for evaluating and addressing peremptory challenges that are potentially discriminatory. AB 3070 improved upon then-existing court procedures to evaluate whether the dismissal of a prospective juror via a peremptory challenge is unlawfully discriminatory.
Most relevant to this bill, AB 3070 provided a list of reasons for excusing a prospective juror that are presumed to be invalid unless the party exercising the peremptory challenge can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case. These provisions are codified in CCP Section 231.7. Two of the reasons specified in Section 231.7 as being presumptively invalid bases for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are the following:
- Expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system.
- Expressing a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner. (CCP Section 231.7 (e)(1)-(2).)
While initially applicable only to criminal trials, these provisions will apply to civil trials as of January 1, 2026.
This bill seeks to remove these two reasons from CCP Section 231.7’s list of presumptively invalid bases for the exercise of a peremptory challenge, arguably undermining a key component of the reforms implemented by AB 3070. The Legislature considered whether to include these reasons in the list and ultimately decided to include them (as numbers (1) and (2)) because of the strong evidence that they are used as a basis for exercising peremptory challenges on a discriminatory basis. Indeed, prior to the enactment of AB 3070, a negative experience with law enforcement or distrust of law enforcement was found to be a top proxy for race that was used by prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner that prevented a disproportionate number of people of color from serving on juries.
Our empirical analysis of California appellate court opinions shows that prosecutors routinely and successfully cite a Black or Latinx prospective juror’s distrust of law enforcement or the criminal legal system to justify a peremptory strike against the juror. Social science research demonstrates that most African Americans and Whites do not share the same views of law enforcement or the criminal legal system. The differences in attitude are long-standing and rooted in the nation’s history of institutional racism, as well as the present-day differential treatment of Blacks and Latinx people by actors in the criminal legal system, including by members of law enforcement. More than 40 years ago, in Wheeler, the California Supreme Court announced that these differences do not support the exercise of peremptory challenges: “The representation on juries of these differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section standard . . . is designed to foster.” California courts long ago lost sight of this goal. (Whitewashing the Jury, How California Perpetuates the Discriminatory Exclusion of Black and Latinx Jurors, Berkeley Law 2020, at p. v)
In fact, prosecutors were trained to dismiss jurors who have had negative experiences with law enforcement.
Prosecutors are trained to strike prospective jurors who have had or whose relatives have had a negative experience with law enforcement or are distrustful of the criminal legal system. They are, in other words, instructed to exploit the historic and present day differential treatment of Whites and people of color, especially African Americans and Latinx people, by the police, prosecutors, and the courts. (Whitewashing the Jury, How California Perpetuates the Discriminatory Exclusion of Black and Latinx Jurors, supra, at p. 36.)
What has been the effect of AB 3070 on the composition of juries and on their verdicts? There does not appear to be any data available from the courts about the effect of AB 3070 on the composition of criminal juries, or their verdicts, in the past two years since it became law. In fact, given that California does not systematically collect demographic information from prospective jurors, there unfortunately is virtually no data available about the diversity of juror pools or juries in the state. (See CCP Section 205 (c)–(e); Semel et al., Guess Who’s Coming to Jury Duty?) (2024) Berkeley Law Death Penalty Clinic, p. vi and fn. 7.)
However, there does appear to be anecdotal evidence about the success of AB 3070 in achieving more diverse juries. In its letter of opposition to the bill, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice offered a number of anecdotes from deputy public defenders across the state, demonstrating that at least in the perception of these attorneys, AB 3070 has greatly increased the diversity of juries and significantly decreased the use of peremptory challenges in the voir dire process, especially challenges exercised against prospective jurors of color:
- A Ventura County Senior Deputy Public Defender reported that the “county has certainly seen more diverse juries since 231.7 passed.” He attributed this to prosecutors being more precise in using peremptory challenges against Black jurors and an increased willingness on the part of judges to review whether a prosecutor is unlawfully striking a person of color.
- An Orange County Deputy Public Defender, who has had four trials since section 231.7 was implemented, observed that almost every jury included a Black juror, reversing a long pattern [of juries not having black jurors].
- Another Orange County Deputy Public Defender, who has had seven trials post-Section 231.7, explained that during jury selection in almost every case, at least one person of color related a story about themselves or a close relative involving either discrimination by or negative encounters with law enforcement. These experiences included racial or ethnic profiling as well as unanswered calls for police assistance. . . .As he explained, the frequency of these encounters illustrates the importance of a statutory provision that prevents prosecutors from excluding young Latinx prospective jurors with impunity.
- A Fresno County Deputy Public Defender described a trial in which the prosecutor made a cause challenge against a Black prospective juror because the juror had negative experiences with law enforcement and had stated that he would not automatically believe a police officer, even though the juror stated they could be fair and impartial. Due to the current law that AB 3039 seeks to eliminate, the court probed the matter further, and the prosecution withdrew its request to remove the prospective juror.
- A group of Contra Costa County Public Defenders have observed an overall decrease in the frequency with which prosecutors rely on “presumptively invalid reasons” to strike jurors of color. One attorney explained that the statute requires both sides to focus more on the actual risk of unfairness, partiality, and biases, as opposed to racial or ethnic stereotypes.
At the same time, there appears to be no evidence that the two opinions about law enforcement and the fairness of the legal system that are in presumptively invalid rationales for the exercise of a peremptory challenge under existing law—expressing distrust in law enforcement or the legal system, or belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner—and that the bill seeks to strike from the law, are problematic or have led to unjust outcomes since AB 3070 took effect. The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) cites the violent attack on Megan McCarthy, a deputy sheriff for their department, as a “poignant example” of why the bill is needed. According the SBCSD, a defendant was charged with attacking Deputy McCarthy, stealing her firearm, and attempting to kill her, but the jury in the case failed to reach a verdict; SBCSD argues that the jury hung “due to biases against law enforcement.” Without knowing more about the strength of the evidence in that case, however, it is impossible to know whether the jury’s failure to convict the defendant was solely caused by bias against law enforcement. And without any evidence that jurors in the case expressed negative feelings about law enforcement--during the voir dire process, during the trial, or after being discharged--it also is impossible to say that a different result (specifically a guilty verdict) would have been reached if this bill had been in effect at the time of the trial. In any case, one (non)verdict does not appear to justify a wholesale change in the existing law to remove these two opinions about law enforcement and the legal system from the presumptively invalid bases for the exercise of peremptory challenges. This is especially true given that the Legislature included these two opinions in the existing law based upon strong data showing the correlation between prosecutors using them as “race-neutral” reasons for the exercise of peremptory challenges and strong empirical research proving that they correlate with discriminatory jury selection practices.
Removing these opinions about law enforcement and the legal process from the list of “presumptively invalid reasons” for the exercise of peremptory challenges that are presumed to be invalid, as proposed by the bill, likely would be detrimental to the Legislature’s efforts to stop bias in the jury selection process by means of its enactment of AB 3070. Rather, these opinions appear to be an integral part of an important law that appears to have been effective, at least based upon the anecdotal evidence available to the Committee, in achieving the goal of making the jury selection process in California less discriminatory and ultimately producing juries that are more diverse, more fair, and more reflective of the diversity of the state.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The California State Sheriffs Association writes the following in support of the bill:
A peremptory challenge results in the exclusion of a potential juror without the need for any reason or explanation. Existing law provides that a party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the bases of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.
The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department writes that it “strongly supports” the bill because it “allows courts and judges to strike a juror for harboring bias against a peace officer to ensure a fair and impartial jury.”
A coalition of local law enforcement officer associations write the following in support of the bill:
This bill is an important equity measure given the fact that under current law prospective jurors who express a trust in or having a positive experience with law enforcement or the legal system may be removed as a prospective juror without a presumption of invalidity.
Relatedly, prospective jurors who express a belief that law enforcement officers do not engage in racial profiling or a belief that criminal laws have not been enforced in a discriminatory manner may also be removed as a prospective juror without a presumption of invalidity.
Open minded jurors, without pre-determined conclusions regarding which witnesses they will trust - or not trust - are necessary for the fair administration of our criminal justice system. Presuming as invalid a peremptory challenge of prospective jurors that that have expressed such biases diminishes public trust in our criminal justice system and is a disservice to all dedicated public servants who have sworn an oath to uphold and defend our laws.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: Alameda County Public Defender Brendon Woods writes the following to explain his office’s opposition to the bill:
Prosecutors have long attempted to claim that excusing jurors because of their attitudes toward the criminal system basis is “race neutral.” Indeed, prior to the enactment of AB 3070, a negative experience with law enforcement or distrust of law enforcement was the number one proxy for race used to peremptorily excuse jurors of color from serving on juries. However, extensive social science research and simple common sense indicate that attitudes about the criminal system are directly related to experiences with that system, and white jurors tend to have distinctly different experiences with the criminal system than do jurors of color. Thus, “attitudes toward law enforcement or the criminal system” can be an extremely accurate proxy for race. This correlation is one that prosecutors have been affirmatively trained to exploit.
. . .
CCP 231.7 helps prevent the dismissal from juries of Black and Latinx jurors because of their race. Juries are more diverse and more representative of the community since AB 3070 amended CCP 231. AB 3039 would undo the progress that has been made. It is discriminatory and bad policy.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Monterey County
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Novato Police Officers Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Employees' Benefit Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
The Home Gardens Community
Upland Police Officers Association
Six individuals
Opposition
Alameda County Public Defender's Office
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
California Innocence Coalition
California Public Defenders Association
Californians for Safety and Justice
Californians United for A Responsible Budget
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Initiate Justice
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of The San Francisco Bay Area
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Rubicon Programs
San Francisco Public Defender
Santa Cruz County Public Defender
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Sonoma County Public Defender
Western Center on Law & Poverty, INC.
Yolo County Public Defender's Office
Analysis Prepared by: Alison Merrilees / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):