AB 1761: Electricity: calculation methodology: nonbypassable charges: data disclosure.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2026-08-30
Current Status:
Failed
(2026-09-20: Vetoed by Governor.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. Existing law authorizes the commission to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable.
This bill would require the commission to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the commission, or in any proposal or analysis provided by commission staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require the commission to require an electrical corporation, member association, load-serving entity, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypasssable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require that the data exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer. The bill would require that the data meet specified requirements, including that it is made available through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.
Because the above provisions would be a part of the act, and because a violation of a commission action implementing the above provisions would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. Existing law authorizes the commission to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable.
This bill would require the commission to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the commission, or in any proposal or analysis provided by commission staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require the commission to require an electrical corporation corporation, member association, load-serving entity, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypasssable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require that the data exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer. The bill would require that the data to meet specified requirements, including that it is made available through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.
Because the above prohibition provisions would be a part of the act, and because a violation of a commission action implementing the above prohibition provisions would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. Existing law authorizes the commission to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable.
This bill would require the commission to ensure that all data relied on in serving as a basis for any decision or ruling, ruling issued by the commission, or in any proposal or analysis provided by an electrical corporation, the commissions staff, or any other party, commission staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover the cost of contracts or resources owned by an electrical corporation or any value derived from that calculation costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require the commission to require an electrical corporation or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require that data to meet specified requirements, including that it is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.
Because the above prohibition would be a part of the act, and because a violation of a commission action implementing the above prohibition would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. Existing law authorizes the commission to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable.
This bill would require the commission to ensure that all data relied on in any decision or ruling, or in any proposal or analysis provided by an electrical corporation, the commissions staff, or any other party, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover the cost of contracts or resources owned by an electrical corporation or any value derived from that calculation is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. The bill would require that data to meet specified requirements, including that it is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.
Because the above prohibition would be a part of the act, and because a violation of a commission action implementing the above prohibition would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)The commission shall ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the commission, or in any proposal or analysis provided by commission staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(b)The commission shall require an electrical corporation, member association, load-serving entity, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(c)For purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b), the data shall exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer. A charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity includes any charge determined or applied pursuant to subdivision (f), (g), or (h) of Section 366.2, and any other nonbypassable charge authorized by the commission to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers, and collected from unbundled customers, regardless of whether the charge is expressly enumerated in those subdivisions.
(d)Data provided pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b) shall meet all of the following requirements:
(1)It shall be made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, which shall be made through disclosure to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative pursuant to the terms of a reasonable, commission-approved nondisclosure agreement.
(2)It shall be made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposal or analyses from the electrical corporation, the commissions staff, a member association, a load-serving entity, or any other party, or any commission-adopted decision or ruling. This requirement may be met through adoption of data sharing practices mutually agreed to by parties at the outset of a proceeding.
(3)It shall be made available in native file format.
(e)A failure to comply with this section, or the identification of good faith errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in data disclosed pursuant to this section, shall not, by itself, invalidate, impair, stay, or otherwise affect the validity of any calculation methodology, charge, decision, or ruling adopted by the commission, unless the failure, good faith error, omission, or inaccuracy constitutes one or more of the grounds specified in Section 1757 or 1757.1.
(f)For purposes of this section, load-serving entity has the same meaning as defined in Section 380.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The commission shall ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the commission, or in any proposal or analysis provided by commission staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(b)The commission shall require an electrical corporation corporation, member association, load-serving entity, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(c)For purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b), a the data shall exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer. A charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity includes any charge determined or applied pursuant to subdivision (f), (g), or (h) of Section 366.2, and any other nonbypassable charge authorized by the commission to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers, and collected from unbundled customers, regardless of whether the charge is expressly enumerated in those subdivisions.
(d)Data provided pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b) shall meet all of the following requirements:
(1)It shall be made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, which shall be made through disclosure to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative pursuant to the terms of a reasonable, commission-approved nondisclosure agreement.
(2)It shall be made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposal or analyses from the electrical corporation, the commissions staff, a member association, a load-serving entity, or any other party, or any commission-adopted decision or ruling. This requirement may be met through adoption of data sharing practices mutually agreed to by parties at the outset of a proceeding.
(3)It shall be made available in native file format.
(e)A failure to comply with this section, or the identification of good faith errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in data disclosed pursuant to this section, shall not, by itself, invalidate, impair, stay, or otherwise affect the validity of any calculation methodology, charge, decision, or ruling adopted by the commission, unless the failure, good faith error, omission, or inaccuracy constitutes one or more of the grounds specified in Section 1757 or 1757.1.
(f)For purposes of this section, load-serving entity has the same meaning as defined in Section 380.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The commission shall ensure that all data relied on in serving as a basis for any decision or ruling, ruling issued by the commission, or in any proposal or analysis provided by an electrical corporation, the commissions staff, or any other party, commission staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity, as defined in Section 380, entity to recover the cost of contracts or resources owned by an electrical corporation or any value derived from that calculation costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(b)The commission shall require an electrical corporation or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(c)For purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b), a charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity includes any charge determined or applied pursuant to subdivision (f), (g), or (h) of Section 366.2, and any other charge authorized by the commission to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers, regardless of whether the charge is expressly enumerated in those subdivisions.
(b)(d)Data provided pursuant to subdivision subdivisions (a) and (b) shall meet all of the following requirements:
(1)It shall be made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, which shall be made through disclosure to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative pursuant to the terms of a reasonable, commission-approved nondisclosure agreement.
(2)It shall be made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposal or analyses from the electrical corporation, the commissions staff, or any other party, or any commission adopted outcome. commission-adopted decision or ruling. This requirement may be met through adoption of data sharing practices mutually agreed to by parties at the outset of a proceeding.
(3)It shall be made available in native file format.
(e)A failure to comply with this section, or the identification of good faith errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in data disclosed pursuant to this section, shall not, by itself, invalidate, impair, stay, or otherwise affect the validity of any calculation methodology, charge, decision, or ruling adopted by the commission, unless the failure, good faith error, omission, or inaccuracy constitutes one or more of the grounds specified in Section 1757 or 1757.1.
(f)For purposes of this section, load-serving entity has the same meaning as defined in Section 380.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The commission shall ensure that all data relied on in any decision or ruling, or in any proposal or analysis provided by an electrical corporation, the commissions staff, or any other party, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity, as defined in Section 380, to recover the cost of contracts or resources owned by an electrical corporation or any value derived from that calculation is made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
(b)Data provided pursuant to subdivision (a) shall meet all of the following requirements:
(1)It shall be made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, which shall be made through disclosure to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative pursuant to the terms of a reasonable, commission-approved nondisclosure agreement.
(2)It shall be made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposal or analyses from the electrical corporation, the commissions staff, or any other party, or any commission adopted outcome. This requirement may be met through adoption of data sharing practices mutually agreed to by parties at the outset of a proceeding.
(3)It shall be made available in native file format.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 20, 2026 | Vetoed by Governor. |
| Sep 3, 2026 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4 p.m. |
| Aug 26, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 65. Noes 9. Page 6569.). |
| Aug 26, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 65. Noes 9.). |
| Aug 25, 2026 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 25, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 5763.). |
| Aug 25, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0.). |
| Aug 17, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 13, 2026 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Aug 13, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 0.) (August 13). |
| Aug 3, 2026 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jun 30, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 17. Noes 0.) (June 30). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 10, 2026 | Referred to Com. on E., U & C. |
| May 28, 2026 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 27, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 61. Noes 8. Page 5448.) |
| May 27, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 61. Noes 8.) |
| May 27, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 18, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 14, 2026 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 13. Noes 1.) (May 14). |
| Apr 29, 2026 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Mar 23, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 19, 2026 | Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 18, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (March 18). |
| Feb 23, 2026 | Referred to Com. on U. & E. |
| Feb 10, 2026 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 12. |
| Feb 9, 2026 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 26, 2026 | AB 1761 Rogers Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 25, 2026 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB1761 Rogers et al. By Padilla | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 13, 2026 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 3, 2026 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 30, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications |
Passed |
|
| May 27, 2026 | AB 1761 Rogers Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 14, 2026 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Mar 18, 2026 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Utilities and Energy |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| 350 Bay Area Action | ** Support | |
| 350 Humboldt | ** Support | |
| Acterra | ** Support | |
| Alliance For Retail Energy Markets | ** Support | |
| Ava Community Energy Authority | ** Support | |
| Belmont | ** Support | |
| Benicia | ** Support | |
| Buellton | ** Support | |
| Buena Park | ** Support | |
| California Choice Energy Authority | ** Support | |
| California Community Choice Association | ** Support | |
| California Community Choice Association (Sponsor) | ** Support | |
| California State Association Of Counties | ** Support | |
| Central Coast Community Energy | ** Support | |
| Chula Vista | ** Support | |
| Cities Association of Santa Clara County | ** Support | |
| City Of Buellton | ** Support | |
| City of National City | ** Support | |
| City Of Pinole | ** Support | |
| City of Seaside, California | ** Support | |
| Clean Energy Alliance | ** Support | |
| Clean Power Alliance | ** Support | |
| Climate Action California | ** Support | |
| Climate Breakthrough | ** Support | |
| Counties of: Marin, Monterey, Santa Barbara, and Santa Clara | ** Support | |
| County of Mendocino | ** Support | |
| County Of San Diego | ** Support | |
| Elders Climate Action (ECA) Northern California (NORCAL) and Southern California (SOCAL) Chapters | ** Support | |
| Elders Climate Action, Norcal and Socal Chapters | ** Support | |
| Elders Climate Action – NorCal and SoCal Chapters | ** Support | |
| EUREKA | ** Support | |
| Goleta | ** Support | |
| GOLETA; CITY OF | ** Support | |
| League Of California Cities | ** Support | |
| Madera County Economic Development Commission | ** Support | |
| Marin | ** Support | |
| Marin Clean Energy | ** Support | |
| Marin Clean Energy (MCE) | ** Support | |
| Marin County | ** Support | |
| Mill Valley | ** Support | |
| Milpitas | ** Support | |
| Monterey | ** Support | |
| Monterey County | ** Support | |
| Mothers Out Front Silicon Valley | ** Support | |
| National City | ** Support | |
| Orange County Power Authority | ** Support | |
| Peninsula Clean Energy | ** Support | |
| pg&e | ** Against | |
| Pico Rivera | ** Support | |
| Pinole | ** Support | |
| Pioneer Community Energy | ** Support | |
| Rancho Mirage | ** Support | |
| Redwood Coast Energy Authority | ** Support | |
| Rural County Representatives of California | ** Support | |
| Sacred Heart Community Service | ** Support | |
| San Diego | ** Support | |
| San Diego Community Power | ** Support | |
| San Diego Gas and Electric Company | ** Against | |
| San Francisco Public Utilities Commission | ** Support | |
| San Jose | ** Support | |
| San Jose Community Energy Advocates | ** Support | |
| San Luis Obispo | ** Support | |
| San Mateo | ** Support | |
| Santa Barbara | ** Support | |
| Santa Barbara County | ** Support | |
| Santa Clara | ** Support | |
| Santa Clara County | ** Support | |
| Seaside | ** Support | |
| Silicon Valley Clean Energy | ** Support | |
| Sonoma Clean Power | ** Support | |
| Sonoma County Mayor’s and Councilmembers’ Association | ** Support | |
| Southern California Edison | ** Against | |
| Supervisor Luis A. Alejo, Monterey County District 1 | ** Support | |
| Supervisor Terra Lawson-Remer, San Diego County District 3 | ** Support | |
| The Climate Center | ** Support | |
| The Climate Reality Project - Silicon Valley Chapter | ** Support | |
| The Office of San Diego County Supervisor Terra Lawson | ** Support | |
| Town of Hillsborough | ** Support | |
| Vallejo | ** Support | |
| Valley Clean Energy | ** Support | |
| Walnut Creek | ** Support |
GOVERNOR'S VETO
GV Bill Id:AB 1761
Author:(Rogers)
As Enrolled Ver:August 30, 2026
2/3 vote
SUMMARY
Requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load serving entity (LSE) to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation or any other resource or value included in that charge, and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. Also directs the CPUC to require an electrical corporation, member association, load-serving entity, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of such a calculation methodology to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates.
Senate Amendments
- Add that the requirements of this bill only apply to nonbypassable charges, as opposed to any charge imposed on a customer of a load-serving entity.
- Clarify that data shared as part of the requirement of this bill will exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer.
Governor's Veto Message
This bill would require the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to disclose any data, including market-sensitive data, to load-serving entities and advocacy organizations concurrent with any proposal or analysis related to the Power Charge Indifference Account.
I am concerned that this legislation will result in improper dissemination of market-sensitive information and benefit a limited subset of market participants.
Fortunately, there are already processes in place at the CPUC to make applicable data available to the public and market participants using existing approved confidentiality procedures to review and evaluate the accuracy of all costs associated with contracts, utility-owned generation, and all other resources or value included in charges derived from these costs. The CPUC has worked with load serving entities to develop a process to access the requested information with proper guardrails to ensure confidentiality.
COMMENTS
California has two main types of electric utilities. Investor-owned utilities (IOUs), like Southern California Edison, are private companies that supply electricity in specific territories and are regulated by the CPUC. Publicly-owned utilities (POUs), like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), are government-run and serve defined areas, with customers required to get all their power from the POU. Beyond these, several other entities called LSEs can procure power on behalf of customers within IOU territories. Electric Service Providers (ESPs) are private companies that sell electricity directly to large commercial customers – known as "direct access" customers – using the IOU's existing infrastructure. Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) are local governments that buy power on behalf of residents. Customers are automatically enrolled but can opt out and return to the IOU at any time.
When customers leave an IOU for a CCA or ESP, they still owe a share of costs the IOU previously committed to on their behalf – such as long-term power contracts and power plant investments. This exit fee, called the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA), ensures that remaining IOU customers aren't stuck paying for obligations made for customers who have since departed. The PCIA is calculated as the difference between what the IOU actually paid for power and its current market value. It is updated annually and varies based on when a customer originally left the IOU.As described by the author, the purpose of this bill is to provide more transparency and accuracy in PCIA calculations.
According to the Author
According to the author, "Electricity bills in California are on the rise, in part due to challenging market conditions and outdated and inefficient regulatory policies. Families and businesses are feeling the impact. Lawmakers and regulators need practical, consumer-focused solutions that ensure customers do not pay more than their fair share. One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it. Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a "black box" will provide the essential checks and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate."
Arguments in Support
Several CCAs, including representation from California Community Choice Association members, support the bill on the grounds that the PCIA has long lacked a consistent standard for data disclosure, leaving CCAs and consumer advocates unable to verify the accuracy of charges or reliably forecast rates. Supports argue that by requiring the CPUC and IOUs to disclose all cost inputs, forecasting assumptions, and methodologies used to set the PCIA – while protecting market-sensitive information through existing NDAs – this bill would reduce costly disputes, improve regulatory efficiency, and give local governments and CCAs the transparency they need to protect ratepayers from unexpected rate increases and deliver affordable, clean energy programs to their communities.
Arguments in Opposition
In opposition to the bill, PG&E argues that the bill's language is overbroad, extending well beyond PCIA transparency to potentially cover transmission-related contract and resource costs, IT-related contract and resource costs, and employee benefits-related contract and resource costs, when existing CPUC mechanisms already provide PCIA data to LSEs under confidentiality protections; that the CPUC lacks the appropriate implementation framework needed to comply with this bill; and that the bill creates a damaging information asymmetry in California's retail electricity market, giving CCAs and other LSEs detailed insight into IOU resource valuations, contract pricing, and negotiating strategies.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the CPUC estimates ongoing costs likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.
VOTES
ASM UTILITIES AND ENERGY: 15-0-3
YES: Petrie-Norris, Patterson, Boerner, Calderon, Mark González, Harabedian, Hart, Kalra, Papan, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Ta, Wallis, Zbur
ABS, ABST OR NV: Chen, Davies, Irwin
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-1-1
YES: Wicks, Hoover, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Ta
NO: Dixon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Tangipa
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-8-11
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Rivas
NO: DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Hadwick, Johnson, Macedo, Sanchez, Valencia
ABS, ABST OR NV: Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Davies, Flora, Gallagher, Lackey, Celeste Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Tangipa, Zbur
SENATE FLOOR: 40-0-0
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Reyes, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 65-9-5
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO: DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Hadwick, Johnson, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Castillo, Chen, Davies, Flora, Lackey
UPDATED
VERSION: August 30, 2026
CONSULTANT: Alexa Cohill-Milanick / U. & E. / (916) 319-2083 FN: 0004590
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1761
Author:(Rogers)
As Amended Ver:August 13, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load serving entity (LSE) to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation or any other resource or value included in that charge, and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. Also directs the CPUC to require an electrical corporation, member association, load-serving entity, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of such a calculation methodology to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates.
Senate Amendments
- Add that the requirements of this bill only apply to nonbypassable charges, as opposed to any charge imposed on a customer of a load-serving entity.
- Clarify that data shared as part of the requirement of this bill will exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer.
COMMENTS
California has two main types of electric utilities. Investor-owned utilities (IOUs), like Southern California Edison, are private companies that supply electricity in specific territories and are regulated by the CPUC. Publicly-owned utilities (POUs), like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), are government-run and serve defined areas, with customers required to get all their power from the POU.
Beyond these, several other entities called LSEs can procure power on behalf of customers within IOU territories. Electric Service Providers (ESPs) are private companies that sell electricity directly to large commercial customers – known as "direct access" customers – using the IOU's existing infrastructure. Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) are local governments that buy power on behalf of residents. Customers are automatically enrolled but can opt out and return to the IOU at any time.
When customers leave an IOU for a CCA or ESP, they still owe a share of costs the IOU previously committed to on their behalf – such as long-term power contracts and power plant investments. This exit fee, called the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA), ensures that remaining IOU customers aren’t stuck paying for obligations made for customers who have since departed.
The PCIA is calculated as the difference between what the IOU actually paid for power and its current market value. It is updated annually and varies based on when a customer originally left the IOU.
As described by the author, the purpose of this bill is to provide more transparency and accuracy in PCIA calculations.
According to the Author
According to the author, "Electricity bills in California are on the rise, in part due to challenging market conditions and outdated and inefficient regulatory policies. Families and businesses are feeling the impact. Lawmakers and regulators need practical, consumer-focused solutions that ensure customers do not pay more than their fair share. One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it. Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a "black box" will provide the essential checks and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate."
Arguments in Support
Several CCAs, including representation from California Community Choice Association members, support the bill on the grounds that the PCIA has long lacked a consistent standard for data disclosure, leaving CCAs and consumer advocates unable to verify the accuracy of charges or reliably forecast rates. Supports argue that by requiring the CPUC and IOUs to disclose all cost inputs, forecasting assumptions, and methodologies used to set the PCIA – while protecting market-sensitive information through existing non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) – this bill would reduce costly disputes, improve regulatory efficiency, and give local governments and CCAs the transparency they need to protect ratepayers from unexpected rate increases and deliver affordable, clean energy programs to their communities.
Arguments in Opposition
In opposition to the bill, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) argues that the bill’s language is overbroad, extending well beyond PCIA transparency to potentially cover transmission-related contract and resource costs, IT-related contract and resource costs, and employee benefits-related contract and resource costs, when existing CPUC mechanisms already provide PCIA data to LSEs under confidentiality protections; that the CPUC lacks the appropriate implementation framework needed to comply with this bill; and that the bill creates a damaging information asymmetry in California’s retail electricity market, giving CCAs and other LSEs detailed insight into IOU resource valuations, contract pricing, and negotiating strategies.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the CPUC estimates ongoing costs likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.
VOTES:
ASM UTILITIES AND ENERGY: 15-0-3
YES: Petrie-Norris, Patterson, Boerner, Calderon, Mark González, Harabedian, Hart, Kalra, Papan, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Ta, Wallis, Zbur
ABS, ABST OR NV: Chen, Davies, Irwin
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-1-1
YES: Wicks, Hoover, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Ta
NO: Dixon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Tangipa
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-8-11
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Rivas
NO: DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Hadwick, Johnson, Macedo, Sanchez, Valencia
ABS, ABST OR NV: Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Davies, Flora, Gallagher, Lackey, Celeste Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Tangipa, Zbur
UPDATED
VERSION: August 13, 2026
CONSULTANT: Alexa Cohill-Milanick / U. & E. / (916) 319-2083 FN: 0004152
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1761 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1761
Author: Rogers (D), et al.
Amended: 8/13/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 17-0, 6/30/26
AYES: Allen, Ochoa Bogh, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Caballero, Dahle, Gonzalez, Grove, Hurtado, McNerney, Reyes, Richardson, Stern, Strickland, Wahab
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-0, 8/13/26
AYES: Cervantes, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Seyarto, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-8, 5/27/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Electricity: calculation methodology: nonbypassable charges: data disclosure
SOURCE: California Community Choice Association
DIGEST:
This bill requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC for the determination of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity (LSE) for costs associated with contracts for generation resources or electrical corporation-owned generation is made available to LSEs, member association, and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes and vests the CPUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Defines an LSE as a community choice aggregator (CCA), electric service provider (ESP), and electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the LSE to pay reentry fees associated with their customers involuntarily being returned to the service of the incumbent electrical corporation (also known as an electric investor-owned utility (IOU)), except in the case of default due to nonpayment. (Public Utilities Code §394.25 (e))
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a CCA program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code §§365.2 and 366.3)
- Authorizes a CCA to aggregate the electrical load of interested electricity consumers within its boundaries and requires a CCA to file an implementation plan with the CPUC in order for the CPUC to determine a cost-recovery mechanism to be imposed on the CCA to prevent a shifting of costs to an electrical corporation’s bundled customers. Specifies requirements to assess nonbypassable charges on the departing load to reimburse the electric IOU for electricity purchases on behalf of the customer. (Public Utilities Code §366.2)
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation do not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a CCA program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code §§365.2 and 366.3)
This bill:
- Requires the CPUC to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of an LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Requires the CPUC to require an electrical corporation, member association, LSE, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Requires the data exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer.
- Requires that the data meet specified requirements, including that it is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Background
Electric utilities. There are two primary types of electric utilities serving customers in the state, one is an IOU, and the other is a publicly owned utility (POU) [additionally there are rural electric cooperatives who serve a very small fraction of the state]. Within the electric IOU, customers of IOUs who receive both energy procurement and distribution services from the utility are considered “bundled customers.” IOUs’ rates to customers are regulated by the CPUC to ensure they provide service at a just and reasonable rate. IOUs also have an obligation to serve all customers in their service territory and serve as providers of last resort. POUs, on the other hand, are publicly owned and governed by local governing boards who set the utility’s rates.
Load-serving entities. Several other types of entities, referred to in statute as LSEs, procure electric generation resources and services on behalf of customers within the service territory of electric IOUs. In addition to electric IOUs, California’s LSEs include ESPs who procure electricity to end-use customers who elect the services of the ESP instead of the incumbent electric IOU; and CCAs who are created by local governments who choose to procure energy on behalf of customers in their jurisdiction. ESPs and CCAs continue to receive distribution, transmission, and utility billing services from the electric IOU.
century. However, the CPUC’s experience regulating CCAs is much more limited. In 2002, statute first allowed the formation of CCAs as among many of the policy responses to the 2000-01 Energy Crisis. It was not until nearly a decade later that the first CCA—Marin Clean Energy—came into existence. The motivation for a local government to join or create a CCA can be many, but, in general, there is an element of local control and, to varying degrees, a belief that rates would be lower as compared to the electric IOU. Today, there are over 20 CCAs operating in the state with over 15 million customers (per estimates from California Community Choice Association (CalCCA)), with an expectation that the number of customers served by CCAs may continue to grow.
Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA). When customers depart from the procurement services of the incumbent electric IOU as either a DA or CCA customer, statute requires the CPUC to ensure that customers leaving the utility do not burden remaining IOU bundled customers with costs which were incurred to serve the departing customers, including energy planned to serve the customer. Statute also requires the CPUC to ensure that departing load customers do not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. In order to ensure this “customer indifference,” CCAs and DA customers are required to pay an exit fee – the PCIA – to account for the costs incurred on their behalf and to ensure remaining customers are not affected by the choice of these customers (or their local governments) to depart their load. The PCIA is the mechanism to ensure that the customers who remain with the electric IOU do not end up taking on the long-term financial obligations the utility incurred on behalf of now-departed customers. The goal is ensuring that remaining customers neither gain nor lose from other customers’ departure. Examples of such financial obligations include utility expenditures to build power plants and, more commonly, long-term power purchase contracts with independent power producers. These departing load customers may represent a significant fraction of the customers within the electric IOU service territory. Without the PCIA, the remaining percent of customers would need to assume financial obligations incurred in anticipation of serving those customers that now receive energy procurement services from a CCA or DA provider.
Calculating the PCIA. The PCIA is calculated by taking the difference between the “actual portfolio cost,” which represents the costs related to the utility’s energy procurement and the “market value” of the portfolio. The market value is measured by a CPUC-approved methodology, known as the Market Price Benchmark (MPB), based upon the weighted average price of market transactions for energy index price, resource adequacy capacity (system, local and flexible), and renewable portfolio standard value. If the IOU’s actual portfolio cost is above-market value, the departing load customers pay their share of the difference based on their power consumption. In instances where the PCIA may be negative, departing load customers receive a credit to offset against a departing load customer’s future positive PCIA.
Calculation of PCIA Source: CPUC website | ||
PCIA Eligible Portfolio Cost minus | Portfolio’s Market Value equals | Power Charge Indifference Amount (PCIA) Revenue Requirement |
Contracted or Built Resources that represent procurement commitments prior to load departure | Calculation using Market Price Benchmark based on CPUC adopted methodology looking at recent market transactions | A bill credit or bill charge to departed load based on the vintage (year) of departure |
PCIA revenue does not represent a profit, rather these are customer costs, as such, any changes to the PCIA affect customers, and not the profit of any entity. Additionally, the PCIA will vary depending on when a customer departed from the electric IOU and the procurement portfolio at the time. As such, each customer pays the assigned vintage PCIA, depending on the year when the customer departed. The PCIA revenue requirements and rates are calculated annually as part of each electric IOUs Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) regulatory process. As noted in the CPUC’s most recent decision (D. 25-06-049), “These processes are complex, often contentious, and regularly at issue in the annual ERRA forecast proceedings.”
Comments
Need for this bill. The author states:
…One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. …But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it. …Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a “black box” will provide the essential check and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate.
Proponents seek greater data transparency. The sponsors and supporters of this bill express a need for greater transparency concerning the data informing the calculation methodology to determine the PCIA. CCAs contend there has been no specific standard for what data must be made available to the CCAs in the ERRA proceedings where the PCIA is established. They argue that in practice disclosure varies by the electric IOU and by the CPUC proceeding. As a result, they believe there is administrative inefficiencies and disputes in resolving the issue on a case-by-case basis. They seek legislative remedy to require consistency in the data disclosures afforded to them, other LSEs, and ratepayer advocates. They believe requiring the electric IOUs to disclose data as required by this bill will encourage IOUs to double-check their work. They note there have at times been errors in the accounting that would have resulted in collecting hundreds of millions from CCA customers, though in that case the electric IOU corrected the error after it was identified.
Data disclosures currently limited within the ERRA proceeding. Currently, the data disclosures that inform the PCIA are limited within the ERRA proceeding to parties within the proceeding. The data sharing confidentiality affords CCAs access to confidential monthly report data, but the non-disclosure agreements limit the use of this information to participate in the specific ERRA forecast proceeding for which the data is disclosed and only while the proceeding remains open. The confidentiality of electric procurement data is governed by Public Utilities Code §454.5(g) and CPUC decisions, including D.06-06-066, D. 06-12-030, D.07-05-032, and D.08-04-023. Pursuant to a 2022 CPUC decision (D. 22-07-008), CCAs’ reviewing representatives are authorized to disclose nonconfidential information to their clients once per the calendar quarter, as the CPUC found it was in the public interest to protect CCA customers from rate volatility and more frequent data access supports CCAs ability to forecast costs. The CPUC also required the electric IOUs to provide all confidential information from the ERRA Master Data Request to all reviewing representatives that have signed nondisclosure agreements with the utility for PCIA forecasting within five business days after each utility’s monthly ERRA reports is submitted to the CPUC. In the case of MPB calculation, the documents informing the MPB are public documents. However, for data not disclosed through the ERRA forecast proceeding, parties can pursue access through Public Records Act requests to the CPUC.
Long-standing effort by CCAs to secure greater data access. CCAs have long sought changes at the CPUC for greater data access. While the CPUC has not adopted their proposals in full, the CPUC has adjusted the data sharing requirements in response to the CCAs’ requests. This bill would expand the data access to all data in connection with any nonbypassable charge (intended to cover only those within the PCIA) imposed on a CCA and ESP customer. This bill would not tie the data to the ERRA proceeding, and instead allow data access concurrently to LSEs, member association, and ratepayer advocates with any proposal, analysis, or CPUC-authorized nonbypassable charge to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers regardless of whether the charge is expressly enumerated. This bill requires the data is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, made available concurrently and in native file format. CCAs note that some files are provided as PDFs where the underlying formulas and data are not accessible.
Electric IOUs raise concerns about undermining existing CPUC confidentiality practices and rules. The electric IOUs contend the application of the data sharing proposed by this bill is broad. They argue that such broad disclosures would extend beyond the PCIA disputes into all aspects of utility ratemaking, resource planning, and procurement. It is unclear whether recent amendments to limit the data sharing to nonbypassable charges collected from unbundled customers fully resolves these concerns. They further argue that compliance with this bill’s mandates would require the CPUC to develop, monitor, and enforce new disclosure standards on an ongoing basis. In general, they contend the CCAs have not identified what data gaps are lacking given the access they are afforded within the ERRA proceeding to determine the PCIA. They further contend this bill would result in profound information asymmetry in the state’s retail market, with electric IOUs facing disclosure requirements that are not applied to CCAs and ESPs.
Prior/Related Legislation
(See Policy Committee analysis.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, ongoing costs likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually (ratepayer funds) for the CPUC to review, compile and prepare any data deemed appropriate for sharing, including market sensitive data, concurrent with any proposal or analyses related to nonbypassable charges. This work could require involvement of multiple sections of the CPUC’s Energy Division, such as the Renewable Portfolio Standard or Resource Adequacy sections, depending on the specific proposal or analyses and associated data. In all cases, the Energy Division would have to analyze data in terms of confidentiality and in close coordination with the Legal Division. Finally, the Energy Division would need to support Legal in any required processes for data sharing and be available to respond to any questions from LSEs.
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/13/26)
California Community Choice Association (Source)
Supervisor Luis A. Alejo, Monterey County District 1
Supervisor Terra Lawson-Remer, San Diego County District 3
350 Bay Area Action
350 Humboldt
Acterra
Alliance for Retail Energy Markets
Ava Community Energy Authority
California Choice Energy Authority
California State Association of Counties
Central Coast Community Energy
Cities Association of Santa Clara County
Cities of: Belmont, Benicia, Buellton, Buena Park, Chula Vista, Eureka, Goleta, Mill Valley, Milpitas, National City, Pico Rivera, Pinole, Rancho Mirage, San Jose, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, San Diego, San Jose, Seaside, Vallejo, and Walnut Creek
County of Mendocino
County of San Diego
Clean Energy Alliance
Clean Power Alliance
Climate Action California
Climate Breakthrough
Counties of: Marin, Monterey, Santa Barbara, and Santa Clara
Elders Climate Action – NorCal and SoCal Chapters
League of California Cities
Madera County Economic Development Commission
Marin Clean Energy
Mothers Out Front Silicon Valley
Orange County Power Authority
Peninsula Clean Energy
Pioneer Community Energy
Redwood Coast Energy Authority
Rural County Representatives of California
Sacred Heart Community Service
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
San Jose Community Energy Advocates
Silicon Valley Clean Energy
Sonoma Clean Power
Sonoma County Mayor’s and Councilmembers’ Association
The Climate Center
The Climate Reality Project - Silicon Valley Chapter
Town of Hillsborough
Valley Clean Energy
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/13/26)
Pacific Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
Southern California Edison
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the California Community Choice Association (CalCCA):
One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is transparency in how PCIA charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) process or proceeding where the PCIA, or related charge, is set. Without adequate transparency, CCAs and ESPs are unable to verify the accuracy of the PCIA charges that their customers must pay and cannot confidently forecast rates – both of which are affordability tools needed to protect customers from unexpected rate increases. Additionally, the lack of consistent data creates costly disputes and inefficiencies in CPUC proceedings.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the Southern California Edison:
AB 1761 is duplicative of existing, well-established CPUC data-access procedures. Today, load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates have access to extensive utility data through CPUC-approved confidentiality frameworks, protective orders, and formal discovery mechanisms. These processes were specifically designed to balance transparency and protect market-sensitive or proprietary information. In particular, the CPUC’s Decision (D.) 22-07-008 established steps that grant community choice aggregators (CCAs) access and ability to review market-sensitive information that could impact Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) rate forecasts. CCAs have not utilized or indicated deficiencies in their ability to access data for PCIA ratemaking purposes as allowed under D.22-07-008. In the absence of a demonstrated gap or need, AB 1761 circumvents the existing rules and introduces new risks to the handling of market-sensitive information, requiring utilities to further secure that data and creating additional administrative burden.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-8, 5/27/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Rivas
NOES: DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Hadwick, Johnson, Macedo, Sanchez, Valencia
NO VOTE RECORDED: Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Davies, Flora, Gallagher, Lackey, Celeste Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Tangipa, Zbur
Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U. & C. / (916) 651-4107
8/21/26 15:47:36
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1761 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1761
Author: Rogers (D), et al.
Amended: 8/13/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE ENERGY, U. & C. COMMITTEE: 17-0, 6/30/26
AYES: Allen, Ochoa Bogh, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Caballero, Dahle, Gonzalez, Grove, Hurtado, McNerney, Reyes, Richardson, Stern, Strickland, Wahab
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-0, 8/13/26
AYES: Cervantes, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Seyarto, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-8, 5/27/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Electricity: calculation methodology: nonbypassable charges: data disclosure
SOURCE: California Community Choice Association
DIGEST:
This bill requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC for the determination of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity (LSE) for costs associated with contracts for generation resources or electrical corporation-owned generation is made available to LSEs, member association, and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes and vests the CPUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Defines an LSE as a community choice aggregator (CCA), electric service provider (ESP), and electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the LSE to pay reentry fees associated with their customers involuntarily being returned to the service of the incumbent electrical corporation (also known as an electric investor-owned utility (IOU)), except in the case of default due to nonpayment. (Public Utilities Code §394.25 (e))
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a CCA program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code §§365.2 and 366.3)
- Authorizes a CCA to aggregate the electrical load of interested electricity consumers within its boundaries and requires a CCA to file an implementation plan with the CPUC in order for the CPUC to determine a cost-recovery mechanism to be imposed on the CCA to prevent a shifting of costs to an electrical corporation’s bundled customers. Specifies requirements to assess nonbypassable charges on the departing load to reimburse the electric IOU for electricity purchases on behalf of the customer. (Public Utilities Code §366.2)
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation do not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a CCA program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code §§365.2 and 366.3)
This bill:
- Requires the CPUC to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of an LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Requires the CPUC to require an electrical corporation, member association, LSE, or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any nonbypassable charge imposed on customers of a LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Requires the data exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer.
- Requires that the data meet specified requirements, including that it is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Background
Electric utilities. There are two primary types of electric utilities serving customers in the state, one is an IOU, and the other is a publicly owned utility (POU) [additionally there are rural electric cooperatives who serve a very small fraction of the state]. Within the electric IOU, customers of IOUs who receive both energy procurement and distribution services from the utility are considered “bundled customers.” IOUs’ rates to customers are regulated by the CPUC to ensure they provide service at a just and reasonable rate. IOUs also have an obligation to serve all customers in their service territory and serve as providers of last resort. POUs, on the other hand, are publicly owned and governed by local governing boards who set the utility’s rates.
Load-serving entities. Several other types of entities, referred to in statute as LSEs, procure electric generation resources and services on behalf of customers within the service territory of electric IOUs. In addition to electric IOUs, California’s LSEs include ESPs who procure electricity to end-use customers who elect the services of the ESP instead of the incumbent electric IOU; and CCAs who are created by local governments who choose to procure energy on behalf of customers in their jurisdiction. ESPs and CCAs continue to receive distribution, transmission, and utility billing services from the electric IOU.
century. However, the CPUC’s experience regulating CCAs is much more limited. In 2002, statute first allowed the formation of CCAs as among many of the policy responses to the 2000-01 Energy Crisis. It was not until nearly a decade later that the first CCA—Marin Clean Energy—came into existence. The motivation for a local government to join or create a CCA can be many, but, in general, there is an element of local control and, to varying degrees, a belief that rates would be lower as compared to the electric IOU. Today, there are over 20 CCAs operating in the state with over 15 million customers (per estimates from California Community Choice Association (CalCCA)), with an expectation that the number of customers served by CCAs may continue to grow.
Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA). When customers depart from the procurement services of the incumbent electric IOU as either a DA or CCA customer, statute requires the CPUC to ensure that customers leaving the utility do not burden remaining IOU bundled customers with costs which were incurred to serve the departing customers, including energy planned to serve the customer. Statute also requires the CPUC to ensure that departing load customers do not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. In order to ensure this “customer indifference,” CCAs and DA customers are required to pay an exit fee – the PCIA – to account for the costs incurred on their behalf and to ensure remaining customers are not affected by the choice of these customers (or their local governments) to depart their load. The PCIA is the mechanism to ensure that the customers who remain with the electric IOU do not end up taking on the long-term financial obligations the utility incurred on behalf of now-departed customers. The goal is ensuring that remaining customers neither gain nor lose from other customers’ departure. Examples of such financial obligations include utility expenditures to build power plants and, more commonly, long-term power purchase contracts with independent power producers. These departing load customers may represent a significant fraction of the customers within the electric IOU service territory. Without the PCIA, the remaining percent of customers would need to assume financial obligations incurred in anticipation of serving those customers that now receive energy procurement services from a CCA or DA provider.
Calculating the PCIA. The PCIA is calculated by taking the difference between the “actual portfolio cost,” which represents the costs related to the utility’s energy procurement and the “market value” of the portfolio. The market value is measured by a CPUC-approved methodology, known as the Market Price Benchmark (MPB), based upon the weighted average price of market transactions for energy index price, resource adequacy capacity (system, local and flexible), and renewable portfolio standard value. If the IOU’s actual portfolio cost is above-market value, the departing load customers pay their share of the difference based on their power consumption. In instances where the PCIA may be negative, departing load customers receive a credit to offset against a departing load customer’s future positive PCIA.
Calculation of PCIA Source: CPUC website | ||
PCIA Eligible Portfolio Cost minus | Portfolio’s Market Value equals | Power Charge Indifference Amount (PCIA) Revenue Requirement |
Contracted or Built Resources that represent procurement commitments prior to load departure | Calculation using Market Price Benchmark based on CPUC adopted methodology looking at recent market transactions | A bill credit or bill charge to departed load based on the vintage (year) of departure |
PCIA revenue does not represent a profit, rather these are customer costs, as such, any changes to the PCIA affect customers, and not the profit of any entity. Additionally, the PCIA will vary depending on when a customer departed from the electric IOU and the procurement portfolio at the time. As such, each customer pays the assigned vintage PCIA, depending on the year when the customer departed. The PCIA revenue requirements and rates are calculated annually as part of each electric IOUs Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) regulatory process. As noted in the CPUC’s most recent decision (D. 25-06-049), “These processes are complex, often contentious, and regularly at issue in the annual ERRA forecast proceedings.”
Comments
Need for this bill. The author states:
…One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. …But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it. …Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a “black box” will provide the essential check and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate.
Proponents seek greater data transparency. The sponsors and supporters of this bill express a need for greater transparency concerning the data informing the calculation methodology to determine the PCIA. CCAs contend there has been no specific standard for what data must be made available to the CCAs in the ERRA proceedings where the PCIA is established. They argue that in practice disclosure varies by the electric IOU and by the CPUC proceeding. As a result, they believe there is administrative inefficiencies and disputes in resolving the issue on a case-by-case basis. They seek legislative remedy to require consistency in the data disclosures afforded to them, other LSEs, and ratepayer advocates. They believe requiring the electric IOUs to disclose data as required by this bill will encourage IOUs to double-check their work. They note there have at times been errors in the accounting that would have resulted in collecting hundreds of millions from CCA customers, though in that case the electric IOU corrected the error after it was identified.
Data disclosures currently limited within the ERRA proceeding. Currently, the data disclosures that inform the PCIA are limited within the ERRA proceeding to parties within the proceeding. The data sharing confidentiality affords CCAs access to confidential monthly report data, but the non-disclosure agreements limit the use of this information to participate in the specific ERRA forecast proceeding for which the data is disclosed and only while the proceeding remains open. The confidentiality of electric procurement data is governed by Public Utilities Code §454.5(g) and CPUC decisions, including D.06-06-066, D. 06-12-030, D.07-05-032, and D.08-04-023. Pursuant to a 2022 CPUC decision (D. 22-07-008), CCAs’ reviewing representatives are authorized to disclose nonconfidential information to their clients once per the calendar quarter, as the CPUC found it was in the public interest to protect CCA customers from rate volatility and more frequent data access supports CCAs ability to forecast costs. The CPUC also required the electric IOUs to provide all confidential information from the ERRA Master Data Request to all reviewing representatives that have signed nondisclosure agreements with the utility for PCIA forecasting within five business days after each utility’s monthly ERRA reports is submitted to the CPUC. In the case of MPB calculation, the documents informing the MPB are public documents. However, for data not disclosed through the ERRA forecast proceeding, parties can pursue access through Public Records Act requests to the CPUC.
Long-standing effort by CCAs to secure greater data access. CCAs have long sought changes at the CPUC for greater data access. While the CPUC has not adopted their proposals in full, the CPUC has adjusted the data sharing requirements in response to the CCAs’ requests. This bill would expand the data access to all data in connection with any nonbypassable charge (intended to cover only those within the PCIA) imposed on a CCA and ESP customer. This bill would not tie the data to the ERRA proceeding, and instead allow data access concurrently to LSEs, member association, and ratepayer advocates with any proposal, analysis, or CPUC-authorized nonbypassable charge to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers regardless of whether the charge is expressly enumerated. This bill requires the data is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, made available concurrently and in native file format. CCAs note that some files are provided as PDFs where the underlying formulas and data are not accessible.
Electric IOUs raise concerns about undermining existing CPUC confidentiality practices and rules. The electric IOUs contend the application of the data sharing proposed by this bill is broad. They argue that such broad disclosures would extend beyond the PCIA disputes into all aspects of utility ratemaking, resource planning, and procurement. It is unclear whether recent amendments to limit the data sharing to nonbypassable charges collected from unbundled customers fully resolves these concerns. They further argue that compliance with this bill’s mandates would require the CPUC to develop, monitor, and enforce new disclosure standards on an ongoing basis. In general, they contend the CCAs have not identified what data gaps are lacking given the access they are afforded within the ERRA proceeding to determine the PCIA. They further contend this bill would result in profound information asymmetry in the state’s retail market, with electric IOUs facing disclosure requirements that are not applied to CCAs and ESPs.
Prior/Related Legislation
(See Policy Committee analysis.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, ongoing costs likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually (ratepayer funds) for the CPUC to review, compile and prepare any data deemed appropriate for sharing, including market sensitive data, concurrent with any proposal or analyses related to nonbypassable charges. This work could require involvement of multiple sections of the CPUC’s Energy Division, such as the Renewable Portfolio Standard or Resource Adequacy sections, depending on the specific proposal or analyses and associated data. In all cases, the Energy Division would have to analyze data in terms of confidentiality and in close coordination with the Legal Division. Finally, the Energy Division would need to support Legal in any required processes for data sharing and be available to respond to any questions from LSEs.
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/13/26)
California Community Choice Association (Source)
Supervisor Luis A. Alejo, Monterey County District 1
Supervisor Terra Lawson-Remer, San Diego County District 3
350 Bay Area Action
350 Humboldt
Acterra
Alliance for Retail Energy Markets
Ava Community Energy Authority
California Choice Energy Authority
California State Association of Counties
Central Coast Community Energy
Cities Association of Santa Clara County
Cities of: Belmont, Benicia, Buellton, Buena Park, Eureka, Goleta, Mill Valley,
National City, Pico Rivera, Pinole, Rancho Mirage, San Jose, San Luis Obispo,
San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Seaside, Vallejo, and Walnut Creek,
Clean Energy Alliance
Clean Power Alliance
Climate Action California
Climate Breakthrough
Counties of: Marin, Monterey, Santa Barbara, and Santa Clara
Elders Climate Action – NorCal and SoCal Chapters
League of California Cities
Madera County Economic Development Commission
Marin Clean Energy
Mothers Out Front Silicon Valley
Orange County Power Authority
Peninsula Clean Energy
Pioneer Community Energy
Redwood Coast Energy Authority
Rural County Representatives of California
Sacred Heart Community Service
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
San Jose Community Energy Advocates
Silicon Valley Clean Energy
Sonoma Clean Power
Sonoma County Mayor’s and Councilmembers’ Association
The Climate Center
The Climate Reality Project - Silicon Valley Chapter
Town of Hillsborough
Valley Clean Energy
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/13/26)
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
Southern California Edison
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the California Community Choice Association (CalCCA):
One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is transparency in how PCIA charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) process or proceeding where the PCIA, or related charge, is set. Without adequate transparency, CCAs and ESPs are unable to verify the accuracy of the PCIA charges that their customers must pay and cannot confidently forecast rates – both of which are affordability tools needed to protect customers from unexpected rate increases. Additionally, the lack of consistent data creates costly disputes and inefficiencies in CPUC proceedings.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the Southern California Edison:
AB 1761 is duplicative of existing, well-established CPUC data-access procedures. Today, load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates have access to extensive utility data through CPUC-approved confidentiality frameworks, protective orders, and formal discovery mechanisms. These processes were specifically designed to balance transparency and protect market-sensitive or proprietary information. In particular, the CPUC’s Decision (D.) 22-07-008 established steps that grant community choice aggregators (CCAs) access and ability to review market-sensitive information that could impact Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) rate forecasts. CCAs have not utilized or indicated deficiencies in their ability to access data for PCIA ratemaking purposes as allowed under D.22-07-008. In the absence of a demonstrated gap or need, AB 1761 circumvents the existing rules and introduces new risks to the handling of market-sensitive information, requiring utilities to further secure that data and creating additional administrative burden.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 61-8, 5/27/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Rivas
NOES: DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Hadwick, Johnson, Macedo, Sanchez, Valencia
NO VOTE RECORDED: Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Davies, Flora, Gallagher, Lackey, Celeste Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Tangipa, Zbur
Prepared by: Nidia Bautista / E., U. & C. / (916) 651-4107
8/17/26 10:42:50
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1761 (Rogers) - Electricity: calculation methodology: data disclosure
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
This bill would require the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC for the determination of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity (LSE) for costs associated with contracts for generation resources or electrical corporation-owned generation is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on August 13, 2026
Fiscal Impact:
- Ongoing costs likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually (ratepayer funds) for the CPUC to review, compile and prepare any data deemed appropriate for sharing, including market sensitive data, concurrent with any proposal or analyses related to nonbypassable charges. This work could require involvement of multiple sections of the CPUC’s Energy Division, such as the Renewable Portfolio Standard or Resource Adequacy sections, depending on the specific proposal or analyses and associated data. In all cases, the Energy Division would have to analyze data in terms of confidentiality and in close coordination with the Legal Division. Finally, the Energy Division would need to support Legal in any required processes for data sharing and be available to respond to any questions from LSEs.
Author Amendments:
Author amendments would limit the bill's data-disclosure requirements to calculation methodologies for nonbypassable charges, extend the submission-disclosure duty from electrical corporations to member associations, load-serving entities, and other parties, and require that disclosed data exclude any information that can reasonably be used to identify an individual, family, household, residence, or nonresidential customer, among other things.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1761 (Rogers) - Electricity: calculation methodology: data disclosure
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
This bill would require the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC for the determination of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity (LSE) for costs associated with contracts for generation resources or electrical corporation-owned generation is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
Fiscal Impact:
- The CPUC estimates ongoing costs of $734,000 annually (ratepayer funds) to review, compile and prepare any data deemed appropriate for sharing, including market sensitive data, concurrent with any proposal or analyses related to the charge imposed on LSEs. This work may require involvement of multiple sections of the CPUC’s Energy Division, such as the Renewable Portfolio Standard or Resource Adequacy sections, depending on the specific proposal or analyses and associated data. In all cases, the Energy Division would have to analyze data in terms of confidentiality and in close coordination with the Legal Division. Finally, the Energy Division would need to support Legal in any required processes for data sharing and be available to respond to any questions from LSEs.
Background:
The Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) is calculated as the difference between the utility's "actual portfolio cost" — the costs tied to its energy procurement — and the "market value" of that same portfolio. Market value is determined through a CPUC-approved methodology known as the Market Price Benchmark (MPB), which uses the weighted average price of market transactions for the energy index price, resource adequacy capacity (system, local, and flexible), and renewable portfolio standard value. Only resources contracted or built before load departure are eligible for inclusion in the portfolio cost. If the utility's actual portfolio cost exceeds market value, departing load customers pay their share of that difference based on their power consumption; if the calculation comes out negative, they receive a credit that offsets future positive PCIA charges.
The resulting charge or credit is assigned by "vintage" — the year the customer departed the utility's procurement service — because the applicable portfolio differed at each point in time, so each customer pays the PCIA associated with their departure year. PCIA revenue requirements and rates are recalculated annually through each electric IOU's Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) proceeding. The revenue is not profit for any entity; it represents customer costs, so changes to the PCIA shift costs among customers rather than affecting utility earnings. As the CPUC noted in its most recent decision (D.25-06-049), these processes are complex, frequently contentious, and routinely disputed in the annual ERRA forecast proceedings.
Proposed Law:
This bill would:
- Require the CPUC to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of an LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Require the CPUC to require an electrical corporation or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of an LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Require that data to meet specified requirements, including that it would be made available through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Related Legislation:
SB 612 (Portantino, 2022) as introduced, would have directed the CPUC to ensure that CCA and DA customers have access to the benefits of IOU legacy resources for which they pay through the PCIA, and to actively manage those resources to minimize above-market costs; the bill was subsequently amended to address an unrelated subject.
AB 2689 (Kalra, 2020) would have required that the CPUC’s procedures related to confidentiality of market sensitive information submitted in or related to an electrical corporation’s proposed procurement plan to include that information that is reasonably necessary to verify the cost proposed to be recovered in rates is available to a person participating in the proceeding, including load-serving entities. The bill died in the Assembly Committee on Utilities and Energy.
SB 520 (Hertzberg, Chapter 408, Statutes of 2019) provided that the electric IOU is the provider of last resort (POLR), as defined, in its electric utility service territory unless provided otherwise in a service territory boundary agreement approved by the CPUC or unless the CPUC designates an LSE, as defined, for all or a portion of that service territory. The bill establishes specified requirements for the process of designating and the qualifications required of the POLR.
SB 237 (Hertzberg, Chapter 600, Statutes of 2018) directed the CPUC to make changes to the existing DA service program, which authorizes direct energy transactions between electricity suppliers and retail end-use customers. Among the proposed changes is a requirement to increase the annual maximum allowable limit of the DA service program by 4,000 GWh for non-residential customers. The bill also directed the CPUC to provide recommendations to the Legislature, with specified findings, on the adoption and implementation of a second direct service transactions reopening schedule.
SB 790 (Leno, Chapter 599, Statutes of 2011) established a code of conduct and associated enforcement procedures governing how IOUs may interact with CCAs.
SB 1488 (Bowen, Chapter 690, Statutes of 2004) required the CPUC to examine its practices regarding confidential information to ensure meaningful public participation in its proceedings and open decision making, while taking into account its obligations under Public Utilities Code §454.5(g) and §583 to protect the confidentiality of certain information.
AB 117 (Migden, Chapter 838, Statutes of 2002) allowed cities and counties to aggregate their electric loads and provide service directly to their residents through formation of CCAs.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Senator Benjamin Allen, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: Hearing Date: 6/30/2026
Author: | |||
Version: | Amended | ||
Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
SUBJECT:
DIGEST: This bill requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC for the determination of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity (LSE) for costs associated with contracts for generation resources or electrical corporation-owned generation is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes and vests the CPUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. (Article XII of the California Constitution)
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix the rates and charges for every public utility and requires that those rates and charges be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code §451)
- Defines a LSE as a community choice aggregator (CCA), electric service provider (ESP), and electrical corporation. (Public Utilities Code §380)
- Requires the LSE to pay reentry fees associated with their customers involuntarily being returned to the service of the incumbent electrical corporation (also known as an electric investor-owned utility (IOU)), except in the case of default due to nonpayment. Requires the LSE to post a bond or demonstrate sufficiency insurance to cover reentry fees. Requires that where an LSE becomes insolvent, the obligation to pay reentry fees is allocated to the returning customers. (Public Utilities Code §394.25 (e))
- Requires the CPUC to authorize and facilitate direct transactions between ESPs and retail end-use customers but suspends direct transactions except as expressly authorized. (Public Utilities Code §365.1)
- Requires the CPUC to authorize direct transactions for non-residential end-use customers, subject to an annual maximum allowable total kilowatt hour (kWh) limit established, as specified, for each electrical corporation, to be achieved following a now-completed three-to-five-year phase-in period. (Public Utilities Code §365.1(b))
- Requires the CPUC, on or before June 1, 2019, to issue an order specifying, among other things, an increase in the annual maximum allowable total kWh limit by 4,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) and to apportion that increase among the service territories of the electrical corporations. (Public Utilities Code §365.1(e))
- Requires the CPUC, by June 1, 2020, to provide the Legislature with recommendations on the adoption and implementation of a 2nd direct transactions reopening schedule and requires that the CPUC make specified findings with respect to those recommendations, including that the recommendations do not cause undue shifting of costs to bundled service customers of an electrical corporation or to direct transaction customers. (Public Utilities Code §365.1(f))
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a CCA program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code §365.2 and 366.3)
- Authorizes a CCA to aggregate the electrical load of interested electricity consumers within its boundaries and requires a CCA to file an implementation plan with the CPUC in order for the CPUC to determine a cost-recovery mechanism to be imposed on the CCA to prevent a shifting of costs to an electrical corporation’s bundled customers. Specifies requirements to assess nonbypassable charges on the departing load to reimburse the electric IOU for electricity purchases on behalf of the customer. (Public Utilities Code §366.2)
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation do not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a CCA program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code §§365.2 and 366.3)
- Authorizes a CCA to aggregate the electrical load of interested electricity customers within its boundaries and requires a CCA to file an implementation plan with the CPUC in order for the CPUC to determine a cost-recovery mechanism to be imposed on the CCA to prevent a shifting of costs to an electrical corporation’s bundled customers. (Public Utilities Code §366.2)
- Requires each electrical corporation to file a proposed long-term electricity procurement plan with the CPUC, and the CPUC is required to review and accept, modify, or reject that plan. The plan must include, among other things, an assessment of the price risk associated with the electrical corporation’s portfolio, the criteria by which proposed procurement transactions will be evaluated for cost recovery eligibility, and mechanisms for recovery of procurement costs in rates. Contracts entered into pursuant to a CPUC-approved procurement plan are generally eligible for recovery in rates. (Public Utilities Code §454.5)
- Requires the CPUC to adopt procedures to ensure the confidentiality of market-sensitive information submitted by an electrical corporation in connection with its proposed or approved procurement plan, including power purchase agreements, data request responses, and consultant reports. Also requires that the Public Advocate’s Office and other consumer groups that are nonmarket participants be provided with access to that confidential information under CPUC-authorized confidentiality procedures. (Public Utilities Code §454.5(g))
This bill:
- Requires the CPUC to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Requires the CPUC to require an electrical corporation or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation, or any other resource or value included in that charge and any other charge derived from those costs, to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
- Requires that data to meet specified requirements, including that it is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, as provided.
Background
Electric utilities. There are two main types of electric utilities serving customers in the state, one is an IOU, and the other is a publicly owned utility (POU) [additionally there are rural electric cooperatives who serve a very small fraction of the state].
- IOUs: privately owned electrical corporations, such as Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) that provide monopoly services in distinct, defined geographic territories. Customers of IOUs who receive both energy procurement and distribution services from the utility are considered “bundled customers.” IOUs are rate-regulated by the CPUC to ensure they provide service at a just and reasonable rate. IOUs also have an obligation to serve all customers in their service territory and serve as providers of last resort.
- POUs: publicly owned utilities, such as Los Angeles Department and Water and Power, are governed by a local governing board, perhaps a city council or other elected body. Similar to IOUs, POUs provide monopoly utility services in distinct defined geographic areas. However, unlike IOU customers, POU customers cannot receive energy procurement services from an entity that is not the POU.
Load-serving entities. Several other types of entities, referred to in statute as LSEs, procure electric generation resources and services on behalf of customers within the service territory of electric IOUs. In addition to electric IOUs, California’s LSEs include:
- ESPs: procure electricity to end-use customers who choose the services of the ESP instead of the incumbent electric IOU. An ESP uses the transmission and distribution infrastructure of the electric IOU to deliver electricity to the customer. Customers of ESPs are considered direct access (DA) customers. They are often large companies or entities who likely have staff whose responsibility is to manage the entity’s electricity (such as, a college campus, medical campus, etc.). Statute directs the CPUC to establish a maximum load cap in each electric IOU’s service territory to limit DA customers. With few exceptions, the number of DA customers has been mostly stable since the program was capped after the California energy crisis in the early 2000s when some ESPs went out-of-business and customers had to be unexpectedly defaulted back to the electric IOU.
- CCAs: local government entities, such as Sonoma Clean Power, by which local governments choose to procure or generate electricity on behalf of residents and businesses while using the incumbent electric IOU’s transmission and distribution infrastructure and billing services. An individual customer within the territory of a CCA is automatically opted-in to have energy procured from the CCA, based on the implementation schedule, when the customer’s local government elects to join or establish the CCA. However, the customer retains the option to return to the procurement service of the incumbent electric IOU. Notwithstanding CCA outreach, customers of CCAs may not notice they have been opted-in to the CCA, as the electric utility bill continues to be sent by the electric IOU for both the energy procurement of the CCA and the distribution and transmission services. However, a close inspection of the utility bill would show a line item that notes the procurement of energy resources coming from the CCA.
Departing load. The CPUC has regulated electric IOUs for about a century. However, the CPUC’s experience regulating CCAs is much more limited. In 2002, statute first allowed the formation of CCAs as among many of the policy responses to the 2000-01 Energy Crisis. It was not until nearly a decade later that the first CCA—Marin Clean Energy—came into existence. The motivation for a local government to join or create a CCA can be many, but, in general, there is an element of local control and, to varying degrees, a belief that rates would be lower as compared to the electric IOU. Today, there are over 20 CCAs operating in the state with over 15 million customers (per estimates from California Community Choice Association (CalCCA)), with an expectation that the number of customers served by CCAs may continue to grow.
Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA). When customers depart from the procurement services of the incumbent electric IOU as either a DA or CCA customer, statute requires the CPUC to ensure that customers leaving the utility do not burden remaining utility customers with costs which were incurred to serve the departing customers, including energy planned to serve the customer. Statute also requires the CPUC to ensure that departing load customers do not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. In order to ensure this “customer indifference,” CCAs and DA customers are required to pay an exit fee – the PCIA – to account for the costs incurred on their behalf and to ensure remaining customers are not affected by the choice of these customers (or their local governments) to depart their load. The PCIA is the mechanism to ensure that the customers who remain with the electric IOU do not end up taking on the long-term financial obligations the utility incurred on behalf of now-departed customers. The goal is ensuring that remaining customers neither gain nor lose from other customers’ departure. Examples of such financial obligations include utility expenditures to build power plants and, more commonly, long-term power purchase contracts with independent power producers. These departing load customers may represent a significant fraction of the customers within the electric IOU service territory. Without the PCIA, the remaining percent of customers would need to assume financial obligations incurred in anticipation of serving those customers that now receive energy procurement services from a CCA or DA provider.
Calculating the PCIA. The PCIA is calculated by taking the difference between the “actual portfolio cost,” which represents the costs related to the utility’s energy procurement and the “market value” of the portfolio. The market value is measured by a CPUC-approved methodology, known as the Market Price Benchmark (MPB), based upon the weighted average price of market transactions for energy index price, resource adequacy capacity (system, local and flexible), and renewable portfolio standard value. If the IOU’s actual portfolio cost is above-market value, the departing load customers pay their share of the difference based on their power consumption. In instances where the PCIA may be negative, departing load customers receive a credit to offset against a departing load customer’s future positive PCIA.
Calculation of PCIA Source: CPUC website | ||
PCIA Eligible Portfolio Cost minus | Portfolio’s Market Value equals | Power Charge Indifference Amount (PCIA) Revenue Requirement |
Contracted or Built Resources that represent procurement commitments prior to load departure | Calculation using Market Price Benchmark based on CPUC adopted methodology looking at recent market transactions | A bill credit or bill charge to departed load based on the vintage (year) of departure |
PCIA revenue does not represent a profit, rather these are customer costs, as such, any changes to the PCIA affect customers, and not the profit of any entity. Additionally, the PCIA will vary depending on when a customer departed from the electric IOU and the procurement portfolio at the time. As such, each customer pays the assigned vintage PCIA, depending on the year when the customer departed. The PCIA revenue requirements and rates are calculated annually as part of each electric IOUs Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) regulatory process. As noted in the CPUC’s most recent decision (D. 25-06-049), “These processes are complex, often contentious, and regularly at issue in the annual ERRA forecast proceedings.”
Comments
Need for this bill. The author states:
Electricity bills in California are on the rise, in part due to challenging market conditions and outdated and inefficient regulatory policies. …One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. …But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it.
Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a “black box” will provide the essential check and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate.
Proponents seek greater data transparency. The sponsors and supporters of this bill express a need for greater transparency concerning the data informing the calculation methodology to determine the PCIA. CCAs contend there has been no specific standard for what data must be made available to the CCAs in the ERRA proceedings where the PCIA is established. They argue that in practice disclosure varies by the electric IOU and by the CPUC proceeding. As a result, they believe there is administrative inefficiencies and disputes in resolving the issue on a case-by-case basis. They seek legislative remedy to require consistency in the data disclosures afforded to them, other LSEs, and ratepayer advocates. They believe requiring the electric IOUs to disclose data as required by this bill will encourage IOUs to double-check their work. They note there have at times been errors in the accounting that would have resulted in collecting hundreds of millions from CCA customers, though in that case the electric IOU corrected the error after it was identified.
Data disclosures currently limited within the ERRA proceeding. Currently, the data disclosures that inform the PCIA are limited within the ERRA proceeding to parties within the proceeding. The data sharing confidentiality affords CCAs access to confidential monthly report data, but the non-disclosure agreements limit the use of this information to participate in the specific ERRA forecast proceeding for which the data is disclosed and only while the proceeding remains open. The confidentiality of electric procurement data is governed by Public Utilities Code §454.5(g) and CPUC decisions, including D.06-06-066, D. 06-12-030, D.07-05-032, and D.08-04-023. Pursuant to a 2022 CPUC decision (D. 22-07-008), CCAs’ reviewing representatives are authorized to disclose nonconfidential information to their clients once per the calendar quarter, as the CPUC found it was in the public interest to protect CCA customers from rate volatility and more frequent data access supports CCAs ability to forecast costs. The CPUC also required the electric IOUs to provide all confidential information from the ERRA Master Data Request to all reviewing representatives that have signed nondisclosure agreements with the utility for PCIA forecasting within five business days after each utility’s monthly ERRA reports is submitted to the CPUC. In the case of MPB calculation, the documents informing the MPB are public documents. However, for data not disclosed through the ERRA forecast proceeding, parties can pursue access through Public Records Act requests to the CPUC.
Long-standing effort by CCAs to secure greater data access. CCAs have long sought changes at the CPUC for greater data access. While the CPUC has not adopted their proposals in full, the CPUC has adjusted the data sharing requirements in response to the CCAs’ requests. This bill would expand the data access to all data in connection with any charge imposed on an LSE customer, including a CCA customer. This bill would not tie the data to the ERRA proceeding, and instead allow data access concurrently to LSEs and ratepayer advocates with any proposal, analysis, or CPUC-authorized charge to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers regardless of whether the charge is expressly enumerated. This bill requires the data is made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, made available concurrently and in native file format. CCAs note that some files are provided as PDFs where the underlying formulas and data are not accessible.
Electric IOUs raise concerns about undermining existing CPUC confidentiality practices and rules. The electric IOUs express concerns about the broad application of the data sharing proposed by this bill. They argue that such broad disclosures would extend beyond the PCIA disputes into all aspects of utility ratemaking, resource planning, and procurement. They further argue that compliance with this bill’s mandates would require the CPUC to develop, monitor, and enforce new disclosure standards on an ongoing basis. In general, they contend the CCAs have not identified what data gaps are lacking given the access they are afforded within the ERRA proceeding to determine the PCIA. They further contend this bill would result in profound information asymmetry in the state’s retail market, with electric IOUs facing disclosure requirements that are not applied to CCAs and ESPs.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 612 (Portantino, 2022) as introduced, would have directed the CPUC to ensure that CCA and DA customers have access to the benefits of IOU legacy resources for which they pay through the PCIA, and to actively manage those resources to minimize above-market costs; the bill was subsequently amended to address an unrelated subject.
AB 2689 (Kalra, 2020) would have required that the CPUC’s procedures related to confidentiality of market sensitive information submitted in or related to an electrical corporation’s proposed procurement plan to include that information that is reasonably necessary to verify the cost proposed to be recovered in rates is available to a person participating in the proceeding, including load-serving entities. The bill died in the Assembly Committee on Utilities and Energy.
SB 520 (Hertzberg, Chapter 408, Statutes of 2019) provided that the electric IOU is the provider of last resort (POLR), as defined, in its electric utility service territory unless provided otherwise in a service territory boundary agreement approved by the CPUC or unless the CPUC designates an LSE, as defined, for all or a portion of that service territory. The bill establishes specified requirements for the process of designating and the qualifications required of the POLR.
SB 237 (Hertzberg, Chapter 600, Statutes of 2018) directed the CPUC to make changes to the existing DA service program, which authorizes direct energy transactions between electricity suppliers and retail end-use customers. Among the proposed changes is a requirement to increase the annual maximum allowable limit of the DA service program by 4,000 GWh for non-residential customers. The bill also directed the CPUC to provide recommendations to the Legislature, with specified findings, on the adoption and implementation of a second direct service transactions reopening schedule.
SB 790 (Leno, Chapter 599, Statutes of 2011) established a code of conduct and associated enforcement procedures governing how IOUs may interact with CCAs.
SB 1488 (Bowen, Chapter 690, Statutes of 2004) required the CPUC to examine its practices regarding confidential information to ensure meaningful public participation in its proceedings and open decision making, while taking into account its obligations under Public Utilities Code §454.5(g) and §583 to protect the confidentiality of certain information.
AB 117 (Migden, Chapter 838, Statutes of 2002) allowed cities and counties to aggregate their electric loads and provide service directly to their residents through formation of CCAs.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
SUPPORT:
California Community Choice Association (Sponsor)
Supervisor Luis A. Alejo, Monterey County District 1
Supervisor Terra Lawson-Remer, San Diego County District 3
350 Bay Area Action
350 Humboldt
Acterra
Alliance for Retail Energy Markets
Ava Community Energy Authority
California Choice Energy Authority
California State Association of Counties
Central Coast Community Energy
Cities Association of Santa Clara County
Cities of: Belmont, Benicia, Buellton, Buena Park, Eureka, Goleta, Mill Valley,
National City, Pico Rivera, Pinole, Rancho Mirage, San Jose, San Luis Obispo,
San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Seaside, and Walnut Creek
Clean Energy Alliance
Clean Power Alliance
Climate Action California
Climate Breakthrough
Counties of: Marin, Monterey, Santa Barbara, and Santa Clara
Elders Climate Action, NorCal and SoCal Chapters
League of California Cities
Madera County Economic Development Commission
Marin Clean Energy
Mothers Out Front Silicon Valley
Orange County Power Authority
Peninsula Clean Energy
Pioneer Community Energy
Redwood Coast Energy Authority
Rural County Representatives of California
Sacred Heart Community Service
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
San Jose Community Energy Advocates
Silicon Valley Clean Energy
Sonoma Clean Power
Sonoma County Mayor’s and Councilmembers’ Association
The Climate Center
The Climate Reality Project - Silicon Valley Chapter
Town of Hillsborough
Valley Clean Energy
OPPOSITION:
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
Southern California Edison
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the California Community Choice Association (CalCCA):
One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is transparency in how PCIA charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) process or proceeding where the PCIA, or related charge, is set. Without adequate transparency, CCAs and ESPs are unable to verify the accuracy of the PCIA charges that their customers must pay and cannot confidently forecast rates – both of which are affordability tools needed to protect customers from unexpected rate increases. Additionally, the lack of consistent data creates costly disputes and inefficiencies in CPUC proceedings.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the Southern California Edison:
AB 1761 is duplicative of existing, well-established CPUC data-access procedures. Today, load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates have access to extensive utility data through CPUC-approved confidentiality frameworks, protective orders, and formal discovery mechanisms. These processes were specifically designed to balance transparency and protect market-sensitive or proprietary information. In particular, the CPUC’s Decision (D.) 22-07-008 established steps that grant community choice aggregators (CCAs) access and ability to review market-sensitive information that could impact Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) rate forecasts.1 CCAs have not utilized or indicated deficiencies in their ability to access data for PCIA ratemaking purposes as allowed under D.22-07-008. In the absence of a demonstrated gap or need, AB 1761 circumvents the existing rules and introduces new risks to the handling of market-sensitive information, requiring utilities to further secure that data and creating additional administrative burden.
-- END --
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1761
Author:(Rogers)
As Amended Ver:March 19, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of a load serving entity (LSE) to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation or any other resource or value included in that charge, and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers. Also directs the CPUC to require an electrical corporation or other party, in submitting a proposal or analysis for the determination or application of such a calculation methodology to make all data serving as a basis for that proposal or analysis available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates.
Major Provisions
- Requires any such data:
- Be made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, which shall be made through disclosure to a nonmarket participating reviewing representative pursuant to the terms of a reasonable, CPUC-approved nondisclosure agreement;
- Be made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposals or analyses from the electrical corporation, CPUC staff or any other party, or any CPUC-adopted decision or ruling; and
- Be made available in native file format.
- Provides that a failure to comply, or the identification of good faith errors, omissions or inaccuracies in data disclosed shall not, by itself, affect the validity of any calculation methodology, charge, decision or ruling adopted by the CPUC, unless the good faith error, omission or inaccuracy constitutes one or more of the grounds specified in existing law.
COMMENTS
California has two main types of electric utilities. Investor-owned utilities (IOUs), like Southern California Edison, are private companies that supply electricity in specific territories and are regulated by the CPUC. Publicly-owned utilities (POUs), like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), are government-run and serve defined areas, with customers required to get all their power from the POU.
Beyond these, several other entities called LSEs can procure power on behalf of customers within IOU territories. Electric Service Providers (ESPs) are private companies that sell electricity directly to large commercial customers – known as "direct access" customers – using the IOU's existing infrastructure. Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) are local governments that buy power on behalf of residents. Customers are automatically enrolled but can opt out and return to the IOU at any time.
When customers leave an IOU for a CCA or ESP, they still owe a share of costs the IOU previously committed to on their behalf – such as long-term power contracts and power plant investments. This exit fee, called the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA), ensures that remaining IOU customers aren’t stuck paying for obligations made for customers who have since departed.
The PCIA is calculated as the difference between what the IOU actually paid for power and its current market value. It is updated annually and varies based on when a customer originally left the IOU.
As described by the author, the purpose of this bill is to provide more transparency and accuracy in PCIA calculations.
According to the Author
"Electricity bills in California are on the rise, in part due to challenging market conditions and outdated and inefficient regulatory policies. Families and businesses are feeling the impact. Lawmakers and regulators need practical, consumer-focused solutions that ensure customers do not pay more than their fair share. One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it. Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a "black box" will provide the essential checks and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate."
Arguments in Support
Organizations support the bill on the grounds that the PCIA has long lacked a consistent standard for data disclosure, leaving CCAs and consumer advocates unable to verify the accuracy of charges or reliably forecast rates. Supports argue that by requiring the CPUC and IOUs to disclose all cost inputs, forecasting assumptions, and methodologies used to set the PCIA – while protecting market-sensitive information through existing NDAs – this bill would reduce costly disputes, improve regulatory efficiency, and give local governments and CCAs the transparency they need to protect ratepayers from unexpected rate increases and deliver affordable, clean energy programs to their communities.
Arguments in Opposition
Opponents argue that the bill’s language is overbroad, extending well beyond PCIA transparency to potentially cover virtually all utility ratemaking, resource planning, and procurement data, when existing CPUC mechanisms already provide PCIA data to LSEs under confidentiality protections; that the bill conflicts with existing law, creating a compliance dilemma for IOUs; that compliance would impose significant costs on both the CPUC and utilities; and that the bill creates a damaging information asymmetry in California’s retail electricity market, giving CCAs and other LSEs detailed insight into IOU resource valuations, contract pricing, and negotiating strategies.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee: This bill requires significant new work of the CPUC to review data for market sensitivity and make it generally available. Such work will likely create new costs in hundreds of thousands of dollars annually to fund the work of one new staff member, at least (Public Utilities Commission Utilities Reimbursement Account). The CPUC estimates these costs to be $734,000 annually to support (a) three positions ($654,000) to analyze confidentiality of data, decide what can be shared without adversely affecting the market, support the data-sharing process and assist LSEs, when requested, (b) $50,000 annually for additional storage capacity and associated software or hardware and (c) $30,000 for each of three years for training on treatment and retention of market sensitive and confidential data (PUCURA).
VOTES
ASM UTILITIES AND ENERGY: 15-0-3
YES: Petrie-Norris, Patterson, Boerner, Calderon, Mark González, Harabedian, Hart, Kalra, Papan, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Ta, Wallis, Zbur
ABS, ABST OR NV: Chen, Davies, Irwin
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-1-1
YES: Wicks, Hoover, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Ta
NO: Dixon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: March 19, 2026
CONSULTANT: Suman Tatapudy / U. & E. / (916) 319-2083 FN: 0002714
Date of Hearing: April 29, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1761
Author:(Rogers) – As Amended Ver:March 19, 2026
Policy Committee: | Utilities and Energy | Vote: | 15 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill directs the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure that all data that is the basis of any decision or ruling to authorize the recovery of certain costs from customers of a load-serving entity (LSE) be made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates.
Specifically, this bill requires the CPUC ensure that all data serving as a basis for any decision or ruling issued by the CPUC, or in any proposal or analysis provided by CPUC staff, for the determination or application of a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of an LSE to recover costs associated with contracts, electrical corporation-owned generation or any other resource or value included in that charge, and any other charge derived from those costs, is made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates on behalf of customers.
The bill requires any such data (1) be made through a public disclosure, except for market-sensitive data, which shall be made through disclosure to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative pursuant to the terms of a reasonable, CPUC-approved nondisclosure agreement, (2) be made available to the LSE and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposal or analyses from the electrical corporation, CPUC staff or any other party, or any CPUC-adopted decision or ruling and (3) be made available in native file format.
The bill further states that a failure to comply with its provisions, or the identification of good faith errors, omissions or inaccuracies in data disclosed shall not, by itself, affect the validity of any calculation methodology, charge, decision or ruling adopted by the CPUC, unless the failure, good faith error, omission or inaccuracy constitutes one or more of the grounds specified in existing law.
FISCAL EFFECT:
This bill requires significant new work of the CPUC to review data for market sensitivity and make it generally available. Such work will likely create new costs in hundreds of thousands of dollars annually to fund the work of one new staff member, at least (Public Utilities Commission Utilities Reimbursement Account).
The CPUC estimates these costs to be $734,000 annually to support (a) three positions ($654,000) to analyze confidentiality of data, decide what can be shared without adversely affecting the market, support the data-sharing process and assist LSEs, when requested, (b) $50,000 annually for additional storage capacity and associated software or hardware and (c) $30,000 for each of three years for training on treatment and retention of market sensitive and confidential data (PUCURA).
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill concerns the power charge indifference adjustment (PCIA), which the CPUC describes as:
the portion of your bill intended to ensure that customers who receive their electric supply from third-party providers, such as a [community choice aggregator (CCA)], pay their share of costs for energy that was acquired by the IOU to serve them prior to their departure. The PCIA is included in the IOU's non-generation charges and may change annually to ensure that the IOU's remaining customers do not bear any cost created by departing customers who receive their electric supply from a third- party provider, such as a CCA.
The author characterizes this bill as increasing transparency around the CPUC’s calculation of costs to be paid by customers of CCAs and energy service providers (ESPs), which, the author contends, will reduce disputes and, possibly, save those customers money. According to the author:
CCAs, ESPs, and their customers must pay the PCIA charge but often lack access to the data, assumptions, and methods used to set it. This transparency problem leads to disputes, inefficiencies, and unexpected rate impacts for customers…Greater transparency allows CCAs and ESPs to better advocate for their customers and assess proposals to change the PCIA. It also can inform cost forecasts and shield customers from sudden rate swings. It reduces repeated fights over information, improves regulatory efficiency, and encourages utilities to verify calculations since the underlying data would be open to review…This proposal strengthens confidence that customers pay their fair share — and not more.
Additionally, the author contends the requirements of AB 1761 will “reduce staffing costs and administrative burdens” because “CPUC staff is already doing the work of releasing PCIA data,” and “With the potential for less Public Records Act requests due to increased transparency, the bill could potentially even lower the amount of staff time devoted to PRA responses.”
- Background. In California, retail electricity service is generally provided by what statute refers to as LSEs. There are many types of LSEs, including integrated utilities, such as investor-owned utilities (IOUs) like Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Edison (SCE), the rates of which are regulated by the CPUC, and publicly owned municipal utilities (munis), such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) and the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District (SMUD), which set their own rates. Such integrated utilities both procure electricity on behalf of their customers and deliver the electricity to those customers through the utility’s transmission and distribution systems and provide other related services. This type of integrated utility service is commonly known as bundled service.
Another type of LSE is the CCA, in which a local government within the service territory of an incumbent IOU elects to aggregate electricity demand within the jurisdiction of the CCA in order to procure electricity for the CCA’s customers. Such a CCA continues to rely on the incumbent IOU to provide electricity transmission and distribution services, as well as metering, billing, collection and customer service. In effect, the customer of a CCA receives an electric bill with two components—the costs of the CCA to procure electricity and the costs of the incumbent IOU to provide transmission, distribution and other related services.
The law that authorized creation of CCAs— AB 117 (Migden), Chapter 838, Statutes of 2002—provided that a customer of an incumbent IOU in a territory in which a CCA is formed is automatically enrolled in the CCA unless the customer opts out of the CCA in order to continue to receive bundled service from the incumbent IOU. Importantly, the law provides the following:
It is the intent of the Legislature that each retail end-use customer that has purchased power from an electrical corporation on or after February 1, 2001, should bear a fair share of the Department of Water Resources’ electricity purchase costs, as well as electricity purchase contract obligations incurred as of the effective date of the act adding this section, that are recoverable from electrical corporation customers in commission-approved rates. It is further the intent of the Legislature to prevent any shifting of recoverable costs between customers.
This requirement is oftentimes called cost indifference, meaning the customers of the IOU should be indifferent, from a cost perspective, to the exit of customers from bundled IOU service for electricity procurement service by a CCA. To ensure such customer indifference, the CPUC instituted the PCIA.
Calculation of the PCIA is complex and, since launch of the first CCA, Marin Clean Energy, in 2010, contentious. This is because one appeal of a CCA is its ability to procure a “greener” mix of energy resources and at a cost that is lower than the incumbent IOU’s cost to do so. But whether the actual bill of a CCA customer is lower than that of a customer who receives bundled service from an incumbent IOU often comes down to the amount of the PCIA charged to the CCA customer.
This bill, thankfully, does not attempt to recalibrate the PCIA. Rather, it requires the CPUC to make available data it uses to set the PCIA so that interested parties may use that information in their advocacy before the CPUC. Or, as numerous CCAs put it:
Greater transparency will allow stakeholders to verify calculations, improve forecasting, and better protect customers from unexpected rate increases. It will also strengthen regulatory accountability and help ensure that customers pay their fair share – and not more.
The IOUs see things differently. For example, San Diego Gas and Electric objects to the bill, asserting “AB 1761 does not balance transparency interests with confidentiality needs and customer cost protection priorities, creating a framework that would ultimately harm the customers it aims to protect.” Similarly, SCE describes the bill as “duplicative of existing, well-established CPUC data-access procedures” and that “CCAs have not utilized or indicated deficiencies in their ability to access data for PCIA ratemaking purposes.”
Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: March 18, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON UTILITIES AND ENERGY
Cottie Petrie-Norris, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1761 (
Author:Rogers) – As Introduced Ver:February 9, 2026
SUBJECT: Electricity: calculation methodology: data disclosure
SUMMARY: Requires the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), CPUC staff, electrical corporations, and other entities, to disclose to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates data relied on in any decision, ruling, proposal, or analysis concerning a calculation methodology for any charge imposed on customers of load-serving entities to recover the costs of contracts or resources owned by an electrical corporation or any value derived from that calculation. Additionally, this bill specifies that the data described above must:
- Be publicly disclosed, except market-sensitive data, which shall be disclosed to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative under a CPUC-approved nondisclosure agreement.
- Be made available to load-serving entities and ratepayer advocates concurrently with any proposal, analysis, or adopted outcome by any party or CPUC staff, which may be satisfied through mutually agreed data-sharing practices established at the outset of a proceeding.
- Be provided in native file format.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes and vests the CPUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations. (California Constitution Article XII, §1-6)
- Authorizes the CPUC to fix rates and charges for public utilities and requires those rates and charges to be just and reasonable. (Public Utilities Code § 451)
- Requires that the bundled retail customers of an electrical corporation not experience any cost increase as a result of retail customers electing service from another provider or from implementation of a community choice aggregator (CCA) program. Requires the CPUC to ensure that the departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. (Public Utilities Code § 365.2 and 366.3)
- Authorizes a CCA to aggregate the electrical load of interested electricity customers within its boundaries and requires a CCA to file an implementation plan with the CPUC in order for the CPUC to determine a cost-recovery mechanism to be imposed on the CCA to prevent a shifting of costs to an electrical corporation’s bundled customers. (Public Utilities Code § 366.2)
- Requires each electrical corporation to file a proposed long-term electricity procurement plan with the CPUC, and the CPUC is required to review and accept, modify, or reject that plan. The plan must include, among other things, an assessment of the price risk associated with the electrical corporation’s portfolio, the criteria by which proposed procurement transactions will be evaluated for cost recovery eligibility, and mechanisms for recovery of procurement costs in rates. Contracts entered into pursuant to a CPUC-approved procurement plan are generally eligible for recovery in rates. (Public Utilities Code § 454.5)
- Requires the CPUC to adopt procedures to ensure the confidentiality of market-sensitive information submitted by an electrical corporation in connection with its proposed or approved procurement plan, including power purchase agreements, data request responses, and consultant reports. Also requires that the Public Advocate’s Office and other consumer groups that are nonmarket participants be provided with access to that confidential information under CPUC-authorized confidentiality procedures. (Public Utilities Code § 454.5(g))
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown. This bill is keyed fiscal, and will be referred to the Assembly Committee on Appropriations for its review.
BACKGROUND:
Electric utilities – California is served by two main types of electric utilities, investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and publicly-owned utilities (POUs).
- IOUs: privately-owned electrical corporations, such as Southern California Edison (SCE), that provide monopoly services in defined geographic territories. Customers of IOUs who receive both energy procurement and distribution services from the utility are considered “bundled customers.” IOUs are rate-regulated by the CPUC to ensure they provide service at a just and reasonable rate. IOUs also have an obligation to serve all customers in their service territory and act as providers of last resort.
- POUs: publicly-owned utilities, such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), are governed by a local governing board (ex. a city council or other elected body). Similar to IOUs, POUs provide monopoly services in distinct, defined geographic areas. However, unlike IOU customers, POU customers cannot receive energy procurement services from an entity that is not the POU.
Load-serving entities (LSEs) – Several other types of entities, referred to in statute as LSEs, procure electric generation resources and services on behalf of customers within the service territory of an IOU. In addition to electric IOUs, California’s LSEs include:
- Electric Service Providers (ESPs): procure electricity to end-use customers who choose the services of the ESP instead of the incumbent electric IOU. ESPs use the transmission and distribution infrastructure of the incumbent IOU to deliver electricity to customers. Customers of ESPs are considered direct access (DA) customers. DA customers are often large commercial or institutional customers, such as college or medical campuses, with dedicated staff to manage the entity’s electricity. Statute directs the CPUC to establish a maximum load cap in each electric IOU’s service territory to limit DA customers. With few exceptions, the number of DA customers has remained stable since the program was capped. The cap was imposed after several ESPs went out of business and their customers were defaulted back to the incumbent IOU during the California energy crisis in the early 2000s.
- Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs): local government entities, such as Sonoma Clean Power, through which local governments choose to procure or generate electricity on behalf of residents within their jurisdiction while using the incumbent electric IOU’s transmission and distribution infrastructure and billing services. An individual customer within the territory of a CCA is automatically opted-in to have energy procured from the CCA, based on the implementation schedule, when the customer’s local government elects to join or establish the CCA. However, the customer retains the option to return to the procurement service of the incumbent electric IOU. Notwithstanding CCA outreach efforts, customers may be unaware they have been enrolled in a CCA, as the IOU continues to issue a single utility bill covering both energy procurement and transmission and distribution services. However, close inspection of the bill would show a line item identifying the CCA as the customer’s energy procurement provider.
Departing Load – The CPUC has regulated electric IOUs for over a century. However, the CPUC’s experience regulating CCAs is comparatively limited. In 2002, AB 117 (Migden, Chapter 838, Statutes of 2002) first allowed the formation of CCAs. It was not until nearly a decade later that the first CCA, Marin Clean Energy, came into existence. Today, there are 25 operational CCA programs operating in the state with more than 15 million customers (per estimates from the California Community Choice Association (CalCCA)).
Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) – When customers migrate away from the procurement services of the incumbent electric IOU as either a DA or CCA customer, statute requires the CPUC to ensure that customers leaving the utility do not burden remaining utility customers with costs that were incurred to serve the departing customers. Statute also requires the CPUC to ensure that departing load customers do not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load. CCA and DA customers pay an exit fee, the PCIA, representing their share of costs previously incurred on their behalf, thereby ensuring remaining customers are not affected by their departure. The PCIA is the mechanism to ensure that the customers who remain with the utility do not end up taking on the long-term financial obligations the utility incurred on behalf of now-departed customers. Such obligations include capital expenditures to build power plants and, more commonly, long-term power purchase agreements with independent power producers. These departing load customers may represent a significant fraction of the customers within the electric IOU service territory. Without the PCIA, bundled customers would be required to absorb financial obligations that were incurred in anticipation of serving customers who have since departed to a CCA or ESP.
Calculating the PCIA – The PCIA is calculated as the difference between the IOU’s “actual portfolio cost,” the costs associated with the utility’s energy procurement, and the “market value” of that portfolio. Market value is determined using a CPUC-approved methodology, known as the Market Price Benchmark (MPB), which estimates the per-unit value of three principal components of IOU portfolios: resource adequacy (RA), energy index, and renewable portfolio standard (RPS). When the IOU’s actual portfolio cost exceeds market value, departing load customers pay their proportionate share of the difference based on power consumption. When the calculation yields a negative value, departing load customers receive a credit against future obligations.
The PCIA rate is set through two annual CPUC proceedings. The CPUC calculates and publishes MPB values annually in October. Those values feed into each IOU’s Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) forecast application, a formal ratemaking proceeding in which IOUs file applications and supporting testimony and parties, including CCAs, ESPs and, ratepayer advocates, may intervene, submit testimony, and comment on proposed decisions. The ERRA proceeding also implements an annual true-up comparing forecasted costs against actual realized costs, with any over- or under-collection carried forward through the Portfolio Allocation Balancing Account (PABA) and ERRA balancing accounts. Because the PCIA is calculated based on when a customer left IOU bundled service, each customer pays a rate corresponding to the “vintage year” of their departure.
Source: CPUC website, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-power-procurement/power-charge-indifference-adjustment.
COMMENTS:
- Author’s Statement. According to the author, “Electricity bills in California are on the rise, in part due to challenging market conditions and outdated and inefficient regulatory policies. Families and businesses are feeling the impact. Lawmakers and regulators need practical, consumer-focused solutions that ensure customers do not pay more than their fair share. One tool to ensure customers receive energy bills that are fair and accurate is increased transparency in how Power Charge Indifference Account (PCIA) charges are calculated. The PCIA is a fee designed to ensure customers who leave utility generation service, like customers of a Community Choice Aggregator (CCA) or Energy Service Provider (ESP), pay their portion of legacy power costs. But since the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any CPUC process or proceeding where the PCIA is set – so, while customers are being asked to pay this charge, they have no ability to fact check it. Everyone makes mistakes, including investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is why transparency is crucial in the quest to reduce ratepayer costs. CCAs, ESPs and ratepayer advocates should have the data required to independently verify the charges impacting customers. Enabling transparency and ensuring the work is not done in a “black box” will provide the essential checks and balances to ensure that costs to all ratepayers are fair and accurate.”
- Purpose of Bill. AB 1761 would require the CPUC to ensure that all data relied on in any decision, ruling, proposal, or analysis used to determine or apply charges imposed on customers of LSEs to recover the costs of contracts or resources owned by an IOU is made available to LSEs and ratepayer advocates. The bill would require such data to be publicly disclosed, except for market-sensitive data, which would be disclosed to a nonmarket participant reviewing representative under a CPUC-approved nondisclosure agreement. The bill would also require that this data be made available concurrently with any proposal or analysis from an IOU, CPUC staff, or any other party, concurrently with any CPUC-adopted outcome, and provided in native file format.
- Current process for obtaining data in connection with ERRA forecast proceedings. The IOUs’ annual ERRA forecast applications are public filings, and public versions of accompanying testimony and workpapers are simultaneously served on all parties to the proceeding. These public filings represent only a portion of the data underlying the calculation. The confidentiality framework governing electric procurement data is established by Public Utilities Code Section 454.5(g) and CPUC decisions, including D.06-06-066, D.06-12-030, D.07-05-032, D.08-04-023, and D.22-01-023. Contrary to the purely request-driven process that previously governed access, D.22-01-023 streamlined and made proactive the IOU obligation to share confidential data. Under that framework, as affirmed in D.22-07-008, each IOU is required to provide all confidential information from the ERRA Master Data Request response to all reviewing representatives that have signed a nondisclosure agreement within 5 business days after each of the IOU’s monthly ERRA reports are submitted to the CPUC.
- Current process for obtaining data in connection with Market Price Benchmarks (MPBs). The CPUC publishes the final MPB values annually. The annual MPB calculation documents describe the methodology and the resulting benchmark figures and explain how the CPUC used the underlying data to arrive at them. These are public documents and are available on the CPUC’s website. For CPUC-held data not disclosed through the ERRA forecast proceeding framework (described above), parties can pursue access through Public Records Act requests to the CPUC.
- How does this bill differ from the existing data disclosure process?
- Scope: The existing process is narrow in scope and applies specifically to ERRA Master Data Request information used for PCIA forecasting purposes, and only during the pendency of an ERRA forecast proceeding (with D.22-07-008 extending access for PCIA forecasting purposes outside of a pending proceeding under specific conditions). The bill is potentially broader in that it covers all data relied upon in connection with any charge imposed on CCA or LSE customers to recover IOU contract or resource costs. While the existing framework established through SB 1488 (Bowen, Chapter 690, Statutes of 2004) and subsequent CPUC decisions represents a meaningful step toward transparency, it ties data access to party status in a pending proceeding, whereas this bill would broaden access to LSEs and ratepayer advocates concurrent with any proposal, analysis, or CPUC-adopted outcome, and does not require active party status as a condition of access, though some disclosure obligations under the bill are still framed in the context of a proceeding.
- Timing of Disclosure: Under the existing framework, confidential data must be provided within 5 business days after each monthly ERRA report is submitted to the CPUC. The bill requires data to be made available concurrently with any proposal, analysis, or CPUC-adopted outcome.
- Disclosure Requirements for the CPUC and its staff: Unlike the existing Public Records Act process, which is reactive, request-driven, and subject to the CPUC’s discretion to withhold market-sensitive procurement data under the Section 454.5(g) confidentiality framework, this bill would create a proactive disclosure obligation on the CPUC without requiring any request or exemption determination. The bill would not amend the Public Records Act or disturb the Section 454.5(g) framework but would instead add an independent statutory mandate to the Public Utilities Code. To the extent concerns exist about market-sensitive data reaching nonmarket participants, the bill’s requirement that such data be disclosed only under CPUC-approved nondisclosure agreements is a mechanism that could preserve the protections of the existing confidentiality framework.
- Arguments in Support. CalCCA states that, “[S]ince the PCIA was implemented, there has been no consistent standard for what data must be made available in any California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) process or proceeding where the PCIA, or a related charge, is set. Without adequate transparency, CCAs and ESPs are unable to verify the accuracy of the PCIA charges that their customers must pay and cannot confidently forecast rates – both of which are affordability tools needed to protect customers from unexpected rate increases. Additionally, the lack of consistent data creates costly disputes and inefficiencies in CPUC proceedings…Disclosures vary by utility and by CPUC proceeding, resulting in repeated fights between CCAs and the Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) over data access and increased administrative inefficiencies as the CPUC resolves disputes on a case-by-case basis…Greater transparency allows CCAs and ESPs to better advocate for their customers and assess proposals to change the PCIA. It can also inform cost forecasts and shield customers from sudden rate swings. It reduces repeated fights over information, improves regulatory efficiency, and encourages utilities to verify calculations since the underlying data would be open to review.”
- Arguments in Opposition. San Diego Gas and Electric Company states that, “[T]he bill’s extraordinarily broad language requiring disclosure of ‘all data relied on in any decision or ruling’ extends far beyond PCIA disputes to encompass virtually all aspects of utility ratemaking, resource planning, and procurement. ‘All data’ could be interpreted to include detailed contract terms, pricing strategies, dispatch operations, proprietary modeling methodologies, and resource valuations…AB 1761 conflicts with Section 583 of the Public Utilities Code, which establishes that information furnished to the CPUC by utilities ‘shall not be open to public inspection or made public except on order of the commission.’…AB 1761 creates a compliance conundrum for IOUs: comply with its disclosure mandate and violate existing privacy protections statutes or maintain customer privacy and face penalties for non-compliance with AB 1761…IOUs would face comprehensive disclosure obligations while LSEs, including Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) and Electric Service Providers (ESPs), would be subject to no equivalent requirements…AB 1761 tilts the field dramatically against IOUs by subsidizing competitor success through forced intelligence sharing while imposing no reciprocal obligations…Compliance with AB 1761 would require SDG&E to build new information technology infrastructure to manage concurrent disclosure of massive datasets…These costs would ultimately be paid by IOU customers through higher rates…SDG&E and other IOUs could face liability, arbitration, and early termination costs, which would ultimately be borne by customers through increased rates.”
- Clarity on scope of disclosure requirements. As described by the author, the purpose of this bill is to provide more transparency and accuracy in PCIA calculations. As introduced, the bill’s relationship to the existing statutory framework governing the PCIA is imprecise because the scope of covered calculations is defined by descriptive language that may not map cleanly onto the intended statutory provisions governing the PCIA. The Committee recommends adding a definition to clarify the descriptive phrase “any charge imposed on customers of a load-serving entity” as including “any charge determined or applied pursuant to subdivisions (f), (g), or (h) of Section 366.2, and any other charge authorized by the commission to recover the costs of contracts or resources procured for the benefit of bundled customers, regardless of whether such charge is expressly enumerated in those subdivisions” to more appropriately target the stated purpose of the author with language in the legislation.
- Delineating the CPUC’s obligations from those of electrical corporations and other parties. As introduced, subdivision (a) of the bill conflates two distinct obligations, one running to the CPUC’s own process and outputs, and one running to electrical corporations and other party submissions, in a single provision. Separating them would clarify who bears which obligation, reduce ambiguity about the CPUC’s enforcement role with respect to electrical corporation and other party submissions, and make the bill easier to implement and administer. The Committee recommends dividing subdivision (a) into two subdivisions: a revised (a) governing what the CPUC must ensure with respect to data underlying its own decisions, rulings, and staff analyses; and a new (b) governing the parallel disclosure obligation of electrical corporations and other parties submitting proposals or analyses in covered proceedings.
- Clarifying that disclosure failures do not independently invalidate CPUC action. Without a savings clause, the bill as introduced creates a risk that parties could seek to invalidate or stay PCIA rate changes, or other CPUC action, on the grounds that a disclosure obligation was not fully or perfectly met. This could introduce substantial litigation risk and potentially delay rate proceedings, undermining the CPUC’s ability to set PCIA rates on a timely annual basis. However, it is also important to preserve the possibility that evidence of a disclosure failure or the identification of errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in disclosed data could be relevant as part of a broader challenge. Indeed, according to CalCCA, there have been proceedings where errors were identified that would have resulted in incorrect charges to CCA customers.[1] To strike a balance between these concerns, the Committee recommends adding a new section providing that a good faith failure to comply with the new disclosure obligations, or the identification of errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in disclosed data, shall not, by itself, invalidate, impair, stay, or otherwise affect the validity of any calculation methodology, charge, decision, or ruling adopted by the CPUC, unless the error, omission, or inaccuracy constitutes one or more of the grounds specified in Section 1757 or 1757.1.
- Clarifying standard for triggering disclosure obligation. “Relied on in” could invite litigation over whether specific data was actually relied upon in reaching a particular decision, ruling, or proposal, a fact-specific inquiry that would be difficult to administer and easy to dispute. “Serving as a basis for” is a more objective standard that captures the universe of data inputs without requiring a retroactive determination of reliance. This change would better serve the bill’s purpose of ensuring that the data underlying PCIA calculations is available for verification by CCAs, ESPs, and ratepayer advocates. The Committee recommends replacing “relied on in” with “serving as a basis for” in the bill.
- Clarifying the use of the term “outcome.” “Outcome” has no established meaning in CPUC practice or the Public Utilities Code. “Decision” and “ruling” are the terms of art used throughout the Code and CPUC rules of practice and procedure to describe formal CPUC action. Using established terms of art eliminates interpretive ambiguity about what category of CPUC action triggers the disclosure requirements and mirrors the bill’s earlier phrasing in subdivision (a). The Committee recommends replacing “commission adopted outcome” in subdivision (c)(2) with “commission adopted decision or ruling.”
- Prior Legislation.
SB 612 (Portantino, 2022), as introduced would have directed the CPUC to ensure that CCA and DA customers have access to the benefits of IOU legacy resources for which they pay through the PCIA, and to actively manage those resources to minimize above-market costs; the bill was subsequently amended to address an unrelated subject. Status: Died – Assembly Committee on Education. AB 2689 (Kalra, 2020) would have required that the CPUC’s procedures related to confidentiality of market sensitive information submitted in or related to an electrical corporation’s proposed procurement plan to include that information that is reasonably necessary to verify the cost proposed to be recovered in rates is available to a person participating in the proceeding, including load-serving entities. Status: Died – Assembly Committee on Utilities and Energy.
SB 520 (Hertzberg) provided that the electric IOU is the provider of last resort (POLR), as defined, in its electric utility service territory unless provided otherwise in a service territory boundary agreement approved by the CPUC or unless the CPUC designates an LSE, as defined, for all or a portion of that service territory. The bill establishes specified requirements for the process of designating and the qualifications required of the POLR. Status: Chapter 408, Statutes of 2019.
SB 237 (Hertzberg) directed the CPUC to make changes to the existing DA service program, which authorizes direct energy transactions between electricity suppliers and retail end-use customers. Among the proposed changes is a requirement to increase the annual maximum allowable limit of the DA service program by 4,000 GWh for non-residential customers. The bill also directs the CPUC to provide recommendations to the Legislature, with specified findings, on the adoption and implementation of a second direct service transactions reopening schedule. Status: Chapter 600, Statutes of 2018.
SB 790 (Leno) established a code of conduct and associated enforcement procedures governing how IOUs may interact with CCAs. Status: Chapter 599, Statutes of 2011.
SB 1488 (Bowen) required the CPUC to examine its practices regarding confidential information to ensure meaningful public participation in its proceedings and open decision making, while taking into account its obligations under Public Utilities Code Sections 454.5(g) and 583 to protect the confidentiality of certain information. Status: Chapter 690, Statutes of 2004.
AB 117 (Migden) allowed cities and counties to aggregate their electric loads and provide service directly to their residents through formation of CCAs. Status: Chapter 838, Statutes of 2002.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
350 Humboldt
Alliance for Retail Energy Markets
California Community Choice Association
California State Association of Counties (CSAC)
Central Coast Community Energy
City of Buellton
City of National City
City of Pinole
City of San Jose
City of Seaside, California
Climate Action California
Climate Breakthrough
Elders Climate Action (ECA) Northern California (NORCAL) and Southern California (SOCAL) Chapters
Goleta; City of
League of California Cities
Marin Clean Energy (MCE)
Monterey County Office of Supervisor Luis A. Alejo
Mothers Out Front Silicon Valley
Orange County Power Authority
Peninsula Clean Energy
Pioneer Community Energy
Redwood Coast Energy Authority
Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC)
San Diego Community Power
San Jose Community Energy Advocates
Silicon Valley Clean Energy
Sonoma Clean Power
The Climate Center
The Climate Reality Project: Silicon Valley
The Office of San Diego County Supervisor Terra Lawson
Town of Hillsborough
Oppose
Edison International and Affiliates, Including Southern California Edison
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
Analysis Prepared by: Suman Tatapudy / U. & E. / (916) 319-2083
California Community Choice Association. “AB 1761: Improving Bill Transparency.” Accessed March 4, 2026. https://cal-cca.org/ab-1761/. ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):