AB 1877: Domestic violence: protective orders.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2026-09-30
Current Status:
Passed
(2026-09-30: Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 835, Statutes of 2026.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law generally punishes the willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding 6 months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both that imprisonment and fine. Existing law makes the willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine for a first offense, and makes a 2nd or subsequent conviction for a violation of these specified protective orders or stay-away court orders occurring within 7 years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders results in a physical injury, the individual is required to be in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence suspended.
This bill would make a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the criminal protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. The bill would make a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, the bill would require the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public for purposes of setting, reducing, or denying bail. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law generally punishes the willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding 6 months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both that imprisonment and fine. Existing law makes the willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine for a first offense, and makes a 2nd or subsequent conviction for a violation of these specified protective orders or stay-away court orders occurring within 7 years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders results in a physical injury, the individual is required to be in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence suspended.
This bill would make a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the criminal protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. The bill would make a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, the bill would require the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public for purposes of setting, reducing, or denying bail. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law generally punishes the willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding 6 months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both that imprisonment and fine. Existing law makes the willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine for a first offense, and makes a 2nd or subsequent conviction for a violation of these specified protective orders or stay-away court orders occurring within 7 years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders results in a physical injury, the individual is required to be in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence suspended.
This bill would make a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the criminal protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. The bill would make a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, the bill would require the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public for purposes of setting, reducing, or denying bail. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law generally punishes the willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding 6 months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both that imprisonment and fine. Existing law makes the willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine for a first offense, and makes a 2nd or subsequent conviction for a violation of these specified protective orders or stay-away court orders occurring within 7 years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders results in a physical injury, the individual is required to be in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence suspended.
This bill would make a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the criminal protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. The bill would make a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, the bill would require the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public. public for purposes of setting, reducing, or denying bail. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
Existing law generally authorizes a court to issue an order for the protection of certain persons, including, among others, the victims of domestic violence. Existing law prohibits the intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as specified, and makes a violation of these provisions a misdemeanor. Existing law also makes a subsequent violation of these provisions after a conviction, as specified, punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. The bill would make any subsequent conviction for a violation of a protective order punishable as a felony. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law generally punishes the willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding 6 months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both that imprisonment and fine. Existing law makes the willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine for a first offense, and makes a 2nd or subsequent conviction for a violation of these specified protective orders or stay-away court orders occurring within 7 years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders results in a physical injury, the individual is required to be in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence suspended.
This bill would make a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the criminal protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. The bill would make a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, the bill would require the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
Existing law generally authorizes a court to issue an order for the protection of certain persons, including, among others, the victims of domestic violence. Existing law prohibits the intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as specified, and makes a violation of these provisions a misdemeanor. Existing law also makes a subsequent violation of these provisions after a conviction, as specified, punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony.
This bill would make an intentional and knowing violation of specified protective orders punishable as a felony if the person who is the subject of a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based. TheThe bill would make any subsequent conviction for a violation of a protective order punishable as a felony. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law generally punishes the willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding 6 months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both that imprisonment and fine. Existing law makes the willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine for a first offense, and makes a 2nd or subsequent conviction for a violation of these specified protective orders or stay-away court orders occurring within 7 years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away court orders results in a physical injury, the individual is required to be in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence suspended.
This bill would make a willful and knowing violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as a felony if the subject of the protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based. The bill would make a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, the bill would require the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
Existing law generally authorizes a court to issue an order for the protection of certain persons, including, among others, the victims of domestic violence. Existing law prohibits the intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as specified, and makes a violation of these provisions a misdemeanor. Existing law also makes a subsequent violation of these provisions after a conviction, as specified, punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony.
This bill would make an intentional and knowing violation of specified protective orders punishable as a felony if the person who is the subject of a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based. The bill would make any subsequent conviction for a violation of a protective order punishable as a felony. By increasing the punishment for a crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), a person guilty of any of the following contempts of court is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1)Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of a court of justice, in the immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority.
(2)Behavior specified in paragraph (1) that is committed in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of a court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.
(3)A breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.
(4)Willful disobedience of the terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial.
(5)Resistance willfully offered by a person to the lawful order or process of a court.
(6)The contumacious and unlawful refusal of a person to be sworn as a witness or, when so sworn, the contumacious and unlawful refusal to answer a material question.
(7)The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of a court.
(8)Presenting to a court having power to pass sentence upon a prisoner under conviction, or to a member of the court, an affidavit, testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner, except as provided in this code.
(9)Willful disobedience of the terms of an injunction that restrains the activities of a criminal street gang or any of its members, lawfully issued by a court, including an order pending trial.
(b)(1)A person who is guilty of contempt of court under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a victim by telephone or mail, social media, electronic communication, or electronic communication device, or directly, and who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision, each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this subdivision.
(3)The present incarceration of a person who makes contact with a victim in violation of paragraph (1) is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall apply:
(A)Social media has the same definition as in Section 632.01.
(B)Electronic communication has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(C)Electronic communication device has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine:
(i)An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.
(ii)An order issued pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1203.097.
(iii)An order issued after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving elder or dependent adult abuse, as defined in Section 368.
(iv)An order issued pursuant to Section 1201.3.
(v)An order described in paragraph (3).
(vi)An order issued pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 273.5.
(B)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except for an order described in clause (v) of subparagraph (A), a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order described in subparagraph (A) shall constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if the person who is the subject a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. However, a violation shall not be punishable as a felony pursuant to this subdivision if an individual was charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
(2)(A)If a violation of paragraph (1) results in a physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended.
(B)If there is an allegation that the violation of paragraph (1) resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing, or denying bail pursuant to Section 1275.
(3)Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to the following court orders:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(B)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(C)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the orders described in paragraph (1).
(4)A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in paragraph (1) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of those orders and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(5)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the orders described in paragraph (1).
(d)(1)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing that person is prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)A person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(e)(1)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097.
(2)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(B)That the defendant provide restitution to reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(3)For an order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this subdivision or subdivision (c), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. An order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, shall not be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support.
(4)If the injury to a married person is caused, in whole or in part, by the criminal acts of the persons spouse in violation of subdivision (c), the community property shall not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents required by this subdivision, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
(5)A person violating an order described in subdivision (c) may be punished for any substantive offenses described under Section 136.1 or 646.9. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1 or 646.9. However, a person held in contempt for a violation of subdivision (c) shall be entitled to credit for any punishment imposed as a result of that violation against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1 or 646.9. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 or 646.9 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), a person guilty of any of the following contempts of court is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1)Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of a court of justice, in the immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority.
(2)Behavior specified in paragraph (1) that is committed in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of a court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.
(3)A breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.
(4)Willful disobedience of the terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial.
(5)Resistance willfully offered by a person to the lawful order or process of a court.
(6)The contumacious and unlawful refusal of a person to be sworn as a witness or, when so sworn, the contumacious and unlawful refusal to answer a material question.
(7)The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of a court.
(8)Presenting to a court having power to pass sentence upon a prisoner under conviction, or to a member of the court, an affidavit, testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner, except as provided in this code.
(9)Willful disobedience of the terms of an injunction that restrains the activities of a criminal street gang or any of its members, lawfully issued by a court, including an order pending trial.
(b)(1)A person who is guilty of contempt of court under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a victim by telephone or mail, social media, electronic communication, or electronic communication device, or directly, and who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision, each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this subdivision.
(3)The present incarceration of a person who makes contact with a victim in violation of paragraph (1) is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall apply:
(A)Social media has the same definition as in Section 632.01.
(B)Electronic communication has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(C)Electronic communication device has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine:
(i)An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.
(ii)An order issued pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1203.097.
(iii)An order issued after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving elder or dependent adult abuse, as defined in Section 368.
(iv)An order issued pursuant to Section 1201.3.
(v)An order described in paragraph (3).
(vi)An order issued pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 273.5.
(B)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except for an order described in clause (v) of subparagraph (A), a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order described in subparagraph (A) shall constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if the person who is the subject a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. However, a violation shall not be punishable as a felony pursuant to this subdivision if an individual was charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
(2)(A)If a violation of paragraph (1) results in a physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended.
(B)If there is an allegation that the violation of paragraph (1) resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing, or denying bail pursuant to Section 1275.
(3)Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to the following court orders:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(B)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(C)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the orders described in paragraph (1).
(4)A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in paragraph (1) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of those orders and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(5)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the orders described in paragraph (1).
(d)(1)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing that person is prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)A person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(e)(1)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097.
(2)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(B)That the defendant provide restitution to reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(3)For an order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this subdivision or subdivision (c), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. An order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, shall not be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support.
(4)If the injury to a married person is caused, in whole or in part, by the criminal acts of the persons spouse in violation of subdivision (c), the community property shall not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents required by this subdivision, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
(5)A person violating an order described in subdivision (c) may be punished for any substantive offenses described under Section 136.1 or 646.9. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1 or 646.9. However, a person held in contempt for a violation of subdivision (c) shall be entitled to credit for any punishment imposed as a result of that violation against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1 or 646.9. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 or 646.9 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), a person guilty of any of the following contempts of court is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1)Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of a court of justice, in the immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority.
(2)Behavior specified in paragraph (1) that is committed in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of a court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.
(3)A breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.
(4)Willful disobedience of the terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial.
(5)Resistance willfully offered by a person to the lawful order or process of a court.
(6)The contumacious and unlawful refusal of a person to be sworn as a witness or, when so sworn, the like contumacious and unlawful refusal to answer a material question.
(7)The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of a court.
(8)Presenting to a court having power to pass sentence upon a prisoner under conviction, or to a member of the court, an affidavit, testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner, except as provided in this code.
(9)Willful disobedience of the terms of an injunction that restrains the activities of a criminal street gang or any of its members, lawfully issued by a court, including an order pending trial.
(b)(1)A person who is guilty of contempt of court under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a victim by telephone or mail, social media, electronic communication, or electronic communication device, or directly, and who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision, each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this subdivision.
(3)The present incarceration of a person who makes contact with a victim in violation of paragraph (1) is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall apply:
(A)Social media has the same definition as in Section 632.01.
(B)Electronic communication has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(C)Electronic communication device has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine:
(i)An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.
(ii)An order issued pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1203.097.
(iii)An order issued after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving elder or dependent adult abuse, as defined in Section 368.
(iv)An order issued pursuant to Section 1201.3.
(v)An order described in paragraph (3).
(vi)An order issued pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 273.5.
(B)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except for an order described in clause (v) of subparagraph (A), a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order described in subparagraph (A) shall constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if the person who is the subject a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. However, a violation shall not be punishable as a felony pursuant to this subdivision if an individual was charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
(2)(A)If a violation of paragraph (1) results in a physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended.
(B)If there is an allegation that the violation of paragraph (1) resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing, or denying bail pursuant to Section 1275.
(3)Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to the following court orders:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(B)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(C)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the orders described in paragraph (1).
(4)A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in paragraph (1) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of those orders and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(5)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the orders described in paragraph (1).
(d)(1)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing that person is prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)A person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(e)(1)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097.
(2)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(B)That the defendant provide restitution to reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(3)For an order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this subdivision or subdivision (c), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. An order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, shall not be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support.
(4)If the injury to a married person is caused, in whole or in part, by the criminal acts of the persons spouse in violation of subdivision (c), the community property shall not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents required by this subdivision, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
(5)A person violating an order described in subdivision (c) may be punished for any substantive offenses described under Section 136.1 or 646.9. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1 or 646.9. However, a person held in contempt for a violation of subdivision (c) shall be entitled to credit for any punishment imposed as a result of that violation against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1 or 646.9. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 or 646.9 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), a person guilty of any of the following contempts of court is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1)Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of a court of justice, in the immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority.
(2)Behavior specified in paragraph (1) that is committed in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of a court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.
(3)A breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.
(4)Willful disobedience of the terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial.
(5)Resistance willfully offered by a person to the lawful order or process of a court.
(6)The contumacious and unlawful refusal of a person to be sworn as a witness or, when so sworn, the like refusal to answer a material question.
(7)The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of a court.
(8)Presenting to a court having power to pass sentence upon a prisoner under conviction, or to a member of the court, an affidavit, testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner, except as provided in this code.
(9)Willful disobedience of the terms of an injunction that restrains the activities of a criminal street gang or any of its members, lawfully issued by a court, including an order pending trial.
(b)(1)A person who is guilty of contempt of court under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a victim by telephone or mail, social media, electronic communication, or electronic communication device, or directly, and who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision, each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this subdivision.
(3)The present incarceration of a person who makes contact with a victim in violation of paragraph (1) is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall apply:
(A)Social media has the same definition as in Section 632.01.
(B)Electronic communication has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(C)Electronic communication device has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine:
(i)An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.
(ii)An order issued pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1203.097.
(iii)An order issued after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving elder or dependent adult abuse, as defined in Section 368.
(iv)An order issued pursuant to Section 1201.3.
(v)An order described in paragraph (3).
(vi)An order issued pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 273.5.
(B)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), (a), and except for an order described in clause (v) of subparagraph (A), a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order described in subparagraph (A) shall constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if the person who is the subject a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. A However, a violation of the criminal protective orders described in subparagraph (A) shall not be punishable as a felony pursuant to this subdivision if an individual was arrested or charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor. misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
(2)(A)If a violation of paragraph (1) results in a physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended.
(B)If there is an allegation that the violation of paragraph (1) resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim. victim in setting, reducing, or denying bail pursuant to Section 1275.
(3)Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to the following court orders:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(B)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(C)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the orders described in paragraph (1).
(4)A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in paragraph (1) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of those orders and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(5)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the orders described in paragraph (1).
(d)(1)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing that person is prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)A person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(e)(1)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097.
(2)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(B)That the defendant provide restitution to reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(3)For an order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this subdivision or subdivision (c), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. An order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, shall not be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support.
(4)If the injury to a married person is caused, in whole or in part, by the criminal acts of the persons spouse in violation of subdivision (c), the community property shall not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents required by this subdivision, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
(5)A person violating an order described in subdivision (c) may be punished for any substantive offenses described under Section 136.1 or 646.9. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1 or 646.9. However, a person held in contempt for a violation of subdivision (c) shall be entitled to credit for any punishment imposed as a result of that violation against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1 or 646.9. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 or 646.9 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
SEC. 2.Section 273.6 of the Penal Code is amended to read:273.6.(a)Any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as defined in Section 6218 of the Family Code, or of an order issued pursuant to Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.(b)In the event of a violation of subdivision (a) that results in physical injury, the person shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days nor more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. However, if the person is imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, the court may, in the interest of justice and for reasons stated on the record, reduce or eliminate the 30-day minimum imprisonment required by this subdivision. In determining whether to reduce or eliminate the minimum imprisonment pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall consider the seriousness of the facts before the court, whether there are additional allegations of a violation of the order during the pendency of the case before the court, the probability of future violations, the safety of the victim, and whether the defendant has successfully completed or is making progress with counseling.(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall apply to the following court orders:(1)Any order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.(2)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.(3)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the order described in subdivision (a).(4)Any order issued by another state that is recognized under Part 5 (commencing with Section 6400) of Division 10 of the Family Code.(d)A subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a), occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.(e)In the event of a subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) for an act occurring within one year of a prior conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) that results in physical injury to a victim, the person shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.(f)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of orders described in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (e).(g)(1)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing they are prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, shall be punished under Section 29825.(2)Every person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.(h)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097, and the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:(1)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program or to a shelter for abused elder persons or dependent adults, up to a maximum of five thousand dollars ($5,000), pursuant to Section 1203.097.(2)That the defendant reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.(i)For any order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under subdivision (e), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. In no event shall any order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support. Where the injury to a married person is caused in whole or in part by the criminal acts of their spouse in violation of this section, the community property may not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse, required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents, required by this section, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.SEC. 3.SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), a person guilty of any of the following contempts of court is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1)Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of a court of justice, in the immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority.
(2)Behavior specified in paragraph (1) that is committed in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of a court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.
(3)A breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.
(4)Willful disobedience of the terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial.
(5)Resistance willfully offered by a person to the lawful order or process of a court.
(6)The contumacious and unlawful refusal of a person to be sworn as a witness or, when so sworn, the like refusal to answer a material question.
(7)The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of a court.
(8)Presenting to a court having power to pass sentence upon a prisoner under conviction, or to a member of the court, an affidavit, testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner, except as provided in this code.
(9)Willful disobedience of the terms of an injunction that restrains the activities of a criminal street gang or any of its members, lawfully issued by a court, including an order pending trial.
(b)(1)A person who is guilty of contempt of court under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a victim by telephone or mail, social media, electronic communication, or electronic communication device, or directly, and who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision, each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this subdivision.
(3)The present incarceration of a person who makes contact with a victim in violation of paragraph (1) is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall apply:
(A)Social media has the same definition as in Section 632.01.
(B)Electronic communication has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(C)Electronic communication device has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine:
(i)An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.
(ii)An order issued pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1203.097.
(iii)An order issued after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving elder or dependent adult abuse, as defined in Section 368.
(iv)An order issued pursuant to Section 1201.3.
(v)An order described in paragraph (3).
(vi)An order issued pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 273.5.
(B)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order described in subparagraph (A) shall constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if the person who is the subject a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. A violation of the criminal protective orders described in subparagraph (A) shall not be punishable as a felony pursuant to this subdivision if an individual was arrested or charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor.
(2)(A)If a violation of paragraph (1) results in a physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended.
(B)If there is an allegation that the violation of paragraph (1) resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim.
(3)Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to the following court orders:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(B)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(C)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the orders described in paragraph (1).
(4)A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in paragraph (1) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of those orders and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(5)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the orders described in paragraph (1).
(d)(1)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing that person is prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)A person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(e)(1)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097.
(2)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(B)That the defendant provide restitution to reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(3)For an order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this subdivision or subdivision (c), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. An order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, shall not be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support.
(4)If the injury to a married person is caused, in whole or in part, by the criminal acts of the persons spouse in violation of subdivision (c), the community property shall not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents required by this subdivision, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
(5)A person violating an order described in subdivision (c) may be punished for any substantive offenses described under Section 136.1 or 646.9. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1 or 646.9. However, a person held in contempt for a violation of subdivision (c) shall be entitled to credit for any punishment imposed as a result of that violation against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1 or 646.9. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 or 646.9 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
SEC. 2.Section 273.6 of the Penal Code is amended to read:273.6.(a)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), any Any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as defined in Section 6218 of the Family Code, or of an order issued pursuant to Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)Any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as defined in Section 6218 of the Family Code, or of an order issued pursuant to Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if the person who is the subject of a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, is a felony punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. A violation of the protective orders described in this paragraph shall not be punishable as a felony if an individual was arrested or charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor.(b)In the event of a violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) that results in physical injury, the person shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days nor more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. However, if the person is imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, the court may, in the interest of justice and for reasons stated on the record, reduce or eliminate the 30-day minimum imprisonment required by this subdivision. In determining whether to reduce or eliminate the minimum imprisonment pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall consider the seriousness of the facts before the court, whether there are additional allegations of a violation of the order during the pendency of the case before the court, the probability of future violations, the safety of the victim, and whether the defendant has successfully completed or is making progress with counseling.
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall apply to the following court orders:
(1)Any order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(2)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(3)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the order described in subdivision (a).
(4)Any order issued by another state that is recognized under Part 5 (commencing with Section 6400) of Division 10 of the Family Code.
(d)A subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a), occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(e)In the event of a subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) for an act occurring within one year of a prior conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) that results in physical injury to a victim, the person shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(f)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of orders described in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (e).
(g)(1)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing they are prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)Every person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(h)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097, and the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(1)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program or to a shelter for abused elder persons or dependent adults, up to a maximum of five thousand dollars ($5,000), pursuant to Section 1203.097.
(2)That the defendant reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(i)For any order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under subdivision (e), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. In no event shall any order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support. Where the injury to a married person is caused in whole or in part by the criminal acts of their spouse in violation of this section, the community property may not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse, required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents, required by this section, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), a person guilty of any of the following contempts of court is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1)Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of a court of justice, in the immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority.
(2)Behavior specified in paragraph (1) that is committed in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of a court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law.
(3)A breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of the court.
(4)Willful disobedience of the terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial.
(5)Resistance willfully offered by a person to the lawful order or process of a court.
(6)The contumacious and unlawful refusal of a person to be sworn as a witness or, when so sworn, the like refusal to answer a material question.
(7)The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of a court.
(8)Presenting to a court having power to pass sentence upon a prisoner under conviction, or to a member of the court, an affidavit, testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner, except as provided in this code.
(9)Willful disobedience of the terms of an injunction that restrains the activities of a criminal street gang or any of its members, lawfully issued by a court, including an order pending trial.
(b)(1)A person who is guilty of contempt of court under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) by willfully contacting a victim by telephone or mail, social media, electronic communication, or electronic communication device, or directly, and who has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 646.9 shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of no more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)For the purposes of sentencing under this subdivision, each contact shall constitute a separate violation of this subdivision.
(3)The present incarceration of a person who makes contact with a victim in violation of paragraph (1) is not a defense to a violation of this subdivision.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following definitions shall apply:
(A)Social media has the same definition as in Section 632.01.
(B)Electronic communication has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(C)Electronic communication device has the same definition as in Section 646.9.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), and except as provided in subparagraph (B), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine:
(A)(i)An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.
(B)(ii)An order issued pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1203.097.
(C)(iii)An order issued after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving elder or dependent adult abuse, as defined in Section 368.
(D)(iv)An order issued pursuant to Section 1201.3.
(E)(v)An order described in paragraph (3).
(F)(vi)An order issued pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 273.5.
(B)Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described in subparagraph (A) shall constitute contempt of court punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 if the person who is the subject a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based. A violation of the protective orders described in subparagraph (A) shall not be punishable as a felony pursuant to this subdivision if an individual was arrested or charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor.
(2)(A)If a violation of paragraph (1) results in a physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended.
(B)If there is an allegation that the violation of paragraph (1) resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim.
(3)Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to the following court orders:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(B)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(C)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the orders described in paragraph (1).
(4)A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in paragraph (1) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of those orders and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as provided in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or in the state prison for 16 months or two or three years. pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(5)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of the orders described in paragraph (1).
(d)(1)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing that person is prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6 or 527.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)A person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(e)(1)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097.
(2)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (c), the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program up to a maximum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(B)That the defendant provide restitution to reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(3)For an order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this subdivision or subdivision (c), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. An order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, shall not be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support.
(4)If the injury to a married person is caused, in whole or in part, by the criminal acts of the persons spouse in violation of subdivision (c), the community property shall not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents required by this subdivision, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
(5)A person violating an order described in subdivision (c) may be punished for any substantive offenses described under Section 136.1 or 646.9. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1 or 646.9. However, a person held in contempt for a violation of subdivision (c) shall be entitled to credit for any punishment imposed as a result of that violation against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1 or 646.9. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 or 646.9 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
SEC. 2.Section 273.6 of the Penal Code is amended to read:273.6.(a)Any (1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as defined in Section 6218 of the Family Code, or of an order issued pursuant to Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(2)Any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order, as defined in Section 6218 of the Family Code, or of an order issued pursuant to Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if the person who is the subject of a protective order was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, is a felony punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. A violation of the protective orders described in this paragraph shall not be punishable as a felony if an individual was arrested or charged with a felony and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor.
(b)In the event of a violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) that results in physical injury, the person shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days nor more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. However, if the person is imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, the court may, in the interest of justice and for reasons stated on the record, reduce or eliminate the 30-day minimum imprisonment required by this subdivision. In determining whether to reduce or eliminate the minimum imprisonment pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall consider the seriousness of the facts before the court, whether there are additional allegations of a violation of the order during the pendency of the case before the court, the probability of future violations, the safety of the victim, and whether the defendant has successfully completed or is making progress with counseling.
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall apply to the following court orders:
(1)Any order issued pursuant to Section 6320 or 6389 of the Family Code.
(2)An order excluding one party from the family dwelling or from the dwelling of the other.
(3)An order enjoining a party from specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate the order described in subdivision (a).
(4)Any order issued by another state that is recognized under Part 5 (commencing with Section 6400) of Division 10 of the Family Code.
(d)A subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a), occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) and involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 139, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(e)In the event of a subsequent conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) for an act occurring within one year of a prior conviction for a violation of an order described in subdivision (a) that results in physical injury to a victim, the person shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than six months nor more than one year, by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. However, if the person is imprisoned in a county jail for at least 30 days, the court may, in the interest of justice and for reasons stated in the record, reduce or eliminate the six-month minimum imprisonment required by this subdivision. In determining whether to reduce or eliminate the minimum imprisonment pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall consider the seriousness of the facts before the court, whether there are additional allegations of a violation of the order during the pendency of the case before the court, the probability of future violations, the safety of the victim, and whether the defendant has successfully completed or is making progress with counseling.
(f)The prosecuting agency of each county shall have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of orders described in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (e).
(g)(1)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives a firearm knowing they are prohibited from doing so by the provisions of a protective order as defined in Section 136.2 of this code, Section 6218 of the Family Code, or Section 527.6, 527.8, or 527.85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or Section 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, shall be punished under Section 29825.
(2)Every person subject to a protective order described in paragraph (1) shall not be prosecuted under this section for owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm to the extent that firearm is granted an exemption pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or subdivision (h) of Section 6389 of the Family Code.
(h)If probation is granted upon conviction of a violation of subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), the court shall impose probation consistent with Section 1203.097, and the conditions of probation may include, in lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(1)That the defendant make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program or to a shelter for abused elder persons or dependent adults, up to a maximum of five thousand dollars ($5,000), pursuant to Section 1203.097.
(2)That the defendant reimburse the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are the direct result of the defendants offense.
(i)For any order to pay a fine, make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under subdivision (e), the court shall make a determination of the defendants ability to pay. In no event shall any order to make payments to a domestic violence shelter-based program be made if it would impair the ability of the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or court-ordered child support. Where the injury to a married person is caused in whole or in part by the criminal acts of their spouse in violation of this section, the community property may not be used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for restitution to the injured spouse, required by Section 1203.04, as operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents, required by this section, until all separate property of the offending spouse is exhausted.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 30, 2026 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 835, Statutes of 2026. |
| Sep 30, 2026 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Aug 28, 2026 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3:30 p.m. |
| Aug 24, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 76. Noes 0. Page 6406.). |
| Aug 24, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 76. Noes 0.). |
| Aug 24, 2026 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 20, 2026 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Aug 20, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 5590.). |
| Aug 20, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0.). |
| Aug 18, 2026 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| Aug 13, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 13, 2026 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (August 13). |
| Aug 3, 2026 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jun 24, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (June 23). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 8, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 3, 2026 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 21, 2026 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 21, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 72. Noes 0. Page 5201.) |
| May 21, 2026 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 72. Noes 0.) |
| May 18, 2026 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 14, 2026 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (May 14). |
| Apr 15, 2026 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 6, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 26, 2026 | Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 25, 2026 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 8. Noes 0.) (March 24). |
| Mar 18, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 17, 2026 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 11, 2026 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Feb 13, 2026 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 15. |
| Feb 12, 2026 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 24, 2026 | AB 1877 Stefani Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 20, 2026 | Special Consent AB1877 Stefani et al. By Wiener | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 13, 2026 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 3, 2026 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 23, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| May 21, 2026 | AB 1877 Stefani Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 14, 2026 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Mar 24, 2026 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aclu California Action | ** Against | |
| Arcadia Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Black Women Revolt Against Domestic Violence | ** Support | |
| Brea Police Association | ** Support | |
| Burbank Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Association of School Police Chiefs | ** Support | |
| California Attorneys For Criminal Justice | ** Against | |
| California Coalition of School Safety Professionals | ** Support | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | |
| California Narcotic Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Support | |
| California Reserve Peace Officers Association | ** Support | |
| City and County of San Francisco (Sponsor) | ** Support | |
| CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Community Forward SF | ** Support | |
| Corona Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Culver City Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Fullerton Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Hilde B Foundation | ** Support | |
| Initiate Justice | ** Against | |
| La Casa De Las Madres | ** Support | |
| LA Casa De Las Mothers | ** Support | |
| League Of California Cities | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles County District Attorney'S Office | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles School Police Management Association | ** Support | |
| los angeles school police officers association | ** Support | |
| Murrieta Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Newport Beach Police Association | ** Support | |
| Open Door Legal | ** Support | |
| Palos Verdes Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Peace Officers Research Association Of California | ** Support | |
| Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| Pomona Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Riverside Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Riverside Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| Safe & Sound | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Family Services Alliance | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Mayor Daniel Lurie | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Police Department | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Safehouse | ** Support |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1877
Author:(Stefani)
As Amended Ver:June 8, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Makes the willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders and stay-away orders punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor, rather than a misdemeanor, if the person who is the subject of a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, unless the matter is reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
Senate Amendments
- Add coauthors and make nonsubstantive changes.
COMMENTS
As Passed by the Assembly: This bill made the willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders and stay-away orders punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor, rather than a misdemeanor, if the person who is the subject of a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, unless the matter is reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
Major Provisions
- Provided that if there is an allegation that the violation resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing or denying bail.
- Increased the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in existing law.
According to the Author
"Protective and stay away orders are one of the most important tools available to survivors of domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault, but they are only effective if violations are taken seriously and enforced. Under current law, violations of these court orders can only be charged as misdemeanors, even when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony or when violations occur repeatedly. This creates a dangerous gap in accountability that can allow abuse to escalate and leaves survivors vulnerable until further harm occurs. AB 1877 strengthens enforcement by allowing prosecutors to charge violations as felonies in the most serious cases, including when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony, when violations are repeated, or when a new violation occurs within one year of a prior conviction. The bill also ensures courts consider allegations of physical injury when determining pretrial release. By providing stronger tools to address serious and repeated violations, AB 1877 improves compliance with protective orders, enhances accountability, and helps protect survivors before violence escalates."
Arguments in Support
According to the San Francisco Mayor Daniel Lurie, the sponsor of this bill, "Protective orders are meant to provide survivors with tangible and enforceable safety from further harm. However, orders are far too often violated without repercussion. Under existing law, violations are treated as minor offenses, even when they are repeated. This can leave survivors vulnerable to danger and perpetuate a lack of confidence in the justice system's ability to protect them. Repeated violations are also warning signs of escalating danger and have to be taken seriously for the safety if the survivor and their family.
"Your legislation remedies the penalty structure for protective order violations to reflect the actual risk posed to the protected person. This bill would give prosecutors greater authority to respond when violations of protective orders show a serious risk to survivor safety. By allowing felony charges in high-risk cases, AB 1877 (Stefani) makes sure that the law reflects the serious nature of repeated or dangerous violations, and ensures meaningful actions and measures can be taken when warning signs are clear."
Arguments in Opposition
According to ACLU California Action, "Under existing law, willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court is punishable as a misdemeanor up to six months in county jail, which can be increased to one year as a gross misdemeanor if the defendant willfully and knowingly violated specified protective orders. For any second or subsequent violation of these specified protective orders within seven years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence is punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, otherwise known as a wobbler.
"This proposal undermines a great amount of study and evidence surrounding the efficacy behind longer criminal sentencing and its impact on crime deterrence. Evidence indicates that applying longer criminal sentences has failed to deter crime.1 The federal Department of Justice shared a paper discouraging increasing existing punishments.2 Other studies support this evidence, finding that the severity of punishment does not generally have an increased effect on deterrence.3 Rather, studies have concluded that certainty of punishment — that someone will be punished for a particular crime — has a greater deterrence effect than the severity of the punishment itself.4 Increasing criminal penalties of existing crimes will incur an additional $133,100 cost per person incarcerated each additional year they are sentenced."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, "Unknown costs to the counties to incarcerate if the felony sentence, punishable by 16 months, two years or three years, is imposed. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $80,000. In 2021 Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail costs with $90,000 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
Cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts, likely in excess of $150,000, to adjudicate enforcement actions authorized by this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,500 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund)."
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-1
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ABS, ABST OR NV: Haney
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 15-0-0
YES: Wicks, Hoover, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Dixon, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Ta, Tangipa
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 72-0-8
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Bryan, Chen, Elhawary, Garcia, Lackey, Ramos, Celeste Rodriguez
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ABS, ABST OR NV: Reyes
UPDATED
VERSION: June 8, 2026
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003835
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-4171 | AB 1877 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1877
Author: Stefani (D), et al.
Amended: 6/8/26 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 6/23/26
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Cortese, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 8/13/26
AYES: Cervantes, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Dahle, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 72-0, 5/21/26 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Domestic violence: protective orders
SOURCE: San Francisco Mayor Daniel Lurie
DIGEST:
This bill makes a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders or stay-away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the criminal protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. This bill makes a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders a felony. If a violation of specified protective orders or stay-away orders alleges a physical injury, this bill requires the court to consider the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury when considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public for purposes of setting, reducing, or denying bail.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue a protective order when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Prohibits a person who is subject to a protective order from owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving, or attempting to purchase or receive a firearm while the protective order is in effect, and the court shall order a person subject to the protective order to relinquish ownership or possession of any firearms. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (d).)
- States that a person is guilty of contempt of court, punishable as a misdemeanor, for a willful disobedience of terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1).)
- Provides that if that violation results in physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(2).)
- States that a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of a criminal protective order from Penal Code section 166, as described, occurring within 7 years of prior conviction of the same violation and involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(2).)
- Specifies that a subsequent conviction for a violation of a Penal Code section 166 criminal protective order that resulted in physical injury occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of an order and involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence, as defined, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or as a county jail eligible felony. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (d).)
This bill:
- Requires a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order to be punished as either a misdemeanor or a jail felony when the underlying case contained certain violations, including threatening a witness, elder abuse, domestic violence, and certain acts of violence, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, and harassment, particularly against a minor.
- Requires that if there is an allegation that the violation of the protective order resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, must include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing or denying bail.
- Increases the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in existing law.
Background
Protective Orders and Restraining Orders. Protective orders and restraining orders are, in outcome, very similar. Both are orders issued or approved by a court that prevents a person from contacting another person under specific circumstances and may also restrict other conduct to prevent harassment, threats, or violence.
In practice, there are some differences. For example, law enforcement may ask for an emergency protective order (EPO) (which includes instances of domestic violence) to protect the victim of a crime, usually when the victim calls the police or 911 for help. If the defendant is arrested and charged, a judge can issue a criminal protective order (CPO) to protect victims and witnesses, particularly during the pendency of the case.
Protective orders and temporary restraining orders (TRO) are often used interchangeably. A victim may also be able to file their own moving papers to request a protective or restraining order. A restraining order can include some of the same orders as an EPO or CPO, like ordering the defendant to stay away from the victim. But in restraining order cases filed by a victim, additional protections may be available. A victim can have a restraining order and an EPO or CPO at the same time as one is issued on an emergency basis and one is issued for a longer period.
Penalties. Simple violation of a protective or restraining order is a misdemeanor. (See Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4); Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a).) If a person violates a protective or restraining order issued in a domestic violence case and injury results, that person may be sentenced to a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of one year in county jail – in addition to whatever the defendant receives for any possible assaultive or threatening conduct. (See Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (b).) Any criminal conviction also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the protective order, knew what they were not allowed to do, and violated the order anyway.
In addition to the penalties for violating a protective order, any person who violates a protective order issued pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, may be sentenced as if the person engaged in witness intimidation–to a state prison sentence of up to four years. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c); Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
Research shows that increasing the severity of punishment does little to deter crime. According to the National Institute of Justice, an agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, “[l]aws and policies designed to deter crime by focusing mainly on increasing the severity of punishment are ineffective partly because criminals know little about the sanctions for specific crimes. More severe punishments do not ‘chasten’ individuals convicted of crimes, and prisons may exacerbate recidivism… Studies show that for most individuals convicted of a crime, short to moderate prison sentences may be a deterrent but longer prison terms produce only a limited deterrent effect. In addition, the crime prevention benefit falls far short of the social and economic costs.” (National Institute of Justice (May 2016). Five Things about Deterrence https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf.)
Bail Setting. Bail is a contract for release of a person from jail upon a promise to appear at future court hearings. The promise is backed by a bond issued through a bail agent. A bailed defendant is said to be in the constructive custody of the bail agent. (Taylor v. Taintor (1862) (16 Wall.) 83U.S. 366, 372.) In the United States, bail setting has long been skewed by racial bias and plagued by predatory lending schemes. (Vera Institute of Justice (May 2018). From Bondage to Bail Bonds: Putting a Price on Freedom in New Orleans https://medium.com/@verainstitute/from-bondage-to-bail-bonds-putting-a-price-on-freedom-in-new-orleans-de065035c1b7; Becker Friedman Institute for Economics at UChicago (Oct. 2020). Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_2020331.pdf; Lincoln Memorial University Law Review (Spring 2023). Bailing on the Bondsman: An Argument for Abolishing Monetary Bail https://www.texaspretrial.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Bailing-on-the-Bondsman_-An-Argument-for-Abolishing-Monetary-Bail.pdf.)
Existing law provides a process whereby the court may set a bail amount for a criminal defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1269b.) Additionally, Section 12 of Article 1 of the California Constitution provides, with limited exceptions, that a criminal defendant has a right to bail and what conditions shall be taken into consideration in setting bail. A defendant may post bail by depositing cash or an equivalent form of currency, provide a security in real property, or undertake bail using a bail bond.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Committee on Appropriations:
Unknown costs to the counties to incarcerate if the felony sentence, punishable by 16 months, 2 years or 3 years, is imposed. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $80,000. In 2021 Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail costs with $90,000 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
Cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts, likely in excess of $150,000, to adjudicate enforcement actions authorized by this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,500 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/13/26)
Mayor Daniel Lurie, City and County of San Francisco (source)
Black Women Revolt Against Domestic Violence
California Police Chiefs Association
Community Forward SF
Hilde B Foundation
LA Casa De Las Madres
League of California Cities
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Open Door Legal
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Safe & Sound
San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium
San Francisco Family Services Alliance
San Francisco Police Department
San Francisco Safehouse
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/13/26)
ACLU California Action
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Initiate Justice
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 72-0, 5/21/26
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Bryan, Chen, Elhawary, Garcia, Lackey, Ramos, Celeste Rodriguez
Prepared by: Natalia DaSilva Telles / PUB. S. /
8/15/26 13:16:01
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1877 (Stefani) - Domestic violence: protective orders
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1877 would make a willful and knowing violation of a specified criminal orders or stay away orders punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony if the subject of the order as charged with or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based.
Fiscal Impact:
Unknown costs to the counties to incarcerate if the felony sentence, punishable by 16 months, 2 years or 3 years, is imposed. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $80,000. In 2021 Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail costs with $90,000 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
Cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts, likely in excess of $150,000, to adjudicate enforcement actions authorized by this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,500 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts. The FY 2026-27 Budget appropriated $70 million General Fund for this purpose (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund).
Background:
Protective orders and restraining orders are, in outcome, very similar. Both are orders issued or approved by a court that prevents a person from contacting another person under specific circumstances and may also restrict other conduct to prevent harassment, threats, or violence.
In practice, there are some differences. For example, law enforcement may ask for an emergency protective order (EPO) (which includes instances of domestic violence) to protect the victim of a crime, usually when the victim calls the police or 911 for help. If the defendant is arrested and charged, a judge can issue a criminal protective order (CPO) to protect victims and witnesses, particularly during the pendency of the case.
Protective orders and “temporary restraining orders or TROs” are often used interchangeably. A victim may also be able to file their own moving papers to request a protective or restraining order. A restraining order can include some of the same orders as an EPO or CPO, like ordering the defendant to stay away from the victim. But in restraining order cases filed by a victim, additional protections may be available. A victim can have a restraining order and an EPO or CPO at the same time as one is issued on an emergency basis and one is issued for a longer period.
Existing law provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court.
Proposed Law:
This bill requires a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order to be punished as either a misdemeanor or a jail felony when the underlying case contained certain violations, including threatening a witness, elder abuse, domestic violence, and certain acts of violence, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, and harassment, particularly against a minor.
This bill increases the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in existing law (Penal Code 166 (c) (4)).
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: AB 1877 Hearing Date: June 23, 2026
Author: | Stefani | ||
Version: | June 8, 2026 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | NDT | ||
Subject: Domestic violence: protective orders
HISTORY
Source: San Francisco Mayor Daniel Lurie
Prior Legislation: AB 1378 (Essayli), failed in Assembly Public Safety, 2023
AB 2040 (Maienschein), held in Assembly Appropriations, 2022
Support: Black Women Revolt Against Domestic Violence; California Police Chiefs Association; Community Forward SF; LA Casa De Las Madres; League of California Cities; Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office; Mayor Daniel Lurie, City and County of San Francisco; Open Door Legal; Peace Officers Research Association of California; Safe & Sound; San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium; San Francisco Family Services Alliance; San Francisco Police Department; San Francisco Safehouse
Opposition: ACLU California Action; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Assembly Floor Vote: 72 - 0
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to make the willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders and stay-away orders punishable as a wobbler if the person who is the subject of a protective order was charged with or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, to require judges to consider criminal protective order and stay-away order violations when setting bail, as specified, and to increase the criminal penalty on subsequent violations from a wobbler to a jail felony.
Existing law authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue a protective order when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
Existing law prohibits a person who is subject to a protective order from owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving, or attempting to purchase or receive a firearm while the protective order is in effect, and the court shall order a person subject to the protective order to relinquish ownership or possession of any firearms. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (d).)
Existing law authorizes a court to issue a restraining order upon conviction of specified offenses for a period not to exceed 10 years. (Pen. Code, § 132.6, subd. (i).)
Existing law authorizes courts to issue civil harassment restraining orders, as specified, including workplace and educational institution violence restraining orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527 et seq.)
Existing law authorizes courts to issue domestic violence restraining orders, as specified. (Fam. Code, § 6300 et seq.)
Existing law authorizes courts to issue a restraining order to protect against elder and dependent adult abuse. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §14657.03.)
Existing law states that a person is guilty of contempt of court, punishable as a misdemeanor, for a willful disobedience of terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1).)
Existing law provides that if that violation results in physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(2).)
Existing law states that a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of a criminal protective order from Penal Code section 166, as described, occurring within 7 years of prior conviction of the same violation and involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(2).)
Existing law specifies that a subsequent conviction for a violation of a Penal Code section 166 criminal protective order that resulted in physical injury occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of an order and involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence, as defined, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or as a county jail eligible felony. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (d).)
Existing law defines “a credible threat” to mean a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. (Pen. Code, § 139, subd. (c).)
Existing law provides that any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order as authorized in the Family Code related to domestic violence, civil harassment, workplace violence, postsecondary education violence, or elder and dependent adult abuse is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a).) Existing law states that in the event of a violation of a protective order authorized in the Family Code, as specified, that results in physical injury, the person shall be punished by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days or more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (b).)
Existing law authorizes certain felonies where the term is not specified in the underlying offense to be punishable by a term of imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h).)
This bill requires a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order to be punished as either a misdemeanor or a jail felony when the underlying case contained certain violations, including threatening a witness, elder abuse, domestic violence, and certain acts of violence, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, and harassment, particularly against a minor.
This bill requires that if there is an allegation that the violation of the protective order resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, must include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing or denying bail.
This bill increases the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in existing law.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Protective and stay away orders are one of the most important tools available to survivors of domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault, but they are only effective if violations are taken seriously and enforced. Under current law, violations of these court orders can only be charged as misdemeanors, even when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony or when violations occur repeatedly. This creates a dangerous gap in accountability that can allow abuse to escalate and leaves survivors vulnerable until further harm occurs. AB 1877 strengthens enforcement by allowing prosecutors to charge violations as felonies in the most serious cases, including when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony, when violations are repeated, or when a new violation occurs within one year of a prior conviction. The bill also ensures courts consider allegations of physical injury when determining pretrial release. By providing stronger tools to address serious and repeated violations, AB 1877 improves compliance with protective orders, enhances accountability, and helps protect survivors before violence escalates.
- Stay Away Orders Generally
Protective orders and restraining orders are, in the outcome, very similar – both are orders issued or approved by a court that prevents a person from contacting another person under specific circumstances and may also restrict other conduct to prevent harassment, threats, or violence. (See generally, Fam. Code, § 6218, subds. (a)-(c).)
However, there are a couple of differences, at least in a practical sense. According to the California Courts, Self Help Guide, the police may ask for an emergency (which includes instances of domestic violence) protective order (EPO) to protect the victim of a crime, usually when the victim calls the police or 911 for help.[1]
If the defendant (the person accused of committing the crime) is arrested and charged, a judge can issue a criminal protective order (CPO) to protect victims and witnesses, particularly during the pendency of the case (as with Penal Code section 136.2). EPOs and CPOs are protective orders. Protective orders and “temporary restraining orders or TROs” are often used interchangeably. A victim may also be able to file their own moving papers to request a protective or restraining order. A restraining order can include some of the same orders as an EPO or CPO, like ordering the defendant to stay away from the victim. But in restraining order cases filed by a victim (instead of law enforcement), additional protections may be available. A victim can have a restraining order and an EPO or CPO at the same time as one is issued on an emergency basis and one is issued for a longer period of time. (See Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a); Judicial Branch of California, California Courts Self-Help Guide, Guide to Protective Orders, p. 1-2.)
An EPO can include orders that the defendant: (a) not contact people protected by the order; (b) not harass, stalk, threaten or hurt people protected by the order; (c) stay a certain distance away from people protected by the order or places they live or go regularly; (d) move out from a home that is shared with the protected person; or (e) not have guns, firearms, or ammunition. An EPO only lasts a short time, usually 5-7 days. If the person protected by the EPO needs protection that lasts longer or wants to ask for other orders, they can apply for a restraining order. A protective order may be issued for a short period of time, often without service to the alleged wrongdoer (ex parte), so the victim may be protected while the court calendars a hearing on the order and the alleged wrongdoer may be served a more formalized notice. In some cases, law enforcement will seek a protective order even after the alleged wrongdoer was already arrested.
In cases of a restraining order, where a person may be enjoined from contacting someone for a longer period of time, the alleged victim may seek a civil order barring a person from coming within a certain distance, but may not have resulted from any police intervention against the person being restrained. A person may be the subject of a protective order or a restraining order even if they are not facing a criminal charge and are never convicted of any criminal act.
Simple violation of a protective or restraining order is a misdemeanor. (See Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4); Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a).) If a person violates a protective or restraining order issued in a domestic violence case and injury results, that person may be sentenced to a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of one year in county jail – in addition to whatever the defendant receives for any possible assaultive or threatening conduct. (See Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (b).) Any criminal conviction also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the protective order, knew what they were not allowed to do, and violated the order anyway.
In addition to the penalties for violating a protective order, any person who violates a protective order issued pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, may be sentenced as if the person engaged in witness intimidation–to a state prison sentence of up to four years. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c); Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Criminal Contempt
Disobedience of a court order, such as a restraining or protective order, may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended “to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) Nevertheless, a violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order.” (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code section 166 is a misdemeanor, and proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) The criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution, and the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt is “entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights.” (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th Supp. 8, 11.) The defendant has the right to a jury trial regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
- Bail Setting
Bail is a contract for release of a person from jail upon a promise to appear at future court hearings. The promise is backed by a bond issued through a bail agent. A bailed defendant is said to be in the constructive custody of the bail agent. (Taylor v. Taintor (1862) (16 Wall.) 83U.S. 366, 372.) In the United States, bail setting has long been skewed by racial bias and plagued by predatory lending schemes.[2]
Existing law provides a process whereby the court may set a bail amount for a criminal defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1269b.) Additionally, Section 12 of Article 1 of the California Constitution provides, with limited exceptions, that a criminal defendant has a right to bail and what conditions shall be taken into consideration in setting bail. A defendant may post bail by depositing cash or an equivalent form of currency, provide a security in real property, or undertake bail using a bail bond.
- Increased Penalties without Deterrence
Research shows that increasing the severity of punishment does little to deter crime. According to the National Institute of Justice, an agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, “Laws and policies designed to deter crime by focusing mainly on increasing the severity of punishment are ineffective partly because criminals know little about the sanctions for specific crimes. More severe punishments do not ‘chasten’ individuals convicted of crimes, and prisons may exacerbate recidivism… Studies show that for most individuals convicted of a crime, short to moderate prison sentences may be a deterrent but longer prison terms produce only a limited deterrent effect. In addition, the crime prevention benefit falls far short of the social and economic costs.”[3]
- Effect of the Bill
This bill requires a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order to be punished as either a misdemeanor or a jail felony when the underlying case contained certain violations, including threatening a witness, elder abuse, domestic violence, and certain acts of violence, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, and harassment, particularly against a minor. Under this bill, the first violation of a specified order, if the violation is for similar behavior as the defendant was convicted of, could result in a felony. Therefore, this bill authorizes increases punishment for a first offense with little evidence that increased penalties will translate to deterrence.
This bill provides that if there is an allegation that the violation resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing or denying bail. Therefore, this bill has an unknown impact on bail, potentially leading to higher bail that could translate to more defendants awaiting in custody for proceedings, or to increased bail denials for these defendants. This bill adds additional judicial discretion to bail setting.
This bill increases the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in existing law. Therefore, this bill mandates increased punishment for subsequent offenses with little evidence that increased penalties will translate to deterrence.
- Argument in Support
According to the San Francisco Police Department:
Protective orders in cases involving domestic violence are a critical legal safeguard for survivors, particularly during periods of heightened risk and instability. It is well documented that survivors are often at greatest risk when attempting to leave an abusive relationship. In these moments, survivors rely heavily on the protections granted through the criminal justice system and on meaningful accountability when those court orders are violated. AB 1877 strengthens protections for survivors in cases where serious harm has already occurred by increasing accountability for violations of specified criminal protective orders such as those involving domestic violence, child sexual abuse and elder or dependent adult abuse.
Under existing law, repeat violations of these court orders are charged as misdemeanors, even when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony. This bill ensures that individuals who repeatedly violate these orders meant to protect the most vulnerable survivors can be charged with a felony. The bill also requires courts to consider violations of these orders that result in physical injury to the victim when making bail determinations, reinforcing the seriousness of continued harm against these protected individuals. By strengthening enforcement of these critical protective orders, this bill reinforces survivor protection and accountability for repeated violations.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the ACLU California Action:
Under existing law, willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court is punishable as a misdemeanor up to six months in county jail, which can be increased to one year as a gross misdemeanor if the defendant willfully and knowingly violated specified protective orders. For any second or subsequent violation of these specified protective orders within seven years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence is punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, otherwise known as a wobbler.
This proposal undermines a great amount of study and evidence surrounding the efficacy behind longer criminal sentencing and its impact on crime deterrence. Evidence indicates that applying longer criminal sentences has failed to deter crime. The federal Department of Justice shared a paper discouraging increasing existing punishments. Other studies support this evidence, finding that the severity of punishment does not generally have an increased effect on deterrence. Rather, studies have concluded that certainty of punishment — that someone will be punished for a particular crime — has a greater deterrence effect than the severity of the punishment itself. Increasing criminal penalties of existing crimes will incur an additional $133,100 cost per person incarcerated each additional year they are sentenced.
To advance a safer California, the state must adopt evidence-based policies that moves us away from this failed experiment of tough on crime policies and allow a court to exercise their best judgment in criminal sentencing.
-- END --
Judicial Branch of California, California Courts Self-Help Guide (2026). Guide to Protective Orders https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/protective-orders ↑
Vera Institute of Justice (May 2018). From Bondage to Bail Bonds: Putting a Price on Freedom in New Orleans https://medium.com/@verainstitute/from-bondage-to-bail-bonds-putting-a-price-on-freedom-in-new-orleans-de065035c1b7; Becker Friedman Institute for Economics at UChicago (Oct. 2020). Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_2020331.pdf; Lincoln Memorial University Law Review (Spring 2023). Bailing on the Bondsman: An Argument for Abolishing Monetary Bail https://www.texaspretrial.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Bailing-on-the-Bondsman_-An-Argument-for-Abolishing-Monetary-Bail.pdf ↑
National Institute of Justice (May 2016). Five Things about Deterrence https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1877
Author:(Stefani)
As Amended Ver:March 26, 2026
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Makes the willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders and stay-away orders punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor, rather than a misdemeanor, if the person who is the subject of a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, unless the matter is reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed.
Major Provisions
- Provides that if there is an allegation that the violation resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing or denying bail.
- Increases the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in existing law.
COMMENTS
According to the Author
"Protective and stay away orders are one of the most important tools available to survivors of domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault, but they are only effective if violations are taken seriously and enforced. Under current law, violations of these court orders can only be charged as misdemeanors, even when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony or when violations occur repeatedly. This creates a dangerous gap in accountability that can allow abuse to escalate and leaves survivors vulnerable until further harm occurs. AB 1877 strengthens enforcement by allowing prosecutors to charge violations as felonies in the most serious cases, including when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony, when violations are repeated, or when a new violation occurs within one year of a prior conviction. The bill also ensures courts consider allegations of physical injury when determining pretrial release. By providing stronger tools to address serious and repeated violations, AB 1877 improves compliance with protective orders, enhances accountability, and helps protect survivors before violence escalates."
Arguments in Support
According to the San Francisco Mayor Daniel Lurie, the sponsor of this bill, "Protective orders are meant to provide survivors with tangible and enforceable safety from further harm. However, orders are far too often violated without repercussion. Under existing law, violations are treated as minor offenses, even when they are repeated. This can leave survivors vulnerable to danger and perpetuate a lack of confidence in the justice system's ability to protect them. Repeated violations are also warning signs of escalating danger and have to be taken seriously for the safety if the survivor and their family.
"Your legislation remedies the penalty structure for protective order violations to reflect the actual risk posed to the protected person. This bill would give prosecutors greater authority to respond when violations of protective orders show a serious risk to survivor safety. By allowing felony charges in high-risk cases, AB 1877 (Stefani) makes sure that the law reflects the serious nature of repeated or dangerous violations, and ensures meaningful actions and measures can be taken when warning signs are clear."
Arguments in Opposition
According to ACLU California Action, "Under existing law, willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court is punishable as a misdemeanor up to six months in county jail, which can be increased to one year as a gross misdemeanor if the defendant willfully and knowingly violated specified protective orders. For any second or subsequent violation of these specified protective orders within seven years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence is punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, otherwise known as a wobbler.
"This proposal undermines a great amount of study and evidence surrounding the efficacy behind longer criminal sentencing and its impact on crime deterrence. Evidence indicates that applying longer criminal sentences has failed to deter crime.1 The federal Department of Justice shared a paper discouraging increasing existing punishments.2 Other studies support this evidence, finding that the severity of punishment does not generally have an increased effect on deterrence.3 Rather, studies have concluded that certainty of punishment — that someone will be punished for a particular crime — has a greater deterrence effect than the severity of the punishment itself.4 Increasing criminal penalties of existing crimes will incur an additional $133,100 cost per person incarcerated each additional year they are sentenced."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Incarceration costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $128,000. CDCR estimates the annual cost is $135,921. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment. If this bill results in only a handful of new convictions per year, the resulting cost of incarceration to the state could be significant.
- Minor costs to the Judicial Council and trial courts (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) for updating Judicial Council forms and criminal protective order templates, and for additional judicial workload associated with felony proceedings.
The Legislative Analyst's Office recently warned of General Fund structural deficits of around $35 billion per year in the 2027-28 fiscal year and ongoing.
VOTES
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-1
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ABS, ABST OR NV: Haney
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 15-0-0
YES: Wicks, Hoover, Aguiar-Curry, Calderon, Caloza, Dixon, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Ta, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: March 26, 2026
CONSULTANT: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002817
Date of Hearing: April 15, 2026
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1877
Author:(Stefani) – As Amended Ver:March 26, 2026
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 8 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill increases penalties for the willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders and stay-away orders.
Specifically, this bill:
- Makes a first violation punishable as a wobbler, rather than a misdemeanor, if the person subject to the order was charged with or convicted of a felony for the underlying conduct, unless the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor or dismissed.
- Increases the punishment for a second or subsequent violation within seven years involving violence or a credible threat of violence from a wobbler to a straight felony.
- Requires courts to consider any alleged physical injury resulting from the violation when setting, reducing, or denying bail.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Incarceration costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $128,000. CDCR estimates the annual cost is $135,921. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment. If this bill results in only a handful of new convictions per year, the resulting cost of incarceration to the state could be significant.
- Minor costs to the Judicial Council and trial courts (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) for updating Judicial Council forms and criminal protective order templates, and for additional judicial workload associated with felony proceedings.
The Legislative Analyst’s Office recently warned of General Fund structural deficits of around $35 billion per year in the 2027-28 fiscal year and ongoing.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author, protective and stay-away orders are among the most important tools available to survivors of domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault, but under current law, violations can only be charged as misdemeanors even when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony or violations are repeated. The bill is intended to strengthen enforcement by allowing prosecutors to charge violations as felonies in the most serious cases.
- Background. Under existing law, a willful and knowing violation of a criminal protective order is punishable as a misdemeanor — up to one year in county jail. A second or subsequent violation within seven years involving violence or a credible threat of violence is punishable as a wobbler. The bill would add an intermediate tier: a first violation is punishable as a wobbler if the underlying conduct was charged or convicted as a felony, and a second or subsequent violation involving violence or a credible threat becomes a straight felony.
Analysis Prepared by: Shiran Zohar / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing:
Deputy Chief Counsel: Stella Choe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1877
Author:(Stefani) – As Amended Ver:March 17, 2026
As Proposed to be Amended in Committee
SUMMARY:
Makes the willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders and stay-away orders punishable as an alternate felony-misdemeanor, rather than a misdemeanor, if the person who is the subject of a protective order was charged with, or convicted of, a felony for the conduct upon which the protective order was based, unless the matter is reduced to a misdemeanor or the charge was dismissed. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that if there is an allegation that the violation resulted in a physical injury to the victim, the court, in considering the seriousness of the offense charged and the protection of the public, shall include consideration of the violation of the protective order or stay-away order and alleged injury to the victim in setting, reducing or denying bail.
- Increases the punishment, from an alternate felony-misdemeanor to a straight felony, for a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of any of a criminal protective orders or stay-away orders involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence, as defined in existing law.
EXISTING LAW:
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue a protective order when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Prohibits a person who is subject to a protective order from owning, possessing, purchasing, attempting to purchase or receive a firearm while the protective order is in effect, and the court shall order a person subject to the protective order to relinquish ownership or possession of any firearms. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (d).)
- Authorizes a court to issue a restraining order upon conviction of specified offenses for a period not to exceed 10 years. (Pen. Code, § 132.6, subd. (i).)
- Authorizes courts to issue civil harassment restraining orders, as specified, including workplace and educational institution violence restraining orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527 et seq.)
- Authorizes courts to issue domestic violence restraining orders, as specified. (Fam. Code, § 6300 et seq.)
- Authorizes courts to issue a restraining order to protect against elder and dependent adult abuse. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §14657.03.)
- States that a person is guilty of contempt of court, punishable as a misdemeanor, for a willful disobedience of terms, as written, of a process or court order or out-of-state order, lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1).)
- Provides that if a violation of the above paragraph 8) results in physical injury, the person shall be imprisoned in a county jail for at least 48 hours, whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed, or the sentence is suspended. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(2).)
- States that a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of an order as described in paragraph 8) occurring within 7 years of prior conviction of the same violation and involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(2).)
- Defines “a credible threat” to mean a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. (Pen. Code, § 139, subd. (c).)
- Provides that any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order as authorized in the Family Code related to domestic violence, civil harassment, workplace violence, postsecondary education violence, or elder and dependent adult abuse is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a).)
- States that in the event of a violation of the above provision that results in physical injury, the person shall be punished by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not less than 30 days or more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (b).)
- Specifies that a subsequent conviction for a violation of an order as described in the above paragraph 9) occurring within seven years of a prior conviction for a violation of an order and involving an act of violence or “a credible threat” of violence, as defined, is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or as a county jail eligible felony. (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (d).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Protective and stay away orders are one of the most important tools available to survivors of domestic violence, stalking, and sexual assault, but they are only effective if violations are taken seriously and enforced. Under current law, violations of these court orders can only be charged as misdemeanors, even when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony or when violations occur repeatedly. This creates a dangerous gap in accountability that can allow abuse to escalate and leaves survivors vulnerable until further harm occurs. AB 1877 strengthens enforcement by allowing prosecutors to charge violations as felonies in the most serious cases, including when the underlying conduct is charged as a felony, when violations are repeated, or when a new violation occurs within one year of a prior conviction. The bill also ensures courts consider allegations of physical injury when determining pretrial release. By providing stronger tools to address serious and repeated violations, AB 1877 improves compliance with protective orders, enhances accountability, and helps protect survivors before violence escalates.”
- Restraining Orders and Protective Orders Generally: Protective orders and restraining orders are, in the outcome, very similar – both are orders issued or approved by a court that prevents a person from contacting another person under specific circumstances and may also restrict other conduct to prevent harassment, threats, or violence. (See generally, Fam. Code, § 6218, subds. (a)-(c).)
However, there are a couple of differences, at least in a practical sense. According to the California Courts, Self Help Guide, the police may ask for an emergency (which includes instances of domestic violence) protective order (EPO) to protect the victim of a crime, usually when the victim calls the police or 911 for help.
If the defendant (the person accused of committing the crime) is arrested and charged, a judge can issue a criminal protective order (CPO) to protect victims and witnesses, particularly during the pendency of the case (as with Penal Code section 136.2). EPOs and CPOs are protective orders. Protective orders and “temporary restraining orders or TROs” are often used interchangeably. A victim may also be able to file their own moving papers to request a protective or restraining order. A restraining order can include some of the same orders as an EPO or CPO, like ordering the defendant to stay away from the victim. But in restraining order cases filed by a victim (instead of law enforcement), additional protections may be available. A victim can have a restraining order and an EPO or CPO at the same time as one is issued on an emergency basis and one is issued for a longer period of time. (See Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a); Judicial Branch of California, California Courts Self-Help Guide, Guide to Protective Orders, p. 1-2.)[1]
An EPO can include orders that the defendant: (a) not contact people protected by the order; (b) not harass, stalk, threaten or hurt people protected by the order; (c) stay a certain distance away from people protected by the order or places they live or go regularly; (d) move out from a home that is shared with the protected person; or (e) not have guns, firearms, or ammunition. An EPO only lasts a short time, usually 5-7 days. If the person protected by the EPO needs protection that lasts longer or wants to ask for other orders, they can apply for a restraining order. A protective order may be issued for a short period of time, often without service to the alleged wrongdoer (ex parte), so the victim may be protected while the court calendars a hearing on the order and the alleged wrongdoer may be served a more formalized notice. In some cases, law enforcement will seek a protective order even after the alleged wrongdoer was already arrested.
In cases of a restraining order, where a person may be enjoined from contacting someone for a longer period of time, the alleged victim may seek a civil order barring a person from coming within a certain distance, but may not have resulted from any police intervention against the person being restrained. A person may be the subject of a protective order or a restraining order even if they are not facing a criminal charge and are never convicted of any criminal act.
Simple violation of a protective or restraining order is a misdemeanor. (See Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4); Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a).) If a person violates a protective or restraining order issued in a domestic violence case and injury results, that person may be sentenced to a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of one year in county jail – in addition to whatever the defendant receives for any possible assaultive or threatening conduct. (See Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (b).) Any criminal conviction also requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of the protective order, knew what they were not allowed to do, and violated the order anyway.
In addition to the penalties for violating a protective order, any person who violates a protective order issued pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2, may be sentenced as if the person engaged in witness intimidation–to a state prison sentence of up to four years. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c); Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Effect of this Legislation: This bill applies to a willful and knowing violation of specified criminal protective orders issued based on intimidation or dissuasion of a witness, term of probation for domestic violence conviction, upon a conviction for elder or dependent adult abuse, upon a conviction for a sex offense involving a minor, or upon a conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury. As discussed above, a simple violation of a protective or restraining order is a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c).) This bill would provide, notwithstanding the existing misdemeanor penalty, that the violation is punishable as a wobbler if the person who is the subject of the protective order was charged with, or convicted of a felony for the conduct upon which the criminal protective order was based. However, the increased punishment would not be authorized if the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor or if the charge is dismissed.
Essentially, the application of the increased punishment proposed by this bill would be dependent upon the prosecution of any criminal case that arises out of the conduct that is alleged to have violated the order. Based on defendant’s conduct, they may be subject to two separate prosecutions – one for the violation of the protective order and one for the underlying conduct. For example, a person may have violated the order by making criminal threats against the victim or other witness, which is punishable as a wobbler.[2] If the subject of the protective order charged with or convicted of felony criminal threats, they would be subject to the wobbler punishment proposed by this bill.
Except in situations where the two separate offenses are charged as separate counts in one accusatory pleading, there would have to be some action to delay or trail the case alleging violation of the order. For example, the prosecutor handling the violation of the criminal order case may wait to see what the outcome of the felony charge is before filing the felony charge. Or, if the prosecutor moves forward with a felony charge for a violation of the protective order based on a charged felony, and not a conviction, the court would likely need to trial the case in order to allow the other underlying felony case to be resolved.
Under existing law, the court may consolidate the cases where appropriate. An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected in their commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, or if two or more accusatory pleadings are filed in different cases, but in the same court, the court may order them to be consolidated. However, a trial court may, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, order the different offenses or counts in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said group tried separately. (Pen. Code, § 954.)
If the cases are not consolidated, the court may also grant a continuance of the case until after the felony case is resolved pursuant to Penal Code section 1050 without a showing of good cause, however if a defendant does not waive their rights to a speedy trial, the court would be limited to the statutory period allowed under Penal Code section 1382. (People v. Graves (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 619.) Thus, depending on whether the defendant has waived their speedy trial rights, the court would be limited in how long they can continue the violation of a criminal protective order case which may not be long enough for the underlying felony charge to be resolved. As written, the bill will likely require procedural action by the court in order to follow the resolution of the felony case. These actions are not guaranteed and may be limited depending on the defendant’s rights and in the interests of justice, thus limiting the application of the bill.
As a practical matter, the bill as written allows for felony punishment for a violation of the order based on an arrest, charge or conviction of a felony, unless the matter is reduced to a misdemeanor or the charges are dismissed. Arrests often do not result in any charges or conviction. Thus, a person who is arrested for a felony but is never charged or convicted would not be subject to the safeguard this bill adds for persons who were charged or convicted of a misdemeanor rather than the felony originally charged. This creates an arguably unjust result for persons who were never found guilty of the underlying offense but nonetheless may receive the increased punishment proposed by this bill. Additionally, a person charged with a felony may also have the charges dismissed. This bill does not specify what is the occur if a person has their charges dismissed rather than reduced to a misdemeanor which may also lead to unjust results similar to arrests not resulting in charges or a conviction.
The proposed amendments remove the felony arrest trigger for the wobbler punishment and clarifies that it also does not apply where the charges are dismissed.
- Increased Penalties and Lack of Deterrent Effect: This bill would increase the applicable punishment, from a misdemeanor to a wobbler, for the willing and knowing violation of a criminal protective order or stay-away court order if the person who is the subject of the order is arrested, charged or convicted of a felony for the conduct that the violation is based upon. A second or subsequent violation involving an act of violence or a credible threat of violence would be punishable as a straight felony, rather than a wobbler.
There is reason to doubt that longer terms of imprisonment will meaningfully deter future criminal conduct. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has looked into the concept of improving public safety through increased penalties.[3] As early as 2016, the NIJ has been publishing its findings that increasing punishment for given offenses does little to deter criminals from engaging in that behavior.[4] The NIJ has found that increasing penalties are generally ineffective and may exacerbate recidivism and actually reduce public safety.[5] These findings are consistent with other research from national institutions of renown.[6] Rather than penalty increases, the NIJ, advocates for polices that “increase the perception that criminals will be caught and punished” because such perception is a vastly more powerful deterrent than increasing the punishment.[7]
From a victim’s perspective, increased punishment is often not the preferred response or support most often needed. A 2025 statewide survey conducted by Blue Shield of California Foundation revealed that 63 percent of participants reported having a personal connection to domestic violence, either directly or through friends and family, and 31 percent identified as a survivor of domestic violence.[8] Among survivors, the survey indicated that the top priorities for making survivors feel safe include the freedom to make decisions that are best for them and their families, being financially stable or having financial support while the survivor is stabilized, and having an affordable, safe place to live.[9] Comparatively, the survey indicated that the lowest priorities included having support from local police and having their partner go to jail.[10]
- Argument in Support: According to the San Francisco Mayor Daniel Lurie, the sponsor of this bill, “Protective orders are meant to provide survivors with tangible and enforceable safety from further harm. However, orders are far too often violated without repercussion. Under existing law, violations are treated as minor offenses, even when they are repeated. This can leave survivors vulnerable to danger and perpetuate a lack of confidence in the justice system’s ability to protect them. Repeated violations are also warning signs of escalating danger and have to be taken seriously for the safety if the survivor and their family.
“Your legislation remedies the penalty structure for protective order violations to reflect the actual risk posed to the protected person. This bill would give prosecutors greater authority to respond when violations of protective orders show a serious risk to survivor safety. By allowing felony charges in high-risk cases, AB 1877 (Stefani) makes sure that the law reflects the serious nature of repeated or dangerous violations, and ensures meaningful actions and measures can be taken when warning signs are clear.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to ACLU California Action, “Under existing law, willful disobedience of a court order as contempt of court is punishable as a misdemeanor up to six months in county jail, which can be increased to one year as a gross misdemeanor if the defendant willfully and knowingly violated specified protective orders. For any second or subsequent violation of these specified protective orders within seven years of a prior conviction and involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence is punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, otherwise known as a wobbler.
“This proposal undermines a great amount of study and evidence surrounding the efficacy behind longer criminal sentencing and its impact on crime deterrence. Evidence indicates that applying longer criminal sentences has failed to deter crime.1 The federal Department of Justice shared a paper discouraging increasing existing punishments.2 Other studies support this evidence, finding that the severity of punishment does not generally have an increased effect on deterrence.3 Rather, studies have concluded that certainty of punishment — that someone will be punished for a particular crime — has a greater deterrence effect than the severity of the punishment itself.4 Increasing criminal penalties of existing crimes will incur an additional $133,100 cost per person incarcerated each additional year they are sentenced.”
- Related Legislation: AB 292 (Patterson) would remove misdemeanor sentencing discretion for defendants who commit domestic violence within seven years of a prior felony domestic violence conviction, requiring the offense to be charged and sentenced as a felony with a two-, four-, or five-year state prison term, and increases the mandatory minimum county jail term on probation from 15 days to 60 days for those defendants. AB 292 is pending referral in the Senate.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 467 (Gabriel), Chapter 14, Statutes of 2023, clarified that a court that sentenced a defendant and issued a 10-year criminal protective order, may make modifications to it throughout the duration of the order.
- AB 2024 (Pacheco), Chapter 648, Statutes of 2024, eliminated delays in getting domestic violence restraining order protection forms to the judicial officer due to relatively minor errors or omissions.
- AB 1378 (Essayli), of the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, would have made the violation of a protective order issued based on victim or witness intimidation or threats punishable as a misdemeanor or state prison felony, or if the person was armed with a firearm the crime would be punishable as a state prison felony. AB 1378 failed passage in this Committee.
- AB 2040 (Maienschein), of the 2021-2022 Legislative Session, would have made the violation of certain domestic violence-related protective orders, which involve forcible entry into, or unlawful presence in, the protected person’s “residential dwelling,” punishable by a minimum of 30 days in the county jail, unless the sentence is not in the interest of justice. AB 2040 was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 935 (Min), Chapter 88, Statutes of 2022, clarified that certain protective orders issued under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) may be renewed more than once.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
City and County of San Francisco (Sponsor)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
LA Casa De Las Madres
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC)
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Assocation
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Opposition
ACLU California Action
Analysis Prepared by:
Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Located at https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/protective-orders, last visited February 20, 2025. ↑
See Pen Code, § 422. ↑
“Five Things About Deterrence,” NIJ, May 2016, available at: https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
See Travis, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, April 2014, at pp. 130 -150 available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=jj_pubs. ↑
“Five Things About Deterrence,” supra. ↑
Californians’ Needs and Experiences with Domestic Violence, Equity, and Safety, Results from a Statewide Survey, Blue Shield California Foundation (Oct. 2025) available at Californians-Needs-Experiences-DV-Equity-Safety-PerryUndum-2025.pdf. ↑
Id. at p. 24. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):