AB 1776: Cartwright Act: violations.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2026-09-30
Current Status:
Passed
(2026-09-30: Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 826, Statutes of 2026.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce, as provided. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, substantial market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions. The bill would provide that its provisions do not prevent, limit, or prohibit certain conduct and legal instruments, including exclusive franchises granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
This bill would require any action brought pursuant to these provisions to be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney, and would, with certain exceptions, preclude an alleged violation under its provisions from serving as a predicate violation under the Unfair Competition Law. The bill would require an action brought pursuant to these provisions to be filed as a complex case pursuant to provisions of law requiring the assessment of additional court fees, as specified. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce, as provided. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, substantial market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions. The bill would provide that its provisions do not prevent, limit, or prohibit certain conduct and legal instruments, including exclusive franchises granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
This bill would require any action brought pursuant to these provisions to be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney, and would, with certain exceptions, preclude an alleged violation under its provisions from serving as a predicate violation under the Unfair Competition Law. The bill would require an action brought pursuant to these provisions to be filed as a complex case pursuant to provisions of law requiring the assessment of additional court fees, as specified. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce, as provided, and would require procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct to be evaluated within the same relevant market, as specified. provided. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, substantial market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions. The bill would provide that its provisions do not prevent, limit, or prohibit certain conduct and legal instruments, including exclusive franchises granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency. The
This bill would require any action brought pursuant to these provisions to be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney. attorney, and would, with certain exceptions, preclude an alleged violation under its provisions from serving as a predicate violation under the Unfair Competition Law. The bill would require an action brought pursuant to these provisions to be filed as a complex case pursuant to provisions of law requiring the assessment of additional court fees, as specified. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th Cal.4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce, as provided, and would require procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct to be evaluated within the same relevant market, as specified. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, substantial market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions. The bill would provide that its provisions do not prevent, limit, or prohibit certain conduct and legal instruments, including exclusive franchises granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency. The bill would require any action brought pursuant to these provisions to be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions, or events that are to unreasonably restrain trade or monopolize or monopsonize in any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce, as provided. The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in a separate market. provided, and would require procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct to be evaluated within the same relevant market, as specified. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, substantial market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions. The bill would provide that its provisions do not prevent, limit, or prohibit certain conduct and legal instruments, including exclusive franchises granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions, or events that are to unreasonably restrain trade or monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce, as specified, or in restraint of trade. provided. The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in a separate market. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions, or events that are to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce, as specified, or in restraint of trade. The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in a separate market and would prohibit the harm to a person or persons from the challenged conduct from being offset by purported benefits to another person or persons. market. The bill would require courts to use the analytical framework and guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions.
The bill would provide that federal antitrust laws are, at most, instructive and not conclusive when interpreting Californias antitrust laws. The bill would authorize any of specified conditions to constitute evidence of liability under the Cartwright Act but would prohibit requiring a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the specified conditions to establish liability. The provisions. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. Existing case law, In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, establishes a rule of reason analysis for certain claims under the Cartwright Act, which, among other things, determines whether an act was made for the purpose of avoiding competition and whether the anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh any procompetitive justifications.
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions, or events that are to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce, as specified, or in restraint of trade. For these purposes, the bill would define restraint of trade to include any actions, measures, or acts included or cognizable under a specified provision of the Cartwright Act that defines trust, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons. The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in a separate market and would prohibit the harm to a person or persons from the challenged conduct from being offset by purported benefits to another person or persons. The bill would require courts to use the guidance provided in In re Cipro Cases I & II. The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, market power through either direct or indirect evidence. The bill would exempt a small business, as defined, from these provisions.
The bill would provide that federal antitrust laws are, at most, instructive and not conclusive when interpreting Californias antitrust laws. The bill would authorize any of specified conditions to constitute evidence of liability under the Cartwright Act but would prohibit requiring a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the specified conditions to establish liability. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions, or events that are to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce, as specified, or in restraint of trade. For these purposes, the bill would define restraint of trade to include any actions, measures, or acts included or cognizable under a specified provision of the Cartwright Act that defines trust, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons. The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in a separate market and would prohibit the harm to a person or persons from the challenged conduct from being offset by purported benefits to another person or persons. The bill would authorize any of specified conditions to constitute evidence of liability under the Cartwright Act but would prohibit requiring a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the specified conditions to establish liability. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts as unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 provides that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Chapter 338 of the Statutes of 2025 also provides that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions, or events that are to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce, as specified, or in restraint of trade. For these purposes, the bill would define restraint of trade to include any actions, measures, or acts included or cognizable under a specified provision of the Cartwright Act that defines trust, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons. The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in a separate market and would prohibit the harm to a person or persons from the challenged conduct from being offset by purported benefits to another person or persons. The bill would authorize any of specified conditions to constitute evidence of liability under the Cartwright Act but would prohibit requiring a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the specified conditions to establish liability. The bill would also make related findings and declarations. The bill would require courts to liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition, as provided.
Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law, known as the Cartwright Act, makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, subject to specified exemptions. A trust is defined for these purposes as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by 2 or more persons for certain prohibited purposes. A violation of the act is punishable as a crime.This bill would, instead, define a trust as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by one or more persons. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.Existing law, known as the Cartwright Act, makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, subject to specified exemptions. A trust is defined for these purposes as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by 2 or more persons for certain prohibited purposes. A violation of the act is punishable as a crime.
This bill would, instead, define a trust as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by one or more persons. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is discussed by the California Supreme Court in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783 and in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 136.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195).
(e)The Legislature affirms that, as referenced in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 148, a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146147.
(c)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(d)This section shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years before the filing of the complaint.
(e)(1)This section does not prevent, limit, or prohibit:
(A)Any exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(B)Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(2)This section does not impose any liability on a person or entity for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
(3)For purposes of this subdivision, local governmental agency includes a city, county, special district, sanitation district, or joint powers agency.
(f)(1)An action pursuant to this section may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
(2)Except in an action brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney pursuant to this section, an alleged violation of this section shall not serve as a predicate violation under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200).
(3)This subdivision does not apply to, create or extinguish a defense to, or limit the scope of, an action that is not brought pursuant to this section.
(g)Sections 16756, 16756.1, and 16757 do not apply to claims brought under this section unless the claims allege that a person combined or conspired with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(h)Pursuant to Section 70616 of the Government Code, any action under this section shall be filed as a complex case.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is discussed by the California Supreme Court in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783 and in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 136.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195).
(e)The Legislature affirms that, as referenced in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 148, a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146147.
(c)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(d)This section shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years before the filing of the complaint.
(e)(1)This section does not prevent, limit, or prohibit:
(A)Any exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(B)Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(2)This section does not impose any liability on a person or entity for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
(3)For purposes of this subdivision, local governmental agency includes a city, county, special district, sanitation district, or joint powers agency.
(f)(1)An action pursuant to this section may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
(2)Except in an action brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney pursuant to this section, an alleged violation of this section shall not serve as a predicate violation under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200).
(3)This subdivision does not apply to, create or extinguish a defense to, or limit the scope of, an action that is not brought pursuant to this section.
(g)Sections 16756, 16756.1, and 16757 do not apply to claims brought under this section unless the claims allege that a person combined or conspired with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(h)Pursuant to Section 70616 of the Government Code, any action under this section shall be filed as a complex case.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783), which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions. discussed by the California Supreme Court in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783 and in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 136.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195).
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.(f)(e)The Legislature affirms that, as referenced in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 148, a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market as the conduct that is alleged to be unlawful.(c)(b)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146147.
(d)(c)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(e)(d)This section shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years before the filing of the complaint.
(f)(e)(1)This section does not prevent, limit, or prohibit:
(A)Any exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(B)Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(2)This section does not impose any liability on a person or entity for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
(3)For purposes of this subdivision, local governmental agency includes a city, county, special district, sanitation district, or joint powers agency.
(g)(f)(1)An action pursuant to this section may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
(h)Any action brought pursuant to, or under, this section is deemed a complex case as described in subdivision (a) of Section 3.400 of the California Rules of Court.(2)Except in an action brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney pursuant to this section, an alleged violation of this section shall not serve as a predicate violation under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200).
(3)This subdivision does not apply to, create or extinguish a defense to, or limit the scope of, an action that is not brought pursuant to this section.
(g)Sections 16756, 16756.1, and 16757 do not apply to claims brought under this section unless the claims allege that a person combined or conspired with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(h)Pursuant to Section 70616 of the Government Code, any action under this section shall be filed as a complex case.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783), which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195).
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
(f)The Legislature affirms that, as referenced in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th Cal.4th 116, 148, a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.(b)Procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market as the conduct that is alleged to be unlawful.
(c)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th Cal.4th 116, 146147.
(d)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(e)Section 16731 This section shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years prior to before the filing of the complaint.
(f)(1)This section does not prevent, limit, or prohibit:
(A)Any exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(B)Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(2)This section does not impose any liability on a person or entity for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
(3)For purposes of this subdivision, local governmental agency includes a city, county, special district, sanitation district, or joint powers agency.
(g)An action pursuant to this section may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
(h)Any action brought pursuant to, or under, this section is deemed a complex case as described in subdivision (a) of Section 3.400 of the California Rules of Court.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783), which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, not conclusive, instructive when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Thus, a claim brought pursuant to Section 16731 shall not be dismissed or rejected on the pleadings or merits pursuant to the Sherman Act or any case decided thereunder unless the court also finds that such a dismissal or rejection is consistent with this chapter.
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
(f)The Legislature affirms that, as referenced in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, 148, a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that do either of the following:(1)Unreasonably restrain trade.(2)Monopolize every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Anticompetitive effects and procompetitive Procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market. market as the conduct that is alleged to be unlawful.
(c)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, 146147.
(d)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(e)Section 16731 shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
(f)(1)This section does not prevent, limit, or prohibit an exclusive prohibit:
(A)Any exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit authorized by state law that is granted and supervised by a local governmental agency, or local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(B)Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
(2)This section does not impose any liability under this section on a person or entity acting for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
(2)(3)For purposes of this subdivision, local governmental agency includes a city, county, special district, sanitation district, or joint powers agency.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783), which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Thus, a claim brought pursuant to Section 16731 shall not be dismissed or rejected on the pleadings or merits pursuant to the Sherman Act or any case decided thereunder unless the court also finds that such a dismissal or rejection is consistent with this chapter.
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that do either of the following:
(1)Unreasonably restrain trade.
(2)Monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market.
(c)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, 146147.
(d)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(e)Section 16731 shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
(f)(1)This section does not prevent, limit, or prohibit an exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit authorized by state law that is granted and supervised by a local governmental agency, or impose any liability under this section on a person or entity acting within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, local governmental agency includes a city, county, special district, sanitation district, or joint powers agency.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783), which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Thus, a claim brought pursuant to Section 16731 shall not be dismissed or rejected on the pleadings or merits pursuant to the Sherman Act or any case decided thereunder unless the court also finds that such a dismissal or rejection is consistent with this chapter.
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that do either of the following:
(1)Unreasonably restrain trade.
(2)Monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market.
(c)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116. 116, 146147.
(d)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(e)Section 16731 shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, and not conclusive, when construing Californias antitrust laws, and as such, the following are not required to find liability:(a)When alleging an anticompetitive refusal to deal, either:(1)The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct.(2)The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons.(b)When alleging predatory pricing, either:(1)The defendant offered a product or service that was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law.(2)The defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.(c)The defendants conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition.(d)The conducts risk of harming competition or actual harm is entirely proven with quantitative evidence, where qualitative evidence may be used to prove harm to competition or actual harm.(e)In a case where a defendants business is a multisided platform, the defendants conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform.(f)The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant.(g)When relying on indirect evidence to show market power, a single firm or person has or might achieve a market share at or above a threshold recognized or required under Section 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code.(h)When using direct evidence to show market power, a definition of a relevant market.SEC. 4.Section 16733 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16733.SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 5.SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of this section and Sections 16731, 16732, and 16733 the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition, competition (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783), which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery, recovery (Section 16750); use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing, standing and antitrust injury (Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1232); recognition of broader harms and per se conduct, conduct (Sections 16720 to 16729, inclusive); lower actionable market shares, structured shares (Fisherman Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Ct. (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 309, 326); structured rule of reason analysis, analysis (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 147); and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Federal case law on the subject of this article is not binding on California state courts, but courts may consider federal case law as persuasive authority to the extent they find it consistent with California law, including this section.(d)Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing Californias antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes (Aryeh v. Canon Business Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195).
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that are either of the following: do either of the following:
(1)In restraint of trade. As used in this paragraph, restraint of trade includes, but is not limited to, any actions, measures, or acts included or cognizable under Section 16720, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons. Unreasonably restrain trade.
(2)To monopolize Monopolize or monopsonize, to attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, to maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market.
(c)Courts adjudicating a claim brought under this section shall use the guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116.
(d)A plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this section shall be required to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
(e)Section 16731 shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Any of the following may constitute evidence of a violation of Section 16731, but establishing liability shall not require a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the following: 16732.Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, and not conclusive, when construing Californias antitrust laws, and as such, the following are not required to find liability:
(a)When alleging an anticompetitive refusal to deal, either:
(a)(1)The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct.
(b)(2)The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons.
(b)When alleging predatory pricing, either:
(c)The defendants price for a(1)The defendant offered a product or service that was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law.
(2)The defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.
(d)(c)The defendants conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition.
(e)(d)The conducts risk of harming competition or actual harm must be is entirely proven with quantitative evidence. evidence, where qualitative evidence may be used to prove harm to competition or actual harm.
(f)(e)In a case where a defendants business is a multisided platform, the defendants conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform.
(g)In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.(h)(f)The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant.
(i)A(g)When relying on indirect evidence to show market power, a single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized or required under Section 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code.
(j)A(h)When using direct evidence to show market power, a definition of a relevant market where there is direct evidence of market power. market.
SEC. 4.Section 16733 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16733.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of this section and Sections 16731 and 16732 16731, 16732, and 16733 is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition, which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery, use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing, recognition of broader harms and per se conduct, lower actionable market shares, structured rule of reason analysis, and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Federal case law on the subject of this article is not binding on California state courts, but courts may consider federal case law as persuasive authority to the extent they find it consistent with California law, including this section.
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that are either of the following:
(1)In restraint of trade. As used in this paragraph, restraint of trade includes, but is not limited to, any actions, measures, or acts included or cognizable under Section 16720, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons.
(2)To monopolize or monopsonize, to attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, to maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Any of the following may constitute evidence of a violation of Section 16731, but establishing liability shall not require a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the following:
(a)The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct.
(b)The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons.
(c)The defendants price for a product or service was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law.
(d)The defendants conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition.
(e)The conducts risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence.
(f)In a case where a defendants business is a multisided platform, the defendants conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform.
(g)In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.
(h)The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant.
(i)A single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code.
(j)A definition of relevant market where there is direct evidence of market power.
SEC. 4.Section 16733 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16733.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)The purpose of this section and Sections 16731 and 16732 is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition, which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
(b)Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers freedom to choose employment.
(c)The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920). The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195). Further, California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery, use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing, recognition of broader harms and per se conduct, lower actionable market shares, structured rule of reason analysis, and differing burdens of proof.
(d)Federal case law on the subject of this article is not binding on California state courts, but courts may consider federal case law as persuasive authority to the extent they find it consistent with California law, including this section.
(e)California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
SEC. 2.Section 16731 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16731.(a)It is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that are either of the following:
(1)In restraint of trade. As used in this paragraph, restraint of trade includes, but is not limited to, any actions, measures, or acts included or cognizable under Section 16720, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons.
(2)To monopolize or monopsonize, to attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, to maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
(b)Anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market.
SEC. 3.Section 16732 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16732.Any of the following may constitute evidence of a violation of Section 16731, but establishing liability shall not require a finding, including, but not limited to, of any of the following:
(a)The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct.
(b)The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons.
(c)The defendants price for a product or service was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law.
(d)The defendants conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition.
(e)The conducts risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence.
(f)In a case where a defendants business is a multisided platform, the defendants conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform.
(g)In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.
(h)The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant.
(i)A single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code.
(j)A definition of relevant market where there is direct evidence of market power.
SEC. 4.Section 16733 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16733.Courts shall liberally interpret Californias antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758).
SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SECTION 1.Section 16720 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:16720.A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by one or more persons for any of the following purposes:(a)To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.(b)To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.(c)To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.(d)To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State.(e)To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any or any combination of any of the following:(1)Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.(2)Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.(3)Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.(4)Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two one or more persons for any of the following purposes:
(a)To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
(b)To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
(c)To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
(d)To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State.
(e)To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any or any combination of any of the following:
(1)Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
(2)Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
(3)Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
(4)Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 30, 2026 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 826, Statutes of 2026. |
| Sep 30, 2026 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 10, 2026 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3 p.m. |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 60. Noes 16. Page 6900.). |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 60. Noes 16.). |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 30, 2026 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 30, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 30. Noes 9.). |
| Aug 28, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 27, 2026 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Aug 17, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 13, 2026 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Aug 13, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (August 13). |
| Aug 10, 2026 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Aug 3, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 22, 2026 | In committee: Hearing postponed by committee. |
| Jul 1, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 2.) (June 30). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 22, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 16, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 10, 2026 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| May 28, 2026 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 27, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 44. Noes 17. Page 5461.) |
| May 27, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 44. Noes 17.) |
| May 27, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 18, 2026 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to third reading. (Page 5141.) |
| May 18, 2026 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 18, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 14, 2026 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 11. Noes 4.) (May 14). |
| Apr 29, 2026 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 13, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 9, 2026 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 8, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 3.) (April 7). |
| Mar 24, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Mar 23, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Feb 23, 2026 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 10, 2026 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 12. |
| Feb 9, 2026 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 30, 2026 | AB 1776 Aguiar-Curry Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 30, 2026 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB1776 Aguiar-Curry et al. By Ashby | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 13, 2026 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 10, 2026 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 30, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| May 27, 2026 | AB 1776 Aguiar-Curry Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 14, 2026 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 7, 2026 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| AAPIs for Civic Empowerment | ** Support | |
| ACT/Association for Competitive Technology | ** Against | |
| Advanced Medical Technologies Association | ** Against | |
| Advance SF | ** Against | |
| AFCSME | ** Support | |
| AFM Local 7 | ** Support | |
| African American Farmers of California | ** Against | |
| Airlines for America | ** Against | |
| Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment Action | ** Support | |
| Amalgamated Transit Union | ** Support | |
| American Economic Liberties Project | ** Support | |
| American Investment Council | ** Against | |
| American Property Casualty Insurance Association | ** Against | |
| Animal Health Institute | ** Against | |
| Associated General Contractors – California | ** Against | |
| Associated General Contractors – San Diego | ** Against | |
| Associated General Contractors San Diego | ** Against | |
| Association for Competitive Technology | ** Against | |
| ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN EMPLOYEES | ** Against | |
| Athens Services | ** Against | |
| Axis Advocacy | ** Against | |
| Bay Area Council | ** Against | |
| Beverly Hills Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Biocom | ** Against | |
| Biomarker Collaborative | ** Against | |
| Biotechnology Innovation Organization | ** Against | |
| Bleeding Disorders Council of California | ** Against | |
| Brea Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Building Owners and Managers Association of California | ** Against | |
| BuildIT | ** Against | |
| CalAsian Pacific Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California Alliance For Retired Americans | ** Support | |
| California Apartment Association | ** Against | |
| California Assisted Living Association | ** Against | |
| California Association For Microenterprise Opportunity | ** Support | |
| California Association Of Realtors | ** Against | |
| California Attractions And Parks Association | ** Against | |
| California Bankers Association | ** Against | |
| California Beer and Beverage Distributors | ** Against | |
| California Broadband & Video Association | ** Against | |
| California Broadcasters Association | ** Against | |
| California Building Industry Association | ** Against | |
| California Business Properties Association | ** Against | |
| California Chronic Care Coalition | ** Against | |
| California Clinical Laboratory Association | ** Against | |
| California Construction And Industrial Materials Association | ** Against | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | |
| California Farm Bureau | ** Against | |
| California Federation of Labor Unions | ** Support | |
| California Food and Farming Network | ** Support | |
| California Food Producers | ** Against | |
| California Forestry Association | ** Against | |
| California Fresh Fruit Association | ** Against | |
| California Fuels And Convenience Alliance | ** Against | |
| California Grocers Association | ** Against | |
| California Hispanic Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California Hospital Association | ** Against | |
| California Hotel + Lodging Association | ** Against | |
| California Kidney Care Alliance | ** Against | |
| California Land and Title Association | ** Against | |
| California Law Revision Commission | ** Support | |
| California Life Sciences | ** Against | |
| California Low-Income Consumer Coalition | ** Support | |
| California Manufacturers And Technology Association | ** Against | |
| California Nurses Association | ** Support | |
| California Professional Firefighters | ** Support | |
| California Public Banking Alliance | ** Support | |
| California Restaurant Association | ** Against | |
| California Retailers Association | ** Against | |
| California School Employees Association AFL-CIO | ** Support | |
| California’s Credit Union | ** Against | |
| California's Credit Unions | ** Against | |
| California Strawberry Commission | ** Against | |
| California Taxpayers Association | ** Against | |
| California Trucking Association | ** Against | |
| California Walnut Commission | ** Against | |
| California Waste Haulers Council (unless amended) | ** Against | |
| California Work & Family Coalition | ** Support | |
| CALinnovates | ** Against | |
| CAMEO Network | ** Support | |
| CA Rare Disease Access Coalition | ** Against | |
| Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Center for Responsible Lending | ** Support | |
| Central Valley Business Federation | ** Against | |
| Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Chamber Of Progress | ** Against | |
| Chamber San Mateo County | ** Against | |
| Chino Valley Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Chronic Disease Coalition | ** Against | |
| Citrus Heights Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Civil Justice Association Of California | ** Against | |
| Colusa County Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Communication Workers of America District 9 | ** Support | |
| Computer & Communications Industry Association | ** Against | |
| Connected Commerce Council | ** Against | |
| Consumer Attorneys Of California | ** Support | |
| Consumer Brands Association | ** Against | |
| Consumer Federation Of California | ** Support | |
| Consumers For Auto Reliability And Safety | ** Support | |
| Consumer Technology Association | ** Against | |
| Consumer Watchdog | ** Support | |
| Corona Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Courage California | ** Support | |
| CTIA | ** Against | |
| Cystic Fibrosis Research Institute | ** Against | |
| Dairy Institute Council | ** Against | |
| Davita | ** Against | |
| Da Vita Healthcare Partners INC. | ** Against | |
| Developers Alliance | ** Against | |
| Distilled Media | ** Against | |
| Economic Security Action | ** Support | |
| Electronic Frontier Foundation | ** Support | |
| Elevate California | ** Against | |
| End Poverty in California | ** Support | |
| Engine | ** Against | |
| Engineers & Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20 | ** Support | |
| Equal Rights Advocates | ** Support | |
| Exon 20 Group | ** Against | |
| Family Business Association | ** Against | |
| Fan Alliance | ** Support | |
| Fontana Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Fremont Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Future of Music Coalition | ** Support | |
| Greater Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Greater Coachella Valley Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Greater Conejo Valley Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Greater High Desert Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Greater Ontario Business Council | ** Against | |
| Greater Riverside Chambers of Commerce | ** Against | |
| health access ca | ** Support | |
| hispanic chambers of commerce san francisco | ** Against | |
| Hmong Innovating Politics | ** Support | |
| hollywood chamber of commerce | ** Against | |
| Housing Contractors Of California | ** Against | |
| ICAN | ** Against | |
| Indivisible Ca: Statestrong | ** Support | |
| Institute for Local Self-Reliance | ** Support | |
| international alliance of theatrical stage employees, local 80 | ** Support | |
| International Association of Mechanists and Aerospace Workers | ** Support | |
| International Franchise Association | ** Against | |
| Internet Accountability Project | ** Support | |
| Kapor Center Advocacy | ** Support | |
| LA Canada Flintridge Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Laguna Niguel Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Latino Prosperity | ** Support | |
| Lodi Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Los Altos Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Los Angeles Area Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Los Angeles County Business Federation | ** Against | |
| Met Crusaders | ** Against | |
| Mission Viejo Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Motion Picture Association | ** Against | |
| Mountain View Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| MRG1 Energizers | ** Against | |
| Murrieta Wildomar Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies | ** Against | |
| NetChoice | ** Against | |
| Neuropathy Action Foundation | ** Against | |
| Nisei Farmers League | ** Against | |
| North San Diego Business Chamber | ** Against | |
| North San Diego Business Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| OC Action | ** Support | |
| Oceanside Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Office of Kat Taylor | ** Support | |
| Omidyar Network | ** Support | |
| Open Markets Institute | ** Support | |
| Orange County Business Council | ** Against | |
| PDL1 Amplifieds | ** Against | |
| Personal Insurance Federation Of California | ** Against | |
| Privacy Defense Alliance | ** Support | |
| Propel San Francisco | ** Support | |
| Protect Borrowers | ** Support | |
| Proton | ** Support | |
| Rancho Cucamonga Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Recording Industry Association Of America | ** Against | |
| Responsible Online Commerce Coalition | ** Support | |
| Rise Economy | ** Support | |
| Sacramento Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| San Deigo Regional Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| San Diego Regional Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| San Francisco Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| San Jose Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| San Juan Capistrano Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| San Mateo County Economic Development Association | ** Against | |
| Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Santa Barbara South Coast Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Santa Clarita Valley Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Santa Maria Valley Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| SEIU California | ** Support | |
| Self Storage Association | ** Against | |
| sf.citi | ** Against | |
| Silicon Valley Leadership Group | ** Against | |
| Small Business Forward | ** Support | |
| Small Business Majority | ** Support | |
| SMART – Transit Division | ** Support | |
| SMART - Transportation Division | ** Support | |
| Software & Information Industry Association | ** Against | |
| Southwest California Legislative Council | ** Against | |
| Storybooth | ** Against | |
| StreamStakes | ** Against | |
| Teamsters California | ** Support | |
| Techequity Action | ** Support | |
| Technet | ** Against | |
| Technology Industry Association of California | ** Against | |
| Tech Oversight California | ** Support | |
| Temecula Valley Chamber Alliance | ** Against | |
| Temecula Valley Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| The Greenlining Institute | ** Support | |
| Torrance Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Tri County Chamber Alliance | ** Against | |
| Tulare Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| UFCW Western States Council | ** Support | |
| Union Of Concerned Scientists | ** Support | |
| United Domestic Workers – AFSCME Local 3930 | ** Support | |
| United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930 | ** Support | |
| United Food And Commercial Workers, Western States Council | ** Support | |
| Upland Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| VALLEY INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE ASSOCIATION | ** Against | |
| Warehouse Worker Resource Center | ** Support | |
| Wellbeing Economy Alliance California | ** Support | |
| western center on law & poverty | ** Support | |
| Western Growers Association | ** Against | |
| Western Plant Health Association | ** Against | |
| Western Wood Preservers Institute | ** Against | |
| West Ventura County Business Alliance | ** Against | |
| Writers Guild of American West | ** Support | |
| Writers Guild Of America West | ** Support | |
| Yorba Linda Chamber of Commerce | ** Against |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1776
Author:(Aguiar-Curry)
As Amended Ver:August 27, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Adopts the California Law Revision Commission's recommended updates to the Cartwright Act to address single firm anticompetitive conduct.
Major Provisions
- Provides that it is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
- Requires courts when adjudicating a suit brought pursuant to this bill to use the guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116.
- Requires a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this bill to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
- Exempts from the provisions of this bill any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years before the filing of the complaint.
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California's antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors ″maximizing″ effective deterrence of antitrust violations in accordance with Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.
- Exempts conduct when subject to an exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit authorized by state law that is granted and supervised by a local governmental agency.
- Exempts conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law.
- Limits enforcement of the bill to the Attorney General or a district attorney.
- Clarifies that claims brought under this bill does not serve as a predicate to a claim Unfair Competition Law except as specific.
- Makes various findings and declarations.
Senate Amendments
- Narrow enforcement of the bill to the Attorney General or a district attorney.
- Limit the scope of the bill to attempts to monopolize or monopsonize a part of trade or commerce.
- Adopt several exemptions to the bill's prohibitions for conduct authorized or required by government entities.
COMMENTS
Since 1990, economists note that over 75 percent of industries in the United States have experienced significant market concentration. (Luke Hinrichs, Freedom from Domination: A Revival of Antitrust Law and the Will to Choose Democracy, The Flaw (Sept. 6, 2022) available at: https://theflaw.org/articles/freedom-from-domination-a-revival-of-antitrust-law-and-the-will-to-choose-democracy/.) Seeking to protect consumers from increased market consolidation, in 2022, the Legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with studying if updates to the state's one hundred year antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, were necessary. (ACR 95 (Wick & Cunningham) Res. Chap. 147, Stats. 2022.) Of note, because the Cartwright Act generally focuses on market collusion and the conduct of multiple firms, the Commission was asked to study how to combat anticompetitive behavior by a single firm or actor.
In January of this year, the Law Revision Commission released its proposal to reform the Cartwright Act to address single firm conduct. This bill would enact those recommendations.
This bill enacts portions of the California Law Revision Commission's recommendations on regulating single-firm anticompetitive behavior. The bill adopts a series of findings regarding the need to police predatory anticompetitive behavior by single firms. The findings also reiterate California's decades old case law that holds that ″the Cartwright Act is 'broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act″ (Cianci v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 920) and that the Cartwright Act is not directly modeled after the Sherman Act. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195.)
Secondly the bill enacts the actual prohibition on anticompetitive behavior that is, largely, modeled after Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This prohibition, in essence, states that it is unlawful for one or more persons to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, an industry. The bill then explicitly prohibits a court excusing anticompetitive behavior in one market simply because that behavior may have boosted competition in another. The bill limits enforcement of these prohibitions to the Attorney General or district attorneys.
Finally, the bill codifies existing state caselaw that requires California courts to liberally interpret California's antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors ″maximizing″ effective deterrence of antitrust violations. (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.)
According to the Author
AB 1776 promotes a fair, competitive economy by strengthening California's antitrust law to reflect modern market realities. Competition drives innovation, lowers prices, raises wages, and expands opportunity for consumers, workers, and small businesses. California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, was enacted in 1907 and does not clearly address anti-competitive conduct by a single dominant company. As markets have consolidated, this gap has allowed companies to stifle competition, limit consumer choice, and suppress wages without clear accountability under state law.
In 2022, the legislature unanimously passed ACR 95 (Cunningham and Wicks), a bipartisan resolution recognizing that the Cartwright Act ″does not apply to monopoly conduct of single powerful companies″ and directing the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) to study updates. AB 1776 implements the CLRC's unanimous recommendations on single firm conduct. The Cartwright Act currently outlaws anti-competitive behavior by two or more companies and AB 1776 ensures this conduct by a single company is also illegal. The bill clarifies that California courts may consider federal antitrust precedent but are not bound by it, and that federal law does not preempt state law, consistent with longstanding principles.
By closing these gaps, AB 1776 aligns California with most other states and federal statutes that outlaw single-company anti-competitive conduct, reduces legal uncertainty, and strengthens the state's ability to protect competition. The bill does not prohibit business growth or monopolies—it targets anti-competitive conduct that harms consumers, workers, and small businesses and exacerbates California's affordability challenges.
Arguments in Support
This bill is supported by a coalition of consumer advocates, labor organizations, and small business trade organizations. In support of the measure a coalition of some of the state's largest labor organizations write:
California is the nation's wealthiest state and the fourth largest economy in the world, yet ranks 48th in the nation in terms of income inequality. 70% of Californians believe that the gap between the rich and poor is widening, and a similar share think the state government should do more to reduce the gap.
Corporate concentration indisputably contributes to these harmful trends. Across healthcare, technology, food and agriculture, entertainment, and consumer retail, market concentration has led to wage suppression, price inflation, and reduced opportunities for business growth. Since the 1990s, consolidation has affected roughly 75% of all U.S. industries, leaving in its wake fewer small businesses, weaker unions, job insecurity, and exploding income inequality.
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the ″Chicago School″ de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
Following an expansive three-year review of California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) – California's most prestigious nonjudicial legal body – made two key findings: First, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit illegal monopolization or unilateral, ″single firm″ anticompetitive conduct. Second, directly mirroring federal antitrust law would be both inconsistent with current California law and effectively import federal jurisprudence that has diluted the federal law's original scope and strength, limiting the effectiveness of state antitrust enforcement.4 The COMPETE Act, which is a verbatim codification of the CLRC's final unanimous recommendation, fixes this by allowing illegal monopolization claims to be brought in state court pursuant to California antitrust cases rooted in a century of law.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, non-partisan approach to reinvigorating competition.
Arguments in Opposition
A coalition of business trade groups, led by the Chamber of Commerce, opposes this measure. They write:
These uncertainty concerns are compounded by the bill's instruction to courts that well established and longstanding federal standards for evaluating business practices, designed to distinguish between lawful and unlawful competition are not required under California law. For example, AB 1776 rejects the economic and legal principles that assist courts in distinguishing between unlawful, below˗cost pricing and lawful price cutting, calling into question business’s ability to offer low prices aimed at gaining customers, which is one of the most frequently used competitive strategies, particularly among small businesses and new entrants. The bill also nullifies the commonsense rule created by the U.S. Supreme Court that a company generally has no duty to assist its rivals and a monopolist only has to do so in unique situations, potentially creating a California standard under which competitors are compelled to assist one another, rather than compete with one another.
Similarly, in a transparent effort to elevate business interests over consumers, the bill states that plaintiffs suing under AB 1776 need not show that ″[t]he rivals whose ability to compete has been reduced are as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant,″ thereby safeguarding the business of less efficient competitors. AB 1776 likewise disavows the notion that, in two-sided markets, courts should evaluate the competitive effects on both sides of the market, thereby ignoring the economic reality that consumers, on one side of a dual-sided market, often benefit from conduct that may harm competitors, on the other side of the market, and flipping on its head the ″consumer welfare standard″ that has guided courts and antitrust policy for decades. In another troubling and significant dismissal of federal law, AB 1776 states that ″one or more″ persons may be held liable for monopolization, whereas federal courts and economists have always recognized that monopolization – as the name implies – is the complete domination of a market by a single competitor.
AB 1776's disavowal of these guiding, federal standards will not only increase litigation and costs but leaves California courts with little guidance on how to deal with these complex issues. The bill's rejection of federal law is even more troubling given the California Supreme Court's repeated explanation that federal antitrust case law is ″helpful″ in interpreting the Cartwright Act. State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice if the Attorney General (AG) brings civil actions for violations of the Cartwright Act. Monopolization is only available under the federal Sherman Act. If the AG pursues monopolization under the Cartwright Act in state court, costs could be higher. (Unfair Competition Law Fund, Attorney General Antitrust Account).
Cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts. Actual costs will depend on the number of new actions created by this bill and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. Complex cases, an action is provisionally a complex case if it involves antitrust or trade regulations claims, are more time consuming. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026–27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Kalra, Lee, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
NO: Macedo, Dixon, Sanchez
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-4-0
YES: Wicks, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache
NO: Hoover, Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 44-17-19
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Pellerin, Quirk-Silva, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Stefani, Ward, Wicks, Zbur, Rivas
NO: Ávila Farías, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Johnson, Lackey, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis
ABS, ABST OR NV: Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Castillo, Chen, Gallagher, Gipson, Irwin, Nguyen, Patel, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Soria, Valencia, Wilson
UPDATED
VERSION: August 27, 2026
CONSULTANT: Nicholas Liedtke / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0004438
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1776 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1776
Author: Aguiar-Curry (D), et al.
Amended: 8/27/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 9-2, 6/30/26
AYES: Allen, Ashby, Durazo, Laird, Reyes, Stern, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NOES: Niello, Valladares
NO VOTE RECORDED: Umberg, Caballero
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/13/26
AYES: Cervantes, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NOES: Seyarto, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 44-17, 5/27/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
SOURCE: American Economic Liberties Project
California Federation of Labor Unions
California Nurses Association
Consumer Federation of California
Economic Security Action
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
SEIU California
Small Business Majority
Teamsters California
TechEquity Action
UFCW Western States Council
United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council
Writers Guild of American West
DIGEST:
This bill adds, to the Cartwright Act, a prohibition on engaging in monopolistic or monopsonistic conduct, as specified; a violation of this measure’s provisions can be enforced only through an action brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
Senate Floor amendments of 8/27/26 add co-authors; remove certain Legislative findings and declarations; and provide guidance regarding the cause of action created by this bill and the nature of trial proceedings in such an action.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1-7.)
- Prohibits, under the Sherman Act:
- Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- The monopolization, or attempt to monopolize, or combination or conspiracy with any other persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the states, or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 2.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Business & Professions (Bus. & Prof.) Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for specified purposes, including restricting trade or commerce or preventing competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- The state and its political subdivisions and public agencies are “persons” for the purpose of 7).
- The Attorney General or a district attorney may file a suit for damages on behalf of a state or county political subdivision, respectively. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that, in any civil action for a violation of the Cartwright Act brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney, a civil penalty of not more than $1 million shall be assessed, as determined by a court or jury based on specified enumerated factors. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755.1.)
This bill:
- Adds the provisions set forth below to the Cartwright Act.
- Makes findings and declarations relating to the history of the Cartwright Act and the Legislature’s intent for the interpretation of the Cartwright Act.
- Provides that it is unlawful for every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
- Requires a court adjudicating a claim brought under 3) to use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146-147.
- Requires a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to 3) to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove, substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
- Provides that 3) does not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of $10 million or less over the three years before the filing of the complaint.
- Provides that 3) does not prevent, limit, or prohibit either of the following:
- An exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit authorized by state law that is granted and supervised by a local governmental agency, as defined, or impose any liability on any person or entity acting within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
- Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
- Provides that 3) does not impose any liability on a person or entity for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits listed in 7).
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California’s antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors “maximizing” effective deterrence of antitrust violations.
- Provides that an action for a violation of this measure may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney, subject to all of the following:
- Except in an action brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney, an alleged violation of this measure shall not serve as a predicate violation under the Unfair Competition Law.
- The limitation on the scope of the cause of action does not apply to, create, or extinguish a defense to, or limit the scope of, an action that is not brought under the new section created by this bill.
- Specified sections of the Cartwright Act, which address the pleading and proving of alleged trusts or combinations, do not apply to claims for monopolization or monopsonization unless the claims allege that a person combined or conspired with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
- An action brought pursuant to, or under, this measure is deemed a complex case, as defined.
Comments
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits “trusts,” or combinations of two or more persons, to restrain trade or commerce. Unlike the federal Sherman Antitrust Act, the Cartwright Act does not also prohibit conduct by a single company in restraint of trade, which generally occurs when one corporation has monopolistic or monopolistic market power and can impose anticompetitive measures on the market and on consumers.
In response to increasing corporate concentration across a host of industries, the Legislature enacted ACR 95 (Wicks & Cunningham (Resolution Chapter 147, Statutes of 2022)), which tasked the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) with studying potential reforms to the Cartwright Act, the state’s antitrust law. This year, after three years of extensive work, the CLRC released its recommendations for amending the law to address anticompetitive behavior by a single firm.
This bill adopts the CLRC’s recommendation to add a single-firm conduct prohibition to the Cartwright Act, with language that mirrors the prohibition on monopolization in the federal Sherman Act. This bill also adds statutory guidance to courts on how to interpret Cartwright Act claims, including the single-firm conduct provision, and on when and how to rely on potentially analogous Sherman Act case law. An action to enforce this bill’s provisions may be brought only by the Attorney General or a district attorney; when the action is a civil action, the case must be automatically designated as a complex case under existing law. Recent floor amendments remove certain findings and declarations; remove language relating to the court’s analysis of procompetitive and anticompetitive justifications, which was duplicative of existing case law (see, e.g., Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 381, 400); and provide guidance for how the bill’s new section within the Cartwright Act should interact with existing Cartwright Act provisions and other state laws.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the fiscal effect is:
Potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice if the Attorney General (AG) brings civil actions for violations of the Cartwright Act. Monopolization is only available under the federal Sherman Act. If the AG pursues monopolization under the Cartwright Act in state court, costs could be higher. (Unfair Competition Law Fund, Attorney General Antitrust Account).
Cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts. Actual costs will depend on the number of new actions created by this bill and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. Complex cases, an action is provisionally a complex case if it involves antitrust or trade regulations claims, are more time consuming. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026–27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/26/26)
American Economic Liberties Project (co-source)
California Federation of Labor Unions (co-source)
California Nurses Association (co-source)
Consumer Federation of California (co-source)
Economic Security Action (co-source)
Institute for Local Self-Reliance (co-source)
SEIU California (co-source)
Small Business Majority (co-source)
Teamsters California (co-source)
TechEquity Action (co-source)
UFCW Western States Council (co-source)
United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930 (co-source)
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council (co-source)
Writers Guild of American West (co-source)
AAPIs for Civic Empowerment
AFCSME
AFM Local 7
Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment Action
Amalgamated Transit Union
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California District Attorneys Association
California Food and Farming Network
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Professional Firefighters
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association AFL-CIO
California Work & Family Coalition
CAMEO Network
Communication Workers of America District 9
Consumer Attorneys of California
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
Courage California
Electronic Frontier Foundation
End Poverty in California
Engineers & Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20
Equal Rights Advocates
Fan Alliance
Future of Music Coalition
Health Access CA
Hmong Innovating Politics
Indivisible CA: StateStrong
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Local 80
International Association of Mechanists and Aerospace Workers
Kapor Center Advocacy
Latino Prosperity
OC Action
Office of Kat Taylor
Omidyar Network
Open Markets Institute
Privacy Defense Alliance
Propel San Francisco
Protect Borrowers
Proton
Responsible Online Commerce Coalition
Rise Economy
Small Business Forward
SMART – Transit Division
The Greenlining Institute
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Union of Concerned Scientists
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Wellbeing Economy Alliance California
Western Center on Law & Poverty
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/26/26)
ACT/Association for Competitive Technology
Advance SF
Advanced Medical Technologies Association
African American Farmers of California
Airlines for America
American Investment Council
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
Animal Health Institute
Associated General Contractors – California
Associated General Contractors – San Diego
Association for Competitive Technology
Association of Western Employees
Athens Services
Axis Advocacy
Bay Area Council
Beverly Hills Chamber of Commerce
Biocom
Biomarker Collaborative
Biotechnology Innovation Organization
Bleeding Disorders Council of California
Brea Chamber of Commerce
Building Owners and Managers Association of California
BuildIT
CA Rare Disease Access Coalition
CalAsian Pacific Chamber of Commerce
California Apartment Association
California Assisted Living Association
California Association of Realtors
California Attractions and Parks Association
California Bankers Association
California Beer and Beverage Distributors
California Broadband & Video Association
California Broadcasters Association
California Building Industry Association
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Chronic Care Coalition
California Clinical Laboratory Association
California Construction and Industrial Materials Association
California Farm Bureau
California Food Producers
California Forestry Association
California Fresh Fruit Association
California Fuels and Convenience Alliance
California Grocers Association
California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
California Hospital Association
California Hotel + Lodging Association
California Kidney Care Alliance
California Land and Title Association
California Life Sciences
California Manufacturers and Technology Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
California Strawberry Commission
California Taxpayers Association
California Trucking Association
California Walnut Commission
California’s Credit Union
CALinnovates
Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce
Central Valley Business Federation
Chamber San Mateo County
Chino Valley Chamber of Commerce
Chronic Disease Coalition
Citrus Heights Chamber of Commerce
Civil Justice Association of California
Colusa County Chamber of Commerce
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Connected Commerce Council
Consumer Brands Association
Consumer Technology Association
Corona Chamber of Commerce
CTIA
Cystic Fibrosis Research Institute
Dairy Institute Council
DaVita
Developers Alliance
Distilled Media
Elevate California
Exon 20 Group
Family Business Association
Fontana Chamber of Commerce
Fremont Chamber of Commerce
Greater Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce
Greater Coachella Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater Conejo Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater High Desert Chamber of Commerce
Greater Ontario Business Council
Greater Riverside Chambers of Commerce
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce San Francisco
Hollywood Chamber of Commerce
Housing Contractors of California
ICAN
International Franchise Association
La Cañada Flintridge Chamber of Commerce
Laguna Niguel Chamber of Commerce
Lodi Chamber of Commerce
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Altos Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles County Business Federation
MET Crusaders
Mission Viejo Chamber of Commerce
Motion Picture Association
Mountain View Chamber of Commerce
MRG1 Energizers
Murrieta Wildomar Chamber of Commerce
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
NetChoice
Neuropathy Action Foundation
Nisei Farmers League
North San Diego Business Chamber
Oceanside Chamber of Commerce
Orange County Business Council
PDL1 Amplifieds
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Rancho Cucamonga Chamber of Commerce
Recording Industry Association of America
Sacramento Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
San José Chamber of Commerce
San Juan Capistrano Chamber of Commerce
San Mateo County Economic Development Association
Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce
Santa Barbara South Coast Chamber of Commerce
Santa Clarita Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Maria Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce
Self Storage Association
sf.citi
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Software & Information Industry Association
Southwest California Legislative Council
Storybooth
StreamStakes
Technology Industry Association of California
TechNet
Temecula Valley Chamber of Commerce
Torrance Chamber of Commerce
Tri County Chamber Alliance
Tulare Chamber of Commerce
Upland Chamber of Commerce
Valley Industry and Commerce Association
West Ventura County Business Alliance
Western Growers Association
Western Plant Health Association
Western Wood Preservers Institute
Yorba Linda Chamber of Commerce
Two individuals
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to a coalition of labor organizations, consumer protection groups, and small business advocates:
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the “Chicago School” de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, nonpartisan approach to reinvigorating competition. The CLRC’s study was initiated in 2022 by bipartisan resolution ACR 95 (Wicks, Cunningham). The CLRC’s Single Firm Conduct Working Group Report, upon which the COMPETE Act is based, was written by legal experts and economics professors, government officials, and attorneys who have defended Fortune 500 companies in antitrust litigation.6 The study, which included 17 public hearings, elicited over 110 letters from trade groups, businesses, advocacy organizations, and members of the public.7 When presented with an option to codify an “abuse of dominance” standard, the CLRC instead proposed codifying California jurisprudence that is well understood by businesses and antitrust experts.8 What emerges is a modest, pro-business proposal to promote competition, affordability, and fair labor standards.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to a coalition of this bill’s opponents, including the California Chamber of Commerce:
AB 1776 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize, just like Section 2 of the federal Sherman Act. Not surprisingly, under federal law, these kinds of monopolization claims require the possession of “monopoly power” or at least a dangerous probability of obtaining such monopoly power. AB 1776, however, creates a new standard that merely requires that a single-firm possess “substantial market power.” Not only is this a standard that federal and California courts have not applied to single-firm conduct, it is a standard that does not fit with the type of monopolization offenses created by this bill and one that presumably creates a threshold lower than that under federal law.
While this may seem like a small tweak to a term of art, it is a massive departure from existing law that will result in two serious problems. First, it will expose businesses that would be entirely beyond the reach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to monopolization claims even though they do not possess the type of monopoly power that allow monopolists to dominate markets. Second, it will generate satellite litigation over the meaning of “substantial,” as courts, juries, and competing experts spend years in expensive litigation arguing about where “market power” ends and “substantial market power” begins—a line that does not exist in federal law because federal law never adopted this standard.
Uncertainty like this chills competition and innovation, it discourages investment and it leads to increased litigation and increased costs for California businesses and consumers. If AB 1776 is intended to outlaw monopolization, it should do just that, not some ill-defined category of conduct that falls short of monopolization.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 44-17, 5/27/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Pellerin, Quirk-Silva, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Stefani, Ward, Wicks, Zbur, Rivas
NOES: Ávila Farías, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Johnson, Lackey, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis
NO VOTE RECORDED: Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Castillo, Chen, Gallagher, Gipson, Irwin, Nguyen, Patel, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Soria, Valencia, Wilson
Prepared by: Allison Whitt Meredith / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
8/28/26 11:28:46
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1776 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1776
Author: Aguiar-Curry (D), et al.
Amended: 8/13/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 9-2, 6/30/26
AYES: Allen, Ashby, Durazo, Laird, Reyes, Stern, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NOES: Niello, Valladares
NO VOTE RECORDED: Umberg, Caballero
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/13/26
AYES: Cervantes, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NOES: Seyarto, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 44-17, 5/27/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
SOURCE: American Economic Liberties Project
California Federation of Labor Unions
California Nurses Association
Consumer Federation of California
Economic Security Action
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
SEIU California
Small Business Majority
Teamsters California
TechEquity Action
UFCW Western States Council
United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council
Writers Guild of American West
DIGEST:
This bill adds, to the Cartwright Act, a prohibition on engaging in monopolistic or monopsonistic conduct, as specified; a violation of this measure’s provisions can be enforced only through an action brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1-7.)
- Prohibits, under the Sherman Act:
- Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- The monopolization, or attempt to monopolize, or combination or conspiracy with any other persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the states, or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 2.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Business & Professions (Bus. & Prof.) Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for specified purposes, including restricting trade or commerce or preventing competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- The state and its political subdivisions and public agencies are “persons” for the purpose of 7).
- The Attorney General or a district attorney may file a suit for damages on behalf of a state or county political subdivision, respectively. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that, in any civil action for a violation of the Cartwright Act brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney, a civil penalty of not more than $1 million shall be assessed, as determined by a court or jury based on specified enumerated factors. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755.1.)
This bill:
- Adds the provisions set forth below to the Cartwright Act.
- Makes findings and declarations relating to the history of the Cartwright Act and the Legislature’s intent for the interpretation of the Cartwright Act.
- Provides that it is unlawful for every person to monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
- Provides that, for purposes of 3), procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market as the conduct that is alleged to be unlawful.
- Requires a court adjudicating a claim brought under 3) to use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146-147.
- Requires a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to 3) to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove, substantial market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
- Provides that 3) does not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of $10 million or less over the three years before the filing of the complaint.
- Provides that 3) does not prevent, limit, or prohibit either of the following:
- An exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit authorized by state law that is granted and supervised by a local governmental agency, as defined, or impose any liability on any person or entity acting within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
- Conduct required or authorized pursuant to state or federal law that is granted and supervised by a local, state, or federal governmental agency.
- Provides that 3) does not impose any liability on a person or entity for conduct within the scope of authority granted by one or more exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits listed in 8).
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California’s antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors “maximizing” effective deterrence of antitrust violations.
- Provides that an action for a violation of this measure may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney, and that an action brought pursuant to, or under, this measure is deemed a complex case, as defined in the California Rules of Court.
Comments
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits “trusts,” or combinations of two or more persons, to restrain trade or commerce. Unlike the federal Sherman Antitrust Act, the Cartwright Act does not also prohibit conduct by a single company in restraint of trade, which generally occurs when one corporation has monopolistic or monopolistic market power and can impose anticompetitive measures on the market and on consumers.
In response to increasing corporate concentration across a host of industries, the Legislature enacted ACR 95 (Wicks & Cunningham (Resolution Chapter 147, Statutes of 2022)), which tasked the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) with studying potential reforms to the Cartwright Act, the state’s antitrust law. This year, after three years of extensive work, the CLRC released its recommendations for amending the law to address anticompetitive behavior by a single firm.
This bill adopts the CLRC’s recommendation to add a single-firm conduct prohibition to the Cartwright Act, with language that mirrors the prohibition on monopolization in the federal Sherman Act. This bill also adds statutory guidance to courts on how to interpret Cartwright Act claims, including the single-firm conduct provision, and on when and how to rely on potentially analogous Sherman Act case law. An action to enforce the bill’s provisions may be brought only by the Attorney General or a district attorney; when the action is a civil action, the case must be automatically designated as a complex case under existing procedures in the California Rules of Court.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the fiscal effect is:
Potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice if the Attorney General (AG) brings civil actions for violations of the Cartwright Act. Monopolization is only available under the federal Sherman Act. If the AG pursues monopolization under the Cartwright Act in state court, costs could be higher. (Unfair Competition Law Fund, Attorney General Antitrust Account).
Cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts. Actual costs will depend on the number of new actions created by this bill and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. Complex cases, an action is provisionally a complex case if it involves antitrust or trade regulations claims, are more time consuming. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026–27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/14/26)
American Economic Liberties Project (co-source)
California Federation of Labor Unions (co-source)
California Nurses Association (co-source)
Consumer Federation of California (co-source)
Economic Security Action (co-source)
Institute for Local Self-Reliance (co-source)
SEIU California (co-source)
Small Business Majority (co-source)
Teamsters California (co-source)
TechEquity Action (co-source)
UFCW Western States Council (co-source)
United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930 (co-source)
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council (co-source)
Writers Guild of American West (co-source)
AAPIs for Civic Empowerment
AFCSME
AFM Local 7
Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment Action
Amalgamated Transit Union
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California District Attorneys Association
California Food and Farming Network
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Professional Firefighters
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association AFL-CIO
California Work & Family Coalition
CAMEO Network
Communication Workers of America District 9
Consumer Attorneys of California
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
Courage California
Electronic Frontier Foundation
End Poverty in California
Engineers & Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20
Equal Rights Advocates
Fan Alliance
Future of Music Coalition
Health Access CA
Hmong Innovating Politics
Indivisible CA: StateStrong
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Local 80
International Association of Mechanists and Aerospace Workers
Kapor Center Advocacy
Latino Prosperity
OC Action
Office of Kat Taylor
Omidyar Network
Open Markets Institute
Privacy Defense Alliance
Propel San Francisco
Protect Borrowers
Proton
Responsible Online Commerce Coalition
Rise Economy
Small Business Forward
SMART – Transit Division
The Greenlining Institute
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Union of Concerned Scientists
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Wellbeing Economy Alliance California
Western Center on Law & Poverty
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/14/26)
ACT/Association for Competitive Technology
Advance SF
Advanced Medical Technologies Association
African American Farmers of California
Airlines for America
American Investment Council
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
Animal Health Institute
Associated General Contractors – California
Associated General Contractors – San Diego
Association for Competitive Technology
Association of Western Employees
Athens Services
Axis Advocacy
Bay Area Council
Beverly Hills Chamber of Commerce
Biocom
Biomarker Collaborative
Biotechnology Innovation Organization
Bleeding Disorders Council of California
Brea Chamber of Commerce
Building Owners and Managers Association of California
BuildIT
CA Rare Disease Access Coalition
CalAsian Pacific Chamber of Commerce
California Apartment Association
California Assisted Living Association
California Association of Realtors
California Attractions and Parks Association
California Bankers Association
California Beer and Beverage Distributors
California Broadband & Video Association
California Broadcasters Association
California Building Industry Association
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Chronic Care Coalition
California Clinical Laboratory Association
California Construction and Industrial Materials Association
California Farm Bureau
California Food Producers
California Forestry Association
California Fresh Fruit Association
California Fuels and Convenience Alliance
California Grocers Association
California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
California Hospital Association
California Hotel + Lodging Association
California Kidney Care Alliance
California Land and Title Association
California Life Sciences
California Manufacturers and Technology Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
California Strawberry Commission
California Taxpayers Association
California Trucking Association
California Walnut Commission
California’s Credit Union
CALinnovates
Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce
Central Valley Business Federation
Chamber San Mateo County
Chino Valley Chamber of Commerce
Chronic Disease Coalition
Citrus Heights Chamber of Commerce
Civil Justice Association of California
Colusa County Chamber of Commerce
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Connected Commerce Council
Consumer Brands Association
Consumer Technology Association
Corona Chamber of Commerce
CTIA
Cystic Fibrosis Research Institute
Dairy Institute Council
DaVita
Developers Alliance
Distilled Media
Elevate California
Exon 20 Group
Family Business Association
Fontana Chamber of Commerce
Fremont Chamber of Commerce
Greater Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce
Greater Coachella Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater Conejo Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater High Desert Chamber of Commerce
Greater Ontario Business Council
Greater Riverside Chambers of Commerce
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce San Francisco
Hollywood Chamber of Commerce
Housing Contractors of California
ICAN
International Franchise Association
La Cañada Flintridge Chamber of Commerce
Laguna Niguel Chamber of Commerce
Lodi Chamber of Commerce
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Altos Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles County Business Federation
MET Crusaders
Mission Viejo Chamber of Commerce
Motion Picture Association
Mountain View Chamber of Commerce
MRG1 Energizers
Murrieta Wildomar Chamber of Commerce
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Neuropathy Action Foundation
Nisei Farmers League
North San Diego Business Chamber
Oceanside Chamber of Commerce
Orange County Business Council
PDL1 Amplifieds
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Rancho Cucamonga Chamber of Commerce
Recording Industry Association of America
Sacramento Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
San José Chamber of Commerce
San Juan Capistrano Chamber of Commerce
San Mateo County Economic Development Association
Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce
Santa Barbara South Coast Chamber of Commerce
Santa Clarita Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Maria Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce
Self Storage Association
sf.citi
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Software & Information Industry Association
Southwest California Legislative Council
Storybooth
StreamStakes
Technology Industry Association of California
TechNet
Temecula Valley Chamber of Commerce
Torrance Chamber of Commerce
Tri County Chamber Alliance
Tulare Chamber of Commerce
Upland Chamber of Commerce
Valley Industry and Commerce Association
West Ventura County Business Alliance
Western Growers Association
Western Plant Health Association
Western Wood Preservers Institute
Yorba Linda Chamber of Commerce
Two individuals
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to a coalition of labor organizations, consumer protection groups, and small business advocates:
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the “Chicago School” de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, nonpartisan approach to reinvigorating competition. The CLRC’s study was initiated in 2022 by bipartisan resolution ACR 95 (Wicks, Cunningham). The CLRC’s Single Firm Conduct Working Group Report, upon which the COMPETE Act is based, was written by legal experts and economics professors, government officials, and attorneys who have defended Fortune 500 companies in antitrust litigation.6 The study, which included 17 public hearings, elicited over 110 letters from trade groups, businesses, advocacy organizations, and members of the public.7 When presented with an option to codify an “abuse of dominance” standard, the CLRC instead proposed codifying California jurisprudence that is well understood by businesses and antitrust experts.8 What emerges is a modest, pro-business proposal to promote competition, affordability, and fair labor standards.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to a coalition of this bill’s opponents, including the California Chamber of Commerce:
AB 1776 prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize, just like Section 2 of the federal Sherman Act. Not surprisingly, under federal law, these kinds of monopolization claims require the possession of “monopoly power” or at least a dangerous probability of obtaining such monopoly power. AB 1776, however, creates a new standard that merely requires that a single-firm possess “substantial market power.” Not only is this a standard that federal and California courts have not applied to single-firm conduct, it is a standard that does not fit with the type of monopolization offenses created by this bill and one that presumably creates a threshold lower than that under federal law.
While this may seem like a small tweak to a term of art, it is a massive departure from existing law that will result in two serious problems. First, it will expose businesses that would be entirely beyond the reach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to monopolization claims even though they do not possess the type of monopoly power that allow monopolists to dominate markets. Second, it will generate satellite litigation over the meaning of “substantial,” as courts, juries, and competing experts spend years in expensive litigation arguing about where “market power” ends and “substantial market power” begins—a line that does not exist in federal law because federal law never adopted this standard.
Uncertainty like this chills competition and innovation, it discourages investment and it leads to increased litigation and increased costs for California businesses and consumers. If AB 1776 is intended to outlaw monopolization, it should do just that, not some ill-defined category of conduct that falls short of monopolization.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 44-17, 5/27/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Pellerin, Quirk-Silva, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Stefani, Ward, Wicks, Zbur, Rivas
NOES: Ávila Farías, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Johnson, Lackey, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis
NO VOTE RECORDED: Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Castillo, Chen, Gallagher, Gipson, Irwin, Nguyen, Patel, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Soria, Valencia, Wilson
Prepared by: Allison Whitt Meredith / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
8/17/26 10:54:41
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1776 (Aguiar-Curry) - Cartwright Act: violations
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1776 would amend the Cartwright Act, California’s primary antitrust law to prohibit any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce and would require procompetitive justifications of the alleged conduct to be evaluated within the same relevant market.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on August 13, 2026
Fiscal Impact:
Potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice if the Attorney General (AG) brings civil actions for violations of the Cartwright Act. Monopolization is only available under the federal Sherman Act. If the AG pursues monopolization under the Cartwright Act in state court, costs could be higher. (Unfair Competition Law Fund, Attorney General Antitrust Account).
Cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts. Actual costs will depend on the number of new actions created by the bill and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. Complex cases, an action is provisionally a complex case if it involves antitrust or trade regulations claims, are more time consuming. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
Author Amendments:
Make technical changes.
Committee Amendments:
Provide that action may be initiated only by the Attorney General or a district attorney.
State that any action brought pursuant to, or under, this section is deemed a complex
case as specified.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1776 (Aguiar-Curry) - Cartwright Act: violations
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1776 would amend the Cartwright Act, California’s primary antitrust law to prohibit any person from monopolizing or monopsonizing any part of trade or commerce and would require procompetitive justifications of the alleged conduct to be evaluated within the same relevant market.
Fiscal Impact:
Potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice if the Attorney General (AG) brings civil actions for violations of the Cartwright Act. Monopolization is only available under the federal Sherman Act. If the AG pursues monopolization under the Cartwright Act in state court, costs could be higher. (Unfair Competition Law Fund, Attorney General Antitrust Account).
Under the Cartwright Act, which is broader than federal antitrust law in allowing actions, private persons and businesses can sue for violations. Consumers may seek injunctive relief, monetary damages and in some cases treble damages. Businesses that allege unfair competition, such as price fixing, market allocation or other anticompetitive agreements may sue along with indirect purchasers, for example, customers who purchase goods or services downstream from the price fixer.
There does not appear to be a standardized reporting of the number of Cartwright Act actions filed annually in the state or their ultimate disposition. Actions may be filed then dropped or settled or actions may be consolidated with federal antitrust actions. Additionally, little information is available on who brings an action.
Cost pressures of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts. Actual costs will depend on the number of new actions created by the bill and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. Complex cases, an action is provisionally a complex case if it involves antitrust or trade regulations claims, are more time consuming. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 based on the hourly rate of court personnel including at minimum the judge, clerk, bailiff, court reporter, jury administrator, administrative staff, and jury per-diems. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
Background:
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits “trusts,” or combinations of two or more persons, to restrain trade or commerce. Unlike the federal Sherman Antitrust Act, the Cartwright Act does not also prohibit conduct by a single company in restraint of trade, which generally occurs when one corporation has monopolistic or monopolistic market power and can impose anticompetitive measures on the market and on consumers.
In response to increasing corporate concentration across a host of industries, the Legislature enacted ACR 95 (Wicks & Cunningham), Resolution Chapter 147/2022, which tasked the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) with studying potential reforms to the Cartwright Act, the state’s antitrust law. This year, after three years of extensive work, the CLRC released its recommendations for amending the law to address anticompetitive behavior by a single firm.
A monopoly is a market with only one seller. A monopsony is a market condition where there is only one dominant buyer for a particular good or service, most often labor, giving that buyer significant power to control prices or wages
Proposed Law:
This bill would prohibit one or more persons from acting, causing, taking, or directing measures, actions or events that are to unreasonably restrain trade or monopolize any part of trade or commerce. The Cartwright Act covers coordinated conspiracies, for example, collusion or price fixing, between two or more firms. Plaintiffs would be able to challenge individual firm actions such as price cuts or new-product rollouts.
The bill would prohibit anticompetitive effects in one market from being offset by purported benefits in another separate market.
The bill would require a plaintiff bringing an action under its provisions to allege, and prove at trial, market power through direct or indirect evidence.
The provisions of the bill shall not apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of $10,000,000 or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
Staff Comments: At this time, courts do not separately track, or report in the aggregate, Cartwright Act cases. Matters brought under the Cartwright Act are generally filed under a broader Antitrust/Trade Regulations Type of Action code.
For Los Angeles County (since 2025)
- 2025 8 filings
- 2026 (thorough the present) 11 filings
A manual review showed that 8 of the 19 total filings included a Cartwright allegation.
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1776 (Author:Aguiar-Curry)
Version: June 22, 2026
Hearing Date: June 30, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: AWM
SUBJECT
Cartwright Act: violations
DIGEST
This bill adds, to the Cartwright Act, a prohibition on one or more persons acting to unreasonably restrain trade or to engage in monopolistic or monopsonistic conduct, as specified.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits “trusts,” or combinations of two or more persons, to restrain trade or commerce. Unlike the federal Sherman Antitrust Act, the Cartwright Act does not also prohibit conduct by a single company in restraint of trade, which generally occurs when one corporation has monopolistic or monopolistic market power and can impose anticompetitive measures on the market and on consumers.
In response to increasing corporate concentration across a host of industries, the Legislature enacted ACR 95 (Wicks & Cunningham (Res. Chap. 147, Stats. 2022)), which tasked the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) with studying potential reforms to the Cartwright Act, the state’s antitrust law. This year, after three years of extensive work, the CLRC released its recommendations for amending the law to address anticompetitive behavior by a single firm.
This bill adopts the CLRC’s recommendation to add a single-firm conduct prohibition to the Cartwright Act. The bill initially adopted the CLRC’s recommended language verbatim, but the bill has changed over time in response to stakeholder concerns. The bill also adds statutory guidance to courts on how to interpret Cartwright Act claims, including the single-firm conduct provision, and on when and how to rely on potentially analogous Sherman Act case law. The Chair of this Committee is asking the author to make certain commitments to make amendments while the bill is in the Senate Appropriations Committee; the specific commitments are set forth in Comment 9 of this analysis.
This bill is sponsored by the American Economic Liberties Project; the California Federation of Labor Unions; the California Nurses Association; the Consumer Federation of California; Economic Security Action; Institute for Local Self-Reliance; SEIU California; Small Business Majority; Teamsters California; TechEquity Action; United Domestic Workers – AFSCME Local 3930; United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council; and Writers Guild of American West. This bill is supported by a number of organizations, including labor unions, consumer protection groups, and the California District Attorneys Association. This bill is opposed by a number of business organizations, including the California Chamber of Commerce and TechNet.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.)
- Prohibits, under the Sherman Act:
- Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- The monopolization, or attempt to monopolize, or combination or conspiracy with any other persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the states, or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 2.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for specified purposes, including restricting trade or commerce or preventing competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- The state and its political subdivisions and public agencies are “persons” for the purpose of 7).
- The Attorney General or a district attorney may file a suit for damages on behalf of a state or county political subdivision, respectively. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that, in any civil action for a violation of the Cartwright Act brought by the Attorney General or a district attorney, a civil penalty of not more than $1 million shall be assessed, as determined by a court or jury based on specified enumerated factors. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755.1.)
This bill:
- Adds the provisions set forth below to the Cartwright Act.
- States the following:
- The purpose of the Cartwright Act is the promotion and protection of free competition, which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
- Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive practices that impede workers’ freedom to choose employment.
- The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach” than the federal Sherman Act; the California Supreme Court has also found that the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Act, and therefore that interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive.
- California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Act in many respects, including the inclusion of direct purchaser recovery; the use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing and antirust injury; recognition of broader harms and per se conduct; lower actionable market shares; structured rule of reason analysis; and differing burdens of proof.
- Interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing California’s antitrust laws, as they are not modeled on federal antitrust statutes. Thus, a claim brought pursuant to the causes of action established by this measure should not be dismissed or rejected on the pleadings or merits pursuant to the Sherman Act or any case decided thereunder unless the court also finds that such a dismissal or rejection is consistent with the Cartwright Act.
- California agrees with the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the FTC in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free trade and fair competition, as reflected in the FTC and USDOJ 2023 Merger Guidelines.
- Provides that it is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that do either of the following:
- Unreasonably restrain trade.
- Monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce.
- Provides that, or purposes of 3), anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct shall be evaluated within the same relevant market.
- Requires a court adjudicating a claim brought under 3) to use the analytical framework and guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146-147.
- Requires a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to 3) to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove, market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
- Provides that 3) does not do either of the following:
- Apply to any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of $10 million or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
- Prevent, limit, or prohibit an exclusive franchise, contract, license, or permit authorized by state law that is granted and supervised by a local governmental agency, as defined, or impose any liability on any person or entity acting within the scope of authority granted by one or more such exclusive franchises, contracts, licenses, or permits.
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California’s antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors “maximizing” effective deterrence of antitrust violations.
COMMENTS
- Author’s comment
According to the author:
AB 1776 promotes a competitive economy by strengthening California’s Cartwright Act to close a gap in our state’s core antitrust law. Today’s Cartwright Act makes anti-competitive behavior illegal only if two or more companies work together. One dominant company behaving the same way can undercut competition and cause harm with impunity. This leaves California consumers, small businesses, and workers without key protections under state law. Forty-five other states have a prohibition on single-firm monopolization used to illegal advantage, leaving California as one of five states without such a prohibition.
As industries consolidate, Californians need better protection as a deterrent to predatory behavior. Over the last two decades, over 75% of U.S. industries have experienced extreme levels of concentration. Studies found those industries experienced higher profit margins with no increase in business operation efficiencies. Without competition, there are fewer suppliers and employers, reducing Californians’ ability to negotiate better prices and products, or better wages and working conditions. Consolidation exacerbates a deepening affordability crisis, driving higher prices, lower wages, and reduced innovation.
The Legislature recognized this loophole in California law when it unanimously passed ACR 95 (Cunningham and Wicks, 2022). This bipartisan resolution stated the Cartwright Act “does not apply to monopoly conduct of single powerful companies” and directed the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) to consider updates to its antitrust laws.
AB 1776, the COMPETE Act, implements the CLRC’s unanimous recommendation to close the gap in the Cartwright Act on single firm conduct, based on a three-year study and 18 public meetings. That recommendation was informed by extensive working group reports, authored by the nation’s most prominent academics, economists, government enforcers, and lawyers for plaintiffs and defendants, including Fortune 500 companies. The process included over 100 written public comments from industries and other stakeholders. The recommendations were amended to address concerns. The bill would codify foundational principles and interpretive guidelines from existing California case law to ensure the language works within the existing framework of the Cartwright Act. This includes existing California Supreme Court precedent that California courts may consider federal antitrust precedent, but are not bound by it, and that federal law does not preempt state law.
AB 1776 will strengthen protections for consumers, small businesses, and workers. It does not prohibit business growth, punish based on size, or outlaw standard business practices. This bill outlaws abuse by dominant companies who stop trying to succeed by providing better products or services and instead wield their power to stifle the next generation of innovation, affordability, and prosperity.
2. Background on the Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act
California enacted the Cartwright Act in 1907[1] “as part of a wave of turn-of-the century state and federal labels intended to stem the power of monopolies and cartels.”[2] The Cartwright Act “generally outlaws any combinations or agreements which restrain trade or competition or which fix or control prices.”[3]
The Sherman Act was passed by Congress in 1890.[4] Similar to the Cartwright Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Act (Section 1) makes combinations, agreements, and conspiracies in restraint of trade unlawful.[5] Additionally, and unlike the Cartwright act, Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Section 2) makes it unlawful to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or to conspire with other persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.[6]
In the era when states and the federal government were first adopting antitrust statutes, there were “two different streams of antitrust statutes: the Sherman Act stream, beginning with its enactment in 1890, and another, which can be called the ‘populist stream.’ ”[7] The Cartwright Act has its origins in the populist stream, not the Sherman Act stream,[8] though reviewing courts subsequently characterized the Cartwright Act as codifying, and adding enforcement mechanisms to, restrictions which already existed in common law.[9] The Legislature has also taken affirmative steps to distinguish the Cartwright Act from the Sherman Act when the Legislature disagreed with an outcome of a United States Supreme Court case interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act.[10]
Consistent with the historical divergence between the Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act, the California Supreme Court has recognized that the Cartwright Act’s prohibition on combinations in restraint of trade “is broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act.”[11] And with respect to whether courts should rely on Sherman Act case law to interpret the Cartwright Act, California Supreme Court has explained that “[i]nterpretations of federal antitrust law are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing the Cartwright Act, given that the Cartwright Act was modeled not on federal antitrust statutes but instead on statutes enacted by California’s sister states around the turn of the 20th century.”[12]
3. Historical Sherman Act approaches and the “consumer welfare standard”
The Sherman Act’s bare-bones text leaves a lot of room for interpretation. This gives courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, enormous power in deciding how to balance the Sherman Act’s pro-competition and pro-consumer rationales, and how to balance those rationales against concerns about stifling legitimate business practices.
The California Law Revision Commission (CLRC), as part of the study discussed in Comment 5, below, commissioned a report on the question of the harms antitrust law is intended to prevent. The report explains the evolution of prevailing antitrust doctrine as follows:
A line of old judicial opinions, most of which were issued from the mid-1940s to the late 1960s, state that Congress passed the antitrust statutes “to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business” although “occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.” This vision is colloquially known as the “Brandeisian” approach, with a nod to Louis Brandeis who championed it in the early 1910s.
By the 1960s, scholarship had moved beyond the Brandeisian approach. Harvard Professor Donald Turner, while serving as head of the Antitrust Division, had placed emphasis on rigor and economic analysis. Writing in the late 1950s, Turner and economist Carl Kaysen identified a number of goals of antitrust enforcement, but suggested protection of the competitive process as the most salient.
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court rejected the Brandeisian approach, holding that proof of unlawful harm to competition requires the showing of “demonstrable economic effect rather than…formalistic line drawing.”[13]
The Court’s decisions beginning in the 1970s moved away from precedent holding that the Sherman Act is intended to protect competition and towards the “consumer welfare standard.”[14] The Court’s adoption of the consumer welfare standard was the culmination of a multi-decade project of members of the conservative Chicago School.[15] Beginning in the 1960s, Bork and others (including now-Judge Richard Posner) published articles and books arguing for a reframing of the Sherman Act and criticizing prior Supreme Court case law.[16] Even though, as the CLRC’s report notes that Bork’s conclusion “relied on an incorrect analysis of the legislative history of the Sherman Act,” the conservative Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have broadly embraced the consumer welfare theory.[17]
The courts have not clearly defined the “consumer welfare standard” or what sort of consumer welfare the courts should be looking out for.[18] Bork argued that consumer welfare should be determined at a very high level, even if prices are increased for some consumers; others argue that consumer prices are the main determinant of consumer welfare.[19] Other “courts sometimes link the concepts to emphasize that high prices alone ‘are not the epitome of competitive harm.’ ”[20] Regardless of whether a precise definition exists, however, the concept has seeped into Supreme Court antitrust case law, which—particularly since the 2000s—lower court judges have applied to dramatically constrict the scope of anticompetitive behavior that will be treated as a violation of Section 2.[21]
The CLRC report identifies two other philosophical underpinnings of the Court’s recent antitrust jurisprudence: that false positive are worse than false negatives, i.e., it’s better to err on the side of allowing potentially anticompetitive behavior to continue; and that vertical arrangements—agreements between actors in different spaces of the supply chain, not direct competitors—are unlikely to harm competition.[22] “There is a broad consensus among scholars that these presumptions have eroded the capacity of the antitrust enterprise to protect competition.”[23]
4. The rise in industry concentration
As the Court contracted the scope of federal antitrust law, industry also began to consolidate. One study found that, since the late 1990s, the index that measures industry concentration:
[H]as systematically increased in more than 75% of U.S. industries, and the average increase in concentration levels has reached 90%. Similarly, the market share of the four largest public and private firms has grown significantly for most industries, and the average and median size of public firms, i.e., the largest players in the economy, has tripled in real terms.[24]
Higher concentration, in turn, correlates to higher corporate profits “mainly through higher profit margins rather than through higher efficiency.”[25] Industries that now have a high rate of concentration include the telecommunications industry; the airline industry; the cable industry; the pharmaceutical industry; the events ticketing industry; the global seed and pesticide industry; and the beer industry.[26] The CLRC’s expert report on consolidation in California also discusses, in depth, extreme market concentration in the meat processing industry; the retail grocery industry; pharmacies; healthcare systems, such as hospitals; and the entertainment industry.[27]
The tech industry started out chaotic and fast-moving in the late 1990s/early 2000s, but is currently a highly concentrated industry dominated by a few big players. Larger tech firms’ growth came in large part from acquisitions of other companies, including those that had the potential to challenge their dominant market position, such as when Google bought YouTube[28] or Facebook bought Instagram.[29] In all:
Facebook managed to string together 67 unchallenged acquisitions, which seemed impressive, unless you consider that Amazon undertook 91 and Google got away with 214 (a few of which were conditioned). In this way, the tech industry became essentially composed of just a few giant trusts: Google for search and related industries, Facebook for social media, Amazon for online commerce.[30]
The FTC has the authority to prevent mergers that would “substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly,”[31] but big tech got a pass for most of the 2000s and 2010s.[32]
5. The California Law Revision Commission’s antitrust report and recommendations
In 2022, the Legislature adopted a resolution directing the CLRC to study and report on the whether California law should be revised to outlaw monopolies as outlawed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act.[33] The CLRC released a pre-print version of its final report in March of 2026.[34] The report concludes that antitrust laws generally, both state and federal, “have not kept up with modern developments,” particularly in the context of the digital economy.[35] The CLRC also explained that “federal court rulings…have made effectuating [the purpose of protecting robust market competition” more difficult.”[36] To remedy this legal gap, the CLRC recommended the addition of three new sections to the Cartwright Act to address harmful single-firm conduct (SFC), including monopolization and monopsonization[37] conduct, across all industries.[38]
The CLRC’s recommendations arise from the CLRC’s finding that “[t]he vertical integration of some of California’s largest industries, as well as the sheer scale of certain digital platforms present unique competitive challenges not foreseen by the original antitrust law drafters.”[39] Yet rather than import Section 2 verbatim, or start from scratch with entirely new antitrust language, the CLRC recommended statutory language that adopts a “hybrid approach that selectively draws on federal statutory and case law to ground the new California standard, while reflecting California’s values and enforcement priorities by tailoring guidelines and definitions to California’s specific concerns.”[40]
6. The state of the Sherman Act today and the debate over whether California needs its own SFC law
In 2022, when the Legislature asked the CLRC to look into the single-firm conduct question, antitrust was in the middle of a resurgence. Between then and now, there have been several high-profile antitrust judgments against some of America’s largest companies, including:
- Courts found that Google violated Section 2 by illegally monopolizing the online search market[41] and the online advertising technology market.[42]
- A federal district court found that Apple violated California’s Unfair Competition Law for anticompetitive practices related to its app store,[43] and then found Apple in contempt of court for violating the court’s injunction and continuing to engage in anticompetitive practices.[44]
- Just last month, a jury found Live Nation/Ticketmaster liable on Section 1 and Section 2 grounds.[45] The jury awarded damages against Live Nation/Ticketmaster, and the remedies phase of the trial is likely to commence early next year.
Opponents of the bill argue that these victories demonstrate that Section 2 is alive and well. The bill’s sponsors argue that Section 2, as currently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, is too permissive of anticompetitive conduct that the Sherman Act was originally intended to prevent—the fact that the most egregious monopolies have started to face consequences does not mean other anticompetitive behavior should get a pass.
One other factor is the federal government’s mercurial attitude toward antitrust enforcement. Under the Biden Administration, FTC Chair Lina Khan was an unrepentant Neo-Brandeisian who believed extremely large firms require “a system of public regulation that prevents the executives who manage this monopoly from exploiting their power.”[46] When President Trump took office for a second time, the approach has been a little less consistent. For example, the USDOJ was originally part of that Live Nation/Ticketmaster lawsuit, but settled with Live Nation/Ticketmaster on the eve of trial. [47] On the merger side, the USDOJ has already signed off on Paramount Skydance’s acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery, concluding it did not pose a threat to competition.[48]
7. This bill prohibits single-firm monopolistic and monopsonistic conduct under the Cartwright Act
This bill adopts the CLRC’s recommendation to add a single-firm conduct prohibition to the Cartwright Act. The bill initially adopted the CLRC’s recommended language verbatim, but the bill has changed over time in response to stakeholder concerns. The bill also adds statutory guidance to courts on how to interpret Cartwright Act claims, including the single-firm conduct provision, and on when and how to rely on potentially analogous Sherman Act case law. The Chair of this Committee is asking for the author to make a commitment to amend the bill while it is in the Senate Appropriations Committee; the requested amendments are set forth in Comment 9, below.
- Single-firm conduct prohibition
This bill provides that it is unlawful for one or more persons to act to (1) unreasonably restrain trade, or (2) monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize any part of trade or commerce. In response to concerns from stakeholders, the author has added provisions to clarify that the single-firm conduct prohibition does not apply to small businesses, as defined, or exclusive franchises and contracts authorized by state law.
Opponents of the bill argue that the first prong, the unreasonable restriction of trade prong, is overly vague. For example, a coalition of the bill’s opponents writes:
The recent amendments to AB 1776 – most of which are grammar fixes or internal cross references – do not at all address the chief concern with the bill: The profound uncertainty that AB 1776 creates and the sheer lack of guidance for businesses and courts as to what is, and what is not, an unlawful single-firm restraint of trade. To be clear, the amendments say nothing meaningful about how businesses can structure their conduct to comply with the law in the first place. In fact, the recent amendments arguably provide less guidance and create more uncertainty.
This argument has merit; although courts examine alleged anticompetitive behavior through a “rule of reason” analysis (discussed further in Comment 8), codifying this term is likely to have destabilizing effects. The “unreasonable restraint of trade” prohibition is one of the portions of the bill that is being requested to be removed, as set forth in Comment 9.
- Interpretive framework and guidance regarding Sherman Act precedent
As currently in print, this bill sets forth interpretive guidelines for how to interpret the new single-firm conduct prohibition and the Cartwright Act writ large. The CLRC, as noted in Comment 5, concluded that recent federal court opinions interpreting the Sherman Act have made it more difficult to “effectuat[e] the purpose” of antitrust laws, i.e., “to protect robust competition in all markets.”[49] The guidelines are, therefore, intended to steer California’s courts in the right direction when considering whether to apply proffered federal case law to a Cartwright Act claim. One of these provisions, however, is more confusing than useful, so the author is being asked to remove it, as set forth in Comment 9.
The bill also provides guidance as to how a claim should be analyzed. These provisions are discussed further in Comment 8, but in broad strokes, they set forth matters relating to the proper analysis for an antitrust claim, necessary allegations, and other factors. These provisions should serve as signposts for the courts.
8. The process of bringing a monopolization claim under this bill
Opponents of the bill express concern that this bill will wreak havoc on businesses because the bill’s terms are too new and too different from the federal Sherman Act. For example, a coalition of the bill’s opponents writes:
Despite no evidence that the current state or federal antitrust framework has faltered, AB 1776 would move California away from established federal guardrails by creating a new statutory approach to evaluating single-firm conduct that departs from decades of case law and United States Supreme Court precedent.
Businesses operating in California have long relied on these clear standards when making investment and operational decisions. By discarding these guardrails, the bill would introduce significant legal uncertainty, invite costly litigation, and expose businesses, including small and mid-sized companies, to expanded private lawsuits even when their conduct ultimately proves lawful.
But this bill does not exist in a vacuum. Because this bill’s prohibition on monopolization and monopsonization is placed within the Cartwright Act, all of the existing Cartwright Act statutes and case law will apply here, too. It is not the Legislature’s intent to require the courts to start from scratch. Existing Cartwright Act—including the case law expressly cited in the bill—should be applied in monopolization/monopsonization claims as well. This Comment addresses some of the specific ways existing law should be applied to this bill.
- Terms of art
Terms of art in this bill—such as “market,” “market power,” and “procompetitive justifications”—are intended to have the same meaning as they do under existing Cartwright Act precedent, and going forward, the terms should be interpreted consistently in both combination and single-firm conduct cases. These are well-established terms—for example, there are already form jury instructions on “market power” and how to find it[50]—and is not intended that courts jettison these existing meanings.
- Rule of reason analysis
Cases alleging prohibited monopolization or monopsonization should apply the “rule of reason” analysis set forth in the California Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Cipro Cases I & II.[51] This analysis recognizes that:
[A]lthough the prohibitions of the Cartwright Act are framed in superficially absolute language, deciding antitrust illegality is not as simple as identifying whether a challenged agreement resolves a restraint of trade…Instead, Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act carry forward the common law understanding that “only unreasonable restraints of trade are prohibited.”[52]
The rule of reason inquiry, therefore, asks “whether the challenged conduct promotes or suppresses competition,” and may require an examination of “the facts particular to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption.”[53] The rule of reason is not a hard and fast rule, but is “something of a sliding scale” based on the nature of the conduct in question.[54] Under the rule of reason, if “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” the defendant may be “asked to come forward with procompetitive justifications for a challenged restraint without the plaintiff having to introduce elaborate market analysis first.”[55]
While In re Cipro Cases I & II applies the rule of reason in an existing Cartwright Act case, this framework can be, and should be, carried over to apply to claims under this bill.
- Lawful monopolies
The California Supreme Court has already recognized that “a business may develop monopoly power, i.e., the power to control prices or exclude competition through the superiority of its product or business acumen.”[56] This bill is not intended to supplant that principle. This bill is intended only to prohibit monopoly or monopsony, or attempted monopoly or monopsony, through anticompetitive means. The Sherman Act already prohibits such activities.[57] As set forth in Comment 9, the author is being requested to commit to adding a term expressly stating that a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen
- Reliance on federal law
As discussed above, the Cartwright Act and its case law already provide most of the legal scaffolding necessary for the application of this bill. Opponents of the bill are correct, however, that there is not a developed body of Cartwright Act case law addressing single-firm conduct and that it may be helpful for courts to rely on federal Section 2 case law when presented with monopoly-specific legal questions. Opponents of the bill are incorrect, however, that this bill is intended to leave courts unmoored and wholly unable to rely on Sherman Act precedent.
The California Supreme Court, and this bill, recognize that Sherman Act precedent should not override state law.[58] Comment 3 of this analysis discusses how the United States Supreme Court has narrowed the Sherman Act over the past few decades, thereby allowing a greater range of monopolistic behavior to go unchecked; this pro-monopolistic approach can be at odds with the Cartwright Act’s “overarching goals of maximizing effective deterrence of antitrust violations, enforcing the state’s antitrust laws against those violations that do occur, and ensuring disgorgement of any ill-gotten proceeds.”[59]
As the bill recognizes, Sherman Act case law can be instructive when it is consistent with the Cartwright Act’s overarching goals. Accordingly, when a court is asked to follow the guidance of ostensibly analogous Sherman Act case law, the court should assess whether the particular case or rule furthers or hinders the purposes of the Cartwright Act. Viewed through this lens, cases like the ones mentioned in footnote 21 of this analysis are likely unsuitable to carry over into a Cartwright Act analysis, whereas a case like U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.[60] might be instructive.
9. Commitment going forward
The Chair of this Committee has grave concerns that this bill, as currently in print, could lead to a proliferation of frivolous litigation and disruption of the markets. The Chair of this Committee, therefore, is requesting that the author commit to make the following amendments to the bill while it is in the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Add language to expressly affirm that a business may lawfully obtain and maintain market power or monopoly power through the superiority of its products, services, or business acumen.
- Delete, in Section 1 of the bill, the second sentence of subdivision (d), relating to dismissal of a case pursuant to the Sherman Act.
- Delete, from Section 2 of the bill, the “unreasonable restraint of trade” prohibition and the reference to “one or more persons” in subdivision (a).
- Clarify, in Section 2 of the bill, that a plaintiff must allege, and prove, that the defendant has substantial market power.
- Eliminate the availability of a private right of action for the new monopolization created by this bill, so that only the Attorney General and other public prosecutors who can bring claims under the Cartwright Act can bring a monopolization claim under this bill.
10. Arguments in support
According to a coalition of labor organizations, consumer protection groups, and small business advocates:
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the “Chicago School” de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
Following an expansive three-year review of California’s antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) – California’s most prestigious nonjudicial legal body – made two key findings: First, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit illegal monopolization or unilateral, “single firm” anticompetitive conduct. Second, directly mirroring federal antitrust law would be both inconsistent with current California law and effectively import federal jurisprudence that has diluted the federal law’s original scope and strength, limiting the effectiveness of state antitrust enforcement. The COMPETE Act, which is a verbatim codification of the CLRC’s final unanimous recommendation, fixes this by allowing illegal monopolization claims to be brought in state court pursuant to California antitrust cases rooted in a century of law.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, non-partisan approach to reinvigorating competition. The CLRC’s study was initiated in 2022 by bipartisan resolution ACR 95 (Wicks, Cunningham). The CLRC’s Single Firm Conduct Working Group Report, upon which the COMPETE Act is based, was written by legal experts and economics professors, government officials, and attorneys who have defended Fortune 500 companies in antitrust litigation.6 The study, which included 17 public hearings, elicited over 110 letters from trade groups, businesses, advocacy organizations, and members of the public.7 When presented with an option to codify an “abuse of dominance” standard, the CLRC instead proposed codifying California jurisprudence that is well understood by businesses and antitrust experts.8 What emerges is a modest, pro-business proposal to promote competition, affordability, and fair labor standards.
Furthermore, the author engaged with opposition, plaintiff and defense anti-trust attorneys, and advocates, to remove the former Section 3, which had enumerated specific conditions that courts would not be required to find in order to establish antitrust liability. These amendments reflect the author's commitment to a collaborative, stakeholder-driven process that we are proud to support.
Californians are paying the price of inadequate competition law in the wages they earn, the prices they pay, and the opportunities foreclosed by unchecked market power. This bill is the right response, developed through the most rigorous process, at exactly the right time
11. Arguments in opposition
According to a coalition of trade associations and chambers of commerce, including the California Chamber of Commerce:
AB 1776 amends California’s Cartwright Act to include prohibitions on Single-Firm conduct, whereas the Act has only covered the coordinated conduct of two or more firms since its passage in 1907. Specifically, the bill prohibits single˗firm “restraints of trade,” but lacks limiting principles or any meaningful guidance for courts and businesses as to what is, and what is not, unlawful single˗firm conduct. While the “restraint of trade” term used in AB 1776 is a familiar one in antitrust law, no court or statute has ever defined how that term applies to single-firm conduct, and the bill makes no effort to do so. Restraints of trade have always been evaluated by courts in the context of two or more firms agreeing to take certain actions. For example, the Cartwright Act currently defines a restraint of trade as acts by “two or more persons” to do things like “limit or reduce [] production,” “increase the price of merchandise,” or “fix at any standard or figure” prices charged in the State. Thus, it has always been unlawful for two or more competitors to agree to reduce production, increase prices or fix prices charged in the State. But at the same time, it has always been lawful for single firms to unilaterally decide on their levels of production and prices, meaning that AB 1776 calls into question the legality of common business practices—such as unilateral price cuts, loyalty programs, rebates, licensing decisions, and efforts to undercut rivals—that are generally legal under federal law and viewed as good for competition and good for consumers. The shear novelty of the bill’s “restraint of trade” language will cause great uncertainty, will increase costs, will increase litigation and is likely to result in conflicting results in the courts.
These uncertainty concerns are compounded by the bill’s new instruction to courts that any lawsuit brought under AB 1776 “shall not be dismissed or rejected on the pleadings or merits pursuant to the [federal] Sherman Act or any case decided thereunder unless the court also finds that such a dismissal or rejection is consistent with this Chapter.” This guidance intentionally obscures the long and consistent line of California cases recognizing that federal antitrust precedent is “often helpful,” “an aid” and “useful” in interpreting the Cartwright Act. State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164; Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1240; Flagship Theatres of Palm desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4th 1366, 1374. It also ignores the fact that the California Supreme Court has itself repeatedly and expressly adopted federal antitrust standards as applicable to the Cartwright Act. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 775 (“the federal Hanover Shoe rule is most consistent with legislative intent and applies equally to state claims under the Cartwright Act.”); In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 144-147 (ruling that federal antitrust review standards “make[] equal sense for claims for claims under the Cartwright Act.”); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843-48 (adopting federal summary judgment standards in conspiracy claims under the Cartwright Act). Moreover, it will be incredibly difficult for a business to convince a California court that existing antitrust precedent is “consistent” with AB 1776 because there is no antitrust law in the world that is consistent with AB 1776 given its novelty. Efforts to dissuade California courts from considering federal antitrust precedent is not only contrary to the way our systems have interacted for decades, but it also creates more uncertainty regarding the meaning and reach of AB 1776.
SUPPORT
American Economic Liberties Project (co-sponsor)
California Federation of Labor Unions (co-sponsor)
California Nurses Association (co-sponsor)
Consumer Federation of California (co-sponsor)
Economic Security Action (co-sponsor)
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
SEIU California (co-sponsor)
Small Business Majority (co-sponsor)
Teamsters California (co-sponsor)
TechEquity Action (co-sponsor)
UFCW Western States Council (co-sponsor)
United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930 (co-sponsor)
United Food and Commercial Workers, Western States Council (co-sponsor)
Writers Guild of American West (co-sponsor)
AAPIs for Civic Empowerment
AFCSME
AFM Local 7
Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE) Action
Amalgamated Transit Union
California Alliance for Retired Americans
California District Attorneys Association
California Food and Farming Network
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Professional Firefighters
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association (CSEA) AFL-CIO
California Work & Family Coalition
CAMEO Network
Communication Workers of America District 9
Consumer Attorneys of California
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
Courage California
Electronic Frontier Foundation
End Poverty in California
Engineers & Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20
Equal Rights Advocates
Fan Alliance
Future of Music Coalition
Health Access CA
Hmong Innovating Politics
Indivisible CA: StateStrong
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Local 80
International Association of Mechanists and Aerospace Workers
Kapor Center Advocacy
Latino Prosperity
OC Action
Office of Kat Taylor
Omidyar Network
Open Markets Institute
Privacy Defense Alliance
Propel San Francisco
Protect Borrowers
Responsible Online Commerce Coalition
Rise Economy
Small Business Forward
SMART – Transit Division
The Greenlining Institute
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Wellbeing Economy Alliance California
Western Center on Law & Poverty
OPPOSITION
ACT/Association for Competitive Technology
Advanced Medical Technologies Association
African American Farmers of California
Airlines for America
American Investment Council
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
Animal Health Institute
Associated General Contractors – California
Associated General Contractors – San Diego
Association of Western Employees
Athens Services
Bay Area Council
Beverly Hills Chamber of Commerce
Biocom
Biotechnology Innovation Organization
Brea Chamber of Commerce
Building Owners and Managers Association of California
BuildIT
CalAsian Pacific Chamber of Commerce
California Apartment Association
California Assisted Living Association
California Association of Realtors
California Attractions and Parks Association
California Bankers Association
California Beer and Beverage Distributors
California Broadband & Video Association
California Broadcasters Association
California Building Industry Association
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Construction and Industrial Materials Association
California Farm Bureau
California Fresh Fruit Association
California Food Producers
California Forestry Association
California Fuels and Convenience Alliance
California Grocers Association
California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
California Hospital Association
California Hotel + Lodging Association
California Kidney Care Alliance
California Land and Title Association
California Life Sciences
California Manufacturers and Technology Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
California Strawberry Commission
California Taxpayers Association
California Trucking Association
California Walnut Commission
California’s Credit Union
CALinnovates
Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce
Central Valley Business Federation
Chamber San Mateo County
Chino Valley Chamber of Commerce
Citrus Heights Chamber of Commerce
Civil Justice Association of California
Colusa County Chamber of Commerce
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Connected Commerce Council
Consumer Brands Association
Corona Chamber of Commerce
CTIA
Dairy Institute Council
Developers Alliance
Distilled Media
Elevate California
Family Business Association
Fontana Chamber of Commerce
Fremont Chamber of Commerce
Greater Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce
Greater Coachella Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater Conejo Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater High Desert Chamber of Commerce
Greater Ontario Business Council
Greater Riverside Chambers of Commerce
Hispanic Chambers of Commerce San Francisco
Hollywood Chamber of Commerce
Housing Contractors of California
International Franchise Association
La Cañada Flintridge Chamber of Commerce
Laguna Niguel Chamber of Commerce
Lodi Chamber of Commerce
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Altos Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles County Business Federation
Mission Viejo Chamber of Commerce
Motion Picture Association
Mountain View Chamber of Commerce
Murrieta Wildomar Chamber of Commerce
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Nisei Farmers League
North San Diego Business Chamber
Oceanside Chamber of Commerce
Orange County Business Council
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Rancho Cucamonga Chamber of Commerce
Sacramento Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
San José Chamber of Commerce
San Mateo County Economic Development Association
San Juan Capistrano Chamber of Commerce
Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce
Santa Barbara South Coast Chamber of Commerce
Santa Clarita Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Maria Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce
Self Storage Association
sf.citi
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Software & Information Industry Association
Southwest California Legislative Council
Storybooth
StreamStakes
Technology Industry Association of California
TechNet
Temecula Valley Chamber of Commerce
Torrance Chamber of Commerce
Tri County Chamber Alliance
Tulare Chamber of Commerce
Upland Chamber of Commerce
Valley Industry and Commerce Association
West Ventura County Business Alliance
Western Plant Health Association
Western Wood Preservers Institute
Yorba Linda Chamber of Commerce
Two individuals
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending legislation:
SB 1074 (Wiener, 2026) prohibits an online platform owned or controlled by an entity with a market capitalization or private valuation of $1 trillion or more from (1) engaging in self-preferencing conduct, or (2) restricting the independence or interoperability of business users or customers on the platform; and authorizes persons harmed and specified public prosecutors to bring an action to enforce a violation of these prohibitions. SB 1074 is pending before the Senate Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection Committee.
SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) establishes the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2025, which prohibits a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with competitor data and requires a person using a pricing algorithm to recommend or set a price or commercial term to make certain commercial disclosures. SB 295 is pending on the Assembly Floor, having failed passage and granted reconsideration.
Prior legislation:
AB 1345 (Bauer-Kahan, 2025) would have made it unlawful, under the Cartwright Act, for a person to take actions in restraint of trade or attempt to restrain the free exercise of competition or production, or to create or maintain a monopoly or monopsony in any part of trade or commerce. AB 1345 died in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry, Ch. 338, Stats. 2025) clarified that using a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy violates the Cartwright Act, and clarified the Cartwright Act’s pleading standard.
ACR 95 (Cunningham, Res. Ch. 147, Stats. 2022) is discussed in Comment 5 of this analysis.
PRIOR VOTES
Assembly Floor (Ayes 44, Noes 17)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 4)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 3)
**************
Stats. 1907, Ch. 530, §§ 1-12, pp. 984-987. ↑
Clayworth v. Pfizer (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 772. ↑
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
See Pub. L. No. 51-647 (Jul. 2, 1890) 26 Stat. 209. ↑
See 15 U.S.C. § 1. ↑
Id., § 2. Congress subsequently enacted the Clayton Act of 1914 (Pub. L. 63-212 (Oct. 15, 1914) 38 Stat. 730) to build on the Sherman Act and has amended both Acts since then. This analysis will use “Sherman Act” to refer to the whole federal anti-monopoly regime unless otherwise specified. ↑
Lasky, Folklore and Myth in Judicial Opinions—Some Reflections Inspired by Texaco-Getty (Spring 1987) 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 591, 592. ↑
Id. at p. 593. ↑
Id. at pp. 595-596. ↑
See Clayworth, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 763 (when the United States Supreme Court held that Section 1 did not create a cause of action for indirect purchasers harmed by an unlawful combination, the Legislature amended the Cartwright Act to expressly permit a cause of action for downstream purchasers). ↑
Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920. ↑
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195. ↑
CLRC, Memorandum 2024-33, Expert Report: Consumer Welfare Standard (Jul. 19, 2024) pp. 1-2 (internal citations omitted), available at https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/2024/MM24-33.pdf; see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. (1977) 433 U.S. 36, 59. All links in this analysis are current as of June 28, 2026. ↑
Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (2018) pp. 87-91. ↑
Id. at pp. 85-86. ↑
E.g., Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (1978) p. 51 (“the responsibility of the federal courts for the integrity and virtue of law requires that they take consumer welfare as the sole value that guides antitrust decisions”); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions (Mar. 1975 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282; Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act (Oct. 1966) 9 J. Law & Econ. 7; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II (Dec. 1965) 75 Yale L.J. 373. ↑
E.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (1985) 472 U.S. 585, 605; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. (1979) 442 U.S. 330, 343; see also Wu, supra, at p. 105. ↑
CLRC, Memorandum 2024-33, supra, at p. 2. ↑
Id. at p. 3; see also Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, supra at pp. 164, 199-200. Bork also rejected the idea that monopolies create barriers to entry for competitors. (Id., pp. 310-329.) ↑
CLRC, Memorandum 2024-33, supra, at p. 3. ↑
See, e.g., Ohio v. American Express Co. (2018) 585 U.S. 529, 547; Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 U.S. 398, 407; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (1993) 509 U.S. 209. ↑
CLRC, Memorandum 2024-33, supra, at p. 6-7. ↑
Id. at p. 7. ↑
Grullon, Larkin, & Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated? (2019) Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 23(4). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Wu, supra, at pp. 115-117. ↑
CLRC, Memorandum 2024-14, Expert Report: Concentration in California (Mar. 28, 2024) pp. 11-12, 15-16, 26-28; 34-36; 39-41. ↑
Sorkin & Peters, Google to Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion (Oct. 9, 2006) New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/business/09cnd-deal.html. ↑
Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 billion (Apr. 9, 2012) New York Times, available at https://archive.nytimes.com/dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-instagram-for-1-billion/. ↑
Wu, supra at p. 123. Earlier this year, the Justice Department changed course and settled its antitrust case alleging that Ticketmaster is an illegal monopoly; over two dozen states, including California, plan to continue their own antitrust suits against Ticketmasater’s parent company, LiveNation. (Richer & Neumister, Justice Department and Live Nation reach settlement over illegal monopoly case (Mar. 9, 2025) AP News, https://apnews.com/article/livenation-antitrust-justice-department-0a6ef66f497e5f626096de753bfff8ce.) ↑
15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 18a. ↑
Wu, supra, at p. 121. ↑
ACR 95 (Cunningham, Res. Ch. 147, Stats. 2022). ↑
See Cal. Law Revision Com., Preprint Recommendation, Antitrust Law: Single Firm Conduct (Mar. 2026) available at https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub249-B750.pdf. The CLRC approved the substance of the recommendation in the preprint version, but may still make minor editorial changes prior to releasing the final version. (Id. at cover page.) ↑
Id. at p. 5. ↑
Id. at p. 6. ↑
A “monopsony” is the inverse of a monopoly: instead of a market with lots of purchasers buying from one predominant seller (monopoly), a monopsony has a single buyer as the predominant purchaser of goods or services offered by many buyers. For example, in a company town, there are lots of workers (i.e., people who want to sell their labor) and only one employer willing to pay for that labor, which allows it to offer lower wages and worse conditions than it would in a competitive market. ↑
California Law Revision Commission, Preprint Recommendation, Antitrust Law: Single Firm Conduct, supra, at pp. 23-27. ↑
Id. at p. 7 (internal citations omitted). ↑
Id. at p. 8. ↑
See United States v. Google LLC (D.D.C. 2024) 747 F.Supp.3d 1. ↑
See United States v. Google LLC (E.D. Va. 2025) 778 F.Supp.3d 797. ↑
See Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 67 F.4th 946, 999. ↑
See Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 161 F.4th 1162, 1172. ↑
Neumeister & Peltz, Jury finds that Ticketmaster and Live Nation had an anticompetitive monopoly over big concert venues (Apr. 15, 2026) AP News, https://apnews.com/article/live-nation-ticketmaster-antitrust-trial. ↑
Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate (Mar. 2018) J. Eur. Competition L. & Practice, Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp. 131-132. ↑
See United States et al. v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:24-cv-3973-AS, Settlement Term Sheet, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1443801/dl. ↑
Khorram, Justice Department approves Paramount’s acquisition of Warner Bros. (Jun. 12, 2026) Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/12/paramount-acquisition-warner-bros-approved-00960300. Attorney General Rob Bonta indicated he might take steps to try to prevent the merger, but the status of these efforts is unclear. (Taheri, Paramount-Warner ‘Not a Done Deal,’ Says California AG—But Can He Stop It? (Jun. 13, 2026) Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/paramount-warner-not-a-done-deal-says-california-ag-but-can-he-stop-it-12070205.) ↑
Cal. Law Revision Com., Preprint Recommendation, Antitrust Law: Single Firm Conduct, supra, at p. 6. ↑
See CACI Nos. 3412-3414. ↑
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 116. ↑
Id. at pp. 145-146. ↑
Id. at p. 146 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
Id. at p. 14y (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
Id. at pp. 146-147 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
Id. at p. 148 (cleaned up). ↑
Id. at p. 146; see also Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S. (1918) 246 U.S. 231, 238. ↑
See, e.g., Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1194. ↑
Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 764. ↑
(D.C. Cir. 2001) 253 F.3d 34. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1776
Author:(Aguiar-Curry)
As Amended Ver:April 9, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Adopts the California Law Revision Commission's recommended updates to the Cartwright Act to address single firm anticompetitive conduct.
Major Provisions
- Provides that it is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that are either of the following:
- In restraint of trade, which "restraint of trade" includes, but is not limited to, any actions, measures, or acts, as specified, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons; or
- To monopolize or monopsonize, to attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, to maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
- Requires that anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct be evaluated within the same relevant market.
- Provides that any of the following may constitute evidence of a violation of 1), but that liability does not require a finding, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
- The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct;
- The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons;
- The defendant's price for a product or service was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law;
- The defendant's conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition;
- The conduct's risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence;
- In a case where a defendant's business is a multisided platform, the defendant's conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform;
- In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue;
- The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant;
- A single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890; or
- A definition of "relevant market" where there is direct evidence of market power.
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California's antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors "maximizing" effective deterrence of antitrust violations in accordance with Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.
- Finds and declares the following:
- The purpose of the provisions of this bill is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition, which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions;
- Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers’ freedom to choose employment;
- The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is "broader in range and deeper in reach" than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920);
- The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195);
- California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery, use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing, recognition of broader harms and per se conduct, lower actionable market shares, structured rule of reason analysis, and differing burdens of proof;
- Federal case law on the subject of antitrust law is not binding on California state courts, but courts may consider federal case law as persuasive authority to the extent they find it consistent with California law, as specified; and
- California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
COMMENTS
Since 1990, economists note that over 75 percent of industries in the United States have experienced significant market concentration. (Luke Hinrichs, Freedom from Domination: A Revival of Antitrust Law and the Will to Choose Democracy, The Flaw (Sept. 6, 2022) available at: https://theflaw.org/articles/freedom-from-domination-a-revival-of-antitrust-law-and-the-will-to-choose-democracy/.) Seeking to protect consumers from increased market consolidation, in 2022, the Legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with studying if updates to the state’s one hundred year antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, were necessary. (ACR 95 (Wick & Cunningham) Res. Chap. 147, Stats. 2022.) Of note, because the Cartwright Act generally focuses on market collusion and the conduct of multiple firms, the Commission was asked to study how to combat anticompetitive behavior by a single firm or actor.
In January of this year, the Law Revision Commission released its proposal to reform the Cartwright Act to address single firm conduct. This bill would enact those recommendations.
This bill adopts a "hybrid" approach to regulating single-firm conduct. This bill enacts the California Law Revision Commission's recommendations on regulating single-firm anticompetitive behavior. The bill adopts a series of findings regarding the need to police predatory anticompetitive behavior by single firms. The findings also reiterate California's decades old case law that holds that "the Cartwright Act is 'broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act" (Cianci v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 920) and that the Cartwright Act is not directly modeled after the Sherman Act. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195.)
Secondly the bill enacts the actual prohibition on anticompetitive behavior that is, largely, modeled after Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This prohibition, in essence, states that it is unlawful for one or more persons to engage in the restraint of trade or to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, an industry. The bill then explicitly prohibits a court excusing anticompetitive behavior in one market simply because that behavior may have boosted competition in another.
Finally, the bill aims to provide guidance to the courts. In light of the Commission’s skepticism of some federal case law, the bill codifies a set of standards that may be considered by a court as evidence of potentially anticompetitive behavior, but, in order to prevent any of the factors from becoming a threshold condition to proving an antitrust case, explicitly states that a court need not find any of the factors present in a given case to find anticompetitive behavior. These factors include:
- The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct.
- The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons.
- The defendant's price for a product or service was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law.
- The defendant’s conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition.
- The conduct's risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence.
- In a case where a defendant's business is a multisided platform, the defendant’s conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform.
- In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.
- The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant.
- A single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code.
- A definition of "relevant market" where there is direct evidence of market power.
Finally, the bill codifies existing state caselaw that requires California courts to liberally interpret California's antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors "maximizing" effective deterrence of antitrust violations. (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.)
According to the Author
AB 1776 promotes a fair, competitive economy by strengthening California's antitrust law to reflect modern market realities. Competition drives innovation, lowers prices, raises wages, and expands opportunity for consumers, workers, and small businesses. California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, was enacted in 1907 and does not clearly address anti-competitive conduct by a single dominant company. As markets have consolidated, this gap has allowed companies to stifle competition, limit consumer choice, and suppress wages without clear accountability under state law.
In 2022, the legislature unanimously passed ACR 95 (Cunningham and Wicks), a bipartisan resolution recognizing that the Cartwright Act "does not apply to monopoly conduct of single powerful companies" and directing the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) to study updates. AB 1776 implements the CLRC's unanimous recommendations on single firm conduct. The Cartwright Act currently outlaws anti-competitive behavior by two or more companies and AB 1776 ensures this conduct by a single company is also illegal. The bill clarifies that California courts may consider federal antitrust precedent but are not bound by it, and that federal law does not preempt state law, consistent with longstanding principles.
By closing these gaps, AB 1776 aligns California with most other states and federal statutes that outlaw single-company anti-competitive conduct, reduces legal uncertainty, and strengthens the state's ability to protect competition. The bill does not prohibit business growth or monopolies—it targets anti-competitive conduct that harms consumers, workers, and small businesses and exacerbates California's affordability challenges.
Arguments in Support
This bill is supported by a coalition of consumer advocates, labor organizations, and small business trade organizations. In support of the measure a coalition of some of the state's largest labor organizations write:
California is the nation's wealthiest state and the fourth largest economy in the world, yet ranks 48th in the nation in terms of income inequality. 70% of Californians believe that the gap between the rich and poor is widening, and a similar share think the state government should do more to reduce the gap.
Corporate concentration indisputably contributes to these harmful trends. Across healthcare, technology, food and agriculture, entertainment, and consumer retail, market concentration has led to wage suppression, price inflation, and reduced opportunities for business growth. Since the 1990s, consolidation has affected roughly 75% of all U.S. industries, leaving in its wake fewer small businesses, weaker unions, job insecurity, and exploding income inequality.
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the "Chicago School" de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
Following an expansive three-year review of California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) – California's most prestigious nonjudicial legal body – made two key findings: First, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit illegal monopolization or unilateral, "single firm" anticompetitive conduct. Second, directly mirroring federal antitrust law would be both inconsistent with current California law and effectively import federal jurisprudence that has diluted the federal law's original scope and strength, limiting the effectiveness of state antitrust enforcement.4 The COMPETE Act, which is a verbatim codification of the CLRC's final unanimous recommendation, fixes this by allowing illegal monopolization claims to be brought in state court pursuant to California antitrust cases rooted in a century of law.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, non-partisan approach to reinvigorating competition.
Arguments in Opposition
A coalition of business trade groups, led by the Chamber of Commerce, opposes this measure. They write:
These uncertainty concerns are compounded by the bill's instruction to courts that well established and longstanding federal standards for evaluating business practices, designed to distinguish between lawful and unlawful competition are not required under California law. For example, AB 1776 rejects the economic and legal principles that assist courts in distinguishing between unlawful, below˗cost pricing and lawful price cutting, calling into question business’s ability to offer low prices aimed at gaining customers, which is one of the most frequently used competitive strategies, particularly among small businesses and new entrants. The bill also nullifies the commonsense rule created by the U.S. Supreme Court that a company generally has no duty to assist its rivals and a monopolist only has to do so in unique situations, potentially creating a California standard under which competitors are compelled to assist one another, rather than compete with one another.
Similarly, in a transparent effort to elevate business interests over consumers, the bill states that plaintiffs suing under AB 1776 need not show that "[t]he rivals whose ability to compete has been reduced are as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant," thereby safeguarding the business of less efficient competitors. AB 1776 likewise disavows the notion that, in two-sided markets, courts should evaluate the competitive effects on both sides of the market, thereby ignoring the economic reality that consumers, on one side of a dual-sided market, often benefit from conduct that may harm competitors, on the other side of the market, and flipping on its head the “consumer welfare standard” that has guided courts and antitrust policy for decades. In another troubling and significant dismissal of federal law, AB 1776 states that “one or more” persons may be held liable for monopolization, whereas federal courts and economists have always recognized that monopolization – as the name implies – is the complete domination of a market by a single competitor.
AB 1776's disavowal of these guiding, federal standards will not only increase litigation and costs but leaves California courts with little guidance on how to deal with these complex issues. The bill's rejection of federal law is even more troubling given the California Supreme Court's repeated explanation that federal antitrust case law is "helpful" in interpreting the Cartwright Act. State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown but potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Unfair Competition Law Fund and Antitrust Fund) for investigation and enforcement of new single-firm antitrust violations within its Antitrust Section and Healthcare Rights Section. Single-firm monopolization cases are among the most complex and resource-intensive matters in antitrust law, typically requiring extensive economic analysis, expert consultation, and multi-year litigation. The DOJ reports that they currently work on federal monopolization cases with partners – other states or federal agencies. The DOJ would litigate monopolization under Cartwright in state court alone, and the costs may be large. A major unknown cost driver is the number of cases the DOJ would litigate under this new authority.
- Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures to the courts (Trial Court Trust Fund) from increased antitrust litigation. The bill broadens the scope of the Cartwright Act — which provides private plaintiffs treble damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief — to cover single-firm conduct for the first time. These changes are expected to increase the volume of private antitrust actions filed in state court, particularly in the initial years as courts develop an interpretive framework for the new provisions. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The state budget provides annual General Fund backfills to the Trial Court Trust Fund to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in 2025-26.
- Unknown, likely minor incarceration costs (General Fund). The Cartwright Act includes criminal penalties for violations; by expanding the Act's scope to single-firm conduct, the bill technically creates new crimes. However, criminal antitrust prosecutions are rare, and this provision is unlikely to generate meaningful incarceration costs.
The Legislative Analyst's Office recently warned of General Fund structural deficits of around $35 billion per year beginning in the 2027-28 fiscal year.
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Kalra, Lee, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
NO: Macedo, Dixon, Sanchez
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-4-0
YES: Wicks, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache
NO: Hoover, Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: April 9, 2026
CONSULTANT: Nicholas Liedtke / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0002590
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1776
Author:(Aguiar-Curry)
As Amended Ver:May 18, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Adopts the California Law Revision Commission's recommended updates to the Cartwright Act to address single firm anticompetitive conduct.
Major Provisions
- Provides that it is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events do either of the following:
- Unreasonably restrain trade; or
- Monopolize or monopsonize, attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
- Requires that anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct be evaluated within the same relevant market.
- Requires courts when adjudicating a suit brought pursuant to this bill to use the guidance of the California Supreme Court in the manner described in In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116.
- Requires a plaintiff bringing an action pursuant to this bill to allege and, to prevail at trial, prove market power, either through direct or indirect evidence.
- Provides that interpretations of federal antitrust laws are at most instructive, and not conclusive, when construing California’s antitrust laws, and as such, the following are not required to find liability:
- When alleging an anticompetitive refusal to deal, either:
- The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct;
- The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons;
- When alleging predatory pricing, either:
- The defendant offered a product or service that was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law;
- The defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.
- The defendant's conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition;
- The conduct's risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence, where qualitative evidence may be used to prove harm to
- competition or actual harm;
- In a case where a defendant's business is a multisided platform, the defendant’s conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform;
- The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant;
- When relying on indirect evidence to show market power, a single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890; or
- When using direct evidence to show market power, a definition of ″relevant market″ where there is direct evidence of market power.
- When alleging an anticompetitive refusal to deal, either:
- Exempts from the provisions of this bill any small business, meaning an independently owned and operated business, the principal office of which is located in California, the officers of which are domiciled in California, and which, together with affiliates, has 100 or fewer employees and average annual gross receipts of ten million dollars ($10,000,000) or less over the three years prior to the filing of the complaint.
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California's antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors ″maximizing″ effective deterrence of antitrust violations in accordance with Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.
- Makes various findings and declarations.
COMMENTS
Since 1990, economists note that over 75 percent of industries in the United States have experienced significant market concentration. (Luke Hinrichs, Freedom from Domination: A Revival of Antitrust Law and the Will to Choose Democracy, The Flaw (Sept. 6, 2022) available at: https://theflaw.org/articles/freedom-from-domination-a-revival-of-antitrust-law-and-the-will-to-choose-democracy/.) Seeking to protect consumers from increased market consolidation, in 2022, the Legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with studying if updates to the state’s one hundred year antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, were necessary. (ACR 95 (Wick & Cunningham) Res. Chap. 147, Stats. 2022.) Of note, because the Cartwright Act generally focuses on market collusion and the conduct of multiple firms, the Commission was asked to study how to combat anticompetitive behavior by a single firm or actor.
In January of this year, the Law Revision Commission released its proposal to reform the Cartwright Act to address single firm conduct. This bill would enact those recommendations.
This bill adopts a ″hybrid″ approach to regulating single-firm conduct. This bill enacts the California Law Revision Commission's recommendations on regulating single-firm anticompetitive behavior. The bill adopts a series of findings regarding the need to police predatory anticompetitive behavior by single firms. The findings also reiterate California's decades old case law that holds that ″the Cartwright Act is 'broader in range and deeper in reach than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act″ (Cianci v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 920) and that the Cartwright Act is not directly modeled after the Sherman Act. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195.)
Secondly the bill enacts the actual prohibition on anticompetitive behavior that is, largely, modeled after Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This prohibition, in essence, states that it is unlawful for one or more persons to engage in the restraint of trade or to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, an industry. The bill then explicitly prohibits a court excusing anticompetitive behavior in one market simply because that behavior may have boosted competition in another.
Finally, the bill aims to provide guidance to the courts. In light of the Commission’s skepticism of some federal case law, the bill codifies a set of standards that may be considered by a court as evidence of potentially anticompetitive behavior, but, in order to prevent any of the factors from becoming a threshold condition to proving an antitrust case, explicitly states that a court need not find any of the factors present in a given case to find anticompetitive behavior. Finally, the bill codifies existing state caselaw that requires California courts to liberally interpret California's antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors ″maximizing″ effective deterrence of antitrust violations. (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.)
According to the Author
AB 1776 promotes a fair, competitive economy by strengthening California's antitrust law to reflect modern market realities. Competition drives innovation, lowers prices, raises wages, and expands opportunity for consumers, workers, and small businesses. California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, was enacted in 1907 and does not clearly address anti-competitive conduct by a single dominant company. As markets have consolidated, this gap has allowed companies to stifle competition, limit consumer choice, and suppress wages without clear accountability under state law.
In 2022, the legislature unanimously passed ACR 95 (Cunningham and Wicks), a bipartisan resolution recognizing that the Cartwright Act ″does not apply to monopoly conduct of single powerful companies″ and directing the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) to study updates. AB 1776 implements the CLRC's unanimous recommendations on single firm conduct. The Cartwright Act currently outlaws anti-competitive behavior by two or more companies and AB 1776 ensures this conduct by a single company is also illegal. The bill clarifies that California courts may consider federal antitrust precedent but are not bound by it, and that federal law does not preempt state law, consistent with longstanding principles.
By closing these gaps, AB 1776 aligns California with most other states and federal statutes that outlaw single-company anti-competitive conduct, reduces legal uncertainty, and strengthens the state's ability to protect competition. The bill does not prohibit business growth or monopolies—it targets anti-competitive conduct that harms consumers, workers, and small businesses and exacerbates California's affordability challenges.
Arguments in Support
This bill is supported by a coalition of consumer advocates, labor organizations, and small business trade organizations. In support of the measure a coalition of some of the state's largest labor organizations write:
California is the nation's wealthiest state and the fourth largest economy in the world, yet ranks 48th in the nation in terms of income inequality. 70% of Californians believe that the gap between the rich and poor is widening, and a similar share think the state government should do more to reduce the gap.
Corporate concentration indisputably contributes to these harmful trends. Across healthcare, technology, food and agriculture, entertainment, and consumer retail, market concentration has led to wage suppression, price inflation, and reduced opportunities for business growth. Since the 1990s, consolidation has affected roughly 75% of all U.S. industries, leaving in its wake fewer small businesses, weaker unions, job insecurity, and exploding income inequality.
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the ″Chicago School″ de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
Following an expansive three-year review of California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) – California's most prestigious nonjudicial legal body – made two key findings: First, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit illegal monopolization or unilateral, ″single firm″ anticompetitive conduct. Second, directly mirroring federal antitrust law would be both inconsistent with current California law and effectively import federal jurisprudence that has diluted the federal law's original scope and strength, limiting the effectiveness of state antitrust enforcement.4 The COMPETE Act, which is a verbatim codification of the CLRC's final unanimous recommendation, fixes this by allowing illegal monopolization claims to be brought in state court pursuant to California antitrust cases rooted in a century of law.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, non-partisan approach to reinvigorating competition.
Arguments in Opposition
A coalition of business trade groups, led by the Chamber of Commerce, opposes this measure. They write:
These uncertainty concerns are compounded by the bill's instruction to courts that well established and longstanding federal standards for evaluating business practices, designed to distinguish between lawful and unlawful competition are not required under California law. For example, AB 1776 rejects the economic and legal principles that assist courts in distinguishing between unlawful, below˗cost pricing and lawful price cutting, calling into question business’s ability to offer low prices aimed at gaining customers, which is one of the most frequently used competitive strategies, particularly among small businesses and new entrants. The bill also nullifies the commonsense rule created by the U.S. Supreme Court that a company generally has no duty to assist its rivals and a monopolist only has to do so in unique situations, potentially creating a California standard under which competitors are compelled to assist one another, rather than compete with one another.
Similarly, in a transparent effort to elevate business interests over consumers, the bill states that plaintiffs suing under AB 1776 need not show that ″[t]he rivals whose ability to compete has been reduced are as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant,″ thereby safeguarding the business of less efficient competitors. AB 1776 likewise disavows the notion that, in two-sided markets, courts should evaluate the competitive effects on both sides of the market, thereby ignoring the economic reality that consumers, on one side of a dual-sided market, often benefit from conduct that may harm competitors, on the other side of the market, and flipping on its head the ″consumer welfare standard″ that has guided courts and antitrust policy for decades. In another troubling and significant dismissal of federal law, AB 1776 states that ″one or more″ persons may be held liable for monopolization, whereas federal courts and economists have always recognized that monopolization – as the name implies – is the complete domination of a market by a single competitor.
AB 1776's disavowal of these guiding, federal standards will not only increase litigation and costs but leaves California courts with little guidance on how to deal with these complex issues. The bill's rejection of federal law is even more troubling given the California Supreme Court's repeated explanation that federal antitrust case law is ″helpful″ in interpreting the Cartwright Act. State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown but potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Unfair Competition Law Fund and Antitrust Fund) for investigation and enforcement of new single-firm antitrust violations within its Antitrust Section and Healthcare Rights Section. Single-firm monopolization cases are among the most complex and resource-intensive matters in antitrust law, typically requiring extensive economic analysis, expert consultation, and multi-year litigation. The DOJ reports that they currently work on federal monopolization cases with partners – other states or federal agencies. The DOJ would litigate monopolization under Cartwright in state court alone, and the costs may be large. A major unknown cost driver is the number of cases the DOJ would litigate under this new authority.
- Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures to the courts (Trial Court Trust Fund) from increased antitrust litigation. The bill broadens the scope of the Cartwright Act — which provides private plaintiffs treble damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief — to cover single-firm conduct for the first time. These changes are expected to increase the volume of private antitrust actions filed in state court, particularly in the initial years as courts develop an interpretive framework for the new provisions. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The state budget provides annual General Fund backfills to the Trial Court Trust Fund to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in 2025-26.
- Unknown, likely minor incarceration costs (General Fund). The Cartwright Act includes criminal penalties for violations; by expanding the Act's scope to single-firm conduct, the bill technically creates new crimes. However, criminal antitrust prosecutions are rare, and this provision is unlikely to generate meaningful incarceration costs.
The Legislative Analyst's Office recently warned of General Fund structural deficits of around $35 billion per year beginning in the 2027-28 fiscal year.
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Kalra, Lee, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
NO: Macedo, Dixon, Sanchez
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-4-0
YES: Wicks, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache
NO: Hoover, Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: May 18, 2026
CONSULTANT: Nicholas Liedtke / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0003048
Date of Hearing: April 29, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1776
Author:(Aguiar-Curry) – As Amended Ver:April 9, 2026
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 9 - 3 |
|
| ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill, the COMPETE Act, expands California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act, to prohibit anticompetitive conduct by a single firm, including monopolization, monopsonization, and single-firm restraints of trade. The bill is a codification of the California Law Revision Commission’s unanimous recommendation following a three-year study directed by ACR 95, (Cunningham and Wicks), Chapter 147, Statutes of 2022.
Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits one or more persons from acting in restraint of trade or from monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or maintaining a monopoly or monopsony in any part of trade or commerce — extending the Cartwright Act’s reach beyond coordinated conduct by two or more firms to cover single-firm conduct for the first time.
- Requires that anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications be evaluated within the same relevant market, prohibiting defendants from offsetting harm in one market with claimed benefits in another.
- Lists ten factors that may constitute evidence of a violation but provides that none is required to establish liability, including below-cost pricing, recoupment likelihood, market share thresholds, alteration of a prior course of dealing, and the efficiency of harmed rivals.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Unknown but potentially significant costs to the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Unfair Competition Law Fund and Antitrust Fund) for investigation and enforcement of new single-firm antitrust violations within its Antitrust Section and Healthcare Rights Section. Single-firm monopolization cases are among the most complex and resource-intensive matters in antitrust law, typically requiring extensive economic analysis, expert consultation, and multi-year litigation. The DOJ reports that they currently work on federal monopolization cases with partners – other states or federal agencies. The DOJ would litigate monopolization under Cartwright in state court alone, and the costs may be large. A major unknown cost driver is the number of cases the DOJ would litigate under this new authority.
- Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures to the courts (Trial Court Trust Fund) from increased antitrust litigation. The bill broadens the scope of the Cartwright Act — which provides private plaintiffs treble damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief — to cover single-firm conduct for the first time. These changes are expected to increase the volume of private antitrust actions filed in state court, particularly in the initial years as courts develop an interpretive framework for the new provisions. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The state budget provides annual General Fund backfills to the Trial Court Trust Fund to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in 2025-26.
- Unknown, likely minor incarceration costs (General Fund). The Cartwright Act includes criminal penalties for violations; by expanding the Act’s scope to single-firm conduct, the bill technically creates new crimes. However, criminal antitrust prosecutions are rare, and this provision is unlikely to generate meaningful incarceration costs.
The Legislative Analyst’s Office recently warned of General Fund structural deficits of around $35 billion per year beginning in the 2027-28 fiscal year.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author, the Cartwright Act was enacted in 1907 and does not address anticompetitive conduct by a single dominant company. The author asserts that, as markets have consolidated, this gap has allowed companies to stifle competition, limit consumer choice, and suppress wages. The author describes this bill as closing this gap by implementing the California Law Revision Commission’s recommendations.
- Background. The Cartwright Act enacted in 1907 is California’s primary antitrust statute. It prohibits combinations of two or more persons acting in restraint of trade, authorizes public enforcement by the Attorney General and district attorneys, and provides a private right of action for treble damages. California courts have held that the Cartwright Act is
“broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act” (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920), and that the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the Sherman Act, such that federal antitrust case law is not conclusive in interpreting it. The federal Sherman Act contains two operative provisions. Section 1, like the Cartwright Act, prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Section 2 separately prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize by a single firm. The Cartwright Act has no analog to the Sherman Act’s Section 2; single-firm conduct that does not involve concerted action with another person is not actionable under the Act. The closest state-law analog, the Unfair Practices Act (Business and Professions Code section 17000 et seq.), prohibits specific enumerated practices such as below-cost pricing, locality discrimination, and loss leaders, but does not provide a general framework for evaluating single-firm conduct in relation to its effect on competition.
In 2022, the Legislature enacted ACR 95, which directed the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) to study potential reforms to the Cartwright Act, particularly with respect to anticompetitive conduct by a single firm. After a three-year study involving eight working groups of attorneys and economists, public comment, and consultation with the California Lawyers Association, the CLRC released its final recommendation in January 2026. The CLRC considered and rejected three alternative approaches: (a) directly mirroring Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which it concluded would import federal judicial doctrines that have narrowed antitrust enforcement; (b) creating an entirely novel framework, which the CLRC concluded would generate excessive litigation uncertainty absent any interpretive case law; and (c) adopting industry-specific rules, such as tech-sector or “dominant company” statutes. The CLRC ultimately recommended a hybrid approach that draws selectively on federal statutory and case law while preserving California’s ability to depart from federal doctrines the CLRC viewed as overly restrictive. This bill codifies the CLRC’s unanimous recommendation.
The bill departs from federal judicial doctrine under Section 2 of the Sherman Act in several respects. Section 2 itself contains no market share threshold, no predatory pricing test, and no refusal-to-deal framework; these requirements have been developed by federal courts over decades of case law. The bill also instructs courts that they may consider federal antitrust case law in interpreting the Cartwright Act. The bill lists ten factors that may constitute evidence of a violation but provides that none is required to establish liability. Given that federal antitrust case law is not binding on California courts under the bill, and in the absence of a developed body of California case law interpreting these new provisions, it remains unclear what standards courts will apply.
- Support and Opposition. This bill is supported by a broad coalition of labor organizations, consumer advocates, and small business groups, including the California Federation of Labor Unions, SEIU California, the California Nurses Association, Consumer Attorneys of California, Consumer Federation of California, Small Business Majority, and the California District Attorneys Association. Supporters argue that corporate consolidation across healthcare, technology, agriculture, entertainment, and retail has driven wage suppression, price inflation, and reduced opportunities for small businesses, and that the Cartwright Act’s current inability to reach single-firm conduct leaves Californians without meaningful recourse against monopolization in state court. Supporters contend that the bill codifies the CLRC’s unanimous recommendation, aligns California with federal law and most other states in prohibiting single-firm anticompetitive conduct, and appropriately declines to import federal judicial doctrines that have weakened antitrust enforcement since the 1970s.
The bill is opposed by the California Chamber of Commerce, which describes it as a cost driver, and a broad coalition of industry groups representing manufacturing, retail, technology, agriculture, healthcare, life sciences, financial services, real estate, and construction, among other sectors. Opponents argue that the bill rejects over 100 years of federal legal precedent; that its use of the term “restraint of trade” in the single-firm context has never been defined by any court or statute and creates definitional uncertainty; that the absence of a market share threshold subjects small and medium-sized firms to potential liability and compliance costs they do not face under federal law; and that the bill’s ten-factor list provides insufficient guidance to courts and businesses as to what conduct is lawful. Opponents further contend that the bill’s rejection of federal doctrines will chill pro-competitive practices such as loyalty programs, rebate programs, discount drug pricing, and exclusive licensing arrangements, generate increased litigation and defensive legal costs, and ultimately raise prices for consumers. Opponents also note that the CLRC’s own Single Firm Conduct Working Group and the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section raised concerns about the absence of adequate limiting principles in the statutory text.
Analysis Prepared by: Shiran Zohar / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 7, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1776
Author:(Aguiar-Curry) – As Amended Ver:March 23, 2026
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
KEY ISSUE: should California antitrust law be reformed to prohibit single firm conduct that is monopolistic or restraining trade?
SYNOPSIS
As a result of growing corporate concentration across a host of industries, in 2022, the Legislature enacted ACR 95 (Wicks & Cunningham) Res. Chap. 147, Stats. 2022, which tasked the California Law Revision Commission with studying potential reforms to the Cartwright Act, the state’s antitrust law. After three years of extensive work by the California Law Revision Commission, in January 2026, the Commission released its recommendations for amending the law to address anticompetitive behavior by a single firm. Although the federal Sherman Act does police monopolistic behavior by single firms, the Cartwright Act does not. The Commission recommended adopting provisions similar, but not identical, to Section 2 of the Sherman Act to address monopolistic behavior in California Law.
This bill represents the legislative vehicle to enact the Commission’s recommendations. The bill has three primary aspects. First, the bill makes findings and declarations that, among other provisions, reiterate case law holding that the Cartwright Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act.” (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 903, 920.) Secondly, the bill prohibits one or more persons from acting in a manner that restrains trade or seeks to monopolize a market. Finally, the bill adopts ten provisions that are designed to help steer judicial interpretation of the statute that are rooted in federal case law but provides that the provisions are merely advisory and do not constitute threshold questions for judicial review.
This bill is supported by a broad coalition of consumer groups, labor organizations, and small business advocates. The proponents of the bill argue that corporate consolidation is one of the predominant factors driving inflation and making life unaffordable for hard working Californians. This bill is vociferously opposed by the California Chamber of Commerce and dozens of industry trade groups from a wide cross section of California’s economy. The opposition contends the bill is unnecessary, vague, overrides decades of case law, and is a boon to the plaintiff’s bar. Proposed amendments are technical and address a cross-reference error.
SUMMARY: Adopts the California Law Revision Commission’s recommended updates to the Cartwright Act to address single firm anticompetitive conduct. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that it is unlawful for one or more persons to act, cause, take, or direct measures, actions, or events that are either of the following:
- In restraint of trade, which “restraint of trade” includes, but is not limited to, any actions, measures, or acts, as specified, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons; or
- To monopolize or monopsonize, to attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, to maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize in any part of trade or commerce.
- Requires that anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications of the challenged conduct be evaluated within the same relevant market.
- Provides that any of the following may constitute evidence of a violation of 1), but that liability does not require a finding, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
- The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct;
- The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons;
- The defendant’s price for a product or service was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law;
- The defendant’s conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition;
- The conduct’s risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence;
- In a case where a defendant’s business is a multisided platform, the defendant’s conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform;
- In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue;
- The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant;
- A single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890; or
- A definition of “relevant market” where there is direct evidence of market power.
- Requires courts to liberally interpret California’s antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors “maximizing” effective deterrence of antitrust violations in accordance with Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.
- Finds and declares the following:
- The purpose of the provisions of this bill is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition, which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions;
- Protecting competition includes protecting competition between businesses when they compete for workers by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices that impede workers’ freedom to choose employment;
- The California Supreme Court has determined that the Cartwright Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach” than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 920);
- The California Supreme Court has found the Cartwright Act is not modeled on the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore interpretations of federal antitrust law are not conclusive (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195);
- California courts have recognized that the Cartwright Act departs from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in many respects, including, but not limited to, inclusion of indirect purchaser recovery, use of a proximate cause test for Cartwright Act standing, recognition of broader harms and per se conduct, lower actionable market shares, structured rule of reason analysis, and differing burdens of proof;
- Federal case law on the subject of antitrust law is not binding on California state courts, but courts may consider federal case law as persuasive authority to the extent they find it consistent with California law, as specified; and
- California agrees with the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in recognizing that unilateral action and multiparty actions, horizontal and vertical relationships, and various forms of corporate entities can interfere with free and fair competition, as reflected in the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2023 Merger Guidelines.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes, in federal law, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. (15 U.S.C. Sections 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. Section 1.)
- Provides, under the Sherman Act, that every person who monopolizes, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. (15 U.S.C. Section 2.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. Section 15c.)
- Establishes the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. Sections 12-27.)
- Defines, under the Clayton Act, “antitrust laws” to include the Sherman Act, certain provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Clayton Act, as amended. (15 U.S.C. Section 12.)
- Makes illegal, under the Clayton Act, certain exclusive dealing agreements, tying contracts, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and interlocking directorates, as specified. (15 U.S.C. Sections 13-14.)
- Prohibits every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, including specified noncompete clauses, subject to specified exemptions. (Business and Professions Code Section 16600 et seq.)
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Business and Professions Code Section 16700 et seq.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of, merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any combination of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Business and Professions Code Section 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Business and Professions Code Section 16726.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by the Cartwright Act, to sue in any court having jurisdiction in the county where the defendant resides or is found, or any agent resides or is found, or where service may be obtained, without respect to the amount in controversy, and to recover three times the damages sustained by him or her, interest on his or her actual damages, as specified, and preliminary or permanent injunctive relief when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief is granted by courts generally under the laws of this state and the rules governing these proceedings, and be awarded a reasonable attorneys’ fee together with the costs of the suit. (Business and Professions Code Section 16750.)
- Establishes the Unfair Practices Act, which is intended to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. (Business and Professions Code Section 17000 et seq.)
- Prohibits, under the Unfair Practices Act, a range of behavior that reduces competition in pricing, including specified locality discrimination in pricing, sales under costs or loss leaders made with the intent of injuring competitors or destroying competition, and contracts for the performance of warranty service and repair below the cost of the service or repair. (Business and Professions Code Section 17040 et seq.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: Since 1990, economists note that over 75 percent of industries in the United States have experienced significant market concentration. (Luke Hinrichs, Freedom from Domination: A Revival of Antitrust Law and the Will to Choose Democracy, The Flaw (Sept. 6, 2022) available at: https://theflaw.org/articles/freedom-from-domination-a-revival-of-antitrust-law-and-the-will-to-choose-democracy/.) Seeking to protect consumers from increased market consolidation, in 2022, the Legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with studying if updates to the state’s one hundred year antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, were necessary. (ACR 95 (Wick & Cunningham) Res Chap. 147, Stats. 2022.) Of note, because the Cartwright Act generally focuses on market collusion and the conduct of multiple firms, the Commission was asked to study how to combat anticompetitive behavior by a single firm or actor.
In January of this year, the Law Revision Commission released its proposal to reform the Cartwright Act to address single firm conduct. This bill would enact those recommendations. In support of this measure, the author states:
AB 1776 promotes a fair, competitive economy by strengthening California’s antitrust law to reflect modern market realities. Competition drives innovation, lowers prices, raises wages, and expands opportunity for consumers, workers, and small businesses. California’s antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, was enacted in 1907 and does not clearly address anti-competitive conduct by a single dominant company. As markets have consolidated, this gap has allowed companies to stifle competition, limit consumer choice, and suppress wages without clear accountability under state law.
In 2022, the legislature unanimously passed ACR 95 (Cunningham and Wicks), a bipartisan resolution recognizing that the Cartwright Act “does not apply to monopoly conduct of single powerful companies” and directing the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) to study updates. AB 1776 implements the CLRC’s unanimous recommendations on single firm conduct. The Cartwright Act currently outlaws anti-competitive behavior by two or more companies and AB 1776 ensures this conduct by a single company is also illegal. The bill clarifies that California courts may consider federal antitrust precedent but are not bound by it, and that federal law does not preempt state law, consistent with longstanding principles.
By closing these gaps, AB 1776 aligns California with most other states and federal statutes that outlaw single-company anti-competitive conduct, reduces legal uncertainty, and strengthens the state’s ability to protect competition. The bill does not prohibit business growth or monopolies—it targets anti-competitive conduct that harms consumers, workers, and small businesses and exacerbates California’s affordability challenges.
Existing antitrust law, the Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act. California’s main antitrust statute is the Cartwright Act, codified at Business and Professions Code Sections 16700 to 16770. Enacted in 1907, the Act closely parallels Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1), which prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Like its federal counterpart, the Cartwright Act is designed to preserve and promote free competition in commercial markets. However, California courts have construed it as “broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act.” (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 903, 920.)
Business and Professions Code Section 16720(e)(4) defines a “trust” to include combinations of agreements in which competitors “agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.” In other words, the Cartwright Act proscribes even indirect or subtle forms of coordinated behavior that may affect market prices or restrict trade.
To violate the Act, conduct must typically involve:
- An agreement or concerted action between two or more people (so-called “single firm conduct” is not encompassed by the Act); and
- Conduct that unreasonably restrains trade.
Under the Cartwright Act, an “agreement” or “concerted action” refers to a mutual understanding or coordinated conduct between two or more persons to restrain trade. It is the foundational element of any antitrust claim under both the Cartwright Act and the federal Sherman Act Section 1. (Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 928 (Cartwright Act requires concerted action); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher (2006) 547 U.S. 1, 5 (federal antitrust law also requires concerted action).)
An agreement under the Cartwright Act does not require a written contract or direct evidence of collusion. Somewhat unique to California is that courts recognize that circumstantial evidence may be used to infer concerted action, particularly because direct evidence of collusion is often unavailable in antitrust cases. (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146.) The concerted action may be established through indirect mechanisms, such as the exchange of competitively sensitive information, market signaling, or the shared use of pricing algorithms that lead to parallel pricing behavior. Once concerted action is established (either through direct or circumstantial evidence), the court turns to the second prong: whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade. Under California law, a restraint is considered unreasonable if it harms competition, rather than merely harming individual competitors. (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 269.) (“It is often repeated in antitrust cases that the law seeks to protect competition, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned.”) (internal quotations omitted).) Courts evaluate this through either the per se rule or the rule of reason. Certain types of restraints are deemed per se unlawful—such as horizontal price fixing, market allocation, and bid rigging—because they are presumed to always harm competition and lack any legitimate justification. Other restraints are analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires a case-specific inquiry into the conduct’s actual or likely anticompetitive effects, the parties’ market power, and any procompetitive justifications. (Palsson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 934-35.)
Of note to this bill, the Cartwright Act, while mirroring Section 1 of the Sherman Act, does not contain an analogue to Section 2 of the Sherman Act which addresses the monopolistic behavior of a single firm. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states, “that every person who monopolizes, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine…” (15 U.S.C. Section 2.) Given the relatively short and general nature of the actual Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Act’s present understanding is largely the product of 100 years of federal case law and guidance documents promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission. For example, the requirement that a firm control at least fifty percent of a market to even trigger a potential violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act comes from Federal Tade Commission guidance interpreting caselaw. (Federal Trade Commission, Guide to Antitrust Laws, Single Firm Conduct, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined.) Similarly, other threshold questions to prove monopolistic conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act originate in federal case law including requirements that conduct make little economic sense outside of thwarting competition (Viamedia, Inc. Vs. Comcast Corp. (7th Cir. 2020) 951 F.3d 429), that predatory conduct involves selling products below cost (Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco (1993) 509 U.S. 209), and that corporate efficiencies are to be considered when evaluating anticompetitive behavior. (Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Laboratories (SDNY 1996) 920 F.Supp. 455.)
The closest analogue in state law to Section 2 of the Sherman Act is the state’s Unfair Practices Act. (Business and Professions Code Section 17000 et seq.) That statute explicitly prohibits below cost pricing, locality discrimination, some rebate programs, and loss leaders. However, unlike the Sherman Act, the Unfair Practices Act does not examine overall competition within a marketplace. Accordingly, anticompetitive conduct by a single firm conduct that does not fall into one of the Act’s enumerated prohibitions is not policed by state law.
The California Law Revision Commission’s antitrust study process. Given that California has seen a significant increase in firm consolidation in recent years, particularly in the tech, oil and gas, and health care sectors, in 2022, the Legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission with examining the Cartwright Act and proposing updates to the Act to reflect the modern economy. Following the enactment of the aforementioned ACR 95, the California Law Revision Commission undertook a three-year process of studying the topic, hearing from subject matter experts, accepting extensive public comment on various proposals, and crafting the recommendation that this bill seeks to codify.
As a part of the review of the Cartwright Act, the Commission assembled eight working groups of subject matter experts (including attorneys and economists), worked with the California Lawyers Association to seek input from their members regarding antitrust law, and held several panel presentations regarding the state of antitrust law. Through that process, the Commission was presented with three alternatives for handling single firm conduct. (Recommendation Antitrust Study: Single Firm Conduct (Jan. 2026) B-750 California Law Revision Report (2026) pg. 3.) The first approach presented to the Commission would have mirrored Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Commission rejected this approach believing that some of the case law interpreting that section was too narrow and would have frustrated enforcement of the new section of the Cartwright Act. (Id at 13.) Conversely, the Commission also rejected an option that would have created an entirely novel approach to regulating single firm conduct. The Commission rejected this approach fearing that any new antitrust provisions without any meaningful interpretive case law would present a litigation nightmare. (Ibid.) The Commission also rejected adopting industry specific laws, notably tech industry specific laws, as well as standalone laws for “dominant companies.” (Id. At 10.)
After rejecting the inadequate or riskier approaches discussed above, the Commission “settled on a hybrid approach that selectively draws on federal statutory and law to ground the new California standard while reflecting California’s values and enforcement priorities.” (Id. At 12.)
This bill adopts a “hybrid” approach to regulating single-firm conduct. This bill enacts the California Law Revision Commission’s recommendations on regulating single-firm anticompetitive behavior. The bill adopts a series of findings regarding the need to police predatory anticompetitive behavior by single firms. The findings also reiterate California’s decades old case law that holds that “the Cartwright Act is ‘broader in range and deeper in reach’ than the federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act” (Cianci v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 920) and that the Cartwright Act is not directly modeled after the Sherman Act. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1195.)
Secondly the bill enacts the actual prohibition on anticompetitive behavior that is, largely, modeled after Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This prohibition, in essence, states that it is unlawful for one or more persons to engage in the restraint of trade or to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, an industry. The bill then explicitly prohibits a court excusing anticompetitive behavior in one market simply because that behavior may have boosted competition in another.
Finally, the bill aims to provide guidance to the courts. In light of the Commission’s skepticism of some federal case law, the bill codifies a set of standards that may be considered by a court as evidence of potentially anticompetitive behavior, but, in order to prevent any of the factors from becoming a threshold condition to proving an antitrust case, explicitly states that a court need not find any of the factors present in a given case to find anticompetitive behavior. These factors include:
- The unilateral conduct of the defendant altered or terminated a prior course of dealing between the defendant and a person subject to the exclusionary conduct.
- The defendant treated persons subject to the exclusionary conduct differently than the defendant treated other persons.
- The defendant’s price for a product or service was below any measure of the costs to the defendant for providing the product or service required under federal antitrust law.
- The defendant’s conduct makes no economic sense apart from its tendency to harm competition.
- The conduct’s risk of harming competition or actual harm must be proven with quantitative evidence.
- In a case where a defendant’s business is a multisided platform, the defendant’s conduct presents harm to competition on more than one side of the multisided platform, or the harm to competition on one side of the multisided platform outweighs any benefits to competition on any other side of the multisided platform.
- In a claim of predatory pricing, the defendant is likely to recoup the losses it sustains from below-cost pricing of the products or services at issue.
- The rival whose ability to compete has been reduced or harmed is as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant.
- A single firm or person has or might achieve a market share or has market power at or above a threshold recognized under Section 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code.
- A definition of “relevant market” where there is direct evidence of market power.
Finally, the bill codifies existing state caselaw that requires California courts to liberally interpret California’s antitrust laws to best promote free and fair competition and be mindful that California favors “maximizing” effective deterrence of antitrust violations. (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758.)
What constitutes “single firm conduct?” As discussed above, much of California’s existing antitrust law focuses on anticompetitive behavior between two or more firms seeking to control a market. For example, if two rival grocery chains colluded to set prices at a level that would undermine competitors, that would be a violation of the existing law. However, if a single entity undertook such conduct, it would not be subject to a Cartwright Act violation. This bill then aims to police the conduct of one firm.
Several illustrative examples of anticompetitive single firm conduct can be found in the public comment letters written in support of the Commission’s final recommendation. For example, several tech platforms that operate smart phone application stores are accused of prominently displaying their own applications at the top of search results and deprioritizing search results for competitors’ applications. One letter noted that an app store prioritized its file storage application over the rival Dropbox even when a person explicitly searched for “Dropbox.” (Recommendation Antitrust Study: Single Firm Conduct (Jan. 2026) B-750 California Law Revision Report, supra, at p. 36.) Similarly, some firms have been accused of refusing to provide access to software platforms necessary to develop applications that work on a given operating system in order to stymie competition with the company’s in-house systems. (Ibid.) Or, in the case of a company like Meta, some firms are simply accused of purchasing their rivals to stamp out any potential competition.
Other more traditional forms of anticompetitive behavior include a large company selling products at a price below the cost of production to ensure that smaller companies must leave the market, backing out of prior agreements to undercut a competitor’s access to portion of a market, or trying to create exclusivity agreements to block competitors from gaining access to customers.
While some of this conduct does involve other parties and may be punishable under the existing law, much of this conduct is undertaken by a single party. The opposition to this measure contends that the Unfair Practices Act already regulates this conduct. This is indeed true. However, to counter this point, as stated in the Law Revision Commission’s report recommending this measure, the Commission notes that because the Unfair Practices Act focus on specific conduct and not the impact to competition, the Act is both overbroad and yet too narrow to properly address single firm conduct. (Id. At 4.) Furthermore, the Unfair Practices Act provides for much lower penalties than the Cartwright Act and as such may not provide the necessary deterrence to large companies.
Regardless of the nature of an antitrust case, properly defining the relevant market in the initial pleadings is critical. One of the most critical aspects of any antitrust case is defining the “market” being impacted by the anticompetitive behavior. As the Federal Trade Commission notes, “Defining the market is the first and in many respects the most important question in antitrust.” (Robert Rogowsky &William Shughart II, Market Definition in Antitrust Analysis, Federal Trade Commission (Oct. 1982) available at: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/market-definition-antitrust-analysis-comment/wp077.pdf.) The market analysis is critical in all types of antitrust litigation, and in order for any case to have a modicum of hope for success, must be properly plead as a part of the initial filing of the case. (Ibid.) Accordingly, most antitrust cases require the plaintiff and their counsel to extensively consult with expert economists before a case is ever filed. The failure to consult with economic experts will almost certainly result in a market definition that will not survive a motion to dismiss the matter. Impressing the importance of properly defining a relevant market, the Federal Trade Commission notes, “In many antitrust cases the outcome falls neatly from the resolution of the market definition issue.” (Id at p. 2.)
As it relates to single firm conduct, properly pleading and scoping the relevant market is especially important as a firm’s percentage of the market share is likely to indicate just how much power a firm has to manipulate the market and stifle competition. For example, assuming one has properly plead the market for retail coffee sales, a neighborhood coffee shop is unlikely to ever have sufficient market power to truly undermine competition, whereas Starbucks or Dunkin Donuts may possess sufficient power to manipulate the market. This is why, as noted above, federal law typically requires a threshold showing that a firm occupies at least 50 percent of the market before a single firm antitrust case can proceed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
This bill, notably, does not include a market share threshold. The opposition to this measure, a myriad of business organizations led by the California Chamber of Commerce, note that the lack of a market threshold in this measure is a fatal flaw. Writing in opposition to this bill, the coalition notes, “AB 1776 is deeply flawed in that it has no market share thresholds in its application. For decades, courts and economists have been aligned in the basic economic view that an individual business with a small share of the market is far less able to harm competition than businesses with large market shares.” To counter this point, the proponents of this bill note case law interpreting the Cartwright Act, which again currently only applies to multiple firms, held that even though two firms only controlled 20 percent of a relevant market, their exclusive dealing arrangement was sufficiently anticompetitive as to violate the Act. (Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 326.)
Returning to the coffee shop example, the proponents would argue that if the market is defined as the statewide market for coffee shops the small shop can attempt to engage in a range of anticompetitive behavior and will likely only undermine its own business. However, if the market is defined as coffee shops on the main street of a small town, the company’s anticompetitive behavior may impact competition, even if the coffee shop still controls a relatively small portion of that smaller market. Accordingly, the proponents of the bill (and the Law Revision Commission) argue no market size threshold is necessary. Nonetheless, the opponents’ argument that lacking a market threshold may result in litigation, especially in the early years of this bill taking effect, is not without merit. Unfortunately, the opposition has not provided a market size threshold they could accept, and the Committee sees no need to create one at this point in the legislative process. However, should the opposition present such a threshold, the author may wish to consider a reasonable market threshold that would limit the single firm conduct provisions of this bill to firms that actually have the market size and power to truly undermine competition.
Opponents fear that prohibiting conduct that is considered a “restraint of trade” will undermine existing business practices. The opposition to this bill argues that the hybrid approach utilized by the California Law Revision Commission, most notably adding the term “restraint of trade” to the prohibition of the bill confuses the state of the law, especially given that Section 2 of the Sherman Act omits such language. On this point the opposition argues, “While the “restraint of trade” term used in AB 1776 is a familiar one in antitrust law, no court or statute has ever defined how that terms applies to single-firm conduct, and the bill makes no effort to do so. Restraints of trade have always been evaluated in terms of two or more firms agreeing to take certain actions.” While the opposition coalition is indeed correct that the bill does not define this term, decades of case law have. Although referencing a contract and arising in the context of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in 1918 Justice Brandeis noted, “Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition [emphasis added].” (Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States (1918) 246 U.S. 231, 238.)
Applying similar logic to this bill, every company in a capitalist society acts in a manner that may restrain competition, in that every company acts to undermine their competitors and boost their bottom line. Although not defined in this bill, it is highly likely a court examining any case that should arise under the proposed statute would look at a restraint’s actual impact on competition. For example, in opposition to this bill California Life Sciences argues that because the bill implicates actions that “establish or settle price” they will be committing antitrust violations by participating in discount drug programs or by offering price rebates to MediCal. However, because the actual impact on competition is negligible, in reality it is highly unlikely discounting drugs so that they can be purchased by persons who cannot otherwise afford their medication would be deemed anticompetitive. Similarly, while such conduct may technically be a restraint, it is nearly impossible to imagine that a court would hold a company liable for participating in a government program. This is especially true when comparing discounting drugs for low-income Californians to some of the conduct mentioned in the California Law Revision Commissions report, including intentionally burying search results of competitors products or limiting the interoperability of a company’s products.
Opponents fear the lack of clarity in this measure will lead to unchecked litigation risks. A repeated theme of the opposition’s arguments against this measure is that the bill is too vague and “rejects over 100 years of legal precedent.” Much of this consternation is aimed at the proposed Section 16732 of the Business and Professions Code which aims to provide judges guidance in interpreting the bill. This section of the bill appears to originate from the Law Revision Commission’s consternation that federal case law interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act will unreasonably narrow the applicability of this statute. Thus, in the guidance provisions, the bill states that “establishing liability shall not require a finding…of the following.” The bill then lists the ten factors articulated above.
While bills providing guidance to the courts is not novel, the approach utilized in this bill is somewhat new. Instead of directly guiding the court to apply certain precedent, for example specifying that pricing a good at 15 percent or less than a competitor is presumptive evidence of a violation, the bill essentially lists factors from federal case law that the Commission is leery of the courts utilizing as threshold questions when evaluating an antitrust case. By telling the courts what factors they may, but need not, examine the bill does not provide the courts or the businesses implementing this bill much guidance of what conduct will be considered anticompetitive. While any guidance to the courts on a complex area of law is advisable, the author may wish to consider amending proposed Section 16732 to provide a more affirmative set of factors that a court should consider when evaluating a case rather than a set of factors the court may but need not rely upon, especially when considering that the Law Revision Commission looked askance at many of the cases that developed those factors in its public report.
The opposition also contends the bill in print is a “plaintiffs’ lawyer’s wish list.” While complaining about trial lawyers is a well-worn lobbying technique, despite being linked to a private right of action, this bill poses far less of a risk of frivolous litigation than other areas of the law. For example, unlike a case arising under Proposition 65 or the Americans with Disabilities Act, where a plaintiffs’ lawyer need only read a product’s ingredient list or measure stripes in a parking lot to find a violation of the law and file suit, as the opposition coalition letter frequently notes, antitrust cases are far more complex. As noted above, without consulting with (and therefore paying in advance) an economist, most antitrust cases will die at the pleading stage. Additionally, the opposition provides no evidence that the state’s existing laws regarding anticompetitive practices are rife with abuse. For example, the provisions of the Cartwright Act dealing with collusion have not produced a wave of frivolous litigation. The same can be said for the Unfair Competition Law and the Unfair Practices Act. Between the complexity of these cases, the sizable upfront costs of antitrust litigation, and the history of litigation under the existing Cartwright Act, the opposition’s fears seem overstated.
Despite the doomsday scenario’s presented by the opposition to this bill, the nature of antitrust law, the history of the existing law, and the realities of 100 years of case precedent suggest this bill will not undermine prescription drug benefits, airline loyalty programs, or any other consumer-friendly tools utilized by businesses to gain an advantage over competitors. The opposition also contends that this bill will end a number of consumer-friendly, pro-competition practices. As noted above, the life sciences industry contends this bill will prohibit discounting drugs. Other opponents have also argued this bill will eliminate consumer loyalty programs, regional pricing discounts, and potentially even releasing a film direct to a streaming service.
As noted above, when reviewing antitrust claims, courts tend to look at the actual impact on competition from the alleged conduct. Given that airline loyalty programs are one of the many ways that air carriers compete with one another to earn customers’ business it is difficult to see how this bill would ban the practice. Indeed, the practice has not been successfully challenged under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and given that most airline loyalty programs partner with banks to issue credit cards (thus introducing a second firm into the mix) the programs appear to be legal under the existing Cartwright Act. This is largely the case because while technically a restraint, these programs promote competition. Using Justice Brandeis’ logic, if a restraint actually promotes competition, it is not unlawful. A similar analysis would hold true for many of the worst case scenarios detailed by the opposition.
In totality, much of the business community’s opposition to this bill appears rooted in the fact that this bill takes aim at potential anticompetitive misconduct of some of the largest businesses in the state. Given that one of the many drivers behind the original ACR that started the Law Revision Commissions work was the practices of social media companies who, for the most part, do not even charge for their products and yet make billions in revenue annually, it is understandable that industry does not want to see changes to the existing law. However, in an era of ever increasing consumer prices and corporate consolidation, enacting a new tool to promote market competition and lower prices is a reasonable policy for the Legislature to consider.
Proposed amendments correct a cross-reference omission. The bill in print is a product of the California Law Revision Commission’s draft proposal with stylistic edits from the Office of Legislative Counsel. When Legislative Counsel drafted the measure, they revised the bill and broke one section of the bill into two, thus the bill contains four sections of code opposed to the three included in the Law Revision Commission’s draft. The bill’s codified findings reference the other sections of the bill, however, the new section drafted by Legislative Counsel was omitted from those cross references. The author proposes the following technical amendment to the proposed Section 16730 of the Business and Professions Code to remedy the error:
16730. (a) The purpose of this section and Sections 16731, and 16732, and 16733 is the promotion and protection of free and fair competition, which is fundamental to a healthy marketplace that protects all trade participants, including workers and consumers, and to an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: This bill is supported by a coalition of consumer advocates, labor organizations, and small business trade organizations. In support of the measure a coalition of some of the state’s largest labor organizations write:
California is the nation's wealthiest state and the fourth largest economy in the world, yet ranks 48th in the nation in terms of income inequality.1 70% of Californians believe that the gap between the rich and poor is widening, and a similar share think the state government should do more to reduce the gap.
Corporate concentration indisputably contributes to these harmful trends. Across healthcare, technology, food and agriculture, entertainment, and consumer retail, market concentration has led to wage suppression, price inflation, and reduced opportunities for business growth. Since the 1990s, consolidation has affected roughly 75% of all U.S. industries, leaving in its wake fewer small businesses, weaker unions, job insecurity, and exploding income inequality.
Without a state law against illegal monopolization, Californians may only use antitrust law to challenge illegal monopolies in federal court pursuant to weakened federal antitrust law. The erosion of federal antitrust laws was not accidental. Beginning in the late 1960s, an intellectual movement known as the “Chicago School” de-emphasized market competition in favor of short-sighted economic gains. Over the next several decades, big business co-opted and promoted Chicago School thinking as a tool to advance its interests. Big businesses triumphed, and antitrust enforcement plummeted.
Following an expansive three-year review of California’s antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) – California’s most prestigious nonjudicial legal body – made two key findings: First, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit illegal monopolization or unilateral, “single firm” anticompetitive conduct. Second, directly mirroring federal antitrust law would be both inconsistent with current California law and effectively import federal jurisprudence that has diluted the federal law’s original scope and strength, limiting the effectiveness of state antitrust enforcement.4 The COMPETE Act, which is a verbatim codification of the CLRC’s final unanimous recommendation, fixes this by allowing illegal monopolization claims to be brought in state court pursuant to California antitrust cases rooted in a century of law.
By every measure, the COMPETE Act reflects a consensus-based, non-partisan approach to reinvigorating competition.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: As noted, a coalition of business trade groups, led by the Chamber of Commerce, opposes this measure. In addition to the above mentioned comments, they write:
These uncertainty concerns are compounded by the bill’s instruction to courts that well established and longstanding federal standards for evaluating business practices, designed to distinguish between lawful and unlawful competition are not required under California law. For example, AB 1776 rejects the economic and legal principles that assist courts in distinguishing between unlawful, below˗cost pricing and lawful price cutting, calling into question business’s ability to offer low prices aimed at gaining customers, which is one of the most frequently used competitive strategies, particularly among small businesses and new entrants. The bill also nullifies the commonsense rule created by the U.S. Supreme Court that a company generally has no duty to assist its rivals and a monopolist only has to do so in unique situations, potentially creating a California standard under which competitors are compelled to assist one another, rather than compete with one another.
Similarly, in a transparent effort to elevate business interests over consumers, the bill states that plaintiffs suing under AB 1776 need not show that “[t]he rivals whose ability to compete has been reduced are as efficient, or nearly as efficient, as the defendant,” thereby safeguarding the business of less efficient competitors. AB 1776 likewise disavows the notion that, in two-sided markets, courts should evaluate the competitive effects on both sides of the market, thereby ignoring the economic reality that consumers, on one side of a dual-sided market, often benefit from conduct that may harm competitors, on the other side of the market, and flipping on its head the “consumer welfare standard” that has guided courts and antitrust policy for decades. In another troubling and significant dismissal of federal law, AB 1776 states that “one or more” persons may be held liable for monopolization, whereas federal courts and economists have always recognized that monopolization – as the name implies – is the complete domination of a market by a single competitor.
AB 1776’s disavowal of these guiding, federal standards will not only increase litigation and costs but leaves California courts with little guidance on how to deal with these complex issues. The bill’s rejection of federal law is even more troubling given the California Supreme Court’s repeated explanation that federal antitrust case law is “helpful” in interpreting the Cartwright Act. State of California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1147, 1164.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Economic Liberties Project
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
California Association for Microenterprise Opportunity
California District Attorneys Association
California Federation of Labor Unions, AFL-CIO
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Nurses Association
California Professional Firefighters
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
Center for Responsible Lending
Communication Workers of America, District 9
Consumer Attorneys of California
Consumer Federation of California
Consumer Watchdog
Courage California
Economic Security California Action
Economic Security Project Action
End Poverty in California
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
Internet Accountability Project
Kapor Center Advocacy
Oakland Privacy
Responsible Online Commerce Coalition
SEIU California
Service Employees International Union, California State Council
Small Business Majority
Smart - Transportation Division
Teamsters California
Tech Oversight California
Techeqiuty Action
The Office of Kat Taylor
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
United Domestic Workers/AFSCME Local 3930
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Western States Council
Writers Guild of America West
Opposition
African American Farmers of California
Airlines for America
American Investment Council
Associated General Contractors of California
Associated General Contractors San Diego
Association for Competitive Technology
Athens Services
Bay Area Council
Biocom
Biocom California
Biotechnology Innovation Organization
Brea Chamber of Commerce
Building Owners and Managers Association of California
California Apartment Association
California Assisted Living Association
California Association of Realtors
California Attractions and Parks Association
California Bankers Association
California Broadband & Video Association
California Broadcasters Association
California Building Industry Association
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Construction and Industrial Materials Association
California Farm Bureau
California Food Producers
California Forestry Association
California Fresh Fruit Association
California Fuels and Convenience Alliance
California Grocers Association
California Hospital Association
California Life Sciences Association
California Manufacturers and Technology Association
California Manufacturing Technology Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
California Strawberry Commission
California Taxpayers Association
California Trucking Association
California Waste Haulers Council (unless amended)
California's Credit Unions
Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce
Chamber of Progress
Chino Valley Chamber of Commerce
Citrus Heights Chamber of Commerce
Civil Justice Association of California
Colusa County Chamber of Commerce
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Connected Commerce Council
Corona Chamber of Commerce
CTIA
Da Vita Healthcare Partners INC.
Elevate California
Engine
Fontana Chamber of Commerce
Greater Bakersfield Chamber of Commerce
Greater Coachella Valley Chamber of Commerce
Greater High Desert Chamber of Commerce
Greater Ontario Business Council
Greater Riverside Chambers of Commerce
Hollywood Chamber of Commerce
Housing Contractors of California
International Franchise Association
LA Cañada Flintridge Chamber of Commerce and Community Association
Laguna Niguel Chamber of Commerce
Lodi Chamber of Commerce
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce
Los Angeles County Business Federation
Motion Picture Association
Murrieta Wildomar Chamber of Commerce
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Netchoice
Nisei Farmers League
North San Diego Business Chamber of Commerce
Oceanside Chamber of Commerce
Orange County Business Council
Personal Insurance Federation of California
San Deigo Regional Chamber of Commerce
San Juan Capistrano Chamber of Commerce
Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce
Santa Clarita Valley Chamber of Commerce
Santa Maria Valley Chamber of Commerce
Silicon Valley Leadership Group
Software and Information Industry Association
Technet
Technology Industry Association of California
The Greater Coachella Valley Chamber of Commerce
Torrance Chamber of Commerce
Tri County Chamber Alliance
Tulare Chamber of Commerce
Upland Chamber of Commerce
West Ventura County Business Alliance
Western Plant Health Association
Western Wood Preservers Institute
Yorba Linda Chamber of Commerce
Other
California Law Revision Commission
Analysis Prepared by: Nicholas Liedtke / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):