AB 1720: Ticket sellers.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2026-05-18
Current Status:
In Progress
(2026-08-13: In committee: Held under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law provides for the comprehensive regulation of ticket sellers, including a requirement to maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. For purposes of these provisions, existing law defines a ticket seller as any person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, sells admission tickets to an event, and defines a primary contractor as the person or organization who is responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold. Existing law makes it unlawful for a ticket seller to represent that they can deliver or cause to be delivered a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and to fail to deliver within a reasonable time or by a contracted time the tickets at or below the price stated or within the range of prices stated. Existing law requires a ticket seller to disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. Existing law makes a violation of the laws regulating ticket sellers a misdemeanor.
Existing law, with specified exceptions, makes unlawful advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction, as specified.
This bill, except as specified, would prohibit a ticket reseller, as defined, from selling a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket plus 10%, as specified, and would also prohibit a ticket reseller from advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges. The bill would prohibit a ticket resale marketplace, as defined, from charging more than 10% of the original face value of the ticket, as specified, and would require a ticket resale marketplace to require the ticket reseller to disclose the original price of the ticket, as described. The bill would require an original seller, as defined, to print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket. The bill would limit these provisions to the resale of tickets where the event is held at an independent venue, as specified. Because the bill would create new crimes, it would impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would make an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates these provisions subject to specified civil penalties and would authorize the Attorney General, county counsel, or city attorney to assess and recover those penalties in a civil action. By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law provides for the comprehensive regulation of ticket sellers, including a requirement to maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. For purposes of these provisions, existing law defines a ticket seller as any person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, sells admission tickets to an event, and defines a primary contractor as the person or organization who is responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold. Existing law makes it unlawful for a ticket seller to represent that they can deliver or cause to be delivered a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and to fail to deliver within a reasonable time or by a contracted time the tickets at or below the price stated or within the range of prices stated. Existing law requires a ticket seller to disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. Existing law makes a violation of the laws regulating ticket sellers a misdemeanor.
Existing law, with specified exceptions, makes unlawful advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction, as specified.
This bill, except as specified, would prohibit a ticket seller, reseller, as defined, from selling a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor plus 10%. The bill plus 10%, as specified, and would also prohibit a ticket seller reseller from advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or and charges charges. The bill would prohibit a ticket resale marketplace, as defined, from charging more than 10% of the original face value of the ticket, as specified, and would require a ticket seller resale marketplace to require the ticket reseller to disclose the original price of the ticket to the consumer. ticket, as described. The bill would require an original seller, as defined, to print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket. Because the bill would create new crimes, it would impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would make a ticket seller an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates these provisions subject to specified civil penalties and would authorize the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney to assess and recover those penalties in a civil action. By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law provides for the comprehensive regulation of ticket sellers, including a requirement to maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. For purposes of these provisions, existing law defines a ticket seller as any person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, sells admission tickets to an event, and defines a primary contractor as the person or organization who is responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold. Existing law makes it unlawful for a ticket seller to represent that they can deliver or cause to be delivered a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and to fail to deliver within a reasonable time or by a contracted time the tickets at or below the price stated or within the range of prices stated. Existing law requires a ticket seller to disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. Existing law makes a violation of the laws regulating ticket sellers a misdemeanor.
Existing law, with specified exceptions, makes unlawful advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction, as specified.
This bill, except as specified, would prohibit a ticket seller seller, as defined, from selling a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor plus 10%. The bill would also prohibit a ticket seller from advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or and charges and would require a ticket seller to disclose the original price of the ticket to the consumer. Because the bill would create a new crime, new crimes, it would impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would make a ticket seller that violates this prohibition these provisions subject to specified civil penalties and would authorize the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney to assess and recover those penalties in a civil action. By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law provides for the comprehensive regulation of ticket sellers, including a requirement to maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. For purposes of these provisions, existing law defines a ticket seller as any person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, sells admission tickets to an event, and defines a primary contractor as the person or organization who is responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold. Existing law makes it unlawful for a ticket seller to represent that they can deliver or cause to be delivered a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and to fail to deliver within a reasonable time or by a contracted time the tickets at or below the price stated or within the range of prices stated. Existing law requires a ticket seller to disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. Existing law makes a violation of the laws regulating ticket sellers a misdemeanor.
This bill, except as specified, would prohibit a ticket seller from selling a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor plus 10%. Because the bill would create a new crime, it would impose a state-mandated local program. The bill would make a ticket seller that violates this prohibition subject to specified civil penalties and would authorize the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney to assess and recover those penalties in a civil action. By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would make a nonsubstantive change to that provision.Existing law provides for the comprehensive regulation of ticket sellers, including a requirement to maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds.
This bill would make a nonsubstantive change to that provision.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Californias cultural and creative events, including concerts, live performances, nonprofit productions, festivals, and community events, are essential to the states cultural life and local economies.
(b)Independent venues, small businesses, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters serve as economic anchors and incubators for emerging artists across California.
(c)Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales, including price, transferability, and access, is an extension of that creative and economic investment.
(d)Certain industrial-scale resellers purchase large quantities of tickets at initial sale and relist them at prices significantly above face value, thereby reducing ticket availability at lawful prices. These resellers extract significant economic value from live music events without contributing to the creation, production, or promotion of those events.
(e)When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians and public trust in the ticketing marketplace erodes. Artists lose meaningful control over how their work reaches the public, undermining their ability to manage their careers and protect their livelihoods. The crews and venue staff who make live performances possible depend on the economic ecosystem surrounding those events.
(f)There is a distinction between true fans who resell a ticket due to changed plans and high-volume resale activity driven by systematic bulk purchasing and markup strategies. Artists have a legitimate interest in ensuring that their fans, not industrial resellers, have access to their performances at prices the artist intended.
(g)Violations of law relating to ticket sales often involve dozens or hundreds of tickets per event, requiring enforcement tools that scale proportionally to the harm.
(h)The objectives of the states policy with regard to ticket sellers include, but are not limited to, all of the following:
(1)Protecting the affordability of cultural and creative events in California.
(2)Ensuring that tickets are more likely to reach fans who intend to attend these events, not industrial resellers.
(3)Preserving and strengthening independent venues, nonprofit stages, and community-based small businesses.
(4)Promoting fairness, transparency, and integrity in the secondary ticket marketplace.
SEC. 2.Section 22502.5 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:22502.5.(a)(1)(A)A ticket reseller shall not sell or facilitate the sale of a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent.
(B)If a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market, the maximum resale price shall remain no more than 10 percent above the original purchase price.
(2)(A)The limit described in paragraph (1) shall apply to the total price paid by the consumer and includes any required fees charged by the original seller or any digital platform through which the ticket is sold.
(B)An original seller shall print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket.
(3)A ticket reseller shall not evade the price limitations described in paragraph (1) by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
(b)A ticket reseller shall not advertise, display, or offer a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than either of the following:
(1)Taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction.
(2)Postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
(c)(1)A ticket resale marketplace shall not charge more than 10 percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the reseller or the buyer of the ticket.
(2)A ticket resale marketplace shall require the ticket reseller to disclose, on the ticket resale marketplace platform listing, the original price of the ticket.
(d)(1)Upon an action brought by the Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel, an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates this section shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) per ticket sold for a first violation, and up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per ticket sold for subsequent violation. violations.
(2)A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of this section shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per ticket sold in violation of this section.
(e)The civil penalties described in subdivision (d) may be assessed and recovered in a civil action to enforce this section brought by the Attorney General, county counsel, or city attorney.
(f)In addition to the civil penalties described in subdivision (d), the Attorney General, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in an action to enforce this section shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.
(g)This section shall apply only to the resale of tickets where the event is held at an independent venue and where either of the following occur:
(1)The seating capacity of the venue is 3,000 individuals or fewer.
(2)The event is to be held at a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances.
(g)(h)This section shall not apply to any of the following:
(1)A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
(2)A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder.
(3)A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by, or under the authority of, a collegiate athletic association or a national governing body. The athletic contests or events described in this subparagraph include events hosted at large entertainment venues or arenas within the state and events involving collegiate athletic teams competing in tournaments or championship contests.
(4)A ticket to an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or Olympics.
(h)(i)For purposes of this section, the following terms apply:
(1)Collegiate or amateur championship sporting event includes, but is not limited to, postseason tournaments or neutral-site competitions conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, conference championships, bowl games, or similar nationally sanctioned collegiate athletic competitions.
(2)Independent venue means an event space that derives a majority of its revenue from ticket events, is not majority owned by a publicly traded company, and does not operate venues in more than 10 states.
(2)(3)Original seller means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
(3)(4)Professional sporting event means a sporting event conducted by, or under contract with, a professional sports team or professional sports league in which participating athletes receive compensation for participation in the event.
(4)(5)Resale means any resale of a ticket other than a sale conducted by the primary contractor or its authorized ticket agent.
(5)(6)Rights holder means an artist, performing arts organization, theater or dance company, professional athletic team, professional athletic league, author, lecturer, or any other persons who are the primary speakers or performers at an event for which tickets are sold.
(6)(7)Season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder means a person or entity that purchases or holds a contractual right to purchase a package of tickets directly from a professional sports team, league, or their authorized ticket agent for multiple games or events during a defined season.
(7)(8)Ticket resale marketplace means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
(8)(9)Ticket reseller means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Californias cultural and creative events, including concerts, live performances, nonprofit productions, festivals, and community events, are essential to the states cultural life and local economies.
(b)Independent venues, small businesses, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters serve as economic anchors and incubators for emerging artists across California.
(c)Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales, including price, transferability, and access, is an extension of that creative and economic investment.
(d)Certain industrial-scale resellers purchase large quantities of tickets at initial sale and relist them at prices significantly above face value, thereby reducing ticket availability at lawful prices. These resellers extract significant economic value from live music events without contributing to the creation, production, or promotion of those events.
(e)When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians and public trust in the ticketing marketplace erodes. Artists lose meaningful control over how their work reaches the public, undermining their ability to manage their careers and protect their livelihoods. The crews and venue staff who make live performances possible depend on the economic ecosystem surrounding those events.
(f)There is a distinction between true fans who resell a ticket due to changed plans and high-volume resale activity driven by systematic bulk purchasing and markup strategies. Artists have a legitimate interest in ensuring that their fans, not industrial resellers, have access to their performances at prices the artist intended.
(g)Violations of law relating to ticket sales often involve dozens or hundreds of tickets per event, requiring enforcement tools that scale proportionally to the harm.
(h)The objectives of the states policy with regard to ticket sellers include, but are not limited to, all of the following:
(1)Protecting the affordability of cultural and creative events in California.
(2)Ensuring that tickets are more likely to reach fans who intend to attend these events, not industrial resellers.
(3)Preserving and strengthening independent venues, nonprofit stages, and community-based small businesses.
(4)Promoting fairness, transparency, and integrity in the secondary ticket marketplace.
SEC. 2.Section 22502.5 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:22502.5.(a)(1)(A)A ticket seller reseller shall not sell or facilitate the sale of a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor. percent.
(B)If a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market, the maximum resale price shall remain no more than 10 percent above the original purchase price.
(2)(A)The limit described in paragraph (1) shall apply to the total price paid by the consumer and includes any required fees charged by the ticket original seller or any digital platform through which the ticket is sold.
(B)An original seller shall print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket.
(3)A ticket seller reseller shall not evade the price limitations described in paragraph (1) by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
(b)(1)A ticket seller reseller shall not advertise, display, or offer a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than either of the following:
(A)(1)Taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction.
(B)(2)Postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
(c)(1)A ticket resale marketplace shall not charge more than 10 percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the reseller or the buyer of the ticket.
(2)A ticket resale marketplace shall require the ticket seller shall also disclose reseller to disclose, on the ticket resale marketplace platform listing, the original price of the ticket to the consumer. ticket.
(c)A ticket seller shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per ticket sold in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) for a first violation, and up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for a subsequent violation. A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of subdivision (a) shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per ticket sold in violation of subdivision (a) or (b).(d)(1)Upon an action brought by the Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel, an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates this section shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) per ticket sold for a first violation, and up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per ticket sold for subsequent violation.
(2)A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of this section shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per ticket sold in violation of this section.
(d)(e)The civil penalties described in subdivision (c) (d) may be assessed and recovered in a civil action to enforce this section brought by the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney.
(e)(f)In addition to the civil penalties described in subdivision (c), (d), the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in an action to enforce this section shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.
(f)(g)This section shall not apply to any of the following:
(1)A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
(2)A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder.
(3)A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by, or under the authority of, a collegiate athletic association or a national governing body. The athletic contests or events described in this subparagraph include events hosted at large entertainment venues or arenas within the state and events involving collegiate athletic teams competing in tournaments or championship contests.
(4)A ticket to an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or Olympics.
(g)(h)For purposes of this section, the following terms apply:
(1)Collegiate or amateur championship sporting event includes, but is not limited to, postseason tournaments or neutral-site competitions conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, conference championships, bowl games, or similar nationally sanctioned collegiate athletic competitions.
(2)Original seller means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
(2)(3)Professional sporting event means a sporting event conducted by, or under contract with, a professional sports team or professional sports league in which participating athletes receive compensation for participation in the event.
(3)(4)Resale means any resale of a ticket other than a sale conducted by the primary contractor or its authorized ticket agent.
(5)Rights holder means an artist, performing arts organization, theater or dance company, professional athletic team, professional athletic league, author, lecturer, or any other persons who are the primary speakers or performers at an event for which tickets are sold.
(4)(6)Season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder means a person or entity that purchases or holds a contractual right to purchase a package of tickets directly from a professional sports team, league, or their authorized ticket agent for multiple games or events during a defined season.
(5)Ticket seller means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000) annually, sells or resells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment events, and includes any entity that operates a marketplace, exchange, or digital platform that sells, resells, or processes payments for tickets or enables consumers to purchase, sell, or resell tickets.(7)Ticket resale marketplace means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
(8)Ticket reseller means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Californias cultural and creative events, including concerts, live performances, nonprofit productions, festivals, and community events, are essential to the states cultural life and local economies.
(b)Independent venues, small businesses, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters serve as economic anchors and incubators for emerging artists across California.
(c)Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales, including price, transferability, and access, is an extension of that creative and economic investment.
(d)Certain industrial-scale resellers purchase large quantities of tickets at initial sale and relist them at prices significantly above face value, thereby reducing ticket availability at lawful prices. These resellers extract significant economic value from live music events without contributing to the creation, production, or promotion of those events.
(e)When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians and public trust in the ticketing marketplace erodes. Artists lose meaningful control over how their work reaches the public, undermining their ability to manage their careers and protect their livelihoods. The crews and venue staff who make live performances possible depend on the economic ecosystem surrounding those events.
(f)There is a distinction between true fans who resell a ticket due to changed plans and high-volume resale activity driven by systematic bulk purchasing and markup strategies. Artists have a legitimate interest in ensuring that their fans, not industrial resellers, have access to their performances at prices the artist intended.
(g)Violations of law relating to ticket sales often involve dozens or hundreds of tickets per event, requiring enforcement tools that scale proportionally to the harm.
(h)The objectives of the states policy with regard to ticket sellers include, but are not limited to, all of the following:
(1)Protecting the affordability of cultural and creative events in California.
(2)Ensuring that tickets are more likely to reach fans who intend to attend these events, not industrial resellers.
(3)Preserving and strengthening independent venues, nonprofit stages, and community-based small businesses.
(4)Promoting fairness, transparency, and integrity in the secondary ticket marketplace.
SEC. 2.Section 22502.5 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:22502.5.(a)(1)A ticket seller shall not sell or facilitate the sale of a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor plus 10 percent. contractor.
(b)(2)The limit described in subdivision (a) applies paragraph (1) shall apply to the total price paid by the consumer and includes any required fees charged by the ticket seller or any digital platform through which the ticket is sold.
(3)A ticket seller shall not evade the price limitations described in paragraph (1) by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
(b)(1)A ticket seller shall not advertise, display, or offer a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than either of the following:
(A)Taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction.
(B)Postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
(2)A ticket seller shall also disclose the original price of the ticket to the consumer.
(c)A ticket seller shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per ticket sold in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) for a first violation, and up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for a subsequent violation. A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of subdivision (a) shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per ticket sold in violation of subdivision (a). (a) or (b).
(d)The civil penalties described in subdivision (c) may be assessed and recovered in a civil action to enforce this section brought by the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney.
(e)In addition to the civil penalties described in subdivision (c), the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in an action to enforce this section shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.
(f)This section shall not apply to tickets to professional athletic events.(f)This section shall not apply to any of the following:
(1)A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
(2)A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder.
(3)A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by, or under the authority of, a collegiate athletic association or a national governing body. The athletic contests or events described in this subparagraph include events hosted at large entertainment venues or arenas within the state and events involving collegiate athletic teams competing in tournaments or championship contests.
(4)A ticket to an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or Olympics.
(g)For purposes of this section, the following terms apply:
(1)Collegiate or amateur championship sporting event includes, but is not limited to, postseason tournaments or neutral-site competitions conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, conference championships, bowl games, or similar nationally sanctioned collegiate athletic competitions.
(2)Professional sporting event means a sporting event conducted by, or under contract with, a professional sports team or professional sports league in which participating athletes receive compensation for participation in the event.
(3)Resale means any resale of a ticket other than a sale conducted by the primary contractor or its authorized ticket agent.
(4)Season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder means a person or entity that purchases or holds a contractual right to purchase a package of tickets directly from a professional sports team, league, or their authorized ticket agent for multiple games or events during a defined season.
(5)Ticket seller means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000) annually, sells or resells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment events, and includes any entity that operates a marketplace, exchange, or digital platform that sells, resells, or processes payments for tickets or enables consumers to purchase, sell, or resell tickets.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Californias cultural and creative events, including concerts, live performances, nonprofit productions, festivals, and community events, are essential to the states cultural life and local economies.
(b)Independent venues, small businesses, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters serve as economic anchors and incubators for emerging artists across California.
(c)Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales, including price, transferability, and access, is an extension of that creative and economic investment.
(d)Certain industrial-scale resellers purchase large quantities of tickets at initial sale and relist them at prices significantly above face value, thereby reducing ticket availability at lawful prices. These resellers extract significant economic value from live music events without contributing to the creation, production, or promotion of those events.
(e)When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians and public trust in the ticketing marketplace erodes. Artists lose meaningful control over how their work reaches the public, undermining their ability to manage their careers and protect their livelihoods. The crews and venue staff who make live performances possible depend on the economic ecosystem surrounding those events.
(f)There is a distinction between true fans who resell a ticket due to changed plans and high-volume resale activity driven by systematic bulk purchasing and markup strategies. Artists have a legitimate interest in ensuring that their fans, not industrial resellers, have access to their performances at prices the artist intended.
(g)Violations of law relating to ticket sales often involve dozens or hundreds of tickets per event, requiring enforcement tools that scale proportionally to the harm.
(h)The objectives of the states policy with regard to ticket sellers include, but are not limited to, all of the following:
(1)Protecting the affordability of cultural and creative events in California.
(2)Ensuring that tickets are more likely to reach fans who intend to attend these events, not industrial resellers.
(3)Preserving and strengthening independent venues, nonprofit stages, and community-based small businesses.
(4)Promoting fairness, transparency, and integrity in the secondary ticket marketplace.
SEC. 2.Section 22502.5 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:22502.5.(a)A ticket seller shall not sell a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor plus 10 percent.
(b)The limit described in subdivision (a) applies to the total price paid by the consumer and includes any required fees charged by the ticket seller or any digital platform through which the ticket is sold.
(c)A ticket seller shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per ticket sold in violation of subdivision (a) for a first violation, and up to two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for a subsequent violation. A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of subdivision (a) shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per ticket sold in violation of subdivision (a).
(d)The civil penalties described in subdivision (c) may be assessed and recovered in a civil action to enforce this section brought by the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney.
(e)In addition to the civil penalties described in subdivision (c), the Attorney General, or a district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in an action to enforce this section shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.
(f)This section shall not apply to tickets to professional athletic events.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SECTION 1.Section 22501 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:22501.Each ticket seller shall maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds.A Each ticket seller shall maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Aug 13, 2026 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| Aug 3, 2026 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 1, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 8. Noes 4.) (June 30). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 29, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on JUD. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (June 29). Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 22, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on P., D.T., & C.P. (Ayes 6. Noes 2.) (June 22). Re-referred to Com. on P., D.T., & C.P. |
| Jun 10, 2026 | Referred to Coms. on B. P. & E.D., P., D.T., & C.P. and JUD. |
| Jun 1, 2026 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 28, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 49. Noes 16. Page 5536.) |
| May 28, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 49. Noes 16.) |
| May 19, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 18, 2026 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| May 14, 2026 | Joint Rule 62(a), file notice suspended. (Page 5030.) |
| May 14, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 3.) (May 14). |
| May 14, 2026 | Joint Rule 62(a), file notice suspended. |
| May 13, 2026 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| May 6, 2026 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| Apr 20, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 4.) (April 16). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 15, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 14, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 9, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 8, 2026 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 7, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 6. Noes 1.) (April 7). |
| Mar 23, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on A.,E.,S., & T. |
| Mar 19, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on A.,E.,S., & T. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 19, 2026 | Referred to Coms. on A.,E.,S., & T., P. & C.P. and JUD. |
| Feb 6, 2026 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 8. |
| Feb 5, 2026 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 3, 2026 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 30, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Jun 29, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Judiciary] | Senate Standing Committee on Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
|
| Jun 22, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection] | Senate Standing Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development |
Passed |
|
| May 28, 2026 | AB 1720 Haney Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 14, 2026 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 16, 2026 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
|
| Apr 7, 2026 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| 1720 Warehouse | ** Support | |
| 72 Music Management | ** Support | |
| 72 Music MGMT | ** Support | |
| Advance Redding | ** Support | |
| American Association of Independent Music | ** Support | |
| American Federation of Musicians | ** Support | |
| Artist Rights Alliance | ** Support | |
| Association of Performing Arts Professionals | ** Support | |
| Attorney General Bonta | ** Against | |
| Biscuits and Blues | ** Support | |
| Black Music Action Coalition | ** Support | |
| Bright Light Strategies | ** Support | |
| Cafe Colonial and the Colonial Theater | ** Support | |
| California Arts Advocates | ** Support | |
| California Black Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California Hispanic Chambers Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California League of United Latin American Citizens | ** Against | |
| California League of United Latin American Citizens (ca Lulac) | ** Against | |
| California Live Events Equity Alliance | ** Against | |
| California Multicultural Business Alliance | ** Against | |
| Central City Association Of Los Angeles | ** Against | |
| Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition | ** Against | |
| Central Valley Yemen Society | ** Against | |
| Coalition For Ticket Fairness | ** Against | |
| Consumer Federation Of California | ** Against | |
| Fan Alliance | ** Support | |
| Folk Alliance International | ** Support | |
| FOX THEATER | ** Support | |
| Future of Music Coalition | ** Support | |
| Gametime | ** Against | |
| Ground Control Touring | ** Support | |
| Harlow's | ** Support | |
| Hispanic 100 | ** Against | |
| hispanic chambers of commerce san francisco | ** Against | |
| Ineffable Music Group | ** Support | |
| Internet.Works | ** Against | |
| Latin American and Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Latin American & Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Latin Business Association | ** Against | |
| Like Management | ** Support | |
| Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. | ** Support | |
| Lucky Man Management | ** Support | |
| Moe's Alley | ** Support | |
| Mongrel Music | ** Support | |
| Music Artists Coalition | ** Support | |
| Music Artists Coalition (MAC) | ** Support | |
| Music Box San Diego | ** Support | |
| Music Managers Forum - US | ** Support | |
| National Action Network Sacramento | ** Against | |
| National Baptist Convention Usa, INC | ** Against | |
| National Independent Talent Organization | ** Support | |
| National Independent Venue Association Of California | ** Support | |
| National Independent Venue Association of California (NIVA-CA) | ** Support | |
| Nederlander Concerts | ** Support | |
| North Valley Yemen Society | ** Against | |
| OAKLAND; CITY OF | ** Support | |
| Oppose Unless Amended | ** Against | |
| Pantone 294 | ** Against | |
| Paradise Artists, INC. | ** Support | |
| Paramount Theatre of the Arts, INC. | ** Support | |
| Partisan Arts | ** Support | |
| Progressive Policy Institute | ** Against | |
| Recording Academy | ** Support | |
| Recording Industry Association Of America | ** Support | |
| Roam | ** Support | |
| SAG-AFTRA | ** Support | |
| Seatgeek | ** Against | |
| Si Se Puede Fresno, Kings, Kern, Tulare | ** Against | |
| Si Se Puede Fresno, Tulare, Kings & Kern | ** Against | |
| Soda Bar | ** Support | |
| Songwriters of North America | ** Support | |
| Sound Talent Group | ** Support | |
| Sports Fans Coalition | ** Against | |
| Stuart Ross Management | ** Support | |
| Stubhub, INC. | ** Against | |
| Tba Agency | ** Support | |
| TBA Agency, LLC | ** Support | |
| Technet | ** Against | |
| The Boardwalk | ** Support | |
| Ticket Policy Forum | ** Against | |
| Tickpick | ** Against | |
| TickPicks | ** Against | |
| Turlock Community Theater | ** Support | |
| United Musicians and Allied Workers | ** Support | |
| Valley Industry and Commerce Association (VICA) | ** Against | |
| Venue Pilot | ** Support |
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1720 (Haney) - Ticket sellers
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1720 prohibits ticket resellers from selling a ticket for more than 10 percent above the original ticket price, subject to certain exemptions and parameters, and prohibits resellers from advertising, displaying, or offering a ticket price that does not include all mandatory fees or charges.
Fiscal Impact:
- The Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates costs of $1.6 million in FY 2026-27, $1.0 million in FY 2027-28, $812,000 in FY 2028-29, and $582,000 ongoing annually (Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Fund) to address an expected increase in enforcement workload for its Public Rights Division.
- Unknown court cost pressures (General Fund and special funds) to the extent the Attorney General (AG) brings civil actions against any person who violates the new requirements and restrictions regarding ticket pricing and advertising in resale marketplaces. Actual costs will depend on the number of actions filed and the time required to adjudicate each case.
- Unknown, potentially significant court cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund and General Fund) as the UCL and general statutes governing ticket sellers provide a private right of action for consumers. Although trial courts are not funded based on workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for additional court resources. For context, the proposed 2026-27 Governor’s Budget would provide $70 million in General Fund support to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Unknown local county costs to the extent that a six-month misdemeanor jail sentence is imposed, though incarceration for this offense appears unlikely. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $80,000. For historical context, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail costs in 2021, averaging roughly $90,000 per incarcerated person. Actual county incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
Background:
In recent years, some original sellers, venues, promoters, and artists have increasingly utilized dynamic pricing models for ticket sales. Under dynamic pricing, the price of a ticket may fluctuate based on factors such as consumer demand, seat location, event popularity, timing of the sale, and overall market conditions. Similar to pricing models used in the airline, hospitality, and ride-sharing industries, dynamic pricing allows ticket prices to increase or decrease after tickets are initially offered for sale. As a result, consumers seeking tickets for the same event may encounter substantial price variation before a ticket ever enters the secondary market.
Supporters of dynamic pricing argue that it allows artists, venues, and event organizers to capture a greater share of the market value of high-demand events rather than leaving those gains to secondary-market resellers. Critics contend that dynamic pricing can make ticket costs less predictable for consumers and may result in substantially higher prices during periods of peak demand.
Ticket Prices and Secondary Market Resales. Proponents of resale price restrictions have argued that consumers are increasingly priced out of live entertainment events when tickets purchased at face value are subsequently offered for resale at substantially higher prices. Following several high-profile concert tours and other live events, policymakers, consumer advocates, and regulators have raised concerns that the use of automated purchasing technologies and large-scale resale activity may contribute to reduced ticket availability at face value and increased prices in secondary markets. Congressional hearings, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions, and legislative proposals in numerous states have examined whether certain resale practices make it more difficult for consumers to purchase tickets directly from authorized sellers and increase the prices consumers ultimately pay to attend live events.
At the same time, questions remain regarding the extent to which high resale prices reflect unlawful or unfair conduct as opposed to consumer demand, limited ticket supply, artist pricing decisions, venue capacity constraints, inventory allocation decisions, or other market factors. While policymakers have identified concerns regarding ticket affordability and marketplace transparency, proposals that impose resale price caps focus on regulating the resale price of a lawfully acquired ticket, whereas California’s existing ticketing laws have generally focused on deceptive conduct, ticket delivery obligations, and marketplace transparency. This bill raises the policy question of whether restrictions on resale prices are an appropriate mechanism for addressing ticket affordability concerns in the secondary market.
Although California law already prohibits certain unfair ticketing practices, policymakers continue to examine whether existing statutes provide sufficient clarity regarding modern ticketing practices, including speculative ticket sales, deceptive online ticketing websites, and consumer understanding of whether a ticket is being offered by an authorized seller or through a resale marketplace. Policymakers have increasingly explored whether additional statutory clarification is warranted to address these practices while preserving legitimate ticketing, resale, and consumer transfer rights.
Proposed Law:
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling a ticket for more than the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent.
- Provides that this limit shall apply to the total price paid by the consumer and include any fees charged by the original seller or digital platform.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from evading this limit by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
- Requires the maximum resale price of a ticket, if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, to remain no more than 10 percent above the original purchase price, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market.
- Requires an original seller to print or display the original purchase price of a ticket on the ticket.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from advertising a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges, other than taxes or fees imposed by the government, or postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
- Prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging more than 10 percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the reseller or buyer of the ticket.
- Requires a ticket resale marketplace to require a ticket reseller to disclose the original price of the ticket on the ticket resale marketplace platform listing.
- Provides that the above provisions apply only to the resale of tickets for events at an independent venue where either of the following occurs:
- The seating capacity of the venue is 3,000 individuals or fewer.
- The event is to be held at a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances.
- Exempts the following from the above provisions:
- A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
- A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or licenseholder.
- A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by a college athletic association or a national governing body.
- A ticket to an athletic contest, event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics.
- Provides that, upon an action brought by the AG, a city attorney, or a county counsel, an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates the above provisions shall be liable for a civil penalty of $1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation and up to $2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violations. Provides that a knowing and willful pattern or practice of violating this section shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per ticket.
- Provides that the AG, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in action to enforce the above provisions shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Independent venue” means an event space that derives a majority of its revenue from ticket events, is not majority owned by a publicly traded company, and does not operate venues in more than 10 states.
- “Original seller” means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
- “Ticket resale marketplace” means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
- “Ticket reseller” means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
- States legislative findings and declarations.
Related Legislation:
AB 1349 (Bryan, 2026) revises and expands prohibitions and requirements relating to speculative ticket sales. AB 1349 is pending in this committee.
-- END --
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1720 (Author:Haney)
Version: May 18, 2026
Hearing Date: June 30, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: AWM
SUBJECT
Ticket sellers
DIGEST
This bill prohibits persons, including ticket resale marketplaces, from selling a ticket for more than 10 percent of the original ticket price, unless the ticket is to an event that is not held at an independent venue; or the event is at an independent venue that seats more than 3,000 individuals, or that is not a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events; or the ticket is for an event that is a professional athletic contest, a collegiate or amateur athletic contest covered pursuant to the collegiate athletic association or national governing body, or an athletic contest or event in which athletes represent foreign nations, including the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics; or if the ticket is for an athletic contest and being sold by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The war on tickets has been a years-long effort, with various pieces of legislation grappling with the issues posed by both the primary and secondary markets. This bill is the latest battleground and seeks to address high ticket prices in the secondary market.
This bill seeks to curb costly resold tickets by establishing a 10 percent cap on tickets sold by ticket resellers. The bill further imposes various disclosure requirements on ticket resellers and the original market. Notably, however, this bill applies only to independent venues that have either a capacity of fewer than 3,000 people or are held at a nonprofit venue hosting live performances at agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events, and exempts certain event types from its application, including the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics.
This bill is sponsored by the author. This bill is opposed by a number of organizations, including consumer groups, small business organizations, and equity groups. The Senate Business, Professions and Economic Development passed this bill with a vote of 6-2, and the Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection passed this bill with a vote of 5-2.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act, which prohibits the use of automated bots to circumvent ticket purchase limits set by ticket sellers. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits selling or offering to sell an event ticket obtained using an automated bot if the seller participated in, had the ability to control, or should have known about the violation. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
Existing state law:[1]
- Declares it unlawful for a person to intentionally use or sell software or services to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure (including limits on the number of tickets a person can purchase) that is used to ensure an equitable ticket-buying process for event attendees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22502.5.)
- Defines a “ticket seller” as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22503.)
- Clarifies that the following are not ticket sellers for purposes of existing law:
- An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier, or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package.
- Any person who sells six tickets or fewer to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the event premises, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
- The person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold, or a seller of tickets operating under a written contract with this person or organization.
- Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 22503.5, 22503.6, 22504, 22511.)
- Requires a ticket seller to have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation. Makes a violation of this requirement a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, a fine not exceeding $2,500, or by both ,and provides for civil penalties of up to $2,500 for violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22500.)
- Requires ticket sellers to do all of the following:
- Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22501.)
- Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22502.)
- Make any partial or full deposit refundable if received on a future event for which tickets are not available, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent, until such time as tickets for the event are actually available. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22506.)
- Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event that is canceled. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22507(a).)
- Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22507(b).)
- Provide that a local jurisdiction may require a bond of not more than $50,000 to cover required refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22507(d).)
- Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22508.)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller:
- Has lawful possession of the ticket;
- Has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or
- Informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, that it does not have possession of the ticket, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22502.1.)
- Provides that it is unlawful for a ticket seller to represent that they can deliver or cause to be delivered a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and to fail to deliver within a reasonable time, or by a contracted time, the tickets at or below the price stated or within the range of prices stated. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22502.2.)
- Provides that, in addition to other remedies, a ticket seller who violates 6) or 7) and fails to supply a ticket at or below a contracted price or price range shall be civilly liable to the ticket purchaser for two times the contracted price of the ticket, in addition to any sum expended by the purchaser in nonrefundable expenses for attending or attempting to attend the event in good faith reliance on seat or space availability, and reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22502.3.)
- Deems a violation of the chapter of the Business and Professions Code containing the provisions related to ticket sellers to be a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22505.)
- Prohibits any person who does not have the written permission of the owner or operator of the property on which an entertainment event is to be held, or is being held, from selling tickets to the entertainment event, which were obtained for the purpose of resale, at any price which is in excess of the price that is printed or endorsed upon the ticket, while on the grounds of or in the stadium, arena, theater, or other place where an event for which admission tickets are sold is to be held or is being held. (Pen. Code, § 346.)
This bill:
- Makes findings and declarations relating to the importance of California’s cultural and creative events, independent and small venues, and artists; and to the problem of ticketing resale marketplaces.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling or facilitating the sale of a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent.
- Provides that, if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market, the maximum resale price shall remain no more than 10 percent above the original purchase price.
- Requires an original seller to print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from evading the price limitations in 2) by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than either of the following:
- Taxes or fees imposed by a government on the transaction.
- Postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
- Prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging more than 10 percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the reseller or buyer of the ticket.
- Provides that the Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel may bring an action against an original seller, a ticket reseller, or a ticket resale marketplace that violates this measure, and may recover the following:
- A civil penalty of up to $1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation.
- A civil penalty of up to $2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violations.
- A civil penalty of up to $5,000 per ticket sold for a knowing and willful pattern and practice of violations.
- Injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of proceeds.
- Provides that the 10 percent resale cap applies only to the resale of tickets where the event is held at an independent venue and either of the following conditions is met:
- The seating capacity of the venue is 3,000 individuals or fewer.
- The event is to be held at a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances.
- Additionally provides that the 10 percent resale cap does not apply to the following ticket types:
- A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
- A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder.
- A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by, or under the authority of, a collegiate athletic association or a national governing body, including events hosted at large entertainment venues or arenas within the state and events involving collegiate athletic teams competing in tournaments or championship contests.
- A ticket to an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or Olympics.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Collegiate or amateur championship sporting event” includes, but is not limited to, postseason tournaments or neutral-site competitions conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), conference championships, bowl games, or similar nationally sanctioned collegiate athletic competitions.
- “Independent venue” means an event space that derives a majority of its revenue from ticket events, is not majority-owned by a publicly traded company, and does not operate venues in more than 10 states.
- “Original seller” means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
- “Professional sporting event” means a sporting event conducted by, or under contract with, a professional sports team or professional sports league in which participating athletes receive compensation for participation in the event.
- “Resale” means any resale of a ticket other than a sale conducted by the primary contractor or its authorized agent.
- “Rights holder” means an artist, performing arts organization, theater or dance company, professional athletic team, professional athletic league, author, lecturer, or any other persons who are the primary speakers or performers at an event for which tickets are sold.
- “Season ticketholder” or “season ticket licenseholder” means a person or entity that purchases or holds a contractual right to purchase a package of tickets directly from a professional sports team, league, or their authorized ticket agent for multiple games or events during a defined season.
- “Ticket resale marketplace” means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
COMMENTS
- Author’s comment
According to the author:
For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.
Concert tickets aren’t stocks to be flipped for profit. They’re a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we’ve let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion’s share of the money. They didn’t write the songs. They didn’t build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn’t put on the show. But they’re the ones cashing in. That’s not fair, and it’s not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.
2. Background on the markets for events tickets and the pending lawsuit against Live Nation/Ticketmaster
The Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee’s analysis of this bill explains the state of the markets for event tickets:
Whenever someone purchases a ticket directly from a venue, event organizer, or their online ticket platform, they are buying from the primary market. These types of ticket sellers are generally referred to as original sellers. Many venues elect to use a third party to facilitate their online ticket sales. The prices of the primary market heavily impact availability and the prices on the secondary market, but generally, the primary market may sell tickets below market value. This is done to ensure a full show and to maximize venue and event expenses, such as merchandise, food, and drink.
The secondary market refers to ticket resellers. Platforms like StubHub, SeatGeek, TickPick, Vivid Seats, and others are all marketplaces that facilitate transactions between a potential consumer and a ticket reseller, who initially purchased the ticket from the primary market. Resellers, who are generally not associated with these platforms, use the secondary marketplace to secure valid, authentic transactions between themselves and consumers. They also provide consumers who, for various reasons, may no longer be able to attend the event with a way to recoup some of their money.
Further complicating this landscape is the fact that there can be overlap between the primary and secondary markets. For instance, Ticketmaster, which facilitates primary market sales, also has a resale platform.
As explained by the Senate Business, Professions and Economic Development Committee’s analysis of this bill, the state of the law may leave something to be desired:
California’s ticket seller regulations were largely enacted before the widespread adoption of online ticket marketplaces, digital ticketing systems, mobile ticket transfers, and sophisticated resale platforms. Today, consumers purchase, transfer, and resell tickets through a variety of online channels that did not exist when many of the ticketing statutes were first enacted. While technological advances have increased convenience and expanded access to tickets, they have also introduced new challenges relating to speculative ticket sales, automated purchasing software, deceptive online practices, fee transparency, and restrictions on ticket transferability. Policymakers, regulators, artists, venues, ticketing companies, and consumer advocates have increasingly focused on whether existing laws adequately protect consumers in the modern ticketing marketplace.
Another confounding factor in the ticketing market is the Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly. In 2010, concert producer Live Nation and ticketing and marketing company Ticketmaster were given authorization to merge.[2] The merger was approved subject to a consent decree that, among other things, was intended to prevent Live Nation from retaliating against a venue that used a ticketing company other than Ticketmaster.[3] In 2019, the DOJ alleged that Live Nation/Ticketmaster violated the consent decree, and the company settled with the government.[4]
Five years later, the Unted States Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the attorneys general of over 30 states (including California) sued Live Nation/Ticketmaster for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act by engaging in illegal monopolization.[5] In 2026, on the eve of trial, the USDOJ settled with Live Nation/Ticketmaster.[6] Reports indicate that Live Nation’s president and CEO spoke to President Donald Trump shortly before the USDOJ announced the settlement.[7] Thirty-three states’ attorneys general carried on with the lawsuit, however, and won a full victory at trial: the jury found that Live Nation/Ticketmaster operated as a monopoly that harmed consumers and overcharged ticket buyers.[8]
The remedies phase of the trial is expected to take place in early 2027. The states’ remedies proposal, joined by Attorney General Rob Bonta, asks the court to require Live Nation to divest its ownership of Ticketmaster.[9]
As the Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee’s analysis notes, Live Nation/Ticketmaster is also a major ticket reseller. The 2024 complaint alleges that Ticketmaster makes up about one-third of the secondary market, and that Live Nation/Ticketmaster employs technology that makes it harder for fans to resell their tickets on rival secondary ticketing platforms.[10]
3. This bill imposes a 10 percent resale price cap on event tickets in a limited number of venues and event types
This bill prohibits any person reselling a ticket—including individuals and professional resellers—from charging more than 10 percent above the price they paid for the original ticket in select circumstances. Specifically, this resale cap applies when all of the following circumstances are met:
- The event is held in an independent venue, i.e., a venue that derives a majority of its revenues from ticket events, is not held by a publicly traded corporation, and is not owned by an entity with venues in more than 10 states.
- The independent venue either (1) has a seating capacity of 3,000 or fewer, or (2) is held at a nonprofit venue that also hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events.
- The event is not a professional athletic contest or event.
- The event is not an athletic contest for which the ticket is being sold by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder.
- The event is not a college or amateur contest event conducted by a collegiate athletic association, e.g., the NCAA.
- The event is not an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, expressly including the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics.
It further prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging fees over 10 percent and requires ticket resale marketplaces to obtain and display pricing information about the resale ticket. The bill also requires original sellers to print or display the original purchase price on tickets.
This bill can be enforced only by the Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel. In the event of a violation, a violating original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace can be liable for civil penalties as follows:
- A civil penalty of up to $1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation.
- A civil penalty of up to $2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violations.
- A civil penalty of up to $5,000 per ticket sold for a knowing and willful pattern and practice of violations.
- Injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of proceeds.
4. Stakeholder concerns related to this bill’s relationship to the ongoing Live Nation/Ticketmaster lawsuit
Although the bill expressly carves out tickets sold at venues owned by Live Nation/Ticketmaster, through its carve-out for venues “not majority owned by a publicly traded company” and which do “not operate venues in more than 10 states,” some of the bill’s opponents are still concerned that this bill will serve to cement Live Nation/Ticketmaster’s monopoly. For example, the Consumer Federation of California writes:
What does all this have to do with AB 1720? Quite a lot, as it turns out. The Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly is a massive vertically integrated monopoly. It directly represents hundreds of the largest artists in entertainment. It owns a dominant number of outdoor amphitheaters important to the live music infrastructure. It has a dominant position in terms of promoting and putting together artist tours. It forces venues of many sizes, particularly mid-sized and smaller venues, to sign long-term exclusive ticketing agreements with the monopoly, and greases these transactions with additional payments (sometimes called kickbacks by critics of the monopoly). It dominates the primary ticketing market, with a roughly 80% market share – clearly monopoly sized. It also is the largest player in the secondary ticketing market - a market which also includes some of the few competitors to the Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly, such as Stub Hub, Vivid, SeatGeek, Gametime and a few others.
This last point is why AB 1720 should be voted down by the California Legislature. Monopolies never admit they are monopolies, and monopolies will do anything to enhance their monopoly and market power. Were AB 1720 to become law the main beneficiary of the bill would actually be the monopoly itself. How? The bill caps prices and profits for the precious few competitors to the monopoly but does nothing to limit the monopoly's predatory behavior against consumers and others. But what about the talking point that the monopoly itself will be trimmed under this bill? This is essentially known as a loss-leader strategy - the monopoly pretends to be making a big sacrifice for consumers, but their real objective is to harm the economics of the secondary ticketing industry such that this limited competition would be diminished and ultimately eliminated. Does anybody actually think that if the monopoly gained more control over the secondary ticketing market this would be good for consumers in the long run? Only a monopolist would defend such an action.
To be clear, CFC is repelled by some of the prices that we see in the secondary market. That sentence, by the way, applies not just to the secondary ticketing market companies mentioned above but also to the monopoly itself, as the largest player in the secondary market. But CFC is also repelled by the monopolistic behavior of Live Nation/Ticketmaster detailed in the original federal DOJ complaint with regards to all other aspects of their business, of which secondary is only a part of it (and a relatively recent part at that, created largely to stymie the forces of competition that monopolies have always hated).
If you're going to do some sort of price cap or limit on resale value it must be combined with a number of discreet and specific actions against the monopoly, none of which are in AB 1720. None. In fact, AB 1720 goes out of its way to create even more loopholes in its own pricing regime by conveniently exempting all professional sports from the bill! That's a massive giveaway for one of the worst offenders of ticketing excess and anti-consumer behavior.
5. Arguments in opposition
According to a coalition of consumer, small business, community, and equity groups:
The fundamental issue in today’s ticketing market is the entrenched monopoly power of Live Nation/Ticketmaster. This vertically integrated conglomerate controls ticketing, promotions, and venues. Roughly 80% of all primary ticketing sales occur on Ticketmaster. Its dominance has produced excessive fees, opaque pricing, and widespread consumer harm. Recently revealed internal company communications describe fans as “so stupid” and boast about “robbing them blind” - the predictable result of unchecked market power.
Yet just weeks ago, the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice entered into a deeply flawed settlement with Live Nation/Ticketmaster, which was widely criticized as a concession that failed to restrain the company’s behavior. The vast majority of states, including California, have rejected that deal and are continuing their case. When federal enforcement falls short, it is even more vital that California act to rein in monopoly practices—not shift the burden onto consumers.
Instead, AB 1720 is myopically focused on limiting the price at which consumers can resell their tickets, even though resale accounts for only a small fraction – roughly 9 percent – of total ticket sales. Meanwhile, Ticketmaster’s monopoly retains full control over how much they can charge on primary sales. They can continue to engage in anti-consumer tactics like dynamic pricing, exclusive pre-sales, and inventory holdbacks, all of which drive up costs and reduce access.
AB 1720’s approach also raises serious equity and consumer protection concerns. Many consumers, particularly low-income Californians, depend on resale as a financial safety valve when plans change. Tying resale limits to the “original price” is unworkable in a primary marketplace defined by secrecy, where consumers often have no clear way to determine what the original price was. As a result, individuals could be forced to sell at a loss or risk violating the law, while Ticketmaster continues to “rob fans blind” and perpetuate the same anti-consumer practices that were the focus of President Biden’s antitrust lawsuit.
AB 1720 regulates consumers instead of monopolies, hurts competition, and deepens inequities in access to live events. Californians deserve real reforms that directly confront Ticketmaster’s monopoly power, increase transparency, and restore fairness in the ticketing marketplace.
SUPPORT
None received
OPPOSITION
California Black Chamber of Commerce
California League of United Latin American Citizens
California Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
California Live Events Equity Alliance
California Multicultural Business Alliance
Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition
Central Valley Yemen Society
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Gametime
Hispanic 100
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce San Francisco
Latin American & Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
National Action Network Sacramento
North Valley Yemen Society
Pantone 294
SeatGeek
Si Se Puede Fresno, Kings, Kern, Tulare
TickPick
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending legislation: AB 1349 (Bryan, 2025) revises and expands existing laws prohibiting speculative ticketing and misleading resale ticketing practices. AB 1349 is pending before this Committee and is set to be heard on the same date as this bill.
Prior legislation:
AB 1291 (Lee, 2025) would have required a ticket seller to immediately provide proof of purchase to a consumer and required a venue operator to honor that proof of purchase in lieu of a ticket, as specified. AB 1291 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
SB 785 (Caballero, 2024) would have prohibited the advertisement, sale, or contract for a ticket if a ticket seller did not own, possess, have constructive possession, or have the contractual right to sell a ticket and prohibited ticket sellers or ticket resale marketplaces from using an internet website with the intent to mislead. SB 785 died on the Assembly Inactive File.
PRIOR VOTES
Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 5, Noes 2)
Senate Business, Professions and Economic Development Committee (Ayes 6, Noes 2)
Assembly Floor (Ayes 49, Noes 16)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 3)
Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 4)
Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee (Ayes 6, Noes 1)
**************
Many of these provisions would be revised by AB 1349 (Bryan, 2025), which is also pending before this Committee. ↑
See Joint Press Release Issued By Live Nation, Inc./Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1335258/000119312510012287/dex991.htm. ↑
Lorsch, Why Live Nation and Ticketmaster dominate the live entertainment industry (Jan. 25, 2023) CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/01/25/the-live-nation-and-ticketmaster-monopoly-of-live-entertainment.html. ↑
Ibid. ↑
See United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. et al. (S.D.N.Y.) Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 257, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1370191/dl. ↑
See United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. et al. (S.D.N.Y.) Notice of Settlement, Dkt. No. 1171, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1443801/dl. ↑
Atkins, Trump spoke with Live Nation’s Head before DOJ reached surprise antitrust settlement (June 25, 2026) NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-spoke-live-nation-ceo-doj-antitrust-settlement-rcna351766. ↑
Sarmiento, Jury finds that Live Nation acted as a monopoly and overcharged ticket buyers (Apr. 15, 2026) NPR, https://www.npr.org/2026/04/15/nx-s1-5786715/live-nation-ticketmaster-antitrust-verdict-monopoly. ↑
California Department of Justice, Press Release: Attorney General Bonta Asks Court to Break Up Live Nation/Ticketmaster (May 21, 2026) https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-asks-court-break-live-nationticketmaster. ↑
United States, et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. et al. (S.D.N.Y.) Amended Complaint, supra, at p. 17. ↑
SENATE PRIVACY, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION COMMITTEE
Senator Christopher Cabaldon, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1720 (Author:Haney)
Version: May 18, 2026
Hearing Date: June 29, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: BD
SUBJECT
Ticket sellers.
DIGEST
This bill prohibits ticket resellers from selling a ticket for more than 10 percent of the original ticket price, subject to certain exemptions and parameters.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The war on tickets has been a years-long effort, with various pieces of legislation grappling with the issues posed by both the primary and secondary markets. This bill is the latest battleground and seeks to address high ticket prices in the secondary market. According to the National Independent Talent Organization, buyers were charged an average markup of 203 percent of the ticket’s face value on the secondary market. Similarly, the average face value price of a ticket was $67.47, while the average resale cost was $129.22. These markups affect large events and small events alike, leaving consumers who were unable to secure a ticket on the primary market subject to these high prices.
This bill seeks to curb these costly tickets by establishing a 10 percent cap on tickets sold by ticket resellers. The bill further imposes various disclosure requirements on ticket resellers and the original market. Notably, however, this bill only applies to independent venues that have either a capacity of less than 3,000 people or are held at a nonprofit venue hosting live performances at agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events, and exempts certain event types from its application. This bill is sponsored by the National Independent Venue Association – California, National Independent Talent Organization, and Music Artists Coalition. It is supported by numerous artist and venue organizations. It is opposed by StubHub and other organizations. The bill passed out of the Senate Business Professions and Economic Development Committee on a vote of 6 to 2. Should the bill pass out of this Committee, it will next be heard by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Establishes the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act, which prohibits the use of automated bots to circumvent ticket purchase limits set by ticket sellers. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits selling or offering to sell an event ticket obtained using an automated bot if the seller participated in, had the ability to control, or should have known about the violation. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits any person who does not have the written permission of the owner or operator of the property on which an entertainment event is to be held or is being held, from selling tickets to the entertainment event, which were obtained for the purpose of resale, at any price which is in excess of the price that is printed or endorsed upon the ticket, while on the grounds of or in the stadium, arena, theater, or other place where an event for which admission tickets are sold is to be held or is being held. A violation of this law constitutes a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code § 346.)
- Declares it unlawful for a person to intentionally use or sell software or services to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure (including limits on the number of tickets a person can purchase) that is used to ensure an equitable ticket-buying process for event attendees. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.5.)
- Defines a “ticket seller” as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22503.)
- Clarifies that the following are not ticket sellers for purposes of existing law:
- An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier, or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package.
- Any person who sells six tickets or less to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the event premises, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
- The person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold, or a seller of tickets operating under a written contract with this person or organization.
- Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22503.5, 22503.6, 22504, 22511.)
- Requires a ticket seller to have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation. Makes a violation of this requirement a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or by both and provides for civil penalties of up to $2,500 for violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22500.)
- Requires ticket sellers:
- Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22501.)
- Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.)
- Make any partial or full deposit refundable if received on a future event for which tickets are not available, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent, until such time as tickets for the event are actually available. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22506.)
- Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event that is canceled. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(a).)
- Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(b).)
- Provide that a local jurisdiction may require a bond of not more than $50,000 to cover required refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(d).)
- Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22508.)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller:
- Has lawful possession of the ticket;
- Has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or
- Informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, that it does not have possession of the ticket, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.1.)
- Deems a violation of the chapter of the Business and Professions Code containing the provisions related to ticket sellers to be a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22505.)
This bill:
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling a ticket for more than the original price for the ticket plus 10 percent.
- Provides that this limit shall apply to the total price paid by the consumer and include any fees charged by the original seller or digital platform.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from evading this limit by imposing separate charges, processing fees, delivery fees, or other charges not included in the original ticket price in excess of 10 percent.
- Requires the maximum resale price of a ticket, if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, to remain no more than 10 percent above the original purchase price, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market.
- Requires an original seller to print or display the original purchase price of a ticket on the ticket.
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from advertising a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes or fees imposed by the government or postage or carriage charges that will be reasonably and actually incurred to ship the ticket to the consumer.
- Prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging more than 10 percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the reseller or buyer of the ticket.
- Requires a ticket resale marketplace to require a ticket reseller to disclose, on the ticket resale marketplace platform listing, the original price of the ticket.
- Provides that the above provisions apply only to the resale of tickets for events at an independent venue and where either of the following occurs:
- The seating capacity of the venue is 3,000 individuals or fewer.
- The event is to be held at a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances.
- Exempts the following from the above provisions:
- A ticket to a professional athletic contest or event.
- A ticket to an athletic contest by a season ticketholder or licenseholder.
- A ticket to a collegiate or amateur athletic contest or event conducted by a college athletic association or a national governing body.
- A ticket to an athletic contest or event, tournament, or series of games or matches involving athletes or teams representing foreign nations, including, but not limited to, the FIFA World Cup or Olympics.
- Provides that, upon an action brought by the Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel, an original seller, ticket reseller, or ticket resale marketplace that violates the above provisions shall be liable for $1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation and up to $2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violations. Provides that a knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of this section shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per ticket.
- Provides that the Attorney General, county counsel, or city attorney, who prevails in action to enforce the above provisions shall be entitled to injunctive relief, restitution, or disgorgement of any proceeds obtained as a result of the violation.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Independent venue” means an event space that derives a majority of its revenue from ticket events, is not majority owned by a publicly traded company, and does not operate venues in more than 10 states.
- “Original seller” means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
- “Ticket resale marketplace” means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
- “Ticket reseller” means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
COMMENTS
- Welcome to ticket land
The digital age has had profound impacts on many industries and aspects of life; this includes the ticketing world. Long gone are the days of camping out overnight to secure a ticket to see one’s favorite artist, sports team, or performer. Nowadays, the battle at the box office begins online, and warfare can continue far after a ticket is initially sold. This is largely due to the current dynamics and methodology of ticket buying, which can be split into two categories: the primary market and secondary market.
Whenever someone purchases a ticket directly from a venue, event organizer, or their online ticket platform, they are buying from the primary market. These types of ticket sellers are generally referred to as original sellers. Many venues elect to use a third party to facilitate their online ticket sales. The prices of the primary market heavily impact availability and the prices on the secondary market, but generally, the primary market may sell tickets below market value. This is done to ensure a full show and to maximize venue and event expenses, such as merchandise, food, and drink.
The secondary market refers to ticket resellers. Platforms like StubHub, SeatGeek, TickPick, Vivid Seats, and others are all marketplaces that facilitate transactions between a potential consumer and a ticket reseller, who initially purchased the ticket from the primary market. Resellers, who are generally not associated with these platforms, use the secondary marketplace to secure valid, authentic transactions between themselves and consumers. They also provide consumers who, for various reasons, may no longer be able to attend the event with a way to recoup some of their money.
Further complicating this landscape is the fact that there can be overlap between the primary and secondary markets. For instance, Ticketmaster, which facilitates primary market sales, also has a resale platform.
Tickets listed on the secondary market can often be much more expensive than those on the primary market. Tickets sold out on the primary market are often subject to even higher markups. In 2023, the National Independent Talent Organization, which is a sponsor of this bill, conducted a study on ticket resales and found that buyers were charged an average markup of 203 percent of the ticket’s face value on the secondary market. Similarly, the average face value price of a ticket was $67.47, while the average resale cost was $129.22.[1] This, quite evidently, leads to serious consumer frustration.
This bad blood was especially pronounced during Taylor Swift’s 2024 Eras Tour. Tickets in the primary market were roughly a few hundred dollars. However, due to increasingly high demand, living out a consumer’s love story with a resold ticket was quite an expensive endeavor:
Prices to see Swift at one of her final nine shows in the United States have increased following the release of the album April 19, with the average get-in-the-door price — the lowest price available — hovering around $2,600 per ticket, according to data from TicketIQ. That means it would cost a couple more than $5,000 just to be in the same building as Swift in Miami (Oct 18-20), New Orleans (Oct 25-27) and Indianapolis (Nov. 1-3) [in 2024].[2]
Due to these resale opportunities, there exists an entire world of professional ticket brokers and resellers who purchase tickets from the primary market with the express intent of reselling them on the secondary market. Inherently, ticket brokers have a competitive edge over the average consumer:
Brokers whose business is to purchase and resell tickets have a competitive advantage over individual consumers because they have the technology and resources to purchase large numbers of tickets as soon as they go on sale. Some consumer advocates, state officials, and event organizers believe that brokers unfairly use this advantage to obtain tickets from the primary market, which restricts ordinary consumers from buying tickets at face value. As a result, consumers may pay higher prices than they would if tickets were available on the primary market. In addition, some event organizers and primary ticket sellers have expressed frustration that the profits from the higher resale price accrue to brokers who have not played a role in creating or producing the event.[3]
Exacerbating this disparity are technological tools used to secure tickets (bots). Bots are commonly employed by ticket brokers to ensure that they can readily attain a large quantity of tickets:
When tickets first go on sale, bots can complete multiple simultaneous searches of the primary ticket seller’s website and reserve or purchase hundreds of tickets, according to the 2016 report by the New York State Office of the Attorney General. Seats reserved by a bot—even if ultimately not purchased— appear online to a consumer as unavailable. This, in turn, can make inventory appear artificially low during the first minutes of the sale and lead consumers to the secondary market to seek available seats, according to event organizers we interviewed. Bots can also automate the ticket-buying process, as well as identify when additional tickets are released and available for purchase. During its investigation of the ticketing industry, the New York State Office of the Attorney General identified an instance in which a bot bought more than 1,000 tickets to a single event in 1 minute.[4]
That is not to say that the primary market does not have its own substantial issues. Mainly, the primary market is dominated by Live Nation, which owns Ticketmaster, the main primary ticket vendor. In 2024, the United States Department of Justice joined multiple state and district attorneys to file an antitrust lawsuit against Live Nation. As explained by the initial filing:
Live Nation directly manages more than 400 musical artists and, in total, controls around 60% of concert promotions at major concert venues across the country. Live Nation also owns or controls more than 265 concert venues in North America, including more than 60 of the top 100 amphitheaters in the United States. For comparison, its closest rival owns no more than a handful of top amphitheaters. And, of course, through Ticketmaster, Live Nation controls roughly 80% or more of major concert venues’ primary ticketing for concerts and a growing share of ticket resales in the secondary market.[5]
Among other anticompetitive conduct, the complaint accused Live Nation of retaliation, acquiring competitors, locking out competition, and restricting artist access to venues.[6] In early 2026, the United States Department of Justice announced a settlement agreement, which, among other items, placed limits on long-term exclusivity contracts, required a 50-50 split on exclusivity agreements, and required partial divestment. However, this settlement was rejected by numerous state attorneys general out of concern that the settlement was too lenient and did not break up Live Nation’s monopoly. The remaining attorneys general proceeded with the antitrust suit, leading to a jury finding Live Nation liable for harming consumers through anticompetitive conduct. Following this verdict, various remedies have been sought. As explained by a press release for California Attorney General Rob Bonta:
“A jury found Live Nation manipulated the market, hurt artists, fans, and businesses nationwide, all while getting richer — not because it is better, but because it acted illegally. Now, it’s time to ensure they can’t hurt consumers or the live ticketing industry again,” said Attorney General Bonta. “Today, alongside a bipartisan coalition, I asked the court to break up Live Nation and Ticketmaster. It is vital that we secure strong structural remedies that prevent Live Nation’s anticompetitive conduct from continuing. As evidence in our trial clearly showed, we cannot trust this behemoth of a company to do the right thing by consumers.”[7]
2. Price caps
In response to high ticket prices, price caps have emerged as a potential solution. As explained by the GAO:
Several states have caps on the price at which tickets can be resold, while others have repealed caps and some studies have questioned their enforceability. For example, Kentucky generally prohibits the resale of event tickets for more than either face value or the amount charged by the venue, and Massachusetts prohibits resale by brokers of most tickets for more than $2 above face value, with the exception of relevant service charges. New Jersey allows a maximum markup of 20 percent or $3 (whichever is greater) for nonbrokers and a maximum markup of 50 percent for registered brokers, but does not limit resale prices for nonbrokers for sales over the Internet. A number of other states— including Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Connecticut—repealed their price cap laws in the 2000s.
However, the New York State Attorney General’s 2016 report recommended bringing back a price cap, through a “reasonable limit” on resale markups. Price caps are generally intended to protect consumers from high markups and increase the fairness of ticket distribution so that the wealthiest consumers do not have disproportionate access to tickets. In theory, price caps offer consumers the advantages of nontransferable tickets without the disadvantages: they limit high secondary-market prices but still allow consumers to transfer tickets to others or resell tickets they cannot use.[8]
While price caps do have their benefits, there have also been concerns raised about their limitations. The same GAO report notes that enforcement can be challenging, can create economic inefficiencies, and force resale activity underground.[9] Additionally, fraud is often cited as a primary reason why price caps may be ineffective. However, fraud in the ticketing world is, unfortunately, already commonplace. As aptly noted by the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee:
The unfortunate reality is whenever there is a concert, game, or other extremely popular team, artist or event, people will find a way to defraud consumers, completely unrelated to whether there is a price cap or not. For decades, along with ticket fraud fans, artists and sports teams have had to contend with bootlegged music and movies and counterfeit sports jerseys and other memorabilia.
Furthermore, in the context of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour, the high prices in the United States were not seen in European countries. In fact, fans calculated that it would actually be cheaper to purchase flights, book a hotel, and spend a few days in Europe while still being less expensive than a ticket in the United States.[10] Billboard proposes the following argument:
In countries like France, Germany and the Netherlands, ticket resellers face limits on how much tickets can be marked up on secondary sites — typically 20% over face value. Other countries like the United Kingdom allow resale but restrict who is allowed to post tickets for resale and give artists and event promoters the right to take some resale ticket listings down.[11]
This argument appears to have gained traction across the nation. Multiple states are considering ticket caps in 2026, with Maine already passing one in 2025.[12]
3. What this bill does
This bill seeks to address these high ticket prices by capping the resale price of a ticket to 10 percent above the original purchase price of a ticket, including fees, and requires ticket resellers to disclose the original price of the ticket. It further prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging fees over 10 percent and requires ticket resale marketplaces to obtain and display pricing information about the resale ticket. The bill also requires original sellers to print or display the original purchase price on tickets. Lastly, this bill authorizes public enforcement for violations of the aforementioned provisions.
Importantly, this bill applies only to ticket resales for events held at an independent venue with a seating capacity of 3,000 or fewer, or at a non-profit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events featuring live performances. It also exempts tickets to professional athletic events, season ticket holder tickets, tickets to collegiate athletics association events, the FIFA World Cup, and the Olympics.
According to the author:
For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.
Concert tickets aren’t stocks to be flipped for profit. They’re a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we’ve let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion’s share of the money. They didn’t write the songs. They didn’t build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn’t put on the show. But they’re the ones cashing in. That’s not fair, and it’s not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.
It is important to note the harsh limitations of this bill. The bill only applies to small, independent venues. It, therefore, excludes large venues that host world-famous artists, performers, and talent. Arguably, these events would be the ones that need a price cap the most, as they are the events subject to the highest markups. As aptly noted by the Senate Business, Professions, and Economic Development Committee, if the bill is intended to address excessive resale prices and improve ticket affordability, it is noteworthy that it excludes the events where fans and consumers are most likely to encounter the very practices it seeks to address. In the worst-case scenario, this bill could implicitly endorse the view that price caps should not apply to larger venues and record-breaking shows, leaving consumer harm unaddressed.
4. Stakeholder positions
A coalition of artist groups and venues, including the California Arts Advocates, writes in support:
The need is clear. Professional ticket flippers and bots routinely buy up large quantities of tickets within seconds, shutting out real fans and immediately relisting at extreme markups. Across 65 shows studied nationwide, secondary-market prices averaged roughly twice face value. Here in California, general-admission tickets priced at $32 have been resold for $56, $61, $200, and in some cases more than $4,000 for the exact same seat. This is not a competitive market working as intended; it is industrial-scale extraction that pulls revenue away from the artists, crews, venues, and local economies that actually create live events.
It is important to be clear about what AB 1720 does and does not do. The bill targets the brokers and resellers who dominate the resale market and aggregate inventory across multiple platforms. It does not target legitimate, consumer-to-consumer resale by fans whose plans change. By removing the financial incentive for bulk speculation, AB 1720 helps ensure more tickets reach real fans at prices closer to what artists intended.
The Consumer Federation of California writes in opposition:
This last point is why AB 1720 should be voted down by the California Legislature. Monopolies never admit they are monopolies, and monopolies will do anything to enhance their monopoly and market power. Were AB 1720 to become law the main beneficiary of the bill would actually be the monopoly itself. How? The bill caps prices and profits for the precious few competitors to the monopoly but does nothing to limit the monopoly's predatory behavior against consumers and others. But what about the talking point that the monopoly itself will be trimmed under this bill? This is essentially known as a loss-leader strategy - the monopoly pretends to be making a big sacrifice for consumers, but their real objective is to harm the economics of the secondary ticketing industry such that this limited competition would be diminished and ultimately eliminated. Does anybody actually think that if the monopoly gained more control over the secondary ticketing market this would be good for consumers in the long run? Only a monopolist would defend such an action.
A group of secondary market platforms, including SeatGeek, write in opposition:
Resale platforms compete by enabling third-party sellers, who very often offer fans lower prices than the primary seller, i.e., Ticketmaster. Sellers offering below-face-value prices are why Ticketmaster frequently imposes resale price floors on consumers whose plans change after they purchase tickets. In a future Ticketmaster-dominated resale world with price floors, there will be little-to-no room for discounting. This will eliminate price competition and consumers seeking less expensive resale tickets will lose.
SUPPORT
American Association of Independent Music
American Federation of Musicians
Artist Rights Alliance
Black Music Action Coalition
California Arts Advocates
Fan Alliance
Folk Alliance International
Future of Music Coalition
Music Artists Coalition
Music Artists Coalition (MAC)
Music Managers Forum - US
National Independent Talent Organization
National Independent Venue Association of California (NIVA-CA)
Oakland; City of
Recording Academy
Recording Industry Association of America
Sag-aftra
Songwriters of North America
Venue Pilot
OPPOSITION
California Black Chamber of Commerce
California Hispanic Chambers of Commerce (CHCC)
California League of United Latin American Citizens (ca Lulac)
California Live Events Equity Alliance
California Multicultural Business Alliance
Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Gametime
Hispanic 100
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco
Latin American and Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
National Action Network Sacramento
National Baptist Convention Usa, INC
North Valley Yemen Society
Pantone 294
Seatgeek, INC.
Si Se Puede Fresno, Tulare, Kings & Kern
Stubhub, INC.
Ticket Policy Forum
Tickpick, LLC
Valley Industry and Commerce Association (VICA)
RELATED LEGISLATION
AB 1349 (Bryan, 2026) would prohibit speculative ticket sales, bolster existing law related to software and service circumvention to purchase tickets, and prohibit the use of deceptive practices for the purpose of selling or reselling tickets. AB 1349 is set to be heard in this Committee on the same day as this bill.
AB 1291 (Lee, 2025) would have required a ticket seller to immediately provide proof of purchase to a consumer and required a venue operator to honor that proof of purchase in lieu of a ticket, as specified. AB 1291 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
SB 785 (Caballero, 2024) would have prohibited the advertisement, sale, or contract for a ticket if a ticket seller did not own, possess, have constructive possession, or have the contractual right to sell a ticket and prohibited ticket sellers or ticket resale marketplaces from using an internet website with the intent to mislead. SB 785 died on the Assembly Inactive File.
AB 2808 (Wicks, 2024) would have prohibited a contract between a primary ticket seller and a venue operator from providing for the primary ticket reseller to be the exclusive ticket seller of an event and prohibited a contract between the two from being longer than three years. AB 2808 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
SB 478 (Dodd, Ch. 378, Stats. 2023) made it an unlawful business practice pursuant to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act to advertise, display, or offer a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes imposed by a government.
AB 8 (Friedman, 2023) would have required all-in ticket pricing and transparency on the fees and would have required ticket sellers to allow for the transferability of tickets. AB 8 was held in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 829 (Wilk, 2023) prohibited the operator of an entertainment facility and a primary ticket seller from entering into a contract that provides for the primary ticket seller to be the exclusive ticket seller for the operator of the entertainment facility. SB 829 died in the Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee.
AB 1556 (Friedman, Ch. 180, Stats. 2021) required for cancelled events, that a refund be made within 30 calendar days of the cancellation; and requires a ticket price at any event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time be fully refunded to the purchaser by the ticket seller upon request within 30 calendar days of the refund request.
SB 342 (Hertzberg, Ch. 162, Stats. 2020) made it unlawful to register, traffic in, or use the name of a professional sports team or the names of professional sports leagues, among others, in a domain or subdomain name of a website to sell tickets in a fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading manner. It provided a private right of action to a person who suffers an economic injury as a result of such misconduct.
AB 329 (Pan, Ch. 325, Stats. 2013) made it a misdemeanor to intentionally use or sell software to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure on a ticket seller’s website that is used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process.
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 49, Noes 16)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 3)
Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 4)
Assembly Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee (Ayes 6, Noes 1)
**************
NITO Ticket Study (2023) National Independent Talent Organization, https://nitolive.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/NITO-Ticket-Resale-Study.pdf. All internet citations are current as of June 24, 2026. ↑
Dave Brooks, Why are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets so much Cheaper in Europe? (May 5, 2024) Billboard, https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/. ↑
Event Ticket Sales: Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues (April 2018) United States Government Accountability Office. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-347.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/File%20stamp%20LNE%20Complaint.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Attorney General Bonta Asks Court to Break Up Live Nation/Ticketmaster (May 21, 2026) Office of Attorney General, https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-asks-court-break-live-nationticketmaster. ↑
Event Ticket Sales: Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues (April 2018) United States Government Accountability Office. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-347.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Dave Brooks, Why are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets so much Cheaper in Europe? (May 5, 2024) Billboard, https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/. ↑
Dave Brooks, Why are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets so much Cheaper in Europe? (May 5, 2024) Billboard, https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/. ↑
Nicole Ogrysko, Maine’s new ticketing transparency law could be a model for others, music industry advocates say (June 20, 2025) Maine Public, https://www.mainepublic.org/business-and-economy/2025-06-20/maines-new-ticketing-transparency-law-could-be-a-model-for-others-music-industry-advocates-say. ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BUSINESS, PROFESSIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Senator Dr. Aisha Wahab, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: Hearing Date: June 22, 2026
Author: | |||
Version: |
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Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
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Subject:
SUMMARY:
Establishes resale price restrictions for certain live entertainment tickets and imposes related requirements on ticket resellers, ticket resale marketplaces, and original sellers. Requires specified pricing disclosures, limits resale markups and fees for covered tickets, and authorizes enforcement and civil penalties for violations. Excludes numerous transactions and events, including sporting events and many large-scale entertainment events, thereby limiting the bill’s application to only a subset of consumers affected by ticket scarcity and high resale prices.
NOTE: This bill is triple-referred to the Senate Committee on Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection second and Senate Committee on Judiciary third.
Existing law:
- Defines a ticket seller as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. Clarifies that the following are not a ticket seller subject to various requirements:
- An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package accomplished through the primary event promoter or his or her agent by written agreement.
- Any person who sells six tickets or less to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the premises where the event is to take place, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
- Any primary contractor (defines as the person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold) or seller of tickets for the primary contractor operating under a written contract with the primary contractor.
- Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Business and Professions Code (BPC) §§ 22503.6, 225034, 22511)
- Establishes various requirements for ticket sellers, a violation of which constitutes a misdemeanor, including that they:
- Have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation, a violation of which constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or by both. Provides that a person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in a violation of this specific requirement is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $2,500 for each violation.
- Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds.
- Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets.
- Make any partial or full deposit received on a future event for which tickets are not available refundable, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent until tickets for the event are actually available.
- Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller.
- Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event which is canceled.
- Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time
- Provide a bond of not more $50,000 to provide for any refunds in a local jurisdiction that requires this.
- Disclose in any advertisement or promotion for any event that a service charge is imposed and added to the actual ticket price. (Business and Professions Code §§ 22500 – 22511)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller has lawful possession of the ticket; has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or informs the purchaser the seller does not have possession of the tickets, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price, as specified. Authorizes a ticket seller to accept a deposit from a prospective purchaser as part of an agreement that the ticket seller will make best efforts to obtain a ticket at a specified price or price range and within a specified time, provided that the ticket seller informs the purchaser orally at the time of the contract or receipt of consideration, whichever is earlier, and in writing within two days, of the terms of the deposit agreement, and includes in the oral and written notice other required disclosures. (BPC § 22502.1)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from representing that they can deliver or cause to be delivered a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and fail to deliver within a reasonable time at or below or within the price and range of prices stated. Specifies that a ticket seller who violated this prohibition and violates 3) above is civilly liable to the ticket purchaser for two times the contracted price of the ticket, in addition to any sum expended in trying to attend the event, and reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs. (BPC §§ 22052.2 and 22052.3)
- Prohibits a person from using, selling, offering for sale, or advertising software designed to circumvent a ticket seller's security measures, access controls, or other controls used to ensure an equitable ticket-buying process. Makes it unlawful to use software or other technological means to purchase tickets in excess of posted limits for online ticket sales. (BPC § 22505.5)
This bill:
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from reselling certain tickets for more than 10 percent above the original purchase price of the ticket, including specified fees.
- Prohibits a ticket resale marketplace from charging fees that exceed specified limits in connection with the resale of covered tickets to the reseller or buyer.
- Requires ticket resellers to disclose the original purchase price of a ticket offered for resale.
- Requires ticket resale marketplaces to obtain and display specified pricing information regarding tickets offered for resale.
- Requires original sellers to print or display the original purchase price on tickets subject to the bill.
- Authorizes civil penalties and enforcement actions against original sellers, ticket resellers, and ticket resale marketplaces that violate the bill's provisions.
- Limits the bill’s application to specified live entertainment events held at independent venues with a seating capacity of 3,000 or fewer or a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances.
- Excludes specified venues, events, and transactions from the bill’s requirements by exempting tickets for sporting events, including professional, collegiate, amateur, Olympic, FIFA World Cup, and other specified athletic events.
- Makes various definitions.
- States legislative findings and declarations that California's cultural and creative events, including concerts, nonprofit productions, festivals, and community events, contribute significantly to the state's cultural life and economy and that independent venues, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters play an important role in supporting artists and local communities. States that artists have a legitimate interest in establishing the terms and conditions under which tickets to their performances are sold, including pricing, transferability, and access. Further finds and declares that certain high-volume ticket resellers acquire tickets in bulk and resell them at significant markups, reducing ticket availability at original prices and increasing costs for consumers. Declares that resale practices may undermine ticket affordability, limit access to events, erode public confidence in the ticket marketplace, and interfere with artists' ability to control how tickets to their performances are distributed. States that California's policy objectives include protecting the affordability of cultural and creative events, increasing the likelihood that tickets reach fans rather than industrial-scale resellers, supporting independent venues and community-based entertainment organizations, and promoting fairness, transparency, and integrity in the secondary ticket marketplace.
FISCAL EFFECT:
This bill is keyed fiscal by Legislative Counsel. According to the Assembly Committee on Appropriations, the bill will result in possible costs to the DOJ of an unknown amount. By adding new requirements for ticket sellers, ticket resellers, and ticket resale marketplaces, this bill provides additional bases for enforcement by DOJ. If DOJ hires staff to handle enforcement actions authorized by this bill, the department would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs. The bill will also result in cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and misdemeanor charges and possible incarceration costs of an unknown but potentially significant amount.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill is sponsored by National Independent Venue Association – California, Music Artists Coalition, and National Independent Talent Organization. According to the Author, “For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists. Concert tickets aren’t stocks to be flipped for profit. They’re a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we’ve let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion’s share of the money. They didn’t write the songs. They didn’t build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn’t put on the show. But they’re the ones cashing in. That’s not fair, and it’s not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.”
- Background. California’s ticket seller regulations were largely enacted before the widespread adoption of online ticket marketplaces, digital ticketing systems, mobile ticket transfers, and sophisticated resale platforms. Today, consumers purchase, transfer, and resell tickets through a variety of online channels that did not exist when many of the ticketing statutes were first enacted. While technological advances have increased convenience and expanded access to tickets, they have also introduced new challenges relating to speculative ticket sales, automated purchasing software, deceptive online practices, fee transparency, and restrictions on ticket transferability. Policymakers, regulators, artists, venues, ticketing companies, and consumer advocates have increasingly focused on whether existing laws adequately protect consumers in the modern ticketing marketplace.
Federal regulators have devoted significant attention to ticketing-related consumer protection concerns in recent years. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has identified hidden fees, deceptive pricing practices, and the use of automated software to circumvent ticket purchasing restrictions as practices that can harm consumers and impair fair competition. In 2024, the FTC adopted its Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Fees, commonly referred to as the “Junk Fees Rule,” which requires greater transparency in ticket pricing and seeks to ensure that consumers receive meaningful information regarding the total cost of a ticket before making purchasing decisions. The FTC has also pursued enforcement actions under the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act against entities alleged to have used automated technologies, multiple accounts, and other means to evade ticket purchasing limits designed to provide equitable access to tickets.
At the same time, federal antitrust scrutiny of the live entertainment industry has continued to increase. In 2010, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) approved the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster subject to conditions intended to address competition concerns. In 2019, the DOJ announced that Live Nation had violated portions of the consent decree governing the merger and extended the decree through 2025. Following highly publicized ticketing issues associated with major concert tours and broader concerns regarding competition in the live entertainment marketplace, the DOJ and a coalition of state attorneys general, including California, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Live Nation Entertainment and Ticketmaster in 2024. The litigation alleges conduct affecting competition in concert promotion, venue services, and ticketing, and reflects ongoing national debate regarding competition, consumer choice, and access to live entertainment events.
The Legislature has considered numerous measures over the past decade intended to address evolving issues in the ticketing marketplace. AB 329 (Pan, Chapter 325, Statutes of 2013) prohibited the use and sale of software designed to circumvent ticket purchasing controls intended to ensure an equitable ticket-buying process. AB 1556 (Friedman, Chapter 180, Statutes of 2021) strengthened consumer protections relating to cancelled, postponed, and rescheduled events by establishing refund requirements. Subsequent legislative efforts have explored a range of consumer protection issues including fee transparency, all-in pricing, resale marketplace disclosures, speculative ticket sales, deceptive practices, ticket transferability, and consumer understanding of ticket transactions. In addition, broader consumer protection measures such as SB 478 (Dodd, Chapter 740, Statutes of 2023), California's Honest Pricing Law, reflect increasing interest in ensuring transparency and fairness in transactions involving mandatory fees.
Ticket Distribution and Inventory Allocation. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has observed that tickets for live entertainment events may be distributed through multiple channels before a general public on-sale occurs, including artist and fan club presales, venue and promoter allocations, sponsorship agreements, credit card partnerships, premium seating programs, season ticket holder programs, and other contractual or promotional arrangements. As a result, the number of tickets available to the general public during an initial public on-sale may represent only a portion of the total ticket inventory for an event.
The allocation of ticket inventory may also affect the relationship between an artist’s stated ticket price and the prices consumers ultimately encounter in the marketplace. While artists, promoters, and venues generally establish the initial face value of tickets, the inventory available at that price may be affected by presales, reserved ticket allocations, premium ticketing programs, venue holds, sponsorship agreements, and other distribution practices. Consequently, consumers may encounter a range of prices for the same event depending on when tickets become available, the distribution channel through which they are offered, and the level of demand for the event. These factors have contributed to ongoing policy discussions regarding the extent to which high ticket prices are attributable to resale activity, inventory allocation decisions, event popularity, venue capacity, consumer demand, or other market dynamics.
Dynamic Ticket Pricing. In recent years, some original sellers, venues, promoters, and artists have increasingly utilized dynamic pricing models for ticket sales. Under dynamic pricing, the price of a ticket may fluctuate based on factors such as consumer demand, seat location, event popularity, timing of the sale, and overall market conditions. Similar to pricing models used in the airline, hospitality, and ride-sharing industries, dynamic pricing allows ticket prices to increase or decrease after tickets are initially offered for sale. As a result, consumers seeking tickets for the same event may encounter substantial price variation before a ticket ever enters the secondary market.
Supporters of dynamic pricing argue that it allows artists, venues, and event organizers to capture a greater share of the market value of high-demand events rather than leaving those gains to secondary-market resellers. Critics contend that dynamic pricing can make ticket costs less predictable for consumers and may result in substantially higher prices during periods of peak demand.
Ticket Prices and Secondary Market Resales. Proponents of resale price restrictions have argued that consumers are increasingly priced out of live entertainment events when tickets purchased at face value are subsequently offered for resale at substantially higher prices. Following several high-profile concert tours and other live events, policymakers, consumer advocates, and regulators have raised concerns that the use of automated purchasing technologies and large-scale resale activity may contribute to reduced ticket availability at face value and increased prices in secondary markets. Congressional hearings, FTC enforcement actions, and legislative proposals in numerous states have examined whether certain resale practices make it more difficult for consumers to purchase tickets directly from authorized sellers and increase the prices consumers ultimately pay to attend live events.
At the same time, questions remain regarding the extent to which high resale prices reflect unlawful or unfair conduct as opposed to consumer demand, limited ticket supply, artist pricing decisions, venue capacity constraints, inventory allocation decisions, or other market factors. While policymakers have identified concerns regarding ticket affordability and marketplace transparency, proposals that impose resale price caps focus on regulating the resale price of a lawfully acquired ticket, whereas California’s existing ticketing laws have generally focused on deceptive conduct, ticket delivery obligations, and marketplace transparency. This bill raises the policy question of whether restrictions on resale prices are an appropriate mechanism for addressing ticket affordability concerns in the secondary market.
Although California law already prohibits certain unfair ticketing practices, policymakers continue to examine whether existing statutes provide sufficient clarity regarding modern ticketing practices, including speculative ticket sales, deceptive online ticketing websites, and consumer understanding of whether a ticket is being offered by an authorized seller or through a resale marketplace. Policymakers have increasingly explored whether additional statutory clarification is warranted to address these practices while preserving legitimate ticketing, resale, and consumer transfer rights.
- Arguments in Support. The Music Artists Coalition writes that “The problem is clear: professional scalpers and automated bots purchase large quantities of tickets and resell them at extreme markups. These resellers extract significant economic value from live music events without contributing to their creation, production, or promotion. These practices not only price out everyday fans but also divert revenue away from the artists, venues, and staff who work tirelessly to create memorable live experiences. The data bears this out: fans now pay an average of 200% above face value, with some markups reaching 30%, pricing out everyday Californians and eroding trust in the live event marketplace… Independent venues, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters are the backbone of California's live music economy. These small businesses and organizations serve as incubators for emerging artists and provide vital economic support to local communities. When industrial resellers siphon ticket revenue out of this ecosystem, it is the venues, crew members, and local economies that suffer. AB 1720 ensures that the economic value of live events stays with the people and places that make them possible.”
Supporters state “The need is clear. Professional ticket flippers and bots routinely buy up large quantities of tickets within seconds, shutting out real fans and immediately relisting at extreme markups. Across 65 shows studied nationwide, secondary-market prices averaged roughly twice face value. Here in California, general-admission tickets priced at $32 have been resold for $56, $61, $200, and in some cases more than $4,000 for the exact same seat. This is not a competitive market working as intended; it is industrial-scale extraction that pulls revenue away from the artists, crews, venues, and local economies that actually create live events. It is important to be clear about what AB 1720 does and does not do. The bill targets the brokers and resellers who dominate the resale market and aggregate inventory across multiple platforms. It does not target legitimate, consumer-to-consumer resale by fans whose plans change. By removing the financial incentive for bulk speculation, AB 1720 helps ensure more tickets reach real fans at prices closer to what artists intended.”
- Arguments in Opposition. Opponents note that by restricting resale pricing, this bill may have the unintended effect of advantaging certain market participants while disadvantaging independent platforms. Limiting the ability of competitive marketplaces to operate effectively can reduce consumer choice and reinforce reliance on a smaller number of dominant channels. Opponents note that transparent and competitive ticket marketplace, supported by multiple platforms, provides the strongest options for consumers, promotes innovation, and ensures broader access to tickets.
According to opponents, this bill does nothing to address the single greatest contributor to the live event affordability crisis: Live Nation/Ticketmaster’s monopoly control over the live event and ticketing ecosystem. Opponents note that Live Nation/Ticketmaster defended its own anti-competitive conduct, which includes overcharging consumers for live event tickets, and instead tried to place the blame elsewhere, citing Live Nation/Ticketmaster’s claim that “The real problem is the secondary market where resellers drive up prices and siphon billions out of the industry, hurting both artists and fans.” Opponents say the company has used this same “it’s the secondary market’s fault” rhetoric as justification to introduce over a dozen Live Nation-supported resale price cap bills across the country this year, including this bill.
According to the Consumer Federation of California, “Were AB 1720 to become law the main beneficiary of the bill would actually be the monopoly itself. How? The bill caps prices and profits for the precious few competitors to the monopoly but does nothing to limit the monopoly's predatory behavior against consumers
and others. But what about the talking point that the monopoly itself will be trimmed under this bill? This is essentially known as a loss-leader strategy - the monopoly pretends to be making a big sacrifice for consumers, but their real objective is to harm the economics of the secondary ticketing industry such that this limited competition would be diminished and ultimately eliminated. Does anybody actually think that if the monopoly gained more control over the secondary ticketing market this would be good for consumers in the long run? Only a monopolist would defend such an action.”
Numerous chambers of commerce and community groups write that “AB 1720 effectively exempts Ticketmaster from accountability while placing the burden of regulation on consumers. This bill unfairly targets consumers by restricting how they may resell tickets they legally own while leaving Live Nation/Ticketmaster’s monopoly and its control over ticket prices, fees, and supply untouched. AB 1720 punishes consumers rather than confronting the real source of the problem: unchecked power by a single player that keeps prices high and limits access… AB 1720’s approach also raises serious equity and consumer protection concerns. Many consumers, particularly low-income Californians, depend on resale as a financial safety valve when plans change. Tying resale limits to the ‘original price’ is unworkable in a primary marketplace defined by secrecy, where consumers often have no clear way to determine what the original price was. As a result, individuals could be forced to sell at a loss or risk violating the law, while Ticketmaster continues to ‘rob fans blind’ and perpetuate the same anti-consumer practices that were the focus of President Biden’s antitrust lawsuit.”
TickPick, SeatGeek, and Gametime state that “Numerous analyses of resale price caps have found they are bad policy, harm consumers, and undermine antitrust efforts against LiveNation/Ticketmaster. They cite the Progressive Policy Institute which stated “Proposed state laws capping ticket resale prices and fees could decimate the resale ticket market and undermine federal antitrust enforcement against Live Nation/Ticketmaster. State legislation to cap resale ticket
prices and fees targets the only market with competition, leaving the monopolized and broken primary ticket market to operate unfettered.” According to the companies, “it is increasingly common for primary ticket prices to fluctuate
in the weeks and months before an event, and because AB 1720 does not mandate pro-consumer pro-competitive interoperable systems as did Assemblymember Wicks’ 2024 bill, AB 2808, secondary ticket marketplaces have no way of knowing or verifying the original ticket price.”
StubHub writes that “A resale price cap does not eliminate a consumer’s willingness to pay above the capped price for a ticket. It merely prevents those transactions from occurring on regulated platforms. When that happens, fans leave regulated marketplaces and both buyers and sellers turn to informal channels such as social media, private messaging platforms, and cash transactions. These channels lack refund protections, customer support, and fraud monitoring. Resale does not disappear under a cap, consumer protection does. More importantly, the same platforms, infrastructure, and actors operate across both exempt and non-exempt events. Introducing a resale cap for concerts adds complexity to systems that also support exempt events, creating confusion for consumers and inconsistent regulatory outcomes. Critically, when safe, regulated resale options are restricted in one part of the market, consumers may turn to unregulated channels and carry that behavior into exempt events where losses are even higher.”
- Proposed Author’s Amendments. The Author is proposing amendments to make conforming changes to reference to the Olympics currently contained in the bill, replacing “Olympics” with “2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games” and to also exempt a ticket to a movie theater for a motion picture or screening from being limited to a 10 percent cap on the resale price. The Author’s amendments would also update the definition of “Ticket resale marketplace” currently contained in the bill.
- Policy Concerns and Comments.
Arbitrary nature of a price cap. This bill would prohibit the resale of certain tickets at a price exceeding 10 percent above the original purchase price. The bill, however, does not identify why a 10 percent threshold was selected as opposed to another percentage, nor does it establish a methodology for determining that 10 percent represents the appropriate balance between consumer protection and lawful resale activity. As a result, questions may arise regarding whether the proposed cap is based on empirical evidence, market analysis, consumer harm data, or another policy rationale.
The bill also raises broader questions regarding whether a resale price cap addresses the underlying causes of high ticket prices. As discussed above, ticket prices may be influenced by a variety of factors, including event popularity, venue capacity, inventory allocation decisions, presales, dynamic pricing practices, consumer demand, and secondary-market activity. While a resale cap may limit the price at which certain tickets can be resold, it may not affect the number of tickets initially available to consumers at face value or address other factors contributing to ticket affordability concerns. Is this proposed price restriction appropriately tailored to the problem the bill seeks to address or are there alternative approaches like a focus on transparency, disclosure, competition, or marketplace practices that would more directly address consumer concerns?
Uneven consumer protections. A fundamental policy question raised by this bill is why consumers purchasing tickets for certain events would receive the bill’s protections while consumers purchasing tickets for many major sporting events would not. The bill exempts sporting events, including professional, collegiate, amateur, Olympic, FIFA, and other specified athletic competitions, from its resale price restrictions. As a result, consumers attending some of the most sought-after and expensive events in the world would remain subject to unrestricted resale prices, while consumers attending consumers attending covered events at qualifying independent venues would receive the benefit of the bill’s price controls.
This distinction is particularly notable given that concerns regarding ticket affordability and resale prices have been widely reported in connection with major sporting events. Recent reporting regarding the 2026 FIFA World Cup documented consumer difficulty obtaining tickets at face value. Consumer concerns regarding Olympic ticket availability and pricing have similarly generated significant public attention in recent years. These examples raise the question of why consumers purchasing tickets for exempted sporting events would not receive the same protections afforded to consumers attending covered events, particularly when many of the concerns cited in support of the bill, ticket affordability, resale markups, and consumer access, are not unique to concerts or live entertainment events. If resale price restrictions are necessary to protect consumers from excessive resale prices, it is unclear why those would not apply consistently across similarly situated consumers. If a 10% cap is necessary to protect consumers, why are the consumers attending the World Cup, Olympics, Super Bowl, NBA Finals, NCAA tournaments, and other major sporting events excluded?
Limited application to smaller venues. AB 1720’s consumer protections only apply to a limited subset of live entertainment events and venues. As drafted, the bill generally applies to specified events held at venues with a seating capacity of fewer than 3,000 individuals and nonprofit venues that host agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances. This raises the policy question of whether the bill is targeting the events where consumers are most likely to encounter the affordability concerns cited by proponents.
Many of the highest-profile examples of ticket scarcity, substantial resale markups, and consumer frustration occur at large-scale events held in arenas, stadiums, and major entertainment venues with capacities well exceeding 3,000 people. By limiting the bill’s application to smaller venues, the measure excludes many of the events that generate the greatest public attention regarding ticket availability and secondary-market pricing. As a result, consumers purchasing tickets for major concerts, arena tours, and stadium events could remain subject to unrestricted resale prices even though those events are frequently cited in discussions regarding ticket affordability.
The bill's venue limitation may also create inconsistent outcomes for consumers seeking tickets to different events. For example, a consumer seeking to purchase a resale ticket for a Broadway touring production at the SAFE Credit Union Performing Arts Center in Sacramento, which has a seating capacity below the bill’s threshold, could receive the benefit of the bill’s resale price restrictions. In contrast, a consumer attempting to purchase a resale ticket for a high-demand concert at a large venue such as Oracle Park or SoFi Stadium could receive no comparable protection because those venues exceed the bill’s capacity limitation. Illustratively, consumers seeking tickets to major stadium and arena performances by artists such as Noah Kahan, Olivia Rodrigo, Beyoncé, Taylor Swift, or other touring acts performing at large-capacity venues, could remain subject to unrestricted resale prices even though those events frequently generate some of the highest levels of consumer demand, resale activity, and public concern regarding ticket affordability.
These distinctions raise questions about whether venue capacity serves as an appropriate proxy for consumer harm. If the bill is intended to address excessive resale prices and improve ticket affordability, it is unclear why the bill excludes many of the events where fans and consumers are most likely to encounter the very practices the bill seeks to address.
Reconciliation of definitions. This bill and AB 1349 both include changes to the existing ticket sellers regulatory framework. Definitions will need to be updated in order for the bills’ intent to be clear and for there to be cohesion in the law.
SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION:
Support:
American Association of Independent Music
American Federation of Musicians
Artist Rights Alliance
Black Music Action Coalition
Bright Light Strategies
California Arts Advocates
Fan Alliance
Future of Music Coalition
Music Artists Coalition
Music Artists Coalition
Music Managers Forum - US
National Independent Talent Organization
National Independent Venue Association of California
Recording Academy
Recording Industry Association of America
SAG-AFTRA
Songwriters of North America
Venue Pilot
Opposition:
California Black Chamber of Commerce
California Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
California League of United Latin American Citizens
California Live Events Equity Alliance
California Multicultural Business Alliance
Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Gametime
Hispanic 100
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco
Internet.works
Latin American and Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
National Action Network Sacramento
National Baptist Convention Usa, INC
North Valley Yemen Society
Pantone 294
Seatgeek, INC.
Si Se Puede Fresno, Tulare, Kings & Kern
Stubhub, INC.
Technet
Ticket Policy Forum
Tickpick, LLC
-- END --
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1720
Author:(Haney)
As Amended Ver:May 18, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
AB 1720 establishes a 10% cap on the amount above the original purchase price for live entertainment tickets occurring at an independent venues that resellers can charge in the secondary ticket market.
Major Provisions
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket plus 10%, and would prohibit a ticket seller from advertising, displaying, or offering a price for a ticket that does not include all mandatory fees or charges.
- These provisions are limited to the resale of tickets where the event is held at an independent venue, defined as a venue with a seating capacity of 3,000 individuals or fewer, or a nonprofit venue that hosts agricultural fairs, exhibitions, or multiday community events in addition to live performances. Additionally, an independent venue is defined as deriving a majority of its revenue from ticket events, is not majority owned by a publicly traded company, and is not operating venues in more than 10 states.
- States that if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market, the maximum resale price remains no more than 10% above the original purchase price.
- Requires an original seller to print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket.
- Exempts professional sports teams, international sporting events, and certain amateur and collegiate teams from the provisions of this bill.
- Violations of this section are punishable by a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation, and up to $2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violations. A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation of this section shall be punishable by a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per ticket sold in violation
COMMENTS
Background. Tickets for live entertainment events are typically purchased on primary ticket seller websites or through the secondary market. Primary ticket sellers, including Ticketmaster and AXS, work with event organizers to control ticket prices, and share revenue between the artists and the venue operators. Smaller independent venues may have contracts with larger primary ticket selling companies, but many still sell paper tickets at an on-sight box-office, or through a smaller ticket distribution platform like Eventbrite. The prices set in the primary market heavily affect the volume and value of tickets in the secondary market. Although the cost of tickets can fluctuate through dynamic pricing, tickets generally sell on the primary market with a face value that is below their market value. The number of tickets available is, of necessity, limited to the capacity of the venue, and of course are subject to sell outs.
The secondary market is where tickets purchased on the primary market are resold. Ticket prices can be significantly higher when purchased from someone in the secondary market, especially for high-demand or sold-out concerts and sports games. They can also be sold for lower than face value, typically in situations where a person is unable to attend an event they purchased a ticket for, and is trying to resell them on short notice. Secondary market platforms not only serve as a way for consumers who are unable to use their tickets to have a relatively simple way of recouping their money and potentially making a profit by reselling them to someone else, they also are utilized by professional ticket brokers. These brokers operate as a business that purchases event tickets solely for the purpose of reselling them to maximize profit.
The platforms, for a fee, simply provide the infrastructure and technology that make up the marketplace for brokers and individuals to resell their tickets. Professional ticket brokers either enter into agreements with sports teams and promoters to have access to tickets for resale, or they compete with consumers in the primary marketplace, to purchase tickets that they intend to resell at a profit on the platforms. These secondary market platforms include StubHub, Vivid Seats, TickPicks, and SeatGeek, as well as resale platforms run by Ticketmaster and AXS.
According to a 2018 report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), ticket brokers are dominating the resale marketplaces. They have a competitive advantage over individual consumers because they have the technology and resources to purchase large numbers of tickets as soon as they go on sale. Some consumer advocates, state officials, and event organizers believe that brokers unfairly use this advantage to obtain tickets from the primary market, which restricts ordinary consumers from buying tickets at face value. As a result, consumers may pay higher prices than they would if tickets were available on the primary market. In addition, some event organizers and primary ticket sellers have expressed frustration that the profits from the higher resale price are pocketed by brokers who had no role in creating or producing the event
In recent years, online ticket sales have drawn criticism by consumers and led to state and federal legislative hearings about online ticket retail practices and competition within the ticketing market. These criticisms have focused both on issues with primary ticket sellers (like Ticketmaster, which is currently the subject of a major antitrust lawsuit filed by the US Department of Justice) and with secondary ticket sellers and marketplaces (like Ticketmaster, Stubhub, and SeatGeek). This bill makes a number of changes to existing law with the goal of restricting the secondary ticket market, including the prohibition of reselling a ticket for more than the original ticket price plus 10% and a requirement that a ticket resale marketplace requires a ticket reseller to disclose the original price of the ticket on the sale listing.
According to the Author
"For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists."
"Concert tickets aren't stocks to be flipped for profit. They're a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we've let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion's share of the money. They didn't write the songs. They didn't build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn't put on the show. But they're the ones cashing in. That's not fair, and it's not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering."
Arguments in Support
According to a group of supporters, including the Music Artists Coalition, the National Independent Venue Association, and others in the music industry, "Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales, including price, transferability, and access, is an extension of that creative and economic investment. When a reseller marks up a ticket by two, five, or 10 times its face value, the artist's pricing decision is overridden, and the economic relationship between artist and fan is hijacked by a middleman who had no role in making the event happen, nor any stake in the community they're extracting the value from. A resale cap preserves the artist's intent and keeps that relationship intact."
"For fans, the impact of uncapped resale is devastating and deeply personal. When tickets are acquired in bulk and re-listed at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians. A parent trying to take their child to a first concert, a young person saving up to see their favorite artist – these are the people who are priced out when the secondary market operates without limits."
Arguments in Opposition
According to a group of ticket resale platforms, including SeatGeek, TickPick, and Gametime, in opposition, "When secure markets do not exist or don't have inventory because tickets are nontransferable or price caps exist, consumers turn to alternative black markets, the digital equivalents of the fraud-ridden street resales that were pervasive pre-Internet. The consumer protections we provide on our ticketing platforms do not exist on Craigslist, Facebook Marketplace, Reddit, or similar platforms, so buyers have no recourse when a seller fails to deliver or sends a fake ticket. The Taylor Swift Eras Tour provided many examples of this, as resale scams and fraud proliferated in countries where the supply of market-priced resale tickets was suppressed by price caps or other restrictions.
"Today, in federal court in New York City, Attorney General Bonta, and over 30 other State Attorneys General are litigating against Live Nation/Ticketmaster, seeking to promote competition by ending decades of monopoly behavior that has hurt fans, artists, and venues. In contrast, economists across the political spectrum agree that resale price caps such as those proposed in AB 1720 will strengthen the Ticketmaster monopoly by reducing competition in today's most competitive ticketing sector – resale."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Committee on Appropriations:
- Possible costs (General Fund, special funds) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of an unknown amount. By adding new requirements for ticket sellers, ticket resellers, and ticket resale marketplaces, this bill provides additional bases for enforcement by DOJ. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ hires staff to handle enforcement actions authorized by this bill, the department could potentially incur significant costs, possibly in the tens of thousands to low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. However, this bill is limited to independent venues only, as defined, which significantly reduces cost exposure related to enforcement. Additionally, if DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Ongoing cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts in additional workload resulting from the new prohibitions provided in this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The state budget provides annual General Fund backfills to the Trial Court Trust Fund to offset revenue reductions. This backfill was $117.3 million in 2025-26.
VOTES
ASM ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT, SPORTS, AND TOURISM: 6-1-2
YES: Ward, Elhawary, McKinnor, Ortega, Valencia, Zbur
NO: Jeff Gonzalez
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Quirk-Silva
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 9-4-2
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Aguiar-Curry, Bryan, Irwin, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Ortega, Petrie-Norris, Ward
NO: Macedo, DeMaio, Hoover, Patterson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Wicks, Wilson
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-3-1
YES: Wicks, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache
NO: Hoover, Dixon, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Ta
UPDATED
VERSION: May 18, 2026
CONSULTANT: Brian V. Anderson, Jr. / A.,E.,S., & T. / (916) 319-3450 FN: 0003028
Date of Hearing: May 13, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1720
Author:(Haney) – As Amended Ver:April 14, 2026
Policy Committee: | Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism | Vote: | 6 - 1 |
Privacy and Consumer Protection | 9 - 4 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: Yes
SUMMARY:
This bill places several restrictions on a ticket reseller, as defined, and caps the resale of a ticket at the original ticket price plus 10%, inclusive of fees, while also requiring a ticket resale marketplace to require a ticket reseller to disclose the original price of the ticket on the sale listing.
Specifically, the bill provides for a civil penalty up to $1,000 per ticket sold for a first violation, up to $2,500 per ticket sold for subsequent violation, and up to $5,000 for a willful pattern or practice of violation. The bill exempts tickets for professional, amateur, international, and collegiate athletic contests, as defined.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Possible costs (General Fund, special funds) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of an unknown amount. By adding new requirements for ticket sellers, ticket resellers, and ticket resale marketplaces, this bill provides additional bases for enforcement by DOJ. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ hires staff to handle enforcement actions authorized by this bill, the department would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Ongoing cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts in additional workload resulting from the new prohibitions provided in this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The state budget provides annual General Fund backfills to the Trial Court Trust Fund to offset revenue reductions. This backfill was $117.3 million in 2025-26.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.
- Background. In recent years, online ticket sales have drawn criticism by consumers and led to state and federal legislative hearings into online ticket retail practices and competition within the ticketing market. These criticisms have focused both on issues with primary ticket sellers (like Ticketmaster, which is currently the subject of a major antitrust lawsuit filed by the US Department of Justice) and with secondary ticket sellers and marketplaces (like Ticketmaster, Stubhub, and SeatGeek). This bill makes a number of changes to existing law with the goal of restricting the secondary ticket market, including the prohibition of reselling a ticket for more than the original ticket price plus 10% and a requirement that a ticket resale marketplace requires a ticket reseller to disclose the original price of the ticket on the sale listing.
- Support and Opposition. This bill is supported by a number of arts advocates and independent venues, with California Arts Advocates claiming:
AB 1720 restores fairness to the ticket marketplace by capping resale prices for live event tickets at no more than 10% above face value, including fees. Additionally, this bill will prohibit a ticket seller from advertising a price that doesn’t include all mandatory fees and charges. In doing so, this bill removes the financial incentive that drives large-scale ticket reselling and prevents false advertising to consumers.
However, others, such as online ticket resale marketplace SeatGeek, warn the following:
Respectfully, AB 1720 will not lower live event ticket prices or protect fans. It will instead (i) empower the illegal Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly, (ii) drastically reduce competition, and (iii) lead to a spike in fraud. Compliance will be challenging or impossible, and enforcement will be an expensive nightmare.
- Related Legislation. AB 1349 (Bryan), of the current legislative session, places various requirements on ticket sellers and resellers to limit speculative ticket selling. AB 1349 is currently in the Senate pending referral to a policy committee.
Analysis Prepared by: Aaron Heredia / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 16, 2026
Fiscal:
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1720 (
Author:Haney) – As Amended Ver:April 14, 2026
SUBJECT: Ticket sellers
SYNOPSIS
Music artists, independent concert venue operators, and Ticketmaster do not agree on much, but they agree that the resale of entertainment tickets at greatly inflated prices is harming both artists and their fans. The Future of Music Coalition characterizes the state of affairs this way:
[T]oo often, policy debates have been framed as a false choice, with Live Nation on one side and the predatory resale industry on the other side, each pointing fingers at each other as solely responsible for the problems in live event ticketing. The journalist Andy Cush has described this as a Godzilla vs King Kong battle. He points out “Just because the two monsters are fighting doesn’t mean one of them is the good guy.”
As a long overdue anti-trust lawsuit against Ticketmaster concludes at the federal level, this bill seeks to complement that effort. It addresses problems in the secondary market by capping the price that someone can resell a ticket for at 110 percent of the price they paid for it when they originally purchased it.
As examined in detail in Comment # 6, the opposition, primarily secondary marketplace platforms, ticket brokers, and organizations that are aligned with them, have three primary arguments. They argue that price caps will bolster the Live Nation monopoly, increase fraud in the resale market, and that the bill is unworkable.
Over the last few years of examining the live entertainment ticket market, including an in-depth informational hearing in 2024, and hearing from a wide range of experts, this Committee has come to several conclusions:
- The live entertainment ecosystem is made up of two distinct markets.
- There are problems in both markets that negatively impact consumers.
- The current on-going efforts to break up Live Nation are separate from reforming the secondary market and both can co-exist.
- In countries that have restricted the resale market, including placing price caps on the price of resale tickets, the price of tickets is significantly lower than in the United States, including in countries where Ticketmaster has a large share of the market.
This is one of three Assembly bills being heard by this Committee related to protecting consumers from predatory resale practices. This bill establishes a ten percent cap on how much live entertainment ticket resellers can charge in the secondary ticket market; the second one prohibits the unauthorized resale of restaurant reservations;[1] and the third prohibits the unauthorized resale of tee time reservations at municipal golf courses.[2]. All three bills seek to discourage people who are competing with actual customers by buying tickets, tee-times, and dinner reservations with the intention of reselling them back to the customers at an inflated price.
This bill is sponsored by the National Independent Talent Organization and is supported by a broad range of organizations representing artists and venues. The opposition includes secondary market platforms, ticket brokers, and a variety of community business organizations, including the Latino Chamber of Commerce and the California Multicultural Business Alliance.
This bill is triple referred. It was first heard by the Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee where it passed on a 6 to 1 vote. If passed by this Committee, this bill will next be referred to the Judiciary Committee.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act, which prohibits the use of automated bots to circumvent ticket purchase limits set by ticket sellers. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits selling or offering to sell an event ticket obtained using an automated bot if the seller participated in, had the ability to control, or should have known about the violation. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits any person who does not have the written permission of the owner or operator of the property on which an entertainment event is to be held or is being held, from selling tickets to the entertainment event, which were obtained for the purpose of resale, at any price which is in excess of the price that is printed or endorsed upon the ticket, while on the grounds of or in the stadium, arena, theater, or other place where an event for which admission tickets are sold is to be held or is being held. A violation of this law constitutes a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code § 346.)
- Declares it unlawful for a person to intentionally use or sell software or services to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure (including limits on the number of tickets a person can purchase) that is used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process for event attendees. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.5.)
- Defines a “ticket seller” as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22503.)
- Clarifies that the following are not ticket sellers for purposes of existing law:
- An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier, or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package.
- Any person who sells six tickets or less to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the event premises, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
- The person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold, or a seller of tickets operating under a written contract with this person or organization.
- Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22503.5, 22503.6, 22504, 22511.)
- Requires a ticket seller to have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation. Makes a violation of this requirement a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or by both and provides for civil penalties of up to $2,500 for violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22500.)
- Requires ticket sellers:
- Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22501.)
- Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.)
- Make any partial or full deposit refundable if received on a future event for which tickets are not available, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent, until such time as tickets for the event are actually available. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22506.)
- Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event that is canceled. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(a).)
- Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(b).)
- Provide that a local jurisdiction may require a bond of not more than $50,000 to cover required refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(d).)
- Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22508.)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller:
- Has lawful possession of the ticket;
- Has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or
- Informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, that it does not have possession of the ticket, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.1.)
- Deems a violation of the chapter of the Business and Professions Code containing the provisions related to ticket sellers to be a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22505.)
THIS BILL:
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling a ticket for more than 110 percent of that ticket’s initial sale price.
- States that if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market, the maximum resale price remains no more than ten percent above the original purchase price.
- Prohibits the ticket reseller from charging more than ten percent of the original ticket price as an administrative fee.
- Prohibits a resale ticket marketplace from charging more than ten percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the seller or the buyer of the ticket.
- Requires an original seller to print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket.
- Places the obligation on the secondary marketplace platform to require that the reseller disclose the original price of the ticket on the platform listing.
- Exempts professional sports teams, international sporting events, and certain amateur and collegiate teams from the provisions of this bill.
- Defines the following:
- “Collegiate or amateur championship sporting event” includes, but is not limited to, postseason tournaments or neutral-site competitions conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, conference championships, bowl games, or similar nationally sanctioned collegiate athletic competitions.
- “Original seller,” as used in this section, means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theatre, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
- “Professional sporting event” means a sporting event conducted by, or under contract with, a professional sports team or professional sports league in which participating athletes receive compensation for participation in the event.
- “Resale” means any resale of a ticket other than a sale conducted by the primary contractor or its authorized ticket agent.
- “Rights holder” means an artist, performing arts organization, theater or dance company, professional athletic team, professional athletic league, author, lecturer, or any other persons who are the primary speakers or performers at an event for which tickets are sold.
- “Season ticketholder” or “season ticket licenseholder” means a person or entity that purchases or holds a contractual right to purchase a package of tickets directly from a professional sports team, league, or their authorized ticket agent for multiple games or events during a defined season.
- “Ticket resale marketplace” means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
- “Ticket reseller” means a person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.
Concert tickets aren’t stocks to be flipped for profit. They’re a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we’ve let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion’s share of the money. They didn’t write the songs. They didn’t build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn’t put on the show. But they’re the ones cashing in. That’s not fair, and it’s not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.
2) The ticket buying marketplace. Generally, there are two distinctly different online marketplaces where tickets are bought and sold, the primary and the secondary markets:
The primary market. The primary market is one in which event organizers control the ticket price, the sharing of the revenue between the artist, venue operator, and ticket company, and which platform will sell the tickets. The prices set in the primary market heavily affect the volume and value of tickets in the secondary market. In general, it is most common to find underpriced tickets—tickets that sell on the primary market with a face value that is below their market value—so that event organizers can maximize the attendance of their target audience in order to increase customer loyalty, and merchandise sales.[3] To complicate ticket selling in the primary market, some artists have been known to hold back a certain number of tickets to sell on the resale market in order to take advantage of the higher prices while still maintaining fan loyalty by offering the initial tickets at a low price.[4]
The secondary market. The secondary market is where tickets purchased on the primary market are resold. Ticket prices are usually significantly higher when purchased from someone in the secondary market. A study conducted by the National Independent Talent Organizations (NITO) analyzed data from 65 different shows around the country in 2023 where artists represented by NITO members performed. According to their findings, on average, ticket buyers were charged twice as much when buying tickets in the secondary market.[5] Secondary market platforms not only serve as a way for professional ticket brokers (i.e. businesses that purchase event tickets solely for the purpose of reselling them for a profit) to sell tickets, they also play an important role by allowing consumers who can no longer use their tickets a relatively simple way of recouping their money and perhaps making a profit by reselling them to someone else.
The platforms, for a fee, simply provide the infrastructure and technology that make up the marketplace for brokers and individuals to resell their tickets. Professional ticket brokers either enter into agreements with sports teams and promoters to have access to tickets for resale or they compete with consumers in the primary marketplace to purchase tickets that they intend to resell at a profit on the platforms. These secondary market platforms, such as StubHub, Vivid Seats, TickPicks, SeatGeek, and the secondary platforms run by Ticketmaster and their main competitor AXS, generally speaking, are similar to eBay (the former parent company for StubHub) or Etsy.
Largely invisible in the world of ticketing are the ticket brokers themselves. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), found in their research that it is ticket brokers, offering large numbers of tickets at inflated prices, who are dominating the resale marketplaces. According to their 2018 report:
Brokers whose business is to purchase and resell tickets have a competitive advantage over individual consumers because they have the technology and resources to purchase large numbers of tickets as soon as they go on sale. Some consumer advocates, state officials, and event organizers believe that brokers unfairly use this advantage to obtain tickets from the primary market, which restricts ordinary consumers from buying tickets at face value. As a result, consumers may pay higher prices than they would if tickets were available on the primary market. In addition, some event organizers and primary ticket sellers have expressed frustration that the profits from the higher resale price accrue to brokers who have not played a role in creating or producing the event. [6]
3) Consumer challenges. One widespread complaint from consumers trying to purchase tickets to popular shows or sporting events is that they are poised on their web browsers to buy tickets the moment they go on sale, but the available tickets are sold out within seconds or minutes of the initial sale. So, consumers are unable to buy them, no matter how quickly they move the moment the tickets are available. Adding to their frustration is the fact that, almost immediately, they find tickets that they were unable to purchase at the on-sale site being advertised for sale on other websites, for much higher prices.
Because of the deployment of a variety of technologies (termed “bots”) used by people operating in the resale market to immediately purchase tickets the moment they go on sale, consumers will always be at a disadvantage when it comes to the most popular artists and sporting events. Despite federal and state laws prohibiting the use of this technology, the problem persists. In addition, as the technology becomes more sophisticated, it becomes harder for primary ticket sellers to detect and block. Cybersecurity firm, Imperva, studies what it has termed “bad bots,” which are “software applications that run automated tasks with malicious intent.” In its 2023 report, Imperva found that bad bots make up 30 percent of all automated internet traffic and that bots generally made up 47.7% of all internet traffic in 2022.[7] In their 2025 report they found that for the first time in a decade bots made up for 51 percent of all internet activity and bad bots made up 37% of internet activity.[8]
In addition, for consumers who are not familiar with the fact that both primary and secondary markets exist, they often can find themselves on a secondary site and pay more than they otherwise would have if they had sought out the primary ticket seller. This problem exists whether it is a major arena show by a well-known artist or a small local club. Below are two examples[9] of the ticket prices being sold by two California clubs, one in Sacramento and one in San Diego. In the first example, Harlow’s, a 350-capacity general admission club in Sacramento, is selling tickets to an upcoming show for a total price of $32.90, including any fees and taxes.
The following illustrates the advertised ticket prices for the same show at Harlow’s on the secondary market. The lowest price is almost double the price of the ticket being sold by Harlow’s at $61 each and the highest price for a ticket is over $4,062. Presumably, a consumer would not purchase a general admission ticket for $4,000 or even $200 when they could purchase on for the “amazing” low price of $61 ($28 over the actual price of the ticket).
The second example, below, shows a general admission ticket for Tauk at The Music Box, a 700-capacity general admission venue in San Diego. The price of the ticket at the venue’s box office are $31.66 including fees and taxes.
Below are the prices of the tickets being sold on a secondary platform. The “amazing” low price is $56 including fees (almost $25 more than the actual price of the ticket). The highest price per ticket is listed at $576 per ticket.
Since both clubs in the examples are general admission clubs without reserved seating, there is no actual difference between the ticket available from the box office and those listed on the secondary market. The only difference is that someone in the business of reselling tickets purchased those tickets before the consumer could, limiting the consumer’s ability to purchase the tickets at their face value.
Of course, the difference in prices can be much more extreme when it comes to a popular artist. The author notes:
Professional scalpers often purchase large numbers of tickets the moment they go on sale and immediately upload them to secondary resale websites at steep markups. These markups have skyrocketed in recent years. The average secondary market price for tickets to the North American leg of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour was approximately $3,801 per ticket, compared to an average face value of $253.56. Similarly, tickets for major tours by Beyoncé and Harry Styles averaged $1,096 and $1,061 on secondary markets.
Recent studies show that fans pay an average of 203% over face value when purchasing tickets on resale platforms. In many cases, artists who intentionally keep ticket prices low to make their shows accessible still see their tickets flipped for massive profits. For example, Luke Combs intentionally priced his tickets modestly at $72.16, yet 7,767 tickets were resold on the secondary market for more than $2.3 million, with an average resale price of $298.52 – a 313% markup
4) How is the ticket buying experience different in other countries? According to the Los Angeles Times, the face value of the tickets for Taylor Swift’s concert at SoFi Stadium in 2023 ranged from $49 to $449. However, tickets on StubHub were quickly being sold for around $800 up to $11,000.[10]
At the time Billboard reported:
Prices to see [Taylor] Swift at one of her final nine shows in the United States have increased following the release of the album April 19, with the average get-in-the-door price — the lowest price available — hovering around $2,600 per ticket, according to data from TicketIQ. That means it would cost a couple more than $5,000 just to be in the same building as Swift in Miami . . , New Orleans . . . and Indianapolis . . . this fall.
In Europe, however . . . tickets cost only a fraction of that. Right now, the get-in-the door price to see the opening of the European leg of the Eras Tour is $340 a ticket — 87% cheaper than the average price in the United States. . . . That means a fan in Miami could fly to Paris for about $900 a person . . . spend two nights at a four-star hotel at $250 a night and purchase a $340 concert ticket for a grand total of $1,740 — which is still $760 less than the cheapest tickets currently available for her Miami shows.
Tickets to see Swift in Stockholm . . . are even cheaper, at $312 for the cheapest tickets, while tickets for her show in Portugal . . . start at $336 and in Spain . . . start at $324.[11]
Opponents of reforms in the resale market have argued that one of the reasons that Swift tickets remained so much lower in Europe was because Ticketmaster did not have the same control over the market. However, as noted above, the face value price of Taylor Swift tickets during the United States leg of her tour, particularly here in California, were in a similar range as those in Europe. So, it is unclear what impact their domination in the primary market played in this case.
The opposition has also posited that another reason for the difference in ticket prices is that Swift is not as popular in Europe, so the demand was not as great. However, Swift fans at her sold-out concerts in Edinburgh, Scotland may beg to differ. According to reports from the British Geological Survey, Swift’s fans caused an actual earthquake during her concerts. Seismic readings were detected almost four miles away from the stadium.[12]
While this bill, and previous bills attempting to reform California’s ticketing ecosystem, are not about or for Ms. Swift, but her popularity, the interest of the media, and the loud voices and devotion of her fans around the world provide a clear illustration of the problems with ticket prices in the United States’ entertainment market and allows us to compare the U.S. with markets in other countries.
European countries continue to distrust “touts.” Despite the fact that ticket brokers and other secondary resellers are directly competing with consumers in the primary market and could be the reason they cannot find tickets, people in the United States have embraced the resale ticket market as a valid business model that provides consumers with the ability to purchase tickets to events that they could not otherwise attend, albeit at a premium price. This is not the case in many European countries where consumers, policymakers, and mainstream media have remained wary of the practice of purchasing tickets to resell them at an inflated price, which the U.K. refers to as “touting.”
Ticket market experts point to this general distrust as one of the reasons for the difference in ticket prices between the United States and Europe, while the United States has turned its attention to the domination of Live Nation Entertainment, the parent company for Ticketmaster, as the main driver behind skyrocketing ticket prices.[13] Policymakers in other countries have taken concerns related to the price of tickets and the resale market so seriously that one of the planks that the Labour party in Britain ran on for the 2024 election was a commitment to cap the price of resale tickets.
5) The elephant in the room: The Live Nation anti-trust lawsuit. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and 30 state and district attorneys general filed an anti-trust lawsuit against Live Nation Entertainment on May 23, 2024. In the suit, the US government asked the courts to break up Live Nation, or at the very least separate Ticketmaster from the conglomerate. The US DOJ accused Live Nation of leveraging its power in the entertainment industry to dominate the industry by locking venues into exclusive ticketing contracts, pressuring artists to use its services, and threatening its rivals with financial retribution. Ultimately a total of 40 States Attorneys General signed onto the lawsuit.
According to California Attorney General Rob Bonta’s office at the time:
The lawsuit alleges Live Nation violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, which prohibits anticompetitive agreements, monopolization, and attempted monopolization. Monopolization offenses occur when a single firm maintains a monopoly unlawfully, by using its control of the market to exclude rivals and harm competition. In addition, the complaint alleges violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.
The complaint filed today alleges that Live Nation protects its monopoly by using both exclusive contracts with promoters and venues to protect its dominant position in the live music industry to force artists and venues to use both its ticketing and concert promotion services. Live Nation uses their market dominance to leverage its power over all other aspects of the live music entertainment industry: from artist management, to ticketing, and promotions. For example, Live Nation has used their dominance in promotions to force venues to use Ticketmaster’s ticketing services, thereby blocking innovation and unfairly competing with competitors in the music concert business.
In the lawsuit, Attorney General Bonta, U.S. DOJ, and coalition states allege that Live Nation has:
- Harmed fans through higher fees. Fans’ ticketing experience — from buying a ticket to showtime — is also worse than it would be if the industry was competitive.
- Maintained its monopoly in ticketing markets by locking up venues through restrictive long-term, exclusive agreements and threats that venues will lose access to Live Nation-controlled tours and artists if they sign with a rival ticketer.
- Leveraged its extensive network of venues to force artists to select Live Nation as a promoter instead of its rivals, maintaining its promotions monopoly. [14]
In March 2026, the US Department of Justice announced a settlement with Live Nation. The settlement included the payment of $280 million in civil penalties to the participating states. In addition, limits were placed on long-term exclusivity contracts with venues, requiring them to be a maximum of four years. In addition, the settlement required a 50-50 split on exclusivity agreements where venues and artists can be exclusive with Live Nation for up to 50 percent of their ticket sales. The other 50 percent of the tickets will be reserved for other ticket sellers to sell. Live nation is also required to divest from 13 amphitheaters around the country. Ticketmaster is also required to open its technology to allow other ticket sellers to use its platform to reach customers.[15]
Shortly after the announcement, Attorney General Bonta and 34 other state attorneys general rejected the settlement offer.[16] In announcing the decision AG Bonta stated:
“Today, U.S. DOJ has chosen to settle with Live Nation, but a bipartisan group of attorneys general, including California, have chosen to continue this fight and get a better deal for consumers — the deal Americans nationwide deserve,” said Attorney General Bonta. “Just in the first week of trial, we’ve already heard that Live Nation fully intended to take advantage of fans — and were able to do so because fans had no other place to go. Live Nation has manipulated the market, made itself untouchable by any competitor, and raked in the cash — not because it is better, but because it has acted illegally and created a monopoly."[17]
The states argue that the $280 million is too small a settlement and that the settlement failed to break up Live Nation’s monopoly. The case is currently wrapping up closing arguments before the jury begins deliberations.[18]
6) Concerns raised by the opposition. The opposition presents three primary arguments: (1) price caps in the secondary market will increase Live Nation/Ticketmaster’s monopoly and it will harm current anti-trust efforts; (2) price caps will increase fraud by driving ticket sales underground; and, (3) the bill is unworkable because the secondary marketplaces have no way of knowing what the original price of the ticket was. Each argument is addressed below.
Will price caps entrench the monopoly? The Consumer Federation of California writes:
The Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly is a massive vertically integrated monopoly. It directly represents hundreds of the largest artists in entertainment. It owns a dominant number of outdoor amphitheaters important to the live music infrastructure. It has a dominant position in terms of promoting and putting together artist tours. It forces venues of many sizes, particularly mid-sized and smaller venues, to sign long-term exclusive ticketing agreements with the monopoly, and greases these transactions with additional payments (sometimes called kickbacks by critics of the monopoly). It dominates the primary ticketing market, with a roughly 80% market share – clearly monopoly sized. It also is the largest player in the secondary ticketing market - a market which also includes some of the few competitors to the Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly, such as Stub Hub, Vivid, SeatGeek, Gametime and a few others.
Were AB 1720 to become law the main beneficiary of the bill would actually be the monopoly itself. How? The bill caps prices and profits for the precious few competitors to the monopoly but does nothing to limit the monopoly's predatory behavior against consumers and others. But what about the talking point that the monopoly itself will be trimmed under this bill? This is essentially known as a loss-leader strategy - the monopoly pretends to be making a big sacrifice for consumers, but their real objective is to harm the economics of the secondary ticketing industry such that this limited competition would be diminished and ultimately eliminated. Does anybody actually think that if the monopoly gained more control over the secondary ticketing market this would be good for consumers in the long run? Only a monopolist would defend such an action.
Music industry experts, artists, independent promoters, independent venue operators, secondary marketplaces, and consumer groups are all generally in agreement that Live Nation has a monopoly in the entertainment industry and that monopoly is harming artists and consumers. Where they differ is in the conclusion that protecting the current practices in the secondary market is protecting consumers, artists, and small venue operators. As described previously, the secondary resellers and platforms are not competing with Ticketmaster in the primary market. Resellers are, in fact, customers of Ticketmaster since they very often purchase the tickets they resell from the company, thus contributing to its success.
Will price caps increase fraud? On price caps increasing fraud, StubHub writes:
Examples from other countries show that price caps, implemented with the same good intentions as AB 1720, ultimately harm fans and preview what California consumers can expect if this bill becomes law. In Ireland, following price cap legislation, ticket scams surged, with financial institutions reporting significant increases in fraud victims and losses. In Australia, fans lost hundreds of thousands of dollars to ticket scams as resale shifted to social media platforms; notably, 25% of Australian young people have reportedly fallen victim to social media scams, with concert tickets among the most common scams. In France, authorities identified hundreds of fraudulent ticket websites during the Paris Olympics but were only able to shut down a fraction. In each case, after a price cap was enacted, demand remained constant while legal resale channels contracted and fraud increased.
StubHub points to a surge in ticket scams in Ireland after the passage of resale price caps in 2021. However, the citation they provide as evidence of that fact is simply a fraud warning by the Bank of Ireland related to Taylor Swift’s 2024 Eras Tour, arguably one of the most popular music artists in history. It is not surprising that banks expected an increase in ticket scams, given her popularity and the difficulty obtaining tickets. Nothing in the fraud warning suggests that the concern is in any way related to price caps on resale tickets.
In addition to the scam warnings from Irish banks, StubHub points to a November 2022 report, Reflecting Ireland: An insight into consumer behavioural change in Ireland.[19] The report found that financial fraud was on the increase, with 75 percent of people in Ireland experiencing attempted fraud and over 25 percent becoming victims. Their research found that the “most common types of financial fraud are vishing (phone call / voice message), smishing (text message) and phishing (email). Other common scams relate to lottery wins, inheritance, investment, romance, tickets sales or property rental.”[20] As with other countries, including the United States, internet fraud in Ireland was increasing significantly. In the 12 months leading up to June 2022, a total of 16,202 incidents of fraud were reported, an increase of 43% over the previous year and more than three times the level reported 5 years ago. The researchers found that the increase was largely driven by unauthorized transactions and attempts to obtain personal or banking information online or by phone.[21] The researchers found that 11 percent of the people surveyed experienced ticket fraud and 5 percent became victims. This contrasts with over half of the respondents reporting that they had experienced vishing, smishing, and phishing scams.[22] At no point does the report draw any connection between price caps recently being imposed and an increase in ticketing scams. They also do not identify whether the scams took place on a ticket resale platform or elsewhere.
The opposition also argues that ticketing fraud in the 2024 Summer Olympics in France was related to the cap on ticket prices in France’s resale market. First, it is important to note that the amendments from the Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee explicitly exempt most sports from the ticket price cap, including the LA28 Olympics. So, the Summer Olympics and any future Olympic games should not be impacted. That being said, sports and tourism experts are already issuing urgent warnings about tickets scams during the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics. A quick internet search turns up warning after warning about the likelihood of being scammed. One travel expert has issued this warning, “Sports fans need to remain vigilant this week. As with any other major event, scammers will try to take advantage of this lucrative opportunity to con people. This could be tricking you into handing over personal details via fake registration sites or parting with your money to secure tickets early (which are fakes).”[23]
As it pertains to the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup in Los Angeles, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the self-regulating governing body for professional soccer, recently faced its own accusations that they are scamming people trying to purchase tickets. FIFA originally allowed unlimited resales, with no price cap on the ticket price and charged a 15% commission to both the buyers and the sellers. As a result, according to reports, a ticket to the men’s finals with an original price of $2,030 could be purchased in the resale market for $25,000 within 24 hours. As a result, FIFA earned a commission of $7,500, over three times the price of the original value “without providing any additional service.”[24]
The unfortunate reality is whenever there is a concert, game, or other extremely popular team, artist or event, people will find a way to defraud consumers, completely unrelated to whether there is a price cap or not. For decades, along with ticket fraud fans, artists and sports teams have had to contend with bootlegged music and movies and counterfeit sports jerseys and other memorabilia.
As recent evidence suggests, instances of fraud are not only found on platforms outside of the secondary marketplace. Recent news reports say a growing number of attendees at the Coachella music festival are reporting systemic failures within the secondary ticketing market. “According to reports, third-party platforms including StubHub are under fire for allowing sellers to default on long-standing ‘guaranteed’ orders without adequate recourse for the buyers.”[25] The article further contends:
The crisis stems from a massive surge in demand over the last 10 days, which has seen general admission wristband values skyrocket to over $3,000, with some VIP listings exceeding $5,000. Fans who purchased tickets months ago at significantly lower prices—frequently around $600—allege that sellers are intentionally failing to deliver passes to capitalize on the price hike. These same passes are reportedly being relisted for whole multiples of the original cost, while the original buyers are left with travel and accommodation booked but no entry to the festival.
While platforms like StubHub officially operate under a ‘FanProtect Guarantee’, critics argue the system is fundamentally broken. In many cases, the platforms offer a simple refund rather than sourcing comparable replacement tickets, which are now prohibitively expensive for the platforms to provide. Beyond that, there’s no accounting for the related expenses incurred like time, travel, accommodations, and more, which could potentially be for naught in these situations.
This lack of accountability has led to accusations of “criminal” behavior on the secondary market, as entire groups of fans find themselves stranded in the desert with no viable options for entry. [26]
As with so many discussions in the last few years about entertainment ticket policy, all roads eventually lead back to Taylor Swift and her Eras Tour. On March 3, 2025, the Queens County (New York) district attorney arrested two suspects accused of stealing more than 900 concert tickets, most of which were for Swift’s Eras Tour, and reselling them for a profit of more than $600,000.[27] The author, Kishani Udugampola writes:
The Queens district attorney's office said that one of the defendants and an accomplice, who both worked for a third-party contractor in Kingston, Jamaica, used their access to StubHub’s computer system to find a secure area of the network that contained URLs of sold tickets. They allegedly redirected the URLs to their coconspirators in Queens who posted the tickets to StubHub then raked in the cash for worthless tickets.
The Queens fraudsters are just a few of the thousands who illegally profited from the record-breaking Eras Tour, which redefined the global music industry while simultaneously exposing structural vulnerabilities in digital marketplaces, consumer protection systems and financial oversight frameworks. The tour, which "surpassed $2 billion in revenue, became the highest-grossing concert series in history.
[. . .]
Resale platforms such as StubHub, SeatGeek and Vivid Seats reported average resale prices between $1,500 and $3,000, compared to face values ranging from $49 to $499. In major metropolitan markets, ticket-resale prices can exceed face value by large margins, sometimes reaching 2,000% from original ticket prices below $500, depending on seat tier, event popularity and proximity to the event date.
However, unlike official ticket-sales markets, secondary-ticket markets operate with inconsistent transparency, fragmented oversight and limited safeguards — conditions that increase fraud risk.[28]
As can be seen, an uncapped secondary market has not spared US consumers from the type of fraudulent activity opponents claim a price cap will induce.
Are price caps unworkable? Finally, Tick Pick, Seat Geek, and Gametime state:
The bill requires marketplaces to cap non-sports tickets at 110% of the “face” or original price. However, ticket resale marketplaces do not purchase or set ticket prices. Sellers own the tickets, set their own resale prices, and only they and the original seller know how much they paid for the tickets. Moreover, the great majority of live event tickets do not print the original or “face value” price, largely because prices increasingly fluctuate based on demand, and buying in a pre-sale, public on-sale, or the days before an event will often be at very different prices for essentially the same seat - even when all the purchases are from the official venue website.
In this environment, only two parties can inform the marketplace of the original ticket prices - the original seller and the reseller.
It may be difficult for a resale platform to confirm the actual amount someone paid for a ticket when they purchased it. It would not be impossible. The reseller could be required to provide the platform with a receipt that corresponds to a serial number on a ticket, for example. However, recent amendments should alleviate the secondary marketplaces’ concerns. The amendments require that original ticket sellers include the total price paid for the ticket on the ticket, whether it is a paper ticket or digital. If it is a paper ticket, the total price would be added when it is printed. For digital tickets, they need to include the full price when they are generated. This requirement, arguably, should remove any confusion or mystery around how much a person paid for the ticket.
7) Analysis. Opponents fail to answer one simple question: why was a Taylor Swift concert ticket less than $350 in countries with price caps and between $800 and $2600 in the United States? If Ticketmaster’s monopoly is solely to blame, why is the average markup on secondary sites 203% over face value? The reality is the single most impactful policy for controlling the price of tickets is a cap both on the resale price and on the amount of fees secondary marketplaces can charge resellers and buyers. The primary difference between the price of tickets in California and the prices in other countries can be traced to capping the amount someone is allowed to resell a ticket for. In Europe, prices are kept low thanks to laws limiting how high tickets can be marked up above face value when they are resold.
This bill, along with two others that the Committee is hearing this year, are all seeking to rein in a predatory secondary market that competes with consumers in the primary market in order to sell them an item or experience for a higher price than they would have had to pay otherwise. Whether it is reselling entertainment tickets, trying to schedule a tee time, or making reservations for a restaurant, pickleball court, or camp site.
As previously noted, this bill establishes a ten percent cap on how much live entertainment ticket resellers can charge in the secondary ticket market, in other words, a ticket cannot be sold for more than 110 percent of the price that was paid for the original ticket. In addition, the bill caps at ten percent the amount that platforms can charge buyers and sellers in fees. This is potentially the most generous of the three bills. The other two limit unauthorized resale. One of the bills focuses on prohibiting the resale of restaurant reservations[29]and the other prohibits the resale of tee time reservations at municipal golf courses.[30] All three bills seek to discourage people who are competing with actual customers by buying tickets, tee-times, or amassing restaurant reservations with the intention of reselling them back to the customers at an inflated price.
Whether Ticketmaster or another on-sale ticket company sells a ticket to a reseller or to an actual customer, their profits remain the same. The Future of Music Coalition, a supporter of the bill, describes the situation this way:
It’s helpful to think of the effort to “fix ticketing” as consisting of two distinct “buckets,” which add up to a complementary and holistic public policy approach.
The first bucket is about structural competition issues and the harms that follow from consolidated ownership. This includes the factors that California and the other remaining state plaintiffs seek to address in their anti-trust lawsuit against Ticketmaster/Live Nation, and the factors that led UK regulators to require divestments when secondary sellers Viagogo and Stubhub merged in 2021.
The second bucket is market regulation, which is concerned with rules of the road that apply to every firm; it’s a means of addressing potentially harmful practices and behavioral concerns by anyone in the field. AB1720 is about this piece. It’s a tough bill that reflects best practices and consumer protection approaches that have worked well in nations that have adopted similar policies.
[. . .]
It makes sense that while anti-trust authorities are focused on a breakup lawsuit, legislative approaches at both state and federal levels can focus on addressing that second “market regulation” bucket. Anti-trust enforcement and good state-level legislation like California’s AB 1720 (and AB 1349) go hand in hand. Either effort on its own would be insufficient to address the range of problems, but together, they add up to sound policy that protects fans, workers, small businesses, and diverse creative expression. This approach is growing in momentum; the new Senate report on Ticketmaster, years in the making, endorses price caps as one of the policy recommendations for how to address dysfunction in the ticket market.[31]
Since 2021, Ireland has capped the resale price of a ticket at what it originally sold for in the primary market. In 2024, there was one state considering price caps (Maryland). That provision made it through one of two chambers. In 2026, at least seventeen states are considering some version of a price cap, and one state has passed a price cap successfully (Maine).
While generally limiting prices in most markets could be seen as something to be leery of, this market is the rare exception where there is a justification to limit resale prices given how fundamentally broken the ticket resale market is. Californian consumers should not have to pay ticket prices that can reach an order of magnitude more expensive than their European counterparts have to pay.
This bill, when combined with AB 1349 (Bryan), which limits speculative ticketing practices, likely would address some of the largest problems in the secondary ticket market and would significantly reduce ticket prices in addition to making it easier for consumers to purchase tickets in the primary market for face value.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Sponsors of the bill, National Independent Talent (NITO), argue:
The Problem
AB 1720 addresses a well-documented problem in today's secondary ticketing market: the proliferation of speculative listings and excessive markups that distort pricing, mislead consumers, and undermine confidence in the marketplace. Artists make deliberate pricing decisions to ensure that live events remain accessible to their fans while supporting the real costs of touring. When tickets are immediately resold at excessive markups, those decisions are undermined and California consumers are forced to pay prices that bear no relationship to the event's original intent or value.
NITO's own research shows resale prices average twice the face value of primary tickets, and the average concert in a 1,700 capacity venue generates over $40,000 in profit from resale alone. That means those Californians are paying $40,000 more than they should for an average concert. These inflated prices do not benefit artists, venues, or anyone responsible for producing the event. Instead, they extract significant dollars from consumers and divert spending away from local restaurants, bars, and surrounding small businesses that depend on live events to drive foot traffic.
Real-World Examples
NITO has documented instances where over 50% of available tickets for a single show were resold on secondary platforms. Unforeseen circumstances, like an illness or the babysitter cancelling, do not explain half the audience reselling a ticket. It is the result of industrial-scale resale operations, often backed by outside investors and private equity. Regular fans are not competing with each other for the best seats; they are competing against well-funded professionals armed with the latest technology, whose sole aim is to extract profit from the system.
When Oasis played the Rose Bowl in 2025, primary market tickets had dynamic pricing turned off, with prices ranging from $81 to $156. Yet data from the secondary market, accounting for approximately 60% of StubHub sales, showed over 8,000 tickets sold at a gross of $2.2 million. The average ticket on StubHub was $270.
One NITO member reported an instance to the FTC in which resellers hijacked a public on-sale at Intuit Arena. Using bots to hold nearly all available inventory in their carts without completing purchases, these actors blocked regular fans from securing any tickets and forced them to secondary sites at inflated prices. These practices erode consumer confidence and drive people away from attending live music events altogether.
Why Legislative Action Is Necessary
We cannot rely on large corporations to police these bad actors on behalf of artists. In emails revealed during the ongoing anti-trust trial, Live Nation CEO Michael Rapino acknowledged that some of the company's artist-protection tools were designed so the company could tell artists it had "tried to stop scalpers." Meanwhile, artists are left to post on their own social media pages, pleading with fans not to buy tickets at huge markups and educating their audiences to avoid being scammed. This is precisely why the comprehensive reform laid out in AB 1720 is needed.
What AB 1720 Does
AB 1720 takes a measured and balanced approach by:
● Establishing a reasonable cap on resale prices to curb excessive speculation
● Preserving the ability for legitimate, consumer-to-consumer resale
● Promoting transparency and accountability in ticket transactions
● Carves out sporting events from the resale cap
Importantly, these caps do not eliminate resale. They simply prevent abuse. Fans who genuinely cannot attend an event retain the ability to resell their tickets, while the most predatory profiteering practices are curtailed. Similarly, sporting events which function completely differently from live performances, are untouched by the resale cap leaving that industry to continue practices that work best for them.
Evidence from market analyses demonstrates that when appropriate resale protections are in place, abusive practices decline significantly and more tickets reach consumers at intended prices — resulting in a healthier and more trustworthy marketplace overall.
A coalition of organizations representing artists, independent promoters, and independent venue operators, writes in support:
At the heart of AB 1720 is a straightforward and powerful idea: no ticket should be resold for more than 10 percent above face value. This cap is the single most meaningful reform California can adopt to restore fairness to the ticketing marketplace. It directly addresses the core problem: industrial-scale resellers who purchase large quantities of tickets at initial sale and relist them at prices far beyond what the artist, venue, or promoter ever intended. These resellers extract enormous economic value from live music events without contributing to the creation, production, or promotion of those events. A face value cap stops that extraction at the source.
Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales including price, transferability, and access is an extension of that creative and economic investment. When a reseller marks up a ticket by two, five, or ten times its face value, the artist's pricing decision is overridden, and the economic relationship between artist and fan is hijacked by a middleman who had no role in making the event happen nor any stake in the community they're extracting the value from. A resale cap preserves the artist's intent and keeps that relationship intact.
For fans, the impact of uncapped resale is devastating and deeply personal. When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians. A parent trying to take their child to a first concert, a young person saving up to see their favorite artist - these are the people who are priced out when the secondary market operates without limits. AB 1720's cap ensures that more tickets end up in the hands of fans who actually intend to attend, at prices close to what the artist set. The bill also rightly distinguishes between true fans who resell a ticket due to changed plans and high-volume resale activity driven by systematic bulk purchasing and markup strategies.
Independent venues, small businesses, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters serve as economic anchors and incubators for emerging artists across California. The crews and venue staff who make live performances possible depend on the economic ecosystem surrounding those events. When industrial resellers siphon ticket revenue out of that ecosystem, it is the venues, the crew members, and the local economies that suffer. A face value cap keeps more of the economic value of live events where it belongs: with the people and places that make them possible.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: In opposition to the bill, along with the arguments discussed in the body of the analysis, a coalition of community business organizations write:
The fundamental issue in today’s ticketing market is the entrenched monopoly power of Live Nation/Ticketmaster. This vertically integrated conglomerate controls ticketing, promotions, and venues. Roughly 80% of all primary ticketing sales occur on Ticketmaster. Its dominance has produced excessive fees, opaque pricing, and widespread consumer harm. Recently revealed internal company communications describe fans as “so stupid” and boast about “robbing them blind” - the predictable result of unchecked market power.
Yet just weeks ago, the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice entered into a deeply flawed settlement with Live Nation/Ticketmaster, which was widely criticized as a concession that failed to restrain the company’s behavior. The vast majority of states, including California, have rejected that deal and are continuing their case. When federal enforcement falls short, it is even more vital that California act to rein in monopoly practices—not shift the burden onto consumers.
Instead, AB 1720 is myopically focused on limiting the price at which consumers can resell their tickets, even though resale accounts for only a small fraction – roughly 9 percent – of total ticket sales. Meanwhile, Ticketmaster’s monopoly retains full control over how much they can charge on primary sales. They can continue to engage in anti-consumer tactics like dynamic pricing, exclusive pre-sales, and inventory holdbacks, all of which drive up costs and reduce access.
AB 1720’s approach also raises serious equity and consumer protection concerns. Many consumers, particularly low-income Californians, depend on resale as a financial safety valve when plans change. Tying resale limits to the “original price” is unworkable in a primary marketplace defined by secrecy, where consumers often have no clear way to determine what the original price was. As a result, individuals could be forced to sell at a loss or risk violating the law, while Ticketmaster continues to “rob fans blind” and perpetuate the same anti-consumer practices that were the focus of President Biden’s antirust lawsuit.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
National Independent Talent Organization (Sponsor)
72 Music MGMT
American Association of Independent Music
American Federation of Musicians
Artist Rights Alliance
Association of Performing Arts Professionals
Black Music Action Coalition
California Arts Advocates
Fan Alliance
Folk Alliance International
Future of Music Coalition
Ground Control Touring
Ineffable Music Group
Like Management
Live Nation Entertainment, INC.
Lucky Man Management
Mongrel Music
Music Artists Coalition (MAC)
Music Managers Forum - US
National Independent Venue Association of California (NIVA-CA)
Paradise Artists, Inc.
Partisan Arts
Recording Academy
Recording Industry Association of America
ROAM
Sag-aftra
Songwriters of North America
Sound Talent Group
Stuart Ross Management
TBA Agency, LLC
United Musicians and Allied Workers
Opposition
California Black Chamber of Commerce
California Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
California League of United Latin American Citizens (ca Lulac)
California Live Events Equity Alliance
California Multicultural Business Alliance
Central City Association of Los Angeles
Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition
Central Valley Yemen Society
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Gametime
Hispanic 100
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco
Latin American and Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
National Action Network Sacramento
National Baptist Convention Usa, INC
North Valley Yemen Society
Progressive Policy Institute
Seatgeek, INC.
Si Se Puede Fresno, Tulare, Kings & Kern
Sports Fans Coalition
Stubhub, INC.
Ticket Policy Forum
Tickpick, LLC
Oppose Unless Amended
Internet Works
Technet
Analysis Prepared by: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
AB 1640 (Stefani) ↑
AB 1954 (Ward) ↑
The Event Ticketing Industry is Broken and in Need of Disruption, Aventus Network (May 19, 2017). ↑
Tyler Jenke, “Ed Sheeran’s manager has admitted to selling tickets to resale services,” The Music Network (Jun 3, 2018) available at https://themusicnetwork.com/ed-sheeran-manager-sold-tickets-resale/. ↑
NITO Ticket Resale Study. National Independent Talent Organization (Jul 2023) ↑
GAO, Event Ticket Sales: Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues, GAO-18-347 (May 14, 2023) available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-347. ↑
Imperva 2023 Bad Bot Report available at https://www.imperva.com/resources/resource-library/reports/2023-imperva-bad-bot-report/. ↑
Imperva 2025 Bad Bot Report available at https://www.imperva.com/blog/2025-imperva-bad-bot-report-how-ai-is-supercharging-the-bot-threat/. ↑
Examples were provided by the sponsors of the bill, the National Independent Venue Association. Both club owners are members of NIVA and do not use Ticketmaster as their primary ticket seller. ↑
Fox, Emma. “$11,000 to see Taylor Swift? How concert tickets got so expensive,” The Los Angeles Times (July 27, 2023) https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2023-07-27/explaining-the-complicated-world-of-ticketing. ↑
Brooks, Dave. “Why Are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets So Much Cheaper in Europe?” Billboard (May 2, 2024) https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/. ↑
Melnick, Kyle. “Swifties set off earthquake sensors again. These songs made the biggest stir.” The Washington Post (Jun. 13, 2024) https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/2024/06/13/taylor-swift-concert-fans-dance-earthquake-sensors/. ↑
While Ticketmaster’s domination is a legitimate concern, as discussed earlier in this analysis, the available data does not support the fact that primary market prices account for the high price of tickets. ↑
California Department of Justice. Attorney General Bonta Files Lawsuit Against Live Nation, Ticketmaster (May 23, 2024) https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-files-lawsuit-against-live-nation-ticketmaster. ↑
Mary Cunningham, Sarah N. Lynch, Jennifer Jacobs. “Live Nation to open Ticketmaster to other sellers and pay $280 million to settle anti-trust charges,” CBS News (Mar. 9, 2026). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/live-nation-ticket-master-doj-case-anti-trust/. ↑
Jon Blistein, “‘Monopolistic Bully’ or ‘Fierce Competitor’? Live Nation Trial Ends With Closing Arguments,” Rolling Stone (Apr. 9, 2026) ↑
Press Release: Attorney General Bonta and State Attorneys General Carry on the Fight Against Live Nation/Ticketmaster (Mar. 9, 2026) https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-and-state-attorneys-general-carry-fight-against-live. ↑
Jon Blistein (Apr. 9, 2026). ↑
Reflecting Ireland: An insight into consumer behavioural change in Ireland, permanent tsb, (Nov. 2022) https://www.ptsb.ie/globalassets/pdf-documents/reflecting-ireland---fraud.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
William Morgan, “Travel expert issues warning ahead of LA28 Olympics ticket registration and what to do if you've been scammed,” Unilad (Mar. 17, 2026) https://www.unilad.com/news/sport/travel-expert-la28-olympics-ticket-registration-scam-warning-786529-20260317. ↑
Girish Sanwal, “FIFA Owes Fans Thousands for Resold World Cup Tickets: Complete Scandal Breakdown,” FWC News (Dec. 20, 2025) ↑
Bryson Page, “Coachella and StubHub Under Fire as Tickets are Canceled and Resold for $3,000+,” EDM Tunes (Apr. 10, 2026) https://www.edmtunes.com/2026/04/coachella-stubhub-controversy-ticket-orders-canceled-resold/amp/. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Kishani Udugampola, Ph.D., CFE, “Taylor Swift’s Eras tour exposes ticket resale fraud,” Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ Fraud Magazine (April 6, 2026) https://www.acfe.com/fraud-magazine/all-issues/issue/article?s=2026-apr-taylor-swift-tour-ticket-fraud. ↑
Ibid. ↑
AB 1640 (Stefani) ↑
AB 1954 (Ward) ↑
So Casually Cruel: How Ticketmaster’s Monopoly Supercharges Prices and Fees, United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senator Blumenthal Minority Staff Report (Mar. 16, 2026) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026_03_16-Live-Event-Ticket-Report-1.pdf. ↑
Date of Hearing: April 16, 2026
Fiscal:
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1720 (
Author:Haney) – As Amended Ver:April 8, 2026
SUBJECT: Ticket sellers
SYNOPSIS
Music artists, independent concert venue operators, and Ticketmaster do not agree on much, but they agree that the resale of entertainment tickets at greatly inflated prices is harming both artists and their fans. The Future of Music Coalition characterizes the state of affairs this way:
[T]oo often, policy debates have been framed as a false choice, with Live Nation on one side and the predatory resale industry on the other side, each pointing fingers at each other as solely responsible for the problems in live event ticketing. The journalist Andy Cush has described this as a Godzilla vs King Kong battle. He points out “Just because the two monsters are fighting doesn’t mean one of them is the good guy.”
As a long overdue anti-trust lawsuit against Ticketmaster concludes at the federal level, this bill seeks to complement that effort. It addresses problems in the secondary market by capping the price that someone can resell a ticket for at 110 percent of the price they paid for it when they originally purchased it.
As examined in detail in Comment # 6, the opposition, primarily secondary marketplace platforms, ticket brokers, and organizations that are aligned with them, have three primary arguments. They argue that price caps will bolster the Live Nation monopoly, increase fraud in the resale market, and that the bill is unworkable.
Over the last few years of examining the live entertainment ticket market, including an in-depth informational hearing in 2024, and hearing from a wide range of experts, this Committee has come to several conclusions:
- The live entertainment ecosystem is made up of two distinct markets.
- There are problems in both markets that negatively impact consumers.
- The current on-going efforts to break up Live Nation are separate from reforming the secondary market and both can co-exist.
- In countries that have restricted the resale market, including placing price caps on the price of resale tickets, the price of tickets is significantly lower than in the United States, including in countries where Ticketmaster has a large share of the market.
This is one of three Assembly bills being heard by this Committee related to protecting consumers from predatory resale practices. This bill establishes a ten percent cap on how much live entertainment ticket resellers can charge in the secondary ticket market; the second one prohibits the unauthorized resale of restaurant reservations;[1] and the third prohibits the unauthorized resale of tee time reservations at municipal golf courses.[2]. All three bills seek to discourage people who are competing with actual customers by buying tickets, tee-times, and dinner reservations with the intention of reselling them back to the customers at an inflated price.
This bill is sponsored by the National Independent Talent Organization and is supported by a broad range of organizations representing artists and venues. The opposition includes secondary market platforms, ticket brokers, and a variety of community business organizations, including the Latino Chamber of Commerce and the California Multicultural Business Alliance.
This bill is triple referred. It was first heard by the Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee where it passed on a 6 to 1 vote. If passed by this Committee, this bill will next be referred to the Judiciary Committee.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act, which prohibits the use of automated bots to circumvent ticket purchase limits set by ticket sellers. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits selling or offering to sell an event ticket obtained using an automated bot if the seller participated in, had the ability to control, or should have known about the violation. (15 U.S.C. § 45c.)
- Prohibits any person who does not have the written permission of the owner or operator of the property on which an entertainment event is to be held or is being held, from selling tickets to the entertainment event, which were obtained for the purpose of resale, at any price which is in excess of the price that is printed or endorsed upon the ticket, while on the grounds of or in the stadium, arena, theater, or other place where an event for which admission tickets are sold is to be held or is being held. A violation of this law constitutes a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code § 346.)
- Declares it unlawful for a person to intentionally use or sell software or services to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure (including limits on the number of tickets a person can purchase) that is used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process for event attendees. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.5.)
- Defines a “ticket seller” as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22503.)
- Clarifies that the following are not ticket sellers for purposes of existing law:
- An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier, or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package.
- Any person who sells six tickets or less to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the event premises, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
- The person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold, or a seller of tickets operating under a written contract with this person or organization.
- Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22503.5, 22503.6, 22504, 22511.)
- Requires a ticket seller to have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation. Makes a violation of this requirement a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $2,500 or by both and provides for civil penalties of up to $2,500 for violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22500.)
- Requires ticket sellers:
- Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22501.)
- Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.)
- Make any partial or full deposit refundable if received on a future event for which tickets are not available, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent, until such time as tickets for the event are actually available. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22506.)
- Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event that is canceled. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(a).)
- Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(b).)
- Provide that a local jurisdiction may require a bond of not more than $50,000 to cover required refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(d).)
- Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22508.)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller:
- Has lawful possession of the ticket;
- Has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or
- Informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, that it does not have possession of the ticket, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.1.)
- Deems a violation of the chapter of the Business and Professions Code containing the provisions related to ticket sellers to be a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22505.)
THIS BILL:
- Prohibits a ticket reseller from selling a ticket for more than 110 percent of that ticket’s initial sale price.
- States that if a ticket has been resold or transferred more than once, regardless of the purchase price in the resale market, the maximum resale price remains no more than ten percent above the original purchase price.
- Prohibits the ticket reseller from charging more than ten percent of the original ticket price as an administrative fee.
- Prohibits a resale ticket marketplace from charging more than ten percent of the original face value of the ticket in additional fees to the seller or the buyer of the ticket.
- Requires an original seller to print or display on a ticket the original purchase price of that ticket.
- Places the obligation on the secondary marketplace platform to require that the reseller disclose the original price of the ticket on the platform listing.
- Exempts professional sports teams, international sporting events, and certain amateur and collegiate teams from the provisions of this bill.
- Defines the following:
- “Collegiate or amateur championship sporting event” includes, but is not limited to, postseason tournaments or neutral-site competitions conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, conference championships, bowl games, or similar nationally sanctioned collegiate athletic competitions.
- “Original seller,” as used in this section, means a person who, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theatre, or other entertainment event for original sale as instructed by an event presenter, event organizer, rights holder, or venue operator.
- “Professional sporting event” means a sporting event conducted by, or under contract with, a professional sports team or professional sports league in which participating athletes receive compensation for participation in the event.
- “Resale” means any resale of a ticket other than a sale conducted by the primary contractor or its authorized ticket agent.
- “Rights holder” means an artist, performing arts organization, theater or dance company, professional athletic team, professional athletic league, author, lecturer, or any other persons who are the primary speakers or performers at an event for which tickets are sold.
- “Season ticketholder” or “season ticket licenseholder” means a person or entity that purchases or holds a contractual right to purchase a package of tickets directly from a professional sports team, league, or their authorized ticket agent for multiple games or events during a defined season.
- “Ticket resale marketplace” means an entity that, for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, processes payments for, facilitates the resale of, or resells an admission ticket for, a sporting, musical, theater, or other live entertainment event.
- “Ticket reseller” means a person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise, advertises, lists, markets for sale, or sells an admission ticket to a sporting, musical, theater, or other entertainment event other than a ticket for original sale sold by an original seller.
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.
Concert tickets aren’t stocks to be flipped for profit. They’re a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we’ve let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion’s share of the money. They didn’t write the songs. They didn’t build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn’t put on the show. But they’re the ones cashing in. That’s not fair, and it’s not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.
2) The ticket buying marketplace. Generally, there are two distinctly different online marketplaces where tickets are bought and sold, the primary and the secondary markets:
The primary market. The primary market is one in which event organizers control the ticket price, the sharing of the revenue between the artist, venue operator, and ticket company, and which platform will sell the tickets. The prices set in the primary market heavily affect the volume and value of tickets in the secondary market. In general, it is most common to find underpriced tickets—tickets that sell on the primary market with a face value that is below their market value—so that event organizers can maximize the attendance of their target audience in order to increase customer loyalty, and merchandise sales.[3] To complicate ticket selling in the primary market, some artists have been known to hold back a certain number of tickets to sell on the resale market in order to take advantage of the higher prices while still maintaining fan loyalty by offering the initial tickets at a low price.[4]
The secondary market. The secondary market is where tickets purchased on the primary market are resold. Ticket prices are usually significantly higher when purchased from someone in the secondary market. A study conducted by the National Independent Talent Organizations (NITO) analyzed data from 65 different shows around the country in 2023 where artists represented by NITO members performed. According to their findings, on average, ticket buyers were charged twice as much when buying tickets in the secondary market.[5] Secondary market platforms not only serve as a way for professional ticket brokers (i.e. businesses that purchase event tickets solely for the purpose of reselling them for a profit) to sell tickets, they also play an important role by allowing consumers who can no longer use their tickets a relatively simple way of recouping their money and perhaps making a profit by reselling them to someone else.
The platforms, for a fee, simply provide the infrastructure and technology that make up the marketplace for brokers and individuals to resell their tickets. Professional ticket brokers either enter into agreements with sports teams and promoters to have access to tickets for resale or they compete with consumers in the primary marketplace to purchase tickets that they intend to resell at a profit on the platforms. These secondary market platforms, such as StubHub, Vivid Seats, TickPicks, SeatGeek, and the secondary platforms run by Ticketmaster and their main competitor AXS, generally speaking, are similar to eBay (the former parent company for StubHub) or Etsy.
Largely invisible in the world of ticketing are the ticket brokers themselves. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), found in their research that it is ticket brokers, offering large numbers of tickets at inflated prices, who are dominating the resale marketplaces. According to their 2018 report:
Brokers whose business is to purchase and resell tickets have a competitive advantage over individual consumers because they have the technology and resources to purchase large numbers of tickets as soon as they go on sale. Some consumer advocates, state officials, and event organizers believe that brokers unfairly use this advantage to obtain tickets from the primary market, which restricts ordinary consumers from buying tickets at face value. As a result, consumers may pay higher prices than they would if tickets were available on the primary market. In addition, some event organizers and primary ticket sellers have expressed frustration that the profits from the higher resale price accrue to brokers who have not played a role in creating or producing the event. [6]
3) Consumer challenges. One widespread complaint from consumers trying to purchase tickets to popular shows or sporting events is that they are poised on their web browsers to buy tickets the moment they go on sale, but the available tickets are sold out within seconds or minutes of the initial sale. So, consumers are unable to buy them, no matter how quickly they move the moment the tickets are available. Adding to their frustration is the fact that, almost immediately, they find tickets that they were unable to purchase at the on-sale site being advertised for sale on other websites, for much higher prices.
Because of the deployment of a variety of technologies (termed “bots”) used by people operating in the resale market to immediately purchase tickets the moment they go on sale, consumers will always be at a disadvantage when it comes to the most popular artists and sporting events. Despite federal and state laws prohibiting the use of this technology, the problem persists. In addition, as the technology becomes more sophisticated, it becomes harder for primary ticket sellers to detect and block. Cybersecurity firm, Imperva, studies what it has termed “bad bots,” which are “software applications that run automated tasks with malicious intent.” In its 2023 report, Imperva found that bad bots make up 30 percent of all automated internet traffic and that bots generally made up 47.7% of all internet traffic in 2022.[7] In their 2025 report they found that for the first time in a decade bots made up for 51 percent of all internet activity and bad bots made up 37% of internet activity.[8]
In addition, for consumers who are not familiar with the fact that both primary and secondary markets exist, they often can find themselves on a secondary site and pay more than they otherwise would have if they had sought out the primary ticket seller. This problem exists whether it is a major arena show by a well-known artist or a small local club. Below are two examples[9] of the ticket prices being sold by two California clubs, one in Sacramento and one in San Diego. In the first example, Harlow’s, a 350-capacity general admission club in Sacramento, is selling tickets to an upcoming show for a total price of $32.90, including any fees and taxes.
The following illustrates the advertised ticket prices for the same show at Harlow’s on the secondary market. The lowest price is almost double the price of the ticket being sold by Harlow’s at $61 each and the highest price for a ticket is over $4,062. Presumably, a consumer would not purchase a general admission ticket for $4,000 or even $200 when they could purchase on for the “amazing” low price of $61 ($28 over the actual price of the ticket).
The second example, below, shows a general admission ticket for Tauk at The Music Box, a 700-capacity general admission venue in San Diego. The price of the ticket at the venue’s box office are $31.66 including fees and taxes.
Below are the prices of the tickets being sold on a secondary platform. The “amazing” low price is $56 including fees (almost $25 more than the actual price of the ticket). The highest price per ticket is listed at $576 per ticket.
Since both clubs in the examples are general admission clubs without reserved seating, there is no actual difference between the ticket available from the box office and those listed on the secondary market. The only difference is that someone in the business of reselling tickets purchased those tickets before the consumer could, limiting the consumer’s ability to purchase the tickets at their face value.
Of course, the difference in prices can be much more extreme when it comes to a popular artist. The author notes:
Professional scalpers often purchase large numbers of tickets the moment they go on sale and immediately upload them to secondary resale websites at steep markups. These markups have skyrocketed in recent years. The average secondary market price for tickets to the North American leg of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour was approximately $3,801 per ticket, compared to an average face value of $253.56. Similarly, tickets for major tours by Beyoncé and Harry Styles averaged $1,096 and $1,061 on secondary markets.
Recent studies show that fans pay an average of 203% over face value when purchasing tickets on resale platforms. In many cases, artists who intentionally keep ticket prices low to make their shows accessible still see their tickets flipped for massive profits. For example, Luke Combs intentionally priced his tickets modestly at $72.16, yet 7,767 tickets were resold on the secondary market for more than $2.3 million, with an average resale price of $298.52 – a 313% markup
4) How is the ticket buying experience different in other countries? According to the Los Angeles Times, the face value of the tickets for Taylor Swift’s concert at SoFi Stadium in 2023 ranged from $49 to $449. However, tickets on StubHub were quickly being sold for around $800 up to $11,000.[10]
At the time Billboard reported:
Prices to see [Taylor] Swift at one of her final nine shows in the United States have increased following the release of the album April 19, with the average get-in-the-door price — the lowest price available — hovering around $2,600 per ticket, according to data from TicketIQ. That means it would cost a couple more than $5,000 just to be in the same building as Swift in Miami . . , New Orleans . . . and Indianapolis . . . this fall.
In Europe, however . . . tickets cost only a fraction of that. Right now, the get-in-the door price to see the opening of the European leg of the Eras Tour is $340 a ticket — 87% cheaper than the average price in the United States. . . . That means a fan in Miami could fly to Paris for about $900 a person . . . spend two nights at a four-star hotel at $250 a night and purchase a $340 concert ticket for a grand total of $1,740 — which is still $760 less than the cheapest tickets currently available for her Miami shows.
Tickets to see Swift in Stockholm . . . are even cheaper, at $312 for the cheapest tickets, while tickets for her show in Portugal . . . start at $336 and in Spain . . . start at $324.[11]
Opponents of reforms in the resale market have argued that one of the reasons that Swift tickets remained so much lower in Europe was because Ticketmaster did not have the same control over the market. However, as noted above, the face value price of Taylor Swift tickets during the United States leg of her tour, particularly here in California, were in a similar range as those in Europe. So, it is unclear what impact their domination in the primary market played in this case.
The opposition has also posited that another reason for the difference in ticket prices is that Swift is not as popular in Europe, so the demand was not as great. However, Swift fans at her sold-out concerts in Edinburgh, Scotland may beg to differ. According to reports from the British Geological Survey, Swift’s fans caused an actual earthquake during her concerts. Seismic readings were detected almost four miles away from the stadium.[12]
While this bill, and previous bills attempting to reform California’s ticketing ecosystem, are not about or for Ms. Swift, but her popularity, the interest of the media, and the loud voices and devotion of her fans around the world provide a clear illustration of the problems with ticket prices in the United States’ entertainment market and allows us to compare the U.S. with markets in other countries.
European countries continue to distrust “touts.” Despite the fact that ticket brokers and other secondary resellers are directly competing with consumers in the primary market and could be the reason they cannot find tickets, people in the United States have embraced the resale ticket market as a valid business model that provides consumers with the ability to purchase tickets to events that they could not otherwise attend, albeit at a premium price. This is not the case in many European countries where consumers, policymakers, and mainstream media have remained wary of the practice of purchasing tickets to resell them at an inflated price, which the U.K. refers to as “touting.”
Ticket market experts point to this general distrust as one of the reasons for the difference in ticket prices between the United States and Europe, while the United States has turned its attention to the domination of Live Nation Entertainment, the parent company for Ticketmaster, as the main driver behind skyrocketing ticket prices.[13] Policymakers in other countries have taken concerns related to the price of tickets and the resale market so seriously that one of the planks that the Labour party in Britain ran on for the 2024 election was a commitment to cap the price of resale tickets.
5) The elephant in the room: The Live Nation anti-trust lawsuit. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and 30 state and district attorneys general filed an anti-trust lawsuit against Live Nation Entertainment on May 23, 2024. In the suit, the US government asked the courts to break up Live Nation, or at the very least separate Ticketmaster from the conglomerate. The US DOJ accused Live Nation of leveraging its power in the entertainment industry to dominate the industry by locking venues into exclusive ticketing contracts, pressuring artists to use its services, and threatening its rivals with financial retribution. Ultimately a total of 40 States Attorneys General signed onto the lawsuit.
According to California Attorney General Rob Bonta’s office at the time:
The lawsuit alleges Live Nation violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, which prohibits anticompetitive agreements, monopolization, and attempted monopolization. Monopolization offenses occur when a single firm maintains a monopoly unlawfully, by using its control of the market to exclude rivals and harm competition. In addition, the complaint alleges violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.
The complaint filed today alleges that Live Nation protects its monopoly by using both exclusive contracts with promoters and venues to protect its dominant position in the live music industry to force artists and venues to use both its ticketing and concert promotion services. Live Nation uses their market dominance to leverage its power over all other aspects of the live music entertainment industry: from artist management, to ticketing, and promotions. For example, Live Nation has used their dominance in promotions to force venues to use Ticketmaster’s ticketing services, thereby blocking innovation and unfairly competing with competitors in the music concert business.
In the lawsuit, Attorney General Bonta, U.S. DOJ, and coalition states allege that Live Nation has:
- Harmed fans through higher fees. Fans’ ticketing experience — from buying a ticket to showtime — is also worse than it would be if the industry was competitive.
- Maintained its monopoly in ticketing markets by locking up venues through restrictive long-term, exclusive agreements and threats that venues will lose access to Live Nation-controlled tours and artists if they sign with a rival ticketer.
- Leveraged its extensive network of venues to force artists to select Live Nation as a promoter instead of its rivals, maintaining its promotions monopoly. [14]
In March 2026, the US Department of Justice announced a settlement with Live Nation. The settlement included the payment of $280 million in civil penalties to the participating states. In addition, limits were placed on long-term exclusivity contracts with venues, requiring them to be a maximum of four years. In addition, the settlement required a 50-50 split on exclusivity agreements where venues and artists can be exclusive with Live Nation for up to 50 percent of their ticket sales. The other 50 percent of the tickets will be reserved for other ticket sellers to sell. Live nation is also required to divest from 13 amphitheaters around the country. Ticketmaster is also required to open its technology to allow other ticket sellers to use its platform to reach customers.[15]
Shortly after the announcement, Attorney General Bonta and 34 other state attorneys general rejected the settlement offer.[16] In announcing the decision AG Bonta stated:
“Today, U.S. DOJ has chosen to settle with Live Nation, but a bipartisan group of attorneys general, including California, have chosen to continue this fight and get a better deal for consumers — the deal Americans nationwide deserve,” said Attorney General Bonta. “Just in the first week of trial, we’ve already heard that Live Nation fully intended to take advantage of fans — and were able to do so because fans had no other place to go. Live Nation has manipulated the market, made itself untouchable by any competitor, and raked in the cash — not because it is better, but because it has acted illegally and created a monopoly."[17]
The states argue that the $280 million is too small a settlement and that the settlement failed to break up Live Nation’s monopoly. The case is currently wrapping up closing arguments before the jury begins deliberations.[18]
6) Concerns raised by the opposition. The opposition presents three primary arguments: (1) price caps in the secondary market will increase Live Nation/Ticketmaster’s monopoly and it will harm current anti-trust efforts; (2) price caps will increase fraud by driving ticket sales underground; and, (3) the bill is unworkable because the secondary marketplaces have no way of knowing what the original price of the ticket was. Each argument is addressed below.
Will price caps entrench the monopoly? The Consumer Federation of California writes:
The Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly is a massive vertically integrated monopoly. It directly represents hundreds of the largest artists in entertainment. It owns a dominant number of outdoor amphitheaters important to the live music infrastructure. It has a dominant position in terms of promoting and putting together artist tours. It forces venues of many sizes, particularly mid-sized and smaller venues, to sign long-term exclusive ticketing agreements with the monopoly, and greases these transactions with additional payments (sometimes called kickbacks by critics of the monopoly). It dominates the primary ticketing market, with a roughly 80% market share – clearly monopoly sized. It also is the largest player in the secondary ticketing market - a market which also includes some of the few competitors to the Live Nation/Ticketmaster monopoly, such as Stub Hub, Vivid, SeatGeek, Gametime and a few others.
Were AB 1720 to become law the main beneficiary of the bill would actually be the monopoly itself. How? The bill caps prices and profits for the precious few competitors to the monopoly but does nothing to limit the monopoly's predatory behavior against consumers and others. But what about the talking point that the monopoly itself will be trimmed under this bill? This is essentially known as a loss-leader strategy - the monopoly pretends to be making a big sacrifice for consumers, but their real objective is to harm the economics of the secondary ticketing industry such that this limited competition would be diminished and ultimately eliminated. Does anybody actually think that if the monopoly gained more control over the secondary ticketing market this would be good for consumers in the long run? Only a monopolist would defend such an action.
Music industry experts, artists, independent promoters, independent venue operators, secondary marketplaces, and consumer groups are all generally in agreement that Live Nation has a monopoly in the entertainment industry and that monopoly is harming artists and consumers. Where they differ is in the conclusion that protecting the current practices in the secondary market is protecting consumers, artists, and small venue operators. As described previously, the secondary resellers and platforms are not competing with Ticketmaster in the primary market. Resellers are, in fact, customers of Ticketmaster since they very often purchase the tickets they resell from the company, thus contributing to its success.
Will price caps increase fraud? On price caps increasing fraud, StubHub writes:
Examples from other countries show that price caps, implemented with the same good intentions as AB 1720, ultimately harm fans and preview what California consumers can expect if this bill becomes law. In Ireland, following price cap legislation, ticket scams surged, with financial institutions reporting significant increases in fraud victims and losses. In Australia, fans lost hundreds of thousands of dollars to ticket scams as resale shifted to social media platforms; notably, 25% of Australian young people have reportedly fallen victim to social media scams, with concert tickets among the most common scams. In France, authorities identified hundreds of fraudulent ticket websites during the Paris Olympics but were only able to shut down a fraction. In each case, after a price cap was enacted, demand remained constant while legal resale channels contracted and fraud increased.
StubHub points to a surge in ticket scams in Ireland after the passage of resale price caps in 2021. However, the citation they provide as evidence of that fact is simply a fraud warning by the Bank of Ireland related to Taylor Swift’s 2024 Eras Tour, arguably one of the most popular music artists in history. It is not surprising that banks expected an increase in ticket scams, given her popularity and the difficulty obtaining tickets. Nothing in the fraud warning suggests that the concern is in any way related to price caps on resale tickets.
In addition to the scam warnings from Irish banks, StubHub points to a November 2022 report, Reflecting Ireland: An insight into consumer behavioural change in Ireland.[19] The report found that financial fraud was on the increase, with 75 percent of people in Ireland experiencing attempted fraud and over 25 percent becoming victims. Their research found that the “most common types of financial fraud are vishing (phone call / voice message), smishing (text message) and phishing (email). Other common scams relate to lottery wins, inheritance, investment, romance, tickets sales or property rental.”[20] As with other countries, including the United States, internet fraud in Ireland was increasing significantly. In the 12 months leading up to June 2022, a total of 16,202 incidents of fraud were reported, an increase of 43% over the previous year and more than three times the level reported 5 years ago. The researchers found that the increase was largely driven by unauthorized transactions and attempts to obtain personal or banking information online or by phone.[21] The researchers found that 11 percent of the people surveyed experienced ticket fraud and 5 percent became victims. This contrasts with over half of the respondents reporting that they had experienced vishing, smishing, and phishing scams.[22] At no point does the report draw any connection between price caps recently being imposed and an increase in ticketing scams. They also do not identify whether the scams took place on a ticket resale platform or elsewhere.
The opposition also argues that ticketing fraud in the 2024 Summer Olympics in France was related to the cap on ticket prices in France’s resale market. First, it is important to note that the amendments from the Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism Committee explicitly exempt most sports from the ticket price cap, including the LA28 Olympics. So, the Summer Olympics and any future Olympic games should not be impacted. That being said, sports and tourism experts are already issuing urgent warnings about tickets scams during the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics. A quick internet search turns up warning after warning about the likelihood of being scammed. One travel expert has issued this warning, “Sports fans need to remain vigilant this week. As with any other major event, scammers will try to take advantage of this lucrative opportunity to con people. This could be tricking you into handing over personal details via fake registration sites or parting with your money to secure tickets early (which are fakes).”[23]
As it pertains to the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup in Los Angeles, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the self-regulating governing body for professional soccer, recently faced its own accusations that they are scamming people trying to purchase tickets. FIFA originally allowed unlimited resales, with no price cap on the ticket price and charged a 15% commission to both the buyers and the sellers. As a result, according to reports, a ticket to the men’s finals with an original price of $2,030 could be purchased in the resale market for $25,000 within 24 hours. As a result, FIFA earned a commission of $7,500, over three times the price of the original value “without providing any additional service.”[24]
The unfortunate reality is whenever there is a concert, game, or other extremely popular team, artist or event, people will find a way to defraud consumers, completely unrelated to whether there is a price cap or not. For decades, along with ticket fraud fans, artists and sports teams have had to contend with bootlegged music and movies and counterfeit sports jerseys and other memorabilia.
As recent evidence suggests, instances of fraud are not only found on platforms outside of the secondary marketplace. Recent news reports say a growing number of attendees at the Coachella music festival are reporting systemic failures within the secondary ticketing market. “According to reports, third-party platforms including StubHub are under fire for allowing sellers to default on long-standing ‘guaranteed’ orders without adequate recourse for the buyers.”[25] The article further contends:
The crisis stems from a massive surge in demand over the last 10 days, which has seen general admission wristband values skyrocket to over $3,000, with some VIP listings exceeding $5,000. Fans who purchased tickets months ago at significantly lower prices—frequently around $600—allege that sellers are intentionally failing to deliver passes to capitalize on the price hike. These same passes are reportedly being relisted for whole multiples of the original cost, while the original buyers are left with travel and accommodation booked but no entry to the festival.
While platforms like StubHub officially operate under a ‘FanProtect Guarantee’, critics argue the system is fundamentally broken. In many cases, the platforms offer a simple refund rather than sourcing comparable replacement tickets, which are now prohibitively expensive for the platforms to provide. Beyond that, there’s no accounting for the related expenses incurred like time, travel, accommodations, and more, which could potentially be for naught in these situations.
This lack of accountability has led to accusations of “criminal” behavior on the secondary market, as entire groups of fans find themselves stranded in the desert with no viable options for entry. [26]
As with so many discussions in the last few years about entertainment ticket policy, all roads eventually lead back to Taylor Swift and her Eras Tour. On March 3, 2025, the Queens County (New York) district attorney arrested two suspects accused of stealing more than 900 concert tickets, most of which were for Swift’s Eras Tour, and reselling them for a profit of more than $600,000.[27] The author, Kishani Udugampola writes:
The Queens district attorney's office said that one of the defendants and an accomplice, who both worked for a third-party contractor in Kingston, Jamaica, used their access to StubHub’s computer system to find a secure area of the network that contained URLs of sold tickets. They allegedly redirected the URLs to their coconspirators in Queens who posted the tickets to StubHub then raked in the cash for worthless tickets.
The Queens fraudsters are just a few of the thousands who illegally profited from the record-breaking Eras Tour, which redefined the global music industry while simultaneously exposing structural vulnerabilities in digital marketplaces, consumer protection systems and financial oversight frameworks. The tour, which "surpassed $2 billion in revenue, became the highest-grossing concert series in history.
[. . .]
Resale platforms such as StubHub, SeatGeek and Vivid Seats reported average resale prices between $1,500 and $3,000, compared to face values ranging from $49 to $499. In major metropolitan markets, ticket-resale prices can exceed face value by large margins, sometimes reaching 2,000% from original ticket prices below $500, depending on seat tier, event popularity and proximity to the event date.
However, unlike official ticket-sales markets, secondary-ticket markets operate with inconsistent transparency, fragmented oversight and limited safeguards — conditions that increase fraud risk.[28]
As can be seen, an uncapped secondary market has not spared US consumers from the type of fraudulent activity opponents claim a price cap will induce.
Are price caps unworkable? Finally, Tick Pick, Seat Geek, and Gametime state:
The bill requires marketplaces to cap non-sports tickets at 110% of the “face” or original price. However, ticket resale marketplaces do not purchase or set ticket prices. Sellers own the tickets, set their own resale prices, and only they and the original seller know how much they paid for the tickets. Moreover, the great majority of live event tickets do not print the original or “face value” price, largely because prices increasingly fluctuate based on demand, and buying in a pre-sale, public on-sale, or the days before an event will often be at very different prices for essentially the same seat - even when all the purchases are from the official venue website.
In this environment, only two parties can inform the marketplace of the original ticket prices - the original seller and the reseller.
It may be difficult for a resale platform to confirm the actual amount someone paid for a ticket when they purchased it. It would not be impossible. The reseller could be required to provide the platform with a receipt that corresponds to a serial number on a ticket, for example. However, recent amendments should alleviate the secondary marketplaces’ concerns. The amendments require that original ticket sellers include the total price paid for the ticket on the ticket, whether it is a paper ticket or digital. If it is a paper ticket, the total price would be added when it is printed. For digital tickets, they need to include the full price when they are generated. This requirement, arguably, should remove any confusion or mystery around how much a person paid for the ticket.
7) Analysis. Opponents fail to answer one simple question: why was a Taylor Swift concert ticket less than $350 in countries with price caps and between $800 and $2600 in the United States? If Ticketmaster’s monopoly is solely to blame, why is the average markup on secondary sites 203% over face value? The reality is the single most impactful policy for controlling the price of tickets is a cap both on the resale price and on the amount of fees secondary marketplaces can charge resellers and buyers. The primary difference between the price of tickets in California and the prices in other countries can be traced to capping the amount someone is allowed to resell a ticket for. In Europe, prices are kept low thanks to laws limiting how high tickets can be marked up above face value when they are resold.
This bill, along with two others that the Committee is hearing this year, are all seeking to rein in a predatory secondary market that competes with consumers in the primary market in order to sell them an item or experience for a higher price than they would have had to pay otherwise. Whether it is reselling entertainment tickets, trying to schedule a tee time, or making reservations for a restaurant, pickleball court, or camp site.
As previously noted, this bill establishes a ten percent cap on how much live entertainment ticket resellers can charge in the secondary ticket market, in other words, a ticket cannot be sold for more than 110 percent of the price that was paid for the original ticket. In addition, the bill caps at ten percent the amount that platforms can charge buyers and sellers in fees. This is potentially the most generous of the three bills. The other two limit unauthorized resale. One of the bills focuses on prohibiting the resale of restaurant reservations[29]and the other prohibits the resale of tee time reservations at municipal golf courses.[30] All three bills seek to discourage people who are competing with actual customers by buying tickets, tee-times, or amassing restaurant reservations with the intention of reselling them back to the customers at an inflated price.
Whether Ticketmaster or another on-sale ticket company sells a ticket to a reseller or to an actual customer, their profits remain the same. The Future of Music Coalition, a supporter of the bill, describes the situation this way:
It’s helpful to think of the effort to “fix ticketing” as consisting of two distinct “buckets,” which add up to a complementary and holistic public policy approach.
The first bucket is about structural competition issues and the harms that follow from consolidated ownership. This includes the factors that California and the other remaining state plaintiffs seek to address in their anti-trust lawsuit against Ticketmaster/Live Nation, and the factors that led UK regulators to require divestments when secondary sellers Viagogo and Stubhub merged in 2021.
The second bucket is market regulation, which is concerned with rules of the road that apply to every firm; it’s a means of addressing potentially harmful practices and behavioral concerns by anyone in the field. AB1720 is about this piece. It’s a tough bill that reflects best practices and consumer protection approaches that have worked well in nations that have adopted similar policies.
[. . .]
It makes sense that while anti-trust authorities are focused on a breakup lawsuit, legislative approaches at both state and federal levels can focus on addressing that second “market regulation” bucket. Anti-trust enforcement and good state-level legislation like California’s AB 1720 (and AB 1349) go hand in hand. Either effort on its own would be insufficient to address the range of problems, but together, they add up to sound policy that protects fans, workers, small businesses, and diverse creative expression. This approach is growing in momentum; the new Senate report on Ticketmaster, years in the making, endorses price caps as one of the policy recommendations for how to address dysfunction in the ticket market.[31]
Since 2021, Ireland has capped the resale price of a ticket at what it originally sold for in the primary market. In 2024, there was one state considering price caps (Maryland). That provision made it through one of two chambers. In 2026, at least seventeen states are considering some version of a price cap, and one state has passed a price cap successfully (Maine).
While generally limiting prices in most markets could be seen as something to be leery of, this market is the rare exception where there is a justification to limit resale prices given how fundamentally broken the ticket resale market is. Californian consumers should not have to pay ticket prices that can reach an order of magnitude more expensive than their European counterparts have to pay.
This bill, when combined with AB 1349 (Bryan), which limits speculative ticketing practices, likely would address some of the largest problems in the secondary ticket market and would significantly reduce ticket prices in addition to making it easier for consumers to purchase tickets in the primary market for face value.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Sponsors of the bill, National Independent Talent (NITO), argue:
The Problem
AB 1720 addresses a well-documented problem in today's secondary ticketing market: the proliferation of speculative listings and excessive markups that distort pricing, mislead consumers, and undermine confidence in the marketplace. Artists make deliberate pricing decisions to ensure that live events remain accessible to their fans while supporting the real costs of touring. When tickets are immediately resold at excessive markups, those decisions are undermined and California consumers are forced to pay prices that bear no relationship to the event's original intent or value.
NITO's own research shows resale prices average twice the face value of primary tickets, and the average concert in a 1,700 capacity venue generates over $40,000 in profit from resale alone. That means those Californians are paying $40,000 more than they should for an average concert. These inflated prices do not benefit artists, venues, or anyone responsible for producing the event. Instead, they extract significant dollars from consumers and divert spending away from local restaurants, bars, and surrounding small businesses that depend on live events to drive foot traffic.
Real-World Examples
NITO has documented instances where over 50% of available tickets for a single show were resold on secondary platforms. Unforeseen circumstances, like an illness or the babysitter cancelling, do not explain half the audience reselling a ticket. It is the result of industrial-scale resale operations, often backed by outside investors and private equity. Regular fans are not competing with each other for the best seats; they are competing against well-funded professionals armed with the latest technology, whose sole aim is to extract profit from the system.
When Oasis played the Rose Bowl in 2025, primary market tickets had dynamic pricing turned off, with prices ranging from $81 to $156. Yet data from the secondary market, accounting for approximately 60% of StubHub sales, showed over 8,000 tickets sold at a gross of $2.2 million. The average ticket on StubHub was $270.
One NITO member reported an instance to the FTC in which resellers hijacked a public on-sale at Intuit Arena. Using bots to hold nearly all available inventory in their carts without completing purchases, these actors blocked regular fans from securing any tickets and forced them to secondary sites at inflated prices. These practices erode consumer confidence and drive people away from attending live music events altogether.
Why Legislative Action Is Necessary
We cannot rely on large corporations to police these bad actors on behalf of artists. In emails revealed during the ongoing anti-trust trial, Live Nation CEO Michael Rapino acknowledged that some of the company's artist-protection tools were designed so the company could tell artists it had "tried to stop scalpers." Meanwhile, artists are left to post on their own social media pages, pleading with fans not to buy tickets at huge markups and educating their audiences to avoid being scammed. This is precisely why the comprehensive reform laid out in AB 1720 is needed.
What AB 1720 Does
AB 1720 takes a measured and balanced approach by:
● Establishing a reasonable cap on resale prices to curb excessive speculation
● Preserving the ability for legitimate, consumer-to-consumer resale
● Promoting transparency and accountability in ticket transactions
● Carves out sporting events from the resale cap
Importantly, these caps do not eliminate resale. They simply prevent abuse. Fans who genuinely cannot attend an event retain the ability to resell their tickets, while the most predatory profiteering practices are curtailed. Similarly, sporting events which function completely differently from live performances, are untouched by the resale cap leaving that industry to continue practices that work best for them.
Evidence from market analyses demonstrates that when appropriate resale protections are in place, abusive practices decline significantly and more tickets reach consumers at intended prices — resulting in a healthier and more trustworthy marketplace overall.
A coalition of organizations representing artists, independent promoters, and independent venue operators, writes in support:
At the heart of AB 1720 is a straightforward and powerful idea: no ticket should be resold for more than 10 percent above face value. This cap is the single most meaningful reform California can adopt to restore fairness to the ticketing marketplace. It directly addresses the core problem: industrial-scale resellers who purchase large quantities of tickets at initial sale and relist them at prices far beyond what the artist, venue, or promoter ever intended. These resellers extract enormous economic value from live music events without contributing to the creation, production, or promotion of those events. A face value cap stops that extraction at the source.
Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales including price, transferability, and access is an extension of that creative and economic investment. When a reseller marks up a ticket by two, five, or ten times its face value, the artist's pricing decision is overridden, and the economic relationship between artist and fan is hijacked by a middleman who had no role in making the event happen nor any stake in the community they're extracting the value from. A resale cap preserves the artist's intent and keeps that relationship intact.
For fans, the impact of uncapped resale is devastating and deeply personal. When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians. A parent trying to take their child to a first concert, a young person saving up to see their favorite artist - these are the people who are priced out when the secondary market operates without limits. AB 1720's cap ensures that more tickets end up in the hands of fans who actually intend to attend, at prices close to what the artist set. The bill also rightly distinguishes between true fans who resell a ticket due to changed plans and high-volume resale activity driven by systematic bulk purchasing and markup strategies.
Independent venues, small businesses, nonprofit stages, and community-based promoters serve as economic anchors and incubators for emerging artists across California. The crews and venue staff who make live performances possible depend on the economic ecosystem surrounding those events. When industrial resellers siphon ticket revenue out of that ecosystem, it is the venues, the crew members, and the local economies that suffer. A face value cap keeps more of the economic value of live events where it belongs: with the people and places that make them possible.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: In opposition to the bill, along with the arguments discussed in the body of the analysis, a coalition of community business organizations write:
The fundamental issue in today’s ticketing market is the entrenched monopoly power of Live Nation/Ticketmaster. This vertically integrated conglomerate controls ticketing, promotions, and venues. Roughly 80% of all primary ticketing sales occur on Ticketmaster. Its dominance has produced excessive fees, opaque pricing, and widespread consumer harm. Recently revealed internal company communications describe fans as “so stupid” and boast about “robbing them blind” - the predictable result of unchecked market power.
Yet just weeks ago, the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice entered into a deeply flawed settlement with Live Nation/Ticketmaster, which was widely criticized as a concession that failed to restrain the company’s behavior. The vast majority of states, including California, have rejected that deal and are continuing their case. When federal enforcement falls short, it is even more vital that California act to rein in monopoly practices—not shift the burden onto consumers.
Instead, AB 1720 is myopically focused on limiting the price at which consumers can resell their tickets, even though resale accounts for only a small fraction – roughly 9 percent – of total ticket sales. Meanwhile, Ticketmaster’s monopoly retains full control over how much they can charge on primary sales. They can continue to engage in anti-consumer tactics like dynamic pricing, exclusive pre-sales, and inventory holdbacks, all of which drive up costs and reduce access.
AB 1720’s approach also raises serious equity and consumer protection concerns. Many consumers, particularly low-income Californians, depend on resale as a financial safety valve when plans change. Tying resale limits to the “original price” is unworkable in a primary marketplace defined by secrecy, where consumers often have no clear way to determine what the original price was. As a result, individuals could be forced to sell at a loss or risk violating the law, while Ticketmaster continues to “rob fans blind” and perpetuate the same anti-consumer practices that were the focus of President Biden’s antirust lawsuit.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
National Independent Talent Organization (Sponsor)
72 Music MGMT
American Association of Independent Music
American Federation of Musicians
Artist Rights Alliance
Association of Performing Arts Professionals
Black Music Action Coalition
California Arts Advocates
Fan Alliance
Folk Alliance International
Future of Music Coalition
Ground Control Touring
Ineffable Music Group
Like Management
Live Nation Entertainment, INC.
Lucky Man Management
Mongrel Music
Music Artists Coalition (MAC)
Music Managers Forum - US
National Independent Venue Association of California (NIVA-CA)
Paradise Artists, Inc.
Partisan Arts
Recording Academy
Recording Industry Association of America
ROAM
Sag-aftra
Songwriters of North America
Sound Talent Group
Stuart Ross Management
TBA Agency, LLC
United Musicians and Allied Workers
Opposition
California Black Chamber of Commerce
California Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
California League of United Latin American Citizens (ca Lulac)
California Live Events Equity Alliance
California Multicultural Business Alliance
Central City Association of Los Angeles
Central Valley Latino Mayors and Elected Officials Coalition
Central Valley Yemen Society
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Gametime
Hispanic 100
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco
Latin American and Caribbean Business Chamber of Commerce
Latin Business Association
National Action Network Sacramento
National Baptist Convention Usa, INC
North Valley Yemen Society
Progressive Policy Institute
Seatgeek, INC.
Si Se Puede Fresno, Tulare, Kings & Kern
Sports Fans Coalition
Stubhub, INC.
Ticket Policy Forum
Tickpick, LLC
Oppose Unless Amended
Internet Works
Technet
Analysis Prepared by: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
AB 1640 (Stefani) ↑
AB 1954 (Ward) ↑
The Event Ticketing Industry is Broken and in Need of Disruption, Aventus Network (May 19, 2017). ↑
Tyler Jenke, “Ed Sheeran’s manager has admitted to selling tickets to resale services,” The Music Network (Jun 3, 2018) available at https://themusicnetwork.com/ed-sheeran-manager-sold-tickets-resale/. ↑
NITO Ticket Resale Study. National Independent Talent Organization (Jul 2023) ↑
GAO, Event Ticket Sales: Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues, GAO-18-347 (May 14, 2023) available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-18-347. ↑
Imperva 2023 Bad Bot Report available at https://www.imperva.com/resources/resource-library/reports/2023-imperva-bad-bot-report/. ↑
Imperva 2025 Bad Bot Report available at https://www.imperva.com/blog/2025-imperva-bad-bot-report-how-ai-is-supercharging-the-bot-threat/. ↑
Examples were provided by the sponsors of the bill, the National Independent Venue Association. Both club owners are members of NIVA and do not use Ticketmaster as their primary ticket seller. ↑
Fox, Emma. “$11,000 to see Taylor Swift? How concert tickets got so expensive,” The Los Angeles Times (July 27, 2023) https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2023-07-27/explaining-the-complicated-world-of-ticketing. ↑
Brooks, Dave. “Why Are Taylor Swift Eras Tour Tickets So Much Cheaper in Europe?” Billboard (May 2, 2024) https://www.billboard.com/business/touring/taylor-swift-eras-tour-tickets-cheaper-europe-1235671760/. ↑
Melnick, Kyle. “Swifties set off earthquake sensors again. These songs made the biggest stir.” The Washington Post (Jun. 13, 2024) https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/2024/06/13/taylor-swift-concert-fans-dance-earthquake-sensors/. ↑
While Ticketmaster’s domination is a legitimate concern, as discussed earlier in this analysis, the available data does not support the fact that primary market prices account for the high price of tickets. ↑
California Department of Justice. Attorney General Bonta Files Lawsuit Against Live Nation, Ticketmaster (May 23, 2024) https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-files-lawsuit-against-live-nation-ticketmaster. ↑
Mary Cunningham, Sarah N. Lynch, Jennifer Jacobs. “Live Nation to open Ticketmaster to other sellers and pay $280 million to settle anti-trust charges,” CBS News (Mar. 9, 2026). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/live-nation-ticket-master-doj-case-anti-trust/. ↑
Jon Blistein, “‘Monopolistic Bully’ or ‘Fierce Competitor’? Live Nation Trial Ends With Closing Arguments,” Rolling Stone (Apr. 9, 2026) ↑
Press Release: Attorney General Bonta and State Attorneys General Carry on the Fight Against Live Nation/Ticketmaster (Mar. 9, 2026) https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-and-state-attorneys-general-carry-fight-against-live. ↑
Jon Blistein (Apr. 9, 2026). ↑
Reflecting Ireland: An insight into consumer behavioural change in Ireland, permanent tsb, (Nov. 2022) https://www.ptsb.ie/globalassets/pdf-documents/reflecting-ireland---fraud.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
William Morgan, “Travel expert issues warning ahead of LA28 Olympics ticket registration and what to do if you've been scammed,” Unilad (Mar. 17, 2026) https://www.unilad.com/news/sport/travel-expert-la28-olympics-ticket-registration-scam-warning-786529-20260317. ↑
Girish Sanwal, “FIFA Owes Fans Thousands for Resold World Cup Tickets: Complete Scandal Breakdown,” FWC News (Dec. 20, 2025) ↑
Bryson Page, “Coachella and StubHub Under Fire as Tickets are Canceled and Resold for $3,000+,” EDM Tunes (Apr. 10, 2026) https://www.edmtunes.com/2026/04/coachella-stubhub-controversy-ticket-orders-canceled-resold/amp/. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Kishani Udugampola, Ph.D., CFE, “Taylor Swift’s Eras tour exposes ticket resale fraud,” Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ Fraud Magazine (April 6, 2026) https://www.acfe.com/fraud-magazine/all-issues/issue/article?s=2026-apr-taylor-swift-tour-ticket-fraud. ↑
Ibid. ↑
AB 1640 (Stefani) ↑
AB 1954 (Ward) ↑
So Casually Cruel: How Ticketmaster’s Monopoly Supercharges Prices and Fees, United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senator Blumenthal Minority Staff Report (Mar. 16, 2026) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026_03_16-Live-Event-Ticket-Report-1.pdf. ↑
Date of Hearing: April 7, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT, SPORTS, AND TOURISM
Christopher M. Ward, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1720 (
Author:Haney) – As Amended Ver:March 19, 2026
SUBJECT: Ticket sellers
SUMMARY: AB 1720 prohibits tickets sellers from reselling tickets to concerts and entertainment events for more than the equivalent of the original price of the ticket plus 10%.
Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a ticket seller from selling a ticket for more than the equivalent of the original price for the ticket if it has been acquired directly from the primary contractor plus 10%.
- This limit applies to the total price paid by the consumer and includes any required fees charged by the ticket seller or any digital platform through which the ticket is sold.
- A ticket seller shall be liable for a civil penalty of up $1,000 per ticket sold in violation for a first violation, and up to $2,500 for a subsequent violation. A knowing and willful pattern or practice of violation is punishable by a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per ticket sold in violation.
- This section shall not apply to tickets to professional athletic events.
EXISTING LAW:
- Defines a “ticket seller” as any person who for compensation, commission, or otherwise sells admission tickets to sporting, musical, theatre, or any other entertainment event. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22503.)
- Clarifies that the following are not ticket sellers for purposes of existing law:
- An officially appointed agent of an air carrier, ocean carrier, or motor coach carrier who purchases or sells tickets in conjunction with a tour package.
- Any person who sells six tickets or less to any one single event, provided the tickets are sold off the event premises, including, but not limited to, designated parking areas and points of entry to the event.
- The person or organization responsible for the event for which tickets are being sold, or a seller of tickets operating under a written contract with this person or organization.
- Any nonprofit charitable tax-exempt organization selling tickets to an event sponsored by the organization. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22503.5, 22503.6, 22504, 22511.)
- Requires that ticket sellers:
- Maintain records of ticket sales, deposits, and refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22501.)
- Prior to sale, disclose to the purchaser by means of description or a map the location of the seat or seats represented by the ticket or tickets. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.)
- Make any partial or full deposit refundable if received on a future event for which tickets are not available, except for a service charge of not more than 10 percent, until such time as tickets for the event are actually available. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22506.)
- Provide a refund within 30 days for the ticket price of an event that is canceled. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(a).)
- Provide a refund, upon request, within 30 days, for the ticket price of an event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(b).)
- Provide that a local jurisdiction may require a bond of not more than $50,000 to cover required refunds. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22507(d).)
- Disclose that a service charge is imposed by the ticket seller and is added to the actual ticket price by the seller in any advertisement or promotion for any event by the ticket seller. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22508.)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from contracting to sell or accepting payment for tickets unless the ticket seller:
- Has lawful possession of the ticket;
- Has a contractual right to obtain the ticket; or
- Informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, that it does not have possession of the ticket, has no contract to obtain the offered ticket, and may not be able to supply the ticket at the contracted price. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.1.)
- Authorizes a ticket seller to accept a deposit from a prospective purchaser as part of an agreement that the ticket seller will make best efforts to obtain a ticket at a specified price or price range and within a specified time, provided that the ticket seller informs the purchaser, in a specified manner, of the terms of the deposit agreement and makes required disclosures. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.1.)
- Prohibits a ticket seller from representing that it can deliver, or cause to be delivered, a ticket at a specific price or within a specific price range and fail to deliver the ticket a) within a reasonable time and b) below or within the price and range of prices stated. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.2.)
- Provides a private right of action to ticket purchasers for violations of 5) and 6). (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.3.)
- Declares it unlawful for a person to intentionally use or sell software or services to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure (including limits on the number of tickets a person can purchase) that is used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process for event attendees. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22502.5.)
- Deems a violation of the chapter of the Business and Professions Code containing the provisions above to be a misdemeanor. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22505.)
- Requires a ticket seller to have a permanent business address from which tickets may only be sold and that the address be included in any advertisement or solicitation. Makes a violation of this requirement a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $2,500, or by both, and provides for civil penalties of up to $2,500 for violations. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 22500.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown. This measure has been keyed fiscal by Legislative Counsel.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s statement. According to the author, “For decades, concert tickets were sold at face value to real fans who wanted to see the artists they loved. But today, professional scalpers and bots buy up tickets in seconds and resell them at massive markups. This bill puts an end to that system and puts the concert experience back where it belongs: with fans and artists.
“Concert tickets aren’t stocks to be flipped for profit. They’re a chance for real fans to see the artists they love. Yet for years we’ve let out-of-state scalpers and speculators cut the line, buy up tickets in bulk, and resell them at outrageous markups, shutting out fans while taking the lion’s share of the money. They didn’t write the songs. They didn’t build the venues. They didn't clean the bathrooms. They didn’t put on the show. But they’re the ones cashing in. That’s not fair, and it’s not inevitable. California is the heart of the music industry, and we have a duty to stand with fans, artists, and venues, not speculators and scalpers. This is about restoring common sense and making sure live music is about community and culture, not price-gouging and profiteering.”
- Background. For decades, live events were accessible to middle class and working fans who wanted to see their favorite artist or band live in concert, their favorite musical come to town, or enjoy a comedy show after a long week. Fans could purchase tickets at the box office and see world-famous bands like the Rolling Stones at affordable prices. That changed with the transition of ticket sales to online platforms and the rise of ticket scalping as a highly profitable scheme.
Professional scalpers often purchase large numbers of tickets the moment they go on sale and immediately upload them to secondary resale websites at steep markups. These markups have skyrocketed in recent years. The average secondary market price for tickets to the North American leg of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour was approximately $3,801 per ticket, compared to an average face value of $253.56. Similarly, tickets for major tours by Beyoncé and Harry Styles averaged $1,096 and $1,061 on secondary markets.
Recent studies show that fans pay an average of 203% over face value when purchasing tickets on resale platforms. In many cases, artists who intentionally keep ticket prices low to make their shows accessible still see their tickets flipped for massive profits. For example, Luke Combs intentionally priced his tickets modestly at $72.16, yet 7,767 tickets were resold on the secondary market for more than $2.3 million, with an average resale price of $298.52 – a 313% markup.
These practices allow ticket scalpers to profit significantly without contributing to the event itself. When a fan purchases a ticket through the primary market, their money supports the artist, the venue, and the staff who make the event possible. But when they pay thousands of dollars over the face value on the secondary market, the money only goes into the scalper’s pocket. A recent analysis by the National Independent Talent Organization found that ticket resellers earned an average cumulative profit of $41,000 per show by charging roughly double the original ticket price.
- Live event ticketing. Tickets purchased online are typically found on either primary ticket seller websites or on the secondary market. Primary ticket sellers, including Ticketmaster and AXS, work with event organizers to control ticket prices, and share revenue between the artists and the venue operators. The prices set in the primary market heavily affect the volume and value of tickets in the secondary market. Although the cost of tickets can fluctuate through dynamic pricing, tickets generally sell on the primary market with a face value that is below their market value. The number of tickets available is, of necessity, limited to the capacity of the venue, and of course are subject to sell outs.
The secondary market is where tickets purchased on the primary market are resold. Ticket prices are usually significantly higher when purchased from someone in the secondary market, especially for high-demand or sold-out concerts and sports games. Secondary market platforms not only serve as a way for consumers who are unable to use their tickets to have a relatively simple way of recouping their money and potentially making a profit by reselling them to someone else, they also are utilized by professional ticket brokers. These brokers operate as a business that purchases event tickets solely for the purpose of reselling them to maximize profit.
The platforms, for a fee, simply provide the infrastructure and technology that make up the marketplace for brokers and individuals to resell their tickets. Professional ticket brokers either enter into agreements with sports teams and promoters to have access to tickets for resale, or they compete with consumers in the primary marketplace, to purchase tickets that they intend to resell at a profit on the platforms. These secondary market platforms include StubHub, Vivid Seats, TickPicks, and SeatGeek, as well as resale platforms run by Ticketmaster and AXS.
According to a 2018 report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), ticket brokers are dominating the resale marketplaces. They have a competitive advantage over individual consumers because they have the technology and resources to purchase large numbers of tickets as soon as they go on sale. Some consumer advocates, state officials, and event organizers believe that brokers unfairly use this advantage to obtain tickets from the primary market, which restricts ordinary consumers from buying tickets at face value. As a result, consumers may pay higher prices than they would if tickets were available on the primary market. In addition, some event organizers and primary ticket sellers have expressed frustration that the profits from the higher resale price are pocketed by brokers who had no role in creating or producing the event.
- Arguments in support. According to a group of supporters, including the Music Artists Coalition, the National Independent Venue Association, and others in the music industry, “Music artists invest significant creative, financial, and personal resources in bringing live performances to their fans. The ability to set the terms and conditions of ticket sales, including price, transferability, and access, is an extension of that creative and economic investment. When a reseller marks up a ticket by two, five, or ten times its face value, the artist’s pricing decision is overridden, and the economic relationship between artist and fan is hijacked by a middleman who had no role in making the event happen, nor any stake in the community they’re extracting the value from. A resale cap preserves the artist’s intent and keeps that relationship intact.
“For fans, the impact of uncapped resale is devastating and deeply personal. When tickets are acquired in bulk and relisted at excessive markups, events of all sizes become financially out of reach for many Californians. A parent trying to take their child to a first concert, a young person saving up to see their favorite artist – these are the people who are priced out when the secondary market operates without limits.”
- Arguments in opposition. According to a group of ticket resale platforms, including SeatGeek, TickPick, and Gametime, in opposition, “When secure markets do not exist or don’t have inventory because tickets are nontransferable or price caps exist, consumers turn to alternative black markets, the digital equivalents of the fraud-ridden street resales that were pervasive pre-Internet. The consumer protections we provide on our ticketing platforms do not exist on Craigslist, Facebook Marketplace, Reddit, or similar platforms, so buyers have no recourse when a seller fails to deliver or sends a fake ticket. The Taylor Swift Eras Tour provided many examples of this, as resale scams and fraud proliferated in countries where the supply of market-priced resale tickets was suppressed by price caps or other restrictions.
“Today, in federal court in New York City, Attorney General Bonta, and over 30 other
State Attorneys General are litigating against Live Nation/Ticketmaster, seeking to
promote competition by ending decades of monopoly behavior that has hurt fans,
artists, and venues. In contrast, economists across the political spectrum agree that
resale price caps such as those proposed in AB 1720 will strengthen the Ticketmaster
monopoly by reducing competition in today’s most competitive ticketing sector – resale.”
- Triple-referral. Should the bill pass from this committee, it will be re-referred to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection, followed by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary.
- Amendments and policy considerations. The Committee has worked with the author’s office on amendments that add clarity to the ticket price limitations, by including mandatory fees for processing and delivery. The amendments also provide more specificity on the types of athletic events that are not subject to the bill, including tickets to an athletic contest sold by a season ticketholder or season ticket licenseholder, tickets to collegiate or amateur athletic contests or events, and athletic contests or events involving teams representing foreign nations, including the FIFA World Cup and Olympics.
As noted above, this bill is triple-referred to both the Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee and the Judiciary Committee. As this bill moves forward, the author should consider adding ways that a consumer can track and verify the original price of a ticket, especially considering dynamic pricing by primary sellers, in order to ensure that the total cost is correctly being provided to the purchaser of a resold ticket.
- Prior and related legislation:
- AB 1349 (Bryan), of the current 2026 legislative session, would require an original ticket seller or a ticket reseller, before listing, marketing, or selling a ticket, to have actual or constructive possession of the ticket, or have the contractual right to sell the ticket. This bill is currently in the Senate pending referral to a policy committee.
- AB 2203 (McCarty), of 2024, would have required ticket sellers that sell admission tickets to sporting, musical, theater, or any other entertainment event, to immediately deliver a proof of purchase to a consumer, and would require a venue operator to honor that proof of purchase in lieu of the ticket if specified conditions are met. Died in the Senate Committee on Business, Professions, and Economic Development.
- AB 2808 (Wicks) of 2024, would have prohibited certain entertainment venue operators from entering into an exclusive contract with a primary ticket seller, among other requirements. Died in the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
- AB 8 (Friedman), of 2023, would have required a ticket seller to disclose to a purchaser the total price of the ticket and the portion of that price that represents any fees or surcharges. The seller would have also been required to provide a link to an internet web page that includes certain refund requirements, as specified. Died in the Senate Committee on Appropriations.
- SB 478 (Dodd), Chapter 400, Statutes of 2023, made it an unlawful business practice pursuant to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act to advertise, display, or offer a price for a good or service that does not include all mandatory fees or charges other than taxes imposed by a government.
- SB 785 (Caballero), of 2023, would have updated laws regulating ticket sales by establishing new categories of ticket sellers, establishing requirements for different categories of ticket sellers, and increasing penalties for violations of rules governing ticket seller operations. Died on Assembly Third Reading.
- SB 829 (Wilk, 2023), would have prohibited the operator of an entertainment facility and a primary ticket seller from entering into a contract that provides for the primary ticket seller to be the exclusive ticket seller for the operator of the entertainment facility. Died in the Assembly Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism.
- AB 1556 (Friedman), Chapter 180, Statutes of 2021, requires, for cancelled events, that a refund be made within 30 calendar days of the cancellation. Requires a ticket price at any event which is postponed, rescheduled, or replaced with another event at the same date and time be fully refunded to the purchaser by the ticket seller upon request within 30 calendar days of the refund request.
- AB 1032 (Quirk), Chapter 105, Statutes of 2019, bolstered anti-bot provisions enacted by AB 329, described below, by clarifying that “a control or measure used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process” includes limits on the number of tickets that a person can purchase.
- SB 1001 (Hertzberg), Chapter 892, Statutes of 2018, prohibits a person from using a bot to communicate or interact with another person in California online with intent to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for the purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services in a commercial transaction or to influence a vote in an election.
- AB 329 (Pan), Chapter 325, Statutes of 2013, made it a misdemeanor to intentionally use or sell software to circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other control or measure on a ticket seller’s internet website that is used to ensure an equitable ticket buying process.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
1720 Warehouse
72 Music Management
Advance Redding
American Association of Independent Music
American Federation of Musicians
Artist Rights Alliance
Association of Performing Arts Professionals
Biscuits and Blues
Black Music Action Coalition
Cafe Colonial and the Colonial Theater
Fan Alliance
Fox Theater
Future of Music Coalition
Ground Control Touring
Harlow's
Ineffable Music Group
Like Management
Lucky Man Management
Moe's Alley
Mongrel Music
Music Artists Coalition
Music Box San Diego
Music Managers Forum - US
National Independent Talent Organization
National Independent Venue Association of California
National Independent Venue Association of California (NIVA-CA)
Nederlander Concerts
Paradise Artists, INC.
Paramount Theatre of the Arts, INC.
Partisan Arts
Recording Academy
Roam
Sag-aftra
Soda Bar
Songwriters of North America
Stuart Ross Management
Sound Talent Group
Tba Agency
The Boardwalk
Turlock Community Theater
United Musicians and Allied Workers
Opposition
Coalition for Ticket Fairness
Consumer Federation of California
Seatgeek, INC.
Sports Fans Coalition
Stubhub, INC.
Ticket Policy Forum
Tickpick, LLC
Oppose Unless Amended
California Live Events Equity Alliance
Internet Works
TechNet
Analysis Prepared by: Brian V. Anderson, Jr. / A.,E.,S., & T. / (916) 319-3450
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Senate Standing Committee on Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection
Senate Standing Committee on Business, Professions and Economic Development
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection
Assembly Standing Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, and Tourism
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):