SB 1095: Fusion centers.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2026-04-23
Current Status:
In Progress
(2026-05-14: May 14 hearing: Held in committee and under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law, the California Emergency Services Act, creates, within the office of the Governor, the Office of Emergency Services, which is responsible for addressing natural, technological, or human-caused disasters and emergencies, including responsibility for activities necessary to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of emergencies and disasters to people and property.
This bill would prohibit a fusion center from engaging in specified acts, including, among other things, law enforcement agency from participating in activity, cooperating, or disclosing or sharing information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, that assists or furthers immigration enforcement unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order, and providing office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, as provided. a fusion center unless the elected governing body or council of the law enforcement agency, or governing board if no elected body exists, has entered into a written memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the fusion center. The bill would define fusion center to mean a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze and share information, as provided. or operated by an executive board consisting of local, state, and federal members, that gathers, analyses, and shares information. The bill would require the MOU to provide, among other things, that information shall not be shared with an individual employed by or contracting with a federal immigration enforcement agency or for immigration enforcement purposes, except pursuant to a judicial warrant, and that a violation of its terms shall result in the termination of the MOU and the withdrawal of the law enforcement agency from participation in the fusion center, as provided. The bill would also require the local governing body or council, or the law enforcement agency if no governing body or council exists, to publicly post a signed copy of the MOU on its internet website. By imposing additional duties on local governments with respect to fusion centers, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
This bill would, commencing January 1, 2029, and every 4 years thereafter, require the Department of Justice to conduct a performance and compliance audit of a representative sample of law enforcement agencies and fusion centers that includes any law enforcement agency that has had its MOU terminated, and submit that audit to the Legislature, as provided.
This bill would authorize state and local elected officials and their accompanying staff to enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization. with 24 hours prior notice, as provided.
This bill would, starting on January 1, 2027, 2028, and each year thereafter, require the Office of Emergency Services every fusion center in California to submit a report to the Department of Justice that includes specified information collected from fusion centers, information, including, among other things, any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers and a certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice. By expanding the crime of perjury, this bill would create a state-mandated local program. The bill would require the Department of Justice to conduct an annual audit based on the report submitted by the Office of Emergency Services, and to submit that audit to the Legislature, as provided. the fusion center and detailed procedures for requesting and conducting site visits requested by elected officials and their staff.
Existing law, the California Public Records Act, requires each state and local agency, as defined, to make its records open to public inspection at all times during office hours, except as specifically exempted from disclosure by law.This bill would provide that all records related to fusion centers are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act, except for specified records which are prohibited from disclosure.The California Constitution requires local agencies, for the purpose of ensuring public access to the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies, to comply with a statutory enactment that amends or enacts laws relating to public records or open meetings and contains findings demonstrating that the enactment furthers the constitutional requirements relating to this purpose.This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Existing law, the California Emergency Services Act, creates, within the office of the Governor, the Office of Emergency Services, which is responsible for addressing natural, technological, or human-caused disasters and emergencies, including responsibility for activities necessary to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of emergencies and disasters to people and property.
This bill would prohibit a fusion center from engaging in specified acts, including, among other things, participating in activity, cooperating, or disclosing or sharing information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, that assists or furthers immigration enforcement unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order, and providing office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, as provided. The bill would define fusion center to mean a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze and share information, as provided.
This bill would authorize state and local elected officials and their staff to enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization.
This bill would, starting on January 1, 2027, and each year thereafter, require the Office of Emergency Services to submit a report to the Department of Justice that includes specified information collected from fusion centers, including, among other things, any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers and a certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice. By expanding the crime of perjury, this bill would create a state-mandated local program. The bill would require the Department of Justice to conduct an annual audit based on the report submitted by the Office of Emergency Services, and to submit that audit to the Legislature, as provided.
Existing law, the California Public Records Act, requires each state and local agency, as defined, to make its records open to public inspection at all times during office hours, except as specifically exempted from disclosure by law.
This bill would provide that all records related to fusion centers are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act, except for specified records which are prohibited from disclosure.
The California Constitution requires local agencies, for the purpose of ensuring public access to the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies, to comply with a statutory enactment that amends or enacts laws relating to public records or open meetings and contains findings demonstrating that the enactment furthers the constitutional requirements relating to this purpose.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law requires the planning agency to prepare, and the legislative body of each county and city to adopt, a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city, and of any land outside its boundaries that in the planning agencys judgment bears relation to its planning. Existing law requires the general plan to include specified elements. In this connection, existing law requires review of the safety element at certain intervals, including during revision of the local hazard mitigation plan, to consider the advice in certain publications by the Office of Planning and Research, including the most recent publication of the Fire Hazard Planning, General Plan Technical Advice Series, as specified.Existing law renames the Office of Planning and Research the Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation and requires all references to the Governors Office of Planning and Research to be deemed to be references to the Governors Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation, except as specified.This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to the provisions that describe the required elements of a general plan by updating references to the Office of Planning and Research the Office contained therein to the Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation.Existing law requires the planning agency to prepare, and the legislative body of each county and city to adopt, a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or city, and of any land outside its boundaries that in the planning agencys judgment bears relation to its planning. Existing law requires the general plan to include specified elements. In this connection, existing law requires review of the safety element at certain intervals, including during revision of the local hazard mitigation plan, to consider the advice in certain publications by the Office of Planning and Research, including the most recent publication of the Fire Hazard Planning, General Plan Technical Advice Series, as specified.
Existing law renames the Office of Planning and Research the Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation and requires all references to the Governors Office of Planning and Research to be deemed to be references to the Governors Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation, except as specified.
This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to the provisions that describe the required elements of a general plan by updating references to the Office of Planning and Research the Office contained therein to the Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The California Constitution guarantees an inalienable right to privacy in Section 1 of Article I.
(b)California law protects the right of people to seek reproductive care in the state and makes the state a refuge for transgender people and their families, however, these communities remain at risk as long as information collected in California is shared out of state.
(c)California law recognizes that immigrants are a valuable and essential part of our state and that California must avoid entangling state and local resources with federal immigration enforcement, which wastes taxpayer resources and undermines public safety. However, as long as California continues to share information with out-of-state and federal agencies and entities, immigrants and their families in California remain at risk.
(d)Fusion centers expose our lives and families to harm by giving federal and out-of-state agencies our personal information, including our location, identity, biometrics, and social media activity, without our consent and without regard to local and state laws.
(e)Fusion centers are a collaboration between state and local law enforcement and federal agencies. According to a report of the United States Senate, fusion centers are state and local entities which are subject to, and governed by, the laws and regulations of their home states, and the exact missions of individual fusion centers are largely beyond the authority of the federal government to determine.
(f)California currently operates at least six fusion centers spread across the state that were established by the Office of Emergency Services, formerly the Governors Office of Homeland Security. These include the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
(g)While the stated priority of fusion centers was originally to prevent terrorism, there is little evidence that fusion centers have meaningfully contributed to this goal. Indeed, a report of the United States Senate could not find evidence of a fusion center uncovering an attack or contributing to disrupt an active plot.
(h)Fusion centers have a track record of being used to target and surveil Muslim and Black, Indigenous, and people of color communities and activists, including tracking protest movements, disseminating conspiracy theories, creating intelligence reports about meditation circles and Juneteenth celebrations, and improperly flagging supporters of abortion rights and climate advocacy groups as suspicious.
(i)By making information about people in California available to out-of-state and federal entities or agencies, fusion centers operating in California grant other governmental entities additional surveillance powers and pose an active threat to the safety and rights of Californians.
(j)The Legislature must protect the rights and safety of people in California and update the law to prevent the exploitation and weaponization of information collected in California.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.6 is added to the Government Code, to read:8586.6.(a)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Data broker means a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.
(2)Fusion center means a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze, and share or operated by an executive board consisting of local, state, and federal members, that gathers, analyses, and shares information, including, but not limited to, the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
(3)Governmental entity means the federal government, any state government other than California, any local government outside of California, and any agency, subdivision, contractor, or representative thereof, or any agreed upon or functional agent thereof. (4)(3)Immigration enforcement includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a persons presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.
(5)(4)Law enforcement agency means a state or local law enforcement agency, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
(A)A police department, including the police department of a transit agency, or any campus of the University of California, the California State University, or California Community Colleges.
(B)A sheriffs department.
(C)A district attorneys office.
(D)A county probation department.
(E)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(F)The Office of Emergency Services.(G)The Department of Justice. (6)(5)Personal information means any information that is maintained by an agency that relates to, describes, or is reasonably capable of identifying or describing, an individual, including, but not limited to, the individuals name, social security number, physical description, home address, biometric information, geolocation data, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history. It includes statements made by, or attributed to, the individual and constitutionally protected activities or involvement engaged in by the individual.
(7)Record means any file or grouping of personal information about an individual that is maintained by an agency.(b)A fusion center operating in the State of California shall not participate in activity, cooperate, or disclose or share information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, when participation, cooperation, or disclosure involves either of the following:(1)Assisting or furthering immigration enforcement, unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order.(2)Investigating, interrogating, detaining, identifying, surveilling, detecting, or arresting people in violation of the prohibition against racial or identity profiling as provided in Section 13519 .4 of the Penal Code.(c)A fusion center shall not allow a governmental entity, contractor for a governmental entity, or private entity to work inside the fusion center when the Office of Emergency Services knows or has reason to know that the entity or contractor is presently engaged in or intends to engage in unlawful intelligence-gathering activity resulting in the violation of the constitutional or civil rights of a resident of California.(d)Fusion centers shall not provide office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, or personnel, agents or subcontractors acting on their behalf, for use within the fusion centers.(b)(1)A law enforcement agency shall not participate in activity, cooperate, or disclose or share information with a fusion center unless it has entered into a written memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the fusion center pursuant to this subdivision.
(2)Before a law enforcement agency may enter into an MOU with a fusion center pursuant to paragraph (1), the MOU shall be adopted by its elected governing body or council, or governing board if no elected body exists, in open session, and shall meet the following requirements:
(A)The MOU does not require the agency to disclose any information it determines, in its sole discretion, it does not have the ability or authority to disclose or to perform any act is contrary to law.
(B)The MOU prohibits reporting any activities protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to the fusion center as suspicious activity reports.
(C)The MOU affirms that all applicable state and local laws, rules, and regulations apply, including the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1) and the California Values Act (Chapter 17.25 (commencing with Section 7284) of Division 7 of Title 1).
(D)The MOU provides that information shall not be shared with an individual employed by or contracting with a federal immigration enforcement agency or for immigration enforcement purposes, except pursuant to a judicial warrant.
(E)The MOU sets forth additional privacy policies as determined by the law enforcement agency or its governing body, council, or board, including any policies required by Title 1.81.23 (commencing with Section 1798.90.5) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.
(F)The MOU specifies that information shared between the law enforcement agency and the fusion center is to be used solely for authorized purposes consistent with federal, state, and local law.
(G)The MOU specifies that all parties to the MOU must ensure that any individuals authorized to access shared information will not access such information by using access credentials or an authentication mechanism that is not unique to that individual.
(H)The terms of the MOU cannot be changed without the approval of the appropriate governing body, council, or board.
(I)The MOU specifies that a violation of its terms shall result in the termination of the MOU and the withdrawal of the law enforcement agency from participation in the fusion center until the Attorney General determines, at the next audit conducted pursuant to subdivision (c), that the violation has been remedied.
(3)A law enforcement agency participating in activity, cooperating, or disclosing or sharing information with a fusion center at the time this section takes effect shall enter into an MOU with the fusion center pursuant to this subdivision on or before January 1, 2028.
(4)An MOU lawfully entered into pursuant to this subdivision is valid for a period of four years but may be renewed upon readoption by the appropriate governing body, council, or board.
(5)The local governing body or council, or the law enforcement agency if no governing body or council exists, shall publicly post a signed copy of the MOU on its internet website.
(c)(1)Commencing January 1, 2029, and every four years thereafter, the Department of Justice shall conduct a performance and compliance audit of a representative sample of law enforcement agencies and fusion centers, including any law enforcement agency that has had its MOU terminated pursuant to subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), and submit that audit to the Legislature pursuant to Section 9795.
(2)The audit shall do both of the following:
(A)Assess compliance with the terms, conditions, and privacy protections set forth in MOU entered into pursuant to subdivision (b).
(B)Assess compliance by the fusion centers with any and all applicable state and federal law, including, but not limited to, the California Values Act (Chapter 17.25 (commencing with Section 7284) of Division 7 of Title 1) and any rights and privileges guaranteed by the California and United States Constitutions.
(e)(d)State elected officials, local elected officials, officials and their accompanying staff may enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization. with 24 hours prior notice, provided they agree to adhere to any fusion center regulation or policy regarding the confidentiality, nondisclosure, and privacy of sensitive law enforcement data and personal information.
(f)(1)(e)Starting on January 1, 2027, 2028, and each year thereafter, the Office of Emergency Services every fusion center in California shall submit a report to the Department of Justice that includes all of the following information collected from fusion centers: information:
(A)(1)A list of all federal, state, and local governmental entities and data brokers, including their contractors and vendors, that participate in fusion centers, the fusion center, a summary of their role and function, and any proposed or existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) or written agreement or material amendments to an existing MOU between these entities regarding participation in fusion centers.
(B)(2)Number of requests for information and suspicious activity reports submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker law enforcement agency, data broker, or other entity, regardless of the reason.
(C)(3)The general types of information collected by state and local law enforcement agencies and shared with federal law enforcement agencies while participating in fusion centers. the fusion center.
(D)A summary highlighting the principal reasons that a governmental entity or data broker is requesting information from the fusion center.(4)A breakdown of the categories of state and federal criminal offenses that served as the basis for the information shared between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
(E)(5)How requests for information are submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker and how quickly those are processed.
(F)(6)An assessment of how the fusion centers process center processes incoming requests for information from governmental entities and data brokers.
(G)(7)The number of times a federal law enforcement agency requested information or assessments from state law enforcement agencies and whether the state law enforcement agency determined that the reasonable suspicion standard was met for the activity.
(H)(8)Any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers. the fusion center.
(I)A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests. (J)(9)The process for validating the authenticity of the requesting governmental entities and data brokers seeking information requests from the fusion center.
(K)Whether a reasonable suspicion standard was met before state law enforcement agencies collected, maintained, or disseminated personal information through fusion centers.(L)(10)The types of agencies that staff each the fusion center, including, but not limited to, the number of staff per agency and a staffing chart or flowchart detailing staffing and how decisions are made about responding to requests from governmental entities or data brokers.
(M)The number of actual or potential violations of state or local laws, policies, or department orders or procedures, the actions taken by the state law enforcement agency to address actual or potential violations, and recommendations to prevent future violations.(N)A certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice.(2)The Department of Justice shall conduct an annual audit based on the report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), and, notwithstanding Section 10231.5, submit that audit to the Legislature pursuant to Section 9795.(g)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), all records related to fusion centers are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1).(2)The Office of Emergency Services, fusion centers, and the Department of Justice shall not disclose the name, address, social security number, or other unique personal identifying information of individuals stopped, searched, or subjected to a property seizure, for purposes of this section.(11)Detailed procedures for requesting and conducting site visits requested by elected officials and their staff.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which adds Section 8586.6 to the Government Code, furthers, within the meaning of paragraph (7) of subdivision (b) of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution, the purposes of that constitutional section as it relates to the right of public access to the meetings of local public bodies or the writings of local public officials and local agencies. Pursuant to paragraph (7) of subdivision (b) of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution, the Legislature makes the following findings:Information about fusion centers, including the participating agencies and operational policies, will further transparency and ensure compliance with existing laws and regulations.SEC. 4.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which adds Section 8586.6 to the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:This act balances the right of the public to know the governments information collection and sharing practices with preserving the confidentiality of information maintained about individuals.SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.SEC. 3.If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The California Constitution guarantees an inalienable right to privacy in Section 1 of Article I.
(b)California law protects the right of people to seek reproductive care in the state and makes the state a refuge for transgender people and their families, however, these communities remain at risk as long as information collected in California is shared out of state.
(c)California law recognizes that immigrants are a valuable and essential part of our state and that California must avoid entangling state and local resources with federal immigration enforcement, which wastes taxpayer resources and undermines public safety. However, as long as California continues to share information with out-of-state and federal agencies and entities, immigrants and their families in California remain at risk.
(d)Fusion centers expose our lives and families to harm by giving federal and out-of-state agencies our personal information, including our location, identity, biometrics, and social media activity, without our consent and without regard to local and state laws.
(e)Fusion centers are a collaboration between state and local law enforcement and federal agencies. According to a report of the United States Senate, fusion centers are state and local entities which are subject to, and governed by, the laws and regulations of their home states, and the exact missions of individual fusion centers are largely beyond the authority of the federal government to determine.
(f)California currently operates at least six fusion centers spread across the state that were established by the Office of Emergency Services, formerly the Governors Office of Homeland Security. These include the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
(g)While the stated priority of fusion centers was originally to prevent terrorism, there is little evidence that fusion centers have meaningfully contributed to this goal. Indeed, a report of the United States Senate could not find evidence of a fusion center uncovering an attack or contributing to disrupt an active plot.
(h)Fusion centers have a track record of being used to target and surveil Muslim and Black, Indigenous, and people of color communities and activists, including tracking protest movements, disseminating conspiracy theories, creating intelligence reports about meditation circles and Juneteenth celebrations, and improperly flagging supporters of abortion rights and climate advocacy groups as suspicious.
(i)By making information about people in California available to out-of-state and federal entities or agencies, fusion centers operating in California grant other governmental entities additional surveillance powers and pose an active threat to the safety and rights of Californians.
(j)The Legislature must protect the rights and safety of people in California and update the law to prevent the exploitation and weaponization of information collected in California.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.6 is added to the Government Code, to read:8586.6.(a)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Data broker means a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.
(2)Fusion center means a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze, and share information, including, but not limited to, the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
(3)Governmental entity means the federal government, any state government other than California, any local government outside of California, and any agency, subdivision, contractor, or representative thereof, or any agreed upon or functional agent thereof.
(4)Immigration enforcement includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a persons presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.
(5)Law enforcement agency means a state or local law enforcement agency, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
(A)A police department, including the police department of a transit agency, or any campus of the University of California, the California State University, or California Community Colleges.
(B)A sheriffs department.
(C)A district attorneys office.
(D)A county probation department.
(E)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(F)The Office of Emergency Services.
(G)The Department of Justice.
(6)Personal information means any information that is maintained by an agency that relates to, describes, or is reasonably capable of identifying or describing, an individual, including, but not limited to, the individuals name, social security number, physical description, home address, biometric information, geolocation data, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history. It includes statements made by, or attributed to, the individual and constitutionally protected activities or involvement engaged in by the individual.
(7)Record means any file or grouping of personal information about an individual that is maintained by an agency.
(b)A fusion center operating in the State of California shall not participate in activity, cooperate, or disclose or share information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, when participation, cooperation, or disclosure involves either of the following:
(1)Assisting or furthering immigration enforcement, unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order.
(2)Investigating, interrogating, detaining, identifying, surveilling, detecting, or arresting people in violation of the prohibition against racial or identity profiling as provided in Section 13519 .4 of the Penal Code.
(c)A fusion center shall not allow a governmental entity, contractor for a governmental entity, or private entity to work inside the fusion center when the Office of Emergency Services knows or has reason to know that the entity or contractor is presently engaged in or intends to engage in unlawful intelligence-gathering activity resulting in the violation of the constitutional or civil rights of a resident of California.
(d)Fusion centers shall not provide office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, or personnel, agents or subcontractors acting on their behalf, for use within the fusion centers.
(e)State elected officials, local elected officials, and their staff may enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization.
(f)(1)Starting on January 1, 2027, and each year thereafter, the Office of Emergency Services shall submit a report to the Department of Justice that includes all of the following information collected from fusion centers:
(A)A list of all federal, state, and local governmental entities and data brokers, including their contractors and vendors, that participate in fusion centers, a summary of their role and function, and any proposed or existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) or written agreement or material amendments to an existing MOU between these entities regarding participation in fusion centers.
(B)Number of requests for information and reports submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker regardless of the reason.
(C)The general types of information collected by state law enforcement agencies and shared with federal law enforcement agencies while participating in fusion centers.
(D)A summary highlighting the principal reasons that a governmental entity or data broker is requesting information from the fusion center.
(E)How requests for information are submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker and how quickly those are processed.
(F)An assessment of how fusion centers process incoming requests for information from governmental entities and data brokers.
(G)The number of times a federal law enforcement agency requested information or assessments from state law enforcement agencies and whether the state law enforcement agency determined that the reasonable suspicion standard was met for the activity.
(H)Any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers.
(I)A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.
(J)The process for validating the authenticity of the requesting governmental entities and data brokers seeking information requests from the fusion center.
(K)Whether a reasonable suspicion standard was met before state law enforcement agencies collected, maintained, or disseminated personal information through fusion centers.
(L)The types of agencies that staff each fusion center, including, but not limited to, the number of staff per agency and a staffing chart or flowchart detailing staffing and how decisions are made about responding to requests from governmental entities or data brokers.
(M)The number of actual or potential violations of state or local laws, policies, or department orders or procedures, the actions taken by the state law enforcement agency to address actual or potential violations, and recommendations to prevent future violations.
(N)A certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice.
(2)The Department of Justice shall conduct an annual audit based on the report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), and, notwithstanding Section 10231.5, submit that audit to the Legislature pursuant to Section 9795.
(g)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2), all records related to fusion centers are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1).
(2)The Office of Emergency Services, fusion centers, and the Department of Justice shall not disclose the name, address, social security number, or other unique personal identifying information of individuals stopped, searched, or subjected to a property seizure, for purposes of this section.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which adds Section 8586.6 to the Government Code, furthers, within the meaning of paragraph (7) of subdivision (b) of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution, the purposes of that constitutional section as it relates to the right of public access to the meetings of local public bodies or the writings of local public officials and local agencies. Pursuant to paragraph (7) of subdivision (b) of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution, the Legislature makes the following findings:
Information about fusion centers, including the participating agencies and operational policies, will further transparency and ensure compliance with existing laws and regulations.
SEC. 4.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which adds Section 8586.6 to the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
This act balances the right of the public to know the governments information collection and sharing practices with preserving the confidentiality of information maintained about individuals.
SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
All matter omitted in this version of the bill appears in the bill as introduced in the Senate, February 13, 2026. (JR11)The general plan shall consist of a statement of development policies and shall include a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals. The plan shall include the following elements:
(a)A land use element that designates the proposed general distribution and general location and extent of the uses of the land for housing, business, industry, open space, including agriculture, natural resources, recreation, and enjoyment of scenic beauty, education, public buildings and grounds, solid and liquid waste disposal facilities, greenways, as defined in Section 816.52 of the Civil Code, and other categories of public and private uses of land. The location and designation of the extent of the uses of the land for public and private uses shall consider the identification of land and natural resources pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (d). The land use element shall include a statement of the standards of population density and building intensity recommended for the various districts and other territory covered by the plan. The land use element shall identify and annually review those areas covered by the plan that are subject to flooding identified by flood plain mapping prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Water Resources. The land use element shall also do both of the following:
(1)Designate in a land use category that provides for timber production those parcels of real property zoned for timberland production pursuant to the California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982 (Chapter 6.7 (commencing with Section 51100) of Part 1 of Division 1 of Title 5).
(2)Consider the impact of new growth on military readiness activities carried out on military bases, installations, and operating and training areas, when proposing zoning ordinances or designating land uses covered by the general plan for land, or other territory adjacent to military facilities, or underlying designated military aviation routes and airspace.
(A)In determining the impact of new growth on military readiness activities, information provided by military facilities shall be considered. Cities and counties shall address military impacts based on information from the military and other sources.
(B)The following definitions govern this paragraph:
(i)Military readiness activities mean all of the following:
(I)Training, support, and operations that prepare the members of the military for combat.
(II)Operation, maintenance, and security of any military installation.
(III)Testing of military equipment, vehicles, weapons, and sensors for proper operation or suitability for combat use.
(ii)Military installation means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Defense as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (g) of Section 2687 of Title 10 of the United States Code.
(b)(1)A circulation element consisting of the general location and extent of existing and proposed major thoroughfares, transportation routes, terminals, any military airports and ports, and other local public utilities and facilities, all correlated with the land use element of the plan.
(2)(A)Commencing January 1, 2011, upon any substantive revision of the circulation element, the legislative body shall modify the circulation element to plan for a balanced, multimodal transportation network that meets the needs of all users of streets, roads, and highways for safe and convenient travel in a manner that is suitable to the rural, suburban, or urban context of the general plan.
(B)Upon any substantive revision of the circulation element on or after January 1, 2025, the legislative body shall do all of the following:
(i)Incorporate the principles of the Federal Highway Administrations Safe System Approach, in the circulation element by including policies that aim to eliminate fatal and serious injuries for all road users through a holistic view of the roadway system, including provisions that account for human error, recognize vulnerable road users, and promote redundant and proactive safety measures.
(ii)Develop bicycle plans, pedestrian plans, and traffic calming plans based on the policies and goals in the circulation element that shall address all of the following for any urbanized area within the scope of the general plan:
(I)Identify safety corridors and any land or facility that generates high concentrations of bicyclists or pedestrians.
(II)Use evidence-based strategies, including strategies identified in the United States Department of Transportations Strategic Highway Safety Plan to develop safety measures specific to those areas that are intended to eliminate traffic fatalities, with an emphasis on fatalities of bicyclists, pedestrians, and users of any other form of micromobility device in the areas identified in subclause (I).
(III)Set goals for initiation and completion of all actions identified in the plans within 25 years of the date of adoption of the modified circulation element based upon projected development activities within urbanized areas within the scope of the general plan and projected availability of revenues.
(C)(i)A county or city shall begin implementation of the modified circulation element plan specified in subparagraph (B) within two years of the date of adoption of the plan.
(ii)A county or city shall regularly review the progress towards and identify impediments to completing implementation of the plan for a multimodal transportation network, including all bicycle plans, pedestrian plans, and traffic calming plans iterated in the modified circulation element, and the construction of any related infrastructure.
(iii)A county or city shall consider revising the circulation element if, following the review under clause (ii), the county or city determines it will not reach the goals of the bicycle, pedestrian, or traffic calming plans within 25 years of the date of adoption of the modified circulation element.
(D)For the purposes of this paragraph, the following definitions shall apply:
(i)Business activity district has the same meaning as defined in Section 22358.9 of the Vehicle Code.
(ii)Land facilities that generate high concentrations of bicyclists or pedestrians has the same meaning as described in Section 22358.7 of the Vehicle Code.
(iii)Micromobility device means a bicycle, electric bicycle, or motorized scooter as those terms are defined and described in Division 1 (commencing with Section 100) of the Vehicle Code.
(iv)Safety corridor has the same meaning as defined in Section 22358.7 of the Vehicle Code.
(v)Urbanized area has the same meaning as defined in Section 21071 of the Public Resources Code.
(E)For purposes of this paragraph, users of streets, roads, and highways mean bicyclists, children, persons with disabilities, motorists, movers of commercial goods, pedestrians, users of public transportation, and seniors.
(c)A housing element as provided in Article 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580).
(d)(1)A conservation element for the conservation, development, and utilization of natural resources, including water and its hydraulic force, forests, soils, rivers and other waters, harbors, fisheries, wildlife, minerals, and other natural resources. The conservation element shall consider the effect of development within the jurisdiction, as described in the land use element, on natural resources located on public lands, including military installations. The conservation element shall consider the effect of development within the jurisdiction, as described in the land use element, on the movement of wildlife and habitat connectivity. That portion of the conservation element including waters shall be developed in coordination with any countywide water agency and with all district and city agencies, including flood management, water conservation, or groundwater agencies that have developed, served, controlled, managed, or conserved water of any type for any purpose in the county or city for which the plan is prepared. Coordination shall include the discussion and evaluation of any water supply and demand information described in Section 65352.5, if that information has been submitted by the water agency to the city or county.
(2)The conservation element may also cover all of the following:
(A)The reclamation of land and waters.
(B)Prevention and control of the pollution of streams and other waters.
(C)Regulation of the use of land in stream channels and other areas required for the accomplishment of the conservation plan.
(D)Prevention, control, and correction of the erosion of soils, beaches, and shores.
(E)Protection of watersheds.
(F)The location, quantity, and quality of the rock, sand, and gravel resources.
(3)Upon the next revision of the housing element on or after January 1, 2009, the conservation element shall identify rivers, creeks, streams, flood corridors, riparian habitats, and land that may accommodate floodwater for purposes of groundwater recharge and stormwater management.
(4)Upon the adoption or next revision of one or more elements on or after January 1, 2028, the conservation element shall be updated to:
(A)Identify and analyze connectivity areas, permeability, and natural landscape areas within the jurisdiction, as those terms are defined in Section 158 of the Streets and Highways Code.
(B)Identify and analyze existing or planned wildlife passage features, as defined in Section 158 of the Streets and Highways Code, including, but not limited to, wildlife passage features included in the inventory of connectivity needs on the state highway system, as described in Section 158.1 of the Streets and Highways Code, to ensure that planned development does not undermine the effectiveness of existing and potential wildlife passage features, as defined in Section 158 of the Streets and Highways Code.
(C)(i)Consider the impacts of development and the barriers caused by development to wildlife and habitat connectivity.
(ii)For the purposes of this subparagraph, wildlife has the same meaning as defined in Section 89.5 of the Fish and Game Code.
(D)Avoid, minimize, or mitigate impacts and barriers to wildlife movement to the extent feasible.
(E)Analyze and consider opportunities to remediate existing barriers to wildlife connectivity and restore degraded habitat and open space.
(5)If a city, county, or city and county has already included policies in existing plans, including its certified local coastal plan, that meet the requirements of paragraph (4), the city, county, or city and county may incorporate the plan by reference into the general plan to comply with this section.
(6)In preparing to update the conservation element, the city, county, or city and county may do any of the following:
(A)Consider incorporating appropriate standards, policies, and feasible implementation programs such as wildlife-friendly fencing and lighting, buffers from sensitive resources, prohibitions on invasive plants, habitat connectivity overlay zones, and compact development standards, or consider whether adoption of ordinances is necessary to feasibly implement these standards, policies, and implementation programs, and include goals to adopt any necessary ordinances.
(B)Consult with the Department of Fish and Wildlife, any California Native American tribe that is on the contact list maintained by the Native American Heritage Commission and that has traditional lands located within the city, county, or city and countys jurisdiction, and any open-space district that owns lands designated for conservation within the city, county, or city and countys jurisdiction. Upon receiving a request for consultation, the department, tribe, or district may, in its sole discretion, accept or refuse to consult, based on the priority of natural resources impacted or other factors.
(C)Consider relevant best available science as appropriate, including, but not limited to, peer-reviewed literature, citable publicly available datasets, publicly sourced online datasets, and information and reports from government agencies, California Native American tribes, and academic institutions.
(D)Consider the most appropriately scaled scientific information on linkages, corridors, and other locations that are essential to maintain landscape connectivity, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Habitat linkages and wildlife corridors, such as those identified and summarized in the Areas of Conservation Emphasis, as defined by subdivision (a) of Section 1851 of the Fish and Game Code, and in regional habitat connectivity assessments.
(ii)Wildlife corridors, such as migration corridors identified by global positioning system collar studies.
(iii)Wildlife movement barriers, such as connectivity areas, as defined by subdivision (a) of Section 158 of the Street and Highways Code, and barriers identified by the Department of Fish and Wildlifes Restoring Californias Wildlife Connectivity report.
(iv)Other connectivity considerations, such as those outlined in the State Wildlife Action Plan, habitat conservation plans approved pursuant to Section 1539 of Title 16 of the United States Code, natural community conservation plans approved pursuant to Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 2800) of Division 3 of the Fish and Game Code, regional conservation investment strategies approved pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 1850) of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code, and other relevant plans, policies, and ordinances adopted by neighboring jurisdictions.
(7)In preparing to update the conservation element, the city, county, or city and county may consult with other appropriate local, state, or federal agencies, or academic institutions, as deemed appropriate by the city or county.
(8)The city, county, or city and county may meet the requirements in paragraphs (4) through (6), inclusive, in a separate component or section of the general plan entitled a wildlife connectivity element.
(e)An open-space element as provided in Article 10.5 (commencing with Section 65560).
(f)(1)A noise element that shall identify and appraise noise problems in the community. The noise element shall analyze and quantify, to the extent practicable, as determined by the legislative body, current and projected noise levels for all of the following sources:
(A)Highways and freeways.
(B)Primary arterials and major local streets.
(C)Passenger and freight online railroad operations and ground rapid transit systems.
(D)Commercial, general aviation, heliport, helistop, and military airport operations, aircraft overflights, jet engine test stands, and all other ground facilities and maintenance functions related to airport operation.
(E)Local industrial plants, including, but not limited to, railroad classification yards.
(F)Other ground stationary noise sources, including, but not limited to, military installations, identified by local agencies as contributing to the community noise environment.
(2)Noise contours shall be shown for all of these sources and stated in terms of community noise equivalent level (CNEL) or day-night average sound level (Ldn). The noise contours shall be prepared on the basis of noise monitoring or following generally accepted noise modeling techniques for the various sources identified in subparagraphs (A) to (F) of paragraph (1), inclusive.
(3)The noise contours shall be used as a guide for establishing a pattern of land uses in the land use element that minimizes the exposure of community residents to excessive noise.
(4)The noise element shall include implementation measures and possible solutions that address existing and foreseeable noise problems, if any. The adopted noise element shall serve as a guideline for compliance with the states noise insulation standards.
(g)(1)A safety element for the protection of the community from any unreasonable risks associated with the effects of seismically induced surface rupture, ground shaking, ground failure, tsunami, seiche, and dam failure; slope instability leading to mudslides and landslides; subsidence; liquefaction; and other seismic hazards identified pursuant to Chapter 7.8 (commencing with Section 2690) of Division 2 of the Public Resources Code, and other geologic hazards known to the legislative body; flooding; and wildland and urban fires. The safety element shall include mapping of known seismic and other geologic hazards. It shall also address evacuation routes, military installations, peakload water supply requirements, and minimum road widths and clearances around structures, as those items relate to identified fire and geologic hazards.
(2)The safety element, upon the next revision of the housing element on or after January 1, 2009, shall also do the following:
(A)Identify information regarding flood hazards, including, but not limited to, the following:
(i)Flood hazard zones. As used in this subdivision, flood hazard zone means an area subject to flooding that is delineated as either a special hazard area or an area of moderate or minimal hazard on an official flood insurance rate map issued by FEMA. The identification of a flood hazard zone does not imply that areas outside the flood hazard zones or uses permitted within flood hazard zones will be free from flooding or flood damage.
(ii)National Flood Insurance Program maps published by FEMA.
(iii)Information about flood hazards that is available from the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
(iv)Designated floodway maps that are available from the Central Valley Flood Protection Board.
(v)Dam failure inundation maps prepared pursuant to Section 6161 of the Water Code that are available from the Department of Water Resources.
(vi)Awareness Floodplain Mapping Program maps and 200-year flood plain maps that are or may be available from, or accepted by, the Department of Water Resources.
(vii)Maps of levee protection zones.
(viii)Areas subject to inundation in the event of the failure of project or nonproject levees or floodwalls.
(ix)Historical data on flooding, including locally prepared maps of areas that are subject to flooding, areas that are vulnerable to flooding after wildfires, and sites that have been repeatedly damaged by flooding.
(x)Existing and planned development in flood hazard zones, including structures, roads, utilities, and essential public facilities.
(xi)Local, state, and federal agencies with responsibility for flood protection, including special districts and local offices of emergency services.
(B)Establish a set of comprehensive goals, policies, and objectives based on the information identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), for the protection of the community from the unreasonable risks of flooding, including, but not limited to:
(i)Avoiding or minimizing the risks of flooding to new development.
(ii)Evaluating whether new development should be located in flood hazard zones, and identifying construction methods or other methods to minimize damage if new development is located in flood hazard zones.
(iii)Maintaining the structural and operational integrity of essential public facilities during flooding.
(iv)Locating, when feasible, new essential public facilities outside of flood hazard zones, including hospitals and health care facilities, emergency shelters, fire stations, emergency command centers, and emergency communications facilities or identifying construction methods or other methods to minimize damage if these facilities are located in flood hazard zones.
(v)Establishing cooperative working relationships among public agencies with responsibility for flood protection.
(C)Establish a set of feasible implementation measures designed to carry out the goals, policies, and objectives established pursuant to subparagraph (B).
(3)Upon the next revision of the housing element on or after January 1, 2014, the safety element shall be reviewed and updated as necessary to address the risk of fire for land classified as state responsibility areas, as defined in Section 4102 of the Public Resources Code, and land classified as very high fire hazard severity zones, as defined in Section 51177. This review shall consider the advice included in the Office of Planning and Researchs Land Use and Climate Innovations most recent publication of Fire Hazard Planning, General Plan Technical Advice Series and shall also include all of the following:
(A)Information regarding fire hazards, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(i)Fire hazard severity zone maps available from the Office of the State Fire Marshal.
(ii)Any historical data on wildfires available from local agencies or a reference to where the data can be found.
(iii)Information about wildfire hazard areas that may be available from the United States Geological Survey.
(iv)General location and distribution of existing and planned uses of land in very high fire hazard severity zones and in state responsibility areas, including structures, roads, utilities, and essential public facilities. The location and distribution of planned uses of land shall not require defensible space compliance measures required by state law or local ordinance to occur on publicly owned lands or open-space designations of homeowner associations.
(v)Local, state, and federal agencies with responsibility for fire protection, including special districts and local offices of emergency services.
(B)A set of goals, policies, and objectives based on the information identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) for the protection of the community from the unreasonable risk of wildfire.
(C)A set of feasible implementation measures designed to carry out the goals, policies, and objectives based on the information identified pursuant to subparagraph (B), including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(i)Avoiding or minimizing the wildfire hazards associated with new uses of land.
(ii)Locating, when feasible, new essential public facilities outside of high fire risk areas, including, but not limited to, hospitals and health care facilities, emergency shelters, emergency command centers, and emergency communications facilities, or identifying construction methods or other methods to minimize damage if these facilities are located in a state responsibility area or very high fire hazard severity zone.
(iii)Designing adequate infrastructure if a new development is located in a state responsibility area or in a very high fire hazard severity zone, including safe access for emergency response vehicles, visible street signs, and water supplies for structural fire suppression.
(iv)Working cooperatively with public agencies with responsibility for fire protection.
(D)If a city or county has adopted a fire safety plan or document separate from the general plan, an attachment of, or reference to, a city or countys adopted fire safety plan or document that fulfills commensurate goals and objectives and contains information required pursuant to this paragraph.
(4)Upon the next revision of a local hazard mitigation plan, adopted in accordance with the federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-390), on or after January 1, 2017, or, if a local jurisdiction has not adopted a local hazard mitigation plan, beginning on or before January 1, 2022, the safety element shall be reviewed and updated as necessary to address climate adaptation and resiliency strategies applicable to the city or county. This review shall consider advice provided in the Office of Planning and Researchs Land Use and Climate Innovations General Plan Guidelines and shall include all of the following:
(A)(i)A vulnerability assessment that identifies the risks that climate change poses to the local jurisdiction and the geographic areas at risk from climate change impacts, including, but not limited to, an assessment of how climate change may affect the risks addressed pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3).
(ii)Information that may be available from federal, state, regional, and local agencies that will assist in developing the vulnerability assessment and the adaptation policies and strategies required pursuant to subparagraph (B), including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(I)Information from the internet-based Cal-Adapt tool.
(II)Information from the most recent version of the California Adaptation Planning Guide.
(III)Information from local agencies on the types of assets, resources, and populations that will be sensitive to various climate change exposures.
(IV)Information from local agencies on their current ability to deal with the impacts of climate change.
(V)Historical data on natural events and hazards, including locally prepared maps of areas subject to previous risk, areas that are vulnerable, and sites that have been repeatedly damaged.
(VI)Existing and planned development in identified at-risk areas, including structures, roads, utilities, and essential public facilities.
(VII)Federal, state, regional, and local agencies with responsibility for the protection of public health and safety and the environment, including special districts and local offices of emergency services.
(B)A set of adaptation and resilience goals, policies, and objectives based on the information specified in subparagraph (A) for the protection of the community.
(C)A set of feasible implementation measures designed to carry out the goals, policies, and objectives identified pursuant to subparagraph (B), including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(i)Feasible methods to avoid or minimize climate change impacts associated with new uses of land.
(ii)The location, when feasible, of new essential public facilities outside of at-risk areas, including, but not limited to, hospitals and health care facilities, emergency shelters, emergency command centers, and emergency communications facilities, or identifying construction methods or other methods to minimize damage if these facilities are located in at-risk areas.
(iii)The designation of adequate and feasible infrastructure located in an at-risk area.
(iv)Guidelines for working cooperatively with relevant local, regional, state, and federal agencies.
(v)The identification of natural infrastructure that may be used in adaptation projects, where feasible. Where feasible, the plan shall use existing natural features and ecosystem processes, or the restoration of natural features and ecosystem processes, when developing alternatives for consideration. For purposes of this clause, natural infrastructure means using natural ecological systems or processes to reduce vulnerability to climate change related hazards, or other related climate change effects, while increasing the long-term adaptive capacity of coastal and inland areas by perpetuating or restoring ecosystem services. This includes, but is not limited to, the conservation, preservation, or sustainable management of any form of aquatic or terrestrial vegetated open space, such as beaches, dunes, tidal marshes, reefs, seagrass, parks, rain gardens, and urban tree canopies. It also includes systems and practices that use or mimic natural processes, such as permeable pavements, bioswales, and other engineered systems, such as levees that are combined with restored natural systems, to provide clean water, conserve ecosystem values and functions, and provide a wide array of benefits to people and wildlife.
(D)(i)If a city or county has adopted the local hazard mitigation plan, or other climate adaptation plan or document that fulfills commensurate goals and objectives and contains the information required pursuant to this paragraph, separate from the general plan, an attachment of, or reference to, the local hazard mitigation plan or other climate adaptation plan or document.
(ii)Cities or counties that have an adopted hazard mitigation plan, or other climate adaptation plan or document that substantially complies with this section, or have substantially equivalent provisions to this subdivision in their general plans, may use that information in the safety element to comply with this subdivision, and shall summarize and incorporate by reference into the safety element the other general plan provisions, climate adaptation plan or document, specifically showing how each requirement of this subdivision has been met.
(5)Upon the next revision of the housing element on or after January 1, 2020, the safety element shall be reviewed and updated as necessary to identify residential developments in any hazard area identified in the safety element that do not have at least two emergency evacuation routes.
(6)After the initial revision of the safety element pursuant to paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5), the planning agency shall review and, if necessary, revise the safety element upon each revision of the housing element or local hazard mitigation plan, but not less than once every eight years, to identify new information relating to flood and fire hazards and climate adaptation and resiliency strategies applicable to the city or county that was not available during the previous revision of the safety element.
(7)Cities and counties that have flood plain management ordinances that have been approved by FEMA that substantially comply with this section, or have substantially equivalent provisions to this subdivision in their general plans, may use that information in the safety element to comply with this subdivision, and shall summarize and incorporate by reference into the safety element the other general plan provisions or the flood plain ordinance, specifically showing how each requirement of this subdivision has been met.
(8)Before the periodic review of its general plan and before preparing or revising its safety element, each city and county shall consult the California Geological Survey of the Department of Conservation, the Central Valley Flood Protection Board, if the city or county is located within the boundaries of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District, as set forth in Section 8501 of the Water Code, and the Office of Emergency Services for the purpose of including information known by and available to the department, the agency, and the board required by this subdivision.
(9)To the extent that a countys safety element is sufficiently detailed and contains appropriate policies and programs for adoption by a city, a city may adopt that portion of the countys safety element that pertains to the citys planning area in satisfaction of the requirement imposed by this subdivision.
(h)(1)An environmental justice element, or related goals, policies, and objectives integrated in other elements, that identifies disadvantaged communities within the area covered by the general plan of the city, county, or city and county, if the city, county, or city and county has a disadvantaged community. The environmental justice element, or related environmental justice goals, policies, and objectives integrated in other elements, shall do all of the following:
(A)Identify objectives and policies to reduce the unique or compounded health risks in disadvantaged communities by means that include, but are not limited to, the reduction of pollution exposure, including the improvement of air quality, and the promotion of public facilities, food access, safe and sanitary homes, and physical activity.
(B)Identify objectives and policies to promote civic engagement in the public decisionmaking process.
(C)Identify objectives and policies that prioritize improvements and programs that address the needs of disadvantaged communities.
(2)A city, county, or city and county subject to this subdivision shall adopt or review the environmental justice element, or the environmental justice goals, policies, and objectives in other elements, upon the adoption or next revision of two or more elements concurrently on or after January 1, 2018.
(3)By adding this subdivision, the Legislature does not intend to require a city, county, or city and county to take any action prohibited by the United States Constitution or the California Constitution.
(4)For purposes of this subdivision, the following terms shall apply:
(A)Disadvantaged communities means an area identified by the California Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to Section 39711 of the Health and Safety Code or an area that is a low-income area that is disproportionately affected by environmental pollution and other hazards that can lead to negative health effects, exposure, or environmental degradation.
(B)Public facilities includes public improvements, public services, and community amenities, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 66000.
(C)Low-income area means an area with household incomes at or below 80 percent of the statewide median income or with household incomes at or below the threshold designated as low income by the Department of Housing and Community Developments list of state income limits adopted pursuant to Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| May 14, 2026 | May 14 hearing: Held in committee and under submission. |
| May 12, 2026 | Set for hearing May 14. |
| May 11, 2026 | May 11 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| May 4, 2026 | Set for hearing May 11. |
| Apr 23, 2026 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 22, 2026 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 1. Page 3983.) (April 21). |
| Apr 22, 2026 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 1.) (April 21). |
| Apr 14, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. (Ayes 7. Noes 1.) (April 13). Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Apr 14, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. (Ayes 7. Noes 1. Page 3843.) (April 13). Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Apr 14, 2026 | Set for hearing April 21 in PUB. S. pending receipt. |
| Apr 9, 2026 | Set for hearing April 13. |
| Apr 8, 2026 | Re-referred to Coms. on P., D.T., & C.P. and PUB. S. |
| Mar 26, 2026 | Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Mar 26, 2026 | Withdrawn from committee. |
| Mar 25, 2026 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on L. GOV. |
| Feb 26, 2026 | Referred to Com. on L. GOV. |
| Feb 17, 2026 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 16. |
| Feb 13, 2026 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 11, 2026 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 21, 2026 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Apr 13, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Public Safety] | Senate Standing Committee on Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| 18 Million Rising | ** Support | |
| 1 individual | ** Support | |
| 67 Sueños | ** Support | |
| Access Reproductive Justice | ** Support | |
| Aclu California Action | ** Support | |
| Alliance for A Better Community | ** Support | |
| All of Us or None | ** Support | |
| Asian Americans Advancing Justice-southern California | ** Support | |
| Asian Prisoner Support Committee | ** Support | |
| Buen Vecino | ** Support | |
| California Coalition for Women Prisoners | ** Support | |
| California Immigrant Policy Center | ** Support | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Against | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Support | |
| California State Sheriffs’ Association | ** Against | |
| Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law | ** Support | |
| CLEAN Carwash Worker Center | ** Support | |
| Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice | ** Support | |
| Council on American-Islamic Relations, California | ** Support | |
| Electronic Frontier Foundation | ** Support | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Support | |
| Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities | ** Support | |
| Felony Murder Elimination Project | ** Support | |
| Freedom for Immigrants | ** Support | |
| Glide | ** Support | |
| Harbor Institute for Immigrant and Economic Justice | ** Support | |
| Health in Partnership | ** Support | |
| Immigrant Defense Project | ** Support | |
| Immigrant Legal Resource Center | ** Support | |
| Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity | ** Support | |
| Justice2jobs Coalition | ** Support | |
| LA Defensa | ** Support | |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Support | |
| Milpa Collective | ** Support | |
| National Day Laborer Organizing Network | ** Support | |
| New Light Wellness | ** Support | |
| Orale: Organizing Rooted in Abolition Liberation and Empowerment | ** Support | |
| Orange County Justice Fund | ** Support | |
| Orange County Rapid Response Network | ** Support | |
| Privacy Defense Alliance | ** Support | |
| San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium | ** Support | |
| san francisco public defender's office | ** Support | |
| Secure Justice | ** Support | |
| Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network | ** Support | |
| Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition | ** Support | |
| south bay people power | ** Support | |
| Southeast Asia Resource Action Center | ** Support | |
| Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC) | ** Support | |
| transitions clinic network | ** Support | |
| Valor US | ** Support | |
| Viet Rise | ** Support |
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
SB 1095 (Pérez) - Fusion centers
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
SB 1095 would regulate the activities of California based fusion centers, including imposition of various restrictions on information sharing and reporting requirements.
Fiscal Impact:
Significant to major cost beginning January 2029 for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct performance and compliance audits (General Fund).
Significant local mandate costs beginning January 2028 for local law enforcement agencies to report to DOJ (federal, state, local).
Background:
“Fusion center” means a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze, and share or operated by an executive board consisting of local, state, and federal members, including, but not limited to, the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC), the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
The Office of Emergency Services (OES) operates the STAC the state’s primary fusion center with funding from federal, state and local sources.
Proposed Law:
Beginning January 2028, and annually thereafter, each fusion center shall report to DOJ the following information:
- A list of federal, state and local governmental entities and data brokers that participate in the fusion center, a summary of their role and function, and any proposed or existing memorandum of understanding (MOUs) between these entities regarding participation in the fusion centers.
- Number of requests for information and suspicious activity reports submitted to the fusion center from a law enforcement agency, data broker, or other entity.
- The general types of information collected by state and local law enforcement agencies and shared with federal law enforcement agencies participating in the fusion centers.
- A breakdown of the categories of state and federal criminal offenses that served as the basis for the information shared between agencies.
- An assessment of how the fusion center processes incoming requests for information from governmental entities and data broke
- The number of times a federal law enforcement agency requested information or assessments from state law enforcement agencies and whether the state law enforcement agency determined that the reasonable suspicion standard was met for the activity.
- Any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers the fusion center.
- The process for validating the authenticity of the requesting governmental entities and data brokers seeking information requests from the fusion center.
- The types of agencies that staff the fusion center, including, but not limited to, the number of staff per agency and a staffing chart or flowchart detailing staffing and how decisions are made about responding to requests from governmental entities or data broker.
- Detailed procedures for requesting and conducting site visits requested by elected officials and their staff.
Commencing January 1, 2029, and every four years thereafter, DOJ shall conduct a performance and compliance audit of a representative sample of law enforcement agencies and fusion centers and submit that audit to the Legislature. An audit shall do both of the following:
1) Assess compliance with the terms, conditions, and privacy protections set forth in MOUs.
2) Assess compliance by the fusion centers with any and all applicable state and federal law, including, but not limited to, the California Values Act and any rights and privileges guaranteed by the California and United States Constitutions.
Staff Comments:
The State Auditor will be conducting an audit to provide independently developed and verified information related to the state and local oversight of the operations and status of California’s fusion centers, focusing on compliance with laws, rules, and regulations governing the fusion centers and access to and use of sensitive personally identifiable information by participating agencies. The audit’s scope will include the STAC and two selected local fusion centers. This audit was approved by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee March 24, 2026 at an estimated cost of $1,029,600 (5,148 hours).
This bill would provide, if the Commission on State Mandates determines the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made. It is unclear at this time, if the costs to local law enforcement agencies to participate in the fusion centers are covered by federal, state or local funds. If it is state funds, there could be significant General Fund costs for reimbursement.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: SB 1095 Hearing Date: April 21, 2026
Author: | Pérez | ||
Version: | March 25, 2026 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | AB | ||
Subject: Fusion centers
HISTORY
Source: California Immigrant Policy Center; San Francisco Public Defenders Office; Immigrant Legal Resource Center; Council on American-Islamic Relations
Prior Legislation: AB 474 (Rodriguez), vetoed, 2023
Support: 18 Million Rising; 67 Sueños; Access Reproductive Justice; ACLU California Action; All of Us or None; Alliance for a Better Community; Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Southern California; Asian Prisoner Support Committee; Buen Vecino; California Coalition for Women Prisoners; California Public Defenders Association; Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law; Clean Carwash Worker Center; Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities; Felony Murder Elimination Project; Freedom for Immigrants; Glide; Harbor Institute for Immigrant and Economic Justice; Health in Partnership; Immigrant Defense Project; Immigrant Legal Resource Center; Interfaith Movement for Human Integrity; Legal Services for Prisoners With Children; MILPA Collective; National Day Laborer Organizing Network; New Light Wellness; Orale: Organizing Rooted in Abolition Liberation and Empowerment; Orange County Justice Fund; Orange County Rapid Response Network; San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium; Secure Justice; Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network; Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition; South Bay People Power; Southeast Asia Resource Action Center; Transitions Clinic Network; Valor US; Viet Rise
Opposition: California Police Chiefs Association; California State Sheriffs’ Association
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to 1) prohibit a fusion center from participating in activity, cooperating, or sharing information with any governmental entity, as defined, when such action involves assisting immigration enforcement or violating the existing prohibition against racial profiling by law enforcement, and 2) require the California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) to annually submit a report to the Department of Justice (DOJ) containing specified information regarding fusion center activities.
Existing federal law provides that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the federal Homeland Security Act of 2002, has responsibility for integrating law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. (P.L. 107-296)
Existing federal law establishes the National Counterterrorism Center as the coordinator at the federal level for terrorism information and assessment. (P.L. 108-458)
Existing federal law provides that a federal, state or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. (8 U.S.C. § 1373.)
Existing federal law provides that no state or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the INS information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States. (8 U.S.C. § 1644.)
Existing law provides that all people have an inalienable right to privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)
Existing law, the California Values Act, generally prohibits California law enforcement agencies from using agency moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, as specified, from placing officers under the supervision of federal agencies for the purpose of immigration enforcement, and from cooperating in other specified ways with federal immigration authorities. (Gov. Code, § 7284.6, subd. (a).)
Existing law establishes the Cal OES within the office of the Governor for the purpose of mitigating the effects of natural, manmade, or war-caused emergencies. (Gov. Code, § 8550, 8585, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that Cal OES shall be considered a law enforcement organization as required for receipt of criminal intelligence information, as specified. (Gov. Code, § 8585, subd. (c).)
Existing law requires Cal OES to coordinate the emergency activities of all state agencies in connection with an emergency, and requires every state agency and officer to cooperate with Cal OES in rendering all possible assistance in carrying out its duties, as specified. (Gov. Code, § 8587, subd. (a).)
Existing law requires Cal OES to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (CCIC), whose primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incident that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. (Gov. Code, § 8586.5, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that the CCIC shall serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. (Ibid.)
Existing law provides that the CCIC shall be comprised of representatives from various organizations, including the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC). (Ibid.)
Existing law requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security –National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center as specified. (Gov. Code, § 8586.5, subd. (b).)
Existing law provides that the CCIC shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of California’s agencies and departments. (Gov. Code, § 8586.5, subd. (b).)
Existing law provides that information sharing by the CCIC shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security. (Gov. Code, § 8586.5, subd. (e).)
Existing law provides that, except as authorized by statute, a government entity may not do any of the following:
- Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
- Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device, however this section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity. (Pen. Code, § 1546.1, subd. (a)(1-3).)
Existing law prohibits a peace officer from engaging in racial or identity profiling, as defined, and requires that the course of basic training for peace officers include adequate instruction on racial, identity, and cultural diversity, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 13519.4.)
This bill prohibits a fusion center operating in California from participating in activity, cooperating, or disclosing or sharing information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, when participation, cooperation, or disclosure involves either of the following:
- Assisting or furthering immigration enforcement, unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order.
- Investigating, interrogating, detaining, identifying, surveilling, detecting, or arresting people in violation of the prohibition against racial or identity profiling, as provided.
This bill prohibits a fusion center from allowing a governmental entity, contractor for a governmental entity, or private entity to work inside the fusion center when Cal OES knows or has reason to know that the entity or contractor is presently engaged in or intends to engage in unlawful intelligence-gathering activity resulting in the violation of the constitutional or civil rights of a resident of California.
This bill prohibits fusion centers from providing office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, or personnel, agents or subcontractors acting on their behalf, for use within the fusion centers.
This bill authorizes state elected officials, local elected officials and their staff to enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization.
This bill, commencing January 1, 2027, and each year thereafter, Cal OES must submit a report to the DOJ that includes all of the following information collected from fusion centers:
- A list of all federal, state, and local governmental entities and data brokers, including their contractors and vendors, that participate in fusion centers, a summary of their role and function, and any proposed or existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) or written agreement or material amendments to an existing MOU between these entities regarding participation in fusion centers.
- Number of requests for information and reports submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker regardless of the reason.
- The general types of information collected by state law enforcement agencies and shared with federal law enforcement agencies while participating in fusion centers.
- A summary highlighting the principal reasons that a governmental entity or data broker is requesting information from the fusion center.
- How requests for information are submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker and how quickly those are processed.
- An assessment of how fusion centers process incoming requests for information from governmental entities and data brokers.
- The number of times a federal law enforcement agency requested information or assessments from state law enforcement agencies and whether the state law enforcement agency determined that the reasonable suspicion standard was met for the activity.
- Any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers.
- A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.
- The process for validating the authenticity of the requesting governmental entities and data brokers seeking information requests from the fusion center.
- Whether a reasonable suspicion standard was met before state law enforcement agencies collected, maintained, or disseminated personal information through fusion centers.
- The types of agencies that staff each fusion center, including, but not limited to, the number of staff per agency and a staffing chart or flowchart detailing staffing and how decisions are made about responding to requests from governmental entities or data brokers.
- The number of actual or potential violations of state or local laws, policies, or department orders or procedures, the actions taken by the state law enforcement agency to address actual or potential violations, and recommendations to prevent future violations.
- A certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice.
This bill requires the DOJ to conduct an annual audit based on the above report and submit that audit to the Legislature.
This bill provides that all records related to fusion centers are public records for the purposes of the California Public Records Act.
This bill prohibits Cal OES, fusion centers, and the DOJ from disclosing the name, address, social security number, or other unique personal identifying information of individuals stopped, searched, or subjected to a property seizure, for purposes of this section.
This bill defines the following terms for the purposes of its provisions:
- “Data broker” means a business that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the business does not have a direct relationship.
- “Fusion center” means a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze, and share information, including, but not limited to, the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
- “Governmental entity” means the federal government, any state government other than California, any local government outside of California, and any agency, subdivision, contractor, or representative thereof, or any agreed upon or functional agent thereof.
- “Immigration enforcement” includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person’s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.
- “Law enforcement agency” means a state or local law enforcement agency, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
- A police department, including the police department of a transit agency, or any campus of the University of California, the California State University, or California Community Colleges.
- A sheriff’s department.
- A district attorney’s office.
- A county probation department.
- The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
- The Office of Emergency Services.
- The Department of Justice.
- “Personal information” means any information that is maintained by an agency that relates to, describes, or is reasonably capable of identifying or describing, an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s name, social security number, physical description, home address, biometric information, geolocation data, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history. It includes statements made by, or attributed to, the individual and constitutionally protected activities or involvement engaged in by the individual.
- “Record” means any file or grouping of personal information about an individual that is maintained by an agency.
This bill includes related legislative findings and declarations.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Fusion Centers have operated for many years with limited accountability and oversight. Originally established to support counterterrorism efforts following the September 11 terrorist attacks, these state-owned and operated data-sharing hubs have expanded in scope. In some instances, concerns have been raised about their use to target minority communities, track activists and protesters, and unlawfully support federal immigration enforcement activities. These Centers have little to no outside oversight, creating conditions where state laws may be inconsistently applied, information could be improperly obtained or shared, and resources may be used in coordination with federal and out-of-state entities. At the same time, questions have been raised about their effectiveness at preventing terrorist activity or reducing crime.
SB 1095 seeks to address these concerns by prohibiting California’s Fusion Centers from sharing sensitive personal information for the purposes of immigration enforcement and racial or identity profiling, and by requiring an annual audit of their activities. This approach aims to strengthen transparency and accountability, align operations with state law, and ensure Californians’ constitutional right to privacy is protected, while helping to maintain public safety.
- Background on Fusion Centers
“Fusion centers” are multi-agency intelligence-sharing hubs established in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to address gaps in threat-related data gathering, sharing and analysis. The National Network of Fusion Centers is the central hub of this information flow between the federal government and their state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners.[1] Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local entities, designated by the governor of their state, that receive extensive support from federal partners in the form of personnel, training, technical assistance and connectivity to federal systems.[2] According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
Fusion centers provide the federal government with critical state and local information and subject-matter expertise that it did not receive in the past—enabling the effective communication of locally generated threat‐related information to the federal government. Fusion centers receive information from a variety of sources, including suspicious activity reporting (SAR) information from stakeholders within their jurisdictions, as well as federal information and intelligence. They analyze the information and develop relevant products to disseminate to their customers. These products assist homeland security partners at all levels of government to identify and address immediate and emerging threats.[3]
Fusion centers are divided into two categories: “primary” fusion centers and “recognized” fusion centers. The former typically provide information sharing and analysis for an entire state, and receive the highest priority for the allocation of federal resources, while the latter typically provide the same service for a major urban area, and receive a lower priority for federal assistance.[4] Currently, there are 6 fusion centers operating in California, including one primary fusion center, the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC), which “serves as California’s information sharing clearinghouse of strategic threat analysis and situational awareness reporting to statewide leadership and the public safety community in support of efforts to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to all crimes and all hazards impacting California citizens and critical infrastructure, while preserving civil liberties, individual privacy, and constitutional rights.”[5] In addition, California is home to 5 “recognized” fusion centers, including:
- Central California Intelligence Center (CCIC); Sacramento, CA
- Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC); Los Angeles, CA
- Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC); San Francisco, CA
- Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC); Orange County, CA
- San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center (SD-LECC); San Diego, CA.[6]
Under the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS is obligated to support privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties training of fusion center personnel, and indeed has dedicated personnel and resources to assist fusion center Civil Liberties and Privacy Officers (CLPOs) and those performing civil liberty and privacy functions at fusion centers.[7] However, despite these commitments, fusion centers have been the subject of significant criticism dating back to the mid-2000s.[8] More recently, the Brennan Center for Justice conducted an assessment of how fusion centers have strayed from their stated mission and in reality have contributed to systematic civil liberties violations due to a near-total absence of meaningful oversight. The Brennan Center found that for nearly two decades, DHS has supported a network of 80 fusion centers nationwide while failing to ensure that they use federal resources properly, resulting in flawed data analysis, leaked sensitive information, and the unlawful monitoring of constitutionally protected activities.[9] This bill seeks to address these and other issues via the imposition of new guardrails on California fusion centers.
- Effect of This Bill
Per the bill’s findings and declarations, “by making information about people in California available to out-of-state and federal entities or agencies, fusion centers operating in California grant other governmental entities additional surveillance powers and pose an active threat to the safety and rights of Californians. […] The Legislature must protect the rights and safety of people in California and update the law to prevent the exploitation and weaponization of information collected in California.” Accordingly, this bill prohibits a fusion center operating in California from participating in, cooperating with, or disclosing or sharing information with any federal or out-of-state governmental entity or a contractor for such an entity, when such actions involve 1) assisting or further immigration enforcement, unless pursuant to a judicial warrant or court order or 2) any conduct that violates the existing prohibition against racial or identity profiling by law enforcement. Additionally, the bill prohibits a fusion center from allowing a federal or out-of-state governmental entity or contractor for such an entity to work inside the fusion center when Cal OES knows or has reason to know that the entity or contractor “intends to engage in unlawful intelligence-gathering activity resulting in the violation of the constitutional civil rights of a resident of California.” The bill also prohibits fusion centers from providing office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement and provides that state elected officials, local elected officials, and their staff may enter any fusion center for inspections without prior notice or authorization.
The provisions above raise several questions that the author and Committee may wish to consider. First, it is unclear whether a fusion center would be aware that certain participation in, cooperation with, or disclosure or sharing of information with a federal or out-of-state entity “involves assisting or furthering immigration enforcement.” Certainly, there would be instances in which cooperation or the sharing of information with such an entity is several steps attenuated from the ultimate immigration enforcement result. For instance, if a California fusion center provided information to an Idaho law enforcement agency that a specific vehicle associated with a crime in that state was spotted in California, and the driver of that vehicle is subsequently pulled over based on a stop that constitutes racial profiling under California law, how is the fusion center supposed to refrain from that information sharing at the outset? The same question regarding an attenuated result is raised by the provision prohibiting fusion centers from allowing federal or out-of-state governmental entities to work in the fusion center when Cal OES knows or should know that the entity is engaged or intends to engage in “intelligence gathering activity that results in the violation of the constitutional or civil rights” of a Californian. Finally, the provision permitting elected officials and their staff to inspect fusion centers “without prior notice or authorization” is arguably too broad – it is unclear what interest would be served by allowing a county assessor or an assistant to a member of the Board of Equalization unfettered access to a fusion center, yet these individuals would receive such access under the bill.
Another of the bill’s provisions requires Cal OES, beginning January 1, 2027, to annually submit a report to DOJ including 14 distinct categories of information concerning who is involved in fusion center processes, what information is being requested, collected and shared, why and how information requests happen, legal compliance, and oversight and accountability. Some of these categories appear overbroad, unclear, or simply impractical, such as:
- “A summary highlighting the principal reasons that a governmental entity or data broker is requesting information from the fusion center.” Do governmental entities regularly provide the reasons for their information requests? What if these reasons are not provided?
- “A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.” Is this too large of a data set to include in an annual report? Is the task of compiling all information responsive to this category too onerous a burden for Cal OES?
- “Whether a reasonable suspicion standard was met before state law enforcement agencies collected, maintained, or disseminated personal information through fusion centers.” How will Cal OES be able to identify information responsive to this category? Is such information flagged with or accompanied by some marker indicating that a specified legal standard was met?
- “The number of actual or potential violations of state or local laws, policies, or department orders or procedures, the actions taken by the state law enforcement agency to address actual or potential violations, and recommendations to prevent future violations.” Does Cal OES track and record all such violations? Should it? What constitutes a “potential violation”? Should Cal OES be responsible for providing recommendations to a specific department for violations of that department’s policies and procedures?
- Pending State Audit on Fusion Centers
Another component of this bill is a requirement that the DOJ conduct an annual audit based on the report submitted by Cal OES and submit that audit to the Legislature. However, on March 24 of this year, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee approved a formal audit of California fusion centers, requested by Senator Cervantes and to be conducted by the State Auditor. According to Senator Cervantes’ request letter:
I am profoundly alarmed by the threat that fusion centers pose to the constitutional rights and privacy of Californians, and the blatant lack of transparency and oversight that they currently operate under. Fusion center personnel have unrestricted access to extensive government and private-sector data systems and information-sharing platforms, yet their usage of these systems are largely exempt from public and legislative oversight. Entities within the Legislature have made repeated attempts to gather information about fusion centers through formal inquiries and public records requests, all to no avail. The largely unregulated operation of fusion centers in California raises significant constitutional and privacy concerns, especially at a time when emerging technologies, increasing government overreach, and the federal government’s descent into authoritarianism is converging to undermine the public safety, privacy, and constitutional rights of all Americans.
The audit, designated “2026-134 California Fusion Centers – State and Local Oversight,” will include an examination of the STAC and two selected local fusion centers, and will include, but not be limited to, the following activities:
- Identify the policies and procedures in place for overseeing fusion center activities and ensuring compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.
- Determine whether the law authorizes STAC’s and local fusion centers’ information collection and sharing practices and whether such collection and sharing practices comply with applicable requirements. To the extent possible, evaluate data sharing practices specifically related to state and local agencies sharing information with the federal government, including for purposes of immigration enforcement, and whether those practices comply with all applicable laws, regulations, and policies.
- To the extent possible, determine whether STAC and local fusion centers establish and enforce data quality standards, and evaluate the processes the STAC and local fusion centers use to decide what information they share with partner agencies, including federal agencies, to determine whether those processes protect against the dissemination of incorrect or misleading information. Evaluate the mitigation processes used if it is determined that incorrect or misleading information has been disseminated.
- To the extent possible, assess how the STAC and local fusion centers ensure that they adequately protect against the unauthorized disclosure of information.
- To the extent possible, determine STAC and local fusion centers utilization of proprietary data systems, analytical tools, and data sets owned or controlled by non-governmental and/or private entities or contractors. Determine whether a selection of these private contractors were chosen based on applicable law, and how their suitability for access to sensitive law enforcement information is determined.
- Determine the percentage of funding that federal, state, local, and private sources provide to support the STAC and local fusion centers. Determine the value of in-kind contributions, such as personnel or equipment, on which the STAC and fusion centers may rely, and identify any policies related to conflicts of interest related to procurement practices.
- To the extent possible, determine whether STAC and the local fusion centers have defined missions and have established metrics that they use to assess their performance. If so, assess the validity of these metrics. Review the performance of the STAC and local fusion centers against these or other applicable measures of performance to determine whether they are effective in their mission and purpose. Identify performance trends based on any internal evaluation reports over the past 10 years.[10]
Given the scope of this formal audit by the State Auditor, the audit required by this bill is likely redundant.
- Related Legislation
SB 1181 (Hurtado), introduced this year, requires Cal OES, in consultation with the State Department of Education, to establish the Central Valley School Safety Coordination Pilot Program for the purpose of studying and evaluating improved communication pathways between local educational agencies, as defined, and regional fusion centers regarding credible safety threats affecting school communities. SB 1181 is currently in the Senate Education Committee. On April 14, it passed out of the Senate Emergency Management Committee by a vote of 9-0.
- Committee Amendments
Given the issues discussed in comments 3 and 4 of this analysis, the author and Committee may wish to consider amendments striking subdivisions (b) through (e) of Section 2 of the bill and instead imposing a requirement that a state or local law enforcement agency, prior to participating in fusion center activities or data sharing, enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the fusion center, adopted by the law enforcement agency’s governing body (such as a board of supervisors or city council). The author and Committee should also consider striking the audit requirement, or at least delaying any statutorily required audit for several years until such a review becomes timely. If the author and Committee wish to retain some provision regarding the inspection of fusion centers by elected officials, such a provision could be limited to state elected officials, or local elected officials approved by their governing bodies to conduct such an inspection.
- Argument in Support
According to the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights:
Data deportation centers, or “Fusion Centers,” are state-owned and operated data-sharing hubs that collect, analyze, and distribute massive amounts of highly personal information about ordinary people, without meaningful oversight or accountability. They access data from automated license plate readers, facial recognition technology, DMV and driver’s license records, utility records, and even social media activity. This information reveals who we are, where we go, what we do, and who we know. California law enforcement has already helped funnel personal data to out-of-state and federal agencies, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Border Patrol, enabling unlawful federal immigration enforcement.
These practices threaten constitutional rights, privacy, and public trust by providing a backdoor to evade California’s limits on mass surveillance and local participation in deportations. Fusion Centers have a documented history of surveillance abuses, including targeting Muslim and Black, Indigenous, and People of Color communities, tracking protestors, and casting peaceful activities as potential threats.3 Additionally, California’s Fusion Centers have spied on people engaged in First-Amendment protected activities. The Northern California Fusion Center issued multiple warnings to 14,000 police officers stating local Black Lives Matter rallies were “dangerous.”
SB 1095 offers a clear and practical solution: prohibiting state Fusion Centers from participating in, cooperating with, disclosing, or sharing information for federal
immigration enforcement and racial or identity profiling unless required by a valid judicial warrant. The bill bans office space for immigration enforcement agencies in Fusion Centers, bars out-of-state, federal, or private entities from operating inside Fusion Centers if they are engaged in unlawful activities that violate constitutional rights, authorizes state and local elected officials to enter and inspect Fusion Centers, and requires an annual audit to ensure transparency, accountability, and compliance with state law.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the California Police Chiefs Association:
While we recognize and appreciate the concerns raised regarding privacy, civil rights, and oversight of fusion centers, SB 1095, as currently drafted, would significantly impair or effectively shut down the operation of these centers, undermining a critical component of California’s public safety and homeland security infrastructure. Fusion centers play a vital role in protecting California communities. These centers are designed to gather, analyze, and share threat-related information across federal, state, and local agencies, with a particular focus on identifying and preventing terrorism and other serious threats. They serve as a central hub for intelligence sharing and situational awareness, enabling law enforcement to connect disparate pieces of information and respond proactively to emerging risks. […] At the same time, we acknowledge that concerns have been raised about fusion center operations. […]
However, SB 1095 goes far beyond addressing these concerns. Instead, it imposes sweeping and rigid restrictions that would fundamentally undermine the core function of fusion centers. Most notably, the bill broadly prohibits fusion centers from “participating,” “cooperating,” or “sharing information” where such activity could be construed as “assisting” immigration enforcement. This language raises significant legal and operational concerns because the term “assist” is not narrowly defined and has been interpreted broadly by courts. In City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), the court treated assistance as including the sharing of information and coordination with federal authorities. Similarly, in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that providing information that materially contributes to another agency’s actions constitutes participation—in other words, assistance.
Taken together, these decisions make clear that “assist” is not limited to direct immigration enforcement actions. It includes coordination, data sharing, grant-funded collaboration, reimbursement arrangements, and joint task force participation. Under SB 1095, these routine and lawful forms of interagency cooperation could trigger violations, even where the underlying activity is focused on serious criminal threats or public safety concerns unrelated to immigration enforcement. It is important to also note, that because all federal law enforcement agencies constantly share information, this would impact operations with any federal agency.
This creates a profound chilling effect. Fusion centers exist specifically to facilitate multi-agency information sharing. If personnel must second-guess whether sharing information could later be deemed “assisting” immigration enforcement, the result will be reduced communication, disengagement from federal partners, and a breakdown in the very collaboration these centers were designed to support. In addition, SB 1095 imposes expansive transparency and reporting requirements that would be extremely difficult to implement in practice. The bill requires detailed reporting on virtually all aspects of fusion center operations, including requests for information, participating entities, and data-sharing practices. While transparency is important, these requirements risk exposing sensitive law enforcement methodologies, overburdening already limited resources, and diverting personnel away from core public safety functions.
-- END –
“Fusion Centers.” Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers ↑
“Fusion Centers Handout.” State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (July 2012) DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Fusion%20Centers%20Handout_0.pdf ↑
Ibid. ↑
“Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information.” https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information ↑
“State Threat Assessment Center.” https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/homeland-security/state-threat-assessment-center/ ↑
“What is a fusion center?” Joint Regional Intelligence Center. https://www.jric.org/default.aspx?menuitemid=265&menusubid=95&menugroup=Public+Home&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 ↑
Pub. L. 110-53, 511, subd. (a). https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1283#2-0 ↑
“What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” American Civil Liberties Union. Published December 2007. https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf ↑
Mike German, Rachel Levinson-Waldman, & Kaylana Mueller-Hsia, Ending Fusion Center Abuses (December 15, 2022) Brennan Center, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/ending-fusion-center-abuses. ↑
“2026-134 California Fusion Centers—State and Local Oversight: Audit Scope & Objectives.” https://www.auditor.ca.gov/reports-coming-soon/2026-134/ ↑
SENATE PRIVACY, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION COMMITTEE
Senator Christopher Cabaldon, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: SB 1095 (Author:Pérez)
Version: March 25, 2026
Hearing Date: April 13, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Fusion centers
DIGEST
This bill regulates the activities of California-based fusion centers, including imposition of various restrictions on information sharing and reporting requirements.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Fusion centers are regional centers owned and operated by state and local entities with support from the federal government. They were established with the goal of sharing and analyzing threat-related information at all levels of government, with a particular focus on counterterrorism. California currently operates at least six fusion centers throughout the state.
Research and investigations into fusion centers by both private organizations and the United States Senate have raised serious concerns about the utility and efficacy of these centers and their commitment to upholding civil rights. One increasing concern is the use of these information-sharing entities to conduct immigration enforcement activity despite the edict of the California Values Act (SB 54, De León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017), which limits local law enforcement agencies’ sharing of certain information with federal immigration agencies, and prohibits law enforcement agencies from using their resources for immigration enforcement or from cooperating in immigration enforcement activities.
This bill places a series of restrictions on the conduct of these fusion centers and imposes a number of transparency requirements, including annual reporting and audits on the conduct and protocol of these regional centers.
The bill is sponsored by the California Immigrant Policy Center, the San Francisco Public Defenders Office, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations, California. It is supported by many advocacy organizations, including the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights and Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Southern California. No timely opposition has been received by the Committee. Should the bill pass out of this Committee, it will next be heard by the Senate Public Safety Committee.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which gives the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibility for integrating law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. (P.L. 107-296.)
- Establishes the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, which established the National Counterterrorism Center as the coordinator at the federal level for terrorism information and assessment. (P.L. 108-458)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) within the office of the Governor, which shall be considered a law enforcement organization as required for receipt of criminal intelligence information. OES is responsible for the state’s emergency and disaster response services for natural, technological, or man-made disasters and emergencies, including responsibility for activities necessary to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of emergencies and disasters to people and property. (Gov. Code § 8585.)
- Requires OES to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (CCIC). CCIC’s primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. It serves as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinates information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. (Gov. Code § 8586.5(a).)
- Requires CCIC to operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System (STAC), a regional fusion center, and DHS. (Gov. Code § 8586.5(b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits a fusion center operating in California from participating in activity, cooperating, or disclosing or sharing information with any governmental entity, or a contractor for any governmental entity, when participation, cooperation, or disclosure involves either of the following:
- Assisting or furthering immigration enforcement, unless pursuant to judicial warrant or court order.
- Investigating, interrogating, detaining, identifying, surveilling, detecting, or arresting people in violation of the prohibition against racial or identity profiling as provided in Section 13519 .4 of the Penal Code.
- Prohibits a fusion center from allowing a governmental entity, contractor for a governmental entity, or private entity to work inside the fusion center when the Office of Emergency Services (OES) knows or has reason to know that the entity or contractor is presently engaged in or intends to engage in unlawful intelligence-gathering activity resulting in the violation of the constitutional or civil rights of a resident of California.
- Prohibits fusion centers from providing office space for agencies engaged in immigration enforcement, or personnel, agents or subcontractors acting on their behalf, for use within the fusion centers.
- Authorizes state elected officials, local elected officials, and their staff to enter any fusion center for inspections, without prior notice or authorization.
- Requires OES, starting on January 1, 2027, and each year thereafter, to submit a report to the Department of Justice (DOJ) that includes all the following information collected from fusion centers:
- A list of all federal, state, and local governmental entities and data brokers, including their contractors and vendors, that participate in fusion centers, a summary of their role and function, and any proposed or existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) or written agreement or material amendments to an existing MOU between these entities regarding participation in fusion centers.
- Number of requests for information and reports submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker, regardless of the reason.
- The general types of information collected by state law enforcement agencies and shared with federal law enforcement agencies while participating in fusion centers.
- A summary highlighting the principal reasons that a governmental entity or data broker is requesting information from the fusion center.
- How requests for information are submitted to the fusion center from a governmental entity or data broker and how quickly those are processed.
- An assessment of how fusion centers process incoming requests for information from governmental entities and data brokers.
- The number of times a federal law enforcement agency requested information or assessments from state law enforcement agencies and whether the state law enforcement agency determined that the reasonable suspicion standard was met for the activity.
- Any policies and standards for the use and retention of data gathered, processed, or analyzed by fusion centers.
- A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.
- The process for validating the authenticity of the requesting governmental entities and data brokers seeking information requests from the fusion center.
- Whether a reasonable suspicion standard was met before state law enforcement agencies collected, maintained, or disseminated personal information through fusion centers.
- The types of agencies that staff each fusion center, including, but not limited to, the number of staff per agency and a staffing chart or flowchart detailing staffing and how decisions are made about responding to requests from governmental entities or data brokers.
- The number of actual or potential violations of state or local laws, policies, or department orders or procedures, the actions taken by the state law enforcement agency to address actual or potential violations, and recommendations to prevent future violations.
- A certification, under penalty of perjury, that the fusion center has not engaged in any acts intended to influence the decisions or assessments of the Department of Justice.
- Requires DOJ to conduct an annual audit based on the above report and to submit it to the Legislature, as provided.
- Provides that all records related to fusion centers are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act.
- Prohibits OES, fusion centers, and DOJ from disclosing the name, address, social security number, or other unique personal identifying information of individuals stopped, searched, or subjected to a property seizure, for the above purposes.
- Defines the relevant terms, including:
- “Fusion center” means a state-owned center operated by the Office of Emergency Services and involving a law enforcement agency and a governmental entity that gather, analyze, and share information, including, but not limited to, the State Threat Assessment Center, the Central California Intelligence Center, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, and the San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center.
- “Governmental entity” means the federal government, any state government other than California, any local government outside of California, and any agency, subdivision, contractor, or representative thereof, or any agreed upon or functional agent thereof.
- “Immigration enforcement” includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person’s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.
- “Personal information” means any information that is maintained by an agency that relates to, describes, or is reasonably capable of identifying or describing, an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s name, social security number, physical description, home address, biometric information, geolocation data, home telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or employment history. It includes statements made by, or attributed to, the individual and constitutionally protected activities or involvement engaged in by the individual.
COMMENTS
- Fusion centers in California: what and where are they?
According to the Department of Homeland Security:
Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local entities with support from federal partners in the form of deployed personnel, training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, and connectivity to federal systems. Fusion centers provide the federal government with critical state and local information and subject-matter expertise that it did not receive in the past—enabling the effective communication of locally generated threat‐related information to the federal government. Fusion centers receive information from a variety of sources, including suspicious activity reporting (SAR) information from stakeholders within their jurisdictions, as well as federal information and intelligence. They analyze the information and develop relevant products to disseminate to their customers. These products assist homeland security partners at all levels of government to identify and address immediate and emerging threats.[1]
Fusion centers are designated by the governor of their state, and the federal government recognizes these designations and has a shared responsibility with state and local governments to support the national network of fusion centers.
There are two types of fusion centers:
- Primary Fusion Centers: A primary fusion center typically provides information sharing and analysis for an entire state. These centers are the highest priority for the allocation of available federal resources, including the deployment of personnel and connectivity with federal data systems.
- Recognized Fusion Centers: A recognized fusion center typically provides information sharing and analysis for a major urban area. As the Federal Government respects the authority of state governments to designate fusion centers, any designated fusion center not designated as a primary fusion center is referred to as a recognized fusion center.[2]
The identified fusion centers operating in California are:
- California State Threat Assessment Center (Primary)
- Central California Intelligence Center; Sacramento, CA (Recognized)
- Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center; Los Angeles, CA (Recognized)
- Northern California Regional Intelligence Center; San Francisco, CA (Recognized)
- Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center; Orange County, CA (Recognized)
- San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego, CA (Recognized)[3]
According to OES, the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC) is California’s state primary fusion center, as designated by the Governor of California, and is operated by the California Highway Patrol, OES, and DOJ. It serves as “California’s information sharing clearinghouse of strategic threat analysis and situational awareness reporting to statewide leadership and the public safety community in support of efforts to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to all crimes and all hazards impacting California citizens and critical infrastructure, while preserving civil liberties, individual privacy, and constitutional rights.”[4]
- Concerns about fusion centers: privacy, civil rights, and mission creep
A report by the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project asserts that fusion centers are being used to circumvent sanctuary city laws. The report found:
- Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) fusion centers spend over $400 million each year to expand federal, state, and local intelligence sharing, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
- Fusion centers enable ICE to co-opt local police databases and surveillance tools (like facial recognition) that otherwise couldn’t be used for deportation purposes.
- Fusion center participants routinely give ICE sensitive data, violating state and local protections for undocumented immigrants.
- Local police officers use fusion centers to encourage ICE to target suspects when officers can’t find enough evidence to bring charges, effectively deporting their cold cases.
- Fusion centers’ opacity allows them to routinely violate state and local civil rights laws without consequence.[5]
The Brennan Center conducted an exhaustive review of the work of fusion centers and how it has strayed from the original purposes of their creation:
While the federal government initially promoted them as hubs for sharing counterterrorism information, fusion centers quickly expanded their missions to include any crimes or hazards.
DHS provides these centers with funding, personnel, and access to federal intelligence, but it has failed to ensure that they have used these resources appropriately. As a result, fusion centers have long produced flawed analysis, abused their authorities to monitor people engaged in First Amendment–protected activities, and leaked sensitive law enforcement information. This domestic intelligence model has undermined Americans’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
Fusion centers have repeatedly targeted minority communities and protest movements under the guise of counterterrorism or public safety. In their early years, they often singled out American Muslims for unwarranted scrutiny. Their bulletins have regularly painted racial and environmental justice activists as menacing threats. Fusion center reports are widely disseminated to local police and federal law enforcement, likely contributing to their heavy-handed responses to these protests in recent years. The participation of private companies, including some that have been the subjects of protests, in fusion centers raises the possibility that these operations sometimes serve private interests rather than public safety.
Fusion centers continue to be susceptible to abuse as protest movements react to events, creating new targets for unwarranted scrutiny. For example, fusion centers have amplified FBI and DHS threat warnings that falsely lump pro-choice activists together with abortion foes as potential “abortion-related violent extremists,” even though only anti-abortion militants have a history of engaging in deadly violence. 1 As states criminalize abortion, investigations of those seeking, providing, or even just supporting access to reproductive services will fit within fusion centers’ “all crimes” remit,2making it likely that fusion centers will heed law enforcement requests for assistance.
At the same time, there is little to suggest that fusion centers have provided meaningful assistance to federal counterterrorism efforts. And even as they have broadened their missions beyond counterterrorism, there is no evidence that they have contributed substantially to reducing or solving serious crime. They do, however, facilitate broad, unregulated information sharing among a variety of public and private entities with little oversight or public accountability, which poses a serious security liability that was realized when hackers breached a fusion center contractor in 2020, exposing hundreds of thousands of sensitive records from the FBI, DHS, and other law enforcement agencies.[6]
Critical review is not isolated to such outside organizations. An investigation by the United States Senate, initiated by Republican Senator Tom Coburn, found government waste, lack of identifiable success in achieving its mission, and resistance to meaningful oversight:
A two-year bipartisan investigation by the U. S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found that Department of Homeland Security efforts to engage state and local intelligence “fusion centers” has not yielded significant useful information to support federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts.
“It’s troubling that the very ‘fusion’ centers that were designed to share information in a post-9/11 world have become part of the problem. Instead of strengthening our counterterrorism efforts, they have too often wasted money and stepped on Americans’ civil liberties,” said Senator Tom Coburn, the Subcommittee’s ranking member who initiated the investigation.
The investigation determined that senior DHS officials were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work with the fusion centers, but did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely manner.
“Unfortunately, DHS has resisted oversight of these centers. The Department opted not to inform Congress or the public of serious problems plaguing its fusion center and broader intelligence efforts. When this Subcommittee requested documents that would help it identify these issues, the Department initially resisted turning them over, arguing that they were protected by privilege, too sensitive to share, were protected by confidentiality agreements, or did not exist at all. The American people deserve better. I hope this report will help generate the reforms that will help keep our country safe,” Dr. Coburn said.[7]
- Responding to concerns regarding California fusion centers
This bill seeks to directly regulate these fusion centers to address the problems cited above. It first places a series of restrictions on data collection and sharing by these fusion centers. The bill places strong prohibitions on engaging in activity that amounts to unlawful profiling or that assists or furthers immigration enforcement, unless required pursuant to a judicial warrant or court order. Fusion centers are prohibited from allowing entities that are engaging in, or have an intention to engage in, unlawful intelligence-gathering to work within the centers or to provide space to agencies engaging in immigration enforcement. These are certainly important guardrails, many of which are already required by the law, including the California Values Act.
The bill also includes provisions specifically looking for greater transparency. First, it requires OES to compile and submit to DOJ a comprehensive report of information collected from fusion centers. This is to include a listing of entities, both public and private, that participate; the protocols for collection, use, and retention of information; and details of the types and numbers of requests being made of the centers. One specific item required to be included in the report is: “A catalog of the information requested by and provided to requesting governmental entities and data brokers and a list of the personal information that is reasonably believed to have been part of those requests.” Given the likely sensitive nature of some of this information, more clarity might be needed to understand exactly what this is intended to require.
Once the report is submitted, DOJ is thereafter required to conduct an audit and to submit it to the Legislature.
The bill also explicitly provides that any state or local elected official, or their staff, may enter any fusion center for inspections at any time. While access to these facilities by elected officials is arguably an important cornerstone to effective oversight, the breadth of this provision may be overly broad. For instance, a staffer for a locally elected school board official is not likely in the best position to oversee such operations and may cause an unnecessary disruption without commensurate benefit to the state. The author may wish to narrow this provision.
The bill tries to strike a balance between more transparency and the privacy of individuals’ information by making all records related to fusion centers public records but prohibiting the disclosure of specified information that would identify individuals. However, as pointed out by Oakland Privacy, writing in a support if amended position, fusion centers are already subject to the California Public Records Act.
According to the author:
Fusion Centers have operated for many years with limited accountability and oversight. Originally established to support counterterrorism efforts following the September 11 terrorist attacks, these state-owned and operated data-sharing hubs have expanded in scope. In some instances, concerns have been raised about their use to target minority communities, track activists and protesters, and unlawfully support federal immigration enforcement activities. These Centers have little to no outside oversight, creating conditions where state laws may be inconsistently applied, information could be improperly obtained or shared, and resources may be used in coordination with federal and out-of-state entities. At the same time, questions have been raised about their effectiveness at preventing terrorist activity or reducing crime.
SB 1095 seeks to address these concerns by prohibiting California’s Fusion Centers from sharing sensitive personal information for the purposes of immigration enforcement and racial or identity profiling, and by requiring an annual audit of their activities. This approach aims to strengthen transparency and accountability, align operations with state law, and ensure Californians’ constitutional right to privacy is protected, while helping to maintain public safety.
In response to many of these same concerns, Senator Sabrina Cervantes recently successfully requested a state audit to investigate the operations and status of fusion centers in California arguing they have operated in secrecy for three decades:
No single piece of federal or state legislation established this national network of fusion centers, defined its mission, or authorized it to operate as a decentralized domestic intelligence collection mechanism feeding the federal intelligence community with information gathered from every part of American life. The network operates in secret and under ambiguous lines of authority. It includes not only federal, state, and local law enforcement, but also other public and private entities that have no legal or statutory authority to collect or disseminate intelligence about Americans. The public has little access to information regarding what their local fusion centers do in their communities or even the individuals who work there. Fusion centers were originally created with the laudable goal of preventing terrorism. However, over the nearly three decades since their establishment and with limited formal oversight, these centers have seen a significant expansion in their surveillance and targeting activities to include broad domestic activities. The infrastructure established at fusion centers is designed to gather considerable information about individuals’ identities, movements, activities, and relationships from various aspects of their lives, and to collect and collate this data to multiple levels of government and private entities for analysis and decision-making.[8]
Given that the audit has been approved, the author may wish to consider removing the auditing piece to allow for the auditor to provide a clearer picture of exactly what activities these centers are engaged in. Thereafter, with both the audit and OES report in hand, the Legislature will be better situated to identify the appropriate steps moving forward. As Oakland Privacy writes:
On March 24th, a day before this bill went into print, the Joint Legislative Audit Committee green lighted a state audit of California’s fusion centers based largely on the work of the Brennan Center documenting fusion center abuses. The audit request was submitted by Senator Sabrina Cervantes of Riverside and we were pleased to support it.
The state audit request comes not as a way to delay state action, but to better inform it. Ten years after starting to think about and research fusion centers, I still can’t say that I truly understand the scope of their activities. The audit request that was approved is broad and comprehensive and in many cases similar to the report envisioned in Senate Bill 1095.
Given that it is unlikely that California will want to have the State Auditor and the Department of Justice doing side by side audits, and that the purpose of a state audit is to put together recommendations about policies to pursue based on the findings, it seems necessary to re-work Senate Bill 1095 at this point.
- Stakeholder positions
A large coalition of community groups and advocacy organizations, including the Immigrant Legal Resource Center and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, writes in strong support:
Fusion Centers have spied on people engaged in First-Amendment protected activities. Fusion Centers have a documented history of surveillance abuses, including targeting Muslim and Black, Indigenous and People of Color communities, tracking protestors, and casting peaceful activities as potential threats. For example, the Northern California Fusion Center issued multiple warnings to 14,000 police officers stating local Black Lives Matter rallies were “dangerous.”
Fusion Centers have circumvented our local and state sanctuary and privacy laws. In Orange County, ICE agents asked a police officer to run searches of individuals at an Orange County fusion center, highlighting how our personal information collected by local and state agencies is being shared with federal agencies despite our local and state laws preventing this information sharing without a valid judicial warrant. In San Francisco, local law enforcement circumvented a local ban on facial recognition by asking for help from a Fusion Center. For Trump’s mass deportation regime to be successful, he needs to commandeer local and state resources, including our personal information collected by local and state agencies.
These practices threaten constitutional rights, privacy, and public trust by providing a backdoor to evade California’s limits on mass surveillance and local participation in deportations. We must protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all who call California home.
SB 1095 will expose the truth about what is happening behind closed doors at California’s Fusion Centers, or state surveillance centers, and protect Californians from abuses and violations of their rights.
Writing in support, the Transitions Clinic Network argues:
SB 1095 offers a clear and practical solution: prohibiting state Fusion Centers from participating in, cooperating with, disclosing, or sharing information for federal immigration enforcement and racial or identity profiling unless required by a valid judicial warrant. The bill bans office space for immigration enforcement agencies in Fusion Centers, bars out-of-state, federal, or private entities from operating inside Fusion Centers if they are engaged in unlawful activities that violate constitutional rights, authorizes state and local elected officials to enter and inspect Fusion Centers, and requires an annual audit to ensure transparency, accountability, and compliance with state law.
SUPPORT
California Immigrant Policy Center (co-sponsor)
Council on American-Islamic Relations, California (co-sponsor)
Immigrant Legal Resource Center (co-sponsor)
San Francisco Public Defender's Office (co-sponsor)
18 Million Rising
67 Sueños
Access Reproductive Justice
All of US or None (HQ)
Asian Americans Advancing Justice-southern California
Buen Vecino
California Coalition for Women Prisoners
Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law
Clean Carwash Worker Center
Communities United for Restorative Youth Justice (CURYJ)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Freedom for Immigrants
Glide
Harbor Institute for Immigrant and Economic Justice
Health in Partnership
Immigrant Defense Project
Justice2jobs Coalition
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)
New Light Wellness
ORALE: Organizing Rooted in Abolition Liberation and Empowerment
Orange County Rapid Response Network
Privacy Defense Alliance
San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium
Secure Justice
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network (SIREN)
Sister Warriors Freedom Coalition
South Bay People Power
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC)
Transitions Clinic Network
Valor US
Viet Rise
1 Individual
OPPOSITION
None received
RELATED LEGISLATION
SB 1181 (Hurtado, 2026) requires OES, in consultation with the State Department of Education, to establish the Central Valley School Safety Coordination Pilot Program for the purpose of studying and evaluating improved communication pathways between local educational agencies, as defined, and regional fusion centers regarding credible safety threats affecting school communities. SB 1181 is currently in the Senate Emergency Management Committee.
AB 474 (Rodriguez, 2023) would have required STAC and OES to prioritize, to the greatest extent possible, cooperation with state and local efforts to disrupt and dismantle criminal networks trafficking opioid drugs that pose a threat to California. AB 474 was vetoed by Governor Newsom, who stated:
The STAC currently has the authority to address and prioritize opioid trafficking, and it already does. Furthermore, the threats facing California are constantly evolving, and law enforcement agencies need flexibility to shift priorities to meet this ever-changing threat landscape. This bill would limit this flexibility, with a detrimental impact on public safety and national security.
For these reasons, I cannot sign this bill.
**************
Handout, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (July 2012) DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Fusion%20Centers%20Handout_0.pdf. All internet citations are current as of April 4, 2026. ↑
Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information (December 22, 2025) DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. ↑
Ibid. ↑
State Threat Assessment Center, OES, https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/homeland-security/state-threat-assessment-center/. ↑
Eleni Manis, et al., Deportation Data Centers: How Fusion Centers Circumvent
Sanctuary City Laws (November 19, 2024) Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6786da0226ec38320c099635/t/68a7599e6067ca6214d163eb/1755797918060/2024.11.19_STOP%2BReport_Deportation%2BData%2BCenters_final.pdf. ↑
Mike German, Rachel Levinson-Waldman, & Kaylana Mueller-Hsia, Ending Fusion Center Abuses (December 15, 2022) Brennan Center, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/ending-fusion-center-abuses. ↑
Investigative Report Criticizes Counterterrorism Reporting, Waste at State & Local Intelligence Fusion Centers (October 3, 2012) Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/rep/investigative-report-criticizes-counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at-state-local-intelligence-fusion-centers/. ↑
Letter to the Joint Legislative Audit Committee (February 11, 2026) Senator Sabrina Cervantes, https://sd31.senate.ca.gov/sites/sd31.senate.ca.gov/files/pdf/Sen%20Cervantes%20JLAC%20Audit%20Request%20California%20Fusion%20Centers%202.12.26_0.pdf. ↑
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Senate Standing Committee on Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):