AB 1160: Military equipment.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2025-05-05
Current Status:
Failed
(2026-02-02: From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law requires a law enforcement agency, as defined, to obtain specific approval of a governing body prior to acquiring military equipment, as specified. Existing law defines military equipment to include an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle.
This bill would prohibit a law enforcement agency from purchasing, on or after January 1, 2027, an unmanned, uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless the vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function or and the law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company, as defined, to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images, as specified, or both. For uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles purchased on or after January 1, 2026, and before January 1, 2027, the bill would require a law enforcement agency to use an American data storage company. For uncrewed aerial or ground vehicles owned or possessed by a law enforcement agency prior to January 1, 2026, the bill would require the law enforcement agency to use an American data storage company after the current contract to house the data expires. The bill would require contracts entered into pursuant to these provisions with an American data storage company to prohibit the American data storage company from using, selling, renting, trading, or otherwise sharing this data with any other entity.
Existing law requires a law enforcement agency, as defined, to obtain specific approval of a governing body prior to acquiring military equipment, as specified. Existing law defines military equipment to include an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle.
This bill would prohibit a law enforcement agency from purchasing, on or after January 1, 2027, an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless the vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function or the law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company, as defined, to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images, as specified, or both.
Existing law generally authorizes a local agency to enact an ordinance that adopts a code by reference if specified form and procedural requirements are met. Existing law prohibits, however, the adoption by reference of a penalty clause in a code that is not of existing ordinances of the adopting agency. Existing law instead requires those penalty clauses to be set forth in full, and published, in the adopting ordinance to be enacted.This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to the provision prohibiting adoption by reference of any penalty clause.Existing law generally authorizes a local agency to enact an ordinance that adopts a code by reference if specified form and procedural requirements are met. Existing law prohibits, however, the adoption by reference of a penalty clause in a code that is not of existing ordinances of the adopting agency. Existing law instead requires those penalty clauses to be set forth in full, and published, in the adopting ordinance to be enacted.
This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to the provision prohibiting adoption by reference of any penalty clause.
(a)(1)A law enforcement agency shall not purchase an unmanned, uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless one or both of the following conditions are met:
(1)(A)The vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function.
(2)(B)The law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
(b)(2)The restriction and conditions pursuant to subdivision (a) paragraph (1) shall only apply to an unmanned, uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle purchased on or after January 1, 2027, and shall not restrict a law enforcement agencys ability to maintain ownership or possession of an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle purchased prior to January 1, 2027. 2027.
(b)For uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles purchased by a law enforcement agency on or after January 1, 2026, and before January 1, 2027, the law enforcement agency shall use an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
(c)A law enforcement agency that maintains ownership or possession of an uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle prior to January 1, 2026, shall exclusively use an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images, after any existing contract to house the data expires.
(d)A contract entered into pursuant to this section shall prohibit the American data storage company that is under contract to house the data collected by the uncrewed vehicles from using, selling, renting, trading, or otherwise sharing the data with any other entity. The data remains under the sole ownership and control of the law enforcement agency that collected the data.
(c)(e)For purposes of this section, an American data storage company means a partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other business entity formed under the laws of, and headquartered in, this state or the laws of any other state of the United States or the District of Columbia, that provides services related to storing digital data, including, but not limited to, through cloud storage, and has adopted security measures to protect stored data from unauthorized access, modification, or destruction, and that has dedicated servers or hard drives located in the United States.
(a)A law enforcement agency shall not purchase an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless one or both of the following conditions are met:
(1)The vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function.
(2)The law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
(b)The restriction and conditions pursuant to subdivision (a) shall only apply to an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle purchased on or after January 1, 2027, and shall not restrict a law enforcement agencys ability to maintain ownership or possession of an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle purchased prior to January 1, 2027.
(c)For purposes of this section, an American data storage company means a partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other business entity formed under the laws of, and headquartered in, this state or the laws of any other state of the United States or the District of Columbia, that provides services related to storing digital data, including, but not limited to, through cloud storage, and has adopted security measures to protect stored data from unauthorized access, modification, or destruction, and that has dedicated servers or hard drives located in the United States.
SECTION 1.Section 50022.4 of the Government Code is amended to read:50022.4.After the hearing, the legislative body may amend, adopt or reject the adopting ordinance in the same manner in which it is empowered to act in the case of other ordinances; and, except as to the adoption of a code of existing ordinances of the adopting agency, nothing in this article shall be deemed to permit the adoption by reference of any penalty clauses that may appear in any code that is adopted by reference. A penalty clause may be enacted only if set forth in full, and published, in the adopting ordinance. It is further provided that all changes or additions to any code made by the legislative body shall be published in the manner which is required for ordinances.After the hearing, the legislative body may amend, adopt or reject the adopting ordinance in the same manner in which it is empowered to act in the case of other ordinances; and, except as to the adoption of a code of existing ordinances of the adopting agency, nothing in this article shall be deemed to permit the adoption by reference of any penalty clauses which that may appear in any code which that is adopted by reference. Any such penalty clauses A penalty clause may be enacted only if set forth in full, and published, in the adopting ordinance. It is further provided that all changes or additions to any code made by the legislative body shall be published in the manner which is required for ordinances.
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Date
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Status
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| Feb 2, 2026 | From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56. |
| Jan 31, 2026 | Died pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 10(c) of the Constitution. |
| May 23, 2025 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| May 14, 2025 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| May 6, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| May 5, 2025 | Read second time and amended. |
| May 1, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 13. Noes 0.) (May 1). |
| Apr 9, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 8. Noes 0.) (April 8). Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Mar 25, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 24, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 24, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on PUB. S. and P. & C.P. |
| Feb 21, 2025 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 23. |
| Feb 20, 2025 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| May 1, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
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| Apr 8, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
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Organization
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Position
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Date
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| Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International | ** Against | |
| California Chapter of Association of Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International | ** Against | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Support | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support |
Date of Hearing: May 14, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1160
Author:(Wilson) – As Amended Ver:May 5, 2025
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 8 - 0 |
Privacy and Consumer Protection | 13 - 0 | ||
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill prohibits, beginning January 1, 2027, a law enforcement agency (LEA) from purchasing an uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle (“covered vehicle”) unless the vehicle includes an option to turn off any unnecessary data collection programs or the LEA uses an American data storage company to house all data collected by the vehicle.
The bill additionally requires an LEA to use an American data storage company to house data collected by other covered vehicles as follows:
- For any covered vehicle purchased in 2026.
- For any covered vehicle purchased before 2026, after any existing contract to house the data expires.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Possible increased contracting costs (General Fund, special funds) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to state LEAs for data storage contracts with American companies. In the aggregate statewide, these costs may exceed this committee’s suspense threshold.
- Possible, non-reimbursable increased contracting costs to local LEAs for data storage contracts with American companies.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill is sponsored by the California Police Chiefs Association. According to the author, this bill seeks to protect the data collected by drones and other uncrewed vehicles used by LEAs during search and rescue operations or for other reconnaissance purposes. The author states this measure “establishes minimum security requirements for law enforcement agencies to adhere to prior to any future purchase of drone technology,” limiting both unnecessary data collection by LEAs and access to LEA data by foreign entities.
- Background. As summarized by the Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection:
This bill seeks to address the privacy and security concerns associated with certain non-U.S. drone manufacturing companies, primarily Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), a private company located in Shenzhen, China. DJI is the world’s largest-selling manufacturer of consumer and commercial drones. The company’s drones are the tools of choice used by first responders throughout the United State[s], including those used by many California law enforcement agencies.
State and federal lawmakers have raised concerns about the cybersecurity risks posed by foreign-manufactured drones, and particularly those made by DJI. Researchers have identified serious security risks associated with the drones, and there have been unsubstantiated but concerning reports that DJI drones have been used to provide information collected by the drones to the Chinese government.
- Prior Legislation. SB 99 (Umberg), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would have prohibited a local governing body from approving a military equipment use policy if it contains military equipment that federal law or regulation prohibits the United States Armed Forces from purchasing. SB 99 was held on this committee’s suspense file.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: May 1, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1160 (
Author:Wilson) – As Amended Ver:March 24, 2025
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
SUBJECT: Military equipment
SYNOPSIS
This bill, sponsored by the California Police Chiefs’ Association, would establish baseline restrictions for law enforcement agencies in California that are using drones that are manufactured in other countries. The bill is primarily in response to recent concerns raised by both the federal government and several members of the Legislature that the continued use of drones made in China by Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), the dominant drone manufacturer, represents an unacceptable national security risk.
Last session, two bills (SB 99 (Umberg, 2024) and AB 740 (Gabriel, 2023)) sought to prohibit law enforcement agencies (LEAs) from purchasing and using military-style drones that were primarily manufactured in a country that the federal government considers a country of concern. This bill takes a different approach, however. Rather than prohibit the use of drones made by a company that dominates the U.S. drone market, this bill seeks to protect the data that the devices collect by requiring that LEAs contract with U.S-based companies to store the data.
The proposed Committee amendments, detailed in Comment #6, strengthen the provisions in the bill by requiring that LEAs shift existing data storage contracts to a U.S.-based company and that all future data collected by drones be stored with a U.S. company. In addition, the amendments require that the contract between the LEA and the storage company prohibit the use, sharing, or sale of the data by that company.
Oakland Privacy has a “support if amended” position. The bill is opposed by the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International(.
This bill was previously heard by the Public Safety Committee, where it passed on an 8-0-1 vote.
THIS BILL:
- Prohibits a law enforcement agency (LEA) from purchasing an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless:
- The vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function; or
- The LEA uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
- Makes this bill effective on January 1, 2027, and specifies that this bill does not restrict a LEA’s ability to maintain ownership or possession of a remotely powered vehicle purchased before January 1, 2027.
- Defines an “American data storage company” to mean a partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other business entity formed under the laws of, and headquartered in, this state or the laws of any other state of the United States or the District of Columbia, that provides services related to storing digital data, including, but not limited to, through cloud storage, and has adopted security measures to protect stored data from unauthorized access, modification, or destruction, and that has dedicated servers or hard drives located in the U.S.
EXISTING LAW:
- Defines the following terms:
- “Unmanned aircraft” means an aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft. (Gov. Code § 853.5(a).)
- “Unmanned aircraft system” means an unmanned aircraft and associated elements, including but not limited to, communication links and the components that control the uncrewed aircraft, which are required for the pilot in command to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system. (Gov. Code § 853.5(b).)
- “Military equipment” means, among other things, unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles, or weaponized aircraft, vessels, or vehicles of any kind. (Gov. Code § 7070 (c)(1) & (6).)
- “Law enforcement agency (LEA)” means a police department, sheriff’s department, district attorney’s office, or county probation department. (Gov. Code § 7070 (b)(1)-(4).)
- “Governing body” means the elected body that oversees a LEA or, if there is no elected body that directly oversees the law enforcement agency, the appointed body that oversees a LEA. (Gov. Code § 7070 (a).)
- Requires an LEA to obtain approval of the governing body, by an ordinance adopting a military equipment use policy at a regular meeting of the governing body before, among other things, requesting, acquiring, or seeking funds for military equipment. (Gov. Code § 7071 (a).)
- Requires an LEA to submit a proposed military equipment use policy to the governing body and make those documents available on the LEA’s internet website at least 30 days prior to any public hearing concerning the military equipment at issue. (Gov. Code § 7070 (b).)
- Provides that the governing body shall only approve a military equipment use policy if it determines all of the following:
- The military equipment is necessary because there is no reasonable alternative that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety.
- The proposed military equipment use policy will safeguard the public’s welfare, safety, civil rights, and civil liberties.
- If purchasing the equipment, the equipment is reasonably cost effective compared to available alternatives that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety.
- Prior military equipment use complied with the military equipment use policy that was in effect at the time or, if prior uses did not comply with the accompanying military equipment use policy, corrective action has been taken to remedy nonconforming uses and ensure future compliance. (Gov. Code § 7071 (d)(1).)
- The military equipment is necessary because there is no reasonable alternative that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety.
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
Law enforcement agencies large and small have progressed in the last decade to implement varying types of drone programs due to the operational and safety advantages provided by these technologies, which cannot be understated. Law enforcement agencies also already take precautions to ensure that the data they collect remains secure. While the specific protocols vary by agency, they include mitigations such as using drones without internet, downloading third-party software to avoid interacting with the manufacturer’s software, and adhering to municipal and state data retention and storage policies as appropriate. Whether used in search and rescue operations, for reconnaissance purposes, or to improve real-time awareness, law enforcement use of drone technology has become ubiquitous throughout California and credited with saving lives.
However, as is the case with all emerging technology, the use of these devices has not come without unique challenges and debates. AB 1160 establishes minimum security requirements for law enforcement agencies to adhere to prior to any future purchase of drone technology. These protections include 1) a requirement that each vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function, and 2) that the law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images. By establishing these requirements, California can limit unnecessary data collection, and ensure the data collected by local and state law enforcement is housed domestically, limiting access to all information by foreign entities.
2) Foreign-made drones. This bill seeks to address the privacy and security concerns associated with certain non-U.S. drone manufacturing companies, primarily Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), a private company located in Shenzhen, China. DJI is the world’s largest-selling manufacturer of consumer and commercial drones. The company’s drones are the tools of choice used by first responders throughout the United State, including those used by many California law enforcement agencies.[1] Along with their headquarters in China, DJI has offices in the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.[2]
3) Federal government concerns. In June 2024, the Chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, John Moolenaar (R-MI), and Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-NY) released a statement of support following the announcement that the Department of Commerce had placed Chinese drone maker, Autel, on its blacklist that prohibits U.S. companies from doing business with them. In the press release, the two Congressmembers urged the passage of a bill that would add DJI to the Federal Communication Commission’s list of foreign companies that pose an unacceptable risk to national security.[3]
In addition, in 2023, a bipartisan group of sixteen U.S. Senators sent a letter to The United States Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) Director regarding DJI drones, which provided:
We write today regarding the cybersecurity risks posed by the widespread use of drones manufactured by Shenzhen DJI Innovation Technology Co., Ltd. (“DJI”) to operators of critical infrastructure and state and local law enforcement in the United States. In short, we believe that given the company’s identified connections to the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”), the use of its drones in such sensitive contexts may present an unacceptable security vulnerability. We ask that the [CISA] evaluate this concern and make the results of its evaluation available to the public through the National Cyber Awareness System.[4]
German researchers in 2022 found 16 security vulnerabilities in four DJI drone models; these included “bugs allow[ing] an attacker to gain extended access rights” and a finding that “transmitted data is not encrypted, and that practically anyone can read the location of the pilot and the drone with relatively simple methods.”[5]
There are also conflicting reports on whether DJI drones have been used to turn information over to the Chinese government. According to one 2023 article, “[C]laims [are] thus far unsubstantiated…that the firm’s [unmanned aerial vehicle] operating systems allow private, potentially sensitive user data to be transmitted to authorities in China’s government for exploitation.”[6] That said, the Senate letter quoted above cites a 2017 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) report which claims:
[T]he Chinese government is likely using information acquired from DJI systems as a way to target assets they are planning to purchase. For instance, a large family-owned wine producer in California purchased DJI UAS to survey its vineyards and monitor grape production. Soon afterwards, Chinese companies began purchasing vineyards in the same area. According to the [source of information], it appeared the companies were able to use DJI data to their own benefit and profit.[7]
The basic problem lies with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) National Intelligence Law of 2017. As summarized by the United States Department of Homeland Security:
This law forms the baseline of the modern data collection regime, and compels all PRC firms and entities to support, assist, and cooperate with the PRC intelligence services, creating a legal obligation for those entities to turn over data collected abroad and domestically to the PRC. Article 7 of this law states “any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the [National Intelligence] Law, and keep the secrets of the national intelligence work from becoming known to the public.” A PRC intelligence agency may request that any PRC firm or entity secretly share access to a U.S. business or individual’s data, or otherwise face penalties. In addition, the National Intelligence Law may compel PRC firms to create backdoors and other security vulnerabilities in equipment and software sold abroad so that the PRC government can easily access data not controlled by PRC firms. The law further establishes a system of incentives for compliance and penalties for non-compliance, stating that the PRC “commends and rewards individuals and organizations that have made significant contributions to national intelligence work” and that, “whoever… obstructs the state intelligence work organization and its staff from carrying out intelligence work according to law” shall be dismissed, investigated, and/or detained.[8]
In other words, the Chinese government has the legal ability to demand data from Chinese companies without any of the due process protections required under American law, and to require these companies to build in security vulnerabilities to facilitate data extraction.
CISA has published a series of reports on Chinese cyber-attacks against the United States. Its findings are summarized as follows:
Malicious cyber activities attributed to the Chinese government targeted, and continue to target, a variety of industries and organizations in the United States, including healthcare, financial services, defense industrial base, energy, government facilities, chemical, critical manufacturing (including automotive and aerospace), communications, IT (including managed service providers), international trade, education, video gaming, faith-based organizations, and law firms.[9]
The sources quoted above were published by federal agencies during both the Biden and first Trump Administrations.
In their “support if amended” position letter, Oakland Privacy provides the following list of federal agencies that have found DJI to be a national security risk and have prohibited their use:
- The U.S. Commerce Department blacklisted DJI in 2017.
- The U.S. Department of the Interior grounded its DJI drone fleet in 2019.
- The Department of Defense issued a list of approved U.S. and European drone makers, known as the Blue drone list where DJI is notably absent.
- The U.S. General Services Administration announced it would only buy drones from the Blue UAS list for government purposes in 2021.
- The Pentagon stated that DJI drones still constitute a threat to national security and blacklisted the company in 2022.
Despite federal government concerns and attempts at limiting the use of DJI drones over the last seven years, they remain the dominant drone manufacturer, holding 80% of the U.S. market share and 54% of the global market share in 2024.[10]
4) Related legislation. Last session, two bills sought to prohibit law enforcement agencies from purchasing and using military-style drones that were primarily manufactured in a country that the federal government considers a country of concern. SB 99 (Umberg, 2024) would have prohibited a local governing body from approving a military equipment use policy if it contained military equipment that federal law or regulation prohibits the United States Armed Forces from purchasing. Similarly, AB 740 (Gabriel, 2023) would have required the Department of Technology to issue regulations meant to ensure the security of data collected, transmitted, and stored by government drones. The regulations, at a minimum, would have banned the use of drones made by certain entities identified by the federal government. These regulations would have applied to both state and local governmental entities. Both bills stalled, however.
5) What this bill would do. As an alternative to an outright ban on DJI and other Chinese manufactured drones, this bill takes a more nuanced approach. The bill, with the amendments included in the following section, would work as follows:
- Require that all uncrewed vehicles purchased by LEAs after January 1, 2027 comply with two requirements:
- Include an options to turn off any data collection capabilities.
- Use a U.S.-based company to house all of the data collected by the vehicle.
- Require that as of January 1, 2026 that all vehicles either purchased in 2026 or already acquired by the LEA either have all of their surveillance data stored in a U.S.-based company, or that the next time the LEA enters into a contract for data storage, it be with a U.S.-based data storage company.
- Requires that LEA contracts with data storage companies include a clause prohibiting the data storage company from using, selling, renting, trading, or otherwise sharing the data with any other entity. In addition, it must explicitly state that the data remains under the sole ownership and control of the law enforcement agency that collected the data.
- Require that all uncrewed vehicles purchased by LEAs after January 1, 2027 comply with two requirements:
6) Amendments. In order to strengthen the protections in the bill, the author has agreed to the following amendments:
7073.5. (a) (1) A law enforcement agency shall not purchase anunmanned, uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless one or both of the following conditions are met:
(1)
(A) The vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function.
(2)
(B) The law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
(b)
(2) The restriction and conditions pursuant to subdivision (a) paragraph (1)shall only apply to an unmanned, uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle purchased on or after January 1, 2027, and shall not restrict a law enforcement agency’s ability to maintain ownership or possession of an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle purchased prior to January 1, 2027. 2027.
(b) For uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles purchased by a law enforcement agency on or after January 1, 2026, and before January 1, 2027, the law enforcement agency shall use an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
(c) Law enforcement agencies that maintain ownership or possession of an uncrewed, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle prior to January 1, 2026, shall exclusively use an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images after the current contract to house this data expires.
(d) For contracts entered into pursuant to this section, the contract shall prohibit the American data storage company that is under contract to house the data collected by the unmanned vehicles from using, selling, renting, trading, or otherwise sharing the data with any other entity. The data remains under the sole ownership and control of the law enforcement agency that collected the data.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The California Police Chiefs’ Association, sponsors of the bill, write in support:
AB 1160 addresses security concerns by ensuring the data collected is only what is necessary for the operation of the equipment, and that the limited data collected is housed by an American based data storage company.
Law enforcement agencies large and small have progressed in the last decade to implement varying types of drone programs due to the operational and safety advantages provided by these technologies, which cannot be overstated. Law enforcement agencies also already take precautions to ensure that the data we collect remains secure. While the specific protocols vary by agency, they include mitigations such as using drones without internet, downloading third-party software to avoid interacting with the manufacturer’s software, and adhering to municipal and state data retention and storage policies as appropriate. Law enforcement would not operate drones if they believed there was any risk to our communities.
Oakland Privacy, with a “support if amended” position, requests the following three amendments to the bill:
We are very pleased that California law enforcement has recognized that national security is part of public safety and that PORAC is putting forth this bill to address the security threat CCP UAS/drones pose to Americans. Furthermore, California law enforcement will be following the lead of other states and agencies across the country to have already discontinued or prohibited the use of CCP drones.
To further strengthen protections we ask the bill be amended in the following fashion:
- Require that all CCP drones currently in possession by law enforcement agencies be modified within 6-12 months of the enactment of this bill.
- State that modifications can only be made to CCP drones currently in possession by law enforcement
- When CCP drones currently in possession by law enforcement must be replaced or become obsolete, limit replacements to Blue list approved drones, and prohibit the further purchase of CCP drones.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: In opposition to the bill, Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), “association represents corporations and leaders from more than 60 countries across industry, government, and academia in the defense, civil and commercial sectors,” argues:
AUVSI’s Partnership for Drone Competitiveness is a coalition of U.S. and Allied drone and drone component manufacturers and enterprise users who are committed to strengthening the U.S. drone industry. The Partnership is built on a simple premise: that stronger U.S. leadership in the drone industry is better for everyone. You can read more about the Partnership in AUVSI’s Whitepaper published on our website.
We write to express our strong opposition to AB 1160 (Wilson), as amended. We have strong concerns over allowing the use of adversary drones with software mitigations. Specifically, AB 1160 would create new and ongoing loopholes by enabling drones manufactured by Chinese military companies, as designated by the U.S. Department of Defense, to be purchased by California state and local entities. Sending Californian tax dollars to the Chinese military is a position we cannot and will not support. To put it simply, the bill is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. By pretending to safeguard, the bill would provide a backdoor for our adversaries. California’s law should strive to protect the state’s cybersecurity and data. The language in this bill would take California backwards.
The risks of operating foreign drones from adversarial nations and Chinese military companies are not new and are very well understood. In 2017, the U.S. military began removing these systems from their Arsenal. In 2020, Congress codified the ban on Chinese drones for the U.S. military. In 2023, Congress enacted the American Security Drone Act extending the ban to the entire federal government. Congress continued this work in 2024 and enacted language which established a year-long transitional period that will begin prohibiting Chinese military drone manufacturers from selling new products in the United States. The U.S. Congress has not provided a carve out for adversarial systems with American software or those operated in local only mode. Congress knows that such actions would not address the national security concerns.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Police Chiefs Association (Sponsor)
Opposition
Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International
California Chapter of Association of Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)
Analysis Prepared by: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Kate Kelly, “A Chinese Firm Is America’s Favorite Drone Maker. Except in Washington.” New York Times (Apr. 25, 2024) https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/25/us/politics/us-china-drones-dji.html ↑
“Moolenaar, Stefanik Statement on Chinese Drone Maker, Autel, Being Blacklisted” (Jun. 21, 2024) https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/moolenaar-stefanik-statement-chinese-drone-maker-autel-being-blacklisted ↑
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/c/8/c8dbcd57-7d3c-4842-85f2-466dc2b70f66/B56DAFD9C216FD3E54239A3E14E281EF.final-2023.03.15-letter-to-cisa-re-dji.pdf ↑
Julia Weiler, Security vulnerabilities detected in drones made by DJI (Mar. 2, 2023), https://news.rub.de/english/press-releases/2023-03-02-it-security-security-vulnerabilities-detected-drones-made-dji. ↑
Bruce Crumley, German research finds security flaws in four leading DJI drones (Mar. 5, 2023) Drone DJ, https://dronedj.com/2023/03/05/german-research-finds-security-flaws-in-four-leading-dji-drones/ ↑
ICE, Da Jiang Innovations (DJI) Likely Providing U.S. Critical Infrastructure and Law Enforcement Data to Chinese Government (Aug. 9, 2017) https://info.publicintelligence.net/ICE-DJI-China.pdf ↑
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment from Firms Linked to the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 20, 2020) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-security-business-advisory.pdf ↑
CISA, China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories, https://www.cisa.gov/china. ↑
Barry Elad, Drones Statistics By Revenue, Market Size, Usage and Manufacturers (Mar. 10, 2025) https://www.coolest-gadgets.com/drones-statistics/ ↑
Date of Hearing:
Counsel: Ilan Zur
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1160
Author:(Wilson) – As Amended Ver:March 24, 2025
SUMMARY:
Prohibits a law enforcement agency (“LEA”) from purchasing a remotely piloted aerial or ground vehicle without specified data protections. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits an LEA from purchasing an unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicle unless:
- The vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function; or
- The LEA uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images.
- Makes this bill effective on January 1, 2027, and specifies that this bill does not restrict a LEA’s ability to maintain ownership or possession of a remotely powered vehicle purchased before January 1, 2027.
- Defines an “American data storage company” to mean a partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other business entity formed under the laws of, and headquartered in, this state or the laws of any other state of the United States or the District of Columbia, that provides services related to storing digital data, including, but not limited to, through cloud storage, and has adopted security measures to protect stored data from unauthorized access, modification, or destruction, and that has dedicated servers or hard drives located in the U.S.
EXISTING LAW:
- Requires a LEA to obtain approval of the governing body, by an ordinance adopting a military equipment use policy at a regular meeting of the governing body before, among other things, requesting, acquiring, or seeking funds for military equipment. (Gov. Code, § 7071, subd. (a).)
- Defines “military equipment” to include, among other things, unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles, or weaponized aircraft, vessels, or vehicles of any kind. (Gov. Code, § 7070, subd. (c)(1) & (6).)
- Defines “governing body” as the elected body that oversees a LEA or, if there is no elected body that directly oversees the law enforcement agency, the appointed body that oversees a LEA. (Gov. Code, § 7070, subd. (a).)
- Defines “law enforcement agency” as a police department, sheriff’s department, district attorney’s office, or county probation department. (Gov. Code, § 7070, subd. (b)(1)-(4).)
- Requires a LEA to submit a proposed military equipment use policy to the governing body and make those documents available on the LEA’s internet website at least 30 days prior to any public hearing concerning the military equipment at issue. (Gov. Code, § 7070, subd. (b).)
- Provides that the governing body shall only approve a military equipment use policy if it determines all of the following:
- The military equipment is necessary because there is no reasonable alternative that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety.
- The proposed military equipment use policy will safeguard the public’s welfare, safety, civil rights, and civil liberties.
- If purchasing the equipment, the equipment is reasonably cost effective compared to available alternatives that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety.
- Prior military equipment use complied with the military equipment use policy that was in effect at the time or, if prior uses did not comply with the accompanying military equipment use policy, corrective action has been taken to remedy nonconforming uses and ensure future compliance. (Gov. Code, § 7071, subd. (d)(1).)
- The military equipment is necessary because there is no reasonable alternative that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety.
- Requires, in order to facilitate public participation, any proposed or final military equipment use policy to be made publicly available on the internet website of the relevant LEA for as long as the military equipment is available for use. (Gov. Code, § 7071, subd. (d)(2).)
- Requires a LEA that receives approval for a military equipment use policy to submit to the governing body an annual military equipment report for each type of military equipment approved by the governing body within one year of approval, and annually thereafter, that among other things, summarizes how the equipment was used, any complaints or concerns pertaining to the equipment, and the total annual cost of the equipment. (Gov. Code, § 7072, subd. (a).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Law enforcement agencies large and small have progressed in the last decade to implement varying types of drone programs due to the operational and safety advantages provided by these technologies, which cannot be understated. Law enforcement agencies also already take precautions to ensure that the data they collect remains secure. While the specific protocols vary by agency, they include mitigations such as using drones without internet, downloading third-party software to avoid interacting with the manufacturer’s software, and adhering to municipal and state data retention and storage policies as appropriate. Whether used in search and rescue operations, for reconnaissance purposes, or to improve real-time awareness, law enforcement use of drone technology has become ubiquitous throughout California and credited with saving lives.
“However, as is the case with all emerging technology, the use of these devices has not come without unique challenges and debates. AB 1160 establishes minimum security requirements for law enforcement agencies to adhere to prior to any future purchase of drone technology. These protections include 1) a requirement that each vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function, and 2) that the law enforcement agency uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images. By establishing these requirements, California can limit unnecessary data collection, and ensure the data collected by local and state law enforcement is housed domestically, limiting access to all information by foreign entities.”
- Need for this Bill: AB 1160 seeks to address the privacy and security concerns associated with certain non-U.S. drone manufacturing companies such as Da-Jiang Innovations (“DJI”), a private company located in Shenzhen, China. For context, DJI is the largest drone manufacturer in the United States, and their drones are in widespread use in California.[1] Some reports suggest there may be loopholes in DJI drone technology that permit DJI to gain access to significant amounts of personal information collected by the drones. As such, DJI has been placed on the Defense Department’s list of Chinese military companies whose products the U.S. armed forces will be prohibited from purchasing in the future. This has also led to federal legislative efforts to ban certain DJI drone models.[2] Most recently, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for 2025, which entered into effect on December 23, 2024. (118 P.L. 159; 2024 Enacted H.R. 5009; 118 Enacted H.R. 5009; 138 Stat. 1773). This Act required specified U.S. national security agencies to identify, within one year after the date of the Act’s enactment, any surveillance equipment or services, including surveillance equipment manufactured by DJI, among other companies, that present an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the security and safety of U.S. persons, for the purposes of placing such equipment on a specified prohibited equipment list. (Id. at § 1709).
SB 99 (Umberg), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, would have broadly prohibited a local governing body from approving a military equipment use policy if it contains military equipment that federal law or regulation prohibits the United States Armed Forces from purchasing. In effect, this would have largely prohibited law enforcement from utilizing DJI drones. SB 99 was ultimately held in suspense in the Assembly Appropriations Committee. Here AB 1160 similarly seeks to establish data privacy and security protections in LEA use of drones, although it takes a slightly different approach.
- Effect of this Bill: Existing law requires a LEA to obtain approval from the governing body that oversees it before acquiring or using military equipment. (Gov. Code, § 7071, subd. (a), et seq.) Military equipment includes, among other things, unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles (hereafter referred to as “drones”). (Gov. Code, § 7070, subd. (c)(1).) As such, before a LEA can purchase a drone in California, that drone must be identified in the LEAs military equipment use policy, which is subject to the approval of the governing body. (Ibid.)
A governing body may only approve a military equipment use policy if four requirements are met: 1) the equipment is necessary because there is no reasonable alternative that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety; 2) the military equipment policy will safeguard the public’s welfare, safety, civil rights, and civil liberties; 3) the equipment is reasonably cost effective compared to available alternatives that can achieve the same objective of officer and civilian safety, if purchasing the equipment; and 4) prior military equipment use complied with the military equipment use policy that was in effect at the time, or if prior uses did not comply with the accompanying military equipment use policy, corrective action has been taken to remedy nonconforming uses and ensure future compliance. (Gov. Code, § 7071, subd. (d)(1).) Any proposed or final military equipment use policy must be made publicly available on the internet website of the applicable LEA, and if a governing body approves a military equipment policy, the LEA must submit to the governing body an annual military equipment report for each type of military equipment approved by the governing body within one year of approval, and annually thereafter. (Gov. Code, § 7071, subd. (d)(2) & 7072, subd. (a).)
This bill would prohibit an LEA from purchasing a drone unless at least one of the following conditions are met: 1) the vehicle contains an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function; or 2) the LEA uses an American data storage company to house all data collected, including, but not limited to, video and photographic images. To meet the definition of an American data storage company, a company must meet four requirements. It must be formed under the laws of, and headquartered in, a U.S. state, provide services related to storing digital data, adopt security measures to protect stored data from unauthorized access, and have dedicated servers or hard drives in the U.S.
AB 1160 delays its effective date by one year, until January 1, 2027, to give law enforcement more time to comply with this bill’s requirements.
The extent to which this bill will prohibit LEAs from purchasing DJI drones, or other drones that similarly may not protect and guard the data they collect, is unclear. One method of complying with this bill is for a LEA-purchased drone to have an option to turn off any data collection programs that are not necessary for the vehicle to function. Having the option to turn off a given data collection function in and of itself, without additional guidance, may not function to protect collection of sensitive information. This bill does not define what a “data collection program” is, and what type of program would be considered to be “necessary for the [drone] to function.” For example, would a LEA purchase of a drone that takes photographs, which has a cover that can technically be placed over the camera (even if it is never actually applied), meet this requirement? Does “necessary to function” refer to the drone’s primary purpose (e.g. taking photographs) or does this refer to a drone’s actually ability to move, fly, or drive? The author may wish to clarify what “data collection program” and “not necessary… to function” mean to reduce uncertainty over the scope of this bill.
The second method of compliance with this bill is for the LEA to use an American data storage company to house all data collected by the drone. While this is aimed at prohibiting LEAs from purchasing drones that may share data with foreign governments, it is unclear if it will have this effect. The bill does not require LEA-purchased drones to be manufactured by American companies, but requires an American company to store all data collected. Further, requiring an LEA to use an American data storage company does not preclude that data from being shared elsewhere or otherwise stored in multiple countries. The author may similarly wish to clarify this provision of the bill.
Finally, as previously noted, federal national security agencies are now in the process of identifying whether specified foreign-made surveillance equipment, such as DJI drones, pose an unacceptable national security risk, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for 2025. This determination must be made not later than one year following December 23, 2024, the date of the Act’s enactment. It may be prudent to wait to review the federal government’s findings, once released, to ensure the restrictions proposed by this bill are effectively tailored to preventing LEAs from purchasing drones that have been identified to have the greatest security risks.
- Argument in Support: According to Oakland Privacy, “Federal agencies have prohibited the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly known as drones) that don’t comply with certain public safety and national security standards. Harmonizing those regulations across California state and local agencies – especially under the current administration and growing global uncertainty – is prudent. The growing security concerns makes it necessary, just as the government has re-evaluated the use of some telecom and surveillance technology equipment from Chinese brands Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua and ZTE.
“The direct and immediate impact of this bill would likely be on the further procurement of drones manufactured by DJI. DJI is a privately-owned company located in Shenzen, China. They are the largest manufacturer of drones with more than 70% market share with a wide variety of unmanned aircraft models. Such market concentration makes them a significant security risk as DJI is a product of China with purported ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). DJI products are popular with California law enforcement agencies predominately because they are “cheap and disposable”. Michigan Congressman Moolenaar articulates the Chinese technology playbook like this: "Pick a national champion in a strategic industry. Subsidize. Employ predatory pricing to offer its products at a massive, anti-competitive price point. Drive out the competition. Then leverage newfound dependencies to advance CCP interests." The Feds and other states seem to have caught on and it’s time California does too.
“Security researchers have identified serious vulnerabilities in DJI-made unmanned aircraft. These vulnerabilities include inadequate encryption of location data, log insecurity, and the potential for unauthorized remote operation. In fact, a security researcher was able to access highly sensitive customer data on DJI’s servers, including passport and driver’s license information, photos, and flight logs from military and government workers accounts. This threatens the security and integrity of data collected by DJI-made drones and have disturbing implications for the critical infrastructure where these drones are deployed…
“It is important to say that the risks of DJI’s product are not confined to possible information links to the Chinese government. The drones from the PRC have weak flight systems and unsecured communication links between the drone and the operator, enabling data such as telemetry and live video feeds to be intercepted, if not properly encrypted. Some PRC drones are also susceptible to malware infections and cyberattacks, which could be used to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks. Obviously, cyberattacks on law enforcement agencies can have severe consequences, including disrupting operations, jeopardizing public safety, crippling essential applications, preventing law enforcement from accessing critical data and impeding first responder[’s] ability to respond to emergencies…
“AB 1160 would make sure that California is aligned with the most up to date intelligence of military, privacy and cybersecurity experts.
“The average shelf life of the drones currently in use by CA law enforcement agencies is approximately in three years, so we can anticipate 100% replacement of this equipment by 2027.
“Will the prohibition of DJI drones hinder public safety? No. The federal government has already undertaken the work to vet drones for security and over a dozen approved make and models appear on a “Blue UAS Cleared List”. In terms of capacity issues between U.S. and Chinese-made drones, the technological jumpstart for China has been largely mitigated in current years and that will continue, making it a non-issue for law enforcement agencies to discontinue to purchase drones banned by the U.S. military.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (“AUVSI”), “AUVSI is the world's largest nonprofit organization dedicated to the advancement of uncrewed systems, autonomy, and robotics. Our association represents corporations and leaders from more than 60 countries across industry, government, and academia in the defense, civil and commercial sectors…
“We write to express our strong opposition to AB 1160 (Wilson), as amended. We have strong concerns over allowing the use of adversary drones with software mitigations. Specifically, AB 1160 would create new and ongoing loopholes by enabling drones manufactured by Chinese military companies, as designated by the U.S. Department of Defense, to be purchased by California state and local entities. Sending Californian tax dollars to the Chinese military is a position we cannot and will not support. To put it simply, the bill is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. By pretending to safeguard, the bill would provide a backdoor for our adversaries. California’s law should strive to protect the state’s cybersecurity and data. The language in this bill would take California backwards.
"The risks of operating foreign drones from adversarial nations and Chinese military companies are not new and are very well understood. In 2017, the U.S. military began removing these systems from their Arsenal. In 2020, Congress codified the ban on Chinese drones for the U.S. military. In 2023, Congress enacted the American Security Drone Act extending the ban to the entire federal government. Congress continued this work in 2024 and enacted language which established a year-long transitional period that will begin prohibiting Chinese military drone manufacturers from selling new products in the United States. The U.S. Congress has not provided a carve out for adversarial systems with American software or those operated in local only mode. Congress knows that such actions would not address the national security concerns.
“As the Federal Government continues to enact policies prohibiting the use of certain foreign-made drones, states that fail to comply with these regulations may find themselves ineligible for federal grants and contracts related to drone operations. These risks are, of course, secondary to the threat of the state’s data. We respectfully oppose the provisions in AB 1160 and ask you to do the same.”
- Prior Legislation:
- SB 99 (Umberg), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, would have prohibited a local governing body from approving a military equipment use policy if it contains military equipment that federal law or regulation prohibits the United States Armed Forces from purchasing. SB 99 was held in Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- AB 2014 (Nguyen), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, would have changed enforcement’s duty to seek approval from the local governing body before funding, acquiring or using drones or robots to only require approval if the drone or robot were weaponized. The hearing on AB 2014 was canceled at the request of the author.
- AB 2536 (Rendon), Chapter 408, Statutes of 2024, clarifies that the definition of “military equipment” for the purposes of existing law regarding police procurement of that equipment refers to certain devices, such as tasers and sound-based weapons, with a general description of the device rather than a specific trade name
- AB 79 (Weber), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session would have prohibited a peace officer from using deadly force against or intending to injure, intimidate, or disorient a person by utilizing any unmanned, remotely piloted, powered ground or flying equipment except under specified circumstances. The hearing on AB 79 was cancelled at the request of the author.
- AB 1486 (Jones-Sawyer), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, would have clarified that an assault weapon is not a “standard issue service weapon” and therefore falls under the definition of “military equipment,” which requires approval from the local governing body before a LEA may acquire it. AB 1486 was placed on the inactive file in the Senate.
- AB 421 (Chiu), Chapter 406, Statutes of 2021, requires local LEAs to follow specific procedures to obtain approval from local government prior to the acquisition or use of federal surplus military equipment.
- AB 3131 (Gloria), of the 2017 – 2018 Legislative Session, was similar to AB 421. AB 3131 was vetoed.
- AB 36 (Campos), of the 2015 – 2016 Legislative Session, would have prohibited local agencies, except local LEAs that are directly under the control of an elected officer, from applying to receive specified surplus military equipment from the federal government, unless the legislative body of the local agency approves the acquisition at a regular meeting. AB 36 was vetoed.
- SB 242 (Monning), Chapter 79, Statutes of 2015, requires a school district's police department to obtain approval from its governing board prior to receiving federal surplus military equipment.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Police Chiefs Association
Oakland Privacy
Oppose
California Chapter of Association of Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)
Analysis Prepared by:
Ilan Zur / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):