SB 796: Threats: schools and places of worship.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2023-04-27
Current Status:
Failed
(2024-08-15: August 15 hearing: Held in committee and under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined. Under existing law, this crime is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for no more than one year for a misdemeanor, or by imprisonment in state prison for a felony.
This bill would make a person who willfully threatens to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to which will result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with specific intent and under certain circumstances, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person, guilty of a misdemeanor or felony punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a specified term, except that if the person is under 18 years of age, the bill would make the person guilty of a misdemeanor. By creating a new crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined. Under existing law, this crime is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for no more than one year for a misdemeanor, or by imprisonment in state prison for a felony.
This bill would additionally make it a crime for a person to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a particular location or event, as specified. By expanding the scope of a crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.This bill would make a person who willfully threatens to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with specific intent and under certain circumstances, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person, guilty of a misdemeanor or felony punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a specified term, except that if the person is under 18 years of age, the bill would make the person guilty of a misdemeanor. By creating a new crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law makes it a crime to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat that, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby reasonably causes the threatened person to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of their immediate family, as defined.
This bill would additionally make it a crime for a person to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a particular location or event, as specified. By expanding the scope of a crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)A person who, by any means, including, but not limited to, an electronic act, willfully threatens to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to which will result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b)Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a person under 18 years of age who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c)This section does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Electronic act has the same meaning as in paragraph (2) of subdivision (r) of Section 48900 of the Education Code.
(2)Place of worship means any church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other building where religious services are regularly conducted.
(3)School means a state preschool, a private or public elementary, middle, vocational, junior high, or high school, a community college, a public or private university, or a location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place and the threat is related to both the school-sponsored event and to the time period during which the school-sponsored event will occur.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)A person who, by any means, including, but not limited to, an electronic act, willfully threatens to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b)Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a person under 18 years of age who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c)This section does not preclude or prohibit prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and Section 422.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Electronic act has the same meaning as in paragraph (2) of subdivision (r) of Section 48900 of the Education Code.
(2)Place of worship means any church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other building where religious services are regularly conducted.
(3)School means a state preschool, a private or public elementary, middle, vocational, junior high, or high school, a community college, a public or private university, or a location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place and the threat is related to both the school-sponsored event and to the time period during which the school-sponsored event will occur.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SECTION 1.Section 422 of the Penal Code is amended to read:422.(a)Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or for their immediate familys safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.(b)Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a particular location or event, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes a person reading or hearing the threat reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or for the safety of others, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.(c)For purposes of this section, immediate family means any spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household.(d)Electronic communication device includes, but is not limited to, telephones, cellular telephones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or pagers. Electronic communication has the same meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.(a)Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her their own safety or for his or her their immediate familys safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(b)Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a particular location or event, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes a person reading or hearing the threat reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or for the safety of others, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(b)(c)For purposes of this section, immediate family means any spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household.
(c)(d)Electronic communication device includes, but is not limited to, telephones, cellular telephones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or pagers. Electronic communication has the same meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
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Date
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Status
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| Aug 15, 2024 | August 15 hearing: Held in committee and under submission. |
| Jul 2, 2024 | July 2 set for first hearing. Placed on suspense file. |
| Jun 26, 2024 | June 26 hearing postponed by committee. |
| Jun 4, 2024 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (June 4). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 11, 2023 | July 11 set for second hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Jun 27, 2023 | June 27 set for first hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Jun 8, 2023 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 25, 2023 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| May 25, 2023 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 40. Noes 0. Page 1305.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 23, 2023 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| May 18, 2023 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 18, 2023 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 7. Noes 0. Page 1184.) (May 18). |
| May 12, 2023 | Set for hearing May 18. |
| May 8, 2023 | May 8 hearing: Placed on APPR suspense file. |
| May 2, 2023 | Set for hearing May 8. |
| Apr 27, 2023 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 26, 2023 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 0. Page 902.) (April 25). |
| Apr 10, 2023 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on PUB S. |
| Mar 23, 2023 | Set for hearing April 25. |
| Mar 22, 2023 | April 18 set for first hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Mar 21, 2023 | Set for hearing April 18. |
| Mar 1, 2023 | Referred to Com. on PUB S. |
| Feb 21, 2023 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 20. |
| Feb 17, 2023 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Jun 4, 2024 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
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| May 25, 2023 | Special Consent SB796 Alvarado-Gil et al. | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| May 18, 2023 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| May 8, 2023 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Apr 25, 2023 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
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Organization
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Position
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Date
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|---|---|---|
| Anti-Defamation League | ** Support | |
| California Association Of Joint Powers Authorities | ** Support | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Support | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Against | |
| California School Employees Association | ** Support | |
| California State Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| California Teachers Association | ** Support | |
| Giffords Law Center To Prevent Gun Violence | ** Support | |
| Hindu American Foundation, INC. | ** Support | |
| National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association | ** Support | |
| San Diego County District Attorney's Office | ** Support | |
| San Francisco District Attorney Brooke Jenkins | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Public Defender | ** Against | |
| Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office | ** Support | |
| Visalia; City of | ** Support | |
| Whittier; City Of | ** Support |
Date of Hearing: July 2, 2024
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 796
Author:(Alvarado-Gil) – As Amended Ver:April 27, 2023
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 7 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill creates a new alternative felony-misdemeanor (“wobbler”) offense for willfully threatening to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, and if the threat causes a person to reasonably sustain fear for their own safety or the safety of another person.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to the courts of an unknown but potentially significant amount to adjudicate cases of the new offense created by this bill. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time and resources needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a need for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The Governor’s 2024-25 budget proposes $83.1 million ongoing from the General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Costs (local funds, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of the offense created by this bill. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. Although county incarceration costs are generally not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012), overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from 2011 public safety realignment.
According to the LAO, the General Fund faces a structural deficit in the tens of billions of dollars over the next several fiscal years.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
SB 796 would make it unlawful to threaten to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily injury at a school or place or worship, even though a specific victim of the crime is not named. Those who receive threats like the ones described, especially those who are or will be at a school or place of worship, may suffer from the fear and trauma of the threatened crime…This gap in the law makes it difficult to fully investigate and prosecute these cases, despite the damage caused to communities when an individual conveys a threat to kill or cause great bodily injury. Given the reality in California and around the country of mass shootings at schools and religious centers, our laws must be updated to reflect the devastating impact of such threats.
- Background. Under the existing offense of criminal threats, it is unlawful for a person to willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the person’s statement is to be taken as a threat, even if the person had no intent of actually carrying the threat out. To obtain a conviction, such a threat must be so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and the threat must cause the person threatened to be in sustained, reasonable fear for their own safety or for their immediate family’s safety. Criminal threats is a wobbler, meaning the offense may be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor at the discretion of a prosecutor. Misdemeanor criminal threats is punishable by up to one year in county jail. Felony criminal threats is punishable by up to three years in state prison.
This bill creates a parallel wobbler for threatening to commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury to any person on the grounds of a school or a place of worship, if the threat causes a person to reasonably fear for their own safety or the safety of another person. Unlike the existing criminal threats statute, this bill refers explicitly to threats against specified institutions. A misdemeanor conviction of the offense created by this bill is punishable by up to one year in county jail. A felony conviction of the offense created by this bill is punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in county jail. If a defendant has certain prior convictions, a felony conviction is punishable by incarceration in state prison. The bill specifies that a defendant who commits this offense when they are under 18 years of age may be convicted only of a misdemeanor.
- Support and Opposition. In support of this bill, its sponsor, the California Association of District Attorneys, writes:
Far too often, threats are made to “shoot-up” a place or event, causing fear, trauma, and disruption to the community because of the grim reality that mass-shootings frequently occur in California and around the country. Currently, under Penal Code section 422, these threats are not illegal because a specific person is not named. SB 796 will eliminate this legal loophole…[L]aw enforcement will be able to properly act upon and investigate terror-causing events, while also holding accountable those who make these threats.
In opposition, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice argues:
Making a criminal threat (in any setting) is conduct that is already covered by the Penal Code in Section 422. Nearly all of the conduct described in this bill falls well within the definition of that section. For the most part, this bill is unnecessary even to achieve its stated aims. To the extent that SB 796 loosens the restrictions of Section 422, it is even more concerning. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that is often misused to penalize conduct that does not truly belong in the criminal justice system. This is particularly true for our clients with mental health conditions, who often suffer from crippling paranoia and delusions. The fear these clients experience can lead them to say things that are easily misinterpreted or are simply a product of their illness.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: June 4, 2024
Counsel: Kimberly Horiuchi
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Kevin McCarty, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 796
Author:(Alvarado-Gil) – As Amended Ver:April 27, 2023
SUMMARY: Creates an alternate misdemeanor-felony for willfully threatening to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, as specified, and if the threat causes a person or persons to reasonably sustain fear for their own safety or the safety of another person. Specifically, this bill:
- States any person who, by any means, including, but not limited to, an electronic act, willfully threatens to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent to carry it out, if the threat, on its face, and under circumstances in which it is made, so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons to reasonably sustain fear for their own safety or safety of another person, shall be guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year in county jail or three years in county jail or state prison depending on the defendant’s criminal history.
- Provides that any person under the age of 18 may be guilty of this offense and may be charged with a misdemeanor.
- States this offense is not meant to preclude prosecution under any other law, except a person shall not be convicted for the same threat pursuant to the hate crimes statute.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Electronic act” means the same as it does in the Education Code: a creation or transmission originated on or off the school site, by means of an electronic device, including, but not limited to, a telephone, wireless telephone, or other wireless communication device, computer, or pager, of a communication, including texts, sounds, video, images, or posting.
- “Place of worship” means any church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other building where religious services are regularly conducted.
- “School” means a state preschool, a private or public elementary, middle, vocational, junior high, or high school, a community college, a public or private university, or a location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place and the treat is related to both the school-sponsored event and to the time period during which the school-sponsored event will occur.
- “Electronic act” means the same as it does in the Education Code: a creation or transmission originated on or off the school site, by means of an electronic device, including, but not limited to, a telephone, wireless telephone, or other wireless communication device, computer, or pager, of a communication, including texts, sounds, video, images, or posting.
EXISTING LAW:
- States any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed three years. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).)
- Defines “electronic communication device” includes, but is not limited to, telephones, cellular telephones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or pagers. “Electronic communication” has the same meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18 of the United States Code. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (c).)
- Defines “hate crime” as a criminal act committed, in whole or in part because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim:
- Disability;
- Gender;
- Nationality;
- Race or ethnicity;
- Religion;
- Sexual orientation; or
- Association with a person or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics. (Pen. Code, § 422.55, subd. (a)(1)-(7).)
- Disability;
- Provides that all state and local agencies shall use the definition of “hate crime” stated above except as other explicit provisions of state or federal law may require otherwise. (Pen. Code, § 422.9.)
- Specifies “hate crimes” include, but are not limited to violating or interfering with the exercise of civil rights, or knowingly defacing, destroying, or damaging property because of actual or perceived characteristics of the victim that fit the “hate crime definition.” (Pen. Code, §§ 422.55, subd. (b). & 422.6., subd. (a) and (b).)
- Defines “Nationality” as country of origin, immigration status, including citizenship, and national origin. (Pen. Code, § 422.56, subd. (e).)
- Defines “Race or ethnicity” as ancestry, color, and ethnic background. (Pen. Code, § 422.56, subd. (f).)
- Defines “Religion” as all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism. (Pen. Code, § 422.56, subd. (g).)
- Defines “Sexual orientation” as heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality. (Pen. Code, § 422.56, subd. (h).)
- Specifies that “Victim” includes, but is not limited to, a community center, educational facility, entity, family, group, individual, office, meeting hall, person, place of worship, private institution, public agency, library, or other victim or intended victim of the offense. (Pen. Code, § 422.56, subd. (i).)
- Requires DOJ, on or before July 1st of each year, to update the OpenJustice Web portal with information obtained from local law enforcement agencies regarding hate crimes. (Pen. Code, § 13023, subd. (b).)
- Requires POST, in consultation with subject-matter experts, including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies, civil rights groups, academic experts, and the DOJ, to develop guidelines and a course of instruction and training for law enforcement officers who are employed as peace officers, or who are not yet employed as a peace officer but are enrolled in a training academy for law enforcement officers, addressing hate crimes. (Pen. Code, § 13519.6, subd. (a).)
- Requires the POST course to include instruction in each of the following:
- Indicators of hate crimes;
- The impact of these crimes on the victim, the victim’s family, and the community, and the assistance and compensation available to victims;
- Knowledge of the laws dealing with hate crimes and the legal rights of, and the remedies available to, victims of hate crimes;
- Law enforcement procedures, reporting, and documentation of hate crimes;
- Techniques and methods to handle incidents of hate crimes in a non-combative manner;
- Multi-mission criminal extremism, which means the nexus of certain hate crimes, antigovernment extremist crimes, anti-reproductive-rights crimes, and crimes committed in whole or in part because of the victims’ actual or perceived homelessness;
- The special problems inherent in some categories of hate crimes, including gender-bias crimes, disability-bias crimes, including those committed against homeless persons with disabilities, anti-immigrant crimes, and anti-Arab and anti-Islamic crimes, and techniques and methods to handle these special problems; and,
- Preparation for, and response to, possible future anti-Arab/Middle Eastern and anti-Islamic hate crime waves, and any other future hate crime waves that the AG determines are likely. (Pen. Code, § 13519.6, subd. (b).)
- Indicators of hate crimes;
- Requires POST guidelines to include a framework and possible content of a general order or other formal policy on hate crimes that all state law enforcement agencies shall adopt and the commission shall encourage all local law enforcement agencies to adopt. (Pen. Code, § 13519.6, subd. (c).)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “SB 796 would make it unlawful to threaten to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily injury at a school or place or worship, even though a specific victim of the crime is not named. Those who receive threats like the ones described, especially those who are or will be at a school or place of worship, may suffer from the fear and trauma of the threatened crime. These threats cause extensive disruption to the community. These kinds of threats require immediate law enforcement response, often with specialized units, in order to gauge whether the threats are credible.
This gap in the law makes it difficult to fully investigate and prosecute these cases, despite the damage caused to communities when an individual conveys a threat to kill or cause great bodily injury. Given the reality in California and around the country of mass shootings at schools and religious centers, our laws must be updated to reflect the devastating impact of such threats. This statute fills a gap in the law, allowing clarity for investigating officers and prosecutors, who can now hold individuals accountable for the terror and disruption their words cause.”
- First Amendment and True Threat Jurisprudence: The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” (U.S. Const, Amend. I, Section 1.) The California Constitution also protects free speech. “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” (Cal. Const. Art. I, § 2.) “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2002) 535 U.S. 564, 573.)
“To achieve First Amendment protection, a plaintiff must show that [t]he[y] possessed: (1) a message to be communicated; and (2) an audience to receive that message, regardless of the medium in which the message is to be expressed.” (Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group (1995) 515 U.S. 557.) Legislation that regulates the content of protected speech is subject to strict scrutiny, sometimes referred to by the courts as “exacting scrutiny” in this context. (Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. (2015) 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226.) To survive strict scrutiny, state action must be narrowly tailored to address a compelling government interest. (Ibid.) However, true threats of violence are outside the bounds of First Amendment protection and punishable as crimes. (See generally, Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 395 U.S. 444, 447; Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359.)
True threats is defined by the court as “serious expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means to “commit an act of unlawful violence.” (See Black, 538 U. S., at 359.) Whether the speaker is aware of, or intends to convey, the threatening aspect of the message is not part of what makes a statement a threat, as this Court recently explained. (See Elonis v. United States (2015) 575 U. S. 723, 733.). The existence of a threat depends not on “the mental state of the author,” but on “what the statement conveys” to the person on the other end. (Ibid.”)
“When the statement is understood as a true threat, all the harms that have long made threats unprotected naturally follow. True threats subject individuals to ‘fear of violence’ and to the many kinds of ‘disruption that fear engenders.’” (See Black, 538 U. S., at 360.)
Most recently, in Counterman v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court refined the true threat test in determining whether the state must show a subjective understanding by the defendant that the statements constituted a threat. The Court held the state must show the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten in order to impose criminal penalties, however, a showing of a mental state of recklessness is sufficient. (See Counterman v. Colorado (2023) 143 S.Ct. 2106, 2112.)
“Again, guided by our precedent, we hold recklessness standard is enough. Given that a subjective standard here shields speech not independently entitled to protection – and indeed posing real dangers – we do not require that the State prove the defendant had any more specific intent to threat the victim.” (Counterman, supra, at 143 S.Ct. at 2113.)
In this case, the author proposes a new statute that requires showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to threaten a school or place of worship with conduct that would result in death or great bodily injury. It requires much more than general intent – meaning knowledge that something may be a crime.
This statute is very similar to the existing criminal threats statute and requires the same elements. The proposed statute requires specific intent, meaning the reason the defendant committed the crime. In the Counterman case, the Court considered whether the defendant was aware of the threatening nature of the comments he made online to a local musician. (See Counterman, 143 S.Ct. at 2113.) However, the Supreme Court upheld Counterman’s conviction because, at the very least, his conduct was reckless.
“…Recklessness offers the right path forward. We have so far mostly focused on the constitutional interest in free expression, and on the correlative need to take into account threat prosecutions’ chilling effect. But the precedent we have relied on has always recognized and insisted on accommodating the competing value in regularly historically unprotected speech. … [The] standard again, is recklessness. It offers enough breathing space for protected speech without sacrificing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats. (Counterman, supra, at 2116.)
It seems likely that this statute will not be viewed as violating the First Amendment. California’s criminal threats statute has been ruled constitutional. (See People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 684, citing People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 401 [“A criminal statute that prohibits a threat made with the specific intent to place the victim reasonably in fear of death or great bodily injury is not unconstitutionally vague.”].) Given this statute is so similar to the existing criminal threats statute, it seems more likely than not a court would not view this statute as violating the First Amendment. However, as explained below, there are numerous other statutes, including the criminal threats statute that may, in some circumstances, provide greater penalty.
- Interpreting Penal Code section 422 [Criminal Threats]: In order to convict a person pursuant to Penal Code section 422, the primary criminal threats statute, the trier of fact must find the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
- the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person;
- the defendant made the threat;
- the defendant intended that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out;
- the threat was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat;
- the threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety; and,
- the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances. (Pen. Code, §422; CALCRIM No. 1300; see also People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)
Penal Code section 422 applies to all criminal threats which will result in death or great bodily injury regardless of location or the exact type of violence that is threatened. As with the proposed statute in this bill, it requires a showing of specific intent to threaten, meaning not only was the defendant aware the action was criminal, but made the threat with the intent that it be taken as a threat.
As noted above, Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a) may be charged as a felony and punished by up to three years in state prison. Penal Code section 422 is not a Realignment offense.[1] If a defendant is charged with a felony, they may be sentenced to state prison even if they do not have a serious or violent felony conviction, or required to register as a sex offender, as required by Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h). This bill just creates a specific criminal threats statute for conduct aimed at schools or places of worship.
According to the author, Penal Code section 422 does not prohibit criminal threats when it is levied against a group of people or institution – it only criminalizes threatening a person. Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a) states in part, “any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).)
Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a) criminalizes threats that will result in death or great bodily injury to another person – not just toward another person. The statute focuses on the seriousness of the threat – not just who reads or hears the threat. In the case of In re George T., although a court did not find the student engaged in criminal threats, the court was not impressed that it could not find in favor of the People because the student threatened a group of students at a school.
In that case, the juvenile drafted several “dark poems” that alluded to threats of mass violence at their high school. (In re George (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 626.) The respondent was convicted of a felony violation of Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a). While the California Supreme Court did not agree the statements in the poem constituted threats, the court did not make any findings that the respondent could not be convicted of this offense because his threats were toward the school, not the students that read the poem. (Id., at 634-35.)
The Court’s reasoning indicates that the students that read the poems may have believed they were at risk because they were students at that school. The Court allowed testimony from one of the students that read the poem that she believed she and the other students were being threatened. (In re George T., 33 Cal.4th at 635-36.) That appeared sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute assuming the respondent actually threatened anyone.
“Only the final two lines of the poem could arguably be construed to be a criminal threat: ‘For I can be the next kid to bring guns to kill students at school. So parents watch your children cuz I'm BACK!!’ Mary believed this was a threat, but her testimony reveals that her conclusion rested upon a considerable amount of interpretation: ‘I feel that when he said, ‘I can be the next person,’ that he meant that he will be, because also he says that he's dark, destructive, and dangerous person. And I'd describe a dangerous person as someone who has something in mind of killing someone or multiple people.’ The juvenile court's finding that minor threatened to kill Mary and Erin likewise turned primarily on its interpretation of the words, ‘For I can be the next kid to bring guns to kill students at school’ (italics added) to mean not only that minor could do so, but that he would do so. In other words, the court construed the word ‘can’ to mean ‘will.’ But that is not what the poem recites. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 635-636.)
As noted above, the Court did not dismiss the case outright because the respondent threatened a group of people. Presumably, if a person emails a place of worship that they “will blow up the building NOW and kill everyone inside today just to get you all out!” will very likely be viewed as a violation of Penal Code section 422 even though the threat is not levied specifically at the religious institution employee that read the email. It seems as if prosecutors may present as evidence the testimony of the person that received the threat, as well as others present on the school grounds or place of worship, in order to prove the required elements.
In contrast, some courts may be viewing Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a) more narrowly resulting in an inability to charge a person who threatens an institution, rather than a specific person. It is conceivable that a court may view this statute narrowly despite existing case law interpreting Penal Code section 422. Most certainly, calling in a bomb threat or threatening to discharge a firearm at people attending a place of worship or school may be prosecuted for it. To suggest otherwise, seems as if it would require a court to interpret this statute in an absurd way and contrary to the rules of statutory construction. (People v. Valdez (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 308, 308 [“The first step in statutory construction is to examine the statutory language and give it a plain and commonsense meaning, a reasonable and common sense interpretation, consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the Legislature.”].)
Penal Code section 422 is a strike:
Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(38) states Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a) is a “serious felony” meaning any defendant convicted of Penal Code section 422 will be subject to a strike. Since criminal threats is a “serious felony,” as that term is defined in statute, a defendant convicted of criminal threats may receive an enhanced sentence and prohibited from receiving probation.
In comparison to this legislation:
This bill also requires a specific intent to threaten death or great bodily injury and with the intent to threaten. The statute appears to be directed at a defendant to who perhaps calls in a bomb threat or threatens students or parishioners on social media or via email.
While the person may not have intended to carry out the threat, they intended to make the receiver feel threatened. The proposed statute in this bill requires a prosecutor to demonstrate the defendant engaged in the following, beyond a reasonable doubt:
- willfully threaten to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury to any person;
- who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship;
- with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent to carry it out, if the threat, on its face, and
- under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and;
- the threat causes a person or persons to reasonably sustain fear for their own safety or safety of another person.
The elements above are very similar to the requirements of Penal Code section 422. It also requires specific intent. However, the penalty is arguably lower than Penal Code section 422 since, theoretically, a defendant convicted of a felony 422, subdivision (a) may be sentenced to state prison whereas this penalty is an alternate misdemeanor-felony punishable in state prison only if the defendant has a prior serious or violent felony or is required to register as a sex offender.
Specific Intent: When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, a court asks whether defendant intends to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent.
When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. There is no real difference, however, only a linguistic one, between an intent to do an act already performed and an intent to do the same act in the future. … A classification of a crime as a specific intent crime is necessary only when the court must determine whether a defense of voluntary intoxication or mental disease, defect, or disorder is available; whether evidence thereon is admissible; or whether appropriate jury instructions are thereby required. (Emphasis added.) (People v. Hering (1999) 20 Cal.4th 440, 442.)
Demonstration of specific intent here would include evidence the defendant contacted the school or place of worship for the express purpose of threatening harm and that the threat be viewed as threatening and real. This bill states that a court not rely on the same threats to punish a defendant under both this statute and the hate crimes statute. Presumably, Penal Code section 654 would prohibit prosecution for both offenses, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” (Pen. Code, § 654, subd. (a).)
“To resolve [questions of multiple punishments], courts must look to the particular characteristics of the crime at issue, including both (1) the factual circumstances of the defendant's criminal conduct and (2) the elements of the crime as defined by the Legislature in the relevant statute. Sometimes, multiple convictions are appropriate for similar acts during a single course of conduct. Even a single act can result in two convictions under the same statute if the Legislature intends such a result. On the other hand, some statutes were written by the Legislature to authorize only a single conviction for a wrongful course of conduct, or an act victimizing more than one person or violating the statute in more than one way. (People v. Wilson (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 193, 200-201.)
Specifically, Penal Code section 422 may not be charged with other credible threats-related statutes in most circumstances. Penal Code 654 prohibits multiple convictions based on multiple threats toward a single victim during a single encounter.
Finally, this crime adds a new statute to the Penal Code rather than amending Penal Code section 422; therefore, it is not a strike. A defendant charged with this new statute will not be subject to a strike.
- Other Offenses and Lesser Included Offenses: There are several other statutes that criminalize threats to either a school or religious institution. Penal Code section 71, which may be applied to a person under the age of 18, punishes any person who, with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution or any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd. (a).) The first conviction is punishable as an alternate misdemeanor-felony and subject to a county jail commitment of up to three years in county jail, or state prison if a defendant has a prior serious or violent felony, or is required to register as a sex offender. (See Pen. Code, §§ 71, subd. (a)(1); 1170, subd. (h)(3).) A second or subsequent conviction is a felony, punishable by a maximum penalty of three years in county jail or state prison depending on the defendant’s criminal history. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd. (a)(2).)
Penal Code section 302 criminalizes disturbing a religious meeting. It states “every person who intentionally disturbs or disquiets any assemblage of people met for religious worship at a tax-exempt place of worship, by profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or by any unnecessary noise, either within the place where the meeting is held, or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the meeting, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.”
A second or subsequent conviction for disrupting a religious meeting, or any violation of disturbing any other type of meeting, shall also be sentenced to community service of not less than 120 hours and not exceeding 160 hours. (Pen. Code, § 302, subd. (c).)
Finally, any person who threatens a place a worship because it is a place of worship may be charged with a hate crime in violation of Penal Code section 422.6. To prove interference with another’s civil rights, including the right to free exercise of religion, by threat of force, a prosecutor must establish the following elements:
- The defendant, by threat of force, injured, intimidated, interfered with, oppressed, or threatened another person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any legally protected right or privilege.
- The threat of force, if consisting of speech alone, threatened violence against a specific person or group.
- The defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the threat (the threat must be one that would reasonably tend to induce fear in the alleged victim).
- The defendant did so in whole or in part because of the other person’s actual or perceived protected characteristic(s), or because of the other person’s association with a person or group having one or more of these characteristics.
- The defendant did so with the specific intent to deprive the other person of the free exercise or enjoyment of the legally protected right or privilege. (See CALCRIM No. 1350.)
The penalty for interfering with the exercise of a constitutional right is an alternate felony-misdemeanor. However, if the district attorney can show evidence of bias even on a misdemeanor conviction, the court may sentence the defendant to up to three years, rather than just one year. (Pen. Code, § 422.7.)
There are numerous other statutes that criminalize threats toward schools or places of worship. In many cases, the penalty may be more severe where the defendant threatened a school or place of worship for any biased reason and Penal Code section 302 specifically criminalizes threats to schools.
- County Jail Impact: In January 2010, a 9th Circuit three-judge panel issued a ruling ordering the State of California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity because overcrowding was the primary reason CDCR was unable to provide inmates with constitutionally adequate healthcare. (Coleman/Plata v. Schwarzenegger (2010) No. Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM P/NO. C01-1351 THE.) The United State Supreme Court upheld the decision, declaring that “without a reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill” inmates in California’s prisons. (Brown v. Plata (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1939; 179 L.Ed.2d 969, 999.)
AB 109, The Criminal Justice Realignment Act, was implemented in 2011 in response to prison overcrowding. In part, it shifted to county jails the responsibility for incarcerating lower-level offenders previously incarcerated in state prison. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h).) This, however, increased the pressure on county jails to house larger populations and to make difficult decisions about how to manage their growing jail populations. These pressures manifest differently by county based on a number of factors including jail capacity and whether the county jail system is operating under a court-mandated population cap. Such caps have been in place in some counties long before Brown v. Plata addressed state prison overcrowding. (Sarah Lawrence, Court-Ordered Population Caps in California County Jails (Dec. 2014).)[2]
Recently, CalMatters published an article explaining that jails are facing increasing death rates even as the population may be declining in the short term. As the article explains, most of the people who died were pre-trial inmates – meaning they have not been convicted of a crime, but could not afford to post cash bail. Aside from natural causes, the two major causes of death for inmates in county jail were suicide, followed by overdoses, particularly fentanyl.[3]
The Board of State and Community Corrections (“BSCC”) have repeatedly warned about failures in the county jails and refusal by locals to adhere to required state standards. Until recently, BSCC was not even notified about deaths inside the county-run lockups. Nor was the pandemic the driving factor: California in 2022 had the smallest share of deaths due to natural causes in the past four decades. A surge in overdoses drove the trend of increasing deaths. And almost every person who died was waiting to be tried. A previous CalMatters investigation found that three-quarters of those held in county jails had not been convicted or sentenced, with many awaiting trial more than three years. (Duara and Kimelman, “California jails are holding thousands fewer people but far more people are dying in them,” Cal Matters (March 25, 2024).)[4]
Given the law already has numerous penalties for threatening schools or places of worship and the escalating pressures on county jails, it begs the question of whether it makes sense to add another crime to the Penal Code that may be viewed as largely unneeded to address the issues.
- Argument in Support: According to the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office: “Existing law does not adequately protect against threats to shoot up a place or event because a specific person is not named in those threats. Schools shut down and events are disrupted without anyone being held accountable as mass shootings become an all too familiar reality nationwide. These threats cause significant trauma and fear in the community even though a specific individual is not the target of the threats. SB [796] proposes to create a new “wobbler” offense where a person “willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to the California Public Defenders Association: “Making a criminal threat (in any setting) is conduct that is already covered by the Penal Code in Section 422. Nearly all of the conduct described in this bill falls well within the definition of that section. For the most part, this bill is unnecessary even to achieve its stated aims. To the extent that SB 796 loosens the restrictions of Section 422, it is even more concerning. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that is often misused to penalize conduct that does not truly belong in the criminal justice system. This is particularly true for our clients with mental health conditions, who often suffer from crippling paranoia and delusions. The fear these clients experience can lead them to say things that are easily misinterpreted or are simply a product of their illness.
“SB 796 is a similar bill to SB 522 and AB 907, which respectively failed to pass out of the Senate Public Safety Committee in the previous legislative session and AB 907 which was held in Senate Appropriations in 2019. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that requires only words – no actions in furtherance of the threat – and it applies even if the person who is saying the words has “no intent of actually carrying it out.” Creating a new offense that loosens this already expansive definition will, we fear, only ensnare more people with mental health conditions in the criminal justice system. We are certainly sympathetic to the intent behind this bill, but creating a new crime is not the answer, and it will end up causing more harm than it prevents.”
- Related Legislation:
- AB 1064 (Low), would define “bias against” as a preexisting negative attitude toward actual or perceived characteristics of a person, and states that bias motivation may include, among other things, hatred, animosity, resentment, revulsion, contempt, unreasonable fear, paranoia, callousness, and thrill-seeking. AB 1064 was held on the Assembly Committee suspense file.
- AB 2099 (Bauer-Kahan) increases penalties for violations of the California Freedom of Access to Clinics and Church Entrances (“FACCE”) Act. AB 2099 is pending in the Senate.
- SB 89 (Ochoa Bogh) expands the crime of stalking to include making a credible threat with the intent to place a person in reasonable fear for the safety of their pet, service animal, emotional support animal, or horse. SB 89 is pending in this committee.
- SB 596 (Portantino) makes it a misdemeanor to threaten or harass a school employee off school grounds or after school hours for reasons related to their duties of employment. SB 596 was vetoed.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 907 (Grayson), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, was identical to this bill. AB 907 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- AB 2768 (Melendez), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, was similar to AB 907 (Grayson). AB 2768 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 110 (Fuller), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have made it an alternate felony-misdemeanor offense for any person to willfully threaten unlawful violence that will result in death or great bodily injury to occur on the grounds of a school, as defined, where the threat creates a disruption at the school. SB 110 was vetoed by the Governor.
- SB 456 (Block), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have specified that any person who threatens to discharge a firearm on the campus of a school, as defined, or location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor. SB 456 was vetoed by the Governor.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Agudath Israel of America
Anti-defamation League (UNREG)
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California School Employees Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
California Teachers Association
City of Long Beach
Crime Victims United of California
Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence
Hindu American Foundation, INC.
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Marshall Medical Center
National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association (NAPIPA)
San Diego County District Attorney's Office
San Francisco District Attorney Brooke Jenkins
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office
Visalia; City of
Whittier; City of
Opposition
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association (CPDA)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
San Francisco Public Defender
Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
See Existing Law, supra, at (1). ↑
Located at https://law.stanford.edu/search-sls/?q_as=california%20county%20jails [last visited March 26, 2024]. ↑
See recent article about Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Michael Meiser smuggling drugs into Los Angeles County Jail. KTLA 5, “Los Angeles County deputy accused of smuggling heroin into jail,” May 7, 2024, located at https://ktla.com/news/local-news/los-angeles-county-deputy-accused-of-smuggling-heroin-into-jail/#:~:text=A%20Los%20Angeles%20County%20deputy,Department's%20Internal%20Criminal%20Investigations%20Bureau [last visited May 20, 2024]. ↑
Located at https://calmatters.org/justice/2024/03/death-in-california-jails/ [last visited March 16, 2024.] ↑
Date of Hearing: June 27, 2023
Chief Counsel: Sandy Uribe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 796
Author:(Alvarado-Gil) – As Amended Ver:April 27, 2023
SUMMARY: Creates a new crime of threatening a school or place of worship, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that any person who, by any means including via an electronic act, willfully threatens to commit a crime which is reasonably likely to result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may by on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with the specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent to carry it out, and where the statement on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and which causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or that of another, is guilty of a crime.
- States that the new crime is an alternate felony-misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or in county jail for 16 months, or 2 or 3 years pursuant to realignment.
- Specifies that a person under 18 years of age who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
- States that this section does not preclude punishment under any other law, but prohibits dual conviction for this crime and the general criminal threats statute based on the same threat.
- Defines the following terms for purposes of this crime:
- “Place of worship” means “any church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other building where religious services are regularly conducted.”
- “School” means “a state preschool, a private or public elementary, middle, vocational, junior high, or high school, a community college, a public or private university, or a location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place and the threat is related to both the school-sponsored event and to the time period during which the school-sponsored event will occur.”
- “Electronic act” means “the creation or transmission originated on or off the schoolsite, by means of an electronic device, including, but not limited to, a telephone, wireless telephone, or other wireless communication device, computer, or pager, of a communication, including, but not limited to, a message, text, sound, video, or image; a post on a social network Internet website; or an act of cyber sexual bullying.”
EXISTING LAW:
- States that any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement made (either verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic device) is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and which thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or that of their family, is guilty of a crime punishable either as a misdemeanor or felony, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.)
- States that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his or her duties, by means of a directly-communicated threat to the person, to inflict unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd, (a).)
- States that any person who with intent to annoy, telephones another or contacts him or her by means of an electronic device, and threatens to inflict injury on the person or the person’s family, or to the person’s property is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 653m, subd. (a).)
- Provides that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause or causes, another to refrain from exercising his or her religion or from engaging in a religious service by means of a threat directly communicated to such a person to inflict an injury upon the person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such a threat could be carried out, is guilty of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 11412.)
- Provides that any person who knowingly threatens to use a weapon of mass destruction with the specific intent that the statement, as defined, or a statement made by means of an electronic device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear of for personal safety or that of their family is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, § 11418.5, subd. (a).)
- Defines “hate crime” as any criminal act committed, in whole or in part, because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim:
- Disability;
- Gender;
- Nationality;
- Race or ethnicity;
- Religion;
- Sexual orientation; and,
- Association with a person or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics. (Pen. Code, § 422.55, subd. (a).)
- Provides that “hate crime” includes but is not limited to violating or interfering with the exercise of civil rights, or knowingly defacing, destroying, or damaging property because of actual or perceived characteristics of the victim that fit the “hate crime definition.” (Pen. Code, §§ 422.55, subds. (a) & (b), 422.6, subds. (a) & (b).)
- Provides that a conviction for violating or interfering with the civil rights of another on the basis of actual or perceived characteristics of the victim that fit the “hate crime” definition is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or by both the above imprisonment and fine, and a minimum of community service, not to exceed 400 hours, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.6, subd. (c).)
- Makes any other hate crime that is not punishable by imprisonment in the state prison a wobbler (punishable alternatively as a misdemeanor or county jail felony) if the crime is committed against the person or property of another for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with that other person’s free exercise or enjoyment of any constitutional right under any of the following circumstances:
- The crime against the person either includes the present ability to commit a violent injury or causes actual physical injury;
- The crime against property causes damage in excess of $950; or,
- The person charged with a crime under this provision has been convicted previously of a hate crime or conspiracy to commit a hate crime, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.7.)
- Provides that unless punishable under the provision above:
- A person who commits a felony that is a hate crime or attempts to do so, shall receive an additional term of one, two, or three years in the state prison, at the court's discretion; and,
- A person who commits a felony that is a hate crime, or attempts to do so, and who voluntarily acted in concert with another person in the commission of the crime shall receive an additional term of two, three, or four years in the state prison. (Pen. Code, § 422.75, subds (a) & (b).)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, ““SB 796 would make it unlawful to threaten to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily injury at a school or place or worship, even though a specific victim of the crime is not named.
“Those who receive threats like the ones described, especially those who are or will be at a school or place of worship, may suffer from the fear and trauma of the threatened crime. These threats cause extensive disruption to the community. These kinds of threats require immediate law enforcement response, often with specialized units, in order to gauge whether the threats are credible. This gap in the law makes it difficult to fully investigate and prosecute these cases, despite the damage caused to communities when an individual conveys a threat to kill or cause great bodily injury.
“Given the reality in California and around the country of mass shootings at schools and religious centers, our laws must be updated to reflect the devastating impact of such threats. This statute fills a gap in the law, allowing clarity for investigating officers and prosecutors, who can now hold individuals accountable for the terror and disruption their words cause.”
- Elements Required for Criminal Threat Prosecutions: In order to convict a person under the current criminal threat statute, Penal Code section 422, the prosecutor must prove the following:
- that the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person;
- that the defendant made the threat;
- that the defendant intended that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out;
- that the threat was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat;
- that the threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety; and,
- that the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances. (Pen. Code, §422; CALCRIM No. 1300; see also People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)
Penal Code section 422 applies to all criminal threats which will result in death or great bodily injury regardless of location or the exact type of violence that is threatened.
This bill seeks to create the specific crime of criminal threats when the threat is to take place on a school campus or place of worship. Some prosecutors argue that the current criminal threats statute does fit well into instances of threats of shootings at schools because often times these threats do not specify who the target is. Rather, the threat typically applies to all students or staff at the school.
A recent example illustrating the existing law's application to threats of violence on school grounds notwithstanding no specified target can be found in an appellate court's recent ruling. In In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, A.G., a high school student posted an image of a realistic-looking gun replica with the caption, “Everybody goes to school tomorrow. I’m taking gum [sic],” on his Snapchat account, which was visible to about 60 “friends.” (Id. at p. 650.) Another student saw the post, “worried when she saw the story because she knew school shootings happened regularly”, and alerted a teacher. (Id. at p. 651.) This same student saw a subsequent post by A.G. saying, “Everyone, it wasn't real. I was xanned out.” But this did not alleviate her fear. (Ibid.) The juvenile court found this conduct was sufficient to constitute a violation of the criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422. (Id. at p. 650.) The minor appealed alleging insufficient evidence to support the adjudication. Specifically, the minor alleged that the evidence failed to show: “(1) he intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a threat; (2) he willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or cause great bodily injury to anyone; (3) he intended to threaten D.J. or Henriquez specifically; (4) any alleged threat was unequivocal or unambiguous to reasonably sustain fear in either D.J. or Henriquez; or (5) any threat to D.J. or Henriquez was sufficiently immediate to place either of them in fear.” (Id. at p. 653.) The appellate court disagreed with all of A.G.’s contentions and affirmed. (Id. at p. 659.)
Similar facts were sufficient to uphold a juvenile adjudication in In re L.F. (June 3, 2015, A142296) [nonpub. opn.]. In that case, the adjudged minor was a Fairfield High School student who posted on her Twitter account that she planned to bring a gun to school and shoot people. While she did note specified areas of the school and one of the campus monitors by name in some of her posts, her Tweets were generally targeted at all of the students and staff at the school. The petition filed against the minor alleged that the minor had made criminal threats against "Fairfield High School students and staff" instead of listing specific persons. (Id. at p. 4.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's ruling that the minor had violated the existing criminal threats statute, and found that the minor intended her comments to be taken as threats, even though she contended that she was only joking. (In re L.F., supra, A142296. at p. 8; see also Egelko, Smiling Emojis Aside, Student's Threats Were Serious, Court Says, San Francisco Chronicle, (June 4, 2015) <http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Smiling-emojis-aside-student-s-threats-were-6307626.php>.)
In other words, despite assertions that the current criminal threats statute is insufficient because a general threat to people at a school or place of worship cannot be prosecuted, courts have upheld convictions/juvenile adjudications on these facts. Additionally, it should be noted that as to places of worship, general threats which do not single out an individual can be prosecuted under hate crime laws or a violation of Penal Code section 11412.
- Prior Governor Veto Messages: Two bills introduced in the 2015-2016 Legislative session would have specifically addressed threats at schools. SB 456 (Block) would have provided that any person who threatens to discharge a firearm on a school campus or at a location where a school-sponsored event is or will to take place, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor. SB 110 (Fuller) would have enacted a new crime prohibiting anyone willfully threatening unlawful violence to another person by any means, including through an electronic act, to occur upon school grounds, with the specific intent that the statement be taken as a threat, and where the threat, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.
Governor Brown had the following veto message as to both bills:
“No one could be anything but intolerant of threats to cause great bodily injury, especially on school grounds. Certainly not legislators, who voted nearly unanimously for this bill.
“While I'm sympathetic and utterly committed to ensuring maximum safety for California's school children, the offensive conduct covered by this bill is already illegal.
“In recent decades, California has created an unprecedented number of new and detailed criminal laws. Before we keep enacting more, I think we should pause and reflect on the fact that our bulging criminal code now contains in excess of 5,000 separate provisions, covering almost every conceivable form of human misbehavior.”
- Punishment for This New Crime: The existing crime of criminal threats is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. (Pen. Code, § 422.) When a criminal threats conviction is punished as a felony, it is also becomes a serious felony for purposes of enhanced punishment under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, 1192.7. subd. (c)(38)) and the five-year prison enhancement for prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667). Additionally it triggers credits limitations. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12.) (See also People v. Moore (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 74.)
This bill does not add the newly-created crime of criminal threats directed at a school or place of worship to the serious-felony list. Therefore, credits limitations and future enhanced penalty provisions for prior convictions would not apply.
This bill would specify that a perpetrator can be prosecuted for a threat under the general criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422, or any other law; but that the person cannot be convicted for both the general statute and this more particularized one.
This bill would also specify that a minor committing this offense can be adjudicated only of a misdemeanor. - Argument in Support: According to the California District Attorneys Association, the sponsor of this bill, “Far too often, threats are made to ‘shoot-up’ a place or event, causing fear, trauma, and disruption to the community because of the grim reality that mass-shootings frequently occur in California and around the country. Currently, under Penal Code section 422, these threats are not illegal because a specific person is not named. SB 796 will eliminate this legal loophole. Under your measure, law enforcement will be able to properly act upon and investigate terror-causing events, while also holding accountable those who make these threats.
“Californians should not have to live in fear, and those who make these threats should not be able to avoid the consequences of their actions. SB 796 takes a necessary and important step towards making our communities safer.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to the California Public Defenders Association, “Making a criminal threat (in any setting) is conduct that is already covered by the Penal Code in Section 422. Nearly all of the conduct described in this bill falls well within the definition of that section. For the most part, this bill is unnecessary even to achieve its stated aims.
“To the extent that SB 796 loosens the restrictions of Section 422, it is even more concerning. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that is often misused to penalize conduct that does not truly belong in the criminal justice system. This is particularly true for our clients with mental health conditions, who often suffer from crippling paranoia and delusions. The fear these clients experience can lead them to say things that are easily misinterpreted or are simply a product of their illness.
“SB 796 is a similar bill to SB 522 and AB 907, which respectively failed to pass out of the
Senate Public Safety Committee in the previous legislative session and AB 907 which was
held in Senate Appropriations in 2019. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that requires only
words – no actions in furtherance of the threat – and it applies even if the person who is saying the words has ‘no intent of actually carrying it out.’ Creating a new offense that loosens this already expansive definition will, we fear, only ensnare more people with mental health conditions in the criminal justice system. We are certainly sympathetic to the intent behind this bill, but creating a new crime is not the answer, and it will end up causing more harm than it prevents.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 907 (Grayson), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, was identical to this bill. AB 907 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- AB 2768 (Melendez), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, was similar to AB 907 (Grayson). AB 2768 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 110 (Fuller), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have made it an alternate felony-misdemeanor offense for any person to willfully threaten unlawful violence that will result in death or great bodily injury to occur on the grounds of a school, as defined, where the threat creates a disruption at the school. SB 110 was vetoed by the Governor.
- SB 456 (Block), of the 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have specified that any person who threatens to discharge a firearm on the campus of a school, as defined, or location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor. SB 456 was vetoed by the Governor.
- AB 907 (Grayson), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, was identical to this bill. AB 907 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Anti-defamation League
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California School Employees Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
California Teachers Association
Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence
Hindu American Foundation, INC.
National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association
San Diego County District Attorney's Office
San Francisco District Attorney Brooke Jenkins
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office
Visalia; City of
Whittier; City of
Opposition
California Public Defenders Association
San Francisco Public Defender
Analysis Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 796 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 796
Author: Alvarado-Gil (D) and Rubio (D)
Amended: 4/27/23
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-0, 4/25/23
AYES: Wahab, Ochoa Bogh, Bradford, Skinner, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 5/18/23
AYES: Portantino, Jones, Ashby, Bradford, Seyarto, Wahab, Wiener
SUBJECT: Threats: schools and places of worship
SOURCE: California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
DIGEST:
This bill creates a new offense of threatening to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a school or place of worship, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- States that any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement made (either verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic device) is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and which thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or that of their family, is guilty of a crime punishable either as a misdemeanor or felony, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.)
- States that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his or her duties, by means of a directly-communicated threat to the person, to inflict unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a crime, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor on a first offense, and a felony on a second or subsequent offense. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd, (a).)
- States that any person who with intent to annoy, telephones another or contacts him or her by means of an electronic device, and threatens to inflict injury on the person or the person’s family, or to the person’s property is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 653m, subd. (a).)
- Provides that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause or causes, another to refrain from exercising his or her religion or from engaging in a religious service by means of a threat directly communicated to such a person to inflict an injury upon the person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such a threat could be carried out, is guilty of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 11412.)
- Provides that any person who knowingly threatens to use a weapon of mass destruction with the specific intent that the statement, as defined, or a statement made by means of an electronic device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear of for personal safety or that of their family is guilty of a crime, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 11418.5, subd. (a).)
- Defines a “hate crime” as a criminal act committed, in whole or in part, because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim:
- Disability;
- Gender;
- Nationality;
- Race or ethnicity;
- Religion;
- Sexual orientation;
- Association with a person or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics. (Pen. Code, § 422.55, subd. (a).)
- Provides that no person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of one or more of the actual or perceived characteristics of the victim defined as a “hate crime.” (Pen. Code, § 422.6, subd. (a).)
- States that a person convicted of violating Penal Code section 422.6 is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in county jail, a fine not to exceed $5,000 and community service, but specifies that no person shall be convicted of violating Penal Code section 422.6, subdivision (a) based upon speech alone, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person or group of persons and that the defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the threat. (Pen. Code, § 422.6, subd. (c).)
- Provides that a person who commits a hate crime that is a felony shall receive an additional term of one, two, or three years in state prison, or an additional term of two, three, or four years if the act was committed in concert with another person. (Pen. Code, § 422.75.)
- Provides, except where the court imposes an enhancement for a hate crime, or imposes the upper sentencing term for committing robbery or assault with a deadly weapon or by means of any force likely to cause great bodily injury, the fact that a person committed or attempted to commit a felony that is a hate crime shall be considered a circumstance in aggravation. (Pen. Code, § 422.76.)
This bill:
- Creates a new crime for a person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or places of worship, with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person.
- Defines “place of worship” as any church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other building where religious services are regularly conducted.
- Defines “school” to mean a state preschool, a private or public elementary, middle, vocational, junior high, or high school, a community college, a public or private university, or a location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place and the threat is related to both the school-sponsored event and to the time period during which the school-sponsored event will occur.
- States that the new crime is an alternate felony-misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or in county jail for 16 months, or 2 or 3 years.
- Specifies that a person under 18 years of age who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
- Provides that this section does not preclude prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and existing Penal Code section 422.
Background
According to the author of this bill:
SB 796 would make it unlawful to threaten to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily injury at a school or place or worship, even though a specific victim of the crime is not named.
Those who receive threats like the ones described, especially those who are or will be at a school or place of worship, may suffer from the fear and trauma of the threatened crime. These threats cause extensive disruption to the community. These kinds of threats require immediate law enforcement response, often with specialized units, in order to gauge whether the threats are credible. This gap in the law makes it difficult to fully investigate and prosecute these cases, despite the damage caused to communities when an individual conveys a threat to kill or cause great bodily injury.
Given the reality in California and around the country of mass shootings at schools and religious centers, our laws must be updated to reflect the devastating impact of such threats. This statute fills a gap in the law, allowing clarity for investigating officers and prosecutors, who can now hold individuals accountable for the terror and disruption their words cause.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Court Workload: Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures due to increased court workload resulting from additional felony prosecutions (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).*
- CDCR Incarceration Costs: Unknown, potentially-significant costs to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in increased incarceration costs (General Fund).*
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/18/23)
California District Attorneys Association (source)
California Police Chiefs Association (source)
Anti-Defamation League
California State Sheriffs’ Association
California Teachers Association
City of Whittier
City of Visalia
Hindu American Foundation, Inc.
National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association
San Francisco District Attorney Brooke Jenkins
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/18/23)
California Public Defenders Association
San Francisco Public Defender
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the Anti-Defamation League:
We are unfortunately living in a new era where school-based mass casualty events and threats of violent attacks against places of worship are increasingly common. For example, each year, hundreds of fake bomb threats are called in - targeting target synagogues and other Jewish communal institutions. This reality has resulted in a heightened fear among students throughout California and the nation that a deadly tragedy could occur in their own schools at any time. When a school or place of worship is threatened, it can and does cause reasonable and immediate fear for anyone on that institution’s property.
Schools and places of worship across California have seen an uptick in threatening activity. When these threats occur, the upheaval can be enormous. Countless hours of lost education time, resource dedication by first-responders, and of course the chilling fear that no individual should have to feel just because they attend school or their place of worship.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the San Francisco Public Defender:
Making a criminal threat (in any setting) is conduct that is already covered by the Penal Code in Section 422. Nearly all of the conduct described in this bill falls well within the definition of that section.
. . . .
To the extent that SB 796 loosens the restrictions of Section 422, it is even more concerning. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that is often misused to penalize conduct that does not truly belong in the criminal justice system. This is particularly true for indigent community members with mental health conditions, who often suffer from paranoia and delusions. The fear these clients experience can lead them to say things that are easily misinterpreted or are simply a product of their illness.
Prepared by: Stella Choe / PUB. S. /
5/20/23 13:09:36
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular Session
SB 796 (Alvarado-Gil) - Threats: schools and places of worship
Version: April 27, 2023 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 5 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: Yes |
Hearing Date: May 8, 2023 | Consultant: Matthew Fleming |
Bill Summary:
SB 796 would create the crime of threatening a school or place of worship, as specified.
Fiscal Impact:
- Court Workload: Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures due to increased court workload resulting from additional felony prosecutions (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).*
- CDCR Incarceration Costs: Unknown, potentially-significant costs to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in increased incarceration costs (General Fund).*
*See Staff Comments for additional detail.
Background:
In order to convict a person under the current criminal threat statute, Penal Code section 422, the prosecutor must prove the following:
- That the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person;
- That the defendant made the threat;
- That the defendant intended that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out;
- That the threat was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat;
- That the threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety; and,
- That the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances.
Penal Code section 422 applies to all criminal threats regardless of the location or the type of violence that is threatened. This bill seeks to create the specific crime of criminal threats when the threat is to take place on the grounds of a school or place of worship. Proponents of the bill argue that the current criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422, does not fit well into instances of threats of violence at schools or places of worship because often times the threats posted on social media do not specify who the target is. Rather, the threat oftentimes applies to anyone present at those locations.
Proposed Law:
- Provides that it is a criminal offense to, by any means, including but not limited to an electronic act, willfully threaten to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or place of worship, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person.
- Punishes this new offense as an alternate felony/misdemeanor (a “wobbler”) with felony liability being imposed pursuant to 2011 criminal justice realignment, except that a person under 18 years of age who violates these provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor.
- Defines the terms “electronic act,” “place of worship,” and “school” for purposes of its provisions.
Related Legislation:
- AB 2768 (Melendez, 2018) was similar to this bill and was held on the Suspense File of the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
- SB 110 (Fuller, 2015) would have made it an alternate felony-misdemeanor offense for a person to willfully threaten unlawful violence that would result in death or great bodily injury to occur on the grounds of a school, as defined, where the threat creates a disruption at the school. SB 110 was vetoed by the Governor.
- SB 456 (Block, 2015) would have specified that any person who threatens to discharge a firearm on the campus of a school, as defined, or location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place, is guilty of an alternate felony-misdemeanor. SB 456 was vetoed by the Governor.
Staff Comments:
- Court Workload: This bill would create additional felony liability, which can result in lengthier and more complex legal proceedings than misdemeanor cases. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations. The Governor's proposed 2022-2023 budget would appropriate $117.8 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and fee revenue for trial court operations. An increase in workload could result in delayed services and would put pressure to increase the backfill amount appropriated from the General Fund for trial court operations.
- Incarceration Costs: This bill would create new felony liability, punishable pursuant to 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment. Although sentences on realigned felonies are typically served in county jail (or on probation), defendants with specific criminal histories can be required to serve their time in prison. It is unknown how many new prison commitments there would be under the provisions of this bill; that number will depend on a variety of factors including how many charges are brought under the terms of this bill, prosecutorial discretion, the criminal history of the defendant, and other factors unique to each case. The estimated, annual, per capita cost to incarcerate an individual in state prison is $127,827 for 2023-24.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Aisha Wahab, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular
Bill No: SB 796 Hearing Date: April 25, 2023
Author: | Alvarado-Gil | ||
Version: | April 10, 2023 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SC | ||
Subject: Threats: schools and places of worship
HISTORY
Source: California Police Chiefs Association
California District Attorneys Association
Prior Legislation: SB 1330 (Borgeas), failed passage Sen. Public Safety 2022
SB 522 (Borgeas), held in Sen. Public Safety, 2022
SB 1391 (Borgeas), held in Sen. Public Safety, 2020
AB 907 (Grayson), held Sen. Approps. suspense file, 2019
AB 2768 (Melendez), held Assembly Approps. suspense file, 2018
SB 110 (Fuller), vetoed, 2015
SB 456 (Block), vetoed, 2015
Support: Anti-Defamation League; California District Attorneys Association; California State Sheriff’s Association; City of Whittier; Hindu American Foundation, INC.; National Asian Pacific Islander Prosecutors Association; San Francisco District Attorney’s Office; Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office
Opposition: California Public Defenders Association; San Francisco Public Defender
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to create a new crime of threatening to commit a crime that will result in death or great bodily injury at a school or place of worship, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor, as specified.
Existing law states that any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement made (either verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic device) is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and which thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or that of their family, is guilty of a crime punishable either as a misdemeanor or felony, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 422.)
Existing law states that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his or her duties, by means of a directly-communicated threat to the person, to inflict unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to
the recipient that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a crime, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor on a first offense, and a felony on a second or subsequent offense. (Pen. Code, § 71, subd, (a).)
Existing law states that any person who with intent to annoy, telephones another or contacts him or her by means of an electronic device, and threatens to inflict injury on the person or the person’s family, or to the person’s property is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 653m, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that any person who with intent to cause, attempts to cause or causes, another to refrain from exercising his or her religion or from engaging in a religious service by means of a threat directly communicated to such a person to inflict an injury upon the person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient that such a threat could be carried out, is guilty of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 11412.)
Existing law provides that any person who knowingly threatens to use a weapon of mass destruction with the specific intent that the statement, as defined, or a statement made by means of an electronic device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, which on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution, and thereby causes the person reasonably to be in sustained fear of for personal safety or that of their family is guilty of a crime, punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 11418.5, subd. (a).)
Existing law defines a “hate crime” as a criminal act committed, in whole or in part, because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim:
- Disability;
- Gender;
- Nationality;
- Race or ethnicity;
- Religion;
- Sexual orientation;
- Association with a person or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics. (Pen. Code, § 422.55, subd. (a).
Existing law provides that no person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of one or more of the actual or perceived characteristics of the victim defined as a “hate crime.” (Pen. Code, § 422.6, subd. (a).)
Existing law states that a person convicted of violating Penal Code section 422.6 is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in county jail, a fine not to exceed $5,000 and community service, but specifies that no person shall be convicted of violating Penal Code section 422.6, subdivision (a) based upon speech alone, except upon a showing that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person or group of persons and that the defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the threat. (Pen. Code, § 422.6, subd. (c).)
Existing law provides that a person who commits a hate crime that is a felony shall receive an additional term of one, two, or three years in state prison, or an additional term of two, three, or four years if the act was committed in concert with another person. (Pen. Code, § 422.75.)
Existing law provides, except where the court imposes an enhancement for a hate crime, or imposes the upper sentencing term for committing robbery or assault with a deadly weapon or by means of any force likely to cause great bodily injury, the fact that a person committed or attempted to commit a felony that is a hate crime shall be considered a circumstance in aggravation. (Pen. Code, § 422.76.)
This bill creates a new crime for a person who willfully threatens to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or places of worship, with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person.
This bill defines “place of worship” as any church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or other building where religious services are regularly conducted.
This bill defines “school” to mean a state preschool, a private or public elementary, middle, vocational, junior high, or high school, a community college, a public or private university, or a location where a school-sponsored event is or will be taking place and the threat is related to both the school-sponsored event and to the time period during which the school-sponsored event will occur.
This bill states that the new crime is an alternate felony-misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or in county jail for 16 months, or 2 or 3 years.
This bill specifies that a person under 18 years of age who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
This bill provides that this section does not preclude prosecution under any other law, except that a person shall not be convicted for the same threat under both this section and existing Penal Code section 422.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author of this bill:
SB 796 would make it unlawful to threaten to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily injury at a school or place or worship, even though a specific victim of the crime is not named.
Those who receive threats like the ones described, especially those who are or will be at a school or place of worship, may suffer from the fear and trauma of the threatened crime. These threats cause extensive disruption to the community. These kinds of threats require immediate law enforcement response, often with specialized units, in order to gauge whether the threats are credible. This gap in the law makes it difficult to fully investigate and prosecute these cases, despite the damage caused to communities when an individual conveys a threat to kill or cause great bodily injury.
Given the reality in California and around the country of mass shootings at schools and religious centers, our laws must be updated to reflect the devastating impact of such threats. This statute fills a gap in the law, allowing clarity for investigating officers and prosecutors, who can now hold individuals accountable for the terror and disruption their words cause.
- First Amendment Considerations
A law that restricts speech has First Amendment implications. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” This fundamental right is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 121, 133-134, citing Gitlow v. People of New York (1925) 268 U.S. 652, 666.) Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution provides that: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
While these guarantees are stated in broad terms, “the right to free speech is not absolute.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 134, citing Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 708; and Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 359.) As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged: “Many crimes can consist solely of spoken words, such as soliciting a bribe (Pen. Code, § 653f), perjury (Pen. Code, § 118), or making a terrorist threat (Pen. Code, § 422).”
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid (R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 382), however, courts have upheld restrictions on content-based speech when the speech is “‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ Thus, for example, a State may punish those words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’” (In re J.M. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 668, 674, citing Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 358–359.)
True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. (In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698. Existing Penal Code section 422 has been found to be constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to apply only to true threats which is defined as a threat "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person . . . which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 233.)
- Criminal Threat Prosecutions and Effect of this Legislation
In order to convict a person under the current criminal threat statute, Penal Code section 422, the prosecutor must prove the following:
- That the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person;
- That the defendant made the threat;
- That the defendant intended that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out;
- That the threat was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat;
- That the threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety; and,
- That the threatened person's fear was reasonable under the circumstances. (Pen. Code, §422; CALCRIM No. 1300; see also People v. Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 227-228.)
Penal Code section 422 applies to all criminal threats regardless of the location or the type of violence that is threatened. This bill seeks to create the specific crime of criminal threats when the threat is to take place on the grounds of a school or place of worship. Proponents of the bill argue that the current criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422, does not fit well into instances of threats of violence at schools or places of worship because often times the threats posted on social media do not specify who the target is. Rather, the threat oftentimes applies to anyone present at those locations.
Case law states that a true threat may be made to a particular individual or group of individuals. (Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359, citing Watts v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 708.) An example illustrating the existing criminal threat statute’s application to threats of violence made to a group of people rather than naming a specific person as the target can be found in In re L.F. (June 3, 2015, A142296) [nonpub. opn.], where the adjudged minor was a Fairfield High School student who posted on her Twitter account that she planned to bring a gun to school and shoot people. While she did point out specified areas of the school and one of the campus monitors by name in some of her posts, her Tweets were generally targeted at all of the students and staff at the school. The petition filed against the minor alleged that the minor had made criminal threats against "Fairfield High School students and staff" instead of listing specific persons. (Id. at p. 4.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's ruling that the minor had violated the existing criminal threats statute. (In re L.F., supra, A142296 at p. 8.)
Another example showing that the current law is applicable regardless whether the threat was made to an individual or a group of people is found in In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App. 5th 647 where the adjudged minor was convicted of criminal threats after a Snapchat image showed that he was going to bring a gun to school with a picture of a gun. The Snapchat image did not include the name of the school or any individuals and the minor later posted that it was all a joke, however the court found that it was sufficient under the criminal threats statute that an individual and a teacher saw the post and were in sustained fear. (Id. at pp. 656-657.)
This bill contains much of the same language as is currently in the existing criminal threats statute (Penal Code section 422). However, there are some differences; the new crime provides that a person who, by any means, willfully threatens to commit a crime that is reasonably likely to [as opposed to “will”] result in death or great bodily injury to any person who may be on the grounds of a school or places of worship, with specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of carrying it out, if the threat on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and if the threat causes a person or persons [as opposed to “that person”] reasonably to be in sustained fear for their own safety or the safety of another person [as opposed to “immediate family’s safety”].
As discussed above, true threats may be made to a specific person or group of persons and does not necessarily require that the other persons be immediate family members. However, a true threat that falls outside the protection of the First Amendment has been defined as a threat “to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person . . . which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat… .”
Does using the term “reasonably likely to result in death or great bodily injury” instead of “will result in death or great bodily injury” meet the First Amendment’s requirement for a true threat?
- Punishment for Criminal Threats
The existing crime of criminal threats is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. (Pen. Code, § 422.) When a criminal threats conviction is punished as a felony, it is also becomes a serious felony for purposes of enhanced punishment under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, 1192.7. subd. (c)(38)) and the five-year prison enhancement for prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667). Additionally it triggers credits limitations. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12.) (See also People v. Moore (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 74.)
This bill does not add the newly-created crime of criminal threats directed at a school or place of worship to existing Penal Code section 422, rather it creates a new section. This bill specifies that a perpetrator can be prosecuted for a threat under the general criminal threats statute, Penal Code section 422, or any other law; but that the person cannot be convicted for both the general statute and this more particularized one.
- Argument in Support
According to the Anti-Defamation League:
We are unfortunately living in a new era where school-based mass casualty events and threats of violent attacks against places of worship are increasingly common. For example, each year, hundreds of fake bomb threats are called in - targeting target synagogues and other Jewish communal institutions. This reality has resulted in a heightened fear among students throughout California and the nation that a deadly tragedy could occur in their own schools at any time. When a school or place of worship is threatened, it can and does cause reasonable and immediate fear for anyone on that institution’s property.
Schools and places of worship across California have seen an uptick in threatening activity. When these threats occur, the upheaval can be enormous. Countless hours of lost education time, resource dedication by first-responders, and of course the chilling fear that no individual should have to feel just because they attend school or their place of worship.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office:
Making a criminal threat (in any setting) is conduct that is already covered by the Penal Code in Section 422. Nearly all of the conduct described in this bill falls well within the definition of that section. However, SB 796 does change the language from PC 422’s “threaten to commit a crime that will produce death or great bodily injury” to “is reasonably likely to produce death or great bodily injury.”
To the extent that SB 796 loosens the restrictions of Section 422, it is even more concerning. Penal Code Section 422 is a statute that is often misused to penalize conduct that does not truly belong in the criminal justice system. This is particularly true for indigent community members with mental health conditions, who often suffer from paranoia and delusions. The fear these clients experience can lead them to say things that are easily misinterpreted or are simply a product of their illness.
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Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):