SB 485: County public defender: appointment.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2025-09-16
Current Status:
Failed
(2026-03-02: Veto sustained.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law authorizes the board of supervisors of a county to establish the office of public defender for the county. Existing law requires that a public defender of the county serve at the board of supervisors will if the public defender is to be appointed.
This bill would instead only allow the board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender from office by a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Existing law authorizes the board of supervisors of a county to establish the office of public defender for the county. Existing law requires that a public defender be appointed by the board of supervisors to of the county serve at its the board of supervisors will if the public defender of the county is to be appointed.
This bill would instead only allow the board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender from office by a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Existing law authorizes the board of supervisors of a county to establish the office of public defender for the county. Existing law requires that a public defender be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at its will if the public defender of the county is to be appointed.
This bill would instead only allow the board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender from office by a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Existing law authorizes the board of supervisors of a county to establish the office of public defender for the county. Existing law requires that a public defender be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at its will if the public defender of the county is to be appointed.
This bill would instead only allow the board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender from office by a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
(a)If the public defender of a county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors. The public defender of two or more counties shall be appointed by the boards of supervisors of those counties.
(b)A public defender appointed pursuant to subdivision (a) may be removed from office by the board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
(c)It is the intent of the Legislature that this section shall not be construed to exempt a public defender from a countys established performance evaluation process for appointed department heads.
SEC. 2.If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
(a)If the public defender of a county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors. The public defender of two or more counties shall be appointed by the boards of supervisors of those counties.
(b)A public defender appointed pursuant to subdivision (a) may be removed from office by the board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
(c)It is the intent of the Legislature that this section shall not be construed to exempt a public defender from a countys established performance evaluation process for appointed department heads.
SEC. 2.If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
(a)If the public defender of a county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board ofsupervisors. of supervisors. The public defender of two or more counties shall be appointed by the boards of supervisors of those counties.
(b)A public defender appointed pursuant to subdivision (a) may be removed from office by the board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
SEC. 2.If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
(a)If the public defender of any a county is to be appointed, he they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at its will.supervisors. The public defender of any two or more counties shall be appointed by the boards of supervisors of such those counties.
(b)A public defender appointed pursuant to subdivision (a) may be removed from office by the board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
SEC. 2.If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Mar 2, 2026 | Veto sustained. |
| Mar 2, 2026 | Stricken from file. |
| Oct 13, 2025 | In Senate. Consideration of Governor's veto pending. |
| Oct 13, 2025 | Vetoed by the Governor. |
| Sep 22, 2025 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 2 p.m. |
| Sep 11, 2025 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 40. Noes 0. Page 2899.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Sep 9, 2025 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Sep 9, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 62. Noes 12. Page 3074.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Sep 4, 2025 | Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 4, 2025 | Read third time and amended. |
| Sep 2, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 12. Noes 2.) (August 29). |
| Aug 20, 2025 | August 20 set for first hearing. Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 16, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (July 15). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 3, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. (Ayes 7. Noes 1.) (July 2). Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 10, 2025 | June 18 set for first hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| May 29, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on L. GOV. and PUB. S. |
| May 8, 2025 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| May 8, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 36. Noes 0. Page 1050.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 6, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to consent calendar. |
| May 5, 2025 | From committee: Be ordered to second reading pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8 and ordered to consent calendar. |
| Apr 25, 2025 | Set for hearing May 5. |
| Apr 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To consent calendar. (Ayes 6. Noes 0. Page 841.) (April 22). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 9, 2025 | Set for hearing April 22. |
| Apr 7, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Apr 3, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. with recommendation: To consent calendar. (Ayes 7. Noes 0. Page 637.) (April 2). |
| Mar 24, 2025 | Set for hearing April 2. |
| Feb 26, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on L. GOV. and PUB. S. |
| Feb 20, 2025 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 22. |
| Feb 19, 2025 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 11, 2025 | Unfinished Business SB485 Reyes Concurrence | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 9, 2025 | SB 485 Reyes Senate Third Reading By Schultz | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 29, 2025 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 15, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jul 2, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Public Safety] | Assembly Standing Committee on Local Government |
Passed |
|
| May 8, 2025 | Consent Calendar 2nd SB485 Reyes | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 22, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Apr 2, 2025 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Public Safety] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Local Government |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aclu California Action | ** Support | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Support | |
| California State Association Of Counties | ** Against | |
| County of Riverside | ** Against | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Support | |
| Initiate Justice | ** Support | |
| Local 148 La County Public Defenders Union | ** Support | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| Rural County Representatives of California | ** Against | |
| Smart Justice California, a project of Tides Advocacy | ** Support | |
| Urban Counties of California | ** Against |
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 485 |
VETO
Bill No: SB 485
Author: Reyes (D)
Enrolled: 9/16/25
Vote: 27
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE: 7-0, 4/2/25
AYES: Durazo, Choi, Arreguín, Cabaldon, Laird, Seyarto, Wiener
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
SENATE FLOOR: 36-0, 5/8/25 (Consent)
AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Hurtado, Reyes, Rubio, Valladares
SENATE FLOOR: 40-0, 9/11/25
AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Reyes, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 62-12, 9/9/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: County public defender: appointment
SOURCE: California Public Defenders Association
DIGEST:
This bill limits the authority of the county board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender at will, instead requiring a three-fifths vote of the board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that in any county a county counsel may be appointed by the board of supervisors.
- Provides that an appointed county counsel may be removed at any time by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause shown, upon written accusation to be filed with the board of supervisors, by a person not a member of the board, and heard by the board and sustained by a three-fifths vote of the board.
- Authorizes the county board of supervisors of any county to establish a public defender office for the county.
- States that at the time of establishing a public defender office, the board of supervisors shall determine whether the public defender is to be appointed or elected.
- Provides that if a public defender of any county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at will.
This bill:
- Limits a board of supervisors’ authority to remove an appointed county public defender from office to neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, and requires a three-fifths vote by the board to do so.
- States that it is the intent of the Legislature that this section shall not be construed to exempt a public defender from a county’s established performance evaluation process for appointed department heads.
Background
To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, the United States (U.S.) and California Constitution’s guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance (unless knowingly and intelligently waived) to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings receive equal protection under law and due process before being deprived of life or liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials” in the United States and that defendants who are too poor to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government, also known as indigent defense. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that even an intelligent and educated person would be in danger of conviction due to a lack of skill and knowledge for adequately preparing a defense to establish innocence. As such, effective defense counsel is necessary to ensure a defendant has a fair trial against government‑funded and trained prosecutors—irrespective of their income level. In many counties, this is accomplished through the establishment of a public defender’s office.
Of California’s 58 counties, there are 34 public defender offices. Counties without a public defender office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense. Some counties share a public defender. When counties establish a public defender’s office, the board of supervisors can elect to have an elected or appointed public defender. Of the state’s 34 public defenders, only San Francisco elects their public defender. Unlike county counsels which can only be removed for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, an appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors, meaning the board can remove them for any reason.
Comments
Purpose of this bill. According to the author, “Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights. To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.”
Leave it local? Since 1943, the Legislature has allowed county boards of supervisors to remove their public defenders at will. SB 485 seeks to limit this authority by only allowing for removal in cases of neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 vote of the board. According to the author, this is necessary to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliation. The sponsor of the bill, the California Public Defenders Association, is unaware of an instance where a board of supervisors has removed a public defender. However, they note, “A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.” Additionally, they argue that SB 485 simply models provisions for public defenders after those for county counsels that have been in place since 1959, which allow a board to only remove a county counsel for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. While these provisions are similar, SB 485 does not subject public defenders to a four-year term like county counsels, which provides county boards with the option to select a different county counsel or appoint the existing counsel to an additional four-year term. However, county charters already allow charter counties to determine whether a term limit is necessary, or spell out conditions when they can remove an officer. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties all have provisions in their charter that specify that the county counsel serves at will, and the board can remove them for any reason. Even if this measure is enacted, charter counties could spell out their own terms for a public defender, just like they have for county counsels. General law counties would not have this ability. The Legislature may wish to consider whether it should limit a board of supervisor’s ability to remove a public defender at will, and if they do, whether an appointed public defender should have a term-limit similar to that of county counsels.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Local costs of an unknown amount, but potentially greater than $150,000 statewide for local agencies to revise administrative procedures regarding the ability of counties to remove appointed public defenders from office. These costs are potentially state-reimbursable, subject to a determination by the Commission on State Mandates.
SUPPORT: (Verified 10/17/25)
California Public Defenders Association (source)
ACLU California Action
California Public Defenders Association
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
Oakland Privacy
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
OPPOSITION: (Verified 10/17/25)
California State Association of Counties
County of Riverside
Rural County Representatives of California
Urban Counties of California
GOVERNOR'S VETO MESSAGE:
This bill would allow an appointed county public defender to be removed from office only upon a three-fifths vote of the board of supervisors and a showing of good cause.
I appreciate the importance of protecting public defenders from undue political interference, as their role sometimes requires taking unpopular positions to fulfill their legal and ethical duties to their clients.
That said, I have not been presented with evidence that California's current system in any way impairs the effectiveness or independence of public defenders. Proponents only cite a handful of examples from other states of public defenders being removed from office for controversial advocacy.
Further, since the law does not place term limits on public defenders, this bill may ultimately make it unduly difficult to replace public defenders for legitimate reasons and leave incumbents entrenched, which I do not support.
For these reasons, I cannot sign this bill.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 62-12, 9/9/25
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Davies, Dixon, Elhawary, Fong, Gabriel, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Jackson, Johnson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NOES: Castillo, DeMaio, Ellis, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Tangipa, Wallis
NO VOTE RECORDED: Calderon, Chen, Flora, Irwin, Pacheco, Michelle Rodriguez
Prepared by: Anton Favorini-Csorba / L. GOV. / (916) 651-4119
10/17/25 14:11:36
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 485 |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 485
Author: Reyes (D)
Amended: 9/4/25 in Assembly
Vote: 21
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE: 7-0, 4/2/25
AYES: Durazo, Choi, Arreguín, Cabaldon, Laird, Seyarto, Wiener
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
SENATE FLOOR: 36-0, 5/8/25 (Consent)
AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Hurtado, Reyes, Rubio, Valladares
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 46-9, 9/9/25 – Roll call not available.
SUBJECT: County public defender: appointment
SOURCE: California Public Defenders Association
DIGEST:
This bill limits the authority of the county board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender at will, instead requiring a three-fifths vote of the board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Assembly Amendments
of 9/4/25 provide that it is the intent of the Legislature that this section shall not be construed to exempt a public defender from a county’s established performance evaluation process for appointed department heads.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that in any county a county counsel may be appointed by the board of supervisors.
- Provides that an appointed county counsel may be removed at any time by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause shown, upon written accusation to be filed with the board of supervisors, by a person not a member of the board, and heard by the board and sustained by a three-fifths vote of the board.
- Authorizes the county board of supervisors of any county to establish a public defender office for the county.
- States that at the time of establishing a public defender office, the board of supervisors shall determine whether the public defender is to be appointed or elected.
- Provides that if a public defender of any county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at will.
This bill:
- Limits a board of supervisors’ authority to remove an appointed county public defender from office to neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, and requires a three-fifths vote by the board to do so.
- States that it is the intent of the Legislature that this section shall not be construed to exempt a public defender from a county’s established performance evaluation process for appointed department heads.
Background
To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, the United States (U.S.) and California Constitution’s guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance (unless knowingly and intelligently waived) to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings receive equal protection under law and due process before being deprived of life or liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials” in the United States and that defendants who are too poor to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government, also known as indigent defense. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that even an intelligent and educated person would be in danger of conviction due to a lack of skill and knowledge for adequately preparing a defense to establish innocence. As such, effective defense counsel is necessary to ensure a defendant has a fair trial against government‑funded and trained prosecutors—irrespective of their income level. In many counties, this is accomplished through the establishment of a public defender’s office.
Of California’s 58 counties, there are 34 public defender offices. Counties without a public defender office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense. Some counties share a public defender. When counties establish a public defender’s office, the board of supervisors can elect to have an elected or appointed public defender. Of the state’s 34 public defenders, only San Francisco elects their public defender. Unlike county counsels which can only be removed for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, an appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors, meaning the board can remove them for any reason.
Comments
Purpose of this bill. According to the author, “Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights. To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.”
Leave it local? Since 1943, the Legislature has allowed county boards of supervisors to remove their public defenders at will. SB 485 seeks to limit this authority by only allowing for removal in cases of neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 vote of the board. According to the author, this is necessary to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliation. The sponsor of the bill, the California Public Defenders Association, is unaware of an instance where a board of supervisors has removed a public defender. However, they note, “A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.” Additionally, they argue that SB 485 simply models provisions for public defenders after those for county counsels that have been in place since 1959, which allow a board to only remove a county counsel for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. While these provisions are similar, SB 485 does not subject public defenders to a four-year term like county counsels, which provides county boards with the option to select a different county counsel or appoint the existing counsel to an additional four-year term. However, county charters already allow charter counties to determine whether a term limit is necessary, or spell out conditions when they can remove an officer. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties all have provisions in their charter that specify that the county counsel serves at will, and the board can remove them for any reason. Even if this measure is enacted, charter counties could spell out their own terms for a public defender, just like they have for county counsels. General law counties would not have this ability. The Legislature may wish to consider whether it should limit a board of supervisor’s ability to remove a public defender at will, and if they do, whether an appointed public defender should have a term-limit similar to that of county counsels.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Local costs of an unknown amount, but potentially greater than $150,000 statewide for local agencies to revise administrative procedures regarding the ability of counties to remove appointed public defenders from office. These costs are potentially state-reimbursable, subject to a determination by the Commission on State Mandates.
SUPPORT: (Verified 9/9/25)
California Public Defenders Association (source)
ACLU California Action
California Public Defenders Association
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
Oakland Privacy
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/9/25)
California State Association of Counties
County of Riverside
Rural County Representatives of California
Urban Counties of California
Prepared by: Anton Favorini-Csorba / L. GOV. / (916) 651-4119
9/9/25 12:56:49
**** END ****
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 485
Author:(Reyes)
As Amended Ver:September 4, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Allows an appointed public defender to be removed from office by a county board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Major Provisions
Allows an appointed public defender to be removed from office by a county board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Declares the intent of the Legislature that this bill shall not be construed to exempt a public defender from a county's established performance evaluation process for appointed department heads.
COMMENTS
- Background. Counties fall into two types: "general law" and "charter." General law counties are organized according to the generally applicable laws for county governance established by the Legislature that set the number, appointment, and election procedures for county officials, including the board of supervisors.
Charter counties have greater leeway to determine their own governance structure, including to elect additional supervisors, appoint or elect additional officers, and select the length of their terms. A new charter, or the amendment of an existing charter, may be proposed by the board of supervisors, a charter commission, or an initiative petition. There are 14 charter counties: Alameda, Butte, El Dorado, Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange, Placer, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Tehama. Most large counties are charter counties: eight of the ten largest counties by population have adopted charters.
All counties elect or appoint a variety of county officials. The California Constitution requires all counties to elect a sheriff, a district attorney, an assessor, and a board of supervisors. State law lists the officers that general law counties must have. State law gives county boards of supervisors the authority to consolidate the duties of certain county offices by ordinance. Some county offices, including the office of the public defender, may be elected or appointed.
- Removing a County Official. While some actions of public officials automatically result in vacating an office, such as conviction of a felony or of any offense involving a violation of their official duties, officials can be removed through other means. For example, the grand jury of a county that has elected or appointed a public official can bring an accusation in writing, which states the offense charged, for willful or corrupt misconduct in office. Such a written accusation requires concurrence of eight to 14 members of the grand jury depending on the total number of members the respective grand jury has.
Additionally, some types of county officials can only be removed under certain conditions. For example, a county board of supervisors can only remove the county counsel, who serves as the county's lawyer, for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 board vote (AB 1539, Allen, 1959).
- Public Defenders. To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, the U.S. and California Constitutions guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance (unless knowingly and intelligently waived) to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings receive equal protection under law and due process before being deprived of life or liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is "fundamental and essential to fair trials" in the United States and that defendants who can't afford to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government, also known as indigent defense. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that even an intelligent and educated person would be in danger of conviction due to a lack of skill and knowledge for adequately preparing a defense to establish innocence. As such, effective defense counsel is necessary to ensure a defendant has a fair trial against government‑funded and trained prosecutors – irrespective of their income level. In many counties, this is accomplished through the establishment of a public defender's office.
Of California's 58 counties, there are 34 public defender offices. Counties without a public defender office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense. Some counties share a public defender. When counties establish a public defender's office, the board of supervisors can elect to have an elected or appointed public defender. Of the state's 34 public defenders, only San Francisco elects their public defender. Unlike county counsels, which can only be removed for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, an appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors (AB 1796, Watson, 1943), meaning the board can remove them for any reason. County counsels serve for 4-year terms, while public defenders have no defined term.
Charter counties, on the other hand, may determine whether a term limit is necessary, or spell out conditions when they can remove an officer. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties all have provisions in their charter that specify that the county counsel serves at will, and the board can remove them for any reason.
According to the Author
Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.
Arguments in Support
The California Public Defenders Association, sponsor of this bill, writes, "This bill protects the independence of chief public defenders who are appointed by county Boards of Supervisors by ensuring that they can only be removed from office by a 3/5 vote of the Board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. This affords chief public defenders the same protections that are currently in place for county counsels.
"In order to be effective, chief public defenders must have independence. Public defenders have a duty to their clients, guaranteed by the Constitution, that is unique among county agencies; it is this duty that must guide every decision that public defenders make. They need the freedom to take unpopular stances, to advocate for those who may not be politically popular, and to occasionally draw the ire of other county departments, or even the members of the Board of Supervisors who appointed them. A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.
"Currently, Government Code Section 27703 states that a public defender who is appointed by a county's Board of Supervisors shall 'serve at its will.' This stands in stark contrast to the protections afforded by Government Code Section 27641 to another, similarly situated, county department head: county counsel. SB 485 seeks to correct this anomalous discrepancy; it mirrors the language of Government Code Section 27641, and gives public defenders the same protection that county counsels currently enjoy.
"In this time of arbitrary terminations and political retribution, it is more important than ever to protect the independence and integrity of civil servants, particularly those entrusted with protecting Constitutional rights."
Arguments in Opposition
The California State Association of Counties (CSAC), the Urban Counties of California (UCC), and the Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC), expressing an "oppose, unless amended" position on this bill, write, "SB 485 proposes to change the public defender's employment status from at-will to one in which removal may only occur by a majority vote of the local board of supervisors and only for neglect of duty, malfeasance, misconduct in office, or other good cause. While we understand and respect the underlying objective to ensure independence in this important role, we believe the bill, as currently written, lacks key structural safeguards. Our request for amendments is rooted in principles of good governance, organizational consistency, and process clarity – standards that we would be seeking to accompany statutory changes in the employment status for any appointed county department head.
"Specifically, CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are respectfully requesting amendments that would:
- Establish a defined term of office such as the four-year term outlined in Government Code section 27640 for county counsel; and
- Set forth a clear process for judicial review should a public defender contest their removal from office.
"CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are concerned about the long-term implications of a perpetual appointment if it is not paired with routine performance oversight or a structured review process. These additional elements are needed to ensure that all department heads are held to the same standards to meet their various responsibilities adequately. Public accountability is an essential element of county governance, and it is both reasonable and prudent to provide clear procedures in the event of a contested termination.
"As organizations representing California's elected county supervisors, we urge your consideration of these amendments, which seek to (1) ensure appropriate governance safeguards and (2) maintain comparability across appointed county leadership positions. If this measure were enacted without these amendments, the public defender's employment status would be an outlier in the broader county organizational framework for non-elected department heads. Finally, we want to underscore that our proposed changes are not intended to – and would not in practice – interfere with a public defender's constitutional obligation to provide clients with ethical and competent legal representation."
FISCAL COMMENTS
Local costs of an unknown amount, but potentially greater than $150,000 statewide for local agencies to revise administrative procedures regarding the ability of counties to remove appointed public defenders from office. These costs are potentially state-reimbursable, subject to a determination by the Commission on State Mandates.
VOTES
SENATE FLOOR: 36-0-4
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ABS, ABST OR NV: Hurtado, Reyes, Rubio, Valladares
ASM LOCAL GOVERNMENT: 7-1-2
YES: Carrillo, Ta, Ramos, Ransom, Blanca Rubio, Stefani, Ward
NO: Hoover
ABS, ABST OR NV: Pacheco, Wilson
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 7-0-2
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Nguyen, Sharp-Collins
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Ramos
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 12-2-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Ahrens, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache, Ta
NO: Sanchez, Dixon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: Saptember 4, 2025
CONSULTANT: Angela Mapp / L. GOV. / (916) 319-3958 FN: 0001692
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 485
Author:(Reyes)
As Amended Ver:April 7, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Allows an appointed public defender to be removed from office by a county board of supervisors by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Major Provisions
COMMENTS
- Background. Counties fall into two types: "general law" and "charter." General law counties are organized according to the generally applicable laws for county governance established by the Legislature that set the number, appointment, and election procedures for county officials, including the board of supervisors.
Charter counties have greater leeway to determine their own governance structure, including to elect additional supervisors, appoint or elect additional officers, and select the length of their terms. A new charter, or the amendment of an existing charter, may be proposed by the board of supervisors, a charter commission, or an initiative petition. There are 14 charter counties: Alameda, Butte, El Dorado, Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange, Placer, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Tehama. Most large counties are charter counties: eight of the ten largest counties by population have adopted charters.
All counties elect or appoint a variety of county officials. The California Constitution requires all counties to elect a sheriff, a district attorney, an assessor, and a board of supervisors. State law lists the officers that general law counties must have. State law gives county boards of supervisors the authority to consolidate the duties of certain county offices by ordinance. Some county offices, including the office of the public defender, may be elected or appointed.
- Removing a County Official. While some actions of public officials automatically result in vacating an office, such as conviction of a felony or of any offense involving a violation of their official duties, officials can be removed through other means. For example, the grand jury of a county that has elected or appointed a public official can bring an accusation in writing, which states the offense charged, for willful or corrupt misconduct in office. Such a written accusation requires concurrence of 8 to 14 members of the grand jury depending on the total number of members the respective grand jury has.
Additionally, some types of county officials can only be removed under certain conditions. For example, a county board of supervisors can only remove the county counsel, who serves as the county's lawyer, for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 board vote (AB 1539, Allen, 1959).
- Public Defenders. To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, the U.S. and California Constitutions guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance (unless knowingly and intelligently waived) to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings receive equal protection under law and due process before being deprived of life or liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is "fundamental and essential to fair trials" in the United States and that defendants who can't afford to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government, also known as indigent defense. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that even an intelligent and educated person would be in danger of conviction due to a lack of skill and knowledge for adequately preparing a defense to establish innocence. As such, effective defense counsel is necessary to ensure a defendant has a fair trial against government‑funded and trained prosecutors – irrespective of their income level. In many counties, this is accomplished through the establishment of a public defender's office.
Of California's 58 counties, there are 34 public defender offices. Counties without a public defender office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense. Some counties share a public defender. When counties establish a public defender's office, the board of supervisors can elect to have an elected or appointed public defender. Of the state's 34 public defenders, only San Francisco elects their public defender. Unlike county counsels, which can only be removed for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, an appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors (AB 1796, Watson, 1943), meaning the board can remove them for any reason. County counsels serve for 4-year terms, while public defenders have no defined term.
Charter counties, on the other hand, may determine whether a term limit is necessary, or spell out conditions when they can remove an officer. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties all have provisions in their charter that specify that the county counsel serves at will, and the board can remove them for any reason.
According to the Author
Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.
Arguments in Support
The California Public Defenders Association, sponsor of this bill, writes, “This bill protects the independence of chief public defenders who are appointed by county Boards of Supervisors by ensuring that they can only be removed from office by a 3/5 vote of the Board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. This affords chief public defenders the same protections that are currently in place for county counsels.
"In order to be effective, chief public defenders must have independence. Public defenders have a duty to their clients, guaranteed by the Constitution, that is unique among county agencies; it is this duty that must guide every decision that public defenders make. They need the freedom to take unpopular stances, to advocate for those who may not be politically popular, and to occasionally draw the ire of other county departments, or even the members of the Board of Supervisors who appointed them. A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.
"Currently, Government Code Section 27703 states that a public defender who is appointed by a county's Board of Supervisors shall 'serve at its will.' This stands in stark contrast to the protections afforded by Government Code Section 27641 to another, similarly situated, county department head: county counsel. SB 485 seeks to correct this anomalous discrepancy; it mirrors the language of Government Code Section 27641, and gives public defenders the same protection that county counsels currently enjoy.
"In this time of arbitrary terminations and political retribution, it is more important than ever to protect the independence and integrity of civil servants, particularly those entrusted with protecting Constitutional rights."
Arguments in Opposition
The California State Association of Counties (CSAC), the Urban Counties of California (UCC), and the Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC), expressing an "oppose, unless amended" position on this bill, write, "SB 485 proposes to change the public defender's employment status from at-will to one in which removal may only occur by a majority vote of the local board of supervisors and only for neglect of duty, malfeasance, misconduct in office, or other good cause. While we understand and respect the underlying objective to ensure independence in this important role, we believe the bill, as currently written, lacks key structural safeguards. Our request for amendments is rooted in principles of good governance, organizational consistency, and process clarity – standards that we would be seeking to accompany statutory changes in the employment status for any appointed county department head.
"Specifically, CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are respectfully requesting amendments that would:
- Establish a defined term of office such as the four-year term outlined in Government Code section 27640 for county counsel; and
- Set forth a clear process for judicial review should a public defender contest their removal from office.
"CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are concerned about the long-term implications of a perpetual appointment if it is not paired with routine performance oversight or a structured review process. These additional elements are needed to ensure that all department heads are held to the same standards to meet their various responsibilities adequately. Public accountability is an essential element of county governance, and it is both reasonable and prudent to provide clear procedures in the event of a contested termination.
"As organizations representing California's elected county supervisors, we urge your consideration of these amendments, which seek to (1) ensure appropriate governance safeguards and (2) maintain comparability across appointed county leadership positions. If this measure were enacted without these amendments, the public defender's employment status would be an outlier in the broader county organizational framework for non-elected department heads. Finally, we want to underscore that our proposed changes are not intended to – and would not in practice – interfere with a public defender's constitutional obligation to provide clients with ethical and competent legal representation."
FISCAL COMMENTS
Local costs of an unknown amount, but potentially greater than $150,000 statewide for local agencies to revise administrative procedures regarding the ability of counties to remove appointed public defenders from office. These costs are potentially state-reimbursable, subject to a determination by the Commission on State Mandates.
VOTES
SENATE FLOOR: 36-0-4
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ABS, ABST OR NV: Hurtado, Reyes, Rubio, Valladares
ASM LOCAL GOVERNMENT: 7-1-2
YES: Carrillo, Ta, Ramos, Ransom, Blanca Rubio, Stefani, Ward
NO: Hoover
ABS, ABST OR NV: Pacheco, Wilson
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 7-0-2
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Nguyen, Sharp-Collins
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Ramos
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 12-2-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Ahrens, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache, Ta
NO: Sanchez, Dixon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: April 7, 2025
CONSULTANT: Angela Mapp / L. GOV. / (916) 319-3958 FN: 0001297
Date of Hearing: August 20, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 485
Author:(Reyes) – As Amended Ver:April 7, 2025
Policy Committee: | Local Government | Vote: | 7 - 1 |
Public Safety | 7 - 0 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: Yes
SUMMARY:
This bill removes the “at will” status of appointed county public defenders and instead allows a county board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender from office by a three-fifths vote of the board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Local costs of an unknown amount, but potentially greater than $150,000 statewide for local agencies to revise administrative procedures regarding the ability of counties to remove appointed public defenders from office. These costs are potentially state-reimbursable, subject to a determination by the Commission on State Mandates.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill is sponsored by the California Public Defenders Association. According to the author:
Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights. To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation.
- Background. To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, both the U.S. Constitution and California Constitution guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance to defendants in criminal proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials” in the United States and defendants who cannot afford to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government.
Public Defender. Existing law authorizes a board of supervisors of a county to establish the office of public defender for the county. Thirty-four of California’s 58 counties have established a public defender office. Counties without an office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense services. When counties establish a public defender office, existing law allows the board of supervisors to elect or appoint the public defender. Thirty-three counties appoint their public defender. Only San Francisco elects its public defender. Existing law requires an appointed public defender to serve at the will of the board of supervisors, meaning the board can remove them at any time for any reason.
This bill instead allows a county board of supervisors to remove its public defender from office only by a three-fifths vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. According to the author and sponsor, this change is necessary to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliation.
County Counsel. Existing law authorizes county board of supervisors to appoint a county counsel, who serves as the county’s lawyer. A county council serves a four-year term, may be reappointed, and may be removed by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause by a three-fifths vote of the board.
This bill, by making a county public defender removable for cause, more closely aligns the appointment of a public defender with the appointment of a county counsel, but without the option to reevaluate the public defender appointment every four years.
Charter Counties. Existing county charters allow the state’s 14 charter counties to determine certain conditions for county officers, including term limits and conditions for removal. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties each have charter provisions that specify the county counsel serves at will, and can be removed by the board for any reason.
There are currently 33 counties with an appointed public defender. Even if this bill is enacted, 13 of those are charter counties that could impose other limits on the terms of a public defender, should they find it necessary. General law counties do not have this ability.
- Oppose Unless Amended. The California State Association of Counties (CSAC), the Urban Counties of California (UCC), and the Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC) assert:
[We] are concerned about the long-term implications of a perpetual appointment if it is not paired with routine performance oversight or a structured review process. These additional elements are needed to ensure that all department heads are held to the same standards to meet their various responsibilities adequately. Public accountability is an essential element of county governance, and it is both reasonable and prudent to provide clear procedures in the event of a contested termination.
CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are requesting amendments to establish a defined term of office for a public defender such as the one provided for a county counsel, and to set forth a clear process for judicial review should a public defender contest their removal from office.
Analysis Prepared by: Jennifer Swenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: July 15, 2025
Counsel: Dustin Weber
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 485
Author:(Reyes) – As Amended Ver:April 7, 2025
SUMMARY: Authorizes the board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender from office by a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
EXISTING FEDERAL LAW:
- States that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. (U.S. Const. amend. V.)
- Establishes that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have assistance of counsel for his defense. (U.S. Const. amend VI.)
- Provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV.)
EXISTING LAW:
- States that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.)
- Establishes that the defendant in a criminal cause has the right to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant’s defense. (Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.)
- States the board of supervisors of any county may establish the office of public defender for the county. Any county may join with one or more counties to establish and maintain the office of public defender to serve such counties. (Gov. Code, § 27700.)
- Provides that at the time of establishing the office the board of supervisors shall determine whether the public defender is to be appointed or elected. (Gov. Code, § 27702.)
- Establishes that if the public defender of any county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at its will, and the public defender of any two or more counties shall be appointed by the boards of supervisors of such counties. (Gov. Code § 27703.)
- Requires that the public defender shall perform the following duties:
- Upon request of the defendant or upon order of the court, the public defender shall defend, without expense to the defendant, any person who is not financially able to employ counsel and who is charged with the commission of any contempt or offense triable in the superior courts at all stages of the proceedings, including the preliminary examination. The public defender shall, upon request, give counsel and advice to such person about any charge against the person upon which the public defender is conducting the defense, and shall prosecute all appeals to a higher court or courts of any person who has been convicted, where, in the opinion of the public defender, the appeal will or might reasonably be expected to result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.
- Upon request, the public defender shall prosecute actions for the collection of wages and other demands of any person who is not financially able to employ counsel, where the sum involved does not exceed one hundred dollars ($100), and where, in the judgment of the public defender, the claim urged is valid and enforceable in the courts.
- Upon request, the public defender shall defend any person who is not financially able to employ counsel in any civil litigation in which, in the judgment of the public defender, the person is being persecuted or unjustly harassed.
- Upon request, or upon order of the court, the public defender shall represent any person who is not financially able to employ counsel in proceedings, as specified.
- Upon order of the court, the public defender shall represent any person who is entitled to be represented but is not financially able to employ counsel in proceedings, as specified.
- Upon order of the court the public defender shall represent any person who is required to have counsel, as defined.
- Upon the order of the court or upon the request of the person involved, the public defender may represent any person who is not financially able to employ counsel in a proceeding of any nature relating to the nature or conditions of detention, of other restrictions prior to adjudication, of treatment, or of punishment resulting from criminal or juvenile proceedings. (Gov. Code, § 27706.)
- Provides that in any county a county counsel may be appointed by the board of supervisors. (Gov. Code, § 27640.)
- Provides that an appointed county counsel may be removed at any time by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause shown, upon written accusation to be filed with the board of supervisors, by a person not a member of the board, and heard by the board and sustained by a three-fifths vote of the board. (Gov. Code, § 27641.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board.
“This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
“To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.”
- Effect of the Bill: This bill would require public defenders be removable only for cause, as defined. One goal of this bill is to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliatory termination. The author suggests that if a public defender’s incentive to fulfill their duties and uphold their clients’ constitutionally guaranteed rights is compromised by fear of retaliation, there is a possibility that public defenders will be unable to provide the effective, conflict-free counsel demanded by the federal and state constitutions.
According to information provided by the author’s office, there are no documented cases in California where a board of supervisors has removed a public defender for taking up a controversial case or issue. Yet, this has occurred in Pennsylvania. The Chief Public Defender and Deputy Chief Public Defender of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania were both fired by their board of supervisors after their office submitted an amicus brief supporting a lawsuit challenging bail setting practices.[1] They filed lawsuits raising retaliation, whistleblower, and First Amendment claims, which the county settled for $310,000.[2] Though the case settled, there is risk of a chilling effect from having been fired for performing duties inherent to their jobs because local elected officials disagreed with a legal position asserted as part of that job responsibility. This bill limits board of supervisors’ removal power of public defenders, unless the public defender has demonstrated neglect of duty, misconduct or malfeasance in office, or other good cause for removal. To clarify the scope of these removable offenses in different cases, our courts have given us guidance.
This bill would allow for removal of public defenders for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or for other good cause. Noting that the term “neglect of duty” has an “accepted legal meaning”, the California Supreme Court defined neglect of duty as “an intentional or grossly negligent failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of a known official duty.” (People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414.) Another court found, in a case involving public officials’ duty to make an arrest that the officials were “punishable for neglect of duty if they neglected to act in a case where there was sufficient or probable cause for acting.” (Michel v. Smith (1922) 188 Cal. 199, 209.)
The California Supreme Court also found that a crime committed in an official capacity is necessarily sufficient to establish “misconduct in office.” (Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal. 4th 368, 410.) Misconduct in office is “broad enough to include any willful malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, even without any criminal intention.” (Id. at p. 411.) Misconduct in office is not limitlessly broad, however, as one court held that an “act or omission for which [a] public officer may be removed from office does not necessarily imply corruption, criminal intent, or commission of crime . . . .” (People v. Hale (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1965) 232 Cal. App 2d 112, 118.)
Another court defined malfeasance as “a wrongful, unlawful, or dishonest act; especially wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official.” (People v. Smith (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2024) 100 Cal. App. 5th 741, 754, quoting Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) at p. 1145.) The court found that “the term ‘malfeasance in office’ . . . means misconduct or wrongdoing by a public official while in office, at least where the conduct ‘evidences moral corruption and dishonesty.’” (Ibid, see also Otsuka v. Hite (1966) 64 Cal. 2d 596, 608.) The court held a public official charged and convicted of perjury had committed malfeasance in office and thus, barred from jury duty. (See ibid.) Another court, however, found that a conviction for obstruction of justice did not necessarily “imply moral corruption or dishonesty” and thus, the person constitutionally was able to hold the office to which he was elected. (See People ex rel. City of Commerce v. Argumendo (Cal. App 2nd Dist. 2018) 28 Cal. App. 274, 280-82.)
While the term “other good cause” leaves apparent room for ambiguity, good cause standards exist in the law. The California Supreme Court cited to the Book of Approved Jury Instructions (BAJI) for the standard that must be met when an employee is contractually unable to be terminated except for good cause. (See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Internat., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 93, 99.) That standard reads,
Where there is an employment agreement not to terminate an employee except for good cause, an employer may not terminate the employment of an employee unless such termination is based on a fair and honest cause or reason. In determining whether there was good cause, you must balance the employer's interest in operating the business efficiently and profitably with the interest of the employee in maintaining employment.” (Id. at fn. 2.)
The California Supreme Court noted the inquiry for demotion for good cause is identical to discharge with good cause. (Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 454, 467.) The good cause inquiry involves determining whether the adverse employment action was done for “'a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power . . . as opposed to one that is ‘trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.’” (Ibid.)
Additionally, while this bill would change public defenders from at-will employees to removable only for cause, the law does not permit blanket authority for termination of at-will employees by their employers. Beyond the protections afforded at-will employees in state and federal law, a person who maliciously induces an employer to discharge an employee through the use of false statements, fear, or “malevolent advice and persuasion” is liable to the employee for damages “and it makes no difference whether the employment was for a fixed term not yet expired of is terminable at the will of the employer.” (See Haddle v. Garrison (1998) 525 U.S. 121, 126.)
By making county public defenders removable for cause, this bill would more closely align those public defenders with county counsels, who have similar statutory protections. (See Gov. Code, § 27641.)
- The Right to Counsel: This bill would modify board of supervisors’ authority to remove an appointed public defender. Public defenders help ensure an accused’s constitutional right to representation are actualized. Indigent criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial. (See U.S. Const., amend. VI, Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The right to counsel is guaranteed by California’s Constitution, but is also guaranteed by the US Constitution and is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 342-343.) In initially establishing this right, the Supreme Court wrote, “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel . . . .” (Gideon, supra, at p. 344, quoting Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68.) The Court went on to state, “In our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth . . . .” (Ibid.)
The bounds of this right have been further formed since these initial decisions. The Court found that the right to counsel is violated unless counsel provides effective assistance to their client. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686.) Assistance is ineffective when “counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” (Id. at pp. 692-93.) At the trial level, being effective requires counsel to “subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.” (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659.)
To ensure a criminal defendant’s right to counsel, the majority of California’s 58 counties have established an Office of the Public Defender. (Gov. Code, § 27700.) When counties create a public defender office, the board of supervisors can choose to have an elected or appointed public defender. (Gov. Code, § 27702.) An appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors, which means the board can remove them for any reason. (Gov. Code, § 27703.) By contrast, county counsels who are also appointed by the board of supervisors only can be removed by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. (Gov. Code, § 27641, subd. (b).)
This bill limits the board of supervisors’ ability to remove a public defender from office except for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. By requiring some cause for removal of a public defender, this bill arguably helps achieve fuller fidelity to the constitutional right to counsel.
- Public Employment and Property Interests: This bill would change the ability of boards of supervisors to remove a county public defender from at-will to only for removable for specified causes. This could create a property interest in the job for the public defender. Creating a property interest in the job could require counties to provide due process protections to public defenders, even with documented evidence of good cause.
The Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights – life, liberty, and property – cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. (Cleveland Bd. of Educ. V. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 541.) Courts have found that “‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause is ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’” (Id. at p. 542.) In determining whether a government job creates a property interest, the proper inquiry involves analyzing the expectations created by the law and the customs surrounding the position. (See Bishop v. Wood (1976) 426 U.S. 341, 353-54.) One court found the Constitution’s procedural due process requirement satisfied where the employee had access to the material upon which the charge was based and the employee could then respond orally and in writing and present rebuttal affidavits. (See Arnett v. Kennedy (1974) 416 U.S. 134.)
This bill could create a property interest in the position of county public defender because the language of the bill would create a statutory expectation of continued employment, absent a showing of good cause for removal. (See Arnett, supra, at pp. 151-52 [“appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be removed other than for [stated] cause.”].) The Court noted that by passing the law at issue in the case, “Congress was obviously intent on according a measure of statutory job security to governmental employees which they had not previously enjoyed.” (Id. at p. 152.) This bill largely would do the same thing for similar reasons by requiring additional job security for county public defenders that the current law does not provide. Whether there is evidence of custom is less clear as current California law makes public defenders at-will employees, while some other municipal public attorneys have a history of removal only for cause. (See Gov. Code, § 27703, cf. Gov. Code, § 27641.)
There are also potential concerns with holding the position of public defender that create potential risks for being able to provide to their clients independent, zealous, and unconflicted counsel. These concerns add potential support for the bill creating a property interest in the position of county public defender. The Court has said, “Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” (Roth, supra, at p. 573.) It went on to note that where discharge from a job “imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities” there is a heightened need for due process protections to refute allegations of impropriety. (See ibid.)
The Court’s decisions generally proscribe summary dismissal from public employment without hearing or inquiry required by due process. (Id. at p. 576.) California’s Supreme Court held that a permanent public employee may not be dismissed or even disciplined by the appointing authority or authorized representative by simply notifying the employee that the adverse action was being taken, if that notice does not then include an opportunity to respond to the grounds forming the adverse action. (See Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 194, 202.) By modifying how public defenders can be removed, this bill may create a constitutional property interest in the county public defender position. It is unclear whether this change would address concerns regarding the level of independence that is currently inherent in these roles.
- Argument in Support: According to the California Public Defenders Association (CDPA), The California Public Defenders Association (CPDA), a statewide organization of public defenders, private defense counsel, defense social workers, and investigators, is pleased to sponsor Senate Bill 485 (Reyes). This bill protects the independence of chief public defenders who are appointed by county Boards of Supervisors by ensuring that they can only be removed from office by a 3/5 vote of the Board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. This affords chief public defenders the same protections that are currently in place for county counsels.
In order to be effective, chief public defenders must have independence. Public defenders have a duty to their clients, guaranteed by the Constitution, that is unique among county agencies; it is this duty that must guide every decision that public defenders make. They need the freedom to take unpopular stances, to advocate for those who may not be politically popular, and to occasionally draw the ire of other county departments, or even the members of the Board of Supervisors who appointed them. A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.
Currently, Government Code Section 27703 states that a public defender who is appointed by a county’s Board of Supervisors shall “serve at its will.” This stands in stark contrast to the protections afforded by Government Code Section 27641 to another, similarly situated, county department head: county counsel. SB 485 seeks to correct this anomalous discrepancy; it mirrors the language of Government Code Section 27641, and gives public defenders the same protection that county counsels currently enjoy.
In this time of arbitrary terminations and political retribution, it is more important than ever to protect the independence and integrity of civil servants, particularly those entrusted with protecting Constitutional rights.
- Argument in Opposition: According to the California State Association of Counties (CSAC), “On behalf of the California State Association of Counties (CSAC), the Urban Counties of California (UCC), and the Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC), we write to respectfully express our joint opposition to SB 485, unless amended to include provisions that offer essential checks and balances regarding the appointment and removal of board of supervisors-appointed county public defenders.
“SB 485 proposes to change the public defender’s employment status from at-will to one in
which removal may only occur by a majority vote of the local board of supervisors and only for neglect of duty, malfeasance, misconduct in office, or other good cause. While we understand and respect the underlying objective to ensure independence in this important role, we believe the bill, as currently written, lacks key structural safeguards. Our request for amendments is rooted in principles of good governance, organizational consistency, and process clarity – standards that we would be seeking to accompany statutory changes in the employment status for any appointed county department head.
“Specifically, CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are respectfully requesting amendments that would:
- Establish a defined term of office such as the four-year term outlined in Government
Code section 27640 for county counsel; and
- Set forth a clear process for judicial review should a public defender contest their
removal from office.
“CSAC, UCC, and RCRC are concerned about the long-term implications of a perpetual
appointment if it is not paired with routine performance oversight or a structured review process. These additional elements are needed to ensure that all department heads are held to the same standards to meet their various responsibilities adequately. Public accountability is an essential element of county governance, and it is both reasonable and prudent to provide clear procedures in the event of a contested termination.”
- Related Legislation: AB 690 (Schultz), would revise the process and require a county or court, when contracting for the provision or administration of indigent defense services, to include certain elements in the contract or other agreement for indigent services, including requirements for compliance with the California Standards for Contract and Panel Defense Systems. This bill is pending hearing in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 1209 (Jones-Sawyer), of the 2023-24 Legislative Session, would have created representation to commence as soon as feasible after being notified of a person’s arrest, but in any case within 24 hours after booking or sufficiently before the arraignment to allow the provision of meaningful representation, as specified. This bill was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- SB 1117 (Becker), Chapter 615, Statutes of 2022, authorizes the State Public Defender to administer and award grants to improve indigent defense services.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
ACLU California Action
California Public Defenders Association
California Public Defenders Association (CPDA)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
Oakland Privacy
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Opposition
California State Association of Counties (CSAC)
Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC)
Urban Counties of California (UCC)
Analysis Prepared by: Dustin Weber / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Vaughn, Pennsylvania Public Defenders not Reinstated Despite Public Outcry over Firing (Mar. 6, 2020) The Appeal <https://theappeal.org/pennsylvania-public-defenders-not-reinstated-despite-public-outcry-over-firing/> [as of July 2, 2025]. ↑
Mitchell, Montgomery County to Pay $310K to Settle Claims from Former Public Defenders in Row over Bail Policies (Mar. 19, 2021) <https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2021/03/19/montgomery-county-to-pay-310k-to-settle-claims-from-former-public-defenders-in-row-over-bail-policies/?slreturn=2025041005802> [as of July 2, 2025]. ↑
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 485 |
CONSENT
Bill No: SB 485
Author: Reyes (D)
Amended: 4/7/25
Vote: 21
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE: 7-0, 4/2/25
AYES: Durazo, Choi, Arreguín, Cabaldon, Laird, Seyarto, Wiener
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
SUBJECT: County public defender: appointment
SOURCE: California Public Defenders Association
DIGEST:
This bill limits the authority of the county board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender at will, instead requiring a three-fifths vote of the board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that in any county a county counsel may be appointed by the board of supervisors.
- Provides that an appointed county counsel may be removed at any time by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause shown, upon written accusation to be filed with the board of supervisors, by a person not a member of the board, and heard by the board and sustained by a three-fifths vote of the board.
- Authorizes the county board of supervisors of any county to establish a public defender office for the county.
- States that at the time of establishing a public defender office, the board of supervisors shall determine whether the public defender is to be appointed or elected.
- Provides that if a public defender of any county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at will.
This bill limits a board of supervisors’ authority to remove an appointed county public defender from office to neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, and requires a three-fifths vote by the board to do so.
Background
To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, the United States (U.S.) and California Constitution’s guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance (unless knowingly and intelligently waived) to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings receive equal protection under law and due process before being deprived of life or liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials” in the United States and that defendants who are too poor to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government, also known as indigent defense. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that even an intelligent and educated person would be in danger of conviction due to a lack of skill and knowledge for adequately preparing a defense to establish innocence. As such, effective defense counsel is necessary to ensure a defendant has a fair trial against government‑funded and trained prosecutors—irrespective of their income level. In many counties, this is accomplished through the establishment of a public defender’s office.
Of California’s 58 counties, there are 34 public defender offices. Counties without a public defender office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense. Some counties share a public defender. When counties establish a public defender’s office, the board of supervisors can elect to have an elected or appointed public defender. Of the state’s 34 public defenders, only San Francisco elects their public defender. Unlike county counsels which can only be removed for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, an appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors, meaning the board can remove them for any reason.
Comments
Purpose of the bill. According to the author, “Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights. To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.”
Leave it local? Since 1943, the Legislature has allowed county boards of supervisors to remove their public defenders at will. SB 485 seeks to limit this authority by only allowing for removal in cases of neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 vote of the board. According to the author, this is necessary to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliation. The sponsor of the bill, the California Public Defenders Association, is unaware of an instance where a board of supervisors has removed a public defender. However, they note, “A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.” Additionally, they argue that SB 485 simply models provisions for public defenders after those for county counsels that have been in place since 1959, which allow a board to only remove a county counsel for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. While these provisions are similar, SB 485 does not subject public defenders to a four-year term like county counsels, which provides county boards with the option to select a different county counsel or appoint the existing counsel to an additional four-year term. However, county charters already allow charter counties to determine whether a term limit is necessary, or spell out conditions when they can remove an officer. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties all have provisions in their charter that specify that the county counsel serves at will, and the board can remove them for any reason. Even if this measure is enacted, charter counties could spell out their own terms for a public defender, just like they have for county counsels. General law counties would not have this ability. The Legislature may wish to consider whether it should limit a board of supervisor’s ability to remove a public defender at will, and if they do, whether an appointed public defender should have a term-limit similar to that of county counsels.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/6/25)
California Public Defenders Association (source)
ACLU California Action
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Initiate Justice
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
Smart Justice California
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/6/25)
Prepared by: Jonathan Peterson / L. GOV. / (916) 651-4119
5/7/25 16:05:26
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: SB 485 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025
Author: | Reyes | ||
Version: | April 7, 2025 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | CA | ||
Subject: County public defender: appointment
HISTORY
Source: California Public Defenders Association
Prior Legislation: AB 1976 (Watson), Ch. 1288, Stats. of 1949
AB 1539 (Allen), Ch. 1389, Stats. of 1959
Support: ACLU California Action; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; Initiate Justice; Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union; Smart Justice California
Opposition: None known
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to limit the authority of the county board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender at will, instead requiring a three-fifths vote of the board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Existing law provides that in any county a county counsel may be appointed by the board of supervisors. (Gov. Code, § 27640.)
Existing law provides that an appointed county counsel may be removed at any time by the board of supervisors for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause shown, upon written accusation to be filed with the board of supervisors, by a person not a member of the board, and heard by the board and sustained by a three-fifths vote of the board. (Gov. Code, § 27641.)
Existing law authorizes the county board of supervisors of any county to establish a public defender office for the county. (Gov. Code, § 27700.)
Existing law states that at the time of establishing a public defender office, the board of supervisors shall determine whether the public defender is to be appointed or elected. (Gov. Code, § 27702.)
Existing law provides that if a public defender of any county is to be appointed, they shall be appointed by the board of supervisors to serve at will. (Gov. Code, § 27703, subd. (a).)
This bill limits the board of supervisors authority to remove an appointed county public defender from office to neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, and requires a three-fifths vote by the board to do so.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board.
This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights.
To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.
- Background: An Indigent Defendant’s Right to Counsel
Indigent criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The right to counsel is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 342-343.) As explained in Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, and as quoted in Gideon, supra, at pp. 344-345, the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision establishing the constitutional right to counsel:
“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence."
Precedent, as well as “reason and reflection” required the Gideon Court to recognize that:
In our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
(Gideon, supra, 372 U.S. at p. 344.)
This constitutional guarantee to counsel is violated unless counsel provides adequate assistance to their client. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686.) Merely having a licensed attorney next to the defendant does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment (id. at p. 685), because "[m]ore than a 'warm body' is required to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. [Citation.]" (United States v. Smith (4th Cir. 2011) 640 F.3d 580, 589.) Rather, constitutionally sufficient counsel must "play[] the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 685.) At the trial level, that role requires counsel to "subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." (United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659.)
To uphold this constitutional guarantee to counsel, the majority of California’s 58 counties have elected to establish a public defender office. (Gov. Code, § 27700.) When counties establish a public defender office, the board of supervisors can choose to have an elected or appointed public defender. (Gov. Code, § 27702.) An appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors, meaning the board can remove them for any reason. (Gov. Code, § 27703.) By contrast, county counsels can only be removed by the board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause shown. (Gov. Code, § 27641, subd. (b).)[1]
This bill limits the board of supervisor’s ability to remove a public defender from office except for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. This aligns with the board’s ability to remove appointed county counsel (the attorney for the county) from office.
- The Right to Counsel Free from Conflict
The right to effective representation by counsel includes the right to conflict free counsel. (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 948; see also Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 482 [Sixth Amendment anticipates counsel unfettered by conflicting interests].) Conflicts of interest are not limited to situations where an attorney represents multiple defendants with competing interests in the same case (People v. Ramsey (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 731, 734-735), or represents the defendant and a prosecution witness in the same case (In re Darr (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 500, 513-514). "Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or third person or by his own interests. [Citation.]" (People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 835, 254 [italics added].)
This bill is intended to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliation. If a public defender’s incentive to fulfill their duties and uphold their clients’ constitutionally guaranteed rights is compromised by fear of personal retaliation, their clients’ constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel free from conflict is also compromised.
While according to information provided by the author’s office, there are no documented instances in California where a board of supervisors has removed a public defender for taking up controversial issues, a Pennsylvania Chief Public Defender and Deputy Chief serve as cautionary examples. They were both fired by the board after their office submitted an amicus brief supporting a lawsuit challenging bail setting practices. (https://theappeal.org/pennsylvania-public-defenders-not-reinstated-despite-public-outcry-over-firing/ [as of April 9, 2025].) They filed lawsuits raising retaliation, whistleblower, and First Amendment claims, which the county settled for $300,000. (https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2021/03/19/montgomery-county-to-pay-310k-to-settle-claims-from-former-public-defenders-in-row-over-bail-policies/?slreturn=2025041005802 [as of April 9, 2025].) Though the case settled, a chilling effect of having been fired and having to sue likely resonates among public defenders.
- Term Limits
Unlike public defenders, county counsel are appointed for four year terms. (See Gov. Code, § 27641.) This bill does not similarly subject public defenders to a term limit. However, even if this bill is enacted, charter cities could set their own terms for a public defender.
There are two types of counties: general law counties and charter counties. Charter counties have a limited degree of “home rule” authority, including to elect or appoint county officers and select the length of their terms. Counties may adopt, amend, or repeal a charter with majority vote approval. Currently, there are 15 charter counties. (https://www.counties.org/general-information/county-structure-0, supra.)
- Argument in Support
According to the California Public Defenders Association, the bill’s sponsor:
…This bill protects the independence of chief public defenders who are appointed by county Boards of Supervisors by ensuring that they can only be removed from office by a 3/5 vote of the Board for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. This affords chief public defenders the same protections that are currently in place for county counsels.
In order to be effective, chief public defenders must have independence. Public defenders have a duty to their clients, guaranteed by the Constitution, that is unique among county agencies; it is this duty that must guide every decision that public defenders make. They need the freedom to take unpopular stances, to advocate for those who may not be politically popular, and to occasionally draw the ire of other county departments, or even the members of the Board of Supervisors who appointed them. A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.
Currently, Government Code Section 27703 states that a public defender who is appointed by a county’s Board of Supervisors shall “serve at its will.” This stands in stark contrast to the protections afforded by Government Code Section 27641 to another, similarly situated, county department head: county counsel. SB 485 seeks to correct this anomalous discrepancy; it mirrors the language of Government Code Section 27641, and gives public defenders the same protection that county counsels currently enjoy.
In this time of arbitrary terminations and political retribution, it is more important than ever to protect the independence and integrity of civil servants, particularly those entrusted with protecting Constitutional rights….
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The county district attorney is an elected official who serves a four-year term. https://www.counties.org/county-office/district-attorney [as of April 12, 2025].) ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Senator María Elena Durazo, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: | SB 485 | Hearing Date: | 4/2/25 |
Author: | Reyes | Fiscal: | Yes |
Version: | 2/19/25 | Consultant: | Peterson |
County public defender: appointment
Allows a county board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender only with a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Background
County governance. Counties fall into two types: “general law” and “charter.” General law counties are organized according to the generally applicable laws for county governance established by the Legislature that set the number, appointment, and election procedures for county officials, including the board of supervisors.
Charter counties have greater leeway to determine their own governance structure, including to elect additional supervisors, appoint or elect additional officers, and select the length of their terms. A new charter, or the amendment of an existing charter, may be proposed by the board of supervisors, a charter commission, or an initiative petition. There are 14 charter counties: Alameda, Butte, El Dorado, Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange, Placer, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Tehama. Most large counties are charter counties: eight of the ten largest counties by population have adopted charters.
All counties elect or appoint a variety of county officials. The California Constitution requires all counties to elect a sheriff, district attorney, assessor, and board of supervisors, and state law lists the officers general law counties must have. State law gives county boards of supervisors the authority to consolidate the duties of certain county offices by ordinance. Other county offices may be elected or appointed, like the public defender.
Removing a county official. While some actions of public officials automatically result in vacating an office, such as conviction of a felony or of any offense involving a violation of their official duties, officials can be removed through other means. For example, the grand jury of the county that has elected or appointed a public official can bring an accusation in writing, which states the offense charged, for willful or corrupt misconduct in office. Such a written accusation requires concurrence of 8 to 14 members of the grand jury depending on the total number of members the respective grand jury has. Additionally, some types of county officials can only be removed under certain conditions. For example a county board of supervisors can only remove the county counsel, who serves as the county’s lawyer, for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 board vote (AB 1539, Allen, 1959).
Public defenders. To ensure individuals charged with a crime receive equal protection and due process under the law, the U.S. and California Constitutions guarantee the right to effective attorney assistance (unless knowingly and intelligently waived) to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings receive equal protection under law and due process before being deprived of life or liberty. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) found that the right to counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials” in the United States and that defendants who are too poor to hire attorneys cannot be assured of a fair trial unless attorneys are provided by the government, also known as indigent defense. The U.S. Supreme Court further noted that even an intelligent and educated person would be in danger of conviction due to a lack of skill and knowledge for adequately preparing a defense to establish innocence. As such, effective defense counsel is necessary to ensure a defendant has a fair trial against government‑funded and trained prosecutors—irrespective of their income level. In many counties, this is accomplished through the establishment of a public defender’s office.
Of California’s 58 counties, there are 34 public defender offices. Counties without a public defender office contract with law offices to provide indigent defense. Some counties share a public defender. When counties establish a public defender’s office, the board of supervisors can elect to have an elected or appointed public defender. Of the state’s 34 public defenders, only San Francisco elects their public defender. Unlike county counsels which can only be removed for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause, an appointed public defender serves at the will of the board of supervisors (AB 1796, Watson, 1943), meaning the board can remove them for any reason.
The California Public Defenders Association wants to limit a board of supervisor’s ability to remove a public defender except for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Proposed Law
Senate Bill 485 allows the board of supervisors to remove an appointed public defender with a 3/5 vote for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause.
Comments
1. Purpose of the bill. According to the author, “Chief Public Defenders play a crucial role in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system. They uphold the Constitution by guaranteeing access to competent legal counsel for all, regardless of financial status. When a public defender fulfills this duty to their clients, it may mean taking unpopular stances which can include positions that, although legal, come into conflict with their appointing board. This creates a challenging environment as public defenders can be fired without cause by a county board of supervisors, creating a disincentive to fulfill their duties out of fear of retaliation, and in turn not offering their clients their constitutionally guaranteed rights. To ensure a fair legal system, public defenders must be free from political pressure and retaliation. SB 485 seeks to eliminate the "at-will" status of Chief Public Defenders, allowing them to be removed only by a 3/5 vote of the board for neglect, misconduct, or other justifiable reasons. This reform would protect their independence and allow them to serve with integrity.”
2. Leave it local? Since 1943, the Legislature has allowed county boards of supervisors to remove their public defenders at will. SB 485 seeks to limit this authority by only allowing for removal in cases of neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause with a 3/5 vote of the board. According to the author, this is necessary to protect public defenders from fear that performing their duties could lead to retaliation. The sponsor of the bill, the California Public Defenders Association, is unaware of an instance where a board of supervisors has removed a public defender. However, they note, “A public defender who fears losing their job if they take up controversial causes cannot adequately fight for their office or for their clients.” Additionally, they argue that SB 485 simply models provisions for public defenders after those for county counsels that have been in place since 1959, which allow a board to only remove a county counsel for neglect of duty, malfeasance or misconduct in office, or other good cause. While these provisions are similar, SB 485 does not subject public defenders to a four-year term like county counsels, which provides county boards with the option to select a different county counsel or appoint the existing counsel to an additional four-year term. However, county charters already allow charter counties to determine whether a term limit is necessary, or spell out conditions when they can remove an officer. For example, Fresno, San Diego and Alameda Counties all have provisions in their charter that specify that the county counsel serves at will, and the board can remove them for any reason. Even if this measure is enacted, charter counties could spell out their own terms for a public defender, just like they have for county counsels. General law counties would not have this ability. The Committee may wish to consider whether the Legislature should limit a board of supervisor’s ability to remove a public defender at will, and if they do, whether an appointed public defender should have a term-limit similar to that of county counsels.
3. Let’s get technical. Committee staff makes the following suggested technical amendment:
- On page 2, line 2, add a space between “of” and “supervisors.”
4. Coming and going. The Senate Rules Committee has ordered a double referral of SB 485: first to the Senate Local Government Committee to hear issues related to local government, and second to the Senate Public Safety Committee.
Support and Opposition
(3/28/2025)
Support: California Public Defenders Association (CPDA) (Sponsor)
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Opposition: None Submitted
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Discussed in Hearing
Senate Floor
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Assembly Standing Committee on Local Government
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):