AB 1647: Juveniles: transfer to criminal court: criminal procedure.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2026-08-21
Current Status:
Failed
(2026-09-27: Vetoed by Governor.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. Existing case law prohibits the use of a minors statements made at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer from being used during a criminal prosecution of the minor transferred to the court of criminal jurisdiction.
This bill would codify existing case law to prohibit the use of the minors statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minors probation officer for the purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified. This bill would state that the provisions of this bill are declaratory of existing law.
Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. Existing case law prohibits the use of a minors statements made at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer from being used during a criminal prosecution of the minor transferred to the court of criminal jurisdiction.
This bill would codify existing case law to prohibit the use of the minors statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minors probation officer for the purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified. This bill would state that the provisions of this bill are declaratory of existing law.
Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. Existing case law prohibits the use of a minors statements made at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer from being used during a criminal prosecution of the minor transferred to the court of criminal jurisdiction.
This bill would codify existing case law to prohibit the use of the minors statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minors probation officer from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified. This bill would state that the provisions of this bill are declaratory of existing law.
Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney or other prosecuting officer to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. Under existing law, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court is required to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This bill would instead require that the court find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. By increasing the number of minors retained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, thereby increasing the number of minors who are entitled to county-funded rehabilitative services, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.Existing law, as amended by the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, enacted by Proposition 57 at the November 8, 2016, statewide general election, authorizes the district attorney or other prosecuting officer to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed a felony when the minor was 16 years of age or older, or in a case in which a specified serious offense is alleged to have been committed by a minor when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. Under existing law, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court is required to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
This bill would instead require that the court find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. By increasing the number of minors retained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, thereby increasing the number of minors who are entitled to county-funded rehabilitative services, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
(a)Testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing conducted pursuant to Section 707, or statements the minor makes to the minors probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense. This section does not prohibit the minors statements made to the minors probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing.
(b)This section shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 or Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802. This section is declaratory of existing law.
(a)Testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing conducted pursuant to Section 707, or statements the minor makes to the minors probation officer, officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense. This section does not prohibit the minors statements made to the minors probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing.
(b)This section shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575 (1972) Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985). Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802. This section is declaratory of existing law.
(a)Testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing conducted pursuant to Section 707, or statements the minor makes to the minors probation officer, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense. This section does not prohibit the minors statements made to the minors probation officer or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing.
(b)This section shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985). This section is declaratory of existing law.
SECTION 1.Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is amended to read:707.(a)(1)In any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, of any offense listed in subdivision (b) or any other felony criminal statute, the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The motion shall be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. Upon the motion, the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor. The report shall include any written or oral statement offered by the victim pursuant to Section 656.2.(2)In any case in which an individual is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation, when the individual was 14 or 15 years of age, of any offense listed in subdivision (b), but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer may make a motion to transfer the individual from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The motion shall be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. Upon the motion, the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the individual. The report shall include any written or oral statement offered by the victim pursuant to Section 656.2.(3)Following submission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the courts finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In any case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to this section, the court shall postpone the taking of a plea to the petition until the conclusion of the transfer hearing, and a plea that has been entered already shall not constitute evidence at the hearing.(A)(i)The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minors age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minors impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minors actions; the effect of the minors family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minors involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minors criminal sophistication.(B)(i)Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile courts jurisdiction.(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minors potential to grow and mature.(C)(i)The minors previous delinquent history.(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minors previous delinquent history and the effect of the minors family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minors previous delinquent behavior.(D)(i)Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minors needs.(E)(i)The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the persons degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the persons mental and emotional development.(iii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor.(b)This subdivision is applicable to any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation of one of the following offenses:(1)Murder.(2)Arson, as provided in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 451 of the Penal Code.(3)Robbery.(4)Rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm.(5)Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm.(6)A lewd or lascivious act as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code.(7)Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm.(8)An offense specified in subdivision (a) of Section 289 of the Penal Code.(9)Kidnapping for ransom.(10)Kidnapping for purposes of robbery.(11)Kidnapping with bodily harm.(12)Attempted murder.(13)Assault with a firearm or destructive device.(14)Assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.(15)Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building.(16)An offense described in Section 1203.09 of the Penal Code.(17)An offense described in Section 12022.5 or 12022.53 of the Penal Code.(18)A felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon described in any provision listed in Section 16590 of the Penal Code.(19)A felony offense described in Section 136.1 or 137 of the Penal Code.(20)Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a controlled substance specified in subdivision (e) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code.(21)A violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code, which also would constitute a felony violation of subdivision (b) of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.(22)Escape, by the use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 871 if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape.(23)Torture as described in Sections 206 and 206.1 of the Penal Code.(24)Aggravated mayhem, as described in Section 205 of the Penal Code.(25)Carjacking, as described in Section 215 of the Penal Code, while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon.(26)Kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault, as punishable in subdivision (b) of Section 209 of the Penal Code.(27)Kidnapping as punishable in Section 209.5 of the Penal Code.(28)The offense described in subdivision (c) of Section 26100 of the Penal Code.(29)The offense described in Section 18745 of the Penal Code.(30)Voluntary manslaughter, as described in subdivision (a) of Section 192 of the Penal Code.SEC. 2.To the extent that this act has an overall effect of increasing certain costs already borne by a local agency for programs or levels of service mandated by the 2011 Realignment Legislation within the meaning of Section 36 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, it shall apply to local agencies only to the extent that the state provides annual funding for the cost increase. Any new program or higher level of service provided by a local agency pursuant to this act above the level for which funding has been provided shall not require a subvention of funds by the state or otherwise be subject to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code. REVISIONS: HeadingLine 2.(a)(1)In any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, of any offense listed in subdivision (b) or any other felony criminal statute, the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The motion shall be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. Upon the motion, the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor. The report shall include any written or oral statement offered by the victim pursuant to Section 656.2.
(2)In any case in which an individual is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation, when the individual was 14 or 15 years of age, of any offense listed in subdivision (b), but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer may make a motion to transfer the individual from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The motion shall be made prior to the attachment of jeopardy. Upon the motion, the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the individual. The report shall include any written or oral statement offered by the victim pursuant to Section 656.2.
(3)Following submission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the courts finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In any case in which a hearing has been noticed pursuant to this section, the court shall postpone the taking of a plea to the petition until the conclusion of the transfer hearing, and a plea that has been entered already shall not constitute evidence at the hearing.
(A)(i)The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minors age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minors impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minors actions; the effect of the minors family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minors involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minors criminal sophistication.
(B)(i)Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile courts jurisdiction.
(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minors potential to grow and mature.
(C)(i)The minors previous delinquent history.
(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minors previous delinquent history and the effect of the minors family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minors previous delinquent behavior.
(D)(i)Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.
(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minors needs.
(E)(i)The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.
(ii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the persons degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the persons mental and emotional development.
(iii)When evaluating the criterion specified in clause (i), the court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor.
(b)This subdivision is applicable to any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation of one of the following offenses:
(1)Murder.
(2)Arson, as provided in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 451 of the Penal Code.
(3)Robbery.
(4)Rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm.
(5)Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm.
(6)A lewd or lascivious act as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code.
(7)Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm.
(8)An offense specified in subdivision (a) of Section 289 of the Penal Code.
(9)Kidnapping for ransom.
(10)Kidnapping for purposes of robbery.
(11)Kidnapping with bodily harm.
(12)Attempted murder.
(13)Assault with a firearm or destructive device.
(14)Assault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.
(15)Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building.
(16)An offense described in Section 1203.09 of the Penal Code.
(17)An offense described in Section 12022.5 or 12022.53 of the Penal Code.
(18)A felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon described in any provision listed in Section 16590 of the Penal Code.
(19)A felony offense described in Section 136.1 or 137 of the Penal Code.
(20)Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a controlled substance specified in subdivision (e) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code.
(21)A violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code, which also would constitute a felony violation of subdivision (b) of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code.
(22)Escape, by the use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 871 if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape.
(23)Torture as described in Sections 206 and 206.1 of the Penal Code.
(24)Aggravated mayhem, as described in Section 205 of the Penal Code.
(25)Carjacking, as described in Section 215 of the Penal Code, while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon.
(26)Kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault, as punishable in subdivision (b) of Section 209 of the Penal Code.
(27)Kidnapping as punishable in Section 209.5 of the Penal Code.
(28)The offense described in subdivision (c) of Section 26100 of the Penal Code.
(29)The offense described in Section 18745 of the Penal Code.
(30)Voluntary manslaughter, as described in subdivision (a) of Section 192 of the Penal Code.
SEC. 2.To the extent that this act has an overall effect of increasing certain costs already borne by a local agency for programs or levels of service mandated by the 2011 Realignment Legislation within the meaning of Section 36 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, it shall apply to local agencies only to the extent that the state provides annual funding for the cost increase. Any new program or higher level of service provided by a local agency pursuant to this act above the level for which funding has been provided shall not require a subvention of funds by the state or otherwise be subject to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 27, 2026 | Vetoed by Governor. |
| Aug 25, 2026 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4 p.m. |
| Aug 19, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 58. Noes 10. Page 6244.). |
| Aug 19, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 58. Noes 10.). |
| Aug 17, 2026 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 17, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 32. Noes 8. Page 5493.). |
| Aug 17, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 32. Noes 8.). |
| Jun 25, 2026 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jun 24, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (June 23). |
| May 13, 2026 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 5, 2026 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 4, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 71. Noes 0. Page 4901.) |
| May 4, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 71. Noes 0.) |
| May 4, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| Apr 23, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 22, 2026 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 9. Noes 0.) (April 21). |
| Apr 22, 2026 | Coauthors revised. |
| Apr 16, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Apr 15, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 3, 2026 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Feb 9, 2026 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jan 28, 2026 | From printer. May be heard in committee February 27. |
| Jan 27, 2026 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 19, 2026 | AB 1647 Bryan Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 17, 2026 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB1647 Bryan et al. By Cortese | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Jun 23, 2026 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| May 4, 2026 | AB 1647 Bryan Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 21, 2026 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aclu California Action | ** Support | |
| Alliance for Boys and Men of Color | ** Support | |
| All of Us or None | ** Support | |
| A New Way of life | ** Support | |
| Anti-Recidivism Coalition | ** Support | |
| Arts for Healing and Justice Network | ** Support | |
| California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice | ** Support | |
| California Attorneys For Criminal Justice | ** Support | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Against | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Against | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Support | |
| California State Sheriffs' Association | ** Against | |
| Cancel the Contract | ** Support | |
| Chief Probation Officers’ of California | ** Against | |
| Children's Advocacy Institute | ** Support | |
| Children's Defense Fund-California | ** Support | |
| Communities United for Restorative Justice | ** Support | |
| Courage California | ** Support | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Support | |
| Fresh Lifelines for Youth | ** Support | |
| Hang Out Do Good | ** Support | |
| Hayward Burns Institute | ** Support | |
| Haywood Burns Institute | ** Support | |
| Hoops 4 Justice | ** Support | |
| Initiate Justice | ** Support | |
| Inside Out Writers | ** Support | |
| Justice2jobs Coalition | ** Support | |
| LA Defensa | ** Support | |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Support | |
| Liberty Hill Foundation | ** Support | |
| Local 148 Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office | ** Support | |
| Loyola Law School's Youth Justice Education Clinic | ** Support | |
| Milpa Collective | ** Support | |
| National Center for Youth Law | ** Support | |
| National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform | ** Support | |
| Peace and Justice Law Center | ** Support | |
| Public Works Alliance | ** Support | |
| Riverside County District Attorney’s Office | ** Against | |
| San Francisco Public Defender | ** Support | |
| San Quentin Skunkworks | ** Support | |
| Santa Cruz Barrios Unidos | ** Support | |
| Silicon Valley De-Bug | ** Support | |
| Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition | ** Support | |
| Smart Justice California | ** Support | |
| The Change Parallel Project | ** Support | |
| The Children's Partnership | ** Support | |
| The Collective for Liberatory Lawyering | ** Support | |
| The Voice of Transfer Youth | ** Support | |
| Tia Chucha's Centro Cultural | ** Support | |
| Ujima Adult and Family Services | ** Support | |
| Underground Grit | ** Support | |
| Urban Peace Institute | ** Support | |
| Youth Alliance | ** Support | |
| Youth Forward | ** Support | |
| Youth Leadership Institute | ** Support |
GOVERNOR′S VETO
GV Bill Id:AB 1647
Author:(Bryan)
As Enrolled Ver:August 21, 2026
2/3 vote
SUMMARY
Prohibits testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor′s probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
Senate Amendments
1) Clarify that statements the minor makes to a probation officer are those made for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing.
2) Make technical changes.
Governor′s Veto Message
″This bill would codify existing case law to prohibit the use of a minor′s statements relating to a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent proceedings.
″This measure provides that it does not ′restrict, expand, alter, or modify′ decisions by the California Supreme Court that have been good law on this issue for more than 40 years. By its own terms, the bill is ′declaratory of existing law′ and therefore unnecessary.″
COMMENTS
As Passed by the Assembly, this bill: Prohibited testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor′s probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
- Stated that testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor′s probation officer, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specified that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor′s probation officer or at a transfer hearing form being used at sentencing.
- Provided that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
According to the Author
″Young people deserve to have certainty that their right to speak is protected during a fitness hearing. Case law is clear on this, and it′s time California Statute affirms and codifies that case law″.
Arguments in Support
According to Hoops 4 Justice, a co-sponsor of this bill, ″AB 1647 bill does not expand the law or create new rights. It simply gives the clarity and permanence of statute to protections that California courts have recognized for decades. A young person must be able to participate in these proceedings and engage with probation officers, without fear that their words will later be used against them. California courts have upheld this principle since Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985). Together, these cases establish that statements a young person makes at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer in connection with those proceedings may not be used against that youth in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. AB 1647 makes these protections permanent, transparent, and guaranteed to every young person in every courtroom across the state.″
Arguments in Opposition
According to the California District Attorneys Association, ″During a transfer hearing, a minor is afforded full due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If a minor elects to testify under oath, and is subject to cross examination, a prosecutor may use this testimony for substantive evidence or impeachment in a subsequent juvenile or criminal trial.″
FISCAL COMMENTS
Unknown. This bill is keyed non-fiscal by the Legislative Counsel.
VOTES
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0-9
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Bennett, Caloza, Chen, DeMaio, Ellis, Macedo, Michelle Rodriguez, Tangipa
SENATE FLOOR: 32-8-0
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Padilla, Pérez, Reyes, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO: Alvarado-Gil, Choi, Grove, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Seyarto, Strickland, Valladares
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 58-10-11
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO: Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Hadwick, Johnson, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Castillo, Hoover, Lackey, Muratsuchi, Pacheco, Ramos, Michelle Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Ta, Valencia, Wallis
UPDATED
VERSION: August 21, 2026
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0004646
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1647
Author:(Bryan)
As Amended Ver:June 25, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Prohibits testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
Senate Amendments
- Clarify that statements the minor makes to a probation officer are those made for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing.
- Make technical changes.
COMMENTS
As Passed by the Assembly, this bill: Prohibited testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
- Stated that testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specified that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor's probation officer or at a transfer hearing form being used at sentencing.
- Provided that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
According to the Author
"Young people deserve to have certainty that their right to speak is protected during a fitness hearing. Case law is clear on this, and it's time California Statute affirms and codifies that case law".
Arguments in Support
According to Hoops 4 Justice, a co-sponsor of this bill, "AB 1647 bill does not expand the law or create new rights. It simply gives the clarity and permanence of statute to protections that California courts have recognized for decades. A young person must be able to participate in these proceedings and engage with probation officers, without fear that their words will later be used against them. California courts have upheld this principle since Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985). Together, these cases establish that statements a young person makes at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer in connection with those proceedings may not be used against that youth in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. AB 1647 makes these protections permanent, transparent, and guaranteed to every young person in every courtroom across the state."
Arguments in Opposition
According to the California District Attorneys Association, "During a transfer hearing, a minor is afforded full due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If a minor elects to testify under oath, and is subject to cross examination, a prosecutor may use this testimony for substantive evidence or impeachment in a subsequent juvenile or criminal trial."
FISCAL COMMENTS
Unknown. This bill is keyed non-fiscal by the Legislative Counsel.
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0-9
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Bennett, Caloza, Chen, DeMaio, Ellis, Macedo, Michelle Rodriguez, Tangipa
SENATE FLOOR: 32-8-0
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Padilla, Pérez, Reyes, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO: Alvarado-Gil, Choi, Grove, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Seyarto, Strickland, Valladares
UPDATED
VERSION: June 25, 2026
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003736
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1647
Author:(Bryan)
As Amended Ver:June 25, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Prohibits testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
Senate Amendments
- Clarify that statements the minor makes to a probation officer are those made for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing.
- Make technical changes.
COMMENTS
As Passed by the Assembly, this bill: Prohibited testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
- Stated that testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specified that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor's probation officer or at a transfer hearing form being used at sentencing.
- Provided that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
According to the Author
"Young people deserve to have certainty that their right to speak is protected during a fitness hearing. Case law is clear on this, and it's time California Statute affirms and codifies that case law".
Arguments in Support
According to Hoops 4 Justice, a co-sponsor of this bill, "AB 1647 bill does not expand the law or create new rights. It simply gives the clarity and permanence of statute to protections that California courts have recognized for decades. A young person must be able to participate in these proceedings and engage with probation officers, without fear that their words will later be used against them. California courts have upheld this principle since Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985). Together, these cases establish that statements a young person makes at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer in connection with those proceedings may not be used against that youth in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. AB 1647 makes these protections permanent, transparent, and guaranteed to every young person in every courtroom across the state."
Arguments in Opposition
According to the California District Attorneys Association, "During a transfer hearing, a minor is afforded full due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If a minor elects to testify under oath, and is subject to cross examination, a prosecutor may use this testimony for substantive evidence or impeachment in a subsequent juvenile or criminal trial."
FISCAL COMMENTS
Unknown. This bill is keyed non-fiscal by the Legislative Counsel.
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0-9
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Bennett, Caloza, Chen, DeMaio, Ellis, Macedo, Michelle Rodriguez, Tangipa
SENATE FLOOR: 32-8-0
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Padilla, Pérez, Reyes, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO: Alvarado-Gil, Choi, Grove, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Seyarto, Strickland, Valladares
UPDATED
VERSION: June 25, 2026
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003736
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1647 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1647
Author: Bryan (D), et al.
Amended: 6/25/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 6/23/26
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Cortese, Pérez, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0, 5/4/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Juveniles: transfer to criminal court: criminal procedure
SOURCE: A New Way of Life
All of Us or None
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color
Communities United for Restorative Justice
Hang Out Do Good
Haywood Burns Institute
Hoops 4 Justice
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Center for Youth Law
The Voice of Transfer Youth
Urban Peace Institute
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits the use of a minor’s statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minor’s probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welfare (Welf.) & Institutions (Inst.) Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
- Authorizes the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor who is 16 years of age or older from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in any case in which the minor is alleged to have committed a felony. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
- Authorizes the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor who committed a specified serious or violent felony from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction if the offense was committed when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age or older but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).)
- Requires, upon the motion of the prosecutor, the juvenile court to order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1) & (2).)
- Requires the juvenile court, following submission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the minor may wish to submit, to decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
- Requires the court, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Requires the court to consider the following criteria in making its decision:
- The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.
- Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.
- The minor’s previous delinquent history. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.
- Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.
- The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. Requires the court to consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
- Requires the juvenile court to recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes if it orders a transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
- Allows the transfer of a juvenile to adult criminal court, as specified above, if the juvenile has been alleged to have committed the following crimes: murder; arson; robbery; rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm; sodomy by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm; a lewd or lascivious act on a minor under 14 years of age by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm; oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; kidnapping for ransom; kidnapping for robbery; kidnapping with bodily harm; attempted murder; assault with a firearm or destructive device; assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building; causing great bodily injury in the commission of specified offenses against a person who is 60 or older; or against a person who is blind, a paraplegic, a quadriplegic, or a person confined to a wheelchair; personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony; felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon; dissuading a witness or influencing testimony; manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a specified controlled substance; a “violent” felony committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang; escape, by use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp or forestry camp if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the escape; torture; aggravated mayhem; carjacking while armed with a dangerous and deadly weapon; kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault; kidnapping in the course of a carjacking; drive by shooting; exploding a destructive device with intent to commit murder; and, voluntary manslaughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits the testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for the transfer hearing, from being used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specifies that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor’s probation officer or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing.
- Provides that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
Background
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction. As a general rule, any minor between the age of 12 and 17, inclusive, who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time or arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)
Some minors may be tried as adults, depending on the age of the minor at the time of the offense and the crime charged. Minors who may be subject to transfer to adult criminal court include those alleged to have committed any felony when 16 years old or older, as well as a person who was 14- or 15-years-old at the time the person was alleged to have committed one of several specified serious or violent felonies but who was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).) In order for a minor to be transferred to criminal court, the prosecution must move to transfer the minor, and the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
History of Juvenile Transfers. The Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Act, enacted in 1961, established 16 as the minimum age for which a minor could be transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Over 30 years later, AB 560 (Peace), Chapter 453, Statutes of 1994, lowered the age at which a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court from 16 to 14 years of age. In response to the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise and more dangerous than the delinquency of earlier decades, Proposition 21 was passed by the voters on March 7, 2000. Among other things, Proposition 21 increased sentences for specified gang-related crimes, authorized a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court for specified felonies, prohibited the sealing of juvenile records involving Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offenses, and designated additional crimes as violent and serious felonies. (Ballot Pamp., Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000), text of Prop. 21, p. 45 et seq.) In 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57, which eliminated the ability of a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court.
Relevant Case Law. This bill states that its provisions are declaratory of existing law as established by Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 or Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802. Ramona R. involved a 17 year old who was charged with murder. Ordinarily, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving that a minor is unfit to be treated in juvenile court. The law, prior to the passage of Proposition 57 in 2016, contained a presumption that a minor who had committed a specified offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) was unfit for juvenile court unless the minor can prove they are fit.
In Ramona R., the minor defendant declined to testify at her fitness hearing after the court refused to grant the minor immunity from use at trial of any of statements made in the hearing or to her probation officer. (Id. at p. 804.) The minor defendant was declared unfit and she filed a writ of mandate to compel the court to vacate arguing that the court erred in refusing to grant her use immunity.
The question before the court was whether prior law, which provided for such use immunities, was nullified by Proposition 8’s “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision. The relevant section reads: “Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(2).)
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court held that “evidence of admissions made by a minor to the juvenile judge or the juvenile probation officer should be excluded in a criminal prosecution, for allowing this evidentiary use of the admissions would frustrate the protective and rehabilitative philosophy of the Juvenile Court Law . . . .” (Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 587.) In Ramona R., the California Supreme Court held that such immunities were preserved by the exception in Proposition 8 for statutory privileges. (Id. at p. 803.) The court further discussed the reasoning for its holding as applied to minors at their fitness hearings:
The purpose of such an interview is not the marshalling of evidence on the issue of guilt, but rather the assembling of all available information relevant to an informed disposition of the case if guilt is established (§§ 280, 702; Pen. Code, § 1203), or to assist in the evaluation of the minor’s fitness for treatment as a juvenile (§ 707). Such decisions, courts have uniformly concluded, should be based on the most complete knowledge of the defendant’s background that is possible. His description and explanation of the circumstances of the alleged offense, and his acknowledgment of guilt and demonstration of remorse, may significantly affect decisions about punishment or transfer for adult proceedings. (Id. at pp. 599-600.) “The minor who is subject to the possibility of a transfer order should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.” (Bryan v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 587-588.)
(Id. at p. 806.) The court also explicitly included in its holding that use immunity applies even when the minor has been found fit for treatment under the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 811.)
This bill prohibits the use of a minor’s statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minor’s probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 6/29/26)
A New Way of Life (co-source)
All of Us or None (co-source)
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color (co-source)
Communities United for Restorative Justice (co-source)
Hang Out Do Good (co-source)
Haywood Burns Institute (co-source)
Hoops 4 Justice (co-source)
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children (co-source)
National Center for Youth Law (co-source)
The Voice of Transfer Youth (co-source)
Urban Peace Institute (co-source)
ACLU California Action
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Local 148 Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union
San Quentin Skunkworks
Smart Justice California
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/7/26)
California District Attorneys Association
Chief Probation Officers’ of California
Riverside County District Attorney’s Office
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0, 5/4/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Bennett, Caloza, Chen, DeMaio, Ellis, Macedo, Michelle Rodriguez, Tangipa
Prepared by: Stephanie Jordan / PUB. S. /
8/7/26 13:08:39
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1647 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1647
Author: Bryan (D), et al.
Amended: 6/25/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 6/23/26
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Cortese, Pérez, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0, 5/4/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Juveniles: transfer to criminal court: criminal procedure
SOURCE: A New Way of Life
All of Us or None
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color
Communities United for Restorative Justice
Hang Out Do Good
Haywood Burns Institute
Hoops 4 Justice
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Center for Youth Law
The Voice of Transfer Youth
Urban Peace Institute
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits the use of a minor’s statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minor’s probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welfare (Welf.) & Institutions (Inst.) Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
- Authorizes the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor who is 16 years of age or older from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in any case in which the minor is alleged to have committed a felony. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
- Authorizes the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor who committed a specified serious or violent felony from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction if the offense was committed when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age or older but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).)
- Requires, upon the motion of the prosecutor, the juvenile court to order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1) & (2).)
- Requires the juvenile court, following submission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the minor may wish to submit, to decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
- Requires the court, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Requires the court to consider the following criteria in making its decision:
- The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.
- Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.
- The minor’s previous delinquent history. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.
- Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.
- The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. Requires the court to consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
- Requires the juvenile court to recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes if it orders a transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
- Allows the transfer of a juvenile to adult criminal court, as specified above, if the juvenile has been alleged to have committed the following crimes: murder; arson; robbery; rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm; sodomy by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm; a lewd or lascivious act on a minor under 14 years of age by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm; oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm; kidnapping for ransom; kidnapping for robbery; kidnapping with bodily harm; attempted murder; assault with a firearm or destructive device; assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building; causing great bodily injury in the commission of specified offenses against a person who is 60 or older; or against a person who is blind, a paraplegic, a quadriplegic, or a person confined to a wheelchair; personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony; felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon; dissuading a witness or influencing testimony; manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a specified controlled substance; a “violent” felony committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang; escape, by use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp or forestry camp if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the escape; torture; aggravated mayhem; carjacking while armed with a dangerous and deadly weapon; kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault; kidnapping in the course of a carjacking; drive by shooting; exploding a destructive device with intent to commit murder; and, voluntary manslaughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits the testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for the transfer hearing, from being used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specifies that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor’s probation officer or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing.
- Provides that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
Background
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction. As a general rule, any minor between the age of 12 and 17, inclusive, who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time or arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)
Some minors may be tried as adults, depending on the age of the minor at the time of the offense and the crime charged. Minors who may be subject to transfer to adult criminal court include those alleged to have committed any felony when 16 years old or older, as well as a person who was 14- or 15-years-old at the time the person was alleged to have committed one of several specified serious or violent felonies but who was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).) In order for a minor to be transferred to criminal court, the prosecution must move to transfer the minor, and the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
History of Juvenile Transfers. The Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Act, enacted in 1961, established 16 as the minimum age for which a minor could be transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Over 30 years later, AB 560 (Peace), Chapter 453, Statutes of 1994, lowered the age at which a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court from 16 to 14 years of age. In response to the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise and more dangerous than the delinquency of earlier decades, Proposition 21 was passed by the voters on March 7, 2000. Among other things, Proposition 21 increased sentences for specified gang-related crimes, authorized a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court for specified felonies, prohibited the sealing of juvenile records involving Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offenses, and designated additional crimes as violent and serious felonies. (Ballot Pamp., Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000), text of Prop. 21, p. 45 et seq.) In 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57, which eliminated the ability of a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court.
Relevant Case Law. This bill states that its provisions are declaratory of existing law as established by Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 or Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802. Ramona R. involved a 17 year old who was charged with murder. Ordinarily, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving that a minor is unfit to be treated in juvenile court. The law, prior to the passage of Proposition 57 in 2016, contained a presumption that a minor who had committed a specified offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) was unfit for juvenile court unless the minor can prove they are fit.
In Ramona R., the minor defendant declined to testify at her fitness hearing after the court refused to grant the minor immunity from use at trial of any of statements made in the hearing or to her probation officer. (Id. at p. 804.) The minor defendant was declared unfit and she filed a writ of mandate to compel the court to vacate arguing that the court erred in refusing to grant her use immunity.
The question before the court was whether prior law, which provided for such use immunities, was nullified by Proposition 8’s “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision. The relevant section reads: “Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(2).)
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court held that “evidence of admissions made by a minor to the juvenile judge or the juvenile probation officer should be excluded in a criminal prosecution, for allowing this evidentiary use of the admissions would frustrate the protective and rehabilitative philosophy of the Juvenile Court Law . . . .” (Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 587.) In Ramona R., the California Supreme Court held that such immunities were preserved by the exception in Proposition 8 for statutory privileges. (Id. at p. 803.) The court further discussed the reasoning for its holding as applied to minors at their fitness hearings:
The purpose of such an interview is not the marshalling of evidence on the issue of guilt, but rather the assembling of all available information relevant to an informed disposition of the case if guilt is established (§§ 280, 702; Pen. Code, § 1203), or to assist in the evaluation of the minor’s fitness for treatment as a juvenile (§ 707). Such decisions, courts have uniformly concluded, should be based on the most complete knowledge of the defendant’s background that is possible. His description and explanation of the circumstances of the alleged offense, and his acknowledgment of guilt and demonstration of remorse, may significantly affect decisions about punishment or transfer for adult proceedings. (Id. at pp. 599-600.) “The minor who is subject to the possibility of a transfer order should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.” (Bryan v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 587-588.)
(Id. at p. 806.) The court also explicitly included in its holding that use immunity applies even when the minor has been found fit for treatment under the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 811.)
This bill prohibits the use of a minor’s statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minor’s probation officer for purposes of preparing a report for a transfer hearing from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
SUPPORT: (Verified 6/29/26)
A New Way of Life (co-source)
All of Us or None (co-source)
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color (co-source)
Communities United for Restorative Justice (co-source)
Hang Out Do Good (co-source)
Haywood Burns Institute (co-source)
Hoops 4 Justice (co-source)
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children (co-source)
National Center for Youth Law (co-source)
The Voice of Transfer Youth (co-source)
Urban Peace Institute (co-source)
ACLU California Action
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Local 148 Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union
San Quentin Skunkworks
Smart Justice California
OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/29/26)
California District Attorneys Association
Chief Probation Officers’ of California
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 71-0, 5/4/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Bennett, Caloza, Chen, DeMaio, Ellis, Macedo, Michelle Rodriguez, Tangipa
Prepared by: Stephanie Jordan / PUB. S. /
6/29/26 10:57:50
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: AB 1647 Hearing Date: June 23, 2026
Author: | Bryan | ||
Version: | April 15, 2026 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | No |
Consultant: | SJ | ||
Subject: Juveniles: transfer to criminal court: criminal procedure
HISTORY
Source: A New Way of Life; All of Us or None; Alliance for Boys and Men of Color; Communities United for Restorative Justice; Hang Out Do Good; Haywood Burns Institute; Hoops 4 Justice; Legal Services for Prisoners with Children; National Center for Youth Law; The Voice of Transfer Youth; Urban Peace Institute
Prior Legislation: AB 2361 (Bonta), Ch. 330, Stats. of 2022
AB 624 (Bauer-Kahan), Ch. 195, Stats. 2021
AB 1423 (Wicks), Ch. 583, Stats. 2019
AB 2865 (Wicks), not heard due to COVID-19
SB 439 (Mitchell), Ch. 1006, Stats. 2018
SB 1391 (Lara), Ch. 1012, Stats. 2018
Proposition 57, as approved by the voters on November 8, 2016
SB 382 (Lara), Ch. 234, Stats. 2015
AB 560 (Peace), Ch. 453, Stats. 1994
SB 332, Ch. 1616, Stats. 1961
Support: ACLU California Action; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Public Defenders Association; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; Local 148 Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Union; San Quentin Skunkworks; Smart Justice California
Opposition: California District Attorneys Association; Chief Probation Officers’ of California
Assembly Floor Vote: 71 - 0
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to prohibit the use of a minor’s statements made during a transfer hearing or to the minor’s probation officer from being used against the minor during subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings, as specified.
Existing law provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
Existing law authorizes the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor who is 16 years of age or older from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in any case in which the minor is alleged to have committed a felony. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
Existing law authorizes the prosecutor to make a motion to transfer a minor who committed a specified serious or violent felony from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction if the offense was committed when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age or older but the minor was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2).)
Existing law requires, upon the motion of the prosecutor, the juvenile court to order the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1) & (2).)
Existing law requires the juvenile court, following submission and consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the minor may wish to submit, to decide whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
Existing law requires the court, in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Requires the court to consider the following criteria in making its decision:
- The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
- Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.
- Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
- Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.
- The minor’s previous delinquent history.
- Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.
- Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.
- Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs.
- The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.
- Requires the juvenile court to give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. Requires the court to consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
Existing law requires the juvenile court to recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes if it orders a transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
Existing law allows the transfer of a juvenile to adult criminal court, as specified above, if the juvenile has been alleged to have committed the following crimes:
- Murder;
- Arson;
- Robbery;
- Rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Sodomy by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- A lewd or lascivious act on a minor under 14 years of age by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Kidnapping for ransom;
- Kidnapping for robbery;
- Kidnapping with bodily harm;
- Attempted murder;
- Assault with a firearm or destructive device;
- Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury;
- Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building;
- Causing great bodily injury in the commission of specified offenses against a person who is 60 or older; or against a person who is blind, a paraplegic, a quadriplegic, or a person confined to a wheelchair;
- Personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony;
- Felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon;
- Dissuading a witness or influencing testimony;
- Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a specified controlled substance;
- A “violent” felony committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang;
- Escape, by use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp or forestry camp if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the escape;
- Torture;
- Aggravated mayhem;
- Carjacking while armed with a dangerous and deadly weapon;
- Kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault;
- Kidnapping in the course of a carjacking;
- Drive by shooting;
- Exploding a destructive device with intent to commit murder; and,
- Voluntary manslaughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b).)
This bill prohibits the testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
This bill specifies that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor’s probation officer or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing.
This bill provides that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
COMMENTS
- Need For This Bill
According to the author:
Young people deserve to have certainty that their right to speak is protected during a fitness hearing. Case law is clear on this, and it’s time California Statute affirms and codifies that case law.
- Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
As a general rule, any minor between the age of 12 and 17, inclusive, who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time or arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)
Some minors may be tried as adults, depending on the age of the minor at the time of the offense and the crime charged. Minors who may be subject to transfer to adult criminal court include those alleged to have committed any felony when 16 years old or older, as well as a person who was 14- or 15-years-old at the time the person was alleged to have committed one of several specified serious or violent felonies but who was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).)
- History of Juvenile Transfers
The Arnold-Kennick Juvenile Court Act, enacted in 1961, established 16 as the minimum age for which a minor could be transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court. Over 30 years later, AB 560 (Peace), Chapter 453, Statutes of 1994, lowered the age at which a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court from 16 to 14 years of age. In response to the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise and more dangerous than the delinquency of earlier decades, Proposition 21 was passed by the voters on March 7, 2000. Among other things, Proposition 21 increased sentences for specified gang-related crimes, authorized a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court for specified felonies, prohibited the sealing of juvenile records involving Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) offenses, and designated additional crimes as violent and serious felonies. (Ballot Pamp., Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000), text of Prop. 21, p. 45 et seq.)
Over the last several years, there have been a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving juvenile defendants that have recognized the inherent difference between juveniles and adults for purposes of sentencing, relying in part on research on brain and adolescent development. (See Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48; J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460.) The Court summarized those differences in Miller:
Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S., at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (567 U.S. 460, 570.)
This body of case law and the research relied upon in these cases prompted the passage of several juvenile justice reform measures. (See SB 9 (Yee), Chapter 828, Statutes of 2012; SB 260 (Hancock), Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013; SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471, Statutes of 2015; AB 1308 (Stone), Chapter 675, Statutes of 2017; SB 394 (Lara), Chapter 684, Statutes of 2017; SB 395 (Lara), Chapter 681, Statutes of 2017). In addition, the voters passed Proposition 57 in November 2016, which among other things, eliminated the ability of a prosecutor to file charges against a juvenile offender directly in criminal court.
- Transfer Criteria
Current law allows the prosecution move to transfer to adult criminal court any minor 16 years of age or older who is alleged to have committed a felony criminal offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution may also move to transfer to adult court a person who was 14 or 15 years of age at the time the person was alleged to have committed a specified serious or violent felony, but who was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 707, subds. (a)(2) & (b).) In order to find that the minor should be transferred to adult criminal court, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the youth should be transferred to adult court by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.770, subd. (b)(2).) Upon the prosecutor filing a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court, the juvenile court orders the probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §707, subd. (a).) The prosecutor and the minor may submit additional relevant information to aid the court in evaluating a juvenile’s fitness to remain in juvenile court. (Ibid.)
A minor is not required to establish innocence in order to show amenability to the juvenile court system, and the fact that a minor did commit the charged offense does not automatically require a finding of unfitness. (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682.) Rather, the dispositive question at a transfer hearing is the minor’s amenability to treatment through the facilities available to the juvenile court. (Jimmy H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 714; see also People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 717 [holding that the issue at a transfer hearing “is not whether the minor committed a specified act, but rather whether he is amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through juvenile court facilities”]; J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 [“There must be substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that the minor is not a fit and proper subject for treatment as a juvenile before the court may certify him to the superior court for prosecution.”].)
In making its transfer decision, the court must consider five enumerated criteria: (1) the degree of criminal sophistication; (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction; (3) the minor’s previous delinquent history; (4) the success of previous rehabilitation attempts by the juvenile court; and (5) the gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
- Relevant Case Law
This bill states that its provisions are declaratory of existing law as established by Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 or Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802. Ramona R. involved a 17 year old who was charged with murder. Ordinarily, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving that a minor is unfit to be treated in juvenile court. The law, prior to the passage of Proposition 57 in 2016,[1] contained a presumption that a minor who had committed a specified offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) was unfit for juvenile court unless the minor can prove they are fit.
In Ramona R., the minor defendant declined to testify at her fitness hearing after the court refused to grant the minor immunity from use at trial of any of statements made in the hearing or to her probation officer. (Id. at p. 804.) The minor defendant was declared unfit and she filed a writ of mandate to compel the court to vacate arguing that the court erred in refusing to grant her use immunity.
The question before the court was whether prior law, which provided for such use immunities, was nullified by Proposition 8’s “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision.[2] The relevant section reads: “Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103.” (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28, subd. (f)(2).)
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court held that “evidence of admissions made by a minor to the juvenile judge or the juvenile probation officer should be excluded in a criminal prosecution, for allowing this evidentiary use of the admissions would frustrate the protective and rehabilitative philosophy of the Juvenile Court Law . . . .” (Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 587.) In Ramona R., the California Supreme Court held that such immunities were preserved by the exception in Proposition 8 for statutory privileges. (Id. at p. 803.) The court further discussed the reasoning for its holding as applied to minors at their fitness hearings:
The purpose of such an interview is not the marshalling of evidence on the issue of guilt, but rather the assembling of all available information relevant to an informed disposition of the case if guilt is established (§§ 280, 702; Pen. Code, § 1203), or to assist in the evaluation of the minor’s fitness for treatment as a juvenile (§ 707). Such decisions, courts have uniformly concluded, should be based on the most complete knowledge of the defendant’s background that is possible. His description and explanation of the circumstances of the alleged
offense, and his acknowledgment of guilt and demonstration of remorse, may significantly affect decisions about punishment or transfer for adult proceedings. (Id. at pp. 599-600.) “The minor who is subject to the possibility of a transfer order should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.” (Bryan v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 587-588.)
(Id. at p. 806.) The court also explicitly included in its holding that use immunity applies even when the minor has been found fit for treatment under the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 811.)
- Effect of This Bill
This bill prohibits the testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense. However, this bill specifies that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor’s probation officer or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing. This bill also provides that its provision are declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
- Argument in Support
The ACLU California Action writes:
AB 1647 … codifies longstanding and foundational protections for young people who appear before the juvenile court in transfer proceedings.
This incredible bill is championed by youth that are incarcerated at Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall who are facing transfer and who understand firsthand why the legal protections this measure codifies matter. Their advocacy is a reminder that behind every transfer hearing is a young person who deserves to be treated with dignity and fairness.
AB 1647 does not expand the law or create new rights. It simply gives the clarity and permanence to protections that California courts have recognized for decades. A young person must be able to participate in these proceedings and engage with probation officers, without fear that their words will later be used against them. California courts have upheld this principle since Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985). Together, these cases establish that statements a young person makes at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer in connection with those proceedings may not be used against that youth in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. AB 1647 makes these protections permanent, transparent, and guaranteed to every young person in every courtroom across the state.
- Argument in Opposition
The California District Attorneys Association writes:
CDAA objects to the amended language in WIC 707.3 which states, “Testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing conducted pursuant to Section 707, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer during a transfer interview, shall not be used against the minor in a subsequent juvenile proceeding or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.” If a minor voluntarily testifies at a transfer hearing, those statements can legally be used as impeachment evidence, not as substantive evidence, in a juvenile contest, or if transferred to adult court, in a criminal trial.
Current law already prohibits the introduction of a statement made by a minor to a probation officer from being introduced as substantive evidence of guilt at any future contest or criminal trial. But, the law also allows a minor’s voluntary testimony during a transfer hearing to be introduced as impeachment evidence in a subsequent contest, or if the minor is ordered transferred, in a criminal adult trial. (People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739)
The proposed language in 707.3 is objectionable because it removes an evidentiary right to introduce impeachment evidence in a hearing currently allowed under the state Constitution and held to be legal by the Supreme Court of California. If a minor voluntarily testifies at their transfer hearing, under oath and subject to cross-examination, that testimony may be introduced as impeachment evidence in a future contest or criminal
-- END --
Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act, was approved by voters during the 2016 general election and amended the process to transfer juveniles to adult court, including removing the presumption that a minor alleged to have violated a 707(b) offense is unfit for juvenile court. ↑
Proposition 8, approved by voters in the 1982 primary election, established the Victims Bill of Rights in the California Constitution. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1647
Author:(Bryan)
As Amended Ver:April 15, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Prohibits testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings.
Major Provisions
- States that testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor's probation officer, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specifies that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor's probation officer or at a transfer hearing form being used at sentencing.
- Provides that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
COMMENTS
According to the Author
"Young people deserve to have certainty that their right to speak is protected during a fitness hearing. Case law is clear on this, and it's time California Statute affirms and codifies that case law".
Arguments in Support
According to Hoops 4 Justice, a co-sponsor of this bill: "AB 1647 bill does not expand the law or create new rights. It simply gives the clarity and permanence of statute to protections that California courts have recognized for decades. A young person must be able to participate in these proceedings and engage with probation officers, without fear that their words will later be used against them. California courts have upheld this principle since Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985). Together, these cases establish that statements a young person makes at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer in connection with those proceedings may not be used against that youth in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. AB 1647 makes these protections permanent, transparent, and guaranteed to every young person in every courtroom across the state."
Arguments in Opposition
According to the California District Attorneys Association, "During a transfer hearing, a minor is afforded full due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If a minor elects to testify under oath, and is subject to cross examination, a prosecutor may use this testimony for substantive evidence or impeachment in a subsequent juvenile or criminal trial."
FISCAL COMMENTS
Unknown. This bill is keyed non-fiscal by the Legislative Counsel
VOTES
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
UPDATED
VERSION: April 15, 2026
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002396
Date of Hearing:
Deputy Chief Counsel: Stella Choe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1647
Author:(Bryan) – As Amended Ver:April 15, 2026
SUMMARY:
Prohibits testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer, from being used against the minor in subsequent proceedings. Specifically, this bill:
- States that testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes to the minor’s probation officer, shall not be used against the minor in subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense.
- Specifies that this provision does not prohibit statements made by the minor to the minor’s probation officer or at a transfer hearing form being used at sentencing.
- Provides that this provision is declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575 (1972) or Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 802 (1985).
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
- Establishes criteria to determine whether to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
- States that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any felony or any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
- States that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2), emphasis added.)
- States that in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the following criteria, inclusive:
- The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication;
- Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature;
- The minor’s previous delinquent history. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior;
- Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs; and,
- The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. The court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
- Enumerates the following predicate offenses which permit transfer of a juvenile to adult court:
- Murder;
- Arson;
- Robbery;
- Rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Sodomy by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- A lewd or lascivious act on a minor under 14 years of age by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Kidnapping for ransom;
- Kidnapping for purposes of robbery;
- Kidnapping with bodily harm;
- Attempted murder;
- Assault with a firearm or destructive device;
- Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury;
- Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building;
- Causing great bodily injury in the commission of specified offenses against a person who is 60 years of age or older; or against a person who is blind, a paraplegic, a quadriplegic, or a person confined to a wheelchair;
- Personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony;
- Personal use of a weapon;
- Dissuading a witness or influencing testimony;
- Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a specified controlled substance;
- A “violent” felony committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang;
- Escape, by use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp or forestry camp if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the escape;
- Torture;
- Aggravated mayhem;
- Carjacking while armed with a dangerous and deadly weapon;
- Kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault;
- Kidnapping in the course of a carjacking;
- Drive by shooting;
- Exploding a destructive device with intent to commit murder; and,
- Voluntary manslaughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Young people deserve to have certainty that their right to speak is protected during a fitness hearing. Case law is clear on this, and it’s time California Statute affirms and codifies that case law”
- Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: As a general rule, any person between the age of 12 and 17 who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time of arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)
The creation of the juvenile court, now over 100 years old, was rooted in the idea that adolescents, who are not fully developed or mature, are less culpable than adults. Accordingly, the focus of the juvenile court was rehabilitation, not punishment. (See e.g., In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 15-16.) The purpose of the juvenile law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the court and to preserve and strengthen family ties when possible. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This may include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative objectives. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a wide range of options available for placing its wards, including probation, placement in a relative's home, foster home, licensed community care facility, or group home, and commitment to “a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp” or “the county juvenile hall.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, subd. (a); 730, subd. (a)(1).) - History of Juvenile Transfer Policies: In 1961, the Legislature set 16 years old as the minimum age that a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court. (O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 88.) In 1995, the state began to move away from this rule by permitting some 14- and 15-year-olds to be transferred to criminal court. (Ibid.) In 2000, the voters passed Proposition 21 which required prosecutors to charge minors 14 years or older directly in criminal court for specified murder and sex crimes. Additionally, the Proposition gave prosecutors discretion to charge minors 14 or older directly in adult criminal court for other serious specified offenses. (Ibid.)
In the years following the passage of Proposition 21, the United State Supreme Court issued several opinions regarding the need to treat juveniles differently from adults in the criminal justice system. Developments in scientific research on adolescent brain development confirmed that children are different from adults in their relative culpability and rehabilitation possibilities and that such differences are critical to identifying age-appropriate sentences. (See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–571 [prohibited capital punishment for juveniles]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–75 [prohibited life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles in non-homicide cases]; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469–470 [prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles].) The Court summarized those differences in Miller:
Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S., at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at 570.)
The California Supreme Court, relying on Graham and Miller, found that a determinate sentence that exceeds the expected lifetime of the juvenile defendant violates the Eighth Amendment because it effectively denies a juvenile any opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267) and that a law that provides a presumption in favor of LWOP for juveniles also violates the Eighth Amendment (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1375-1376).
Following this body of case law and research, several measures were adopted to reflect the scientific evidence and constitutional mandate to treat juveniles differently than adults. In 2016, Proposition 57 eliminated direct filing in adult court by amending Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to require a transfer hearing to be held before a minor can be prosecuted in adult court. In 2018, the Legislature raised the youngest age a minor could be tried as an adult back to 16. (SB 1391 (Lara), Ch. 1012, Stats. 2018.) The age change was challenged as an invalid amendment to Proposition 57 but the California Supreme Court ultimately ruled that SB 1391 furthered the ameliorative purposes of Proposition 57 and the proposition authorized such amendments by a majority vote of the Legislature. (People v. Superior Court (O.G.) (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82.)
- Transfer Criteria: The issue in a juvenile transfer hearing “is not whether the minor committed a specified act, but rather whether [they are] amendable to the care, treatment and training program available through the juvenile court facilities….” (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 717, disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33.) Under current law, the prosecution may move to transfer to adult criminal court any minor 16 years of age or older who is alleged to have committed a felony criminal offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution may also move to transfer to adult court a person who was 14 or 15 years of age at the time the person was alleged to have committed a specified serious or violent felony, but who was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 707, subds. (a)(2) & (b).) Existing law requires the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a)(3), emphasis added.)
In making its transfer decision, the court must consider the following: the minor’s degree of criminal sophistication, whether the minor can be rehabilitated in the time before the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction over the minor, the minor’s prior history of delinquency, the success of prior attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the charged offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) Existing law provides guidance to the juvenile court when considering each of these criteria. Existing law specifies that when evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior, the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions, and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal sophistication. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Existing law additionally specifies that when evaluating the minor’s previous delinquent history, the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).) Existing law states that in evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor, the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. The court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(E).)
- Relevant Case Law: This bill states that its provisions are declaratory of existing law as established by Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575 or Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802. Ramona R. involved a 17-year-old who was charged with murder. Ordinarily, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving that a minor is unfit to be treated in juvenile court. The law, prior to the passage of Proposition 57 in 2016[1], contained a presumption that a minor who had committed a specified offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code 707(b) was unfit for juvenile court unless the minor can prove they are fit.
In Ramona R., the minor defendant declined to testify at her fitness hearing after the court refused to grant the minor immunity from use at trial of any of statements made in the hearing or to her probation officer. (Id. at p. 804.) The minor defendant was declared unfit and she filed a writ of mandate to compel the court to vacate arguing that the court erred in refusing to grant her use immunity.
The question before the court was whether prior law, which provided for such use immunities, was nullified by Proposition 8’s “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision.[2] The relevant section reads: “Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103.” (Cal. Const. art. 1, Sec. 28, subd. (f)(2).)
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court held that “evidence of admissions made by a minor to the juvenile judge or the juvenile probation officer should be excluded in a criminal prosecution, for allowing this evidentiary use of the admissions would frustrate the protective and rehabilitative philosophy of the Juvenile Court Law . . . .” (Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 587.)
In Ramona R., the California Supreme Court held that such immunities were preserved by the exception in Proposition 8 for statutory privileges:
That constitutional provision expressly provides that it does not affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege. Such use immunities are essential to the California constitutional privilege against self-incrimination (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15); thus, the law providing for such immunities is included within the broad language of Evid. Code, § 940, which declares that "To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him."
(Id. at p. 803.) The court further discussed the reasoning for its holding as applied to minors at their fitness hearings:
The purpose of such an interview is not the marshalling of evidence on the issue of guilt, but rather the assembling of all available information relevant to an informed disposition of the case if guilt is established (§§ 280, 702; Pen. Code, § 1203), or to assist in the evaluation of the minor's fitness for treatment as a juvenile (§ 707). Such decisions, courts have uniformly concluded, should be based on the most complete knowledge of the defendant's background that is possible. His description and explanation of the circumstances of the alleged offense, and his acknowledgment of guilt and demonstration of remorse, may significantly affect decisions about punishment or transfer for adult proceedings." (Id. at pp. 599-600.) "The minor who is subject to the possibility of a transfer order should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings." (Bryan v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 587-588.) "
(Id. at p. 806.) The court also explicitly included in its holding that use immunity applies even when the minor has been found fit for treatment under the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 811.)
This bill provides that testimony a minor gives at a transfer hearing, or statements the minor makes the minor’s probation officer, shall not be used against the minor at a subsequent juvenile proceedings or subsequent criminal proceedings for the offense. This bill specifies that this provision does not prohibit the minor’s statements made to the minor’s probation officer or at a transfer hearing from being used at sentencing. Additionally, this bill provides that its provisions are declaratory of existing law and shall not be construed to restrict, expand, alter, or modify the decision in Bryan v. Superior Court or Ramona R. v. Superior Court.
- Argument in Support: According to Hoops 4 Justice, a co-sponsor of this bill: “AB 1647 bill does not expand the law or create new rights.. It simply gives the clarity and permanence of statute to protections that California courts have recognized for decades. A young person must be able to participate in these proceedings and engage with probation officers, without fear that their words will later be used against them. California courts have upheld this principle since Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985). Together, these cases establish that statements a young person makes at a transfer hearing or to a probation officer in connection with those proceedings may not be used against that youth in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings. AB 1647 makes these protections permanent, transparent, and guaranteed to every young person in every courtroom across the state.”
- Argument in Opposition: No longer relevant.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 2361 (Bonta), Chapter 330, Statutes of 2022, increased the burden of proof from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence for a court to find that a minor should be transferred to adult criminal court.
- AB 624 (Bauer-Kahan), Chapter 195, Statutes of 2021, made an order transferring a minor from a juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction subject to appeal, as specified.
- AB 1423 (Wicks), Chapter 583, Statutes of 2019, created a mechanism for the return of a case back to the juvenile court from the criminal court under certain circumstances.
- AB 2865 (Wicks), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, would have required a court to find that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. AB 2865 was held in this Committee without a hearing.
- SB 439 (Mitchell), Chapter 1006, Statutes of 2018, prohibited the prosecution of a minor under the age of 12, unless the minor is alleged to have committed specified violent crimes.
- SB 1391 (Lara), Chapter 1012, Statutes of 2018, repealed the authority of a district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in specified cases, unless the individual was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.
- SB 382 (Lara), Chapter 382, Statutes of 2015, enumerated certain factors that may be given weight within each of the criteria to be determined by a court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
- SB 1151 (Kuehl), of the 2003-2004 Legislative Session, would have clarified the definition of the “circumstances and gravity of the offense” for purposes of evaluating the fitness of a minor for juvenile court jurisdiction. SB 1151 was vetoed.
- AB 560 (Peace), Chapter 453, Statutes of 1994, lowered the age from 16 to 14 at which a juvenile could be transferred to adult criminal court and be tried as an adult for committing certain crimes.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
A New Way of Life (Co-sponsor)
Alliance for Boys and Men of Color (Co-sponsor)
Communities United for Restorative Justice (Co-sponsor)
Hang Out Do Good (Co-sponsor)
Hayward Burns Institute (Co-sponsor)
Hoops 4 Justice (Co-sponsor)
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children (Co-sponsor)
All of Us or None (Co-sponsor)
National Center for Youth Law (Co-sponsor)
The Voice of Transfer Youth (Co-sponsor)
Urban Peace Institute (Co-sponsor)
Opposition
No longer relevant.
Analysis Prepared by:
Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act, was approved by voters in the 2016 general election, amended the process to transfer juveniles to adult court including removing the presumption that a minor alleged to have violated a 707(b) offense is unfit. ↑
Proposition 8, approved by voters in the 1982 primary election, established the Victims Bill of Rights in the California Constitution. ↑
Date of Hearing:
Deputy Chief Counsel: Stella Choe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1647
Author:(Bryan) – As Introduced Ver:January 27, 2026
SUMMARY:
Requires the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of by clear and convincing evidence, that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for purposes of transfer to adult criminal court.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, generally, that a minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when the minor violates any law defining a crime, is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to adjudication as a ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)
- Establishes criteria to determine whether to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)
- States that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any felony or any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 16 years of age or older, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)
- States that in a case in which a minor is alleged to have committed any of the enumerated felonies, as specified, when the minor was 14 or 15 years of age, but was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the prosecutor may make a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(2), emphasis added.)
- States that in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the following criteria, inclusive:
- The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication;
- Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature;
- The minor’s previous delinquent history. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior;
- Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to address the minor’s needs; and,
- The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. The juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. The court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
- Enumerates the following predicate offenses which permit transfer of a juvenile to adult court:
- Murder;
- Arson;
- Robbery;
- Rape with force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Sodomy by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- A lewd or lascivious act on a minor under 14 years of age by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm;
- Kidnapping for ransom;
- Kidnapping for purposes of robbery;
- Kidnapping with bodily harm;
- Attempted murder;
- Assault with a firearm or destructive device;
- Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury;
- Discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied building;
- Causing great bodily injury in the commission of specified offenses against a person who is 60 years of age or older; or against a person who is blind, a paraplegic, a quadriplegic, or a person confined to a wheelchair;
- Personal use of a firearm during the commission of a felony;
- Personal use of a weapon;
- Dissuading a witness or influencing testimony;
- Manufacturing, compounding, or selling one-half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a specified controlled substance;
- A “violent” felony committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang;
- Escape, by use of force or violence, from a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp or forestry camp if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted upon an employee of the juvenile facility during the escape;
- Torture;
- Aggravated mayhem;
- Carjacking while armed with a dangerous and deadly weapon;
- Kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault;
- Kidnapping in the course of a carjacking;
- Drive by shooting;
- Exploding a destructive device with intent to commit murder; and,
- Voluntary manslaughter. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, "Placing young people in the adult prison system should be the absolute last option. This bill makes sure the highest legal standards are met before making this life-altering decision.”
- Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: As a general rule, any person between the age of 12 and 17 who commits a crime falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) This extends to a youth alleged to have committed a crime before their 18th birthday, even if they were an adult at the time of arrest or commencement of proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 603.) For example, if someone commits a crime at age 17, but it is not discovered or tried until the person is 20, the person can still be tried in juvenile court. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the youth is 23 years old, unless the youth would have, in criminal court, faced a sentence of 7 years or more, in which case the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues until the youth turns 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 607.)
The creation of the juvenile court, now over 100 years old, was rooted in the idea that adolescents, who are not fully developed or mature, are less culpable than adults. Accordingly, the focus of the juvenile court was rehabilitation, not punishment. (See e.g., In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 15-16.) The purpose of the juvenile law is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the court and to preserve and strengthen family ties when possible. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This may include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative objectives. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a wide range of options available for placing its wards, including probation, placement in a relative's home, foster home, licensed community care facility, or group home, and commitment to “a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp” or “the county juvenile hall.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, subd. (a); 730, subd. (a)(1).) - History of Juvenile Transfer Policies: In 1961, the Legislature set 16 years old as the minimum age that a minor could be transferred to adult criminal court. (O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82, 88.) In 1995, the state began to move away from this rule by permitting some 14- and 15-year-olds to be transferred to criminal court. (Ibid.) In 2000, the voters passed Proposition 21 which required prosecutors to charge minors 14 years or older directly in criminal court for specified murder and sex crimes. Additionally, the Proposition gave prosecutors discretion to charge minors 14 or older directly in adult criminal court for other serious specified offenses. (Ibid.)
In the years following the passage of Proposition 21, the United State Supreme Court issued several opinions regarding the need to treat juveniles differently from adults in the criminal justice system. Developments in scientific research on adolescent brain development confirmed that children are different from adults in their relative culpability and rehabilitation possibilities and that such differences are critical to identifying age-appropriate sentences. (See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–571 [prohibited capital punishment for juveniles]; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–75 [prohibited life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juveniles in non-homicide cases]; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469–470 [prohibited mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles].) The Court summarized those differences in Miller:
Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S., at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed. 2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at 570.)
The California Supreme Court, relying on Graham and Miller, found that a determinate sentence that exceeds the expected lifetime of the juvenile defendant violates the Eighth Amendment because it effectively denies a juvenile any opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267) and that a law that provides a presumption in favor of LWOP for juveniles also violates the Eighth Amendment (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1375-1376).
Following this body of case law and research, several measures were adopted to reflect the scientific evidence and constitutional mandate to treat juveniles differently than adults. In 2016, Proposition 57 eliminated direct filing in adult court by amending Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to require a transfer hearing to be held before a minor can be prosecuted in adult court. In 2018, the Legislature raised the youngest age a minor could be tried as an adult back to 16. (SB 1391 (Lara), Ch. 1012, Stats. 2018.) The age change was challenged as an invalid amendment to Proposition 57 but the California Supreme Court ultimately ruled that SB 1391 furthered the ameliorative purposes of Proposition 57 and the proposition authorized such amendments by a majority vote of the Legislature. (People v. Superior Court (O.G.) (2021) 11 Cal.5th 82.)
- Transfer Criteria: The issue in a juvenile transfer hearing “is not whether the minor committed a specified act, but rather whether [they are] amendable to the care, treatment and training program available through the juvenile court facilities….” (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 717, disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33.) Under current law, the prosecution may move to transfer to adult criminal court any minor 16 years of age or older who is alleged to have committed a felony criminal offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution may also move to transfer to adult court a person who was 14 or 15 years of age at the time the person was alleged to have committed a specified serious or violent felony, but who was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 707, subds. (a)(2) & (b).) Existing law requires the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to adult criminal court. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 707, subd. (a)(3), emphasis added.)
In making its transfer decision, the court must consider the following: the minor’s degree of criminal sophistication, whether the minor can be rehabilitated in the time before the juvenile court would lose jurisdiction over the minor, the minor’s prior history of delinquency, the success of prior attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the charged offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) Existing law provides guidance to the juvenile court when considering each of these criteria. Existing law specifies that when evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense, the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior, the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions, and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal sophistication. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Existing law additionally specifies that when evaluating the minor’s previous delinquent history, the juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).) Existing law states that in evaluating the circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor, the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development. The court shall consider evidence offered that indicates that the person against whom the minor is accused of committing an offense trafficked, sexually abused, or sexually battered the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(E).)
Existing law requires a court to find by clear and convincing evidence that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to adult criminal court. “Clear and convincing” means that the evidence is highly and substantially more likely to be true than untrue; the trier of fact must have an abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contention is highly probable. (Colorado v. New Mexico (1984) 467 U.S. 310.) Prior to 2023, the law required the court to make this finding by a preponderance of the evidence. The “preponderance of the evidence standard” is met if the trier of fact (judge or jury) believes the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not—more than 50% likely to be—true. (Braud v. Kinchen (1975) 310 So.2d 657.)
In 2022, the Legislature passed AB 2361, which, among other things, raised the legal standard for transfer hearings from preponderance of evidence to clear and convincing evidence.[1] The bill passed out of both Legislative houses without any registered opposition. According to a committee analysis of AB 2361[2]:
The California Supreme Court has called the transfer of a minor from juvenile court for prosecution in adult court “the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict.” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 810.) Despite the enormous consequence of the transfer decision, current statutory provisions provide insufficient guidance as to how the juvenile court should make its determination.
Over 50 years ago, the California Supreme Court held that “the dispositive question [at a transfer hearing] is the minor’s amenability to treatment through the facilities available to the juvenile court.” (Jimmy H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 714; see also People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 717 (holding that the issue at a transfer hearing “is not whether the minor committed a specified act, but rather whether he is amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through juvenile court facilities”); J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (“There must be substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that the minor is not a fit and proper subject for treatment as a juvenile before the court may certify him to the superior court for prosecution.”) However, current statutory provisions do not explicitly reflect this principle, nor do they direct how the juvenile court should exercise its discretion.
By providing a clear legal standard, AB 2361 will reduce arbitrary determinations, ensure that youth amenable to treatment and rehabilitation will be retained in juvenile court, and will allow appellate courts more effectively to review the lower court’s holdings to determine whether the transfer was based on clear and convincing evidence.
This bill raises the standard of proof by which the juvenile court is to make the determination that a minor should be transferred to adult criminal court, from clear and convincing evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the most rigorous standard of proof, applies to findings of guilt in criminal matters. It requires the trier of fact to hold “an abiding conviction that the charge is true” although it “need not eliminate all possible doubt.” (CALCRIM No. 220.) Increasing the legal standard to beyond a reasonable doubt will likely result in more juveniles being retained in juvenile court.
According to the California Department of Justice’s Juvenile Justice in California 2024 report, an annual report on juvenile justice in the state, of the 24 transfer hearings reported by probation departments, 5 minors were found unfit for juvenile court and were transferred to adult criminal court and 19 were determined to be fit and remained in the juveniles system.[3] There were a total of 89 adult-level court dispositions received in 2024.[4] The report shows there are racial disparities with respect to transfer orders. Of juveniles who received adult court dispositions, 7.9% were white, 61.8% were Hispanic, 25.8% were Black, and 4.5% were from other race/ethnic groups.[5] Studies also indicate that youth transferred to adult court have negative impacts on likelihood of victimization, behavioral issues, recidivism and rehabilitation than youth who are retained in the juvenile system.[6]
If a minor is transferred to adult criminal court, the minor is entitled to a jury trial instead of a bench trial and faces a conviction and traditional sentencing, which may constitute a “strike” for future sentencing.
- Retroactivity: Retroactivity[7] means whether a change in sentencing or constitutional interpretation should be applied to cases where the penalty may already be imposed and appeals exhausted. As a general matter, Penal Code section 3 states “No part of it (meaning the codes) is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” If retroactivity is not specified, the law is not applied retroactively. However, beginning in 1965, if a defendant’s case is still pending at the time of the change and the law seeks to lessen a criminal penalty, they may be eligible for application of the new law. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 (hereinafter “Estrada”).) This is known as the “final judgement rule.”
Estrada and other cases since 1965 have held “new laws that reduce the punishment for a crime are presumptively to be applied to defendants whose judgments are not yet final.” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656, citing Estrada, 63 Cal.2d at 746).).
The Estrada presumption [of retroactivity] stems from our understanding that when the Legislature determines a lesser punishment is appropriate for a particular offense or class of people, it generally does not wish the previous, greater punishment—which it now deems too severe—to apply going forward. We presume the Legislature intends the reduced penalty to be used instead in all cases in which there is no judgment or a nonfinal one, and in which it is constitutionally permissible for the new law to control. (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 162, emphasis added.)
Finality is broadly construed by the courts but generally means where a criminal proceeding has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it. (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 677.)
Recently, we held that ‘a convicted defendant who [was] placed on probation after imposition of sentence [was] suspended, and who [did] not timely appeal from the order granting probation, [could] take advantage of ameliorative statutory amendments that [took] effect during a later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing sentence.’ We reasoned that the defendant's “prosecution had not been ‘reduced to final judgment at the time the ameliorative legislation was enacted as the criminal proceeding … [meaning it] ha[d] not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it (Internal citations omitted).” (People v. Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 677, citing People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 43-45.)[8]
Estrada’s inference of retroactivity has been applied when the Legislature creates “a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or to avoid punishment altogether.” (Burgos, supra in footnote, 16 Cal.5th at p. 13 citing People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624; see also People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81 [newly enacted affirmative defense applies retroactively].)
This bill would increase the burden of proof required to transfer a minor from juvenile court to adult criminal court from the current standard of clear and convincing evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this change would make it harder to transfer juveniles to adult criminal court, which would be considered an ameliorative change in the law,[9] Estrada’s inference of retroactivity would apply to nonfinal cases without specific direction from the Legislature. (See In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416 [New fitness hearing ordered after burden of proof in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 was increased from preponderance of evidence to clear and convincing evidence.])
- Argument in Support: According to Fresh Lifelines for Youth, “The bill raises the evidentiary standard at transfer hearings from “clear and convincing evidence” to “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maintains judicial discretion to transfer youth when appropriate but ensures the highest standard of proof is applied before imposing this irreversible decision. Aligns the standard of proof with the severe and permanent consequences of adult prosecution.
“In the juvenile legal system, transfer to adult criminal court is, as the California Supreme Court has recognized: “the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to inflict." (Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 810.) Yet under current law, that punishment can be imposed under a “clear and convincing” standard — a standard used in civil proceedings where the consequences are less severe. In adult criminal cases, the highest burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, is required because the consequence– deprivation of liberty– is the most severe power the state yields. Even in minor criminal matters that might have fewer consequences, like shoplifting or a traffic ticket, an adult cannot be convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
“For youth facing transfer hearings, the stakes could not be higher. Transferring a youth to adult court is a final, devastating judgment. When a juvenile court mistakenly sends a youth to adult court, they take away a young person's best opportunity for rehabilitation. If courts already recognize that the consequences of transfer on youth are uniquely severe, the standard of proof must also reflect that severity to minimize the risk of wrong decisions.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to the California District Attorneys Association, “After the standard was increased to a clear and convincing standard, there was a significant decrease in juvenile cases being transferred to criminal court jurisdiction. In 2023, there were a total of 36 transfer hearings and 12 of those cases were transferred to the criminal court. In 2024, there were a total of 24 transfer hearings, and 5 of those cases were transferred to the criminal court. [See Juvenile Justice in California 2023 and 2024, Office of the Attorney General]
“AB 1647 would unnecessarily increase the standard of proof to the highest legal standard, beyond a reasonable doubt. The bill would restrict the court’s ability to respond appropriately in the most egregious cases. A request to transfer a case to the criminal court is reserved for those cases that involve the most egregious and violent crimes of murder, rape with force, sodomy with force, lewd and lascivious sexual acts on children with force, mayhem and kidnapping.
“During a transfer hearing, a minor is afforded full due process protection and the ability to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. In 2024, SB 545 amended WIC 707(a) to require the court to consider the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery. The court must also consider evidence of a minor’s childhood trauma, their age, maturity, intellectual capacity, physical mental and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense, the effect of peer pressure on the minor’s actions and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment.
“This bill would make it nearly impossible to transfer the most serious cases to criminal jurisdiction. The highest burden, beyond a reasonable doubt, would increase public safety concerns.”
- Related Legislation: AB 2040 (Macedo) would reduce the burden of proof for transferring minors to adult criminal court from clear and convincing evidence to preponderance of the evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. AB 2040 is pending referral.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 2361 (Bonta), Chapter 330, Statutes of 2022, increased the burden of proof from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence for a court to find that a minor should be transferred to adult criminal court.
- AB 624 (Bauer-Kahan), Chapter 195, Statutes of 2021, made an order transferring a minor from a juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction subject to appeal, as specified.
- AB 1423 (Wicks), Chapter 583, Statutes of 2019, created a mechanism for the return of a case back to the juvenile court from the criminal court under certain circumstances.
- AB 2865 (Wicks), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, would have required a court to find that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction. AB 2865 was held in this Committee without a hearing.
- SB 439 (Mitchell), Chapter 1006, Statutes of 2018, prohibited the prosecution of a minor under the age of 12, unless the minor is alleged to have committed specified violent crimes.
- SB 1391 (Lara), Chapter 1012, Statutes of 2018, repealed the authority of a district attorney to make a motion to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction in a case in specified cases, unless the individual was not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction.
- SB 382 (Lara), Chapter 382, Statutes of 2015, enumerated certain factors that may be given weight within each of the criteria to be determined by a court in order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
- SB 1151 (Kuehl), of the 2003-2004 Legislative Session, would have clarified the definition of the “circumstances and gravity of the offense” for purposes of evaluating the fitness of a minor for juvenile court jurisdiction. SB 1151 was vetoed.
- AB 560 (Peace), Chapter 453, Statutes of 1994, lowered the age from 16 to 14 at which a juvenile could be transferred to adult criminal court and be tried as an adult for committing certain crimes.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
All of US or None (HQ)
Alliance for Boys & Men of Color
Anti-recidivism Coalition
Arts for Healing and Justice Network
California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
California United for a Responsible Budget (CURB)
Cancel the Contract
Children's Advocacy Institute
Children's Defense Fund-California
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ)
Courage California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Fresh Lifelines for Youth
Hang Out Do Good
Haywood Burns Institute
Hoops 4 Justice
Initiate Justice
Inside Out Writers
Justice2jobs Coalition
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Liberty Hill Foundation
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office
Loyola Law School's Youth Justice Education Clinic
Milpa Collective
National Center for Youth Law
National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform
Peace and Justice Law Center
Public Works Alliance
San Francisco Public Defender
Santa Cruz Barrios Unidos
Silicon Valley De-bug
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
The Change Parallel Project
The Children's Partnership
The Collective for Liberatory Lawyering
Tia Chucha's Centro Cultural
Ujima Adult and Family Services
Underground Grit
Urban Peace Institute
Youth Alliance
Youth Forward
Youth Leadership Institute
Opposition
California District Attorneys Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Chief Probation Officers' of California (CPOC)
Analysis Prepared by:
Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
AB 2361 (Bonta), Chapter 330, Statutes of 2022. ↑
Sen. Comm. On Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 31, 2022, p. 4. ↑
Juvenile Justice in California, 2024, CA Department of Justice, p. 38 https://data-openjustice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/Juvenile%20Justice%20In%20CA%202024%20final.pdf. (July 2024.) ↑
Id. at p. 45. ↑
Id. at p. 47. ↑
Technical Assistance: Maintaining Youth in Juvenile Court: Published Research, Office of Youth and Community Restoration (May 2023). ↑
The California Supreme Court in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1 ruled that a defendant was not eligible for a bifurcated trial on a gang enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 1109, as enacted in 2021 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.) The Court correctly rejected Estrada as applied to the defendant’s case because Penal Code section 1109 was not a criminal penalty reduction, but rather a “prophylactic rule of criminal procedure….” Accordingly, the general rule rejecting retroactivity unless otherwise specified by the statute controlled. In his concurrence, Justice Gorban asked the Legislature to consider the retroactive application of new laws, particularly where the statute is not a clear reduction of a criminal penalty, and to express their intent regarding whether any changes in that kind of legislation should be applied retroactively.
See also Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 161 (holding that “non-final” includes any case remanded following a habeas petition). ↑
See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 302 where California Supreme Court held that “[t]he possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment,” and concluded “[f]or this reason, Estrada's inference of retroactivity applies.” ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):