SB 981: Sexually explicit digital images.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2024-09-19
Current Status:
Passed
(2024-09-19: Chaptered by Secretary of State. Chapter 292, Statutes of 2024.)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report sexually explicit digital identity theft to the social media platform. The bill would define sexually explicit digital identity theft to mean the posting of covered material on a social media platform and would define covered material to mean material that meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person or an identifiable person engaged in certain sexual acts, and that the reporting person is the person depicted in the material and did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material. The bill would also require a social media platform to immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft, as prescribed.
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report sexually explicit digital identity theft to the social media platform. The bill would define sexually explicit digital identity theft to mean the posting of covered material on a social media platform and would define covered material to mean material that meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person or an identifiable person engaged in certain sexual acts, and that the reporting person is the person depicted in the material and did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material. The bill would also require a social media platform to immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft, as prescribed.
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report digital identify theft to the social media platform. The bill would define digital identity theft sexually explicit digital identity theft to mean the posting of covered material on a social media platform and would define covered material to mean material that meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person or an identifiable person engaged in certain sexual acts, and that the reporting person is the person depicted in the material and did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material. The bill would also require a social media platform to immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft, as prescribed.
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a natural person located within reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report digital identify theft to the social media platform. The bill would define digital identity theft to mean the posting of covered material on a social media platform and would define covered material to mean material that meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person or an identifiable person engaged in certain sexual acts, and that the reporting person is the person depicted in the material and did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material. The bill would also require a social media platform to permanently block immediately remove a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft, as prescribed. The bill would also require a social media platform to make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a natural person located within California to report digital identify theft to the social media platform. The bill would define digital identity theft to mean the posting of covered material on a social media platform and would define covered material to mean material that a reporting person reasonably believes meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person or an identifiable person engaged in certain sexual acts, and that the reporting person identifies themselves as the person depicted, as specified. is the person depicted in the material and did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material. The bill would also require a social media platform to permanently block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform, as prescribed, and to make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform. platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft, as prescribed. The bill would also require a social media platform to make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users for a user who is a California resident a natural person located within California to report covered material digital identify theft to the social media platform. The bill would define digital identity theft to mean the posting of covered material on a social media platform and would define covered material to mean material that a user of a social media platform reporting person reasonably believes meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created, created or altered through, through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person, person or an identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration, or an identifiable person engaged in masturbation. certain sexual acts, and that the reporting person identifies themselves as the person depicted, as specified. The bill would also require a social media platform to permanently block a reported instance of covered material digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform platform, as prescribed, and to make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of reported covered material digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
Existing law generally regulates social media platforms, including by requiring a social media platform to provide, in a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users, a means for a user who is a California resident to report material to the social media platform that the user reasonably believes is, among other things, child sexual abuse material.
This bill would require a social media platform to provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users for a user who is a California resident to report covered material to the social media platform. The bill would define covered material to mean material that a user of a social media platform reasonably believes meets certain criteria, including that the material is an image or video created, or altered through, digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of an intimate body part of an identifiable person, an identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration, or an identifiable person engaged in masturbation. The bill would also require a social media platform to permanently block a reported instance of covered material from being viewable on the social media platform and to make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of reported covered material from being viewable on the social media platform.
Existing law defines grand theft as theft committed in specified cases, including when the property taken is of a value exceeding $950, punishable as a felony, subject to specified exceptions. Existing law, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, enacted as an initiative statute by Proposition 47, as approved by the electors at the November 4, 2014, statewide general election, requires the theft of money, labor, or property to be considered petty theft, punishable as a misdemeanor, whenever the value of the property taken does not exceed $950. Existing law authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officers presence, the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the officers presence, or the officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed.This bill would state the Legislatures intent to enact legislation relating to the authority of a law enforcement officer to arrest a person suspected of retail theft if the officer did not observe the commission of the crime.Existing law defines grand theft as theft committed in specified cases, including when the property taken is of a value exceeding $950, punishable as a felony, subject to specified exceptions. Existing law, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, enacted as an initiative statute by Proposition 47, as approved by the electors at the November 4, 2014, statewide general election, requires the theft of money, labor, or property to be considered petty theft, punishable as a misdemeanor, whenever the value of the property taken does not exceed $950. Existing law authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officers presence, the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in the officers presence, or the officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed.
This bill would state the Legislatures intent to enact legislation relating to the authority of a law enforcement officer to arrest a person suspected of retail theft if the officer did not observe the commission of the crime.
(a)(1)Covered material means material that meets all of the following criteria:
(A)The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(i)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(ii)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(iii)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(B)The reporting person is the person depicted in the material, and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material.
(C)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(2)Covered material does not include an image or video that contains only minor alterations that do not lead to significant changes to the perceived content or meaning of the content, including changes to brightness or contrast of images and other minor changes that do not impact the content of the image or video.
(b)Reporting user means a natural person who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(c)Sexually explicit digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
(d)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report sexually explicit digital identity theft to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting users report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting user as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(c)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), determine within 30 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(2)(A)If the social media platform cannot comply with paragraph (1) within 30 days due to circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the social media platform, the social media platform shall comply with paragraph (1) no later than 60 days after the date on which the covered material was first reported.
(B)If subparagraph (A) applies, the social media platform shall promptly provide written notice of the delay, no later than 48 hours from the time the social media platform knew the delay was likely to occur, to the reporting user using the information collected from the reporting user under subdivision (b).
(d)(1)Temporarily block a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2)Immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(a)(1)Covered material means material that meets all of the following criteria:
(A)The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(i)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(ii)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(iii)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(B)The reporting person is the person depicted in the material, and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material.
(C)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(2)Covered material does not include an image or video that contains only minor alterations that do not lead to significant changes to the perceived content or meaning of the content, including changes to brightness or contrast of images and other minor changes that do not impact the content of the image or video.
(b)Reporting user means a natural person who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(c)Sexually explicit digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
(d)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report sexually explicit digital identity theft to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting users report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting user as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(c)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), determine within 30 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(2)(A)If the social media platform cannot comply with paragraph (1) within 30 days due to circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the social media platform, the social media platform shall comply with paragraph (1) no later than 60 days after the date on which the covered material was first reported.
(B)If subparagraph (A) applies, the social media platform shall promptly provide written notice of the delay, no later than 48 hours from the time the social media platform knew the delay was likely to occur, to the reporting user using the information collected from the reporting user under subdivision (b).
(d)(1)Temporarily block a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2)Immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(a)(1)Covered material means material that meets all of the following criteria:
(A)The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(i)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(ii)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(iii)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(B)The reporting person is the person depicted in the material, and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material.
(C)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(2)Covered material does not include an image or video that contains only minor alterations that do not lead to significant changes to the perceived content or meaning of the content, including changes to brightness or contrast of images and other minor changes that do not impact the content of the image or video.
(b)Digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.(c)(b)Reporting user means a natural person who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(c)Sexually explicit digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
(d)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report sexually explicit digital identity theft to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting users report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting user as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(c)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), determine within 30 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(2)(A)If the social media platform cannot comply with paragraph (1) within 30 days due to circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the social media platform, the social media platform shall comply with paragraph (1) no later than 60 days after the date on which the covered material was first reported.
(B)If subparagraph (A) applies, the social media platform shall promptly provide written notice of the delay, no later than 48 hours from the time the social media platform knew the delay was likely to occur, to the reporting user using the information collected from the reporting user under subdivision (b).
(d)(1)Temporarily block a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2)Immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is sexually explicit digital identity theft.
(a)(1)Covered material means material that meets all of the following criteria:
(1)(A)The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(A)(i)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(B)(ii)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(C)(iii)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(2)(B)The reporting person is the person depicted in the material, and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material.
(3)(C)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(2)Covered material does not include an image or video that contains only minor alterations that do not lead to significant changes to the perceived content or meaning of the content, including changes to brightness or contrast of images and other minor changes that do not impact the content of the image or video.
(b)Digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
(c)Reporting person user means a natural person located within the geographic boundaries of the state who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(d)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting persons user who is a California resident who has an account with the social media platform to report digital identity theft to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting person user with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting persons users report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting person user as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported digital identity theft.
(c)Determine (1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), determine within 14 30 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
(2)(A)If the social media platform cannot comply with paragraph (1) within 30 days due to circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the social media platform, the social media platform shall comply with paragraph (1) no later than 60 days after the date on which the covered material was first reported.
(B)If subparagraph (A) applies, the social media platform shall promptly provide written notice of the delay, no later than 48 hours from the time the social media platform knew the delay was likely to occur, to the reporting user using the information collected from the reporting user under subdivision (b).
(d)(1)Temporarily block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2)Permanently block Immediately remove a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
(e)Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.(a)Covered material means material that a reporting person reasonably believes meets all of the following criteria:
(1)The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(A)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(B)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(C)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(2)The reporting person identifies the reporting person as is the person depicted in the material material, and confirms that the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting persons likeness in the material.
(3)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(b)Digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
(c)Reporting person means a natural person located within the geographic boundaries of the state who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(d)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to reporting persons to report digital identity theft to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting person with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting persons report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting person as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported digital identity theft.
(c)Determine within 14 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
(d)(1)Temporarily block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2)Permanently block an a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform. platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
(e)Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
(a)Covered material means material that a user of a social media platform reporting person reasonably believes meets all of the following criteria:
(1)The material is an image or video created, created or altered through, through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(A)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(B)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(C)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(2)The reporting user person identifies the reporting user person as the person depicted in the material and confirms that the reporting user person did not consent to the use of the reporting users persons likeness in the material.
(3)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(b)Digital identity theft means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
(b)(c)Reporting user person means a natural person located within the geographic boundaries of the state who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(c)(d)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users for a user who is a California resident reporting persons to report covered material digital identity theft to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the reported covered material instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user person with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting users persons report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting user person as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported covered material. digital identity theft.
(c)Determine within 14 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
(c)Permanently(d)(1)Temporarily block a reported instance of covered material digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform. platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2)Permanently block an instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
(d)(e)Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of reported covered material digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
(a)Covered material means material that a user of a social media platform reasonably believes meets all of the following criteria:
(1)The material is an image or video created, or altered through, digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(A)An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(B)An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(C)An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(2)The reporting user identifies the reporting user as the person depicted in the material and confirms that the reporting user did not consent to the use of the reporting users likeness in the material.
(3)The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
(b)Reporting user means a natural person who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform pursuant to Section 22671.
(c)(1)Social media platform has, except as provided in paragraph (2), the same meaning as defined in Section 22675.
(2)Social media platform does not include either of the following:
(A)A stand-alone direct messaging service that provides end-to-end encrypted communication or the portion of a multiservice platform that uses end-to-end encrypted communication.
(B)An internet-based service or application owned or operated by a nonprofit organization exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
22671.A social media platform shall do all of the following:
(a)Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to users for a user who is a California resident to report covered material to the social media platform.
(b)Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the reported covered material and to contact a reporting user with both of the following:
(1)Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting users report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
(2)Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) is issued, a written update to the reporting user as to the status of the social media platforms handling of the reported covered material.
(c)Permanently block a reported instance of covered material from being viewable on the social media platform.
(d)Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of reported covered material from being viewable on the social media platform.
SECTION 1.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to the authority of a law enforcement officer to arrest a person suspected of retail theft if the officer did not observe the commission of the crime.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to the authority of a law enforcement officer to arrest a person suspected of retail theft if the officer did not observe the commission of the crime.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 19, 2024 | Chaptered by Secretary of State. Chapter 292, Statutes of 2024. |
| Sep 19, 2024 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Aug 23, 2024 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 2 p.m. |
| Aug 19, 2024 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 40. Noes 0. Page 5198.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Aug 12, 2024 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Aug 12, 2024 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 73. Noes 0. Page 6278.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Aug 6, 2024 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 5, 2024 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Jul 3, 2024 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 10. Noes 0.) (July 2). |
| Jun 21, 2024 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jun 3, 2024 | Referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| May 13, 2024 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| May 13, 2024 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 36. Noes 0. Page 3895.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 2, 2024 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 1, 2024 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 0. Page 3819.) (April 30). |
| Apr 22, 2024 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 5, 2024 | Set for hearing April 30. |
| Apr 3, 2024 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Mar 20, 2024 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 14, 2024 | Referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Jan 30, 2024 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after February 29. |
| Jan 29, 2024 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 19, 2024 | Unfinished Business SB981 Wahab et al. Concurrence | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 12, 2024 | SB 981 Wahab Senate Third Reading By Bauer-Kahan | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Jul 2, 2024 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
|
| May 13, 2024 | Senate 3rd Reading SB981 Wahab | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 30, 2024 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Arcadia Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Burbank Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Coalition of School Safety Professionals | ** Support | |
| California Narcotic Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Reserve Peace Officers Association | ** Support | |
| City of San Jose | ** Support | |
| CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Corona Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Crime Victims Alliance | ** Support | |
| Culver City Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Deputy Sheriffs Association of Monterey County | ** Support | |
| Electronic Frontier Foundation | ** Against | |
| Fullerton Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles County District AttorneyS Office | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles School Police Management Association | ** Support | |
| los angeles school police officers association | ** Support | |
| Murrieta Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Newport Beach Police Association | ** Support | |
| Novato Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Against | |
| Palos Verdes Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Perk Advocacy | ** Support | |
| PLACER COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Pomona Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| RIVERSIDE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Riverside Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| Santa Ana Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| SNAP Inc. | ** Support | |
| Technet-Technology Network | ** Support | |
| Upland Police Officers Association | ** Support |
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 981 |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 981
Author: Wahab (D), et al.
Amended: 8/5/24
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-0, 4/30/24
AYES: Umberg, Wilk, Allen, Blakespear, Caballero, Dodd, Durazo, Laird, Min, Niello, Wiener
SENATE FLOOR: 36-0, 5/13/24
AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Bradford, Caballero, Cortese, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Eggman, Glazer, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, Min, Newman, Nguyen, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Seyarto, Skinner, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Wiener, Wilk
NO VOTE RECORDED: Atkins, Gonzalez, Menjivar, Padilla
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 73-0, 8/12/24 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Sexually explicit digital images
SOURCE: Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
DIGEST:
This bill requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes; and requires platforms to timely respond and investigate and to remove instances of this material, as provided.
Assembly Amendments
narrow the scope of the bill and extend the timeline for compliance.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Provides that no provider or user of a website shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, and that no provider of a website shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict the availability of materials that the provider determines to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. (Title 47 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 230(c))
- Provides that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. (Title 47 U.S.C. Section 230(e))
- Provides a right to free speech and expression. (U.S. Constitution, 1st amendment; California Constitution, Art. 1, Section 2)
- Recognizes certain judicially created exceptions to the rights of freedom of speech and expression. (E.g., Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359)
Existing state law:
- Defines “social media platform” as a public or semipublic internet-based service or application that has users in California and that meets specified criteria.
- Defines “deepfake” to mean audio or visual content that has been generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) which would falsely appear to be authentic or truthful and which features depictions of people appearing to say or do things they did not say or do without their consent. Requires the Secretary of Government Operations to evaluate the impact of the proliferation of deepfakes on the state. (Government Code Section 11547.5)
- Authorizes a depicted individual to bring a cause of action against a person who does either of the following:
- Creates and intentionally discloses sexually explicit material and the person knows or reasonably should have known the depicted individual in that material did not consent to its creation or disclosure.
- Intentionally discloses sexually explicit material that the person did not create and the person knows the depicted individual in that material did not consent to the creation of the sexually explicit material. (Civil Code Section 1708.86)
- Defines, for the preceding statute, “depicted individual” as an individual who appears, as a result of digitization, to be giving a performance they did not actually perform or to be performing in an altered depiction. (Civil Code Section 1708.86)
- Prohibits a person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress. (Penal Code Section 647(j)(4)(A))
This bill:
- Requires a social media platform to do all of the following:
- Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user to report sexually explicit digital identity theft to the social media platform.
- Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the reported instance and to contact the person with confirmation that the platform received the report within 48 hours of receipt and an update within seven days thereof of the status of the platform’s response.
- Determine within 30 days of the date on which the confirmation is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported material is sexually explicit digital identity theft, with opportunity for an extension, as provided.
- Temporarily block a reported instance from being publicly viewable on the platform pending the above determination and immediately remove the reported instance of sexually explicit digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported material meets the criteria for sexually explicit digital identity theft.
- Defines the relevant terms, including:
- “Covered material” means material that meets all of the following criteria, except as provided:
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
- An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
- An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
- The reporting person is the person depicted in the material and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting person’s likeness in the material.
- The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- “Sexually explicit digital identity theft” means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
- “Covered material” means material that meets all of the following criteria, except as provided:
Background
With the technological advances in digital editing capabilities, the use of such tools to alter audiovisual work to portray individuals in various states of undress and/or engaging in sexually explicit conduct in which they are not actually performing has become an increasingly widespread issue. The growth of generative artificial intelligence capabilities has intensified the incidence and impact of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes.
This bill addresses the appearance of these deepfakes on social media platforms. The platforms are required to create a mechanism for persons depicted in this “covered material” to report it to the platform. The platform is required to communicate with the reporting user and make a determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported material amounts to “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of these nonconsensual deepfakes on the platform. Social media platforms are required to temporarily block content as soon as it is reported through this mechanism, and, if the platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe it is, in fact, “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” immediately remove that instance of the material.
This bill is sponsored by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office and supported by law enforcement agencies. This bill is opposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. For a more thorough assessment of this bill, including a discussion of relevant legal considerations involving the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 230, please see the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of this bill.
Comments
- Author’s Statement. According to the author:
Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for users to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.
It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.
Currently, there is no 24-hour hotline or number to call nor other alternative means of seeking recourse. Delays between a user reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.
We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through collaboration between users, platforms, and lawmakers, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of non-consensual sexually explicit material.
- Targeting deepfakes and “digital identity theft” on social media. This bill aims to address the growing concerns associated with “deepfakes” by ensuring there are tools to combat the appearance of these nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes on social media platforms. It requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “sexually explicit digital identity theft” to them, defined as the posting of covered material on a social media platform. “Covered material” is defined as altered content that meets several criteria, as provided. First, that the content is a digitized image or video that appears to be a person’s intimate body part or the person engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Second, the reporting person is the one depicted in the material without their consent. And finally, that the material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
Platforms are required to confirm they received a report through this mechanism and to collect sufficient information for them to find the reported instance. Within a week, they are to provide the reporting person an update and then within 30 days, except as provided, the platform must make a determination if the content is in fact sexually explicit digital identity theft. If there is a reasonable basis to believe it is, the content must be immediately removed.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/12/24)
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (source)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Crime Victims Alliance
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Monterey County
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Novato Police Officers Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
Upland Police Officers Association
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/12/24)
Electronic Frontier Foundation
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, the sponsor of the bill, writes:
The harms this type of victimization causes are well documented and include but are not limited to PTSD, chronic health problems, mental illness, and substance abuse. They can also negatively impact educational attainment, job opportunities, and earning potential.
Many of these victims begin to doubt everyone they come into contact with. Others have had to change their names or completely remove themselves from the internet. They constantly fear being retraumatized, because at any moment the images could resurface and once again ruin their lives. In the most severe cases victims have committed suicide after becoming a victim of this type of illicit behavior.
Many DV advocates believe the increase in this type of deepfake victimization is particularly concerning and alarming because it is a perfect tool for someone seeking to exert power and control over a victim.
Unfortunately, there are only a smattering of existing civil and criminal laws to protect these victims leaving no legal remedies for the vast majority of cases.
Even when a criminal prosecution can be filed, it takes months and sometimes over a year before a case can be adjudicated. For this reason, it is crucial that legislation like SB 981 be enacted to protect innocent victims.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues this bill is preempted by Section 230:
While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms, making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230’s immunity: “no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.” 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 (e)(3).
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 73-0, 8/12/24
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Juan Carrillo, Wendy Carrillo, Cervantes, Chen, Connolly, Megan Dahle, Davies, Dixon, Flora, Mike Fong, Friedman, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Lee, Low, Lowenthal, Maienschein, McCarty, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Stephanie Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Jim Patterson, Joe Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Rendon, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Santiago, Schiavo, Soria, Ta, Ting, Valencia, Waldron, Wallis, Ward, Weber, Wicks, Wilson, Wood, Zbur, Robert Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bennett, Essayli, Gallagher, Holden, Mathis, Villapudua
Prepared by: Christian Kurpiewski / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
8/13/24 16:23:41
**** END ****
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 981
Author:(Wahab)
As Amended Ver:June 21, 2024
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism for reporting "sexually explicit digital identity theft," as defined. Establishes timeframes for the platform to determine whether there is a reasonable basis that the reported content is sexually explicit digital identity theft. Requires the platform to temporarily block the content pending the determination and to permanently block it if the content is determined to be sexually explicit digital identity theft.
Major Provisions
- Requires a social media platform to:
- Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident and has an account with the platform to report "sexually explicit digital identity theft," defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person.
- Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user with confirmation of receipt within 48 hours and a written update as to the status of the platform's handling of the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft within seven days of the issuance of the confirmation.
- Determine within 30 days of the date of the issuance of the above-mentioned confirmation whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is accurate. Allows for this period to be extended an extra 30 days if the platform cannot timely respond due to circumstances beyond its reasonable control, provided that notice of the delay is provided within 48 hours from the time the platform knew the delay was likely to occur.
- Temporarily block a reported instance of sexually explicit identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending the determination described above.
- Immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit identity theft from public view on the platform if it determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is accurate.
COMMENTS
Sexually explicit digital identity theft. Consumer-facing, phone-based "nudification" applications enable the use of a person's likeness to create highly-realistic pornographic imagery and videos, which with a click of a button can go viral among the person's friends, family, employer, community, and beyond. Social media websites provide a potent means of amplifying deepfake nonconsensual pornography, extending the content's reach by, in effect, crowdsourcing abuse—potentially reaching millions of viewers. The psychological trauma this can inflict on survivors—who are overwhelmingly women and young girls—cannot be overstated.
In a recent Guardian article, gender equity expert and journalist Luba Kassova argues that "nonconsensual deepfake pornography has become a growing human rights crisis." In her article she asks readers to:
Imagine finding that someone has taken a picture of you from the internet and superimposed it on a sexually explicit image available online. Or that a video appears showing you having sex with someone you have never met.
Imagine worrying that your children, partner, parents or colleagues might see this and believe it is really you. And that your frantic attempts to take it off social media keep failing, and the fake "you" keeps reappearing and multiplying. Imagine realising that these images could remain online for ever and discovering that no laws exist to prosecute the people who created it.[1]
The problem has become so pervasive that the United States Department of Justice recently launched the first national 24/7 helpline for survivors of image-based sexual abuse.[2] According to RAINN, a non-profit anti-sexual assault organization, more than 100,000 deepfake images and videos are posted on the internet every day.[3] Disturbingly, the 2023 State of Deepfakes report found in its survey of American men that 74% of deepfake pornography users did not feel guilty about their consumption. According to the report's authors, this finding suggests that deepfake pornographic content is becoming normalized and accepted. Further, of those surveyed almost one-third stated that they did not think that deepfake pornography hurt anyone as long as it was only used for their personal interest.[4]
According to the Author
Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is digital identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for people to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.
It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.
Delays between a person reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.
We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through thoughtful and realistic requirements, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of unauthorized sexually explicit material.
Arguments in Support
Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón, the bill's sponsor, writes:
While deepfakes have received enormous attention for their potential political dangers, the vast majority of deepfakes are used to target women. Sensity AI, a research company that has tracked online deepfake videos since December of 2018, has consistently found that between 90% and 95% of the deepfakes online are nonconsensual porn and that about 90% is nonconsensual porn of women. The harm caused to victims of this type of criminal activity is real. These victims are at risk for both short and long-term negative outcomes due to the trauma, fear, instability, interrupted attachment relationships, grief, and subsequent emotions that arise after this type of victimization.
The harms this type of victimization causes are well documented and include but are not limited to PTSD, chronic health problems, mental illness, and substance abuse. They can also negatively impact educational attainment, job opportunities, and earning potential.
Many of these victims begin to doubt everyone they come into contact with. Others have had to change their names or completely remove themselves from the internet. They constantly fear being retraumatized, because at any moment the images could resurface and once again ruin their lives. In the most severe cases victims have committed suicide after becoming a victim of this type of illicit behavior.
Many DV advocates believe the increase in this type of deepfake victimization is particularly concerning and alarming because it is a perfect tool for someone seeking to exert power and control over a victim.
Unfortunately, there are only a smattering of existing civil and criminal laws to protect these victims leaving no legal remedies for the vast majority of cases.
Even when a criminal prosecution can be filed, it takes months and sometimes over a year before a case can be adjudicated. For this reason, it is crucial that legislation like SB 981 be enacted to protect innocent victims.
Arguments in Opposition
Electronic Frontier Foundation writes:
Combined with a reporting mechanism and the requirement to block and remove covered materials, S.B. 981 will lead to over-censorship of protected speech. The most recent amendments allow platforms up to 60 days to make a determination that the reported person is the depicted person. Despite the additional time to deliberate, it may still be difficult for a platform to determine whether a generated image would be "covered material." Platforms, however, must temporarily block reported materials during review, and immediately remove materials determined to be covered. Because platforms must comply with the statute and are motivated to avoid liability for failures to comply, they will likely remove content with little review or investigation in response to this bill.
[ . . .]
A federal law often referred to as Section 230, 47 U.S.C. 230(c), "protects from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider." See Barnes v. Yahoo, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009).
While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms, making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230's immunity: "no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section." 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 (e)(3). (Footnote omitted.)
FISCAL COMMENTS
As currently in print, this bill is keyed nonfiscal.
VOTES
SENATE FLOOR: 36-0-4
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Bradford, Caballero, Cortese, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Eggman, Glazer, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, Min, Newman, Nguyen, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Seyarto, Skinner, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Atkins, Gonzalez, Menjivar, Padilla
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 10-0-1
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Joe Patterson, Bryan, Dixon, Hoover, Irwin, Lowenthal, Ortega, Ward, Wilson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Wicks
UPDATED
VERSION: June 21, 2024
CONSULTANT: Josh Tosney / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0003730
Kassova, Luba. "Tech bros need to realise deepfake porn ruins lives – and the law has to catch up," The Guardian (Mar. 1, 2024) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/mar/01/tech-bros-nonconsensual-sexual-deepfakes-videos-porn-law-taylor-swift. ↑
Travers, Karen and Emmanuelle Saliba. "Fake explicit Taylor Swift images: White House is 'alarmed'," ABC News (Jan. 26, 2024) https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-house-calls-legislation-regulate-ai-amid-explicit/story?id=106718520. ↑
Ibid. ↑
2023 State of Deepfakes: Realities, Threats, and Impact. Home Security Heroes. https://www.homesecurityheroes.com/state-of-deepfakes/#deepfake-porn-survey. ↑
Date of Hearing: July 2, 2024
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 981
Author:(Wahab) – As Amended Ver:June 21, 2024
AS PROPOSED TO BE AMENDED
SENATE VOTE: 36-0
SUBJECT: Sexually explicit digital images
SYNOPSIS
“Imagine finding that someone has taken a picture of you from the internet and superimposed it on a sexually explicit image available online. Or that a video appears showing you having sex with someone you have never met.
“Imagine worrying that your children, partner, parents or colleagues might see this and believe it is really you. And that your frantic attempts to take it off social media keep failing, and the fake ‘you’ keeps reappearing and multiplying. Imagine realising that these images could remain online for ever and discovering that no laws exist to prosecute the people who created it.”[1]
Consumer-facing, phone-based “nudification” applications enable the use of a person’s likeness to create highly-realistic pornographic imagery and videos, which with a click of a button can go viral among the person’s friends, family, employer, community, and beyond. Social media websites provide a potent means of amplifying deepfake nonconsensual pornography, extending the content’s reach by, in effect, crowdsourcing abuse—potentially reaching millions of viewers. The psychological trauma this can inflict on victims cannot be overstated.
This bill, as proposed to be amended, requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism for users of the platform to report “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing their intimate body parts. The bill would establish timeframes for the platform to respond, collect information, and make a determination—generally within 30 days—as to whether there is a reasonable basis that the reported content is sexually explicit digital identity theft. During this period, the platform must temporarily block the content. If the content is determined to be sexually explicit identity theft, the platform must permanently remove the content.
The bill is sponsored by Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón and supported by Snap, TechNet, and numerous law enforcement organizations. The Electronic Frontier Foundation opposes the bill, arguing that it runs afoul of the First Amendment and Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996.
Committee amendments align the bill’s terminology with its scope by adding “sexually explicit” before “digital identity theft.”
SUMMARY: Requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism for reporting “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” as defined. Establishes timeframes for the platform to determine whether there is a reasonable basis that the reported content is sexually explicit digital identity theft. Requires the platform to temporarily block the content pending the determination and to permanently block it if the content is determined to be sexually explicit digital identity theft. Specifically, this bill:
- Requires a social media platform to:
- Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident and has an account with the platform to report “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person.
- Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting user with confirmation of receipt within 48 hours and a written update as to the status of the platform’s handling of the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft within seven days of the issuance of the confirmation.
- Determine within 30 days of the date of the issuance of the above-mentioned confirmation whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is accurate. Allows for this period to be extended an extra 30 days if the platform cannot timely respond due to circumstances beyond its reasonable control, provided that notice of the delay is provided within 48 hours from the time the platform knew the delay was likely to occur.
- Temporarily block a reported instance of sexually explicit identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending the determination described above.
- Immediately remove a reported instance of sexually explicit identity theft from public view on the platform if it determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported sexually explicit digital identity theft is accurate.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that no provider or user of a website shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, and that no provider of a website shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict the availability of materials that the provider determines to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. (47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Section 230).)
- Provides that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. (47 U.S.C. § 230(e).)
- Provides a right to free speech and expression. (U.S. Const., 1st amend; Cal. Const., art 1, § 2.)
- Defines “social media platform” as a public or semipublic internet-based service or application that has users in California and that meets both of the following criteria:
- A substantial function of the service or application is to connect users in order to allow them to interact socially with each other within the service or application. (A service or application that provides email or direct messaging services does not meet this criterion based solely on that function.)
- The service or application allows users to do all of the following:
- Construct a public or semipublic profile for purposes of signing into and using the service or application.
- Populate a list of other users with whom an individual shares a social connection within the system.
- Create or post content viewable by other users, including on message boards, in chat rooms, or through a landing page or main feed that presents the user with content generated by other users. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22675(e).)
- Defines “deepfake” to mean audio or visual content that has been generated or manipulated by AI which would falsely appear to be authentic or truthful and which features depictions of people appearing to say or do things they did not say or do without their consent. Requires the Secretary of Government Operations to evaluate the impact to the state of the proliferation of deepfakes. (Gov. Code § 11547.5.)
- Authorizes a depicted individual to bring a cause of action against a person who does either of the following:
- Creates and intentionally discloses sexually explicit material and the person knows or reasonably should have known the depicted individual in that material did not consent to its creation or disclosure.
- Intentionally discloses sexually explicit material that the person did not create and the person knows the depicted individual in that material did not consent to the creation of the sexually explicit material. (Civ. Code § 1708.86.)
- Defines, for the preceding statute, “depicted individual” as an individual who appears, as a result of digitization, to be giving a performance they did not actually perform or to be performing in an altered depiction. (Civ. Code § 1708.86.)
- Prohibits a person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress. (Pen. Code § 647(j)(4)(A).)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print, this bill is keyed nonfiscal.
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is digital identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for people to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.
It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.
Delays between a person reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.
We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through thoughtful and realistic requirements, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of unauthorized sexually explicit material.
2) Sexually explicit digital identity theft. This bill, as proposed to be amended, applies to “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” which is defined as an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person. This type of harm has been turbo-charged by the rapid development and widespread consumer availability of artificial intelligence (AI).
AI refers to the mimicking of human intelligence by artificial systems, such as computers. AI uses algorithms – sets of rules – to transform inputs into outputs. Inputs and outputs can be anything a computer can process: numbers, text, audio, video, or movement. AI that are trained on small, specific datasets in order to make recommendations and predictions are sometimes referred to as “predictive AI.” This differentiates them from GenAI, which are trained on massive datasets in order to produce detailed text and images. When Netflix suggests a TV show to a viewer, the recommendation is produced by predictive AI that has been trained on the viewing habits of Netflix users. When DALL-E generates high-resolution, lifelike images, it uses GenAI that has been trained on ~250 million text-image pairs.
The creation of text, imagery, video, and audio by GenAI has the potential to change the world by automating repetitive tasks and fostering creativity. When employed by bad actors, however, these capabilities have the potential to invade privacy and disrupt the lives of Californians. Since its inception, GenAI has been used to create nonconsensual pornography, more accurately referred to by sexual assault experts as image-based sexual abuse. According to a recent New York Times article, phone-based apps allowing teenage boys to digitally “nudify” their classmates have become increasingly accessible and affordable:
Boys in several states have used widely available “nudification” apps to pervert real, identifiable photos of their clothed female classmates, shown attending events like school proms, into graphic, convincing-looking images of the girls with exposed A.I.-generated breasts and genitalia. In some cases, boys shared the faked images in the school lunchroom, on the school bus or through group chats on platforms like Snapchat and Instagram, according to school and police reports.[2]
The harms of AI-powered image-based sexual abuse are already being felt in California:
A third school in Southern California has been hit with allegations of digitally manipulated images of students circulating around campus . . . “Sixteen eighth-grade students were identified as being victimized, as well as five egregiously involved eighth-grade students,” Superintendent Michael Bregy wrote. While Bregy acknowledged that children “are still learning and growing, and mistakes are part of the process,” he affirmed disciplinary measures had been taken and noted that the incident was swiftly contained. The district vowed to hold accountable any other students “found to be creating, disseminating, or in possession of AI-generated images of this nature.”[3]
Women are the primary targets of these efforts, and no one appears to be immune: in the run-up to the 2024 Super Bowl, a series of images involving Taylor Swift began to appear on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter). These images were removed over the following days, but the damage had been done:
“We are too little, too late at this point, but we can still try to mitigate the disaster that’s emerging,” says Mary Anne Franks, a professor at George Washington University Law School and president of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. Women are “canaries in the coal mine” when it comes to the abuse of artificial intelligence, she adds. “It’s not just going to be the 14-year-old girl or Taylor Swift. It’s going to be politicians. It’s going to be world leaders. It’s going to be elections.”[4]
The harm inflicted on women and girls by this technology cannot be overstated. In a recent Guardian article by gender equity expert and journalist, Luba Kassova, she argues that “nonconsensual deepfake pornography has become a growing human rights crisis.” In her article she asks readers to:
Imagine finding that someone has taken a picture of you from the internet and superimposed it on a sexually explicit image available online. Or that a video appears showing you having sex with someone you have never met.
Imagine worrying that your children, partner, parents or colleagues might see this and believe it is really you. And that your frantic attempts to take it off social media keep failing, and the fake “you” keeps reappearing and multiplying. Imagine realising that these images could remain online for ever and discovering that no laws exist to prosecute the people who created it.[5]
The problem has become so pervasive that the United States Department of Justice recently launched the first the first national 24/7 helpline for survivors of image-based sexual abuse.[6] According to RAINN, a non-profit anti-sexual assault organization, more than 100,000 deepfake images and videos are posted on the internet every day.[7] The 2023 State of Deepfakes report found in its survey of American men that 74 percent of deepfake pornography users did not feel guilty about their consumption. According to the report’s authors, this finding suggests that deepfake pornographic content is becoming normalized and accepted. Further, of those surveyed almost one-third of those surveyed stated that they did not think that deepfake pornography hurt anyone as long as it was only used for their personal interest.[8]
3) What this bill does. This bill, as proposed to be amended, requires social media platforms to establish a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to a reporting user who is a California resident and has an account with the platform to report “sexually explicit digital identity theft,” defined under the bill to be an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be a depiction of the reporting person engaging in explicit sexual conduct or showing an intimate body part of that person.
Within 48 hours of receiving a report, platforms must confirm they received the report and commence collecting information to determine its veracity. Seven days after confirming receipt of the report, the platform must update reporting person. Within 30 days of confirming receipt, the platform must make a final determination as to whether the content is in fact sexually explicit digital identity theft.
Meantime, the platform must temporarily block the content. And if the content is determined to be sexually explicit identity theft, the platform must permanently remove it. Although the bill does not have an express enforcement mechanism, it is enforceable pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law.[9]
4) Committee amendment. The bill in print, although specific to deepfake nonconsensual pornography, applies more broadly to “digital identity theft.” To align the bill’s terminology with its scope, the author has agreed to amend the bill to apply to “sexually explicit digital identity theft.” The author has indicated an intent to revisit this issue next year in order continue expanding on these provisions.
5) Constitutional considerations. This bill is opposed by Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment and Section 230 of the federal Communications Act of 1996.
First Amendment. The United States and California Constitutions prohibit abridging, among other fundamental rights, freedom of speech.[10] Citing no case law, EFF argues:
To begin, the definition of “covered material” is vague and ambiguous. The bill determines coverage using metrics that rely on the personal judgment of the individual depicted in the material. One is whether the reporter believes a “reasonable person” would find an image “intimate.” Another metric hinges on the reporter’s belief that the image or video will “appear to a reasonable person” to depict an “identifiable” person or body part of an “identifiable” person. What is “reasonable” is subjective; each reporter will have a unique interpretation based on their lived experience and the possibly disputed factual context around any particular image.
Combined with a reporting mechanism and the requirement to block and remove covered materials, S.B. 981 will lead to over-censorship of protected speech. The most recent amendments allow platforms up to 60 days to make a determination that the reported person is the depicted person. Despite the additional time to deliberate, it may still be difficult for a platform to determine whether a generated image would be “covered material.” Platforms, however, must temporarily block reported materials during review, and immediately remove materials determined to be covered. Because platforms must comply with the statute and are motivated to avoid liability for failures to comply, they will likely remove content with little review or investigation in response to this bill.
Content-based restrictions on protected speech,[11] including sexual speech that is not obscene,[12] are subject to “strict scrutiny” and thus are presumptively unconstitutional, valid only if the government proves they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest.[13]
Preventing the severe psychological trauma that nonconsensual pornography transmitted via social media can inflict unquestionably serves a compelling governmental interest. The question, then, is whether the bill is narrowly tailored to further that interest. This bill applies to narrowly drawn categories of nonconsensual deepfake pornography on a specific medium—social media platforms—on which such imagery can easily go viral among the victim’s friends, family, employers, community, and beyond. In this regard, nearly every state, California included, has adopted “revenge pornography” statutes that vary widely in their elements, requirements, definitions and penalties. And yet “none of these statutes have ultimately been struck down as unconstitutional.”[14] Given the similarity of the harms, there does not appear to be strong basis for expecting a different outcome for deepfake revenge pornography. That being said, to insulate the bill from challenge, the author may wish to explore ways of further narrowing it, including by expressly providing that the covered images must be highly realistic and life-like.
Section 230. Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) states, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”[15] That section also provides a safe harbor for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”[16] Finally, it provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”[17]
Through this statute, “Congress intended to create a blanket immunity from tort liability for online republication of third party content.”[18] “The courts have consistently construed CDA Section 230 to eliminate all tort liability against websites, search engines, and other online intermediaries arising out of third-party postings on their services. The result is that large gatekeepers such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube have no duty to respond to takedown notices, even if the deplorable content is a continuing tort or crime.”[19]
According to EFF: “While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms, making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230’s immunity: ‘no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.’”
This argument has merit. As noted in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s analysis of the bill, “the bill will likely face challenge as it exposes social media platforms to liability for failing to take down certain content posted by users. It also potentially exposes them to liability for failing to take reasonable steps to remove and block unreported instances posted by users.” On the other hand, it is noteworthy that TechNet and Snap support the bill. This may be a reflection of the fact that some platforms have voluntarily implemented effective takedown regimes for such vile content. In support, Snap writes:
When someone shares intimate images of another person online without that person’s consent, the effects can be devastating. These gross violations of privacy are a violation of Snapchat’s Community Guidelines. At Snapchat, we are determined to put victims of NCII back in control of their most personal and private photos and videos. Accordingly, we encourage victims to: Report it to Snap in-app, via our Support Site, or via direct message on X (formerly Twitter); Snap’s Trust & Safety teams will review your report and take action. Users can also contact StopNCII, a non-profit dedicated to stopping the online spread of NCII. StopNCII offers victims of NCII the opportunity to create a unique digital signature, called a “hash,” of their image(s). These hashes are then made available to participating tech companies, including Snapchat. We search for matches to the hashes and delete any violating content from Snapchat.
Snapchat employs moderation tools for our public content features such as Spotlight, Stories, and the Map to reduce the chances of obscene material being distributed. Content and accounts can also be flagged via in-app reporting – including private snaps and chat. These reports are reviewed and acted upon quickly by our dedicated safety teams.
SB 981 represents a necessary step in ensuring our collective efforts to protect users’ well-being are reinforced by smart policy. It is imperative that industry, law enforcement, and the legislature stand in lock-step to root out violative material and bad actors, and ensure platforms are safe for all users.
6) Related legislation. SB 646 (Cortese, 2023) creates liability for the distribution of certain “actionable material,” which includes illicit pictures of minors and images or depictions of minors that serve as the basis for criminal and civil liability at the federal level. The bill was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón, the bill’s sponsor, writes:
While deepfakes have received enormous attention for their potential political dangers, the vast majority of deepfakes are used to target women. Sensity AI, a research company that has tracked online deepfake videos since December of 2018, has consistently found that between 90% and 95% of the deepfakes online are nonconsensual porn and that about 90% is nonconsensual porn of women. The harm caused to victims of this type of criminal activity is real. These victims are at risk for both short and long-term negative outcomes due to the trauma, fear, instability, interrupted attachment relationships, grief, and subsequent emotions that arise after this type of victimization.
The harms this type of victimization causes are well documented and include but are not limited to PTSD, chronic health problems, mental illness, and substance abuse. They can also negatively impact educational attainment, job opportunities, and earning potential.
Many of these victims begin to doubt everyone they come into contact with. Others have had to change their names or completely remove themselves from the internet. They constantly fear being retraumatized, because at any moment the images could resurface and once again ruin their lives. In the most severe cases victims have committed suicide after becoming a victim of this type of illicit behavior.
Many DV advocates believe the increase in this type of deepfake victimization is particularly concerning and alarming because it is a perfect tool for someone seeking to exert power and control over a victim.
Unfortunately, there are only a smattering of existing civil and criminal laws to protect these victims leaving no legal remedies for the vast majority of cases.
Even when a criminal prosecution can be filed, it takes months and sometimes over a year before a case can be adjudicated. For this reason, it is crucial that legislation like SB 981 be enacted to protect innocent victims.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: See Comment 5.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (sponsor)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
City of San Jose
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Monterey County
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Novato Police Officers Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
PERK Advocacy
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
SNAP INC.
Technet-technology Network
Upland Police Officers Association
Opposition
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Analysis Prepared by: Josh Tosney / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Kassova, Luba. “Tech bros need to realise deepfake porn ruins lives – and the law has to catch up,” The Guardian (Mar. 1, 2024) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/mar/01/tech-bros-nonconsensual-sexual-deepfakes-videos-porn-law-taylor-swift. ↑
Natasha Singer, “Teen Girls Confront an Epidemic of Deepfake Nudes in Schools,” New York Times, Apr. 8, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/08/technology/deepfake-ai-nudes-westfield-high-school.html. ↑
Mackenzie Tatananni, “'Inappropriate images' circulate at yet another California high school, as officials grapple with how to protect teens from AI porn created by classmates,” Daily Mail, Apr. 11, 2024, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13295475/Inappropriate-images-California-Fairfax-High-School-AI-deepfake.html. ↑
Brian Contreras, “Tougher AI Policies Could Protect Taylor Swift—And Everyone Else—From Deepfakes,” Feb. 8. 2024, www.scientificamerican.com/article/tougher-ai-policies-could-protect-taylor-swift-and-everyone-else-from-deepfakes/. ↑
Kassova, Luba. “Tech bros need to realise deepfake porn ruins lives – and the law has to catch up,” The Guardian (Mar. 1, 2024) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/mar/01/tech-bros-nonconsensual-sexual-deepfakes-videos-porn-law-taylor-swift. ↑
Travers, Karen and Emmanuelle Saliba. “Fake explicit Taylor Swift images: White House is ‘alarmed’,” ABC News (Jan. 26, 2024) https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-house-calls-legislation-regulate-ai-amid-explicit/story?id=106718520. ↑
Ibid. ↑
2023 State of Deepfakes: Realities, Threats, and Impact. Home Security Heroes. https://www.homesecurityheroes.com/state-of-deepfakes/#deepfake-porn-survey. ↑
“The California unfair competition law (UCL) ([Bus. & Prof. Code,] § 17200 [et seq.]) defines ‘unfair competition’ as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’ Prevailing plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief and restitution, but the scope of the law is broad, ‘embracing “anything that [is] a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’” Even a practice not specifically proscribed by law may be deemed unfair under the statute, which ‘is written in the disjunctive, [and] establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’” (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407, internal citations and nested quotation marks omitted.) ↑
U.S. Const., 1st and 14th Amends; Cal. Const. art. I, § 2. ↑
“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” (Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163.) ↑
Sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment. (Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC (1989) 492 U.S. 115, 126.) Miller v. California (1973) 414 U.S. 15 set forth the test for obscenity: “(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Id. at p. 24 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) With regard to nonconsensual pornography, the Indiana Supreme Court in State v. Katz (Ind. 2022) 179 N.E.3d 431, 452 stated that “under the stringent test articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California, this expressive activity is not ‘obscene.’” ↑
Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC (1989) 492 U.S. 115, 126.; Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004) 542 U.S. 656, 670; see Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 576 U.S. 155, 163; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 813. ↑
State v. Katz (Ind. 2022) 179 N.E.3d 431, 450, citing, among other cases, People v. Iniguez (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1 (upholding California’s revenge pornography law). ↑
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). ↑
Id. at § 230(c)(2)(A) ↑
Id. at (e)(3). ↑
Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 57. ↑
The Case for a CDA Section 230 Notice-and-Takedown Duty (Spring, 2023) 23 Nev. L.J. 533, 536. ↑
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 981 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 981
Author: Wahab (D)
Amended: 5/2/24
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-0, 4/30/24
AYES: Umberg, Wilk, Allen, Blakespear, Caballero, Dodd, Durazo, Laird, Min, Niello, Wiener
SUBJECT: Sexually explicit digital images
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes; and requires platforms to timely respond and investigate and to block instances of this material, as provided.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Provides that no provider or user of a website shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, and that no provider of a website shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict the availability of materials that the provider determines to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. (47 U.S.C. Section 230(c) (Section 230).)
- Provides that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. (47 U.S.C. Section 230(e).)
- Provides a right to free speech and expression. (U.S. Constitution, 1st amendment; California Constitution, Art. 1, Section 2.)
- Recognizes certain judicially created exceptions to the rights of freedom of speech and expression. (E.g., Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359.)
Existing law:
- Defines “social media platform” as a public or semipublic internet-based service or application that has users in California and that meets both of the following criteria:
- A substantial function of the service or application is to connect users in order to allow them to interact socially with each other within the service or application. (A service or application that provides email or direct messaging services does not meet this criterion based solely on that function.)
- The service or application allows users to do all of the following:
- Construct a public or semipublic profile for purposes of signing into and using the service or application.
- Populate a list of other users with whom an individual shares a social connection within the system.
- Create or post content viewable by other users, including on message boards, in chat rooms, or through a landing page or main feed that presents the user with content generated by other users. (Bus. & Prof. Code Section 22675(e).)
- Defines “deepfake” to mean audio or visual content that has been generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) which would falsely appear to be authentic or truthful and which features depictions of people appearing to say or do things they did not say or do without their consent. Requires the Secretary of Government Operations to evaluate the impact of the proliferation of deepfakes on the state. (Gov. Code Section 11547.5.)
- Authorizes a depicted individual to bring a cause of action against a person who does either of the following:
- Creates and intentionally discloses sexually explicit material and the person knows or reasonably should have known the depicted individual in that material did not consent to its creation or disclosure; or
- Intentionally discloses sexually explicit material that the person did not create and the person knows the depicted individual in that material did not consent to the creation of the sexually explicit material. (Civ. Code Section 1708.86.)
- Defines, for the preceding statute, “depicted individual” as an individual who appears, as a result of digitization, to be giving a performance they did not actually perform or to be performing in an altered depiction. (Civ. Code Section 1708.86.)
- Prohibits a person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress. (Pen. Code Section 647(j)(4)(A).)
This bill:
- Requires a social media platform to do all of the following:
- Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to reporting persons to report digital identity theft to the social media platform.
- Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting person with both of the following:
- Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting person’s report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
- Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation is issued, a written update to the reporting person as to the status of the platform’s handling of the reported digital identity theft.
- Determine within 14 days of the date on which the confirmation is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
- Temporarily block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the platform pending the above determination.
- Permanently block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
- Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported material meets the criteria for digital identity theft.
- Defines the relevant terms, including:
- “Covered material” means material that meets all of the following criteria:
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- An intimate body part of an identifiable person;
- An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration; or
- An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
- The reporting person is the person depicted in the material and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting person’s likeness in the material.
- The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- “Digital identity theft” means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
- “Reporting person” means a natural person located within the geographic boundaries of the state who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform
- “Covered material” means material that meets all of the following criteria:
.
- “Social media platform” has the same meaning as defined in Section 22675 of the Business and Professions Code. However, it does not include specified messaging services or internet-based services or applications owned or operated by nonprofit organizations, as provided.
Background
With the technological advances in digital editing capabilities, the use of such tools to alter audiovisual work to portray individuals in various states of undress and/or engaging in sexually explicit conduct in which they are not actually performing has become an increasingly widespread issue. The growth of generative artificial intelligence capabilities has intensified the incidence and impact of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes.
This bill addresses the appearance of these deepfakes on social media platforms. The platforms are required to create a mechanism for persons depicted in this “covered material” to report it to the platform. The platform is required to communicate with the reporting person and make a determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported material amounts to “digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of these nonconsensual deepfakes on the platform. Social media platforms are required to temporarily block content as soon as it is reported through this mechanism. If the platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe it is, in fact, “digital identity theft, they must permanently block that instance of the material.
This bill is author-sponsored. No timely support was received by the Senate Judiciary Committee. This bill is opposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. For a more thorough assessment of this bill, including a discussion of relevant legal considerations involving the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 230, please see the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of this bill.
Comments
Author’s Statement. According to the author:
Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for users to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.
It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.
Currently, there is no 24-hour hotline or number to call nor other alternative means of seeking recourse. Delays between a user reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.
We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through collaboration between users, platforms, and lawmakers, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of non-consensual sexually explicit material.
Combating deepfakes. This bill aims to address the growing concerns associated with what are called “deepfakes,” a term drawn from “deep learning” plus “fake.” There are various manifestations, but essentially all involve the digital manipulation of audiovisual material to falsely depict an individual engaging in certain conduct. One privacy expert describes the problem relevant here: “Although political deepfakes are relatively new, pornographic deepfakes have been a problem for some time. These often purport to show a famous actress or model involved in a sex act but actually show the subject’s face superimposed onto another woman’s body.”[1]
With the rapid advancement in generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), deepfake images have become exponentially easier to produce, exacerbating the problem:
Recent improvements in artificial intelligence software have made it surprisingly easy to graft the heads of stars, and ordinary women, to the bodies of X-rated actresses to create realistic videos.
These explicit movies are just one strain of so-called “deepfakes,” which are clips that have been doctored so well they look real. Their arrival poses a threat to democracy; mischief makers can, and already have, used them to spread fake news. But another great danger of deepfakes is their use as a tool to harass and humiliate women.[2]
Infamously, in January of this year, Taylor Swift was the victim of sexually explicit, nonconsensual deepfake images using GenAI that were widely spread across social media platforms.[3] Perhaps more disturbingly, a trend has emerged in schools of students creating such images: “At schools across the country, people have used deepfake technology combined with real images of female students to create fraudulent images of nude bodies. The deepfake images can be produced using a cellphone.”[4]
Targeting deepfakes and “digital identity theft” on social media.This bill aims to address this problem by ensuring there are tools to combat the appearance of these nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes on social media platforms. It requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “digital identity theft” to them. “Digital identity theft” is defined as the posting of covered material on a social media platform. “Covered material” is defined as material that the reporting person reasonably believes meets several criteria. First, that the content is a digitized image or video that appears to be a person’s intimate body part or the person engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Second, the reporting person is the one depicted in the material without their consent. And finally, that the material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
Platforms are required to confirm they received a report through this mechanism within 48 hours and to collect sufficient information for them to find the reported instance of digital identity theft. Within a week, they are to provide the reporting person an update and then at two weeks must make a determination if the content is in fact digital identity theft.
This bill also requires social media platforms to block this content from being publicly viewable on their platform both temporarily, pending the platform’s determination, and then permanently, if it is an instance of digital identity theft. Platforms must also make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft on their platforms.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/7/24)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Crime Victims Alliance
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Monterey County
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Novato Police Officers Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
Upland Police Officers Association
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/7/24)
Electronic Frontier Foundation
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues this bill is preempted by Section 230:
While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms, making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230’s immunity: “no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.” 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 (e)(3).
Prepared by: Christian Kurpiewski / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
5/8/24 14:04:32
**** END ****
Nicholas Schmidt, Privacy law and resolving 'deepfakes' online (Jan. 30, 2019) IAPP, https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-law-and-resolving-deepfakes-online/. All further internet citations are available as of Apr. 22, 2024. ↑
Jeff John Roberts, Fake Porn Videos Are Terrorizing Women. Do We Need a Law to Stop Them? (Jan. 15, 2019) Fortune, http://fortune.com/2019/01/15/deepfakes-law/. ↑
Brian Contreras, Tougher AI Policies Could Protect Taylor Swift—And Everyone Else—From Deepfakes (February 8, 2024) Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tougher-ai-policies-could-protect-taylor-swift-and-everyone-else-from-deepfakes/. ↑
Hannah Fry, Laguna Beach High School investigates ‘inappropriate’ AI-generated images of students (April 2, 2024) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-04-02/laguna-beach-high-school-investigating-creation-of-ai-generated-images-of-students. ↑
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 981 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 981
Author: Wahab (D)
Amended: 5/2/24
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-0, 4/30/24
AYES: Umberg, Wilk, Allen, Blakespear, Caballero, Dodd, Durazo, Laird, Min, Niello, Wiener
SUBJECT: Sexually explicit digital images
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes; and requires platforms to timely respond and investigate and to block instances of this material, as provided.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Provides that no provider or user of a website shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, and that no provider of a website shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict the availability of materials that the provider determines to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. (47 U.S.C. Section 230(c) (Section 230).)
- Provides that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. (47 U.S.C. Section 230(e).)
- Provides a right to free speech and expression. (U.S. Constitution, 1st amendment; California Constitution, Art. 1, Section 2.)
- Recognizes certain judicially created exceptions to the rights of freedom of speech and expression. (E.g., Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359.)
Existing law:
- Defines “social media platform” as a public or semipublic internet-based service or application that has users in California and that meets both of the following criteria:
- A substantial function of the service or application is to connect users in order to allow them to interact socially with each other within the service or application. (A service or application that provides email or direct messaging services does not meet this criterion based solely on that function.)
- The service or application allows users to do all of the following:
- Construct a public or semipublic profile for purposes of signing into and using the service or application.
- Populate a list of other users with whom an individual shares a social connection within the system.
- Create or post content viewable by other users, including on message boards, in chat rooms, or through a landing page or main feed that presents the user with content generated by other users. (Bus. & Prof. Code Section 22675(e).)
- Defines “deepfake” to mean audio or visual content that has been generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) which would falsely appear to be authentic or truthful and which features depictions of people appearing to say or do things they did not say or do without their consent. Requires the Secretary of Government Operations to evaluate the impact of the proliferation of deepfakes on the state. (Gov. Code Section 11547.5.)
- Authorizes a depicted individual to bring a cause of action against a person who does either of the following:
- Creates and intentionally discloses sexually explicit material and the person knows or reasonably should have known the depicted individual in that material did not consent to its creation or disclosure; or
- Intentionally discloses sexually explicit material that the person did not create and the person knows the depicted individual in that material did not consent to the creation of the sexually explicit material. (Civ. Code Section 1708.86.)
- Defines, for the preceding statute, “depicted individual” as an individual who appears, as a result of digitization, to be giving a performance they did not actually perform or to be performing in an altered depiction. (Civ. Code Section 1708.86.)
- Prohibits a person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress. (Pen. Code Section 647(j)(4)(A).)
This bill:
- Requires a social media platform to do all of the following:
- Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to reporting persons to report digital identity theft to the social media platform.
- Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting person with both of the following:
- Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting person’s report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
- Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation is issued, a written update to the reporting person as to the status of the platform’s handling of the reported digital identity theft.
- Determine within 14 days of the date on which the confirmation is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
- Temporarily block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the platform pending the above determination.
- Permanently block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
- Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported material meets the criteria for digital identity theft.
- Defines the relevant terms, including:
- “Covered material” means material that meets all of the following criteria:
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- An intimate body part of an identifiable person;
- An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration; or
- An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
- The reporting person is the person depicted in the material and the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting person’s likeness in the material.
- The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- “Digital identity theft” means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
- “Reporting person” means a natural person located within the geographic boundaries of the state who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform
- “Covered material” means material that meets all of the following criteria:
.
- “Social media platform” has the same meaning as defined in Section 22675 of the Business and Professions Code. However, it does not include specified messaging services or internet-based services or applications owned or operated by nonprofit organizations, as provided.
Background
With the technological advances in digital editing capabilities, the use of such tools to alter audiovisual work to portray individuals in various states of undress and/or engaging in sexually explicit conduct in which they are not actually performing has become an increasingly widespread issue. The growth of generative artificial intelligence capabilities has intensified the incidence and impact of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes.
This bill addresses the appearance of these deepfakes on social media platforms. The platforms are required to create a mechanism for persons depicted in this “covered material” to report it to the platform. The platform is required to communicate with the reporting person and make a determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported material amounts to “digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of these nonconsensual deepfakes on the platform. Social media platforms are required to temporarily block content as soon as it is reported through this mechanism. If the platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe it is, in fact, “digital identity theft, they must permanently block that instance of the material.
This bill is author-sponsored. No timely support was received by the Senate Judiciary Committee. This bill is opposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. For a more thorough assessment of this bill, including a discussion of relevant legal considerations involving the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 230, please see the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of this bill.
Comments
Author’s Statement. According to the author:
Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for users to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.
It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.
Currently, there is no 24-hour hotline or number to call nor other alternative means of seeking recourse. Delays between a user reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.
We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through collaboration between users, platforms, and lawmakers, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of non-consensual sexually explicit material.
Combating deepfakes. This bill aims to address the growing concerns associated with what are called “deepfakes,” a term drawn from “deep learning” plus “fake.” There are various manifestations, but essentially all involve the digital manipulation of audiovisual material to falsely depict an individual engaging in certain conduct. One privacy expert describes the problem relevant here: “Although political deepfakes are relatively new, pornographic deepfakes have been a problem for some time. These often purport to show a famous actress or model involved in a sex act but actually show the subject’s face superimposed onto another woman’s body.”[1]
With the rapid advancement in generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), deepfake images have become exponentially easier to produce, exacerbating the problem:
Recent improvements in artificial intelligence software have made it surprisingly easy to graft the heads of stars, and ordinary women, to the bodies of X-rated actresses to create realistic videos.
These explicit movies are just one strain of so-called “deepfakes,” which are clips that have been doctored so well they look real. Their arrival poses a threat to democracy; mischief makers can, and already have, used them to spread fake news. But another great danger of deepfakes is their use as a tool to harass and humiliate women.[2]
Infamously, in January of this year, Taylor Swift was the victim of sexually explicit, nonconsensual deepfake images using GenAI that were widely spread across social media platforms.[3] Perhaps more disturbingly, a trend has emerged in schools of students creating such images: “At schools across the country, people have used deepfake technology combined with real images of female students to create fraudulent images of nude bodies. The deepfake images can be produced using a cellphone.”[4]
Targeting deepfakes and “digital identity theft” on social media.This bill aims to address this problem by ensuring there are tools to combat the appearance of these nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes on social media platforms. It requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “digital identity theft” to them. “Digital identity theft” is defined as the posting of covered material on a social media platform. “Covered material” is defined as material that the reporting person reasonably believes meets several criteria. First, that the content is a digitized image or video that appears to be a person’s intimate body part or the person engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Second, the reporting person is the one depicted in the material without their consent. And finally, that the material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
Platforms are required to confirm they received a report through this mechanism within 48 hours and to collect sufficient information for them to find the reported instance of digital identity theft. Within a week, they are to provide the reporting person an update and then at two weeks must make a determination if the content is in fact digital identity theft.
This bill also requires social media platforms to block this content from being publicly viewable on their platform both temporarily, pending the platform’s determination, and then permanently, if it is an instance of digital identity theft. Platforms must also make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft on their platforms.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/2/24)
None received
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/2/24)
Electronic Frontier Foundation
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues this bill is preempted by Section 230:
While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms, making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230’s immunity: “no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.” 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 (e)(3).
Prepared by: Christian Kurpiewski / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
5/3/24 15:24:50
**** END ****
Nicholas Schmidt, Privacy law and resolving 'deepfakes' online (Jan. 30, 2019) IAPP, https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-law-and-resolving-deepfakes-online/. All further internet citations are available as of Apr. 22, 2024. ↑
Jeff John Roberts, Fake Porn Videos Are Terrorizing Women. Do We Need a Law to Stop Them? (Jan. 15, 2019) Fortune, http://fortune.com/2019/01/15/deepfakes-law/. ↑
Brian Contreras, Tougher AI Policies Could Protect Taylor Swift—And Everyone Else—From Deepfakes (February 8, 2024) Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tougher-ai-policies-could-protect-taylor-swift-and-everyone-else-from-deepfakes/. ↑
Hannah Fry, Laguna Beach High School investigates ‘inappropriate’ AI-generated images of students (April 2, 2024) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-04-02/laguna-beach-high-school-investigating-creation-of-ai-generated-images-of-students. ↑
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2023-2024 Regular Session
Bill No: SB 981 (Author:Wahab)
Version: April 22, 2024
Hearing Date: April 30, 2024
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Sexually explicit digital images
DIGEST
This bill requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes. The bill requires platforms to timely respond and investigate and to block instances of this material, as provided.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the technological advances in digital editing capabilities, the use of such tools to alter audiovisual work to portray individuals in various states of undress and/or engaging in sexually explicit conduct in which they are not actually performing has become an increasingly widespread issue. The growth of generative artificial intelligence capabilities has intensified the incidence and impact of nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes.
This bill addresses the appearance of these deepfakes on social media platforms. The platforms are required to create a mechanism for persons depicted in this “covered material” to report it to the platform. The platform is required to communicate with the reporting person and make a determination of whether the reported material amounts to “digital identity theft,” essentially the posting of these nonconsensual deepfakes on the platform. Social media platforms are required to temporarily block content as soon as it is reported through this mechanism. If the platform determines it is, in fact, “digital identity theft, they must permanently block that instance of the material.
This bill is author-sponsored. No timely support was received by the Committee. The bill is opposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Provides that no provider or user of a website shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, and that no provider of a website shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict the availability of materials that the provider determines to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. (47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Section 230).)
- Provides that no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with Section 230. (47 U.S.C. § 230(e).)
- Provides a right to free speech and expression. (U.S. Const., 1st amend; Cal. Const., art 1, § 2.)
- Recognizes certain judicially created exceptions to the rights of freedom of speech and expression. (E.g., Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359.)
Existing law:
- Defines “social media platform” as a public or semipublic internet-based service or application that has users in California and that meets both of the following criteria:
- A substantial function of the service or application is to connect users in order to allow them to interact socially with each other within the service or application. (A service or application that provides email or direct messaging services does not meet this criterion based solely on that function.)
- The service or application allows users to do all of the following:
- Construct a public or semipublic profile for purposes of signing into and using the service or application.
- Populate a list of other users with whom an individual shares a social connection within the system.
- Create or post content viewable by other users, including on message boards, in chat rooms, or through a landing page or main feed that presents the user with content generated by other users. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22675(e).)
- Defines “deepfake” to mean audio or visual content that has been generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI) which would falsely appear to be authentic or truthful and which features depictions of people appearing to say or do things they did not say or do without their consent. Requires the Secretary of Government Operations to evaluate the impact of the proliferation of deepfakes on the state. (Gov. Code § 11547.5.)
- Authorizes a depicted individual to bring a cause of action against a person who does either of the following:
- creates and intentionally discloses sexually explicit material and the person knows or reasonably should have known the depicted individual in that material did not consent to its creation or disclosure; or
- intentionally discloses sexually explicit material that the person did not create and the person knows the depicted individual in that material did not consent to the creation of the sexually explicit material. (Civ. Code § 1708.86.)
- Defines, for the preceding statute, “depicted individual” as an individual who appears, as a result of digitization, to be giving a performance they did not actually perform or to be performing in an altered depiction. (Civ. Code § 1708.86.)
- Prohibits a person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress. (Pen. Code § 647(j)(4)(A).)
This bill:
- Requires a social media platform to do all of the following:
- Provide a mechanism that is reasonably accessible to reporting persons to report digital identity theft to the social media platform.
- Collect information reasonably sufficient to enable the social media platform to locate the instance of digital identity theft and to contact a reporting person with both of the following:
- Confirmation that the social media platform received the reporting person’s report within 48 hours of receipt of the report.
- Within seven days of the date on which the confirmation is issued, a written update to the reporting person as to the status of the platform’s handling of the reported digital identity theft.
- Determine within 14 days of the date on which the confirmation is issued whether the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
- Temporarily block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the platform pending the above determination.
- Permanently block an instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform.
- Make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the platform.
- Defines the relevant terms, including:
- “Covered material” means material that a reporting person reasonably believes meets all of the following criteria:
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
- An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
- An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
- The reporting person identifies the reporting person as the person depicted in the material and confirms that the reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting person’s likeness in the material.
- The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
- The material is an image or video created or altered through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
- “Digital identity theft” means the posting of covered material on a social media platform.
- “Reporting person” means a natural person located within the geographic boundaries of the state who reports material to a social media platform using the mechanism provided by the social media platform.
- “Social media platform” has the same meaning as defined in Section 22675 of the Business and Professions Code. However, it does not include specified messaging services or internet-based services or applications owned or operated by nonprofit organizations, as provided.
- “Covered material” means material that a reporting person reasonably believes meets all of the following criteria:
COMMENTS
- Stated intent of the bill
According to the author:
Identity theft is a serious crime that continues to evolve. When an individual digitally alters images with the intent to distribute them on social media—and in order to create a false characterization of the featured individual—it is identity theft. This form of identity theft harms the victim in a variety of ways by creating a tarnished reputation, financial ruin, professional ruin, and more. This harm is especially significant when the digitally altered images are non-consensual sexually explicit material. Social Media platforms do not make it easy for users to request the removal of non-consensual sexually explicit images. The distribution of these non-consensual images can contribute to mental health issues, decreased socialization, and increased online harassment.
It is imperative organizations take action to protect individuals from these forms of 21st century identity theft, but also have basic mechanisms for the reporting and removal of these non-consensual images, pages, and/or accounts.
Currently, there is no 24-hour hotline or number to call nor other alternative means of seeking recourse. Delays between a user reporting an image, and the image being removed create harm and perpetuate toxic online environments.
We deserve better, and we should expect these social media platforms to do better. Through collaboration between users, platforms, and lawmakers, this bill seeks to create a safer online environment by ending the spread of non-consensual sexually explicit material.
- Combating deepfakes
This bill aims to address the growing concerns associated with what are called “deepfakes,” a term drawn from “deep learning” plus “fake.” There are various manifestations, but essentially all involve the digital manipulation of audiovisual material to falsely depict an individual engaging in certain conduct. One privacy expert describes the problem relevant here: “Although political deepfakes are relatively new, pornographic deepfakes have been a problem for some time. These often purport to show a famous actress or model involved in a sex act but actually show the subject’s face superimposed onto another woman’s body.”[1]
With the rapid advancement in generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), deepfake images have become exponentially easier to produce, exacerbating the problem:
Recent improvements in artificial intelligence software have made it surprisingly easy to graft the heads of stars, and ordinary women, to the bodies of X-rated actresses to create realistic videos.
These explicit movies are just one strain of so-called “deepfakes,” which are clips that have been doctored so well they look real. Their arrival poses a threat to democracy; mischief makers can, and already have, used them to spread fake news. But another great danger of deepfakes is their use as a tool to harass and humiliate women.[2]
Infamously, in January of this year, Taylor Swift was the victim of sexually explicit, nonconsensual deepfake images using GenAI that were widely spread across social media platforms.[3] Perhaps more disturbingly, a trend has emerged in schools of students creating such images: “At schools across the country, people have used deepfake technology combined with real images of female students to create fraudulent images of nude bodies. The deepfake images can be produced using a cellphone.”[4]
- Targeting deepfakes and “digital identity theft” on social media
This bill aims to address this problem by ensuring there are tools to combat the appearance of these nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes on social media platforms. It requires social media platforms to provide a mechanism for reporting “digital identity theft” to them. “Digital identity theft” is defined as the posting of covered material on a social media platform. “Covered material” is defined as material that the reporting person reasonably believes meets several criteria. First, that the content is a digitized image or video that appears to be a person’s intimate body part or the person engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Second, the reporting person is the one depicted in the material without their consent. And finally, that the material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
Platforms are required to confirm they received a report through this mechanism within 48 hours and to collect sufficient information for them to find the reported instance of digital identity theft. Within a week, they are to provide the reporting person an update and then at two weeks must make a determination if the content is in fact digital identity theft.
The bill also requires social media platforms to block this content from being publicly viewable on their platform both temporarily, pending the platform’s determination, and then permanently, if it is an instance of digital identity theft. Platforms must also make reasonable efforts to remove and block unreported instances of digital identity theft on their platforms.
One concern is that the definition of “covered material” includes what the reporting person “reasonably believes” is included in the material, not what the material actually is. To ensure the bill is getting at actual nonconsensual deepfakes, the author has agreed to the following amendments that take that phrase, and other subjective elements, out of the definition:
22670. (a) “Covered material” means material that a reporting person reasonably believes that meets all of the following criteria:
(1) The material is an image or video created, created or altered through, through digitization that would appear to a reasonable person to be an image or video of any of the following:
(A) An intimate body part of an identifiable person.
(B) An identifiable person engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration.
(C) An identifiable person engaged in masturbation.
(2) The reporting person is identifies the reporting person as the person depicted in the material and confirms that the
reporting person did not consent to the use of the reporting person’s likeness in the material.
(3) The material is displayed, stored, or hosted on the social media platform.
- Legal considerations
As with most of the legislation seeking to govern content on social media, legal questions arise around whether the specific approach of any proposed law runs afoul of the First Amendment or is preempted by Section 230.
- First Amendment
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits Congress or the states from passing any law “abridging the freedom of speech.”[5] “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”[6] However, while the amendment is written in absolute terms, the courts have created a handful of narrow exceptions to the First Amendment’s protections, including “true threats,”[7] “fighting words,”[8] incitement to imminent lawless action,[9] defamation,[10] and obscenity.[11]
Expression on the internet is given the same measure of protection granted to in-person speech or statements published in a physical medium.[12] Accordingly, a social media user may generally post content and comments free from government regulation, but may incur civil or criminal liability if their comment falls within one of the First Amendment exceptions. At the same time, social media platforms themselves—as private businesses—are not subject to the constraints of the First Amendment and may limit or prohibit users’ speech on their sites as they see fit.[13]
The United States Supreme Court has held that posting on social networks and/or social media sites constitutes communicative activity protected by the First Amendment.[14] As a general rule, the government “may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.”[15]
A constitutional challenge to a restriction on speech is generally analyzed under one of two frameworks, depending on whether the courts deem it to be “content neutral” or “content based,” i.e., targeting a particular type of speech. A law is content neutral when it “serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression.”[16] On the other hand, a law is content based when the proscribed speech is “defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech.”[17]
If a law is determined to be content neutral it will be subject to intermediate scrutiny, which requires that the law “be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.’ ”[18] In other words, the law “‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the government’s interests,” but “’may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.’”[19]
If a restriction on speech is determined to be content based, it will be subject to strict scrutiny.[20] A restriction is content based “if it require[s] ‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether’ a violation has occurred.”[21] Content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny are “presumptively unconstitutional.”[22] A restriction can survive strict scrutiny only if it uses the least-restrictive means available to achieve a compelling government purpose.[23]
Writing in support of past legislation seeking to outlaw nonconsensual sexually explicit deepfakes, SB 564 (Leyva, 2019), noted First Amendment scholar Erwin Chemerinsky argues that this type of “speech” is not expression that has historically received First Amendment protection:
While the content regulated by this statute may be “speech” insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, it is a longstanding precept of First Amendment doctrine that “not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.” See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-759 (1985). And it is likewise true that “speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.” Id. at 759. The U.S. Supreme Court has correctly recognized that “sexual behavior” is “the most private human conduct.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). By regulating the nonconsensual use of an individual’s persona in sexually explicit audiovisual works, Senate Bill 564 does not target any forms of expression that have historically received First Amendment protection.
He goes on to assert that protecting victims from the “serious reputational and economic harms” that can result from this conduct more than justifies regulating this false and misleading material that arguably lacks social value.
It should be noted that the bill requires material to be “temporarily blocked” pending a determination by the social media platform of whether the content amounts to “digital identity theft.” Therefore, the bill requires content to be taken down immediately based solely on a report; this will likely result in protected speech on social media being blocked by this statute, at least temporarily. The bill also requires examination of whether or not the underlying material is digital identity theft, therefore it is likely to be considered content-based, notwithstanding that nonconsensual, sexual deepfakes are entitled to very little First Amendment protection, if any.
Writing in an oppose unless amended position, Oakland Privacy raises concerns with the “permanently block language”:
A change that needs to be made to Senate Bill [981] is to remove the term “permanently block” from the bill language. We completely understand the intent of the author to avoid content popping up in other places after being removed. In fact, this exact same conversation ensued in 2023 with a bill from Assemblymember Wicks which focused on child sexual abuse material (AB 1394).
That bill’s “permanently block” language was amended to specify that the language refers only to the reported instance of the content and only that reasonable efforts be made to remove other instances of the content. This clarification is necessary because it is not necessarily possible to “permanently block” content that can be reposted and attempts to try to do so can be problematic.
To ensure that the requirement for permanently blocking content is more narrowly tailored to its goal, the author has agreed to amend the bill to require the platform to permanently block only when it determines there is a reasonable basis to believe reported content is digital identity theft.
Amendment
Amend Section 22671(c) and (d) as follows:
(c) Determine within 14 days of the date on which the confirmation required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) is issued whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
(d) (1) Temporarily block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform pending a determination pursuant to subdivision (c).
(2) Permanently block a reported instance of digital identity theft from being publicly viewable on the social media platform if the social media platform determines there is a reasonable basis to believe the reported digital identity theft is digital identity theft.
With the amendments discussed here and below that the author has agreed to accept, Oakland Privacy has agreed to go neutral.
- Conflict with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230
In addition to the First Amendment, the other primary source governing content on social media is Section 230. Section 230 does not apply to the users of social media (or the internet generally), but rather applies to the platforms themselves. In the early 1990s, prior to the enactment of Section 230, two trial court orders—one in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and New York state court—suggested that internet platforms could be held liable for allegedly defamatory statements made by the platforms’ users if the platforms engaged in any sort of content moderation (e.g., filtering out offensive material).[24] In response, two federal legislators and members of the burgeoning internet industry crafted a law that would give internet platforms immunity from liability for users’ statements, even if they might have reason to know that the statements might be false, defamatory, or otherwise actionable.[25] The result—Section 230—was relatively uncontroversial at the time, in part because of the relative novelty of the internet and in part because Section 230 was incorporated into a much more controversial internet regulation scheme that was the subject of greater debate.[26]
Section 230 begins with findings and a statement of policy that extol the value of the internet and the intention to let the internet develop without significant government regulation.[27] The crux of Section 230 is then laid out in two parts. The first provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”[28] The second provides a safe harbor for content moderation, by stating that no provider or user shall be held liable because of good-faith efforts to restrict access to material that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”[29]
Together, these two provisions give platforms immunity from any civil or criminal liability that could be incurred by user statements, while explicitly authorizing platforms to engage in their own content moderation without risking that immunity.
Section 230 specifies that it does not preempt federal criminal laws, but that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State law that is inconsistent with this section.”[30]
Section 230 uses terminology generally applicable in defamation cases (e.g., “publisher,” “speaker”), but courts interpreting Section 230 did not limit its application to the defamation context. Instead, courts have applied Section 230 in a vast range of cases to immunize internet platforms from “virtually all suits arising from third-party content.”[31] Courts have even extended Section 230 immunity to situations where the platform’s moderator affirmatively solicited the information, selected the user’s statement for publication, and/or edited the content.[32]
A brief look at recent, relevant case law is necessary to assess these Section 230 concerns.
First, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 established the prevailing three-part test for certain claims pursuant to Section 230: “[I]t appears that subsection (c)(1) only protects from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider.”
The United States Supreme Court in May 2023 issued opinions in Gonzalez v. Google LLC (2023) 143 S. Ct. 1191, and Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh (2023) 143 S. Ct. 1206, a pair of highly anticipated decisions, which presented the highest court with the task of determining the scope of Section 230’s protective shield and the valid bases for holding platforms liable for content and conduct carried out on their platforms. The cases below were brought by the families of several victims of ISIS attacks in various parts of the world. The defendants were several social media platforms. Relevant here, the Court in Taamneh found:
In this case, the failure to allege that the platforms here do more than transmit information by billions of people—most of whom use the platforms for interactions that once took place via mail, on the phone, or in public areas—is insufficient to state a claim that defendants knowingly gave substantial assistance and thereby aided and abetted ISIS’ acts. A contrary conclusion would effectively hold any sort of communications provider liable for any sort of wrongdoing merely for knowing that the wrongdoers were using its services and failing to stop them. That would run roughshod over the typical limits on tort liability and unmoor aiding and abetting from culpability.[33]
Although the case law in this area is ever-changing, the bill will likely face challenge as it exposes social media platforms to liability for failing to take down certain content posted by users. It also potentially exposes them to liability for failing to take reasonable steps to remove and block unreported instances posted by users. Writing in opposition, the Electronic Frontier Foundation argues the bill is preempted by Section 230:
While S.B. 981 does not itself impose civil liability, any platform perceived to have failed to comply will find themselves subject to a suit. This imposes a cost on platforms, making S.B. 981 directly in conflict with Section 230’s immunity: “no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.” 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 (e)(3).
SUPPORT
None received
OPPOSITION
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Oakland Privacy
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation:
AB 3172 (Lowenthal, 2024) makes social media platforms liable for specified damages in addition to any other remedy provided by law, if the platform fails to exercise ordinary care or skill toward a child. AB 3172 is currently in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
SB 646 (Cortese, 2023) creates liability for the distribution of certain “actionable material,” which includes illicit pictures of minors and images or depictions of minors that serve as the basis for criminal and civil liability at the federal level. SB 646 is currently in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
Prior Legislation:
AB 1394 (Wick, Ch. 579, Stats. 2023) required social media platforms to provide a reporting mechanism for suspected child sexual abuse material and requires them to permanently block the material, as provided. It also prohibited platforms from knowingly facilitating, aiding, or abetting minor’s commercial sexual exploitation.
SB 1056 (Umberg, Ch. 881, Stats. 2022) required a social media platform, as defined, to clearly and conspicuously state whether it has a mechanism for reporting violent posts, as defined; and allowed a person who is the target, or who believes they are the target, of a violent post to seek an injunction to have the violent post removed.
AB 587 (Gabriel, Ch. 269, Stats. 2022) required social media companies, as defined, to post their terms of service and report certain information to the Attorney General on a quarterly basis.
AB 1628 (Ramos, Ch. 432, Stats. 2022) required a social media platform, as defined, that operates in this state to create and publicly post a policy statement including specified information pertaining to the use of the platform to illegally distribute controlled substances, until January 1, 2028.
AB 2273 (Wicks, Ch. 320, Stats. 2022) established the California Age-Appropriate Design Code Act, placing a series of obligations and restriction on businesses that provide online services, products, or features likely to be accessed by a child.
AB 1114 (Gallagher, 2021) would have required a social media company located in California to develop a policy or mechanism to address content or communications that constitute unprotected speech, including obscenity, incitement of imminent lawless action, and true threats, or that purport to state factual information that is demonstrably false. AB 1114 died in the Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media Committee.
SB 388 (Stern, 2021) would have required a social media platform company, as defined, that, in combination with each subsidiary and affiliate of the service, has 25,000,000 or more unique monthly visitors or users for a majority of the preceding 12 months, to report to the Department of Justice by April 1, 2022, and annually thereafter, certain information relating to its efforts to prevent, mitigate the effects of, and remove potentially harmful content. SB 388 died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
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Nicholas Schmidt, Privacy law and resolving 'deepfakes' online (Jan. 30, 2019) IAPP, https://iapp.org/news/a/privacy-law-and-resolving-deepfakes-online/. All further internet citations are available as of Apr. 22, 2024. ↑
Jeff John Roberts, Fake Porn Videos Are Terrorizing Women. Do We Need a Law to Stop Them? (Jan. 15, 2019) Fortune, http://fortune.com/2019/01/15/deepfakes-law/. ↑
Brian Contreras, Tougher AI Policies Could Protect Taylor Swift—And Everyone Else—From Deepfakes (February 8, 2024) Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tougher-ai-policies-could-protect-taylor-swift-and-everyone-else-from-deepfakes/. ↑
Hannah Fry, Laguna Beach High School investigates ‘inappropriate’ AI-generated images of students (April 2, 2024) Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-04-02/laguna-beach-high-school-investigating-creation-of-ai-generated-images-of-students. ↑
U.S. Const., 1st & 14th amends. ↑
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2002) 535 U.S. 564, 573. ↑
Snyder v. Phelps (2011) 562 U.S. 443, 452. ↑
Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 20. ↑
Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359. ↑
R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 383. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Reno v. ACLU (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 870. ↑
E.g., Hudgens v. NLRB (1976) 424 U.S. 507, 513. Some have argued that certain social media platforms are so essential to the freedom of expression that they should be treated as common carriers subject to the First Amendment. ↑
E.g., Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1735-1736. ↑
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 255; see also United States v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U.S. 709, 717 (Supreme Court “has rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage…[based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits’ ” [alterations in original]). ↑
Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791. ↑
FCC v. League of Women Voters (1984) 468 U.S. 364, 383. ↑
Packingham, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 1736. ↑
McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464, 486 (McCullen). ↑
Id. at p. 478. ↑
Id. at p. 479. ↑
Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (Reed). ↑
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 813. ↑
See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 776 F.Supp. 135, 141; Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 26, 1995) 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, *10-14. These opinions relied on case law developed in the context of other media, such as whether book stores and libraries could be held liable for distributing defamatory material when they had no reason to know the material was defamatory. (See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at p. 139; Smith v. California (1959) 361 U.S. 147, 152-153.) ↑
Kosseff, The Twenty-Six Words That Created The Internet (2019) pp. 57-65. ↑
Id. at pp. 68-73. Section 230 was added to the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (title 5 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56), which would have imposed criminal liability on internet platforms if they did not take steps to prevent minors from obtaining “obscene or indecent” material online. The Supreme Court invalidated the CDA, except for Section 230, on the basis that it violated the First Amendment. (See Reno, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 874.) ↑
47 U.S.C. § 230(a) & (b). ↑
Id., § 230(c)(1). ↑
Id., § 230(c)(1) & (2). ↑
Id., § 230(e)(1) & (3). ↑
Kosseff, supra, fn. 13, at pp. 94-95; see, e.g., Doe v. MySpace Inc. (5th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 413, 421-422; Carfano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1125; Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 333-334. ↑
See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC (6th Cir. 2014) 755 F.3d 398, 415; Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1030-1031; cf. Blumenthal v. Drudge (D.D.C. 1998) 992 F.Supp. 44, 51-52. ↑
Taamneh, 143 S. Ct. at 1213. ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):