AB 358: Criminal procedure: privacy.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2025-06-25
Current Status:
In Progress
(2025-08-29: In committee: Held under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic communication information or electronic device information, as defined, without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions. Existing law authorizes a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device in certain circumstances, including, pursuant to the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device or if the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person requires access to the information. Existing law requires a government entity that obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, within 3 court days after obtaining the electronic information, to file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order setting forth the facts giving rise to the emergency. Existing law requires the court to promptly rule on the application and to destroy all information obtained upon a finding that the facts did not give rise to an emergency or upon rejecting the application on any other ground.
This bill would additionally authorize a government entity to access electronic device information with the specific consent of an individual who locates a tracking or surveillance device, as defined, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used to track or record the individual without their permission. The bill would require a government entity that obtains information through this method, within 3 court days after obtaining the electronic information, to follow the above process for applying for a warrant or order from a court by setting forth the facts that describe the circumstances and would require the court to promptly rule on the application and order the immediate destruction of all information obtained upon a finding that the facts were not as described.
Existing law authorizes an individual whose information is targeted by a warrant, order, or other legal process, or other specified recipients of a warrant, that is inconsistent with the act or the California or United States Constitution, to petition the issuing court to void or modify the warrant, order, or process, or to order the destruction of any information obtained in violation of the act or the California or United States Constitution.
This bill would recast the provisions described above to authorize an individual whose information is sought or obtained by a government entity in a manner that is inconsistent with the act or the California or United States Constitution, or other specified recipients of a warrant, order, legal process, request, or demand seeking the individuals information, to petition a court to void or modify the warrant, order, other legal process, request, or demand to order the destruction of the information.
Existing law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic communication information or electronic device information, as defined, without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions. Existing law authorizes a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device in certain circumstances, including, pursuant to the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device or if the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person requires access to the information.
This bill would additionally authorize a government entity to access electronic device information with the specific consent of an individual who locates a tracking and or surveillance device device, as defined, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used to track or record the individual without their permission.
Existing law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic communication information or electronic device information, as defined, without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions. Existing law authorizes a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device in certain circumstances, including, pursuant to the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device or if the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person requires access to the information.
This bill would additionally authorize a government entity to access electronic device information if the government entity locates the device with a deceased body, and the entity in good faith believes that the device belongs to the decedent, as specified, or with the specific consent of an individual who locates the a tracking and surveillance device and the device is reasonably believed to have been used to track or record the individual without their permission.
Existing law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic communication information or electronic device information, as defined, without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions. Existing law authorizes a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device in certain circumstances, including, pursuant to the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device or if the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person requires access to the information.
This bill would additionally authorize a government entity to access electronic device information if the government entity locates the device with a deceased body, and the entity in good faith believes that the device belongs to the decedent, as specified, or with the specific consent of an individual who locates the device and the device is reasonably believed to have been used to track or record the individual without their permission.
(a)Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:
(1)Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
(2)Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
(3)Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. This section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity.
(b)A government entity may compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records issued pursuant to Section 1798.90 of the Civil Code.
(4)Pursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to expand any authority under state law to compel the production of or access to electronic information.
(5)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(c)A government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to paragraph (12) of subdivision (a) of Section 1524 and subdivision (b) of Section 1534.
(4)With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device.
(5)With the specific consent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen.
(6)If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.
(7)If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
(8)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an inmates possession or found in an area of a correctional facility or a secure area of a local detention facility where inmates have access, the device is not in the possession of an individual, and the device is not known or believed to be the possession of an authorized visitor. This paragraph shall not be construed to supersede or override Section 4576.
(9)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of postrelease community supervision under the supervision of county probation.
(10)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.
(11)If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(12)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(13)(A)With the specific consent from an individual who locates a tracking or surveillance device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
(B)For the purpose of subparagraph (A), a tracking or surveillance device means an electronic device the sole purpose of which is to record audio or visual information or to permit the tracking of a person.
(d)Any warrant for electronic information shall comply with the following:
(1)The warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought, provided, however, that in the case of a warrant described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), the court may determine that it is not appropriate to specify time periods because of the specific circumstances of the investigation, including, but not limited to, the nature of the device to be searched.
(2)The warrant shall require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure except pursuant to a court order or to comply with discovery as required by Sections 1054.1 and 1054.7. A court shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.
(3)The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants. If directed to a service provider, the warrant shall be accompanied by an order requiring the service provider to verify the authenticity of electronic information that it produces by providing an affidavit that complies with the requirements set forth in Section 1561 of the Evidence Code. Admission of that information into evidence shall be subject to Section 1562 of the Evidence Code.
(e)When issuing any warrant or order for electronic information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or order, a court may, at its discretion, do either or both of the following:
(1)Appoint a special master, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 1524, charged with ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order is produced or accessed.
(2)Require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as feasible after the termination of the current investigation and any related investigations or proceedings.
(f)A service provider may voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law.
(g)If a government entity receives electronic communication information voluntarily provided pursuant to subdivision (f), it shall destroy that information within 90 days unless one or more of the following circumstances apply:
(1)The government entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or recipient of the electronic communications about which information was disclosed.
(2)The government entity obtains a court order authorizing the retention of the information. A court shall issue a retention order upon a finding that the conditions justifying the initial voluntary disclosure persist, in which case the court shall authorize the retention of the information only for so long as those conditions persist, or there is probable cause to believe that the information constitutes evidence that a crime has been committed.
(3)The government entity reasonably believes that the information relates to child pornography and the information is retained as part of a multiagency database used in the investigation of child pornography and related crimes.
(4)The service provider or subscriber is, or discloses the information to, a federal, state, or local prison, jail, or juvenile detention facility, and all participants to the electronic communication were informed, prior to the communication, that the service provider may disclose the information to the government entity.
(h)If a government entity obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information without delay, or as described in paragraph (13) of subdivision (c), the government entity shall, within three court days after obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency, emergency or that describe the circumstances described in paragraph (13) of subdivision (c), and, if applicable, a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1546.2. The court shall promptly rule on the application or motion and shall order the immediate destruction of all information obtained, and immediate notification shall be given pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1546.2 if that notice has not already been given, upon a finding that the facts did not give rise to an emergency or were not as described in paragraph (13) of subdivision (c), or upon rejecting the warrant or order application on any other ground. This subdivision does not apply if the government entity obtains information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(i)This section does not limit the authority of a government entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena to do any of the following:
(1)Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic communication information associated with that communication.
(2)Require an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, directors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity.
(3)Require a service provider to provide subscriber information.
(j)This section does not limit the authority of the Public Utilities Commission or the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to obtain energy or water supply and consumption information pursuant to the powers granted to them under the Public Utilities Code or the Public Resources Code and other applicable state laws.
(k)This chapter shall not be construed to alter the authority of a government entity that owns an electronic device to compel an employee who is authorized to possess the device to return the device to the government entitys possession.
SEC. 2.Section 1546.4 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1546.4.(a)Any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding may move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or of this chapter. The motion shall be made, determined, and be subject to review in accordance with the procedures set forth in subdivisions (b) to (q), inclusive, of Section 1538.5.
(b)The Attorney General may commence a civil action to compel any government entity to comply with the provisions of this chapter.
(c)An individual whose information is targeted by a warrant, order, or other legal process sought or obtained by a government entity in a manner that is inconsistent with this chapter, or the California Constitution or the United States Constitution, or a service provider or any other recipient of the warrant, order, or other legal process process, request, or demand may petition the issuing a court to void or modify the warrant, order, or legal process, request, or demand or to order the destruction of any information obtained in violation of this chapter, or the California Constitution, or the United States Constitution.
(d)A California or foreign corporation, and its officers, employees, and agents, are not subject to any cause of action for providing records, information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a warrant, court order, statutory authorization, emergency certification, or wiretap order issued pursuant to this chapter.
(a)Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:
(1)Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
(2)Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
(3)Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. This section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity.
(b)A government entity may compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records issued pursuant to Section 1798.90 of the Civil Code.
(4)Pursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to expand any authority under state law to compel the production of or access to electronic information.
(5)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(c)A government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to paragraph (12) of subdivision (a) of Section 1524 and subdivision (b) of Section 1534.
(4)With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device.
(5)With the specific consent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen.
(6)If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.
(7)If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
(8)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an inmates possession or found in an area of a correctional facility or a secure area of a local detention facility where inmates have access, the device is not in the possession of an individual, and the device is not known or believed to be the possession of an authorized visitor. This paragraph shall not be construed to supersede or override Section 4576.
(9)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of postrelease community supervision under the supervision of county probation.
(10)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.
(11)If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(12)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(13)(A)With the specific consent from an individual who locates a tracking and or surveillance device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
(B)For the purpose of subparagraph (A), a tracking or surveillance device means an electronic device the sole purpose of which is to record audio or visual information or to permit the tracking of a person.
(d)Any warrant for electronic information shall comply with the following:
(1)The warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought, provided, however, that in the case of a warrant described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), the court may determine that it is not appropriate to specify time periods because of the specific circumstances of the investigation, including, but not limited to, the nature of the device to be searched.
(2)The warrant shall require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure except pursuant to a court order or to comply with discovery as required by Sections 1054.1 and 1054.7. A court shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.
(3)The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants. If directed to a service provider, the warrant shall be accompanied by an order requiring the service provider to verify the authenticity of electronic information that it produces by providing an affidavit that complies with the requirements set forth in Section 1561 of the Evidence Code. Admission of that information into evidence shall be subject to Section 1562 of the Evidence Code.
(e)When issuing any warrant or order for electronic information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or order, a court may, at its discretion, do either or both of the following:
(1)Appoint a special master, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 1524, charged with ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order is produced or accessed.
(2)Require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as feasible after the termination of the current investigation and any related investigations or proceedings.
(f)A service provider may voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law.
(g)If a government entity receives electronic communication information voluntarily provided pursuant to subdivision (f), it shall destroy that information within 90 days unless one or more of the following circumstances apply:
(1)The government entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or recipient of the electronic communications about which information was disclosed.
(2)The government entity obtains a court order authorizing the retention of the information. A court shall issue a retention order upon a finding that the conditions justifying the initial voluntary disclosure persist, in which case the court shall authorize the retention of the information only for so long as those conditions persist, or there is probable cause to believe that the information constitutes evidence that a crime has been committed.
(3)The government entity reasonably believes that the information relates to child pornography and the information is retained as part of a multiagency database used in the investigation of child pornography and related crimes.
(4)The service provider or subscriber is, or discloses the information to, a federal, state, or local prison, jail, or juvenile detention facility, and all participants to the electronic communication were informed, prior to the communication, that the service provider may disclose the information to the government entity.
(h)If a government entity obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information without delay, the government entity shall, within three court days after obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency, and, if applicable, a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1546.2. The court shall promptly rule on the application or motion and shall order the immediate destruction of all information obtained, and immediate notification shall be given pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1546.2 if that notice has not already been given, upon a finding that the facts did not give rise to an emergency or upon rejecting the warrant or order application on any other ground. This subdivision does not apply if the government entity obtains information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(i)This section does not limit the authority of a government entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena to do any of the following:
(1)Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic communication information associated with that communication.
(2)Require an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, directors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity.
(3)Require a service provider to provide subscriber information.
(j)This section does not limit the authority of the Public Utilities Commission or the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to obtain energy or water supply and consumption information pursuant to the powers granted to them under the Public Utilities Code or the Public Resources Code and other applicable state laws.
(k)This chapter shall not be construed to alter the authority of a government entity that owns an electronic device to compel an employee who is authorized to possess the device to return the device to the government entitys possession.
REVISIONS: HeadingLine 2.(a)Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:
(1)Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
(2)Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
(3)Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. This section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity.
(b)A government entity may compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records issued pursuant to Section 1798.90 of the Civil Code.
(4)Pursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to expand any authority under state law to compel the production of or access to electronic information.
(5)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(c)A government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to paragraph (12) of subdivision (a) of Section 1524 and subdivision (b) of Section 1534.
(4)With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device.
(5)With the specific consent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen.
(6)If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.
(7)If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
(8)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an inmates possession or found in an area of a correctional facility or a secure area of a local detention facility where inmates have access, the device is not in the possession of an individual, and the device is not known or believed to be the possession of an authorized visitor. This paragraph shall not be construed to supersede or override Section 4576.
(9)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of postrelease community supervision under the supervision of county probation.
(10)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.
(11)If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(12)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(13)If the government entity locates the device with a deceased body, and in good faith believes that the device belongs to the decedent, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic information in order to attempt to determine cause of death or to identify next of kin.(14)(13)With the specific consent from an individual who locates the a tracking and surveillance device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
(d)Any warrant for electronic information shall comply with the following:
(1)The warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought, provided, however, that in the case of a warrant described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), the court may determine that it is not appropriate to specify time periods because of the specific circumstances of the investigation, including, but not limited to, the nature of the device to be searched.
(2)The warrant shall require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure except pursuant to a court order or to comply with discovery as required by Sections 1054.1 and 1054.7. A court shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.
(3)The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants. If directed to a service provider, the warrant shall be accompanied by an order requiring the service provider to verify the authenticity of electronic information that it produces by providing an affidavit that complies with the requirements set forth in Section 1561 of the Evidence Code. Admission of that information into evidence shall be subject to Section 1562 of the Evidence Code.
(e)When issuing any warrant or order for electronic information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or order, a court may, at its discretion, do either or both of the following:
(1)Appoint a special master, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 1524, charged with ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order is produced or accessed.
(2)Require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as feasible after the termination of the current investigation and any related investigations or proceedings.
(f)A service provider may voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law.
(g)If a government entity receives electronic communication information voluntarily provided pursuant to subdivision (f), it shall destroy that information within 90 days unless one or more of the following circumstances apply:
(1)The government entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or recipient of the electronic communications about which information was disclosed.
(2)The government entity obtains a court order authorizing the retention of the information. A court shall issue a retention order upon a finding that the conditions justifying the initial voluntary disclosure persist, in which case the court shall authorize the retention of the information only for so long as those conditions persist, or there is probable cause to believe that the information constitutes evidence that a crime has been committed.
(3)The government entity reasonably believes that the information relates to child pornography and the information is retained as part of a multiagency database used in the investigation of child pornography and related crimes.
(4)The service provider or subscriber is, or discloses the information to, a federal, state, or local prison, jail, or juvenile detention facility, and all participants to the electronic communication were informed, prior to the communication, that the service provider may disclose the information to the government entity.
(h)If a government entity obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information without delay, the government entity shall, within three court days after obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency, and and, if applicable, a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1546.2. The court shall promptly rule on the application or motion and shall order the immediate destruction of all information obtained, and immediate notification pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1546.2 if that notice has not already been given, upon a finding that the facts did not give rise to an emergency or upon rejecting the warrant or order application on any other ground. This subdivision does not apply if the government entity obtains information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(i)This section does not limit the authority of a government entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena to do any of the following:
(1)Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic communication information associated with that communication.
(2)Require an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, directors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity.
(3)Require a service provider to provide subscriber information.
(j)This section does not limit the authority of the Public Utilities Commission or the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to obtain energy or water supply and consumption information pursuant to the powers granted to them under the Public Utilities Code or the Public Resources Code and other applicable state laws.
(k)This chapter shall not be construed to alter the authority of a government entity that owns an electronic device to compel an employee who is authorized to possess the device to return the device to the government entitys possession.
(a)Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall not do any of the following:
(1)Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
(2)Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
(3)Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. This section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity.
(b)A government entity may compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records issued pursuant to Section 1798.90 of the Civil Code.
(4)Pursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to expand any authority under state law to compel the production of or access to electronic information.
(5)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(c)A government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
(1)Pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1523) and subject to subdivision (d).
(2)Pursuant to a wiretap order issued pursuant to Chapter 1.4 (commencing with Section 629.50) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(3)Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to paragraph (12) of subdivision (a) of Section 1524 and subdivision (b) of Section 1534.
(4)With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device.
(5)With the specific consent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen.
(6)If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.
(7)If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
(8)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an inmates possession or found in an area of a correctional facility or a secure area of a local detention facility where inmates have access, the device is not in the possession of an individual, and the device is not known or believed to be the possession of an authorized visitor. This paragraph shall not be construed to supersede or override Section 4576.
(9)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of postrelease community supervision under the supervision of county probation.
(10)Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.
(11)If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(12)Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 630) of Title 15 of Part 1.
(13)If the government entity locates the device with a deceased body, and in good faith believes that the device belongs to the decedent, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic information in order to attempt to determine cause of death or to identify next of kin.
(14)With the specific consent from an individual who locates the device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
(d)Any warrant for electronic information shall comply with the following:
(1)The warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought, provided, however, that in the case of a warrant described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), the court may determine that it is not appropriate to specify time periods because of the specific circumstances of the investigation, including, but not limited to, the nature of the device to be searched.
(2)The warrant shall require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure except pursuant to a court order or to comply with discovery as required by Sections 1054.1 and 1054.7. A court shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.
(3)The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants. If directed to a service provider, the warrant shall be accompanied by an order requiring the service provider to verify the authenticity of electronic information that it produces by providing an affidavit that complies with the requirements set forth in Section 1561 of the Evidence Code. Admission of that information into evidence shall be subject to Section 1562 of the Evidence Code.
(e)When issuing any warrant or order for electronic information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or order, a court may, at its discretion, do either or both of the following:
(1)Appoint a special master, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 1524, charged with ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order is produced or accessed.
(2)Require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as feasible after the termination of the current investigation and any related investigations or proceedings.
(f)A service provider may voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law.
(g)If a government entity receives electronic communication information voluntarily provided pursuant to subdivision (f), it shall destroy that information within 90 days unless one or more of the following circumstances apply:
(1)The government entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or recipient of the electronic communications about which information was disclosed.
(2)The government entity obtains a court order authorizing the retention of the information. A court shall issue a retention order upon a finding that the conditions justifying the initial voluntary disclosure persist, in which case the court shall authorize the retention of the information only for so long as those conditions persist, or there is probable cause to believe that the information constitutes evidence that a crime has been committed.
(3)The government entity reasonably believes that the information relates to child pornography and the information is retained as part of a multiagency database used in the investigation of child pornography and related crimes.
(4)The service provider or subscriber is, or discloses the information to, a federal, state, or local prison, jail, or juvenile detention facility, and all participants to the electronic communication were informed, prior to the communication, that the service provider may disclose the information to the government entity.
(h)If a government entity obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information without delay, the government entity shall, within three court days after obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency, and if applicable, a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification under paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 1546.2. The court shall promptly rule on the application or motion and shall order the immediate destruction of all information obtained, and immediate notification pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1546.2 if that notice has not already been given, upon a finding that the facts did not give rise to an emergency or upon rejecting the warrant or order application on any other ground. This subdivision does not apply if the government entity obtains information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.
(i)This section does not limit the authority of a government entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena to do any of the following:
(1)Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic communication information associated with that communication.
(2)Require an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, directors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity.
(3)Require a service provider to provide subscriber information.
(j)This section does not limit the authority of the Public Utilities Commission or the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to obtain energy or water supply and consumption information pursuant to the powers granted to them under the Public Utilities Code or the Public Resources Code and other applicable state laws.
(k)This chapter shall not be construed to alter the authority of a government entity that owns an electronic device to compel an employee who is authorized to possess the device to return the device to the government entitys possession.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Aug 29, 2025 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| Jul 7, 2025 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jun 25, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 24, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (June 24). |
| May 28, 2025 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 15, 2025 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 15, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 63. Noes 1. Page 1556.) |
| May 1, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 30, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 14. Noes 0.) (April 30). |
| Apr 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 10. Noes 0.) (April 22). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 23, 2025 | Coauthors revised. |
| Apr 21, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 10, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 21, 2025 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Mar 19, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Mar 18, 2025 | Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 17, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (March 11). |
| Feb 18, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on PUB. S. and P. & C.P. |
| Jan 31, 2025 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 2. |
| Jan 30, 2025 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 7, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 24, 2025 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| May 15, 2025 | AB 358 Alvarez Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 30, 2025 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 22, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
|
| Mar 11, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aclu California Action | ** Against | |
| All of Us or None | ** Against | |
| All of Us or None Los Angeles | ** Against | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | |
| California Narcotic Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Californians United for a Responsible Budget | ** Against | |
| California State Sheriffs Association | ** Support | |
| Crime Victims Alliance | ** Support | |
| Culver City Democratic Club | ** Against | |
| Electronic Frontier Foundation | ** Against | |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Against | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Against | |
| San Diego County District Attorneys Office | ** Support | |
| San Diego County Probation Officers Association | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Public Defender | ** Against | |
| Silicon Valley De-Bug | ** Against | |
| Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition | ** Against | |
| Survivor Leader Network of California | ** Support | |
| Universidad Popular | ** Against |
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: AB 358 Hearing Date: June 24, 2025
Author: | Alvarez | ||
Version: | April 10, 2025 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SU | ||
Subject: Criminal procedure: privacy
HISTORY
Source: San Diego County District Attorney
Prior Legislation: AB 928 (Grayson), failed passage Assembly Public Safety, 2020
AB 1638 (Olbernolte), Ch. 196, Stats. of 2019
AB 165 (Cooper), not heard in Assembly Privacy, 2017
AB 1924 (Low), Ch. 511, Stats. of 2016
SB 178 (Leno), Ch. 651, Stats. of 2015
Support: California District Attorneys Association; California State Sheriffs’ Association; San Diego County District Attorney’s Office; Survivor Leader Network of California
Opposition: Culver City Democratic Club; Electronic Frontier Foundation
Assembly Floor Vote: 63 - 1
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to create an exemption from the warrant requirement imposed by the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), which would authorize law enforcement to access specified electronic device information without a warrant if an individual locates a device within their residence, automobile, or personal property and gives consent.
Existing law provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., Amend. IV.)
Existing law provides, pursuant to the California Constitution, that all people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these the fundamental right to privacy. (Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.)
Existing law provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
Existing law provides that a search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing, or things and the place to be searched. (Pen. Code, § 1525.)
Existing law enacts CalECPA, which generally prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic communication information or electronic device information without a search warrant, wiretap order, order for electronic reader records, or subpoena issued pursuant to specified conditions. (Pen. Code, §§ 1546-1546.4.)
Existing law states that a government entity may not do any of the following, except as authorized by statute:
- Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
- Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device, however this does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
Existing law allows a government entity to compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
- Pursuant to a warrant;
- Pursuant to a wiretap order;
- Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records;
- Pursuant to a subpoena issued pursuant to existing state law, as specified; and,
- Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (b).)
Existing law allows a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
- Pursuant to a warrant;
- Pursuant to a wiretap order;
- Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant;
- With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device;
- With the specific consent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen;
- If the government entity believes, in good faith, that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information;
- If the government entity believes, in good faith, the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the government entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact its owner or authorized possessor;
- If the device is seized from an incarcerated person’s possession, as specified;
- If the device is seized from an authorized possessor who is on parole under post-release community supervision;
- If the device is seized from an authorized possessor who is subject to an electronic device search condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release;
- If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device; and,
- Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c).)
Existing law allows a person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding to move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the CalECPA. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4, subd. (a).)
Existing law allows an individual whose information is targeted by a warrant, order, or other legal process that is inconsistent with CalECPA, or the California or U.S. Constitution, or a service provider or any other recipient of the warrant, order, or other legal process to petition the issuing court to void or modify the warrant, order, or process, or to order the destruction of any information obtained in violation of CalECPA, or the California or U.S. Constitution. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4, subd. (c).)
This bill creates an exception to CalECPA’s warrant requirement which allows a government entity to access electronic device information with the specific consent of an individual who locates a tracking or surveillance device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
This bill defines a “tracking or surveillance device” as “an electronic device the sole purpose of which is to record audio or visual information or to permit the tracking of a person.”
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author:
The ease of access to spy cameras and geo-trackers, some costing as little as $19.99, has led to a concerning rise in unauthorized surveillance and tracking of movements. This has enabled individuals with malicious intent to discreetly install cameras in others' homes. Under current state law, law enforcement must obtain a judicial warrant to search any electronic device, even when that device was secretly placed in someone’s home or personal space without their knowledge or consent. A warrant can take anywhere from an hour, or up to 30 days according to the San Diego District Attorney’s office. However, any delay in accessing these spy devices allows perpetrators to hide their tracks and continue violating the privacy of their victims.
AB 358 empowers victims of stalking and abuse by ensuring law enforcement can access critical digital evidence—like surveillance footage or GPS data—without unnecessary delays. Specifically, the bill provides a narrow victim-centered exemption to CA Electronic Communication Privacy Law (CalECPA) by allowing individuals who locate spy cameras and geo-trackers in their own homes and vehicles to consent to those devices being searched by law enforcement.
AB 358 aligns with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Greenwood to ensure it does not violate any Fourth Amendment protections. The amended bill only applies to spy cameras and movement trackers, while excluding cell phones, tablets, laptops, and cloud data that may contain personal information.
- The Fourth Amendment and California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA):
Both the United States and the California Constitutions guarantee the right of all persons to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., Amend. IV; Cal. Const., art. 1, sec. 13.) This protection applies to all unreasonable government intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy. (United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 7, overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565.) In general, a search is not valid unless it is conducted pursuant to a warrant. A search warrant may not be issued without probable cause. “Reasonable and probable cause exists if a man of ordinary care and prudence would be led to conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the accused is guilty.” (People v. Alvarado (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 584, 591, citations and quotations omitted.) The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a substitute for the warrant required by the Constitution. (Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753, 758, overruled on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, supra.) There are exceptions to the warrant requirement, but the burden of establishing an exception is on the party seeking one. (Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760.)
Application of the Fourth Amendment to searches or seizures of electronic information by law enforcement was directly addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in several cases which largely formed the basis for the CalECPA. In United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400, law enforcement agents planted a GPS tracking device on a vehicle without a warrant. The court ruled that this was an unreasonable search, due to the amount of information a tracking device discloses and based on the length of time the person was tracked. (Id. at p. 404.) California reacted to the Jones case by establishing a warrant protocol for the use of a tracking device in Penal Code section 1534.
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, the Unites States Supreme Court unanimously held that police must generally obtain a warrant before searching digital information on arrestee's cell phone. (Id. at p. 386.) In so doing, the Court recognized that the search of digital data has serious implications for an individual's privacy. The court observed that cell phones are both qualitatively and quantitatively different than other objects which might be found on an arrestee's person. (Id. at p. 393.) “The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as telephones. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.” (Ibid.) The Court also recognized that "cloud computing" poses additional complications when considering privacy concerns because the data viewed may not in fact be stored on the device itself. (Id. at p. 397.) The Court concluded, "Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans 'the privacies of life.' The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant." (Id. at p. 403, quotation omitted.)
In so doing, the Court noted:
We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost.
Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest. (Riley, supra, at p. 401.)
In response to Riley v. California, supra, 573 U.S. 373, the Legislature passed SB 178 (Leno), Chapter 651, Statutes of 2015, which established CalECPA. SB 178 codified the requirement that law enforcement officials obtain a warrant before “searching” a third party’s electronic records for law enforcement purposes. In doing so, California made it clear that a warrant is required when there is an intrusion into a person’s electronic records and devices even if a third party has access to them.
CalECPA has various exceptions including in cases involving the consent of the device’s owner. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c)(5).) Another exemption allows a government entity to access electronic information without a warrant with the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c)(4).) “Authorized possessor” is defined as the possessor of an electronic device when that person is the owner of the device or has been authorized to possess the device by the owner of the device. (Pen. Code, § 1546, subd. (b).)
This bill would create a related exception to CalECPA and permit law enforcement to seize and search a device when an individual finds a tracking or surveillance device in their home, vehicle, or personal property and gives consent because it is reasonably believed that the device has been used for the purpose of tracking or recording that person without their permission. This exception would apply only to an electronic devices which has the sole purpose of recording audio or visual information or to permit tracking of a person. In other words, this exception would apply to a camera or an AirTag or other GPS tracking device, but not to a cell phone.
Significantly, one of the United States Supreme Court cases which formed the basis for CalECPA involved the use of a GPS tracking device. (See U.S. v. Jones, supra, 565 U.S. 400.) Moreover, AB 539 (Acosta), Chapter 342, Statutes of 2017, addressed law enforcement ability to investigate disorderly conduct in which the individual uses any instrumentality to view and invade a person’s privacy and secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic means them in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivisions (j)(1)-(3). Since January 1, 2018, Penal Code section 1524, subdivision (a) explicitly allows law enforcement to obtain a warrant when the property or things to be seized consist of evidence that tends to show that a violation of the crime of disorderly conduct related to invasion of privacy has occurred or is occurring.
Proponents of this bill argue that by requiring them to obtain a warrant to get subscriber or personally identifying information, investigations are delayed and the IP address may change by the time local law enforcement obtains the warrant. Presumably, some of those same concerns have been present since law enforcement has had the ability to obtain a warrant for these types of offenses, and yet individuals have been held accountable. For example, police might choose to leave a tracking device or camera in place while a warrant is sought and the case investigated so as not to tip off the owner of the device. As the Supreme Court noted in Riley, supra, 573 U.S. 373:
The warrant requirement is “an important working part of our machinery of government,” not merely “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.” [Citation] Recent technological advances similar to those discussed here have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient. [Citations]
(Id. at p. 401, citations omitted.)
If however, in balancing privacy interests, police efficiency, and victim safety, this Committee feels that another exception to CalECPA is warranted, should the bill be amended to require law enforcement to obtain a warrant after the fact, as is the case with the emergency exception to CalECPA? Penal Code Section 1546.1, subdivision (h) requires a law enforcement officer who obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person that requires access to the electronic information without delay, to file an application for a warrant within three court days after obtaining the electronic information. Should this same requirement be applied under these circumstances?
Relatedly, should there be a remedy for individuals other than a criminal defendant who are impacted? While a defendant might be able to file a motion to suppress, the same is not true if there are not criminal charges filed. For example, what if a person accidentally drops an AirTag in an Uber but the driver mistakenly believes that they are being tracked? Penal Code section 1546.4, subdivision (c) allows an individual whose information is targeted by a warrant that is inconsistent with CalECPA, or the Constitution to petition the issuing court to void or modify the warrant or to order the destruction of any information obtained in violation of CalECPA or the Constitution. Should this same remedy be allowed for persons impacted by exception this bill seeks to create?
- Consent Searches in Joint Owner or Occupant Situations
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches does not apply when voluntary consent to the search has been given by someone authorized to do so. (Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 181; People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 311.) And as noted above, CalECPA contains an exception for when the owner of the electronic device consents to the search.
The problem is that in the scenario addressed by this bill, the owner of the device is not giving consent; rather it is the person who found the device on their property. This raises the question of whether there is valid consent when there are joint owners or occupants in the property where the tracking or recording device is found?
Courts have held that a person with common authority over a premise or property may validly consent to its search. (See U.S. v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 170 [consent to search rented room by person who told police she and defendant were co-occupants]; People v. Witkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 765 [consent by co-tenant]; Fraiser v. Cupp (1969) 394 U.S. 731, 740 [joint user of duffle bag].) Consent has also been found to be valid in cases of apparent authority, such as when a wife has left the residence and was staying at a domestic violence shelter. (See People v. Bishop (1996) 44 Cal.App.4t 220, 236-239.) However, when “a physically present inhabitan[t]” refuses to consent, that refusal “is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” (Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 122-123.)
Recently, in People v. Clymer (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 131, the Court of Appeal, relying on the “authorized possessor” exception, held that search of the decedent's electronic devices without a warrant did not violate CalECPA because the decedent‘s parents were “authorized possessors” of his electronic devices, and consented to the search. In that case, the decedent’s parents repeatedly urged police to search their son’s iPhone and iPad so the officer could “find out what happened to their son,” and they provided the passcode to the devices. (Id. at p. 135.)
Nevertheless, a proprietary interest in a property does not automatically imply actual or apparent authority to consent to a search, such as in the case of a landlord. (See Chapman v. U.S. (1961) 365 U.S. 610, 612.)
- Argument in Support
According to the San Diego County District Attorney, the sponsor of this bill:
The CalECPA created a new framework for warrants in the digital space. AB 358 aims to empower victims, preserve evidence, and save resources by creating a narrow exception to this newly created statutory framework. This exception will align CalECPA with general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In its current form, CalECPA can lead to results that shock the conscience:
- A Peeping Tom leaves a spy camera in a women’s bunkroom at a fire station. Their employer has no right to consent to the search of the device.
- A guest in a family home leaves spy cameras in the children’s bathroom. The parents have no right to consent to the search of these devices.
The collection of this evidence can be highly time sensitive. First and foremost, there are our victims and their families. Victims have a right to have crimes involving them investigated judiciously and prudently.
Finally, as to the surveillance and tracking component of AB 358, this narrow exception is focused on righting a wrong that CalECPA may have unintentionally created. In traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the focus was always on one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” CalECPA, in some circumstances, has empowered individuals committing crimes who do not expect privacy, at the expense of victims who do expect privacy. As mentioned above, cases that we have seen in San Diego include: (1) a person putting spy cameras in vents in a victim’s home to spy on her in her bedroom and bathroom; (2) a person putting spy cameras in bathrooms of local stores; and (3) a person putting spy cameras in a dorm within a public employer.
Granting authorization to the victims in these very narrow circumstances — specifically, when a tracking device is found and being used to commit the crime, and the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy at the location where the device is located — empowers the victim, speeds up investigations, and brings CalECPA closer in line with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
AB 358 modernizes California’s criminal procedure by protecting victims targeted by stalkers and domestic abusers who exploit increasingly available tracking tools. These concealable surveillance devices, like Bluetooth-enabled trackers and hidden cameras, can be placed in a victim’s vehicle, home, or personal belongings, invade their privacy, and even threaten their lives. AB 358 sends a strong message that California will not tolerate the misuse of surveillance technology to harass and endanger others. We must act now to protect the rights and safety of individuals, including survivors of domestic abuse, before further harm is done.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation:
EFF co-sponsored CalECPA, which requires state law enforcement to get a warrant before they can access electronic information about who we are, where we go, who we know, and what we do. The law was supported by many civil liberties groups and technology companies as a common-sense extension of the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riley v. California. Recognizing that the information held on smart phones can reveal comprehensive records of a person’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations, the Court in Riley held that before police can access information held on a smart phone, they must get a search warrant. Among other provisions, CalECPA reflects Riley and generally requires police to get a warrant before accessing electronic device information via physical or electronic interaction with the device.
We appreciate the work and continued conversations with the author’s office about how to address the bill’s problems.
As written, however, the bill introduces a dangerous and unnecessary loophole into this important law. CalECPA currently allows warrantless searches of devices when a law enforcement agency believes an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires accessing the device. To do so, an agency must file an appropriate warrant application within three days of the search. (If no emergency exists, then the police can simply get a warrant to search the device.)
Thus, CalECPA already allows law enforcement officers to quickly search electronic devices without a warrant in appropriate situations. For this reason, we share the opinion of the Assembly Public Safety analysis that the need for this new exception remains unclear.
Creating a new provision for warrantless searches threatens the proper balance between privacy and public safety that the Legislature carefully crafted in passing CalECPA. CalECPA includes strong protections that prohibit the government from overreaching. Search warrants must be narrowly particularized to ensure that they properly describe the information sought and seized. And any information obtained that is unrelated to the subject matter of the warrant must be “sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure” without another court order. These additional protections protect Californians’ constitutional rights and ensure that material unrelated to the search— which might be associated with people with no connection at all to a criminal investigation—are not rummaged through by law enforcement.
To address our concerns around the new proposed exemption to CalECPA, we suggest two amendments that would remove our opposition to this bill. Our first amendment adds a revision to Penal Code Section 1546.1(h) to require law enforcement get a warrant within 72 hours after doing the warrantless search that A.B. 358 would create. This ensures A.B. 358 will reflect current practice for warrants…
Our second suggested change goes hand-in-hand with the first. This amendment would add a revision to Penal Code Section 1546.4(c) to give a remedy to people whose rights were violated because law enforcement failed to comply with AB 358…
The warrant requirement in the first half of our amendments allows a court to order that law enforcement delete the information they obtained from the device, which could include revealing photos, audio, or locations that are not relevant to any criminal investigation. The second half of our amendment ensures that those subject to wrongful or overbroad searches have a way to seek redress, which is especially important when the police conduct searches without a warrant.
-- END –
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 358
Author:(Alvarez)
As Amended Ver:April 10, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Authorizes law enforcement to access electronic device information without a warrant if, with specific consent, an individual locates a tracking or surveillance device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
Major Provisions
COMMENTS
According to the Author
"The California Electronic Communication Privacy Act (CalECPA) requires, with limited exceptions, a warrant in order to access electronic devices and/or communication. Exceptions are limited by Penal Code section 1546.1(c)(3)—(c)(11) and includes specific consent from the 'authorized possessor' (Pen. Code Section(c)(3)). An 'authorized possesso' 'means the possessor of an electronic device when that person is the owner of the device or has been authorized to possess the device by the owner of the device.' (Pen. Code Section 1546(b).) In limited circumstances, a device and/or electronic communication information can be accessed if it's reasonably believed that the device has been abandoned, lost, or stolen, or if there is a belief that accessing the device will prevent death or serious bodily injury.
"Current law pertaining to law enforcement's ability to access devices and/or electronic information without a warrant is unnecessarily narrow, frustrating the ability for law enforcement to protect the rights of victims. AB 358 seeks to rectify this by adding two additional exemptions to the need to acquire a warrant to access electronic device. The first being when the device is believed in good faith to belong to a deceased individual, the second, when the device is found by a victim and was being used to record and/or track the victim without their consent.
"Every Californian deserves justice, dignity, and protection under the law. AB 358 addresses this by amending the California Electronic Privacy Communication's Act in two ways. First, AB 358 allows that families who have lost loved ones to tragedy to be contacted and get the answers they deserve. Second, the bill protects survivors of domestic violence and stalking from being re-victimized through abusive use of technology tools.
"One example is the fentanyl crisis that has devastated communities across our state, leaving parents, siblings, and children searching for closure after an unimaginable loss. Right now, outdated and uncertain legal barriers prevent law enforcement from accessing a deceased victim's device in a timely manner, delaying critical investigations that could save lives and prevent further harm. These delays mean that families are left without answers, and dangerous drugs continue circulating in our communities. AB 358 ensures that when tragedy strikes, we act with urgency and compassion by giving law enforcement and public administrators access to electronic devices to contact next of kin or to investigate a death.
"Similarly, no one should have to live in fear of being watched, tracked, or controlled by an abuser. Technology has given bad actors new ways to invade people's most private spaces, yet our laws have not kept up. Even when survivors discover hidden tracking or recording devices, law enforcement cannot access them without a warrant. This delay gives perpetrators the opportunity to remotely erase evidence, making it nearly impossible to hold them accountable. AB 358 gives victims the ability to seek immediate protection by allowing law enforcement to investigate these devices when found in a private space.
"AB 358 is not about weakening privacy protections—it is about balancing them with the real and urgent needs of victims. It is about giving families peace, keeping our communities safe, and ensuring that survivors are not left defenseless against technological exploitation."
Arguments in Support
According to the San Diego County District Attorney: "The CalECPA created a new framework for warrants in the digital space. AB 358 is aimed at empowering victims, preserving evidence, speeding up death investigations, and saving resources by creating two narrow exceptions to this newly created statutory framework. Finally, as to the surveillance and tracking component of AB 358, this narrow exception is focused on righting a wrong that CalECPA may have unintentionally created. In traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the focus was always on ones "reasonable expectation of privacy". CalECPA, in some circumstances, has empowered individuals committing crimes who have no expectation of privacy, at the expense of victims who do have an expectation of privacy. As mentioned above, cases that we have seen in San Diego include: 1) a person putting spy cameras in vents in a victim's home to spy on her in her bedroom and bathroom; 2) a person putting spy cameras in bathrooms of local stores; and 3) a person putting spy cameras in a dorm within a public employer.
"Allowing the victims in these very narrow circumstances—device being used to commit the crime and the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy where the device is located—empowers the victim, speeds up investigations, and brings CalECPA closer in line with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
Arguments in Opposition
According to Electronic Frontier Foundation: "CalECPA is a common-sense extension of the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Riley v. California. Recognizing that the information held on smart phones can reveal comprehensive records of a person's familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations, the Court in Riley held that before police can access information held on a smart phone, they must comply with the basic constitutional process that applies to other searches – "get a warrant". Among other provisions, CalECPA reflects Riley and generally requires police to get a warrant before accessing electronic device information via physical or electronic interaction with the device.
"AB 358 is unnecessary because CalECPA currently allows warrantless searches of devices when a law enforcement agency believes an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires accessing the device, so long as the agency files an appropriate warrant application within three days of the search. Therefore, CalECPA already allows law enforcement officers to quickly search electronic devices without a warrant in appropriate situations, whether the device is found on a decedent, in a person's house, or elsewhere.
"AB 358 would unnecessarily threaten the proper balance between privacy and public safety that the Legislature carefully crafted in passing CalECPA. A warrantless search, without a proper exception, violates Californians' State and Federal constitutional rights. CalECPA includes strong protections that prohibit the government from overreaching. Search warrants must be narrowly particularized to ensure that they properly describe the information sought and seized. And any information obtained that is unrelated to the subject matter of the warrant must be "sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure" without an additional court order. These additional protections protect Californians constitutional rights and ensure that material unrelated to the search—which might be associated with people with no connection at all to a criminal investigation—are not rummaged through by law enforcement.
"While the author's intention is to address delays in getting warrants approved, the solution proposed, allowing certain warrantless searches, is wholly inappropriate. As stated in Riley, the Court has "historically recognized that the warrant requirement is 'an important working part of our machinery of government,' not merely "an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency." In so far as there are concerns about the efficiency of approving warrants, the answer is not to get rid of this "important working part of our machinery of government." Instead, the Legislature should invest in our Courts to increase their capacity to consider, analyze, and make decisions on applications for warrants."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee, "No significant state costs."
VOTES
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 6-0-3
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen
ABS, ABST OR NV: Mark González, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 10-0-5
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Dixon, DeMaio, Irwin, Lowenthal, Macedo, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Wicks, Wilson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Bryan, McKinnor, Ortega, Patterson, Ward
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 14-0-1
YES: Wicks, Sanchez, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Dixon, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Solache, Ta, Alanis
ABS, ABST OR NV: Pellerin
UPDATED
VERSION: April 10, 2025
CONSULTANT: Kimberly Horiuchi / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0000308
Date of Hearing: April 30, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 358
Author:(Alvarez) – As Amended Ver:April 10, 2025
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 6 - 0 |
Privacy and Consumer Protection | 10 - 0 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill allows a law enforcement agency (LEA) to access information on a tracking or surveillance device without a warrant if a person finds the device in their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the person without their permission.
FISCAL EFFECT:
No significant state costs.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill is sponsored by the Office of the San Diego County District Attorney, which argues that obtaining a warrant for a tracking or surveillance device takes too long and impedes investigation of crimes related to such devices. According to the sponsor:
Giving authorization to the victims in these very narrow circumstances — a tracking device is found and being used to commit the crime, and the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy where the device is located — empowers the victim, speeds up investigations, and brings CalECPA closer in line with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
- Background. Generally, courts have held that the Fourth Amendment requires an LEA to get a warrant before searching a person’s property, including searching a person’s cell phone or obtaining information from an electronic communications provider. Without a warrant, an LEA may conduct these searches only if specified exceptions apply. The warrant requirement is also codified in the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), which prohibits a government entity from compelling production of or access to electronic communication or electronic device information without a warrant or wiretap order, subject to certain exceptions. The warrant requirement provides court oversight over LEA searches of electronic devices and communications.
This bill adds an exception to CalECPA’s warrant requirement, allowing an LEA to access information from a tracking or surveillance device if a person finds the device in their home or property and the device is reasonably believed to be tracking or surveilling the person without their consent.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 22, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 358 (
Author:Alvarez) – As Amended Ver:April 10, 2025
SUBJECT: Criminal procedure: privacy
SYNOPSIS
In the early 2010s, two landmark Supreme Court cases helped define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age. In United States v. Jones (2010), the Court ruled that the government must obtain a warrant to track an individual using GPS. In Riley v. California (2014), the Court held that law enforcement must obtain a warrant to access digital information on a cell phone belonging to an arrested person. In both cases, the Court emphasized the importance of protecting individual privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the context of modern technology.
To codify these principles, the California Legislature enacted the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) (SB 127 (Leno; Stats. 2015, Chap. 651). CalECPA prohibits the government from accessing electronic communication records from individuals, service providers, or through physical or digital access to a device, without a warrant. It includes exceptions in cases of imminent danger or with the consent of the device’s owner.
This new bill, sponsored by the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, would add an exception to CalECPA. It would allow law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search of a surveillance or tracking device found on someone’s property if the person who discovered it reasonably believes it was used to monitor them without consent. The bill narrowly defines such devices to include hidden cameras, geotags, and audio recorders—excluding commonly used devices like phones and laptops. It was introduced in response to growing concerns about the misuse of surveillance technology to stalk or harass individuals.
The bill is supported by the California District Attorneys Association, California State Sheriffs’ Association, Crime Victims Alliance, and other law enforcement organizations. It is opposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office, Universidad Popular, and other civil rights advocacy groups.
This bill passed the Assembly Public Safety Committee on a 6-0-3 vote.
THIS BILL:
- Allows a government entity to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device with the specific consent from an individual who locates a tracking or surveillance device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
- Defines a “tracking or surveillance device” to mean an electronic device the sole purpose of which is to record audio or visual information or to permit the tracking of a person.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., Amend. IV.)
- Provides that all people have an inalienable right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
- Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
- Provides that a search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and, in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 1523.)
- Provides that a search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing, or things and the place to be searched. (Pen. Code, § 1525.)
- States, except as authorized by statute, a government entity may not do any of the following:
- Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
- Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device, however this section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1(a)(1-3).)
- Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- Authorizes a government entity may compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
- Pursuant to a warrant;
- Pursuant to a wiretap order;
- Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records;
- Pursuant to a subpoena, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited; or
- Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1(b)(1-5).)
- Pursuant to a warrant;
- Allows a government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
- Pursuant to a warrant, as specified.
- Pursuant to a wiretap order.
- Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant.
- With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device.
- With the specific intent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported lost or stolen.
- If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.
- If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
- Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an inmate’s possession or found in an area of a correctional facility or a secure area of a local detention facility where inmates have access, the device is not in the possession of an individual, and the device is not known or believed to be the possession of an authorized visitor.
- Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of post-release community supervision under the supervision of county probation.
- Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.
- If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1(c)(1-11).)
- Pursuant to a warrant, as specified.
- States any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding may move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or existing statute. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4(a).)
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
The California Electronic Communication Privacy Act requires, with limited exceptions, a warrant in order to access electronic devices and/or communication. Exceptions are limited by Penal Code section 1546.1(c)(3)—(c)(11) and includes specific consent from the ‘authorized possessor’ (Pen. Code §(c)(3)). An ‘authorized possessor’ ‘means the possessor of an electronic device when that person is the owner of the device or has been authorized to possess the device by the owner of the device.’ (Pen. Code § 1546(b).) In limited circumstances, a device and/or electronic communication information can be accessed if it’s reasonably believed that the device has been abandoned, lost, or stolen, or if there is a belief that accessing the device will prevent death or serious bodily injury.
Current law pertaining to law enforcement’s ability to access devices and/or electronic information without a warrant is unnecessarily narrow, frustrating the ability for law enforcement to protect the rights of victims. AB 358 seeks to rectify this by adding two additional exemptions to the need to acquire a warrant to access an electronic device. The first being when the device is believed in good faith to belong to a deceased individual, the second, when the device is found by a victim and was being used to record and/or track the victim without their consent.
Every Californian deserves justice, dignity, and protection under the law. AB 358 addresses this by amending the California Electronic Privacy Communication’s Act in two ways. First, AB 358 allows that families who have lost loved ones to tragedy to be contacted and get the answers they deserve. Second, the bill protects survivors of domestic violence and stalking from being re-victimized through abusive use of technology tools.
One example is the fentanyl crisis that has devastated communities across our state, leaving parents, siblings, and children searching for closure after an unimaginable loss. Right now, outdated and uncertain legal barriers prevent law enforcement from accessing a deceased victim’s device in a timely manner, delaying critical investigations that could save lives and prevent further harm. These delays mean that families are left without answers, and dangerous drugs continue circulating in our communities. AB 358 ensures that when tragedy strikes, we act with urgency and compassion by giving law enforcement and public administrators’ access to electronic devices to contact next of kin or to investigate a death.
Similarly, no one should have to live in fear of being watched, tracked, or controlled by an abuser. Technology has given bad actors new ways to invade people’s most private spaces, yet our laws have not kept up. Even when survivors discover hidden tracking or recording devices, law enforcement cannot access them without a warrant. This delay gives perpetrators the opportunity to remotely erase evidence, making it nearly impossible to hold them accountable. AB 358 gives victims the ability to seek immediate protection by allowing law enforcement to investigate these devices when found in a private space.
AB 358 is not about weakening privacy protections—it is about balancing them with the real and urgent needs of victims. It is about giving families peace, keeping our communities safe, and ensuring that survivors are not left defenseless against technological exploitation.
2) Court Rulings and Cal ECPA. Before the 2010s, there was significant uncertainty surrounding the privacy rights and legal standards for accessing electronic devices. During this time, cell phones rapidly evolved from basic communication tools into powerful pocket-sized computers containing vast amounts of personal information. As a result, law enforcement increasingly sought access to these devices, raising important questions about what level of authorization was required to protect individuals’ privacy. This legal ambiguity culminated in two landmark Supreme Court decisions and ultimately led to the passage of the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA).
The first case was United States v. Jones (132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)), the Court ruled that the physical attachment of a global positioning system (GPS) device to a car in order to monitor its movements over the course of a month as part of a drug trafficking investigation required a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, although the reasoning differed between the Justices. This left open the question of whether government's collection of geolocation data requires a warrant when there is no physical invasion, such as getting GPS information from a mobile phone company. The Court even highlighted this uncertainty, writing, "It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question." Instead, Justice Alito appears to invite action by Congress and the states, saying “a legislative body is well suited to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”
The second case, Riley v. United States (134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), was a landmark case that held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to searching digital information on a cellphone seized during an arrest. The Court found that searching an individual's purse for evidence or a weapon during an arrest is qualitatively different than searching someone's cellphone in part because there is less danger of potential harm to an officer or of evidence being destroyed, but there is also a far greater danger to an individual's privacy because of the vast quantities and distinct types of personal information that can be stored on a phone. In one widely quoted passage, the Court wrote that treating the search of a purse like the search of a cellphone "would be like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”
To codify the Riley ruling, CalECPA (SB 178, Leno; Stats 2015 Chap. 651) was passed which ultimately prohibits the government from compelling the release of electronic communication records from individuals, from a service provider, or through physical or digital manipulation of an electronic communication device. Electronic communication records can only be accessed via a warrant unless they meet any of the following criteria:
- There is the consent of the owner or an authorized possessor.
- A governmental entity has a good faith basis to believe that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury requires access to the device’s information.
- The device is lost, stolen, or abandoned and a government entity must access the device for purposes of identifying the owner of the device.
- A device is seized from a person incarcerated in a prison or jail.
- It is necessary to locate the phone or user to respond to a 911 call.
- When a person is on probation or parole and there are lawful search terms related to their electronic communication devices.
In all other circumstances, a government entity (i.e., a law enforcement agency), must obtain a search warrant.
3) What this bill would do and policy considerations. This bill would create a new exception to the warrant requirement under CalECPA, allowing for warrantless searches of tracking or surveillance devices discovered in an individual’s residence, automobile, or personal property—if the individual has reason to believe the device was used to record or track them without their consent. The bill defines a "tracking or surveillance device" to include only those that can be used for surreptitiously monitoring, such as hidden cameras, geotags, and audio recorders, explicitly excluding devices like phones and laptops. Additionally, the bill requires that the individual who finds the device must consent to the warrantless search.
Supporters of the bill express concern that if such a device is discovered, its contents could be remotely wiped before law enforcement has time to obtain a warrant. This risk could become troubling in cases involving repeat stalking, where identifying the perpetrator is crucial. Opponents, however, argue that law enforcement already has effective strategies to prevent remote data deletion, such as removing the device’s battery or placing it in a Faraday cage to block communications and prevent wiping.
Ultimately, the debate centers on whether a tracking or surveillance device found on private property and used without permission, should be afforded privacy protections, and whether that violation of the expectation of privacy in such spaces merits warrantless access.
The American Civil Liberties Union California Action, in opposition, argues:
[N]othing in CalECPA prevents police from searching alleged stalking devices in an efficient and timely manner. As stated above, CalECPA simply requires that law enforcement get a warrant before searching any device – a process that can take as little as 15 minutes. Moreover, CalECPA currently allows warrantless searches of devices where the police agency believes an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires accessing the device, so long as the agency files an appropriate warrant application within three days of the search. Therefore, AB 358’s broad warrantless search scheme is unneeded because CalECPA already allows police to search electronic devices quickly, including without a warrant during an emergency.
The California Districts Attorney Association argues in support that:
AB 358 permits victims of stalking and surreptitious recording to allow police to investigate any electronic devices used to record or track those victims. This exception allows law enforcement to expeditiously investigate crimes of stalking or surveillance without being restricted by CalECPA’s broad expansion of privacy protections. CalECPA has expanded the privacy rights of defendants such that they now eclipse the privacy rights of their victims in these circumstances. Such a reversal of privacy rights benefitting defendants at the expense of their victims cannot stand and the legal framework should be returned to the constitutional principles underpinning those rights.
This legal framework, as highlighted in the analysis of the bill by the Assembly Public Safety Committee, may find some standing in California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to garbage left for collection outside the home. One could argue that placing a tracking or surveillance device on someone else’s property constitutes abandonment, akin to discarding trash, and therefore forfeits any reasonable expectation of privacy in the device. However, current case law has yet to directly address the use of such tracking and surveillance technologies in the context of warrantless searches, and it remains uncertain whether this violation of privacy would constitute a waiving of the Fourth Amendment protection. As the Assembly Public Safety Committee concludes, “it is not clear why the police cannot take the device found, get a warrant, and identify the person who left the device.”
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The Office of the District Attorney of San Diego, the sponsor of the bill, write in support:
The collection of this evidence can be extremely time-sensitive. First and foremost, there are our victims and their families. Victims have a right to have crimes involving them judiciously and prudently investigated.
There are also technological reasons why the collection of data from a device is time-sensitive. Most notably, there are technological limitations on data extraction from devices. If a device restarts or powers down for any reason, the state it enters (known as “BFU”) makes it much harder, or even impossible, to extract data from it. Some modern devices have, by design, self-imposed timers that force a restart after as little as 72 hours, putting the device in BFU mode automatically at the expiration of the timer. Whether due to the battery dying or a restart caused by the device itself, once the power down occurs, the chance of collecting usable evidence to solve a crime drastically diminishes.
[…]
Finally, as to the surveillance and tracking component of AB 358, this narrow exception is focused on righting a wrong that CalECPA may have unintentionally created. In traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the focus was always on one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” CalECPA, in some circumstances, has empowered individuals committing crimes who have no expectation of privacy, at the expense of victims who do have an expectation of privacy. As mentioned above, cases that we have seen in San Diego include: (1) a person putting spy cameras in vents in a victim’s home to spy on her in her bedroom and bathroom; (2) a person putting spy cameras in bathrooms of local stores; and (3) a person putting spy cameras in a dorm within a public employer.
Giving authorization to the victims in these very narrow circumstances — a tracking device is found and being used to commit the crime, and the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy where the device is located — empowers the victim, speeds up investigations, and brings CalECPA closer in line with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
AB 358 modernizes California’s criminal procedure by protecting victims targeted by stalkers and domestic abusers who exploit increasingly available tracking tools. These concealable surveillance devices, like Bluetooth-enabled trackers and hidden cameras, can be placed in a victim’s vehicle, home, or personal belongings, invade their privacy, and even threaten their lives. AB 358 sends a strong message that California will not tolerate the misuse of surveillance technology to harass and endanger others. We must act now to protect the rights and safety of individuals, including survivors of domestic abuse before further harm is done.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: In opposition to the bill, Electronic Frontier Foundation argues:
As amended, the current bill still introduces a dangerous and unnecessary loophole into this important law. CalECPA currently allows warrantless searches of devices when a law enforcement agency believes an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires accessing the device. To do so, an agency must file an appropriate warrant application within three days of the search. (If no emergency exists, then the police can simply get a warrant to search the device.)
Therefore, CalECPA already allows law enforcement officers to quickly search electronic devices without a warrant in appropriate situations. For this reason, we share the opinion of the Assembly Public Safety analysis that it remains unclear it is necessary to create this additional exception.
Creating a new provision for warrantless searches threatens the proper balance between privacy and public safety that the Legislature carefully crafted in passing CalECPA. A warrantless search, without a proper exception, violates Californians’ constitutional rights. CalECPA includes strong protections that prohibit the government from overreaching. Search warrants must be narrowly particularized to ensure that they properly describe the information sought and seized.8 And any information obtained that is unrelated to the subject matter of the warrant must be “sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure” without an another court order.9 These additional protections protect Californians’ constitutional rights and ensure that material unrelated to the search—which might be associated with people with no connection at all to a criminal investigation—are not rummaged through by law enforcement.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
San Diego County District Attorney's Office (Sponsor)
California District Attorneys Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Crime Victims Alliance
San Diego County Probation Officers Association
Opposition
ACLU California Action
All of Us or None (HQ)
All of Us or None Los Angeles
Californians United for A Responsible Budget
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
San Francisco Public Defender
Silicon Valley De-bug
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
Universidad Popular
Analysis Prepared by: John Bennett / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Date of Hearing:
Counsel: Kimberly Horiuchi
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 358
Author:(Alvarez) – As Introduced Ver:January 30, 2025
As Proposed to be Amended in Committee
SUMMARY:
Authorizes law enforcement to access electronic device information without a warrant if, with specific consent, an individual locates a device within their residence, automobile, or personal property, and the device is reasonably believed to have been used for the purpose of recording or tracking the individual without their permission.
EXISTING FEDERAL LAW:
Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., Amend. IV.)
EXISTING STATE LAW:
- Provides that all people have an inalienable right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
- Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
- Provides that a search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and, in the case of a thing or things or personal property, bring the same before the magistrate. (Pen. Code, § 1523.)
- Provides that a search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be searched or searched for, and particularly describing the property, thing, or things and the place to be searched. (Pen. Code, § 1525.)
- States, except as authorized by statute, a government entity may not do any of the following:
- Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
- Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device, however this section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (a)(1-3).)
- Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- Authorizes a government entity may compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:
- Pursuant to a warrant;
- Pursuant to a wiretap order;
- Pursuant to an order for electronic reader records;
- Pursuant to a subpoena, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited; or
- Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (b)(1-5).)
- Pursuant to a warrant;
- Allows a government entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:
- Pursuant to a warrant, as specified.
- Pursuant to a wiretap order.
- Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant.
- With the specific consent of the authorized possessor of the device.
- With the specific intent of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported lost or stolen.
- If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.
- If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be lost, stolen, or abandoned, provided that the entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.
- Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an inmate’s possession or found in an area of a correctional facility or a secure area of a local detention facility where inmates have access, the device is not in the possession of an individual, and the device is not known or believed to be the possession of an authorized visitor.
- Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of post-release community supervision under the supervision of county probation.
- Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.
- If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c)(1-11).)
- Pursuant to a warrant, as specified.
- States any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding may move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or existing statute. (Pen. Code, § 1546.4, subd. (a).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “The California Electronic Communication Privacy Act requires, with limited exceptions, a warrant in order to access electronic devices and/or communication. Exceptions are limited by Penal Code section 1546.1(c)(3)—(c)(11) and includes specific consent from the ‘authorized possessor’ (Pen. Code §(c)(3)). An ‘authorized possesso’ ‘means the possessor of an electronic device when that person is the owner of the device or has been authorized to possess the device by the owner of the device.’ (Pen. Code § 1546(b).) In limited circumstances, a device and/or electronic communication information can be accessed if it’s reasonably believed that the device has been abandoned, lost, or stolen, or if there is a belief that accessing the device will prevent death or serious bodily injury.
“Current law pertaining to law enforcement’s ability to access devices and/or electronic information without a warrant is unnecessarily narrow, frustrating the ability for law enforcement to protect the rights of victims. AB 358 seeks to rectify this by adding two additional exemptions to the need to acquire a warrant to access electronic device. The first being when the device is believed in good faith to belong to a deceased individual, the second, when the device is found by a victim and was being used to record and/or track the victim without their consent.
"Every Californian deserves justice, dignity, and protection under the law. AB 358 addresses this by amending the California Electronic Privacy Communication’s Act in two ways. First, AB 358 allows that families who have lost loved ones to tragedy to be contacted and get the answers they deserve. Second, the bill protects survivors of domestic violence and stalking from being re-victimized through abusive use of technology tools.
“One example is the fentanyl crisis that has devastated communities across our state, leaving parents, siblings, and children searching for closure after an unimaginable loss. Right now, outdated and uncertain legal barriers prevent law enforcement from accessing a deceased victim’s device in a timely manner, delaying critical investigations that could save lives and prevent further harm. These delays mean that families are left without answers, and dangerous drugs continue circulating in our communities. AB 358 ensures that when tragedy strikes, we act with urgency and compassion by giving law enforcement and public administrators access to electronic devices to contact next of kin or to investigate a death.
“Similarly, no one should have to live in fear of being watched, tracked, or controlled by an abuser. Technology has given bad actors new ways to invade people’s most private spaces, yet our laws have not kept up. Even when survivors discover hidden tracking or recording devices, law enforcement cannot access them without a warrant. This delay gives perpetrators the opportunity to remotely erase evidence, making it nearly impossible to hold them accountable. AB 358 gives victims the ability to seek immediate protection by allowing law enforcement to investigate these devices when found in a private space.
“AB 358 is not about weakening privacy protections—it is about balancing them with the real and urgent needs of victims. It is about giving families peace, keeping our communities safe, and ensuring that survivors are not left defenseless against technological exploitation
- Fourth Amendment Protections Generally: The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 13, Article I of the California Constitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. To that end, an officer generally must secure a warrant before conducting a search of private property. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the applicability of an exception.” (In re Randy C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 933, 937.)
Application of the Fourth Amendment to searches or seizures of electronic information by law enforcement was directly addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2012 and 2014 and its holdings largely formed the basis for the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”).
In U.S. v. Jones (2012) 132 S.Ct. 945, the Court held that attaching a global positioning system (GPS) device to a person's vehicle to track their movements constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at p. 949.) The Court reasoned that attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle is akin to trespass and constitutes a search because the government is physically “occupying” private property (by placing a GPS on a car) for the purpose of information gathering. (Ibid.)
In Riley v. California (2014) 134 S. Ct. 2473, the Unites States Supreme Court unanimously held that police must obtain a warrant before searching digital information on a person’s cell phone. In so doing, the Court recognized that the search of digital data has serious implications for an individual's privacy. The court observed that cell phones are both qualitatively and quantitatively different than other objects which might be found on an arrestee's person. (Id. at p. 2489.)
Hence, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires a warrant before searching a phone or seeking information from an electronic communications provider. The only exceptions would be abandonment, consent, and exigency. States are required to comply with the Fourth Amendment and cannot simply legislate around it.
California law cannot exempt the City from complying with the Fourth Amendment. State law might require the City to hold [the defendant’s] [property], but that ‘does not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.’ The federal Fourth Amendment requires the City to return the [property], and that supersedes any contrary requirements in California law. (See id. Brandstetter v. City of Riverside (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 506, at *8, citing Sibron v. New York (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 61; Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 864-65.)
Therefore, courts examining the reasonableness of a search must consider not just California law, but also the limits of the Fourth Amendment. California, for instance, may not enact a statute that states law enforcement may search any deceased person’s phone for evidence without a warrant because the Fourth Amendment does not allow for that.
- CalECPA: Penal Code section 1546.1 prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic communication information or electronic device information without a search warrant or wiretap order, except under specified emergency situations. (Pen Code, § 1546.1, subd. (c)(6-7).) Before the enactment of CalECPA, California law as it related to a search of electronic communications (e.g. cell phones, email, social media accounts, location data) was controlled by 4th Amendment law pertaining to a reasonable expectation of privacy. (People v. Sandee (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 294.)
Penal Code section 1546.1 requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant before ordering any person or service provider to grant access to information located on an electronic communications device. The only exceptions to the warrant requirement within CalECPA are: (a) where there is the consent of the owner or an authorized possessor; (b) if a governmental entity has a good faith basis to believe that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury requires access to the device’s information; (c) if the device is lost, stolen, or abandoned and a government entity must access the device for purposes of identifying the owner of the device; (d) if a device is seized from a prison or jail inmate; (e) where it is necessary to locate the phone or user to respond to a 911 call; or (f) where a person is on probation or parole and there are lawful search terms related to their electronic communication devices. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (f)(1-8).) In all other circumstances, a government entity (i.e., a law enforcement agency), must obtain a search warrant pursuant to Penal Code section 1546.1, subdivision (a). Furthermore, case law does not require a specific identified target when seeking a warrant where the person accused of wrongdoing is not known.
There is no requirement in the statute that a suspect's name or other identifying information be included in the warrant to ensure its validity. In fact, CalECPA specifically contemplates a scenario where there is no identified target of a warrant and provides that, in such an instance, because notice of the warrant cannot be served upon any individual, the law enforcement agency seeking the warrant must notify the California Department of Justice. (Internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the failure to specify an individual's name or other identifying information did not render the warrant invalid under CalECPA. (People v. Meza (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 520, 546.)
As to the second exception regarding devices left to surreptitiously record or surveil someone seems less problematic, but it is not clear why the police cannot take the device found, get a warrant, and identify the person who left the device. However, it is arguable under California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, that the device is abandoned and the person who placed the device does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data collected from the device because it was left in someone else’s home, vehicle, or in someone else’s property.
- Argument in Support: According to the San Diego County District Attorney: “The CalECPA created a new framework for warrants in the digital space. AB 358 is aimed at empowering victims, preserving evidence, speeding up death investigations, and saving resources by creating two narrow exceptions to this newly created statutory framework.
Finally, as to the surveillance and tracking component of AB 358, this narrow exception is focused on righting a wrong that CalECPA may have unintentionally created. In traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the focus was always on ones “reasonable expectation of privacy”. CalECPA, in some circumstances, has empowered individuals committing crimes who have no expectation of privacy, at the expense of victims who do have an expectation of privacy. As mentioned above, cases that we have seen in San Diego include: (1) a person putting spy cameras in vents in a victim’s home to spy on her in her bedroom and bathroom; (2) a person putting spy cameras in bathrooms of local stores; and (3) a person putting spy cameras in a dorm within a public employer.
“Allowing the victims in these very narrow circumstances—device being used to commit the crime and the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy where the device is located—empowers the victim, speeds up investigations, and brings CalECPA closer in line with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”
- Argument in Opposition: According to Electronic Frontier Foundation: “CalECPA is a common-sense extension of the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riley v. California. Recognizing that the information held on smart phones can reveal comprehensive records of a person’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations, the Court in Riley held that before police can access information held on a smart phone, they must comply with the basic constitutional process that applies to other searches – “get a warrant”. Among other provisions, CalECPA reflects Riley and generally requires police to get a warrant before accessing electronic device information via physical or electronic interaction with the device.
“AB 358 is unnecessary because CalECPA currently allows warrantless searches of devices when a law enforcement agency believes an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires accessing the device, so long as the agency files an appropriate warrant application within three days of the search. Therefore, CalECPA already allows law enforcement officers to quickly search electronic devices without a warrant in appropriate situations, whether the device is found on a decedent, in a person’s house, or elsewhere.
“AB 358 would unnecessarily threaten the proper balance between privacy and public safety that the Legislature carefully crafted in passing CalECPA. A warrantless search, without a proper exception, violates Californians’ State and Federal constitutional rights. CalECPA includes strong protections that prohibit the government from overreaching. Search warrants must be narrowly particularized to ensure that they properly describe the information sought and seized. And any information obtained that is unrelated to the subject matter of the warrant must be “sealed and shall not be subject to further review, use, or disclosure” without an additional court order. These additional protections protect Californians constitutional rights and ensure that material unrelated to the search—which might be associated with people with no connection at all to a criminal investigation—are not rummaged through by law enforcement.
“While the author’s intention is to address delays in getting warrants approved, the solution proposed, allowing certain warrantless searches, is wholly inappropriate. As stated in Riley, the Court has “historically recognized that the warrant requirement is ‘an important working part of our machinery of government,’ not merely “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.” In so far as there are concerns about the efficiency of approving warrants, the answer is not to get rid of this “important working part of our machinery of government.” Instead, the Legislature should invest in our Courts to increase their capacity to consider, analyze, and make decisions on applications for warrants.”
- Related Legislation: AB 1118 (Chen), would allow a search warrant for stolen or embezzled property to include an order for such property to be returned to a lawful owner identified in the warrant pursuant to specified procedures including a hearing, if requested, to determine that the property was stolen or embezzled, before it is returned to its owner. AB 1118 is pending hearing in this committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 2603 (Low), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would authorize issuance of a search warrant on the grounds that the property or things to be seized consists of evidence that tends to show that certain misdemeanor hate crimes have occurred. AB 2603 is pending hearing in this committee. AB 2603 was never heard in this committee.
- AB 2419 (Gipson), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would expand the grounds upon which a search warrant may be issued to include when the property or things to be seized consist of evidence that tend to show the crime of communications in furtherance of a solicitation of a minor, as specified, has occurred or is occurring. AB 2419 was never heard in the Senate Committee on Public Safety.
- AB 1924 (Bigelow), Chapter 511, Statutes of 2016, provides an exemption from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) for pen registers and trap and trace devices to permit authorization for the devices to be used for 60 days
- SB 178 (Leno), Chapter 651, Statutes of 2015, prohibits a government entity from compelling the production of, or access to, electronic-communication information or electronic-device information without a search warrant or wiretap order, except under specified emergency situations.
- AB 2603 (Low), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would authorize issuance of a search warrant on the grounds that the property or things to be seized consists of evidence that tends to show that certain misdemeanor hate crimes have occurred. AB 2603 is pending hearing in this committee. AB 2603 was never heard in this committee.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California District Attorneys Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
Crime Victims Alliance
San Diego County District Attorney's Office
San Diego County Probation Officers Association
Oppose
ACLU California Action
All of Us or None Los Angeles
Californians United for A Responsible Budget
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Oakland Privacy
San Francisco Public Defender
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
Analysis Prepared by:
Kimberly Horiuchi / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):