AB 325: Cartwright Act: violations.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2025-10-06
Current Status:
Passed
(2025-10-06: Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 338, Statutes of 2025.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. The bill would make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of the state. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. The bill would make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of the state. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. The bill would make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of the state. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. The bill would make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of the state. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. The bill would make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person either distributes the common pricing algorithm, as specified, or uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and either knows or should know that they are adhering to or participating in a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or a similar product or service, as specified, or coerces any coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services, as specified. services in the jurisdiction of the state. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. The bill would make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person either distributes the common pricing algorithm, as specified, or uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and either knows or should know that the common pricing algorith is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services in the jurisdiction of this state. they are adhering to or participating in a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or a similar product or service, as specified, or coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services, as specified. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also prohibit a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data, as defined. The bill would make it unlawful, except as provided, make it unlawful for a person to use or distribute any a common pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if the person either distributes the common pricing algorithm, as specified, or uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market. prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that the common pricing algorith is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services in the jurisdiction of this state. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also prohibit a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data, as defined. The bill would make it unlawful, except as provided, for a person to use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if the person either distributes the pricing algorithm, as specified, or uses the pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also prohibit a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data, as defined. The bill would provide that certain presumptions are established as applicable, including that the defendant entered into a contract in restraint of trade, as specified, if any of specified requirements are established, including that the defendant distributed the pricing algorithm to 2 or more persons with the intent that the pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price, as defined, or commercial term, as defined, of a product or service in the same market or a related market and 2 or more persons used the pricing make it unlawful, except as provided, for a person to use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if the person either distributes the pricing algorithm, as specified, or uses the pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service. service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, commonly known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts and prescribes provisions for its enforcement.
Existing law requires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain, among other things, a statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.
This bill would instead provide that in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. The bill would provide that a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act is not required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
This bill would also prohibit a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data, as defined. The bill would provide that certain presumptions are established as applicable, including that the defendant entered into a contract in restraint of trade, as specified, if any of specified requirements are established, including that the defendant distributed the pricing algorithm to 2 or more persons with the intent that the pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price, as defined, or commercial term, as defined, of a product or service in the same market or a related market and 2 or more persons used the pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce in violation of this chapter.
(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(3)Common pricing algorithm means any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce in violation of this chapter.
(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(3)Common pricing algorithm means any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce in violation of this chapter.
(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(3)Common pricing algorithm means any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce in violation of this chapter.
(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(3)Common pricing algorithm means any process or rule, methodology, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that processes the same or substantially similar uses competitor data to recommend or set recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term using the same or performing a substantially similar function. term.
(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce. commerce in violation of this chapter.
(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following occurs:(1)The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.(2)The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and does either of the following:(A)Knows or should know that they are adhering to or participating in a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or a similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state.(B)Coerces any(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(3)Common pricing algorithm means any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same or performing a substantially similar function.
(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following is true: as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.
(b)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following occurs:
(1)The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(2)The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows does either of the following:
(A)Knows or should know that the common pricing algorithm is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the they are adhering to or participating in a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or a similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state.
(B)Coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(b)Any person who violates this section shall be jointly and severally liable for any such violation.(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(3)Common pricing algorithm means any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same or performing a substantially similar function.
(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)It shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute any a common pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if either of the following is true:
(1)The person distributes the common pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data, algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price prices or commercial term terms of a product or service in the same market or a related market. the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
(2)The person uses the common pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data, algorithm to set or recommend a price prices or commercial term terms of a product products or service services and knows or should know that the common pricing algorithm was is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend a price prices or commercial term terms of a product the same or similar products or service services in the same market or a related market. jurisdiction of this state.
(c)A person shall not be liable for violating subdivision (b) if the person did not develop or distribute the pricing algorithm and the person demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the person did not have actual knowledge or could not have reasonably known that the pricing algorithm was used by two or more persons to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.(d)(b)Any person that distributes the pricing algorithm and knows, or could have reasonably known, that the pricing algorithm would use, incorporate, or be trained with nonpublic competitor data, or that the pricing algorithm would be used by two or more people to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market, who violates this section shall be jointly and severally liable for any violation of this section. such violation.
(e)(c)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(f)(d)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this chapter, commonly known as the Cartwright Act. means the provisions of this part.
(2)Commercial term means includes, without limitation, any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(D)Rebates or discounts made available.(3)Common pricing algorithm means any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same or performing a substantially similar function.
(3)(4)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(4)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data, including, but not limited to, aggregated data, that is based on, derived from, or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same market as a person, or a related market.(5)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including information about prices, commercial terms, and related products or services, regardless of whether the data is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized. Nonpublic data includes public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.(5)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
(7)Pricing algorithm means any computational process, including a computational process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes data to recommend or set a price or commercial term within the jurisdiction of this state. SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)A person shall not use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data.
(2)This subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing law.
(b)Except as provided in subdivision (c), it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if either of the following is true:
(1)The person distributes the pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that pricing algorithm, data, to two or more persons with the intent that the pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(2)The person uses the pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that algorithm, data, to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(c)A defendant is not guilty of person shall not be liable for violating subdivision (b) if the defendant person did not develop or distribute the pricing algorithm and the defendant person demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant person did not have actual knowledge or could not have reasonably known that the pricing algorithm was used by two or more persons to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(d)Any person that distributes the pricing algorithm and knows, or could have reasonably known, that the pricing algorithm would use, incorporate, or be trained with nonpublic competitor data, or that the pricing algorithm would be used by two or more people to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market, shall be jointly and severally liable for any violation of this section.
(e)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(f)For purposes of this section, both of the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this chapter, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(2)Commercial term means any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(D)Rebates or discounts made available.
(3)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(4)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data, including, but not limited to, aggregated data, that is based on, derived from, or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same market as a person, or a related market.
(5)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including information about prices, commercial terms, and related products or services, regardless of whether the data is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized. Nonpublic data includes public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
(6)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702. (7)(6)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
(8)(7)Pricing algorithm means any computational process, including a computational process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes data to recommend or set a price or commercial term within the jurisdiction of this state.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)A person shall not use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data.
(2)This subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing law.
(b)If a court finds a violation of subdivision (a), there shall be, subject to the requirements of subdivisions (c) and (d), all Except as provided in subdivision (c), it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if either of the following presumptions: is true:
(1)The defendant entered into a contract in restraint of trade in violation of Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 16600). (2)The defendant entered into a contract, agreement, or trust in violation of this chapter. (3)The defendant entered into a contract in violation of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 17000).(c)The applicable presumptions described in subdivision (b) shall apply only if either of the following is established:(1)The defendant distributed person distributes the pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that pricing algorithm, to two or more persons with the intent that the pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market and two or more persons used the pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service. market.
(2)The defendant used person uses the pricing algorithm algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that algorithm, to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(d)The presumptions described in(c)A defendant is not guilty of violating subdivision (b) shall not apply to a defendant if the defendant did not develop or distribute the pricing algorithm and the defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not have actual knowledge or could not have reasonably known that the pricing algorithm used nonpublic competitor data and was used by two or more persons to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(e)In a civil case in which a presumption described in subdivision (b) is applicable, any(d)Any person that distributed distributes the pricing algorithm and knew, knows, or could have reasonably known, that the pricing algorithm would use, incorporate, or be trained with nonpublic competitor data, or that the pricing algorithm would be used by two or more people to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market, shall be jointly and severally liable for any violation of this chapter or Chapter 4 (commencing with 17000). section.
(f)(e)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(g)(f)For purposes of this section, both of the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this chapter, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(2)Commercial term means any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(D)Rebates or discounts made available.
(3)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(4)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data data, including, but not limited to, aggregated data, that is based on, derived from, or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same market as a person, or a related market. Nonpublic competitor data includes aggregated data but does not include information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that does not reveal any underlying data from a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results.
(5)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including information about prices, commercial terms, and related products or services, regardless of whether the data is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized. Nonpublic data includes public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
(6)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702.
(7)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
(8)Pricing algorithm means any computational process, including a computational process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes data to recommend or set a price or commercial term within the jurisdiction of this state.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)A person shall not use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data.
(2)This subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing law.
(b)If a court finds a violation of subdivision (a), there shall be, subject to the requirements of subdivisions (c) and (d), all of the following presumptions:
(1)The defendant entered into a contract in restraint of trade in violation of Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 16600).
(2)The defendant entered into a contract, agreement, or trust in violation of this chapter.
(3)The defendant entered into a contract in violation of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 17000).
(c)The applicable presumptions described in subdivision (b) shall apply only if either of the following is established:
(1)The defendant distributed the pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that pricing algorithm, to two or more persons with the intent that the pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market and two or more persons used the pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service.
(2)The defendant used the pricing algorithm to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(d)The presumptions described in subdivision (b) shall not apply to a defendant if the defendant did not develop or distribute the pricing algorithm and the defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not have actual knowledge or could not have reasonably known that the pricing algorithm used nonpublic competitor data and was used by two or more persons to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(e)In a civil case in which a presumption described in subdivision (b) is applicable, any person that distributed the pricing algorithm and knew, or could have reasonably known, that the pricing algorithm would use, incorporate, or be trained with nonpublic competitor data, or that the pricing algorithm would be used by two or more people to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market, shall be jointly and severally liable for any violation of this chapter or Chapter 4 (commencing with 17000).
(f)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
(g)For purposes of this section, both of the following definitions apply:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this chapter, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(2)Commercial term means any of the following:
(A)Level of service.
(B)Availability.
(C)Output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
(D)Rebates or discounts made available.
(3)Distribute, distribution, and distributing include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
(4)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data that is based on, derived from, or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same market as a person, or a related market. Nonpublic competitor data includes aggregated data but does not include information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that does not reveal any underlying data from a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results.
(5)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including information about prices, commercial terms, and related products or services, regardless of whether the data is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized.Nonpublic data includes public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
(6)Person has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702.
(7)Price means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
(8)Pricing algorithm means any computational process, including a computational process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes data to recommend or set a price or commercial term within the jurisdiction of this state.
SEC. 2.Section 16756.1 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:16756.1.Notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of this chapter, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Oct 6, 2025 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 338, Statutes of 2025. |
| Oct 6, 2025 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 24, 2025 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3 p.m. |
| Sep 12, 2025 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 54. Noes 18. Page 3371.). |
| Sep 12, 2025 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Sep 11, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 29. Noes 9. Page 2905.). |
| Sep 8, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 5, 2025 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Sep 2, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (August 29). |
| Jul 14, 2025 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 2, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 11. Noes 2.) (July 1). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 19, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 11, 2025 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 3, 2025 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| Jun 2, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 54. Noes 17. Page 1818.) |
| May 29, 2025 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to third reading. (Page 1788.) |
| May 27, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 11. Noes 3.) (May 23). |
| May 14, 2025 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to suspense file. |
| May 1, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 10. Noes 2.) (May 1). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 28, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 24, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 10, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 9, 2025 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 8, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 9. Noes 3.) (April 8). |
| Mar 11, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Mar 10, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 10, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and P. & C.P. |
| Jan 28, 2025 | From printer. May be heard in committee February 27. |
| Jan 27, 2025 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 12, 2025 | AB 325 Aguiar-Curry Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 11, 2025 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB325 Aguiar-Curry et al. By Umberg | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 29, 2025 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 14, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 1, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Jun 2, 2025 | AB 325 Aguiar-Curry Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 23, 2025 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| May 1, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
|
| Apr 8, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aids Healthcare Foundation | ** Support | |
| American Economic Liberties Project | ** Support | |
| American Property Casualty Insurance Association | ** Against | |
| Americans for Financial Reform | ** Support | |
| CalBroadband | ** Against | |
| California Apartment Association | ** Against | |
| California Association Of Realtors | ** Against | |
| California Attorney General's Office | ** Support | |
| California Business Properties Association | ** Against | |
| California Business Roundtable | ** Against | |
| California Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California Federation of Labor Unions | ** Support | |
| California Fuels Convenience Alliance | ** Against | |
| California Hospital Association | ** Against | |
| California Hotel & Lodging Association | ** Against | |
| California Low-Income Consumer Coalition | ** Support | |
| California Nurses Association | ** Support | |
| California Public Banking Alliance | ** Support | |
| California Restaurant Association | ** Against | |
| California Retailers Association | ** Against | |
| California School Employees Association, AFL-CIO | ** Support | |
| CAMEO Network | ** Support | |
| Center on Policy Initiatives | ** Support | |
| Chamber Of Progress | ** Against | |
| Civil Justice Association Of California | ** Against | |
| Consumer Federation Of California | ** Support | |
| Contra Costa Senior Legal Services | ** Support | |
| Courage California | ** Support | |
| Democracy Policy Network | ** Support | |
| Democratic Policy Network | ** Support | |
| East Bay YIMBY | ** Support | |
| Economic Security California Action | ** Support | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Support | |
| End Poverty in California | ** Support | |
| Equal Rights Advocates | ** Support | |
| Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California | ** Support | |
| Grow the Richmond | ** Support | |
| Insights Association | ** Against | |
| Institute for Local Self-Reliance | ** Support | |
| Kapor Center | ** Support | |
| Mountain View YIMBY | ** Support | |
| Napa Housing Coalition | ** Support | |
| Napa-Solano for Everyone | ** Support | |
| National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies | ** Against | |
| National Consumer Law Center | ** Support | |
| Northern Neighbors | ** Support | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| Omidyar Network | ** Support | |
| Peninsula for Everyone | ** Support | |
| Personal Insurance Federation Of California | ** Against | |
| Powerswitch Action | ** Support | |
| Progressive Women of Napa Valley | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Yimby | ** Support | |
| Santa Cruz Yimby | ** Support | |
| Santa Monica Democratic Club | ** Support | |
| Santa Rosa Yimby | ** Support | |
| SEIU California | ** Support | |
| SLOCo YIMBY | ** Support | |
| Small Business Majority | ** Support | |
| Software & Information Industry Association | ** Against | |
| South Bay Yimby | ** Support | |
| Techequity Action | ** Support | |
| Technet | ** Against | |
| Tech Oversight California | ** Support | |
| UDW/AFSCME Local 3930 | ** Support | |
| UFCW Western States Council | ** Support | |
| United Latino Voices of Contra Costa County | ** Support | |
| Ventura County YIMBY | ** Support | |
| Warehouse Worker Resource Center | ** Support | |
| western center on law and poverty | ** Support | |
| Yimby Action | ** Support | |
| YIMBY Los Angeles | ** Support |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 325
Author:(Aguiar-Curry)
As Amended Ver:September 5, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Major Provisions
- Prohibits the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm 1) as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce or 2) if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Defines:
- "Commercial term" to include level of service, availability, and output, as specified.
- "Common pricing algorithm" as any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
- "Distribute," "distribution," and "distributing" as selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- "Person" as defined under Business and Professions Code section 16702, which provides the term includes corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations existing or authorized under state, federal, or foreign law. "Person" does not include end consumers of a product or service.
- "Price" as the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Provides that the bill does not impair or limit the applicability of antitrust law.
- Provides, notwithstanding any other law, that in a complaint for a violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
Senate Amendments
Clarify when use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm constitutes a violation of law; amend definition of "common pricing algorithm."
COMMENTS
This bill aims to modernize California's antitrust laws to address the emerging threat of algorithmic price fixing, where multiple businesses use shared pricing algorithms—often powered by AI or machine learning—to coordinate prices, reduce competition, and inflate costs to consumers. It does so by amending the state's Cartwright Act to prohibit the distribution and use of certain shared pricing algorithms and by clarifying the legal standards for bringing enforcement actions under state law. Traditional antitrust law prohibits explicit agreements between competitors to fix prices. However, algorithmic tools now enable firms to engage in tacit collusion—coordinating pricing strategies without formal agreements—by delegating pricing decisions to a shared algorithm. These algorithms can process market data, adjust prices based on competitor behavior, and even punish deviation from coordinated pricing patterns, all in real time and without human intervention. As multiple companies adopt the same pricing tools, market competition may be undermined even absent direct communication. Federal agencies, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), have warned that algorithmic coordination may amount to a per se violation of the federal Sherman Act. Ongoing cases—such as those, for example, involving RealPage—raise allegations that competitors jointly using the same pricing software are effectively fixing prices. However, courts applying federal law have often dismissed such cases due to stringent pleading requirements.
What the bill does. To counter this form of anticompetitive behavior, the bill adds a new section to the Cartwright Act prohibiting the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm if:
1) It is part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce; or
2) The person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
A "common pricing algorithm" is defined as any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term. The bill applies regardless of whether the underlying data is public or private, reflecting the understanding that even public data can enable collusion when processed similarly across competitors. The bill is structured to avoid interfering with ordinary or beneficial uses of pricing software. It targets only those situations where separate firms use shared algorithms, consistent with antitrust law's focus on preserving "independent centers of decisionmaking." Businesses that develop or use their own proprietary pricing tools remain unaffected.
A key feature of the bill is its reform of the pleading standard under the Cartwright Act. Under federal law, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts that rule out independent conduct and show a "meeting of the minds"—a high burden that often leads to early dismissal, especially in algorithmic collusion cases. This bill explicitly rejects that heightened standard. Instead, it clarifies that under California law, a plaintiff need only allege plausible facts showing a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Courts may not require allegations that exclude the possibility of independent parallel conduct. This makes it easier for legitimate claims to survive a motion to dismiss and reach discovery, where further evidence can be obtained. The bill preserves the strong remedies already available under the Cartwright Act. Available penalties under existing antitrust law include treble damages, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and in some cases, criminal sanctions.
According to the Author
It doesn't matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, its wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the "price crisis," resulting in higher costs and fewer choices. AB 325 updates California's antitrust laws to address modern technologies being used for illegal price fixing. This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing. AB 325 will help enforce existing laws through common sense guardrails because California shouldn't tolerate practices that exploit working families, the very families that already can't afford the high costs of living.
Arguments in Support
A broad coalition of organizations, representing consumers, workers, small businesses, and communities throughout California, explain their support of this measure:
Price fixing—when two or more competing businesses agree to set prices, output, or other commercial terms—results in increased prices and reduced choice for consumers. Price fixing is anticompetitive, and has long been thought of as the "supreme evil" of fair competition laws. Currently, price fixing is already illegal, under California and federal antitrust laws. However, it remains difficult to detect, especially as technological advancements enable collusion without direct communication. Algorithmic pricing tools now allow businesses to coordinate prices covertly, using third-party software to drive up prices and reduce competition. Despite the clear illegality of these practices, enforcing against this activity is harder than ever due to current law requiring an extremely high bar to bring a case. This has led to the proliferation of price-fixing algorithms, further undermining fair competition and consumer protections.
The California Attorney General's Office supports this measure, stating that AB 325 helpfully clarifies the applicability of state antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, to common pricing algorithms:
California's Cartwright Act prohibits agreements between corporations to restrain trade, limit production, and fix prices or otherwise prevent competition. Modern digital tools like pricing algorithms can make it easier for bad actors to artificially inflate prices, restrict supply, and undermine fair market competition. To be clear, price fixing is illegal under existing law, but AB 325 simply makes it clear that using common pricing algorithms to fix prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing methods under the Act. The bill also makes it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
Arguments in Opposition
A coalition of organizations, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, oppose this measure, challenging the principle that pricing algorithms are inherently problematic:
To the contrary, pricing algorithms are, in fact, extremely common tools that enable businesses to save money, improving efficiency by avoiding manual pricing, reducing costs for consumers, and making prices far more responsive to changes in supply and demand - and they can do so without involving any anti-competitive conduct. In contrast, price collusion (or price fixing) is problematic and is clearly illegal under current federal and state laws. Indeed, existing antitrust laws prohibit competitors from colluding on price in any manner, whether through using a pricing algorithm or otherwise. In other words, whether a price-fixing conspiracy is hatched by salespeople conspiring or computers running algorithms, collusion is collusion and is already effectively covered by existing law. To be clear, however, the use of a pricing algorithm does not inherently constitute price fixing. Retailers use pricing algorithms to ensure they are offering the most competitive prices to consumers. Realtors use them to help clients set home prices. Banks use them to set terms (e.g. rates and fees) for services. Hospitality, airlines, transportation network companies, utilities, ticket venues, and many others use them for dynamic pricing. The list goes on. All this bill does is remove a valuable tool for setting dynamic pricing and imposes significant costs on all businesses that use price algorithms, thereby reducing competition, rather than promoting it. In the end, this bill hurts not only businesses, taking them back to pre-technological times, but it hurts consumers, effectively doing away with price-comparison shopping and competitive/dynamic pricing by businesses seeking to earn their business.
If enacted, AB 325's reliance on incredibly broad, ill-defined terms and ambiguous standards will invariably muddy the distinction between permissible pricing algorithms and price fixing, creating significant confusion for businesses. For one thing, the bill's definition of "pricing algorithm" is so overly broad and vague that it captures any algorithm that uses a computational process. For another, AB 325 prohibits the use or distribution of any "pricing algorithm" that uses, incorporates, or was trained on "nonpublic competitor data." "Nonpublic competitor data", however, is not actually limited to nonpublic information. Rather, even the use of a competitor's public prices could be deemed "nonpublic competitor data" if the data is later determined to have not been "widely available" or "easily accessible" to the public. Of course, what is considered widely available or easily accessible to the public is entirely unclear as the bill is currently drafted. These are just two (of many) examples of definitional defects with the proposed statutory language in AB 325.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the fiscal impact is as follows:
- Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no fiscal impact. The department notes to staff that, while the impact of this bill would not pose a significant impact to the DOJ, as numerous bills this session may result in no significant impact to the DOJ, should an aggregate of these bills chapter, the DOJ would submit a workload BCP for additional resources to process the increase to the DOJ workload. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknowns, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. For example, in 2021, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail spending, including $89,580 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. Thus, if even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR.
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Kalra, Wicks, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
NO: Dixon, Sanchez, Tangipa
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 10-2-3
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Bryan, Irwin, Lowenthal, Ortega, Pellerin, Ward, Wicks, Wilson
NO: DeMaio, Patterson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dixon, Flora, Petrie-Norris
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-3-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
NO: Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-17-8
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Quirk-Silva, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Soria, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO: Alanis, Castillo, Chen, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis
ABS, ABST OR NV: Ahrens, Bains, Flora, Lackey, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Blanca Rubio, Solache
UPDATED
VERSION: September 5, 2025
CONSULTANT: Shiran Zohar / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0001838
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 325 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 325
Author: Aguiar-Curry (D), et al.
Amended: 9/5/25 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-2, 7/1/25
AYES: Umberg, Allen, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Laird, Stern, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NOES: Niello, Valladares
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/29/25
AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NOES: Seyarto, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-17, 6/2/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
SOURCE: American Economic Liberties Project
Economic Security California Action
TechEquity Action
DIGEST:
This bill clarifies that using a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy violates the Cartwright Act, and clarifies the Cartwright Act’s pleading standard.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/5/25 clarify that it is unlawful for a person to coerce another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by a common pricing algorithm used or distributed by that person, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Business and Professions Code (Bus. & Prof. Code), div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, for the purpose of specified restraints of trade.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that a violation of the Cartwright Act is a conspiracy against trade, and that knowingly engaging or participating in such a conspiracy is a crime, punishable as follows:
- If the violator is a corporation, by a fine of not more than $1 million or the amount under (c), whichever is greater.
- If the violator is an individual, by imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h) for one, two, or three years; by imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail; by a fine of not more $250,000 or the amount under (c), whichever is greater; or by both a fine and imprisonment.
- If any person derives pecuniary gain from a violation of the Cartwright Act, or the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the violator may be fined not more than twice the amount of the gain or loss. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(a).)
- Provides that all moneys received by a court in payment of any fine or civil penalty imposed pursuant to 9) shall be paid to the State Treasury, if the Attorney General initiated and prosecuted the action; or to the treasurer of the county in which the prosecution is conducted, if the district attorney initiated and prosecuted the action. In an action prosecuted jointly by the Attorney General and a district attorney, the amounts shall be paid in the proportion agreed upon by the prosecuting entities. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(c).)
- Provides that, in any indictment, information, or complaint for any offense under the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to state the purpose or effects of the trust or combination, and that the accused is a member of, acted with, or in pursuance of it, or aided and assisted in carrying out its purposes, without giving its name or description, or how, when, and where it was created. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16756.)
This bill:
- Adds a new section to the Cartwright Act, set forth in 2)-5), below.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Antitrust laws” means the provisions of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.
- “Commercial term” includes, without limitation, any of (1) level of service, (2) availability, or (3) output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
- “Common pricing algorithm” means any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses computer data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
- “Distribute,” “distribution,” and “distributing” include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- “Person” has the same meaning as defined in Business and Professions Code section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
- “Price” means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as follows:
- It is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Cartwright Act.
- It is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by the common pricing algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides that nothing in 2)-4) shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
Comments
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits businesses from restraining trade, fixing prices, and reducing competition. The Cartwright Act was enacted in 1907 and has remained in substantially the same form ever since. In the same timeframe, we have moved from a largely pre-electric society to one where most people own a tiny combination computer-telephone-camera-alarm clock-calculator-television-dictionary-etc. that they can keep in their pockets.
The fast pace of technological advancements has been a boon to licit and illicit actors alike. Developments in the online space—such as artificial intelligence (AI), algorithms, and distributed ledger—make it easier for bad actors to hide their tracks, or to bury illegitimate activities under layers of supposedly neutral computer processes. In the past several years, there have been numerous allegations that businesses have used algorithms and AI to do what groups of humans are prohibited from doing, including engaging in hiring discrimination, violate copyrights, and—relevant to this bill—fix prices.
This bill is intended to provide clarity in the Cartwright Act’s application to “algorithmic collusion,” through which persons manipulate market forces through the use of a shared pricing algorithm. First, this bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain grade or commerce in violation of the Cartwright Act. Second, this bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term recommended by that algorithm for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state. This bill also clarifies the pleading standard for a Cartwright Act claim.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the fiscal impact is as follows:
- Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no fiscal impact. The department notes to staff that, while the impact of this bill would not pose a significant impact to the DOJ, as numerous bills this session may result in no significant impact to the DOJ, should an aggregate of these bills chapter, the DOJ would submit a workload BCP for additional resources to process the increase to the DOJ workload. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknowns, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. For example, in 2021, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail spending, including $89,580 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. Thus, if even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR.
SUPPORT: (Verified 9/8/25)
American Economic Liberties Project (co-source)
Economic Security California Action (co-source)
TechEquity Action (co-source)
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
Americans for Financial Reform
Attorney General Rob Bonta
California Federation of Labor Unions
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Nurses Association
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association, AFL-CIO
CAMEO Network
Center on Policy Initiatives
Consumer Federation of California
Contra Costa Senior Legal Services
Courage California
Democratic Policy Network
East Bay YIMBY
Economic Security California Action
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
End Poverty in California
Equal Rights Advocates
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California
Grow the Richmond
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
Kapor Center
Mountain View YIMBY
Napa Housing Coalition
Napa-Solano for Everyone
National Consumer Law Center
Northern Neighbors
Oakland Privacy
Omidyar Network
Peninsula for Everyone
PowerSwitch Action
Progressive Women of Napa Valley
San Francisco YIMBY
Santa Cruz YIMBY
Santa Monica Democratic Club
Santa Rosa YIMBY
SEIU California
SLOCo YIMBY
Small Business Majority
South Bay YIMBY
Tech Oversight California
UDAW/AFSCME Local 3930
UFCW Western States Council
United Latino Voices of Contra Costa County
Ventura County YIMBY
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Western Center on Law and Poverty
YIMBY Action
YIMBY Los Angeles
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/8/25)
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
CalBroadband
California Association of Realtors
California Business Properties Association
California Business Roundtable
California Chamber of Commerce
California Fuels + Convenience Alliance
California Hospital Association
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
Chamber of Progress
Civil Justice Association of California
Insights Association
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Software Information Industry Association
TechNet
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to Attorney General Rob Bonta:
California’s Cartwright Act prohibits agreements between corporations to restrain trade, limit production, and fix prices or otherwise prevent competition. Modern digital tools like pricing algorithms can make it easier for bad actors to artificially inflate prices, restrict supply, and undermine fair market competition. To be clear, price fixing is illegal under existing law, but AB 325 simply makes it clear that using common pricing algorithms to fix prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing methods under the Act. The bill also makes it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
In addition, AB 325 reforms pleading standards under California law. Under federal law, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts that rule out independent conduct and show a "meeting of the minds"—a high burden that often leads to early dismissal, especially in algorithmic collusion cases brought by private plaintiffs.
AB 325 rejects that heightened standard and clarifies that under California law, a plaintiff need only allege plausible facts showing a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. In other words, courts may not require allegations that exclude the possibility of independent parallel conduct. This bill makes it easier for legitimate claims to survive a motion to dismiss and reach discovery, where private plaintiffs can obtain further evidence.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to a coalition of this bill’s opponents:
AB 325 remains as serious a concern, in part because there are other related bills that would address the liability components of these issues, and existing law imposes significant liability on the misuse of pricing algorithms as well. When combined with the bill’s broad and vague standards, AB 325’s would invariably have a chilling effect on the use of such technologies among businesses, particularly smaller ones who rely more heavily on these technologies to be more competitive with larger businesses that have access to far more data.
We are particularly concerned by the bill’s use of the word “coerces’. Coercion is not an antitrust concept and we are unaware of any case, investigation or allegation of an algorithm developer forcing or coercing others to accept pricing recommendations based on an algorithm. In addition, the language of Section (b) is vague because it does not connect coercion with a common pricing algorithm.
We continue to believe that the definition of a “common pricing algorithm” is too broad. The way the definition is currently written, it would apply to completely distinct algorithms - and other types of pricing software - if they are trained on the same or similar data. Any algorithm designed to recommend prices will be trained on the same or similar data as any other pricing algorithm, such as historic pricing and supply and demand information, meaning virtually any algorithm will be covered by the definition, even if designed independently and even if it makes pricing recommendations that are different from other algorithms.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-17, 6/2/25
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Quirk-Silva, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Soria, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NOES: Alanis, Castillo, Chen, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis
NO VOTE RECORDED: Ahrens, Bains, Flora, Lackey, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Blanca Rubio, Solache
Prepared by: Allison Whitt Meredith / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/8/25 21:08:14
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 325 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 325
Author: Aguiar-Curry (D), et al.
Amended: 8/29/25 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-2, 7/1/25
AYES: Umberg, Allen, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Laird, Stern, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NOES: Niello, Valladares
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/29/25
AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NOES: Seyarto, Dahle
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-17, 6/2/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
SOURCE: American Economic Liberties Project
Economic Security California Action
TechEquity Action
DIGEST:
This bill clarifies that using a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy violates the Cartwright Act, and clarifies the Cartwright Act’s pleading standard.
ANALYSIS:
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Business and Professions Code (Bus. & Prof. Code), div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, for the purpose of specified restraints of trade.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that a violation of the Cartwright Act is a conspiracy against trade, and that knowingly engaging or participating in such a conspiracy is a crime, punishable as follows:
- If the violator is a corporation, by a fine of not more than $1 million or the amount under (c), whichever is greater.
- If the violator is an individual, by imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h) for one, two, or three years; by imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail; by a fine of not more $250,000 or the amount under (c), whichever is greater; or by both a fine and imprisonment.
- If any person derives pecuniary gain from a violation of the Cartwright Act, or the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the violator may be fined not more than twice the amount of the gain or loss. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(a).)
- Provides that all moneys received by a court in payment of any fine or civil penalty imposed pursuant to 9) shall be paid to the State Treasury, if the Attorney General initiated and prosecuted the action; or to the treasurer of the county in which the prosecution is conducted, if the district attorney initiated and prosecuted the action. In an action prosecuted jointly by the Attorney General and a district attorney, the amounts shall be paid in the proportion agreed upon by the prosecuting entities. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(c).)
- Provides that, in any indictment, information, or complaint for any offense under the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to state the purpose or effects of the trust or combination, and that the accused is a member of, acted with, or in pursuance of it, or aided and assisted in carrying out its purposes, without giving its name or description, or how, when, and where it was created. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16756.)
This bill:
- Adds a new section to the Cartwright Act, set forth in 2)-5), below.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Antitrust laws” means the provisions of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.
- “Commercial term” includes, without limitation, any of (1) level of service, (2) availability, or (3) output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
- “Common pricing algorithm” means any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses computer data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
- “Distribute,” “distribution,” and “distributing” include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- “Person” has the same meaning as defined in Business and Professions Code section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
- “Price” means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following occurs:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and either (1) knows or should know that they are adhering to, or participating in, a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state, or (2) coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides that nothing in 2)-4) shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
Comments
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits businesses from restraining trade, fixing prices, and reducing competition. The Cartwright Act was enacted in 1907 and has remained in substantially the same form ever since. In the same timeframe, we have moved from a largely pre-electric society to one where most people own a tiny combination computer-telephone-camera-alarm clock-calculator-television-dictionary-etc. that they can keep in their pockets.
The fast pace of technological advancements has been a boon to licit and illicit actors alike. Developments in the online space—such as artificial intelligence, algorithms, and distributed ledger—make it easier for bad actors to hide their tracks, or to bury illegitimate activities under layers of supposedly neutral computer processes. In the past several years, there have been numerous allegations that businesses have used algorithms and AI to do what groups of humans are prohibited from doing, including engaging in hiring discrimination, violate copyrights, and—relevant to this bill—fix prices.
This bill is intended to provide clarity in the Cartwright Act’s application to “algorithmic collusion,” through which persons manipulate market forces through the use of a shared pricing algorithm. First, this bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain grade or commerce in violation of the Cartwright Act. Second, this bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state. This bill also clarifies the pleading standard for a Cartwright Act claim.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the fiscal impact is as follows:
- Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no fiscal impact. The department notes to staff that, while the impact of this bill would not pose a significant impact to the DOJ, as numerous bills this session may result in no significant impact to the DOJ, should an aggregate of these bills chapter, the DOJ would submit a workload BCP for additional resources to process the increase to the DOJ workload. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknowns, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. For example, in 2021, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail spending, including $89,580 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. Thus, if even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR.
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/25/29)
American Economic Liberties Project (co-source)
Economic Security California Action (co-source)
TechEquity Action (co-source)
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
Americans for Financial Reform
Attorney General Rob Bonta
California Federation of Labor Unions
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Nurses Association
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association, AFL-CIO
CAMEO Network
Center on Policy Initiatives
Consumer Federation of California
Contra Costa Senior Legal Services
Courage California
Democratic Policy Network
East Bay YIMBY
Economic Security California Action
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
End Poverty in California
Equal Rights Advocates
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California
Grow the Richmond
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
Kapor Center
Mountain View YIMBY
Napa Housing Coalition
Napa-Solano for Everyone
National Consumer Law Center
Northern Neighbors
Oakland Privacy
Omidyar Network
Peninsula for Everyone
PowerSwitch Action
Progressive Women of Napa Valley
San Francisco YIMBY
Santa Cruz YIMBY
Santa Monica Democratic Club
Santa Rosa YIMBY
SEIU California
SLOCo YIMBY
Small Business Majority
South Bay YIMBY
Tech Oversight California
UDAW/AFSCME Local 3930
UFCW Western States Council
United Latino Voices of Contra Costa County
Ventura County YIMBY
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Western Center on Law and Poverty
YIMBY Action
YIMBY Los Angeles
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/29/25)
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
CalBroadband
California Association of Realtors
California Business Properties Association
California Business Roundtable
California Chamber of Commerce
California Fuels + Convenience Alliance
California Hospital Association
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
Chamber of Progress
Civil Justice Association of California
Insights Association
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Software Information Industry Association
TechNet
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to Attorney General Rob Bonta:
California’s Cartwright Act prohibits agreements between corporations to restrain trade, limit production, and fix prices or otherwise prevent competition. Modern digital tools like pricing algorithms can make it easier for bad actors to artificially inflate prices, restrict supply, and undermine fair market competition. To be clear, price fixing is illegal under existing law, but AB 325 simply makes it clear that using common pricing algorithms to fix prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing methods under the Act. The bill also makes it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
In addition, AB 325 reforms pleading standards under California law. Under federal law, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts that rule out independent conduct and show a "meeting of the minds"—a high burden that often leads to early dismissal, especially in algorithmic collusion cases brought by private plaintiffs.
AB 325 rejects that heightened standard and clarifies that under California law, a plaintiff need only allege plausible facts showing a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. In other words, courts may not require allegations that exclude the possibility of independent parallel conduct. This bill makes it easier for legitimate claims to survive a motion to dismiss and reach discovery, where private plaintiffs can obtain further evidence.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to a coalition of this bill’s opponents:
AB 325 remains as serious a concern, in part because there are other related bills that would address the liability components of these issues, and existing law imposes significant liability on the misuse of pricing algorithms as well. When combined with the bill’s broad and vague standards, AB 325’s would invariably have a chilling effect on the use of such technologies among businesses, particularly smaller ones who rely more heavily on these technologies to be more competitive with larger businesses that have access to far more data.
We are particularly concerned by the bill’s use of the word “coerces’. Coercion is not an antitrust concept and we are unaware of any case, investigation or allegation of an algorithm developer forcing or coercing others to accept pricing recommendations based on an algorithm. In addition, the language of Section (b) is vague because it does not connect coercion with a common pricing algorithm.
We continue to believe that the definition of a “common pricing algorithm” is too broad. The way the definition is currently written, it would apply to completely distinct algorithms - and other types of pricing software - if they are trained on the same or similar data. Any algorithm designed to recommend prices will be trained on the same or similar data as any other pricing algorithm, such as historic pricing and supply and demand information, meaning virtually any algorithm will be covered by the definition, even if designed independently and even if it makes pricing recommendations that are different from other algorithms.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-17, 6/2/25
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Quirk-Silva, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Soria, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NOES: Alanis, Castillo, Chen, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis
NO VOTE RECORDED: Ahrens, Bains, Flora, Lackey, Petrie-Norris, Ramos, Blanca Rubio, Solache
Prepared by: Allison Whitt Meredith / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/2/25 17:53:09
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry) - Cartwright Act: violations
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
Provides that using a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy violates the Cartwright Act.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on August 29, 2025
Fiscal Impact:
- Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no fiscal impact. The department notes to staff that, while the impact of this bill would not pose a significant impact to the DOJ, as numerous bills this session may result in no significant impact to the DOJ, should an aggregate of these bills chapter, the DOJ would submit a workload BCP for additional resources to process the increase to the DOJ workload. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknowns, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. For example, in 2021, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail spending, including $89,580 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. Thus, if even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR.
Author Amendments:
Redefine “common pricing algorithm” as any methodology, including a computer, software, or other technology, used by two or more persons, that uses competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or otherwise influence a price or commercial term.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry) - Cartwright Act: violations
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 325 provides that using a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy violates the Cartwright Act. In the past several years, there have been numerous allegations that businesses have used algorithms and AI to fix prices.
Fiscal Impact:
- Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no fiscal impact. The department notes to staff that, while the impact of this bill would not pose a significant impact to the DOJ, as numerous bills this session may result in no significant impact to the DOJ, should an aggregate of these bills chapter, the DOJ would submit a workload BCP for additional resources to process the increase to the DOJ workload. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknowns, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds) to the counties to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail varies by county, but likely ranges from $70,000 to $90,000 per year. For example, in 2021, Los Angeles County budgeted $1.3 billion for jail spending, including $89,580 per incarcerated person. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. Generally, county incarceration costs are not reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012).
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (General Fund) to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. Thus, if even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR.
Background:
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits businesses from restraining trade, fixing prices, and reducing competition. As explained in the Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis of this bill, pricing algorithms are intended to help firms determine optimal pricing on a near real-time basis. A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning to weigh variables such as supply and demand, competitor pricing, and delivery time, along with any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information. Some studies suggest that pricing algorithm can result in higher prices for consumers, particularly when one seller is using a more sophisticated reinforced learning algorithm and its competitors are using a rule-based algorithm that incorporates that seller’s price as an input. Concerns have been raised that algorithms—particularly reinforced learning algorithms—can “learn” to collude with competitors’ pricing algorithms, thereby keeping prices higher than pure market forces would warrant.
Proposed Law:
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following occurs:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state; or,
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and either (1) knows or should know that they are adhering to, or participating in, a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state, or (2) coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action
- Defines the “Common pricing algorithm” as any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same or performing a substantially similar function.
-- END --
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 325 (Author:Aguiar-Curry)
Version: June 19, 2025
Hearing Date: July 1, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: AWM
SUBJECT
Cartwright Act: violations
DIGEST
This bill clarifies that using a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy violates the Cartwright Act, and clarifies the Cartwright Act’s pleading standard.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
California’s primary antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, prohibits businesses from restraining trade, fixing prices, and reducing competition. The Cartwright Act was enacted in 1907 and has remained in substantially the same form ever since. In the same timeframe, we have moved from a largely pre-electric society to one where most people own a tiny combination computer-telephone-camera-alarm clock-calculator-television-dictionary-etc. that they can keep in their pockets.
The fast pace of technological advancements has been a boon to licit and illicit actors alike. Developments in the online space—such as artificial intelligence, algorithms, and distributed ledger—make it easier for bad actors to hide their tracks, or to bury illegitimate activities under layers of supposedly neutral computer processes. In the past several years, there have been numerous allegations that businesses have used algorithms and AI to do what groups of humans are prohibited from doing, including engaging in hiring discrimination, violate copyrights, and—relevant to this bill—fix prices.
This bill is intended to provide clarity in the Cartwright Act’s application to “algorithmic collusion,” through which persons manipulate market forces through the use of a shared pricing algorithm. First, the bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain grade or commerce in violation of the Cartwright Act. Second, the bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state. The bill also clarifies the type of factual allegations necessary to state a claim in a complaint for a Cartwright Act violation.
This bill is sponsored by the American Economic Liberties Project, Economic Security California Action, and TechEquity Action, and is supported by over 40 organizations. This bill is opposed by a coalition of CalChamber and 15 other organizations, and the California Business Roundtable.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any combination of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- The state and its political subdivisions and public agencies are “persons” for the purpose of 7).
- The Attorney General or a district attorney may file a suit for damages on behalf of a state or county political subdivision, respectively. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that a violation of the Cartwright Act is a conspiracy against trade, and that knowingly engaging or participating in such a conspiracy is a crime, punishable as follows:
- If the violator is a corporation, by a fine of not more than $1 million or the amount under (c), whichever is greater.
- If the violator is an individual, by imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h) for one, two, or three years; by imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail; by a fine of not more $250,000 or the amount under (c), whichever is greater; or by both a fine and imprisonment.
- If any person derives pecuniary gain from a violation of the Cartwright Act, or the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the violator may be fined not more than twice the amount of the gain or loss. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(a).)
- Provides that all moneys received by a court in payment of any fine or civil penalty imposed pursuant to 9) shall be paid to the State Treasury, if the Attorney General initiated and prosecuted the action; or to the treasurer of the county in which the prosecution is conducted, if the district attorney initiated and prosecuted the action. In an action prosecuted jointly by the Attorney General and a district attorney, the amounts shall be paid in the proportion agreed upon by the prosecuting entities. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(c).)
- Provides that, in any indictment, information, or complaint for any offense under the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to state the purpose or effects of the trust or combination, and that the accused is a member of, acted with, or in pursuance of it, or aided and assisted in carrying out its purposes, without giving its name or description, or how, when, and where it was created. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16756.)
This bill:
- Adds a new section to the Cartwright Act, set forth in 2)-5), below.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Antitrust laws” means the provisions of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.
- “Commercial term” includes, without limitation, any of (1) level of service, (2) availability, or (3) output, including quantities of products produced or distributed or the amount or level of service provided.
- “Common pricing algorithm” means any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same or performing a substantially similar function.
- “Distribute,” “distribution,” and “distributing” include selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- “Person” has the same meaning as defined in Business and Professions Code section 16702 and does not include the end consumer of a product or service.
- “Price” means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.
- Provides that it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following occurs:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and either (1) knows or should know that they are adhering to, or participating in, a scheme to fix the price or commercial term of the same or similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state, or (2) coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides that nothing in 2)-4) shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws.
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other law, in a complaint for any violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
COMMENTS
- Author’s comment
According to the author:
It doesn’t matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, it’s wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the "price crisis," resulting in higher costs and fewer choices. AB 325 updates California’s antitrust laws to address modern technologies being used for illegal price fixing. This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing. AB 325 will help enforce existing laws through common sense guardrails because California shouldn’t tolerate practices that exploit working families, the very families that already can’t afford the high costs of living.
2. Background on price-fixing algorithms
“Pricing algorithms are intended to help firms determine optimal pricing on a near real-time basis.”[1] A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning “to weigh variables such as supply and demand, competitor pricing, and delivery time,” along with any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information.[2] Some studies suggest that pricing algorithm can result in higher prices for consumers,[3] particularly when one seller is using a more sophisticated reinforced learning algorithm and its competitors are using a rule-based algorithm that incorporates that seller’s price as an input.[4]
As algorithms grew more expansive in the 2010s, scholars raised concerns that algorithms—particularly reinforced learning algorithms—could “learn” to collude with competitors’ pricing algorithms, thereby keeping prices higher than pure market forces would warrant.[5]
3. State and federal antitrust laws
Section 1 of the federal Sherman Act[6] prohibits concerted action that restrains trade; Section 2 prohibits concerted action and independent action, but “only when it threatens actual monopolization,” a higher bar than restraint of trade. [7] “[Horizontal] price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se” under Section 1’s prohibition on concerted action.[8] This per se bar extends to any “combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity” in interstate or foreign commerce.[9]
Similarly, California’s Cartwright Act “ ‘generally outlaws any combinations or agreements which restrain trade or competition or which fix or control prices.’ ”[10] Under the Cartwright Act,[11] “agreements fixing or tampering with prices are illegal per se.”[12] These prohibitions “rest on the premise that unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”[13] “The [A]ct’s principal goal is the preservation of consumer welfare” through the maintenance of competitive markets.[14]
A violation of the Cartwright Act requires “a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons” that seeks to achieve an anticompetitive end.[15] A complaint pursuant to the Act must allege: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.”[16] The Cartwright Act carries criminal penalties for a violation and permits persons injured by a violation, or various public prosecutors on behalf of persons injured, to file a civil action for damages against a violator.[17]
4. Antitrust law and algorithms
It is a longstanding antitrust principle that “competitors cannot simply get around antitrust liability by acting through a third-party intermediary or joint venture.”[18] In the same vein, if several competitors conspire to keep prices artificially high, the fact that an algorithm, rather than a person, sets the specific prices does not appear to relieve them of liability.
Of course, existing antitrust laws do not reach anticompetitive behavior absent an agreement to restrain trade.[19] This has led some to question to what extent antitrust laws apply when a price-setting algorithm takes in data that competitors would normally keep private and recommends prices to those competitors on the basis of those inputs. In theory, then, a user could be engaging in anticompetitive price-fixing without realizing it, and in the absence of a conspiracy, there would be no antitrust violation.
Former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Maureen K. Ohlhausen disagrees. She argues that the use of a vendor that provides algorithmic pricing services derived from confidential pricing information is merely an updated version of a long-prohibited practice, known as the “hub-and-spoke conspiracy”: “[j]ust as the antitrust laws do not allow competitors to exchange competitively sensitive information directly in an effort to stabilize or control industry pricing, they also prohibit using an intermediary to facilitate the exchange of confidential business information.”[20] To understand why this is such an easy call, Ohlhausen recommended replacing “algorithm” with “ ‘a guy named Bob’ ”:
Is it ok for a guy named Bob to collect confidential price strategy information from all the participants in a market, and then tell everybody how they should price? If it isn’t ok for a guy named Bob to do it, then it probably isn’t ok for an algorithm to do it either.[21]
Consistent with this approach, the U.S Department of Justice (USDOJ) and several states, including California, have filed an antitrust lawsuit against RealPage and several property management companies, alleging that RealPage is running a hub-and-spoke price-fixing conspiracy.[22] According to the First Amended Complaint, RealPage’s Vice President of Revenue Management Advisory Services described RealPage’s benefit to landlords thusly: “ ‘[T]here is greater good in everybody succeeding versus essentially trying to compete against one another in a way that actually keeps the entire industry down.’ ”[23] At the time this analysis was released, RealPage’s motion to dismiss was pending before the court.
One other factor that may be relevant in determining whether the use of a pricing algorithm violates antitrust law, in the absence of an overt agreement by competitors to do so, is whether the algorithm is actually setting prices or just offering up a price as a possible option. To date, federal courts have dismissed antitrust suits against algorithmic pricing software where the inputs were public information and the individual users did not agree to be bound by the pricing recommendations.[24]
5. This bill adds algorithm-specific provisions to the Cartwright Act
As discussed above in Comment 4, the Cartwright Act already extends to conspiracies in which prices are fixed, or the aims of the conspiracy are otherwise accomplished, through the use of an algorithm. Nevertheless, this bill is intended to provide more clarity to how a shared pricing algorithm can be used as a tool in a price-fixing scheme. The bill addresses only “common pricing algorithms,” i.e., a single algorithm making recommendations for multiple persons; it does not affect separate algorithmic products that happen to incorporate the same data.
First, the bill expressly states that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain grade or commerce in violation of the Cartwright Act. Second, the bill provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a pricing algorithm if the person coerces another person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state. “Coercion” arises when the person imposes negative consequences for failing to accept the desired price or commercial term.[25] Coercion can encompass a wide range of behavior, including imposing a financial penalty or withholding a financial benefit, de-prioritizing or hiding a person’s listings or posts, or tweaking the algorithm to penalize the person’s interests.[26]
The bill’s provisions apply to both the distributor and the user of the algorithm. The bill does not extend to the end consumer of a product or service, but it does extend to sellers and resellers—using an algorithm to control the resale market, for example, would be covered by this bill. The author has committed to continue working on the definition of “common pricing algorithm” to make sure it is sufficiently precisely tailored so as to avoid roping in bespoke algorithms or algorithms that are not used to fix prices.
6. This bill clarifies the pleading standard for Cartwright Act claims
As discussed above in Comment 3, the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act are similar but not identical. Because of those similarities, courts often turn to Sherman Act case law for guidance on how to apply the Cartwright Act.[27] This bill is intended, however, to prevent courts from applying federal case law addressing how to plead a Sherman Act claim to the question of how to plead a Cartwright Act claim.
The United States Supreme Court, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, addressed the facts necessary to plead a claim under Section 1 the Sherman Act (Section 1) under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[28] Twombly holds that, “when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a [Section 1] claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be an independent action.”[29] In other words, under Twombly, a plaintiff cannot proceed to the discovery stage with only allegations of parallel conduct that permit an inference of a price-fixing agreement; the plaintiff must be able to plead facts specifically tending to show that such an agreement existed. Courts often describe the Twombly pleading standard for Section 1 claims as requiring, in addition to allegations of competitors’ parallel conduct, “plus factors” that provide “ ‘something more,’ ‘some further factual enhancement,’ a ‘further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds’ of the alleged conspirators.”[30]
California has a different pleading standard. While a federal court will examine a complaint to determine whether the facts pleaded are plausible,[31] a California court must “assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded[,] and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.”[32] Additionally, a California court must construe pleadings liberally, “with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”[33] Accordingly, while the Sherman and Cartwright Acts can be interpreted in tandem in some respects, imposing a “plus factor” pleading standard in Cartwright Claims would improperly overlook California’s longstanding pleading rules.
This bill is intended to prevent the “plus factor” pleading standard from being imported into Cartwright Act context by expressly stating that a Cartwright Act complaint need not allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action. The bill’s language still affirms a plaintiff’s need to plead factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade is plausible, so this should not open the floodgates to frivolous antitrust suits where the defendants demonstrate no signs of engaging in a conspiracy. Instead, this language should prevent inapplicable federal precedent from seeping into California law.
7. Arguments in support
According to the bill’s sponsors:
Price fixing has long been illegal under California and Federal antitrust laws. However, it remains difficult to detect, especially as technological advancements enable collusion without direct communication. Algorithmic pricing tools now allow businesses to coordinate prices covertly, using third-party software to drive up prices and reduce competition. In some cases, providers of third-party pricing tools may pressure independent businesses to surrender pricing control by offering incentives, such as promotions or market research, that are hard to refuse without forfeiting a competitive advantage. Despite the clear illegality of these practices, enforcing against this activity is harder than ever due to the current law requiring an extremely high bar to bring a case, sometimes requiring lengthy and resource-intensive court battles. AB 325 will codify best practices that the courts have already begun to coalesce around to allow them to better detect what constitutes an illegal agreement, bringing clarity to our laws and easing the path to enforcement.
This bill targets the most serious antitrust violations while affirming that traditional market analysis remains legal. It holds bad actors accountable for coercing others to follow algorithm-based pricing (e.g., a wholesaler pressuring a retailer), and aligns the law with established legal precedent that price fixing can be inferred from the use of such algorithms. It also addresses advanced digital collusion that harms market fairness, limits competition, and raises consumer prices. By setting clear standards and closing loopholes, it equips regulators and courts to protect fair, competitive markets.
8. Arguments in opposition
According to a coalition of the bill’s opponents:
AB 325 remains as serious a concern, in part because there are other related bills that would address the liability components of these issues, and existing law imposes significant liability on the misuse of pricing algorithms as well. When combined with the bill’s broad and vague standards, AB 325’s would invariably have a chilling effect on the use of such technologies among businesses, particularly smaller ones who rely more heavily on these technologies to be more competitive with larger businesses that have access to far more data.
We are particularly concerned by the bill’s use of the word “coerces’. Coercion is not an antitrust concept and we are unaware of any case, investigation or allegation of an algorithm developer forcing or coercing others to accept pricing recommendations based on an algorithm. In addition, the language of Section (b) is vague because it does not connect coercion with a common pricing algorithm.
We continue to believe that the definition of a “common pricing algorithm” is too broad. The way the definition is currently written, it would apply to completely distinct algorithms - and other types of pricing software - if they are trained on the same or similar data. Any algorithm designed to recommend prices will be trained on the same or similar data as any other pricing algorithm, such as historic pricing and supply and demand information, meaning virtually any algorithm will be covered by the definition, even if designed independently and even if it makes pricing recommendations that are different from other algorithms.
SUPPORT
American Economic Liberties Project (co-sponsor)
Economic Security California Action (co-sponsor)
TechEquity Action (co-sponsor)
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
Americans for Financial Reform
California Federation of Labor Unions
California Low-Income Consumer Coalition
California Nurses Association
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association, AFL-CIO
CAMEO Network
Center on Policy Initiatives
Consumer Federation of California
Contra Costa Senior Legal Services
Courage California
Democratic Policy Network
East Bay YIMBY
Economic Security California Action
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
End Poverty in California
Equal Rights Advocates
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California
Grow the Richmond
Institute for Local Self-Reliance
Kapor Center
Mountain View YIMBY
Napa-Solano for Everyone
National Consumer Law Center
Northern Neighbors
Oakland Privacy
Peninsula for Everyone
PowerSwitch Action
San Francisco YIMBY
Santa Cruz YIMBY
Santa Monica Democratic Club
Santa Rosa YIMBY
SEIU California
SLOCo YIMBY
Small Business Majority
South Bay YIMBY
Tech Oversight California
UDAW/AFSCME Local 3930
UFCW Western States Council
United Latino Voices of Contra Costa County
Ventura County YIMBY
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Western Center on Law and Poverty
YIMBY Action
YIMBY Los Angeles
OPPOSITION
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
CalBroadband
California Business Properties Association
California Business Roundtable
California Chamber of Commerce
California Fuels + Convenience Alliance
California Hospital Association
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
Civil Justice Association of California
Insights Association
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Software Information Industry Association
TechNet
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending legislation:
SB 763 (Hurtado, 2025) increases the existing criminal penalties, and permits the Attorney General or a district attorney to seek civil penalties of up to $1 million, for a violation of the Cartwright Act. SB 763 is pending before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
SB 384 (Wahab, 2025) establishes the Preventing Algorithmic Price Fixing Act, which prohibits a business from using a price-fixing algorithm, as defined, to set a price or supply level of a good or service. SB 384 is pending before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) establishes the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2025, which prohibits a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with competitor data and requires a person using a pricing algorithm to recommend or set a price or commercial term to make certain commercial disclosures. SB 295 is pending before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
SB 52 (Pérez, 2025) prohibits the sale, licensing, or provision, to two or more persons, a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more landlords in the same market to set or recommend specified rental terms, and prohibits the use of nonpublic competitor data in an algorithm used to set or recommend specified rental terms. SB 52 is pending before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
Prior legislation:
SB 1154 (Hurtado, 2024) would have established the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2024, which was substantially similar to this bill. SB 1154 died in this Committee.
AB 2930 (Bauer-Kahan, 2024) would have prohibited a person or entity from using an automated decision tool, including an algorithm, in a way that results in algorithmic discrimination, as defined, in employment, educational, housing, and other contexts. AB 2930 died on the Assembly Floor.
AB 2230 (Bennett, 2024) would have established the Residential Housing Unfair Practices Act of 2023, which would have amended the Cartwright Act to expressly list certain practices relating to the provision of housing. AB 2230 died in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 331 (Bauer-Kahan, 2023) was largely similar to AB 2930 (Bauer-Kahan, 2024) and would have prohibited a person or entity from using an automated decision tool, including an algorithm, in a way that results in algorithmic discrimination, as defined, in employment, educational, housing, and other contexts. AB 331 died in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
AB 2224 (McCarty, 2022) would have required online real estate platforms, known as iBuyers, that use algorithms to determine the value of a property and make offers to purchase a home without the use of a mortgage or other type of financing, to work with a local real estate broker when selling and completing a sale of real property in California. AB 2224 died in the Senate Business, Professions and Economic Development Committee.
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 54, Noes 17)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 3)
Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 10, Noes 2)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 3)
**************
Bertini & Koenigsberg, The Pitfalls of Pricing Algorithms, Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct. 2021), available at https://hbr.org/2021/09/the-pitfalls-of-pricing-algorithms. All links in this analysis are current as of June 26, 2025. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Calvano, et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion (2020) 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 3267. ↑
Wang, et al., Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence and Simple Rule-Based Pricing (Jun. 29, 2022) SSRN, p. 40, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4144905. ↑
Calvano, supra, at p. 3268. ↑
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. ↑
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. (1984) 467 U.S. 752, 767. ↑
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 150, 218. ↑
Id. at p. 223. ↑
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1147. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq. ↑
Oakland-Alameda County Builders’ Exchange v. F. P. Lathrop Constr. Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 354, 363. ↑
Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 935 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 116, 136. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720. ↑
Qualimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 48-49. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16750-16761. ↑
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League (2010) 560 U.S. 183, 202 (cleaned up). ↑
E.g., Quelimane Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 49. ↑
Remarks of Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairwoman, U.S. FTC, “Should We Fear The Things That Go Beep In the Night? Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust Law and Algorithmic Pricing,” Remarks from the Concurrences Antitrust Financial Sector Conference (May 23, 2017), p. 10, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/should-we-fear-things-go-beep-night-some-initial-thoughts-intersection-antitrust-law-algorithmic. ↑
Ibid. ↑
See U.S. v. RealPage, Inc.(M.D.N.C.) Case No. 1:24-cv-00710-LCB-JLW. ↑
First Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 47, U.S. v. RealPage, Inc.(M.D.N.C.) Case No. 1:24-cv-00710-LCB-JLW, ¶ 2 (emphasis in original). ↑
See Gibson v. Cendyn Group (D. Nev. May 8, 2024) Case No. 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA, 2024 WL 2060260; Cornish-Adebiyi v. Caesar’s Entertainment, Inc. (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2024) Case No. 1:23-CV-02536-KMW-EAP, 2024 WL 4356188. ↑
E.g., Kolling v. Dow Jones & CO. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 709, 720 (“[I]t is now established that the ‘conspiracy’ or ‘combination’ necessary to support an antitrust action can be found where a supplier or producer, by coercive conduct, imposes restraints to which distributors voluntarily adhere.”). ↑
See id. at p. 721 (“If, for example, the supplier takes ‘affirmative action’ to bring about the involuntary acquiescence of its dealers, an unlawful combination exists.”); see also CACI No. 3408 (Nov. 2024) (“Vertical Restraints—‘Coercion’ Explained”). ↑
E.g., Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842, 852-853. ↑
550 U.S. 544, 554-556. ↑
Id. at p. 557. ↑
In re Musical Instruments and Equipment Antitrust Litig. (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3d 1186, 1193. ↑
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 680. ↑
Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.719, 725. ↑
Code Civ. Proc., § 452. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 325
Author:(Aguiar-Curry)
As Amended Ver:May 29, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Prohibits the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm when the person 1) distributes it with intent to set prices and coerces adoption, 2) uses it knowing or having reason to know they are joining a price-fixing scheme or coercing others, or 3) uses it to set prices and coerces others to adopt recommended terms.
Major Provisions
- Defines:
- "Commercial term" to include level of service, availability, and output, as specified.
- "Common pricing algorithm" as any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same, or performing a substantially similar, function.
- "Distribute," "distribution," and "distributing" as selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- "Person" as defined under Business and Professions Code section 16702, which provides the term includes corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations existing or authorized under state, federal, or foreign law. "Person" does not include end consumers of a product or service.
- "Price" as the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Clarifies that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.
- Provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if any of the following is true:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or term in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that they are adhering to or participating in a scheme to fix the price or term of the same or similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides, notwithstanding any other law, that in a complaint for a violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
COMMENTS
This bill aims to modernize California's antitrust laws to address the emerging threat of algorithmic price fixing, where multiple businesses use shared pricing algorithms—often powered by AI or machine learning—to coordinate prices, reduce competition, and inflate costs to consumers. It does so by amending the state's Cartwright Act to prohibit the distribution and use of certain shared pricing algorithms and by clarifying the legal standards for bringing enforcement actions under state law. Traditional antitrust law prohibits explicit agreements between competitors to fix prices. However, algorithmic tools now enable firms to engage in tacit collusion—coordinating pricing strategies without formal agreements—by delegating pricing decisions to a shared algorithm. These algorithms can process market data, adjust prices based on competitor behavior, and even punish deviation from coordinated pricing patterns, all in real time and without human intervention. As multiple companies adopt the same pricing tools, market competition may be undermined even absent direct communication. Federal agencies, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), have warned that algorithmic coordination may amount to a per se violation of the federal Sherman Act. Ongoing cases—such as those, for example, involving RealPage—raise allegations that competitors jointly using the same pricing software are effectively fixing prices. However, courts applying federal law have often dismissed such cases due to stringent pleading requirements.
What the bill does. To counter this form of anticompetitive behavior, the bill adds a new section to the Cartwright Act prohibiting the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm by separate entities if:
1) It is part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce; or
2) Any of the following is true:
a) The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products, and the person coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or term in the jurisdiction of this state.
b) The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that they are adhering to or participating in a scheme to fix the price or term of the same or similar product or service in the jurisdiction of this state.
c) The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and coerces any person to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
A "common pricing algorithm" is defined as any automated process—including those using AI or machine learning—that recommends or sets prices using the same or substantially similar data inputs and logic. The bill applies regardless of whether the underlying data is public or private, reflecting the understanding that even public data can enable collusion when processed similarly across competitors. The bill is structured to avoid interfering with ordinary or beneficial uses of pricing software. It targets only those situations where separate firms use shared algorithms, consistent with antitrust law's focus on preserving "independent centers of decisionmaking." Businesses that develop or use their own proprietary pricing tools remain unaffected. zA key feature of the bill is its reform of the pleading standard under the Cartwright Act. Under federal law, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts that rule out independent conduct and show a "meeting of the minds"—a high burden that often leads to early dismissal, especially in algorithmic collusion cases. This bill explicitly rejects that heightened standard. Instead, it clarifies that under California law, a plaintiff need only allege plausible facts showing a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Courts may not require allegations that exclude the possibility of independent parallel conduct. This makes it easier for legitimate claims to survive a motion to dismiss and reach discovery, where further evidence can be obtained. The bill preserves the strong remedies already available under the Cartwright Act. Violators are subject to joint and several liability—meaning any one defendant can be held responsible for the full amount of damages. Available penalties include treble damages, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and in some cases, criminal sanctions.
According to the Author
It doesn't matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, its wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the "price crisis," resulting in higher costs and fewer choices. AB 325 updates California's antitrust laws to address modern technologies being used for illegal price fixing. This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing. AB 325 will help enforce existing laws through common sense guardrails because California shouldn't tolerate practices that exploit working families, the very families that already can't afford the high costs of living.
Arguments in Support
A broad coalition of organizations, representing consumers, workers, small businesses, and communities throughout California, explain their support of this measure:
Price fixing—when two or more competing businesses agree to set prices, output, or other commercial terms—results in increased prices and reduced choice for consumers. Price fixing is anticompetitive, and has long been thought of as the "supreme evil" of fair competition laws. Currently, price fixing is already illegal, under California and federal antitrust laws. However, it remains difficult to detect, especially as technological advancements enable collusion without direct communication. Algorithmic pricing tools now allow businesses to coordinate prices covertly, using third-party software to drive up prices and reduce competition. Despite the clear illegality of these practices, enforcing against this activity is harder than ever due to current law requiring an extremely high bar to bring a case. This has led to the proliferation of price-fixing algorithms, further undermining fair competition and consumer protections.
Arguments in Opposition
A coalition of organizations, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, oppose this measure, challenging the principle that pricing algorithms are inherently problematic:
To the contrary, pricing algorithms are, in fact, extremely common tools that enable businesses to save money, improving efficiency by avoiding manual pricing, reducing costs for consumers, and making prices far more responsive to changes in supply and demand - and they can do so without involving any anti-competitive conduct. In contrast, price collusion (or price fixing) is problematic and is clearly illegal under current federal and state laws. Indeed, existing antitrust laws prohibit competitors from colluding on price in any manner, whether through using a pricing algorithm or otherwise. In other words, whether a price-fixing conspiracy is hatched by salespeople conspiring or computers running algorithms, collusion is collusion and is already effectively covered by existing law. To be clear, however, the use of a pricing algorithm does not inherently constitute price fixing. Retailers use pricing algorithms to ensure they are offering the most competitive prices to consumers. Realtors use them to help clients set home prices. Banks use them to set terms (e.g. rates and fees) for services. Hospitality, airlines, transportation network companies, utilities, ticket venues, and many others use them for dynamic pricing. The list goes on. All this bill does is remove a valuable tool for setting dynamic pricing and imposes significant costs on all businesses that use price algorithms, thereby reducing competition, rather than promoting it. In the end, this bill hurts not only businesses, taking them back to pre-technological times, but it hurts consumers, effectively doing away with price-comparison shopping and competitive/dynamic pricing by businesses seeking to earn their business.
If enacted, AB 325's reliance on incredibly broad, ill-defined terms and ambiguous standards will invariably muddy the distinction between permissible pricing algorithms and price fixing, creating significant confusion for businesses. For one thing, the bill's definition of "pricing algorithm" is so overly broad and vague that it captures any algorithm that uses a computational process. For another, AB 325 prohibits the use or distribution of any "pricing algorithm" that uses, incorporates, or was trained on "nonpublic competitor data." "Nonpublic competitor data", however, is not actually limited to nonpublic information. Rather, even the use of a competitor's public prices could be deemed "nonpublic competitor data" if the data is later determined to have not been "widely available" or "easily accessible" to the public. Of course, what is considered widely available or easily accessible to the public is entirely unclear as the bill is currently drafted. These are just two (of many) examples of definitional defects with the proposed statutory language in AB 325.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Possible costs (General Fund, special funds) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of an unknown amount. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ hires staff to handle enforcement actions authorized by this bill, the department would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2024-25 state budget provides $37.3 million ongoing General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Incarceration costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as this bill expands criminal liability under the Cartwright Act. Actual costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in jail is approximately $29,000. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Kalra, Wicks, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
NO: Dixon, Sanchez, Tangipa
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 10-2-3
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Bryan, Irwin, Lowenthal, Ortega, Pellerin, Ward, Wicks, Wilson
NO: DeMaio, Patterson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dixon, Flora, Petrie-Norris
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-3-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
NO: Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez
UPDATED
VERSION: May 29, 2025
CONSULTANT: Shiran Zohar / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000951
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 325
Author:(Aguiar-Curry)
As Amended Ver:April 24, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Prohibits the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm if the algorithm is used by two or more parties to set or recommend prices or commercial terms for the same or similar products or services in California.
Major Provisions
- Defines:
- "Commercial term" to include level of service, availability, and output, as specified.
- "Common pricing algorithm" as any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same, or performing a substantially similar, function.
- "Distribute," "distribution," and "distributing" as selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- "Person" as defined under Business and Professions Code section 16702, which provides the term includes corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations existing or authorized under state, federal, or foreign law. "Person" does not include end consumers of a product or service.
- "Price" as the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following is true:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that the common pricing algorithm is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides that any person who violates 2) is jointly and severally liable for any such violation.
- Provides, notwithstanding any other law, that in a complaint for a violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
COMMENTS
This bill aims to modernize California's antitrust laws to address the emerging threat of algorithmic price fixing, where multiple businesses use shared pricing algorithms—often powered by AI or machine learning—to coordinate prices, reduce competition, and inflate costs to consumers. It does so by amending the state's Cartwright Act to prohibit the distribution and use of certain shared pricing algorithms and by clarifying the legal standards for bringing enforcement actions under state law. Traditional antitrust law prohibits explicit agreements between competitors to fix prices. However, algorithmic tools now enable firms to engage in tacit collusion—coordinating pricing strategies without formal agreements—by delegating pricing decisions to a shared algorithm. These algorithms can process market data, adjust prices based on competitor behavior, and even punish deviation from coordinated pricing patterns, all in real time and without human intervention. As multiple companies adopt the same pricing tools, market competition may be undermined even absent direct communication. Federal agencies, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), have warned that algorithmic coordination may amount to a per se violation of the federal Sherman Act. Ongoing cases—such as those, for example, involving RealPage—raise allegations that competitors jointly using the same pricing software are effectively fixing prices. However, courts applying federal law have often dismissed such cases due to stringent pleading requirements.
What the bill does. To counter this form of anticompetitive behavior, the bill adds a new section to the Cartwright Act prohibiting the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm by separate entities if:
- The algorithm is distributed to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms for the same or similar products in California; or
- A person uses such an algorithm and knows or should know that it is or will be used by another entity to set or recommend prices or commercial terms for the same or similar products or services in California.
A "common pricing algorithm" is defined as any automated process—including those using AI or machine learning—that recommends or sets prices using the same or substantially similar data inputs and logic. The bill applies regardless of whether the underlying data is public or private, reflecting the understanding that even public data can enable collusion when processed similarly across competitors. The bill is structured to avoid interfering with ordinary or beneficial uses of pricing software. It targets only those situations where separate firms use shared algorithms, consistent with antitrust law's focus on preserving "independent centers of decisionmaking." Businesses that develop or use their own proprietary pricing tools remain unaffected.
A key feature of the bill is its reform of the pleading standard under the Cartwright Act. Under federal law, particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts that rule out independent conduct and show a "meeting of the minds"—a high burden that often leads to early dismissal, especially in algorithmic collusion cases. This bill explicitly rejects that heightened standard. Instead, it clarifies that under California law, a plaintiff need only allege plausible facts showing a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Courts may not require allegations that exclude the possibility of independent parallel conduct. This makes it easier for legitimate claims to survive a motion to dismiss and reach discovery, where further evidence can be obtained. The bill preserves the strong remedies already available under the Cartwright Act. Violators are subject to joint and several liability—meaning any one defendant can be held responsible for the full amount of damages. Available penalties include treble damages, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and in some cases, criminal sanctions.
According to the Author
It doesn't matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, its wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the "price crisis," resulting in higher costs and fewer choices. AB 325 updates California's antitrust laws to address modern technologies being used for illegal price fixing. This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing. AB 325 will help enforce existing laws through common sense guardrails because California shouldn't tolerate practices that exploit working families, the very families that already can't afford the high costs of living.
Arguments in Support
A broad coalition of organizations, representing consumers, workers, small businesses, and communities throughout California, explain their support of this measure:
Price fixing—when two or more competing businesses agree to set prices, output, or other commercial terms—results in increased prices and reduced choice for consumers. Price fixing is anticompetitive, and has long been thought of as the "supreme evil" of fair competition laws.
Currently, price fixing is already illegal, under California and federal antitrust laws. However, it remains difficult to detect, especially as technological advancements enable collusion without direct communication. Algorithmic pricing tools now allow businesses to coordinate prices covertly, using third-party software to drive up prices and reduce competition. Despite the clear illegality of these practices, enforcing against this activity is harder than ever due to current law requiring an extremely high bar to bring a case. This has led to the proliferation of price-fixing algorithms, further undermining fair competition and consumer protections.
AB 325 strengthens California's ability to tackle algorithmic price fixing by:
- Prohibiting secret agreements: Ensuring that companies cannot use third-party algorithms to coordinate prices in secrecy.
- Closing loopholes: Codifying that price fixing through algorithmic tools is just as illegal as traditional price fixing between competitors, incorporating best legal practices from ongoing enforcement efforts.
- Strengthening enforcement: Removing the impractical requirement for "smoking gun" evidence at the outset of a case, allowing legitimate claims to proceed based on plausible evidence.
- Holding bad actors accountable: Ensuring that both companies using price-fixing algorithms and the third-party providers of these tools are held liable.
- Deterring illegal price fixing before it begins: Creating bright-line standards to prevent the use of pricing algorithms to unlawfully coordinate prices, protecting consumers from unfair price hikes, and enabling small businesses to price their goods and services competitively.
Arguments in Opposition
A coalition of organizations, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, oppose this measure, challenging the principle that pricing algorithms are inherently problematic:
To the contrary, pricing algorithms are, in fact, extremely common tools that enable businesses to save money, improving efficiency by avoiding manual pricing, reducing costs for consumers, and making prices far more responsive to changes in supply and demand - and they can do so without involving any anti-competitive conduct. In contrast, price collusion (or price fixing) is problematic and is clearly illegal under current federal and state laws. Indeed, existing antitrust laws prohibit competitors from colluding on price in any manner, whether through using a pricing algorithm or otherwise. In other words, whether a price-fixing conspiracy is hatched by salespeople conspiring or computers running algorithms, collusion is collusion and is already effectively covered by existing law. To be clear, however, the use of a pricing algorithm does not inherently constitute price fixing.
Retailers use pricing algorithms to ensure they are offering the most competitive prices to consumers. Realtors use them to help clients set home prices. Banks use them to set terms (e.g. rates and fees) for services. Hospitality, airlines, transportation network companies, utilities, ticket venues, and many others use them for dynamic pricing. The list goes on. All this bill does is remove a valuable tool for setting dynamic pricing and imposes significant costs on all businesses that use price algorithms, thereby reducing competition, rather than promoting it. In the end, this bill hurts not only businesses, taking them back to pre-technological times, but it hurts consumers, effectively doing away with price-comparison shopping and competitive/dynamic pricing by businesses seeking to earn their business.
If enacted, AB 325's reliance on incredibly broad, ill-defined terms and ambiguous standards will invariably muddy the distinction between permissible pricing algorithms and price fixing, creating significant confusion for businesses. For one thing, the bill's definition of "pricing algorithm" is so overly broad and vague that it captures any algorithm that uses a computational process. For another, AB 325 prohibits the use or distribution of any "pricing algorithm" that uses, incorporates, or was trained on "nonpublic competitor data." "Nonpublic competitor data", however, is not actually limited to nonpublic information.
Rather, even the use of a competitor's public prices could be deemed "nonpublic competitor data" if the data is later determined to have not been "widely available" or "easily accessible" to the public. Of course, what is considered widely available or easily accessible to the public is entirely unclear as the bill is currently drafted. These are just two (of many) examples of definitional defects with the proposed statutory language in AB 325.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Possible costs (General Fund, special funds) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of an unknown amount. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ hires staff to handle enforcement actions authorized by this bill, the department would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2024-25 state budget provides $37.3 million ongoing General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Incarceration costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as this bill expands criminal liability under the Cartwright Act. Actual costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in jail is approximately $29,000. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Kalra, Wicks, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
NO: Dixon, Sanchez, Tangipa
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 10-2-3
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Bryan, Irwin, Lowenthal, Ortega, Pellerin, Ward, Wicks, Wilson
NO: DeMaio, Patterson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dixon, Flora, Petrie-Norris
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-3-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
NO: Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez
UPDATED
VERSION: April 24, 2025
CONSULTANT: Shiran Zohar / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000489
Date of Hearing: May 14, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 325
Author:(Aguiar-Curry) – As Amended Ver:April 24, 2025
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 9 - 3 |
Privacy and Consumer Protection | 10 - 2 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill makes it unlawful to distribute or use a common pricing algorithm in specified anti-competitive circumstances.
Specifically, among other provisions, this bill makes it unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following is true:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that the common pricing algorithm is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
The bill makes any person who violates this prohibition jointly and severally liable, meaning each person involved may be ordered to pay the full penalty or damages resulting from the violation.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Possible costs (General Fund, special funds) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of an unknown amount. Actual costs will depend on whether the Attorney General pursues enforcement actions, and, if so, the level of additional staffing DOJ needs to handle the related workload. If DOJ hires staff to handle enforcement actions authorized by this bill, the department would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum. If DOJ does not pursue enforcement as authorized by this bill, the department would likely not incur any costs.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions and criminal charges. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2024-25 state budget provides $37.3 million ongoing General Fund to backfill declining revenue to the Trial Court Trust Fund.
- Incarceration costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as this bill expands criminal liability under the Cartwright Act. Actual costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in jail is approximately $29,000. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
It doesn’t matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, it’s wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the “price crisis,” resulting in higher costs and fewer choices…This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing.
- Cartwright Act. The Cartwright Act (Act) is a state antitrust law that prohibits anticompetitive business practices. A violation of the Act typically involves: 1) an agreement or concerted action between two or more people; and 2) conduct that unreasonably restrains trade. For example, coordinated price-fixing, where two businesses agree to set the same prices for similar goods, resulting in higher prices for consumers, is an anticompetitive business practice outlawed by the Act.
A violation of the Act may be enforced through a private right of action brought by an affected individual, a civil enforcement action brought by a public prosecutor, or through criminal charges filed by the Attorney General or a county district attorney. A person or corporation that violates the Act is subject to penalties of up to $250,000 (for a person) or $1 million (for a corporation), or two times the amount of pecuniary gain or loss from the violation, whichever is greater. A criminal violation of the Act is punishable by up to one year in county jail as a misdemeanor, or by one, two, or three years in county jail as a felony. If the defendant has certain prior convictions, a felony conviction is punishable by a state prison term. In California, the Attorney General has not brought a criminal prosecution under the Act in decades. However, in March 2024, DOJ announced that it intended to revive its criminal antitrust practice in the coming years.
- Law Revision Commission Study. In 2022, the Legislature tasked the California Law Revision Commission (Commission) with studying the state’s antitrust laws and recommending changes to revise and modernize them. To that end, the Commission has recruited expert contributors and solicited and reviewed feedback from the public and industry professionals. The Commission’s recommendations on this topic may be completed in 2025.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: May 1, 2025
Fiscal:
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 325 (
Author:Aguiar-Curry) – As Amended Ver:April 24, 2025
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
SYNOPSIS
Antitrust laws have been on the books for over a century and have evolved along with the means of reaching unlawful price-fixing agreements. As smoke-filled backrooms and handshakes gave way to the phone, fax, pager, and email, the law adapted to address new challenges. The new frontier is algorithmic price-fixing, which can attain uncompetitive ends with greater efficiency and scale and yet is even more difficult to detect, let alone prove in court.
This bill seeks to tackle algorithmic collusion by strengthening California’s antitrust law, the Cartwright Act. The bill prohibits distributing common pricing algorithms to two or more persons with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products in the jurisdiction of the state. The bill also prohibits using common pricing algorithms if the person knows or should know the common pricing algorithm is, was, or will be used by another person for the same or similar products. Violators are subject to joint and several liability. Finally, the bill makes it easier to file cases under the Cartwright Act – by providing that complaints for violations are not subject to heightened pleading standards that have been applied under federal law.
The bill is co-sponsored by American Economic Liberties Project, Economic Security California Action, and TechEquity Action and supported by a broad array of civil society and labor groups. The bill is opposed by a coalition of industry associations led by California Chamber of Commerce.
The Judiciary Committee passed the bill by a vote of 9-3.
THIS BILL:
- Defines:
- “Commercial term” to include level of service, availability, and output, as specified.
- “Common pricing algorithm” as any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same, or performing a substantially similar, function.
- “Distribute,” “distribution,” and “distributing” as selling, licensing, providing access to, or otherwise making available by any means, including through a subscription or the sale of a service.
- “Person” as defined under Business and Professions Code section 16702, which provides the term includes corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations existing or authorized under state, federal, or foreign law. “Person” does not include end consumers of a product or service.
- “Price” as the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
- Provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following is true:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that the common pricing algorithm is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
- Provides that any person who violates 2) is jointly and severally liable for any such violation.
- Provides, notwithstanding any other law, that in a complaint for a violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible, and the complaint shall not be required to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
EXISTING LAW:
- Under the federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, prohibits any contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, that unreasonably restrains trade. (15 U.S.C. § 1.) Prohibits monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize, trade or commerce. (15 U.S.C. § 2.)
- Under California’s Cartwright Act, makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16726.) Provides that a trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer is in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption in California.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any or any combination of any of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720.)
- Provides that the Attorney General and county district attorneys may bring criminal or civil actions to enforce the Cartwright Act. Corporations are subject to fines of up to $1 million; individuals are subject to fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for three years. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16755.)
- Grants a private right of action in which plaintiffs may recover treble damages, injunctive relief, costs, attorney’s fees, and interest on actual damages. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16750, 16761.)
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
It doesn’t matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, its wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the “price crisis,” resulting in higher costs and fewer choices. AB 325 updates California’s antitrust laws to address modern technologies being used for illegal price fixing. This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing. AB 325 will help enforce existing laws through common sense guardrails because California shouldn’t tolerate practices that exploit working families, the very families that already can’t afford the high costs of living.
2) Antitrust laws. Two closely related antitrust laws – the federal Sherman Act and the state’s Cartwright Act – are implicated by this bill.
Sherman Act. Section 1 of the federal Sherman Act prohibits concerted action that restrains trade, while Section 2 covers concerted action and independent action, but “only when it threatens actual monopolization,” a higher bar than restraint of trade.[1] According to the United States Supreme Court:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.[2]
“The relevant inquiry” under section 1 “is whether there is a ‘contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy’ amongst ‘separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, such that the agreement ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests,’ and thus of actual or potential competition.”[3] In other words, “The ‘crucial question’ prompting Section 1 liability is ‘whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct ‘stems from [lawful] independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.’”[4]
Cartwright Act. “[B]roader in range and deeper in reach,”[5] than its federal counterpart, California’s Cartwright Act (Act) “‘generally outlaws any combinations or agreements which restrain trade or competition or which fix or control prices.’”[6] The Act is “premised on the notion that competition yields efficient resource allocation, lower prices, higher quality, and greater social welfare.”[7] “‘At its heart is a prohibition against agreements that prevent the growth of healthy, competitive markets for goods and services and the establishment of prices through market forces.’”[8] “The [A]ct’s principal goal is the preservation of consumer welfare.”[9]
Under the Act, a violation requires “a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons” that seeks to achieve an anticompetitive end.[10] A complaint pursuant to the Act must allege: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.”[11]
Concerted action. “Two forms of conspiracy may be used to establish a violation of antitrust laws: a horizontal restraint, consisting of a collaboration among competitors; or a vertical restraint, based upon an agreement between business entities occupying different levels of the marketing chain.”[12] A hybrid of horizontal and vertical agreements is sometimes referred to as a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy, in which a central actor, or hub, enters into vertical agreements with spokes, such as competing manufacturers or distributors. If the spokes have horizontal agreements with each other, the conspiracy is “rimmed” whereas if they do not, it is a “rimless” hub-and-spoke.
Certain types of agreements that restrain trade are illegal per se because they almost always undermine competition, while others are subject to a “rule of reason” review, which requires the plaintiff to show that the agreement harms competition more than it helps.[13] Most horizontal agreements are per se violations,[14] whereas vertical agreements are usually analyzed under the rule of reason.[15] Price fixing, however, is per se illegal regardless of whether it occurs between competitors or businesses at different economic levels.[16]
On the other hand, merely exchanging information, including about prices, is not itself illegal unless it is part of an express or tacit agreement to fix prices.[17] Agreements “may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors.”[18] Plus factors can include “a common motive to conspire, evidence that shows that the parallel acts were against the apparent individual economic self-interest of the alleged conspirators, and evidence of a high level of interfirm communications.”[19]
3) Price fixing algorithms. Algorithmic collusion is not new. In 1992, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against eight of the nation’s largest airlines in connection with an algorithmic pricing system, known as the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATP), which they used to increase the cost of airplane tickets by potentially upwards of a billion dollars during a four year period. “By supplying or withdrawing changes in fares, the airlines told each other what fares they wanted to charge in which markets, what competitors’ fares were acceptable to them, and what deals they were willing to make.” The attorney in charge of DOJ’s Antitrust Division stated, ‘The airlines used the ATP fare dissemination system to carry on conversations just as direct and detailed as those traditionally conducted, by conspirators over the telephone or in hotel rooms. Although their method was novel, their conduct amounted to price fixing, plain and simple.’ Two of the airlines entered a consent decree and the other six entered into a settlement with the DOJ.[20]
The rise of machine-learning pricing algorithms has intensified concerns about anti-competitive behavior, particularly tacit collusion.[21] Unlike older rule-based systems, modern algorithms can rapidly assimilate market data, predict demand fluctuations, and adjust prices based on competitor behavior, often reinforcing strategies that maximize profits in an anticompetitive fashion.[22] In particular, models that use reinforcement learning – a training process that uses rewards and punishments to orient a model’s behavior towards attaining a specific goal[23] – and real-time data feedback loops can adapt to function in a manner that sustains high prices, effectively facilitating tacit collusion without explicit human agreement.[24] Moreover, algorithms’ faster response times and improved demand predictions may help firms sustain collusive pricing structures by swiftly detecting and punishing deviations, leading to supra-competitive prices.[25]
4) AI collusion cases. A number of pending federal cases allege that the use of a common pricing algorithms violates the Sherman Act. Some key examples follow.
RealPage. In October of 2022, ProPublica published an investigation of RealPage’s rental housing pricing algorithm. This popular software, used by many of the largest property managers who control thousands of apartments in metropolitan areas throughout the country, collects information from the property managers, including private lease transactions and occupancy data, that is then fed into a common algorithm that recommends optimal rental rates.[26] This led to numerous class-action lawsuits against RealPage, as well as a lawsuit by Attorney General Rob Bonta, along with the DOJ and eight other attorneys general. The litigation is ongoing.[27]
In a filing with the court, the DOJ set forth its view that “[a]s with other actions taken in concert, competitors’ joint use of common algorithms can remove independent decision making. . . . Put another way, whether firms effectuate a price-fixing scheme through a software algorithm or through human-to-human interaction should be of no legal significance. Automating an anticompetitive scheme does not make it less anticompetitive.” The DOJ continued:
The question in this case is whether the defendants have violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by allegedly knowingly combining their sensitive, nonpublic pricing and supply information in an algorithm that they rely upon in making pricing decisions, with the knowledge and expectation that other competitors will do the same. Although not every use of an algorithm to set price qualifies as a per se violation of Section 1, taking the allegations set forth in the complaints as true, the alleged scheme meets the legal criteria for per se unlawful price fixing.[28]
RENTmaximizer. Another pending case similarly involves allegations that competing landlords violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by, among other things, unlawfully agreeing to use a centralized pricing algorithm to artificially inflate multifamily rental prices.[29] The DOJ argued that “competitors’ jointly delegating key aspects of their decisionmaking to a common algorithm” amounts to per se concerted action “because doing so ‘joins together separate decisionmakers’ and thus ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking.’”[30] Furthermore, “[w]here, as here, plaintiffs’ allegations involve a conspiracy to centralize pricing decisions in a third-party algorithm, it is irrelevant to the scheme whether landlords share confidential information among themselves or with only the pricing agent; the alleged scheme is designed to obviate the need for competitors to share information directly with each other.”[31]
Cendyn. A federal district court recently dismissed a class action lawsuit alleging that Las Vegas hotel operators engaged in illegal price-fixing by using Cendyn’s revenue management software.[32] The court highlighted that the pricing recommendations were not based on nonpublic, competitively sensitive information; rather, it was public information available from online listings and travel agencies. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege that hotel operators “agreed to be bound by [Cendyn’s] pricing recommendations, much less that they all agreed to charge the same prices.”[33] The decision is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The DOJ has argued that “an invitation for collective action followed by conduct showing acceptance” such as “joint use” of the pricing algorithm amounts to concerted action, which may be a per se violation if the algorithm sets a “default or starting point price,” if it the hotel ultimately charges a different price.[34]
A similar case involving use of Cendyn’s pricing software by Atlantic City hotels was also dismissed. Although the DOJ and FTC argued usage of pricing algorithms is unlawful even when co-conspirators retain pricing discretion and do not communicate directly with each other, the court found that the alleged co-conspirators used the pricing algorithm at different points in time, no confidential or otherwise nonpublic information was exchanged, and the alleged co-conspirators were not bound to accept the algorithm’s pricing recommendations.[35]
5) Law Revision Commission working group report. AR 95 (Cunningham, 2021) called upon the California Law Revision Commission to study whether the Cartwright Act requires updating. To assist in its study, the Commission formed working groups of experts, one of which issued a report on “Competition and Artificial Intelligence.” Regarding algorithmic collusion, the working group concludes:
. . . The Cartwright Act generally prohibits any combinations or agreements which unreasonably restrain trade or fix or control prices. As currently interpreted by the courts, the Cartwright Act requires a “combination” or “concerted action” between 2 or more independent economic entities. Given the increasing use of software programs containing or relying on pricing algorithms, the Legislature might consider declaring that the “concerted action” requirement of the Cartwright Act encompasses multiple competitors that knowingly use the same or similar revenue management software programs containing or relying on pricing algorithms that utilize nonpublic competitor information to train or inform any price recommendations.
Consistent with the position of the DOJ . . ., the Legislature might also clarify that direct communications are not required to show proof of a “combination” or “concerted action” among competitors, as the Cartwright Act covers tacit as well as express agreements. This is in accord with the position of the DOJ . . . that Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “tacit agreements”—that is where one co-conspirator invites participation in an illegal price-fixing scheme and other co-conspirators act in accordance with the scheme, showing acceptance through a course of conduct.
Further, the Legislature might make clear that the Act prohibits competitors from “delegating key aspects of pricing decision making to a common entity, even if the competitors never communicate with each other directly.” Further, to refute the argument that there can be no actionable claim of price fixing because the algorithm’s recommendations are not binding, the Legislature could declare that, under the Cartwright Act, “an agreement among competitors to fix the starting point of pricing is per se unlawful, no matter what prices the competitors ultimately charge.” [36]
6) This bill seeks to prevent algorithmic collusion by prohibiting common pricing algorithms used by separate entities. This bill seeks to strengthen California’s ability to tackle algorithmic price-fixing by developers and users of common pricing algorithms intended or used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms. The bill’s key provisions are as follows:
Prohibitions on distribution and use of common pricing algorithms. This bill adds a new section to the Cartwright Act that makes it unlawful for a person – defined as a corporation, firm, partnership, or association (but not end consumers of products or services) – to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm if either of the following is true:
- The person distributes the common pricing algorithm to two or more persons with the intent that the common pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products in the jurisdiction of this state.
- The person uses the common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of products or services and knows or should know that the common pricing algorithm is, was, or will be used by another person to set or recommend prices or commercial terms of the same or similar products or services in the jurisdiction of this state.
The bill defines “common pricing algorithm” as any process or rule, including a process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes the same or substantially similar data to recommend or set a price or commercial term using the same, or performing a substantially similar, function. Unlike an earlier version of the bill, the bill no longer distinguishes between public and nonpublic data.
Supporters argue these provisions “reflect well-established legal findings that price-fixing agreements can be inferred from the use of these algorithmic tools.” They also argue that any information – whether public or private – can be used for collusive purposes. Moreover, they assert, any instance of algorithmic price fixing between separate entities is inherently anticompetitive, even if it leads to reasonable prices in the short run. This view finds support in longstanding judicial precedents. The California Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he United States Supreme Court declared, “[For] over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense . . . . Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The [Sherman] Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our economy against any degree of interference.”
Nor is it significant that the prices set pursuant to a price-fixing scheme are reasonable, for the “reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.”
This court has similarly interpreted the Cartwright Act to prohibit tampering with prices; they must be determined, we have stated, by the “interplay of the economic forces of supply and demand.”
These rules apply whether the price-fixing scheme is horizontal or vertical; that is, whether the price is fixed among competitors or businesses at different economic levels.[37]
Opponents contend, however, that the “the use of a pricing algorithm does not inherently constitute price fixing.” As a result, they assert, the bill effectively prohibits commonplace, beneficial uses of pricing algorithms, such as dynamic pricing. Writing about the prior version of the bill, they state:
Retailers use pricing algorithms to ensure they are offering the most competitive prices to consumers. Realtors use them to help clients set home prices. Banks use them to set terms (e.g. rates and fees) for services. Hospitality, airlines, transportation network companies, utilities, ticket venues, and many others use them for dynamic pricing. The list goes on.
But this bill, as recently amended, would not prohibit use of pricing algorithms that are not shared with another corporation, firm, partnership, or association. The bill applies only when distinct entities use a common pricing algorithm to set or recommend prices or commercial terms. As such, the bill is arguably consistent with the longstanding antitrust principle that a contract, combination, or conspiracy amongst separate economic actors “‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests,’ and thus of actual or potential competition.”[38] Nevertheless, the author may wish to continue to work with stakeholders to ensure the scope of the bill is consistent with the types of arrangements that have been historically recognized as price fixing.
Strengthens liability. Under existing law, the Attorney General and district attorneys may bring criminal or civil actions to enforce the Cartwright Act. Corporations are subject to fines of up to $1 million; individuals are subject to fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for three years. Additionally, the Cartwright Act grants a private right of action in which plaintiffs may recover treble damages (triple the actual damages), injunctive relief, costs, attorney’s fees, and interest on actual damages.
The bill provides that violators are jointly and severally liable for violations – meaning that each violator is independently liable for the full extent of the collective damage and that a plaintiff can recover compensation from any violator. This strong remedy further counsels in favor of ensuring the bill’s scope is narrowly tailored.
Clarifies the pleading standard under the Cartwright Act. A complaint pursuant to the Act must allege: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.”[39] In Cartwright Act complaints, “it is sufficient to state the purpose or effects of the trust or combination, and that the accused is a member of, acted with, or in pursuance of it, or aided or assisted in carrying out its purposes, without giving its name or description, or how, when and where it was created.”[40]
However, many antitrust cases are brought in federal court, in which the pleading standard requires greater specificity than state court. Under the United States Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,[41] “mere allegations of parallel conduct – even consciously parallel conduct – are insufficient to state a claim under [the Sherman Act]. Plaintiffs must plead ‘something more,’ ‘some further factual enhancement,’ a ‘further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds’ of the alleged conspirators.”[42] Such pleadings must include facts that rule out “independent parallel conduct in an interdependent market.”[43]
In Sherman Act cases, courts have required allegations to exclude the possibility of independent conduct, a significant barrier in the context of shared pricing algorithms. To avoid the application of this requirement when a court is applying state law,[44] this bill provides that in a complaint for a violation of the Cartwright Act, it is sufficient to contain factual allegations demonstrating that the existence of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce is plausible. Courts would not be allowed to require plaintiffs to allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
Proponents argue that this change removes “the impractical requirement for ‘smoking gun’ evidence at the outset of a case, allowing legitimate claims to proceed based on plausible evidence.”
7) Related legislation. Several related legislative proposals are currently pending, including:
- At the federal level, Senator Amy Klobuchar recently reintroduced her “Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act” (S. 232) which makes it presumptively unlawful for a person to use or distribute a pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data.
- SB 52 (Renee-Perez, 2025) prohibits a person from offering a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same or a related market, and prohibits a person from knowingly using such an algorithm. The bill also prohibits the use of nonpublic competitor data, as defined, in any rental pricing algorithm.
- SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) prohibits a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with competitor data; requires a person using a pricing algorithm to recommend or set a price or commercial term to make certain commercial disclosures; and requires a person to provide specified information to the Attorney General relating to the use of pricing algorithms.
- SB 384 (Wahab, 2025) prohibits the use of a pricing algorithm that incorporates competitors’ nonpublic, competitively sensitive data, as defined.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The bill is co-sponsored by American Economic Liberties Project, Economic Security California Action, and TechEquity Action and supported by a broad array of civil society and labor groups. This coalition writes:
Price fixing—when two or more competing businesses agree to set prices, output, or other commercial terms—results in increased prices and reduced choice for consumers. Price fixing is anticompetitive, and has long been thought of as the “supreme evil” of fair competition laws.
Currently, price fixing is already illegal, under California and federal antitrust laws. However, it remains difficult to detect, especially as technological advancements enable collusion without direct communication. Algorithmic pricing tools now allow businesses to coordinate prices covertly, using third-party software to drive up prices and reduce competition. Despite the clear illegality of these practices, enforcing against this activity is harder than ever due to current law requiring an extremely high bar to bring a case. This has led to the proliferation of price-fixing algorithms, further undermining fair competition and consumer protections.
AB 325 strengthens California’s ability to tackle algorithmic price fixing by:
- Prohibiting secret agreements: Ensuring that companies cannot use third-party algorithms to coordinate prices in secrecy.
- Closing loopholes: Codifying that price fixing through algorithmic tools is just as illegal as traditional price fixing between competitors, incorporating best legal practices from ongoing enforcement efforts.
- Strengthening enforcement: Removing the impractical requirement for “smoking gun” evidence at the outset of a case, allowing legitimate claims to proceed based on plausible evidence.
- Holding bad actors accountable: Ensuring that both companies using price-fixing algorithms and the third-party providers of these tools are held liable.
- Deterring illegal price fixing before it begins: Creating bright-line standards to prevent the use of pricing algorithms to unlawfully coordinate prices, protecting consumers from unfair price hikes, and enabling small businesses to price their goods and services competitively.
This bill also provides clear guidelines on liability. Under AB 325:
- Developers of pricing algorithms will be held accountable if they create and distribute tools designed to use competitor data—whether public or nonpublic—to generate price recommendations.
- Companies utilizing these algorithms will be liable if they knew or reasonably should have known that the tool was being used by at least one competitor and was developed for the purpose of setting coordinated prices.
These provisions reflect well-established legal findings that price-fixing agreements can be inferred from the use of these algorithmic tools, making enforcement more effective.
By passing AB 325, California will ensure that our antitrust laws keep pace with technological advancements and modern business practices. This legislation is crucial to preventing digital collusion, protecting consumers from artificially inflated prices, and safeguarding fair competition for small businesses. California must act decisively to prevent a regulatory gap that allows illegal price-fixing schemes to flourish.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The bill is opposed by a coalition of industry opponents led by California Chamber of Commerce. Writing about the prior version of the bill, they state:
[. . .] AB 325 remains as serious a concern, in part because there are other related bills that would address the liability components of these issues, and existing law imposes significant liability on the misuse of pricing algorithms as well. When combined with the bill’s broad and vague standards, AB 325 would invariably have a chilling effect on the use of such technologies among businesses, particularly smaller ones who rely more heavily on these technologies to be more competitive with larger businesses that have access to far more data.
First and foremost, this bill, like SB 1154 before it, and SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025), appears based on a presumption that pricing algorithms are inherently problematic, if not unlawful. To the contrary, pricing algorithms are, in fact, extremely common tools that enable businesses to save money, improving efficiency by avoiding manual pricing, reducing costs for consumers, and making prices far more responsive to changes in supply and demand - and they can do so without involving any anti-competitive conduct.
In contrast, price collusion (or price fixing) is problematic and is clearly illegal under current federal and state laws. Indeed, existing antitrust laws prohibit competitors from colluding on price in any manner, whether through using a pricing algorithm or otherwise. In other words, whether a price-fixing conspiracy is hatched by salespeople conspiring or computers running algorithms, collusion is collusion and is already effectively covered by existing law. To be clear, however, the use of a pricing algorithm does not inherently constitute price fixing.
Retailers use pricing algorithms to ensure they are offering the most competitive prices to consumers. Realtors use them to help clients set home prices. Banks use them to set terms (e.g. rates and fees) for services. Hospitality, airlines, transportation network companies, utilities, ticket venues, and many others use them for dynamic pricing. The list goes on.
All this bill does is remove a valuable tool for setting dynamic pricing and imposes significant costs on all businesses that use price algorithms, thereby reducing competition, rather than promoting it. In the end, this bill hurts not only businesses, taking them back to pre-technological times, but it hurts consumers, effectively doing away with price-comparison shopping and competitive/dynamic pricing by businesses seeking to earn their business.
[. . .]
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Economic Liberties Project (Co-Sponsor)
Economic Security California Action (Co-Sponsor)
Techequity Action (Co-Sponsor)
Aids Healthcare Foundation
Americans for Financial Reform
California Federation of Labor Unions, Afl-cio
California Low-income Consumer Coalition
California Nurses Association
California Public Banking Alliance
California School Employees Association
Cameo Network
Center on Policy Initiatives
Consumer Federation of California
Contra Costa Senior Legal Services
Courage California
Democracy Policy Network
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
End Poverty in California (EPIC)
Equal Rights Advocates
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California
Institute for Local Self-reliance
Kapor Center
National Consumer Law Center
Oakland Privacy
Powerswitch Action
Santa Monica Democratic Club
Seiu California
Small Business Majority
Tech Oversight California
Udw/afscme Local 3930
Ufcw - Western States Council
United Latino Voices of Contra Costa County
Warehouse Worker Resource Center
Western Center on Law and Poverty
Opposition
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
Calbroadband
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Hospital Association
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California Restaurant Association
California Retailers Association
Chamber of Progress
Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC)
Insights Association
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
Personal Insurance Federation of California
Software Information Industry Association
Oppose Unless Amended
California Apartment Association
Analysis Prepared by: Josh Tosney / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. (1984) 467 U.S. 752, 767. ↑
Id. at pp. 768-769. ↑
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL (2010) 560 U.S. 183, 195, citations omitted. ↑
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig. (9th Cir. 2022) 28 F.4th 42, 46, quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 553. ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 160-161. However, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit unilateral conduct. ↑
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1147. ↑
Ahn v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 168, 179. ↑
Ibid. ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II, supra, 61 Cal. 4th at p. 136. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720. ↑
Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 722; Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. CoTherix, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1, 8; Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 31 F.4th 651, 665, fn. 8. ↑
G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 267, emphasis in original. ↑
People v. Bldg. Maint. Contractors’ Ass’n (1957) 41 Cal. 2d 719, 727. ↑
See Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 1979) 232 F.3d 979, 986. ↑
In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig. (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3d 1186 n.3; United States v. Joyce (9th Cir. 2018) 895 F.3d 673, 677. ↑
Mailand v. Burckle (1978) 20 Cal.3d 367, 377. ↑
Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 862-863 (“‘Competition does not become less free merely because the conduct of commercial operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge of all the essential factors entering into the commercial transaction’”). ↑
In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2015) 1 Cal.App.5th 127, 169, citations and nested quotation marks omitted. ↑
Ibid. ↑
“Justice Department Settles Airlines Price Fixing Suit, May Save Consumers Hundreds of Millions of Dollars” (1994), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1994/211786.htm. ↑
Clark et al, “Pricing Algorithms as Third-Party Facillitators of Collusion” American Bar Association (Dec. 2024), p. 3, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/source/2024/december/pricing-algorithms-third-party-facilitators-collusion.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Mummert et al., “What is reinforcement learning?” IBM Developer (September 15, 2022), developer.ibm.com/learningpaths/get-started-automated-ai-for-decision-making-api/what-is-automated-ai-for-decision-making. ↑
“Pricing Algorithms as Third-Party Facillitators of Collusion,” supra, pp. 3-5. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Heath Vogell, “Rent Going Up? One Company’s Algorithm Could Be Why,” ProPublica (Oct. 15, 2022), https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-realpage-rent. ↑
See In re RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litig. (No. II) (M.D.Tenn. 2023) 709 F. Supp. 3d 478, 492. ↑
Memorandum of Law in Support of Statement of Interest of the United States, In re RealPage, Case No. 3:23-MD-3071 (M.D. Tenn Nov. 15, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-11/418053.pdf. ↑
See Duffy v. Yardi Sys., Inc. (W.D.Wash. Dec. 5, 2024, No. 2:23-cv-01391-RSL) 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 220641. ↑
Statement of Interest (March 1, 2024), in Yardi, supra, pp. 2-3, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-03/420301.pdf. ↑
Id. at p. 7, fn. 4. Emphasis in original. ↑
Gibson v. Cendyn Grp., LLC (D.Nev. May 8, 2024, No. 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA) 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 83547. ↑
Id. at 6. ↑
Brief for the DOJ as Amicus Curiae, Gibson v. Cendyn Group LLC, No. 24-3576 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 24, 2024), Dkt. No. 28.1, pp. 18, 22-24. ↑
Cornish-Adebiyi, et al. v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., et al., No. 1:23-CV-02536-KMW-EAP (D. N.J. Sept. 30, 2024). ↑
“Report to the California Law Review Commission Antitrust Law: Study B-750: Competition and Artificial Intelligence,” p. 5, https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/ExRpt-B750-Grp8.pdf. Emphasis in original. ↑
Mailand v. Burckle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 376-377 (internal citations omitted). ↑
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 195, citations omitted. ↑
See fn. 11, supra. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16756. ↑
(2007) 550 U.S. 544 (Twombly). ↑
In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., supra, 798 F.3d at p. 1193. ↑
Id. at p. 1195. ↑
“No California state published decision has applied Twombly to a Cartwright Act claim, but the Ninth Circuit has embraced this requirement, applying it in federal antitrust cases that also include Cartwright Act claims.” (1 CA Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law § 2.02 (2025).) ↑
Date of Hearing: April 8, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 325
Author:(Aguiar-Curry) – As Amended Ver:March 10, 2025
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: Cartwright Act: violations
KEY ISSUES:
- To safeguard competitive markets in the digital age, should California prohibit the use and distribution of pricing algorithms that are trained on nonpublic competitor data or are used by multiple firms in the same or related markets to set or recommend prices or commercial terms?
- SHOULD CALIFORNIA CLARIFY THAT A PLAUSIBLE ALLEGATION OF CONCERTED ACTION IS SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE CARTWRIGHT ACT, WITHOUT REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO NEGATE INDEPENDENT CONDUCT AT THE PLEADING STAGE?
SYNOPSIS
Algorithmic price fixing refers to the use of software—often powered by artificial intelligence—to set or recommend prices in ways that result in coordinated outcomes across competitors without any formal agreement. Third-party vendors now offer pricing tools trained on large datasets, sometimes including nonpublic or sensitive market information, which are deployed across competing firms. These tools can respond rapidly to market changes, discouraging price competition and creating uniform pricing—all while preserving the appearance of independent decision-making. The result is a technologically mediated form of price fixing that achieves the same anticompetitive effects as traditional collusion, but without overt coordination, making it difficult to detect or prosecute under current antitrust law. This bill seeks to close that enforcement gap by prohibiting the use or distribution of pricing algorithms trained on nonpublic competitor data, which may encode confidential strategies and facilitate tacit coordination. This bill also prohibits the use or distribution of any pricing algorithm—regardless of the data used—when the tool is employed by multiple firms in the same or related markets to set or recommend prices or other commercial terms. A narrow safe harbor is provided for users who can demonstrate they neither knew nor should have known that the algorithm was being used in this way. The bill also codifies that plaintiffs under the Cartwright Act need only plead facts showing a plausible agreement and need not negate the possibility of independent conduct at the pleading stage. The author is taking clarifying amendments, as described in the SUMMARY, and in the analysis below.
This measure is co-sponsored by the American Economic Liberties Project, Economic Security California Action, and TechEquity Action. It is supported by a broad coalition of public interest and labor organizations, including SEIU, the National Consumer Law Center, and Equal Rights Advocates. Opposition to this measure is spearheaded by business and trade associations, including the Chamber of Commerce and the California Realtors Association. This bill will be heard by the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection in the event of its successful passage by this Committee.
SUMMARY: Prohibits the use or distribution of pricing algorithms that rely on nonpublic competitor data, or algorithms that are used by multiple parties to set or recommend prices or other commercial terms in the same or related markets. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits the use or distribution of any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data, defined to include any proprietary or restricted-access pricing, output, or service-level information obtained from a competitor, whether directly or indirectly, and whether anonymized or not.
- Declares that 1) does not constitute a change in, but rather, is declaratory of, existing law.
- Prohibits the distribution of any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with any data when the algorithm is used by two or more persons with the intent to set or recommend a price or commercial term for goods or services in the same or related markets.
- Prohibits the use of any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with any data to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term for goods or services in the same or related markets.
- Provides that a person has not violated 3) or 4) if they did not develop or distribute the pricing algorithm and the person demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that they did not know and they could not have reasonably known that the pricing algorithm was used by two or more persons to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
- Establishes joint and several liability for distributors of pricing algorithms who know or should know that the algorithm is based on nonpublic competitor data or is used by multiple actors in the same or related markets.
- Clarifies that these provisions do not impair the enforcement or applicability of state or federal antitrust laws.
- Defines key terms, including:
- “Nonpublic competitor data” as nonpublic data, including, but not limited to, aggregated data, that is based on, derived from, or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same market as a person, or a related market.
- “Nonpublic data” as information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including information about prices, commercial terms, and related products or services, regardless of whether the data is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized. Nonpublic data includes public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
- “Pricing algorithm” as any computational process, including a computational process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes data to recommend or set a price or commercial term within the jurisdiction of this state.
- Clarifies that, to survive demurrer, a complaint alleging a violation of the Cartwright Act need only contain factual allegations making it plausible that a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce existed.
- Provides that a complaint alleging violation of the Cartwright Act need not allege facts tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 U.S.C. Sections 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. Section 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. Section 15c.)
- Establishes the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. Sections 12-27.)
- Defines, under the Clayton Act, “antitrust laws” to include the Sherman Act, certain provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Clayton Act, as amended. (15 U.S.C. Section 12.)
- Makes illegal, under the Clayton Act, certain exclusive dealing agreements, tying contracts, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and interlocking directorates, as specified. (15 U.S.C. Sections 13-14.)
- Prohibits every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is, including specified noncompete clauses, subject to specified exemptions. (Business and Professions Code Section 16600 et seq. All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise specified.)
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Section 16700 et seq.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of, merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any combination of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Section 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Section 16726.)
- Establishes the Unfair Practices Act (UPA), which is intended to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. (Section 17000 et seq.)
- Prohibits, under the UPA, a range of behavior that reduces competition in pricing, including specified locality discrimination in pricing, sales under costs or loss leaders made with the intent of injuring competitors or destroying competition, and contracts for the performance of warranty service and repair below the cost of the service or repair. (Sections 17040-17051.)
- Permits the head of any department in the state to make investigations and prosecute actions concerning violations of law; as part of those investigations, the department head may inspect and copy books, records, and other items, issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents or other tangible things, and promulgate interrogatories. (Government Code Sections 11180, 11181.)
- For purposes of investigating potential violations of the Cartwright Act and the UPA, extends all of the investigative powers granted to the Attorney General pursuant to 13) to the district attorney of any county when the district attorney reasonably believes that a violation has occurred. (Government Code Section 16759 (a).)
- Establishes that a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that they are asserting. (Evidence Code Section 500.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: Algorithmic price fixing refers to the use of software—often powered by artificial intelligence—to set or recommend prices in ways that result in coordinated outcomes between competitors without any formal agreement. Third-party vendors now offer pricing tools trained on large datasets, sometimes including nonpublic or sensitive market information, which can be deployed across competing firms. These tools can respond rapidly to market changes, discouraging price competition and creating uniform pricing—all while preserving the outward appearance of independent decision-making. The result is a technologically enabled form of price-fixing that achieves the same anticompetitive effects as traditional collusion, but without overt coordination, making it difficult to detect or prosecute under current antitrust law. The author introduces this measure to address this concern. In furtherance of the bill the author states:
It doesn’t matter if price fixing happens behind closed doors or through artificial intelligence, its wrong either way. Californians face an affordability crisis, with basic needs like food and housing increasingly priced beyond their means. Unknown to consumers, digital tools are accelerating the “price crisis,” resulting in higher costs and fewer choices. AB 325 updates California’s antitrust laws to address modern technologies being used for illegal price fixing. This bill makes it clear that using digital pricing algorithms (like computer software and apps) to coordinate prices among competitors is just as illegal as traditional price fixing. AB 325 will help enforce existing laws through common sense guardrails because California shouldn’t tolerate practices that exploit working families, the very families that already can’t afford the high costs of living.
Algorithmic price fixing. Modern algorithmic coordination has its institutional roots in the aftermath of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which eliminated federal oversight of airline fares. Shortly thereafter, major carriers created the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO), a centralized platform for submitting and disseminating fare data. Although ATPCO nominally served as a neutral repository, it allowed airlines to signal pricing intentions and monitor rival responses in near real-time, thereby enabling tacit collusion—a form of price coordination not easily captured by conventional antitrust tools. The Department of Justice (DOJ) challenged ATPCO’s structure in the early 1990s under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, arguing that it facilitated price signaling among competitors. The resulting settlement permitted ATPCO to continue with minimal restrictions, effectively sanctioning data-driven pricing coordination in the absence of direct collusion or express agreements.
Today’s version of this phenomenon has been dramatically amplified by advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and data infrastructure. Third-party vendors now offer algorithmic pricing systems trained on vast market datasets—sometimes including nonpublic or competitively sensitive information—which are simultaneously deployed across competing firms. These systems can rapidly adjust prices in reaction to competitors’ changes, discouraging undercutting and reducing market variability, all while maintaining the appearance of independent decision-making. Unlike traditional cartels, these algorithmic tools do not require express communication between competitors and may even operate without any human intervention at all. The result is a technologically mediated form of price fixing that achieves the same anticompetitive effect as a classic conspiracy—higher prices, suppressed competition, and consumer harm—but in a way that existing legal frameworks struggle to capture. (David Dayen, Three Algorithms in a Room: How Big Data Supercharged Collusion, The American Prospect (June 5, 2024) https://prospect.org/economy/2024-06-05-three-algorithms-in-a-room.) The absence of legislative action in the wake of ATPCO, and the continued judicial reliance on formal notions of “agreement,” have left a legal gray area in which algorithmic collusion remains both highly illegal in principle and difficult to prosecute in practice.
Existing law - The Cartwright Act. California’s main antitrust statute is the Cartwright Act, codified at Business and Professions Code Sections 16700 to 16770. Enacted in 1907, the Act predates the federal Clayton Act and closely parallels Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 United States Code Section 1), which prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Like its federal counterpart, the Cartwright Act is designed to preserve and promote free competition in commercial markets. However, California courts have construed it as “broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act.” (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 903, 920.)
Business and Professions Code Section 16720(e)(4) defines a “trust” to include combinations or agreements in which competitors “agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.” In other words, the Cartwright Act proscribes even indirect or subtle forms of coordinated behavior that may affect market prices or restrict trade.
To violate the Act, conduct must typically involve:
- An agreement or concerted action between two or more people (so-called “single firm conduct” is not encompassed by the Act); and
- Conduct that unreasonably restrains trade.
Under the Cartwright Act, an “agreement” or “concerted action” refers to a mutual understanding or coordinated conduct between two or more persons to restrain trade. It is the foundational element of any antitrust claim under both the Cartwright Act and the federal Sherman Act Section 1. (Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 928 (Cartwright Act requires concerted action); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher (2006) 547 U.S. 1, 5 (federal antitrust law also requires concerted action).)
An agreement under the Cartwright Act does not require a written contract or direct evidence of collusion. California courts recognize that circumstantial evidence may be used to infer concerted action, particularly because direct evidence of collusion is often unavailable in antitrust cases. (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146.) The concerted action may be established through indirect mechanisms, such as the exchange of competitively sensitive information, market signaling, or the shared use of pricing algorithms that lead to parallel pricing behavior.
However, parallel conduct alone is not sufficient to prove concerted action. Courts require additional “plus factors” that support an inference of agreement, such as the existence of facilitating practices, opportunities to collude, or monitoring mechanisms that suggest firms are consciously coordinating their behavior.
Once concerted action is established (either through direct or circumstantial evidence), the court turns to the second prong: whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.
Under California law, a restraint is considered unreasonable if it harms competition, rather than merely harming individual competitors. (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 269.) (“It is often repeated in antitrust cases that the law seeks to protect competition, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned.”) (internal quotations omitted).) Courts evaluate this through either the per se rule or the rule of reason. Certain types of restraints are deemed per se unlawful—such as horizontal price fixing, market allocation, and bid rigging—because they are presumed to always harm competition and lack any legitimate justification. Other restraints are analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires a case-specific inquiry into the conduct’s actual or likely anticompetitive effects, the parties’ market power, and any procompetitive justifications. (Palsson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 934-35.)
This bill bans the use or distribution of pricing algorithms trained on nonpublic competitor data, in essence treating that behavior as a per se violation of the Cartwright Act. AB 325 also makes it illegal to use or share a pricing algorithm using any data if two or more companies are using it to set or suggest prices or other business terms in the same or related markets; and it clarifies that to bring an antitrust case under the Cartwright Act, a plaintiff only needs to show that a price-fixing agreement is plausible—they don’t have to prove at the outset that the companies weren’t acting independently.
Part 1: Prohibition on algorithms trained on nonpublic data. Subdivision (a)(1) of the bill prohibits any person from using or distributing a pricing algorithm that “uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data” (NPCD), and subdivision (a)(2) asserts that this prohibition is declaratory of existing law. The scope of subdivision (a)(1) is notably broad—it applies regardless of the user’s intent, knowledge, or the algorithm’s market impact. Under current California antitrust law, however, liability typically requires proof of a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Courts have consistently held that unilateral conduct—even if harmful—is not sufficient to establish a violation under the Cartwright Act. (Palsson, supra at 928.)
At first blush, subdivision (a)(1) appears to impose liability for unilateral conduct, which could be read as inconsistent with the foundational requirement of concerted action under the Cartwright Act. However, when read in conjunction with the bill’s definition of “nonpublic competitor data,” which limits the term to data provided by or derived from a horizontal competitor, the prohibition properly targets a form of implicit coordination. In that light, the bill seeks to capture situations where competitors indirectly share sensitive pricing or output data—such as through a third-party vendor or common algorithmic platform—and thereby align prices without a formal agreement.
A contemporary example of this theory appears in the DOJ’s ongoing litigation against Agri Stats, in which meat processors allegedly submitted competitively sensitive data to a third-party data aggregator. The government alleges that Agri Stats collected and compiled nonpublic information from competing poultry, pork, and turkey producers—including detailed data on prices, costs, production volumes, and compensation—then generated regular reports that allowed each firm to benchmark itself against its rivals. According to the complaint, this system enabled producers, who collectively control the majority of their respective markets, to coordinate supply reductions and price increases, leading to inflated prices and suppressed competition. (United States v. Agri Stats, Inc., No. 0:23-cv-03009 (D. Minn., filed Sept. 28, 2023).) Although the firms did not interact directly, the mutual use of shared reports allegedly facilitated coordinated pricing behavior. That case was brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which, like the Cartwright Act, prohibits concerted conduct in restraint of trade. However, it remains an open question whether the use of pricing algorithms trained on NPCD, by itself, constitutes a per se violation of antitrust law—no court in California or elsewhere has yet so held. That question is currently being litigated in cases like RealPage (In re RealPage, Inc. Rental Software Antitrust Litigation, No. 3:23-md-03071 (M.D. Tenn., consolidated)), Agri Stats, and Rainmaker (Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC, et al., No. 2:23-cv-00140 (D. Nev., filed Jan. 25, 2023).) The sponsors argue that under federal law, courts have recognized that competitors’ exchanging of price information can play an important role in price fixing. (Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States (1921) 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (“condemning information exchange whose “purpose and effect” were “to restrict competition” through “concerted action in curtailing production and in increasing prices”); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig. (3d Cir. 2004) 385 F.3d 350, 369).) Importantly, the sponsors point out, an alleged scheme constitutes price fixing regardless of whether the competitors ever communicated with one another about prices. Both state and federal price fixing law encompass purely “tacit agreements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553; C.S. Sewell, 2018 WL 6591429, at *3; In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that Section 1 is “broad enough” to “encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices”).
This bill would resolve any ambiguity by codifying a per se rule: that the use or distribution of a pricing algorithm trained on NPCD is inherently anticompetitive and constitutes a violation of the Cartwright Act. In order to better advance that intent, the author may wish to consider adding legislative findings stating that such conduct lacks any legitimate justification and predictably facilitates collusion.
The prohibition in (a)(1) is limited to conduct that is implicitly coordinated (vis-à-vis the definition of NPCD). As written, the bill imposes liability on users of an algorithm trained on NPCD—even if the user did not know, and had no reason to know, the nature of the training data. The author may wish to consider amending subdivision (a)(1) to include a knowledge or reason-to-know standard, similar to what is provided in subdivisions (c) and (d). This could help ensure that liability is appropriately limited to entities who knew or should have known that they were participating in coordinated conduct through the use of NPCD.
Finally, if the policy goal is to treat this type of algorithmic coordination as per se unlawful, the author may wish to consider expressly stating that intent and market effect are not required, and clarifying that the use or distribution of such algorithms will give rise to a presumption of anticompetitive conduct under California law.
Part 2: Prohibition on use or distribution of shared pricing algorithms (even without competitor data). This part of the bill is aimed at addressing algorithmic price coordination that may not involve the direct use of nonpublic competitor data, but still results in collusive or anticompetitive outcomes—particularly when the same pricing algorithm is used by multiple firms in the same or related markets. In essence, it tries to capture tacit or hub-and-spoke style coordination facilitated by third-party pricing tools, even in the absence of explicit agreement or shared confidential data. Subdivision (b) prohibits the use or distribution of any pricing algorithm (regardless of the type of data it was trained on) if:
- The algorithm is distributed to two or more market participants with the intent that it be used to set or recommend prices or commercial terms in the same or related markets (subsection (b)(1)); or
- The same or similar algorithm is used by multiple parties in the same or related markets to set or recommend prices or commercial terms—even if distributed without express intent (subsection (b)(2)).
This is meant to capture cases where entities may not share sensitive data directly, but still rely on a common mechanism that aligns prices across the market. Unlike subdivision (a)(1) (discussed in Part 1), which focuses on the source of the algorithm’s data, subdivision (b) focuses on the shared use or distribution of the algorithm—regardless of what data it was trained on. This part is targeting coordination via common tool deployment, even if the algorithm was not trained on shared nonpublic consumer data. Subdivision (b) is an effort to extend antitrust liability to algorithmic pricing coordination, even where: no nonpublic competitor data is shared (unlike (a)(1)), and there’s no explicit agreement. Rather, it attempts to treat shared use of pricing algorithms across market participants—when used to influence pricing—as inherently suspect and potentially per se unlawful, especially when the distributor intends coordination or when market-wide deployment leads to price alignment.
This provision targets algorithmic parallelism—a modern method of tacit price coordination. The existing language in subdivision (b) gestures toward price coordination—i.e., “the use or distribution of pricing algorithms that are employed to set or recommend prices or commercial terms across multiple parties in the same or related market”—but it stops short of explicitly requiring an agreement, combination, or conspiracy, or that the conduct was undertaken for the purpose or with the effect of restraining trade. Making this more explicit could help ensure the provision is fully tethered to the Cartwright Act’s doctrinal structure, but the sponsors correctly respond that adding a burden to provide evidence of an agreement runs counter to the core problem that this bill seeks to solve: direct evidence of an agreement is nearly impossible to detect.
Subdivision (c) of AB 325 creates a narrow safe harbor from liability for users of pricing algorithms under subdivision (b), provided they meet a specific evidentiary threshold. This provision functions as an affirmative defense—meaning the defendant bears the burden of proving they are entitled to protection. This narrow affirmative defense is available to users of an algorithm who can demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” they lacked knowledge (actual or constructive) that the tool was being used to coordinate pricing. Under California law, it is well established that the burden of proof may be placed on a defendant asserting an affirmative defense, particularly where the facts supporting that defense are uniquely within the defendant’s control. (Evidence Code Section 500.)
The “clear and convincing” standard is a high standard under California and reflects a belief by the author that that the conduct targeted by subdivision (b)—shared or coordinated use of algorithmic pricing systems across competing firms—presents a serious threat to competition and is difficult to detect using traditional antitrust tools. Because algorithmic coordination can achieve the same effects as a price-fixing cartel, while avoiding direct communication or written agreements, the author believes it is appropriate to require stronger proof from defendants claiming to be unwitting participants. The heightened standard may also be intended to discourage willful blindness, and to ensure that businesses take affirmative steps to understand the tools they adopt and how they operate in the market.
Opposition argues that the standard is too high. Requiring defendants to satisfy a preponderance of the evidence standard—i.e., that it is more likely than not they lacked knowledge—may better balance the enforcement goals of the bill with procedural fairness. Businesses that rely on third-party vendors or off-the-shelf pricing systems may have limited visibility into how those tools are used by others in the market. Without access to discovery, they may be unable to meet a heightened evidentiary threshold. A lower burden would still require defendants to affirmatively demonstrate their lack of knowledge, but would reduce the risk of unintended liability for firms acting in good faith.
Furthermore, as drafted, the safe harbor in subdivision (c) only applies to users who neither developed nor distributed the algorithm. Developers and distributors would face liability if the tool is used by multiple firms, even without intent or coordination—potentially discouraging the development of otherwise lawful tools used across industries. The sponsors point out that a hypothetical situation such as this one—where the developer/distributor of a pricing algorithm could not have known that the pricing algorithm was used by two or more persons—is an extremely unlikely scenario.
Nevertheless, to align this provision more closely with the structure and the intent of the Cartwright Act, the author may wish to consider extending the safe harbor in subdivision (c) to developers and distributors, thereby limiting their liability to situations where they knew or should have known that the algorithm would be used to suppress competition.
Part 3: Codification of pleading standard under the Cartwright Act. While Section 1 of the bill addresses the substantive use of pricing algorithms trained on nonpublic competitor data, Section 2 addresses pleading standards under the Cartwright Act, codifying that a complaint need only allege facts rendering a conspiracy “plausible,” and need not include allegations tending to exclude the possibility of independent conduct. This arguably represents a modification—or at least a clarification—of the standard currently applied by California courts at the pleading stage.
Under existing law, a complaint alleging an antitrust conspiracy under the Cartwright Act must allege: “(1) the formation and operation of a conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.” (Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1999) 93 Cal. App. 4th 1264 700, 722 (internal citation omitted).) Pleading general allegations is usually insufficient; violations must be plead with specificity. (Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors (1999) 77 Cal. App. 4th 171, 196 (“The unlawful combination or conspiracy must be alleged with specificity.”).) In other words, a Cartwright Act violation must be sufficiently pleaded such that a defendant can understand the nature of the plaintiff’s claims and not be subjected to burdensome and unnecessary discovery. Courts balance this requirement for factual specificity against the reality that a plaintiff will often not know the full details of an antitrust violation. Accordingly, “[w]hile allegations of the purposes of the conspiracy must normally be specific, inferences as to purpose may be drawn where the effect of the combination is apparent from the face of the complaint.” (Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc. (1975) 54 Cal. App. 3d 7, 21.) As discussed above, these inferences may be drawn from circumstantial facts such as parallel conduct, use of common pricing tools, facilitating practices like data sharing or signaling, and other “plus factors” that suggest the defendants were not acting independently but in conscious coordination with one another.
Importantly, California law does not impose a requirement at the pleading stage that the plaintiff allege facts “tending to exclude the possibility of independent conduct.” That evidentiary burden arises only at the summary judgment stage, as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 863: “A plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude, although it need not actually exclude, the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently rather than collusively.”
However, Aguilar involved vertical restraints and was analyzed under the rule of reason—not a per se horizontal price-fixing claim. There, the Court imposed a heightened evidentiary threshold appropriate to the complex and ambiguous nature of the vertical conduct alleged. As such, Aguilar is not necessarily controlling at the pleading stage or in per se contexts, where once a concerted agreement is shown, liability attaches without the need to show market harm or purpose.
By contrast, under federal law following Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, a plaintiff must allege facts in the complaint that not only render a conspiracy plausible, but also tend to exclude the possibility of independent action—particularly where the complaint relies on circumstantial evidence such as parallel conduct. (Twombly, supra, at pp. 556–557.)
No California state published decision has applied Twombly to a Cartwright Act claim, but the Ninth Circuit has embraced this requirement, applying it in federal antitrust cases that also include Cartwright Act claims. (See, e.g., Rick-Mik Enters. Inc. v. Equilon Enters. LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 973, 975-76, n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of Sherman Act price-fixing claims on grounds that they lacked the factual specificity required in Twombly, and stating that the Cartwright Act claims failed because they were “derivative of the federal law claims.”).)
This section of the bill—which expressly adopts the plausibility-based pleading standard and affirms that plaintiffs are not required to allege facts excluding independent conduct at the pleading stage—clarifies existing California law and reinforces the distinction between pleading standards and evidentiary burdens. It aligns with California precedent recognizing the need for flexibility at the pleading stage, particularly in complex or data-driven markets where traditional collusion is harder to detect. It also ensures that novel forms of coordinated behavior—such as algorithmic price setting—can be meaningfully adjudicated even when there is no direct evidence of a formal agreement.
Definitions. The author may wish to consider narrowing the definition of “nonpublic competitor data” in subdivision (f), in order to better establish the inference of an agreement in (a)(1). As currently drafted, the definition encompasses any data “based on, derived from, or otherwise provided by” a competitor, including “aggregated” data and even “public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.” This broad scope risks imposing liability where no inference of coordination exists—such as where a firm lawfully acquires competitor data through public sources (e.g., scraping or third-party vendors) without any intentional sharing or mutual understanding. The theory behind subdivision (a)(1) is that the training of a pricing algorithm on nonpublic competitor data may itself function as a form of tacit collusion—but that rationale is weakened when the data was not voluntarily or knowingly shared by a competitor. The sponsors believe that the definition properly gets at the circumstance where the format of the data, even if public-facing, is not available to members of the general public. Regardless, the definition of “nonpublic data” seeks to qualify that expansion of the definition of NPCD so that it is tied to the terms of service of the website being scraped. The author contends that data—whether nonpublic or public—can be competitively sensitive if it is capable of informing the price recommendations. These definitional concerns may be more appropriately addressed in the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection, which is scheduled to hear the bill in the event of its successful passage out of this Committee.
The author and sponsors have indicated that they have had productive conversations to address concerns raised by the opposition.
Previous and pending related legislation. SB 1154 (Hurtado, 2024) would have prohibited the use of algorithms trained with nonpublic competitor data, requires disclosure of algorithm-driven pricing to customers, and authorizes civil actions for violations, while also requiring biennial reports on emerging markets and a study on the prevalence and impact of pricing algorithms, in collaboration with state economic and financial agencies. This bill was pulled at the author’s request in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
SB 52 (Renee-Perez, 2025) would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to a landlord an algorithmic device, as defined, that advises on rental rates or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units, and would also make it unlawful for a landlord to use an algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units. The bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a tenant to file a civil action for a violation of the bill by a landlord, as specified. This bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and a hearing is pending.
AB 446 (Ward, 2025) would prohibit setting consumer prices based, in whole or in part, on personally identifiable information gathered through electronic surveillance technologies, including electronic shelving labels. It establishes civil penalties for violations and declares that any waiver of these provisions is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. This bill has passed out of the Assembly of Privacy and Consumer Protection as amended and was re-referred to this Committee, where a hearing is pending.
SB 384 (Wahab, 2025) would prohibit businesses from using price-fixing algorithms to set prices or supply levels for goods or services. A price-fixing algorithm is defined as software or a system that collects and analyzes historical or contemporaneous price or supply data from multiple sources or public databases and creates pricing models based on that analysis. The Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel may file civil actions for violations, seeking damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, with prevailing parties entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. This bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and a hearing is pending.
SB 259 (Wahab, 2025) would ban the practice of affinity-based algorithmic pricing, which combines personalized pricing and dynamic pricing to determine differential pricing for a targeted group of consumers based on explicit or perceived characteristics gathered from personal data, and creates opaque and discriminatory pricing structures. This bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and a hearing is pending.
SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) would ban the use of pricing algorithms that rely on competitor data to fix prices. It strengthens enforcement by requiring companies to disclose algorithmic pricing practices, allows the Attorney General to investigate and penalize violations, and imposes strict fines for noncompliance. This bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Public Safety, and a hearing is pending in Senate Judiciary.
Proposed author’s amendments. The author will be taking the following clarifying amendments:
16729. (a) (1) A person shall not use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data.
(2) This subdivision does not constitute a change in, but is declaratory of, existing law.
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), it shall be unlawful for a person to use or distribute any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with data other than nonpublic competitor data if either of the following is true:
(1) The person distributes the pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that pricing algorithm, to two or more persons with the intent that the pricing algorithm be used to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(2) The person uses the pricing algorithm, or a pricing algorithm trained on substantially similar data to that algorithm, to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service and the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
(c) A defendant is not guilty of violating person shall not be liable for violating subdivision (b) if the defendant person did not develop or distribute the pricing algorithm and the person defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the person defendant did not have actual knowledge or could not have reasonably known that the pricing algorithm was used by two or more persons to set or recommend a price or commercial term of a product or service in the same market or a related market.
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(f) For purposes of this section, both of the following definitions apply:
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(6) “Person” has the same meaning as defined in Section 16702.
(7) (6)“Price” means the amount of money or other thing of value, whether tangible or not, expected, required, or given in payment for any product or service, including compensation paid to an employee or independent contractor for services provided.
(8) (7) “Pricing algorithm” means any computational process, including a computational process derived from machine learning or other artificial intelligence techniques, that processes data to recommend or set a price or commercial term within the jurisdiction of this state.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: A broad coalition of organizations, representing consumers, workers, small businesses, and communities throughout California, explain their support of this measure:
Price fixing—when two or more competing businesses agree to set prices, output, or other commercial terms—results in increased prices and reduced choice for consumers. Price fixing is anticompetitive, and has long been thought of as the “supreme evil” of fair competition laws.
Currently, price fixing is already illegal, under California and federal antitrust laws. However, it remains difficult to detect, especially as technological advancements enable collusion without direct communication. Algorithmic pricing tools now allow businesses to coordinate prices covertly, using third-party software to drive up prices and reduce competition. Despite the clear illegality of these practices, enforcing against this activity is harder than ever due to current law requiring an extremely high bar to bring a case. This has led to the proliferation of price-fixing algorithms, further undermining fair competition and consumer protections.
AB 325 strengthens California’s ability to tackle algorithmic price fixing by:
- Prohibiting secret agreements: Ensuring that companies cannot use third-party algorithms to coordinate prices in secrecy.
- Closing loopholes: Codifying that price fixing through algorithmic tools is just as illegal as traditional price fixing between competitors, incorporating best legal practices from ongoing enforcement efforts.
- Strengthening enforcement: Removing the impractical requirement for “smoking gun” evidence at the outset of a case, allowing legitimate claims to proceed based on plausible evidence.
- Holding bad actors accountable: Ensuring that both companies using price-fixing algorithms and the third-party providers of these tools are held liable.
- Deterring illegal price fixing before it begins: Creating bright-line standards to prevent the use of pricing algorithms to unlawfully coordinate prices, protecting consumers from unfair price hikes, and enabling small businesses to price their goods and services competitively.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: A coalition of organizations, led by the California Chamber of Commerce, oppose this measure, challenging the principle that pricing algorithms are inherently problematic:
To the contrary, pricing algorithms are, in fact, extremely common tools that enable businesses to save money, improving efficiency by avoiding manual pricing, reducing costs for consumers, and making prices far more responsive to changes in supply and demand - and they can do so without involving any anti-competitive conduct.
In contrast, price collusion (or price fixing) is problematic and is clearly illegal under current federal and state laws. Indeed, existing antitrust laws prohibit competitors from colluding on price in any manner, whether through using a pricing algorithm or otherwise. In other words, whether a price-fixing conspiracy is hatched by salespeople conspiring or computers running algorithms, collusion is collusion and is already effectively covered by existing law. To be clear, however, the use of a pricing algorithm does not inherently constitute price fixing.
Retailers use pricing algorithms to ensure they are offering the most competitive prices to consumers. Realtors use them to help clients set home prices. Banks use them to set terms (e.g. rates and fees) for services. Hospitality, airlines, transportation network companies, utilities, ticket venues, and many others use them for dynamic pricing. The list goes on.
All this bill does is remove a valuable tool for setting dynamic pricing and imposes significant costs on all businesses that use price algorithms, thereby reducing competition, rather than promoting it. In the end, this bill hurts not only businesses, taking them back to pre-technological times, but it hurts consumers, effectively doing away with price-comparison shopping and competitive/dynamic pricing by businesses seeking to earn their business.
If enacted, AB 325’s reliance on incredibly broad, ill-defined terms and ambiguous standards will invariably muddy the distinction between permissible pricing algorithms and price fixing, creating significant confusion for businesses. For one thing, the bill’s definition of “pricing algorithm” is so overly broad and vague that it captures any algorithm that uses a computational process. For another, AB 325 prohibits the use or distribution of any “pricing algorithm” that uses, incorporates, or was trained on “nonpublic competitor data.” “Nonpublic competitor data”, however, is not actually limited to nonpublic information.
Rather, even the use of a competitor’s public prices could be deemed “nonpublic competitor data” if the data is later determined to have not been “widely available” or “easily accessible” to the public. Of course, what is considered widely available or easily accessible to the public is entirely unclear as the bill is currently drafted. These are just two (of many) examples of definitional defects with the proposed statutory language in AB 325.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Economic Liberties Project (co-sponsor)
Economic Security California Action (co-sponsor)
TechEquity Action (co-sponsor)
Americans for Financial Reform
California Low-income Consumer Coalition
California Nurses Association
California Public Banking Alliance
Cameo Network
Center on Policy Initiatives
Consumer Federation of California
Contra Costa Senior Legal Services
Courage California
Democracy Policy Network
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
End Poverty in California (EPIC)
Equal Rights Advocates
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern California
Institute for Local Self-reliance
National Consumer Law Center
Oakland Privacy
Powerswitch Action
Santa Monica Democratic Club
SEIU California
Small Business Majority
Tech Oversight California
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
UFCW - Western States Council
United Latino Voices of Contra Costa County
Western Center on Law and Poverty
Opposition
American Property Casualty Insurance Association
California Business Properties Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California Hospital Association
California Retailers Association
Chamber of Progress
Insights Association
Software Information Industry Association
Analysis Prepared by: Shiran Zohar / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):