SB 52: Housing rental terms: algorithmic devices.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2025-07-17
Current Status:
In Progress
(2025-08-29: August 29 hearing: Held in committee and under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law governs the hiring of residential dwelling units and requires a landlord to provide specified notice to tenants prior to an increase in rent. Existing law, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, prescribes statewide limits on the application of local rent control with regard to certain properties. That act, among other things, authorizes an owner of residential real property to establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or unit that meets specified criteria, subject to certain limitations.
This bill would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to 2 or more persons a rental pricing algorithm, as defined, with the intent or reasonable expectation that it be used by 2 or more persons, as specified, to set rental terms, as defined, for residential premises. The bill would make it unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to recommend rental terms for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms by 2 or more landlords in the same or related market used or if the person coerces any other person to use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental terms for residential premises in the same market or a related market. The bill would also make it unlawful for a person to set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data, as defined, to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for residential premises in the same market or a related market.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws.
This bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a person who is harmed by a violation of the bill to file a civil action, as specified.
Existing law governs the hiring of residential dwelling units and requires a landlord to provide specified notice to tenants prior to an increase in rent. Existing law, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, prescribes statewide limits on the application of local rent control with regard to certain properties. That act, among other things, authorizes an owner of residential real property to establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or unit that meets specified criteria, subject to certain limitations.
This bill would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to 2 or more persons a rental pricing algorithm, as defined, with the intent that it be used by 2 or more persons, as specified, to set rental terms, as defined, for residential premises. The bill would make it unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to recommend rental terms for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms by 2 or more landlords in the same or related market used or if the person coerces any other person to use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental terms for residential premises in the same market or a related market. The bill would also make it unlawful for a person to set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data, as defined, to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for residential premises in the same market or a related market.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws.
This bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a person who is harmed by a violation of the bill to file a civil action, as specified.
Existing law governs the hiring of residential dwelling units and requires a landlord to provide specified notice to tenants prior to an increase in rent. Existing law, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, prescribes statewide limits on the application of local rent control with regard to certain properties. That act, among other things, authorizes an owner of residential real property to establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or unit that meets specified criteria, subject to certain limitations.
This bill would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to 2 or more persons a rental pricing algorithm, as defined, with the intent that it be used by 2 or more persons, as specified, to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates terms, as defined, for residential premises. The bill would make it unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels terms for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms by 2 or more landlords in the same or related market used or will if the person coerces any other person to use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates terms for residential premises. premises in the same market or a related market. The bill would also prohibit make it unlawful for a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or adopt rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises and that is not otherwise prohibited under these provisions from using terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data, as defined, pertaining to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for residential premises in the state. same market or a related market.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts. Under existing law, a violation of the Cartwright Act is punishable as a crime. The Unfair Competition Law makes various practices unlawful and provides that a person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition is liable for a civil penalty, as specified.
This bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a person who is harmed by a violation of the bill to file a civil action, as specified. The bill would provide that a violation of its provisions is an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition in violation of the Unfair Competition Law. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.Existing law governs the hiring of residential dwelling units and requires a landlord to provide specified notice to tenants prior to an increase in rent. Existing law, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, prescribes statewide limits on the application of local rent control with regard to certain properties. That act, among other things, authorizes an owner of residential real property to establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or unit that meets specified criteria, subject to certain limitations.
This bill would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to 2 or more persons a rental pricing algorithm, as defined, with the intent that it be used by 2 or more persons, as specified, to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises. The bill would make it unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises. The bill would also prohibit a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises and that is not otherwise prohibited under these provisions from using nonpublic competitor data, as defined, pertaining to residential premises in the state.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts. Under existing law, a violation of the Cartwright Act is punishable as a crime. The Unfair Competition Law makes various practices unlawful and provides that a person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition is liable for a civil penalty, as specified.
This bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a person who is harmed by a violation of the bill to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, action, as specified. The bill would provide that a violation of its provisions is an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition in violation of the Unfair Competition Law. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law governs the hiring of residential dwelling units and requires a landlord to provide specified notice to tenants prior to an increase in rent. Existing law, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, prescribes statewide limits on the application of local rent control with regard to certain properties. That act, among other things, authorizes an owner of residential real property to establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or unit that meets specified criteria, subject to certain limitations.
This bill would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to a landlord an algorithmic device, as defined, that advises on rental rates or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units, and 2 or more persons a rental pricing algorithm, as defined, with the intent that it be used by 2 or more persons, as specified, to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises. The bill would also make it unlawful for a landlord any person to use an algorithmic device a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units. The premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises. The bill would also prohibit a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates for residential premises and that is not otherwise prohibited under these provisions from using nonpublic competitor data, as defined, pertaining to residential premises in the state.
Existing law establishes the Attorney General as the head of the Department of Justice, with charge of all legal matters in which the state is interested, except as specified. Existing law imposes various requirements on the Attorney General related to consumer protection, including, among others, the supervision of charitable trusts and the enforcement of antitrust laws. Existing law, known as the Cartwright Act, identifies certain acts that are unlawful restraints of trade and unlawful trusts. Under existing law, a violation of the Cartwright Act is punishable as a crime. The Unfair Competition Law makes various practices unlawful and provides that a person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition is liable for a civil penalty, as specified.
This bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a tenant person to file a civil action for a violation of the bill by a landlord, bill, as specified. The bill would provide that a violation of its provisions is an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition in violation of the Unfair Competition Law. Because the bill would expand the scope of activities prohibited by the Cartwright Act, the violation of which is punishable as a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law governs the hiring of residential dwelling units and requires a landlord to provide specified notice to tenants prior to an increase in rent. Existing law, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, prescribes statewide limits on the application of local rent control with regard to certain properties. That act, among other things, authorizes an owner of residential real property to establish the initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or unit that meets specified criteria, subject to certain limitations.
This bill would make it unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to a landlord an algorithmic device, as defined, that advises on rental rates or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units, and would also make it unlawful for a landlord to use an algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units. The bill would authorize the Attorney General, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, to file a civil action for a violation of the bill, as specified, and would authorize a tenant to file a civil action for a violation of the bill by a landlord, as specified.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Renters make up a larger share of households in California at 44 percent, compared to the United States average of 35 percent, and California has a higher percentage of renters compared to any other state other than New York, which has a rate of 46 percent.
(b)Californias median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), which is 40 percent higher than the national median. In the City of Los Angeles, the median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), while in the City and County of San Francisco, the median rent is three thousand two hundred eighty-five dollars ($3,285).
(c)Recently, algorithmic pricing software has disrupted rental housing markets in cities nationwide.
(d)Algorithmic pricing technology uses proprietary lease information to gather and share rent data, setting prices that can inflate rents and vacancy rates. The public sharing of vast amounts of proprietary data can harm renters by calculating and recommending rent and occupancy levels.
(e)Algorithmic pricing software has led to double-digit rent increases, higher vacancy rates, and more evictions, distorting markets by causing both rents and vacancy rates to rise simultaneously.
(f)Often used by large corporate landlords, algorithmic pricing software promotes the consolidation of corporate and private equity ownership of rental housing. This occurs at the expense of landlords, both large and small, who adhere to standard practices, thereby suppressing competition and creating an unfair market advantage.
(g)Investigations have been launched recently into the use of algorithmic pricing software. California and seven other states joined the United States Department of Justices antitrust lawsuit, alleging that an algorithmic intermediary collects, combines, and exploits landlords competitively sensitive information, causing renters to pay inflated prices.
(h)Local governments in California have introduced ordinances to ban the use of algorithmic rent pricing software to protect renters from potential market manipulations.
SEC. 2.Section 1947.16 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.16.(a)It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent or reasonable expectation that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
(b)It is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm for residential premises if either of the following applies:(1)The person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms for a residential premises by two or more landlords in the same market or a related market.(2)The person coerces any other person to set or adopt a recommended rental terms for a residential premises located in the same market or a related market.(c)(b)It is unlawful for a person to set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the same market or a related market.
(d)(c)(1)For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section, each month that a violation exists or continues shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(2)Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, provides the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3)Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(e)(d)The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, Part 2 (commencing with Section 16600) of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code, including provisions in this section, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(2)(A)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data derived from two or more competitors, directly or indirectly, regarding information about actual rental amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that is obtained through nonpublic means.
(B)Nonpublic competitor data does not include any of the following:
(i)Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from publicly accessible sources, including, but not limited to:
(I)Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager. a third party.
(II)Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
(ii)Information obtained from public records subject to disclosure pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552).
(iii)Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
(iv)Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
(v)Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
(vi)Data processed by the rental pricing algorithm collected more than one year before the use or distribution of the rental pricing algorithm.
(vii)Listings, advertisements or other information regarding rental properties on a multiple listing service, as defined in Section 1087.
(3)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public.
(4)Rental pricing algorithm means a service or product, commonly known as revenue management software, that uses one or more algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rental terms for the purpose of advising a landlord on setting or recommending rental terms for residential premises.
(A)Rental pricing algorithm includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
(B)Rental pricing algorithm does not include either of the following:
(i)A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii)A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(5)Rental term means rental rate, lease term, or occupancy level.
(e)For purposes of this section, a parent entity and its wholly owned subsidiaries shall be considered one person.
(f)(1)The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2)A person who is harmed by a violation of this section may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorneys fees or that caps the tenants fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenants claim against their landlord under this section.
(g)(1)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions described herein apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
(2)The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Renters make up a larger share of households in California at 44 percent, compared to the United States average of 35 percent, and California has a higher percentage of renters compared to any other state other than New York, which has a rate of 46 percent.
(b)Californias median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), which is 40 percent higher than the national median. In the City of Los Angeles, the median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), while in the City and County of San Francisco, the median rent is three thousand two hundred eighty-five dollars ($3,285).
(c)Recently, algorithmic pricing software has disrupted rental housing markets in cities nationwide.
(d)Algorithmic pricing technology uses proprietary lease information to gather and share rent data, setting prices that can inflate rents and vacancy rates. The public sharing of vast amounts of proprietary data can harm renters by calculating and recommending rent and occupancy levels.
(e)Algorithmic pricing software has led to double-digit rent increases, higher vacancy rates, and more evictions, distorting markets by causing both rents and vacancy rates to rise simultaneously.
(f)Often used by large corporate landlords, algorithmic pricing software promotes the consolidation of corporate and private equity ownership of rental housing. This occurs at the expense of landlords, both large and small, who adhere to standard practices, thereby suppressing competition and creating an unfair market advantage.
(g)Investigations have been launched recently into the use of algorithmic pricing software. California and seven other states joined the United States Department of Justices antitrust lawsuit, alleging that an algorithmic intermediary collects, combines, and exploits landlords competitively sensitive information, causing renters to pay inflated prices.
(h)Local governments in California have introduced ordinances to ban the use of algorithmic rent pricing software to protect renters from potential market manipulations.
SEC. 2.Section 1947.16 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.16.(a)It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
(b)It is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm for residential premises if either of the following applies:
(1)The person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms for a residential premises by two or more landlords in the same market or a related market.
(2)The person coerces any other person to set or adopt a recommended rental terms for a residential premises located in the same market or a related market.
(c)It is unlawful for a person to set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the same market or a related market.
(d)(1)For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section, each month that a violation exists or continues shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(2)Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3)Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(e)The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this section, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(2)(A)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data derived from two or more competitors, directly or indirectly, regarding information about actual rental amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that is obtained through nonpublic means.
(B)Nonpublic competitor data does not include any of the following:
(i)Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from publicly accessible sources, including, but not limited to:
(I)Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager.
(II)Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
(ii)Information obtained from public records subject to disclosure pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552).
(iii)Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
(iv)Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
(v)Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
(vi)Data processed by the rental pricing algorithm collected more than one year before the use or distribution of the rental pricing algorithm.
(vii)Listings, advertisements or other information regarding rental properties on a multiple listing service, as defined in Section 1087.
(3)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public.
(4)Rental pricing algorithm means a service or product, commonly known as revenue management software, that uses one or more algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rental terms for the purpose of advising a landlord on setting or recommending rental terms for residential premises.
(A)Rental pricing algorithm includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
(B)Rental pricing algorithm does not include either of the following:
(i)A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii)A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(5)Rental term means rental rate, lease term, or occupancy level.
(f)(1)The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2)A person who is harmed by a violation of this section may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorneys fees or that caps the tenants fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenants claim against their landlord under this section.
(g)(1)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions described herein apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
(2)The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Renters make up a larger share of households in California at 44 percent, compared to the United States average of 35 percent, and California has a higher percentage of renters compared to any other state other than New York, which has a rate of 46 percent.
(b)Californias median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), which is 40 percent higher than the national median. In the City of Los Angeles, the median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), while in the City and County of San Francisco, the median rent is three thousand two hundred eighty-five dollars ($3,285).
(c)Recently, algorithmic pricing software has disrupted rental housing markets in cities nationwide.
(d)Algorithmic pricing technology uses proprietary lease information to gather and share rent data, setting prices that can inflate rents and vacancy rates. The public sharing of vast amounts of proprietary data can harm renters by calculating and recommending rent and occupancy levels.
(e)Algorithmic pricing software has led to double-digit rent increases, higher vacancy rates, and more evictions, distorting markets by causing both rents and vacancy rates to rise simultaneously.
(f)Often used by large corporate landlords, algorithmic pricing software promotes the consolidation of corporate and private equity ownership of rental housing. This occurs at the expense of landlords, both large and small, who adhere to standard practices, thereby suppressing competition and creating an unfair market advantage.
(g)Investigations have been launched recently into the use of algorithmic pricing software. California and seven other states joined the United States Department of Justices antitrust lawsuit, alleging that an algorithmic intermediary collects, combines, and exploits landlords competitively sensitive information, causing renters to pay inflated prices.
(h)Local governments in California have introduced ordinances to ban the use of algorithmic rent pricing software to protect renters from potential market manipulations.
SEC. 2.Section 1947.16 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.16.(a)It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels rental terms for residential premises.
(b)It is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the either of the following applies:
(1)The person knew knows or should have known know that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels rental terms for a residential premises. premises by two or more landlords in the same market or a related market.
(2)The person coerces any other person to set or adopt a recommended rental terms for a residential premises located in the same market or a related market.
(c)A It is unlawful for a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or recommend adopt rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises, and that is not otherwise prohibited under subdivision (a), shall not use terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data pertaining to to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the state. same market or a related market.
(d)(1)For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section, each month that a violation exists or continues shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(2)Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3)Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(e)The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this section, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(2)(A)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data derived from two or more persons, competitors, directly or indirectly, including regarding information about actual rental rates, lease terms, amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market. lease start and end dates that is obtained through nonpublic means.
(B)Nonpublic competitor data does not include any of the following:
(i)Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from the following publicly accessible sources: sources, including, but not limited to:
(I)Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager.
(II)Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
(ii)Information obtained from public records subject to disclosure pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552).
(ii)(iii)Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
(iii)(iv)Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
(iv)(v)Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
(vi)Data processed by the rental pricing algorithm collected more than one year before the use or distribution of the rental pricing algorithm.
(3)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public.
(4)Rental pricing algorithm means a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, commonly known as revenue management software, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rental terms for the purpose of advising a landlord on setting or recommending rental terms for residential premises.
(A)Rental pricing algorithm includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
(B)Rental pricing algorithm does not include either of the following:
(i)A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii)A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(5)Rental term means rental rate, lease term, or occupancy level.
(f)(1)The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2)A person who is harmed by a violation of this section may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorneys fees or that caps the tenants fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenants claim against their landlord under this section.
(g)(1)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions described herein apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
(2)A violation of this section shall constitute an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 16700) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code) and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Unfair Competition Law (Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code). The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Renters make up a larger share of households in California at 44 percent, compared to the United States average of 35 percent, and California has a higher percentage of renters compared to any other state other than New York, which has a rate of 46 percent.
(b)Californias median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), which is 40 percent higher than the national median. In the City of Los Angeles, the median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), while in the City and County of San Francisco, the median rent is three thousand two hundred eighty-five dollars ($3,285).
(c)Recently, algorithmic pricing software has disrupted rental housing markets in cities nationwide.
(d)Algorithmic pricing technology uses proprietary lease information to gather and share rent data, setting prices that can inflate rents and vacancy rates. The public sharing of vast amounts of proprietary data can harm renters by calculating and recommending rent and occupancy levels.
(e)Algorithmic pricing software has led to double-digit rent increases, higher vacancy rates, and more evictions, distorting markets by causing both rents and vacancy rates to rise simultaneously.
(f)Often used by large corporate landlords, algorithmic pricing software promotes the consolidation of corporate and private equity ownership of rental housing. This occurs at the expense of landlords, both large and small, who adhere to standard practices, thereby suppressing competition and creating an unfair market advantage.
(g)Investigations have been launched recently into the use of algorithmic pricing software. California and seven other states joined the United States Department of Justices antitrust lawsuit, alleging that an algorithmic intermediary collects, combines, and exploits landlords competitively sensitive information, causing renters to pay inflated prices.
(h)Local governments in California have introduced ordinances to ban the use of algorithmic rent pricing software to protect renters from potential market manipulations.
SEC. 2.Section 1947.16 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.16.(a)It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises.
(b)It is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises.
(c)A person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises, and that is not otherwise prohibited under subdivision (a), shall not use nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state.
(d)Each (1)For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section, each month that a violation exists or continues, and each residential premises for which the person uses the rental pricing algorithm, continues shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(2)Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3)Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(e)The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1)Antitrust laws has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this section, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
(1)(2)(A)Nonpublic competitor data means nonpublic data, data derived from two or more persons, directly or indirectly, including information about actual rental rates, lease terms, occupancy rates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market.
(B)Nonpublic competitor data does not include any of the following:
(i)Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from the following publicly accessible sources:
(I)Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager.
(II)Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
(ii)Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
(iii)Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
(iv)Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
(2)(3)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data. public.
(3)(4)Rental pricing algorithm means a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of residential premises.
(A)Rental pricing algorithm includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
(B)Rental pricing algorithm does not include either of the following:
(i)A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii)A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(f)(1)The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2)A person who is harmed by a violation of this section may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorneys fees or that caps the tenants fee award shall not be enforceable against void as contrary to public policy in a tenants claim for attorneys fees that arise against their landlord under this paragraph. section.
(g)(1)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions described herein apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
(2)A violation of this section shall constitute an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 16700) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code) and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Unfair Competition Law (Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code). The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Renters make up a larger share of households in California at 44 percent, compared to the United States average of 35 percent, and California has a higher percentage of renters compared to any other state other than New York, which has a rate of 46 percent.
(b)Californias median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), which is 40 percent higher than the national median. In the City of Los Angeles, the median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), while in the City and County of San Francisco, the median rent is three thousand two hundred eighty-five dollars ($3,285).
(c)Recently, algorithmic pricing software has disrupted rental housing markets in cities nationwide.
(d)Algorithmic pricing technology uses proprietary lease information to gather and share rent data, setting prices that can inflate rents and vacancy rates. The public sharing of vast amounts of proprietary data can harm renters by calculating and recommending rent and occupancy levels.
(e)Algorithmic pricing software has led to double-digit rent increases, higher vacancy rates, and more evictions, distorting markets by causing both rents and vacancy rates to rise simultaneously.
(f)Often used by large corporate landlords, algorithmic pricing software promotes the consolidation of corporate and private equity ownership of rental housing. This occurs at the expense of landlords, both large and small, who adhere to standard practices, thereby suppressing competition and creating an unfair market advantage.
(g)Investigations have been launched recently into the use of algorithmic pricing software. California and seven other states joined the United States Department of Justices antitrust lawsuit, alleging that an algorithmic intermediary collects, combines, and exploits landlords competitively sensitive information, causing renters to pay inflated prices.
(h)Local governments in California have introduced ordinances to ban the use of algorithmic rent pricing software to protect renters from potential market manipulations.
SEC. 2.Section 1947.14 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.14.SEC. 2.Section 1947.16 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.16.(a)It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to a landlord an algorithmic device that advises on rental rates or occupancy levels that may be achieved for residential dwelling units. two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises.
(b)(1)It is unlawful for a landlord any person to use an algorithmic device a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units. premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises.
(c)A person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises, and that is not otherwise prohibited under subdivision (a), shall not use nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state.
(2)(d)Each month that a violation exists or continues, and each dwelling unit residential premises for which the landlord person uses the algorithmic device, rental pricing algorithm, shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(c)(e)The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1)Algorithmic device means a device commonly known as revenue management software that uses one or more algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rents or occupancy levels, for the purpose of advising a landlord on whether to leave a unit vacant or on the amount of rent that the landlord may obtain for a unit.(A)Algorithmic device includes a product that incorporates an algorithmic device.(B)Algorithmic device does not include either of the following:(i) A report that publishes existing rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.(ii)A product used for the purpose of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.(2)(1)(A)Nonpublic competitor data means information that is not available to the general public, nonpublic data, including information about actual rent amounts, rental rates, lease terms, occupancy rates, lease start and end dates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market.
(B)Nonpublic competitor data does not include any of the following:
(i)Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from the following publicly accessible sources:
(I)Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager.
(II)Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
(ii)Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
(iii)Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
(iv)Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
(2)Nonpublic data means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
(3)Rental pricing algorithm means a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of residential premises.
(A)Rental pricing algorithm includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
(B)Rental pricing algorithm does not include either of the following:
(i)A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii)A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(d)(f)(1)The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2)A tenant person may file a civil action for a violation of subdivision (b) this section for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the tenant if the tenant is the prevailing party plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorneys fees shall not be enforceable against a tenants claim for attorneys fees that arise under this paragraph.
(g)(1)Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions described herein apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
(2)A violation of this section shall constitute an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 16700) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code) and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Unfair Competition Law (Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code). The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
SEC. 3.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Renters make up a larger share of households in California at 44 percent, compared to the United States average of 35 percent, and California has a higher percentage of renters compared to any other state other than New York, which has a rate of 46 percent.
(b)Californias median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), which is 40 percent higher than the national median. In the City of Los Angeles, the median rent is two thousand eight hundred dollars ($2,800), while in the City and County of San Francisco, the median rent is three thousand two hundred eighty-five dollars ($3,285).
(c)Recently, algorithmic pricing software has disrupted rental housing markets in cities nationwide.
(d)Algorithmic pricing technology uses proprietary lease information to gather and share rent data, setting prices that can inflate rents and vacancy rates. The public sharing of vast amounts of proprietary data can harm renters by calculating and recommending rent and occupancy levels.
(e)Algorithmic pricing software has led to double-digit rent increases, higher vacancy rates, and more evictions, distorting markets by causing both rents and vacancy rates to rise simultaneously.
(f)Often used by large corporate landlords, algorithmic pricing software promotes the consolidation of corporate and private equity ownership of rental housing. This occurs at the expense of landlords, both large and small, who adhere to standard practices, thereby suppressing competition and creating an unfair market advantage.
(g)Investigations have been launched recently into the use of algorithmic pricing software. California and seven other states joined the United States Department of Justices antitrust lawsuit, alleging that an algorithmic intermediary collects, combines, and exploits landlords competitively sensitive information, causing renters to pay inflated prices.
(h)Local governments in California have introduced ordinances to ban the use of algorithmic rent pricing software to protect renters from potential market manipulations.
SEC. 2.Section 1947.14 is added to the Civil Code, to read:1947.14.(a)It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to a landlord an algorithmic device that advises on rental rates or occupancy levels that may be achieved for residential dwelling units.
(b)(1)It is unlawful for a landlord to use an algorithmic device to set rental rates or occupancy levels for residential dwelling units.
(2)Each month that a violation exists or continues, and each dwelling unit for which the landlord uses the algorithmic device, shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(c)The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1)Algorithmic device means a device commonly known as revenue management software that uses one or more algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rents or occupancy levels, for the purpose of advising a landlord on whether to leave a unit vacant or on the amount of rent that the landlord may obtain for a unit.
(A)Algorithmic device includes a product that incorporates an algorithmic device.
(B)Algorithmic device does not include either of the following:
(i) A report that publishes existing rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii)A product used for the purpose of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(2)Nonpublic competitor data means information that is not available to the general public, including information about actual rent amounts, occupancy rates, lease start and end dates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market.
(d)(1)The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2)A tenant may file a civil action for a violation of subdivision (b) for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the tenant if the tenant is the prevailing party in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorneys fees shall not be enforceable against a tenants claim for attorneys fees that arise under this paragraph.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Aug 29, 2025 | August 29 hearing: Held in committee and under submission. |
| Aug 20, 2025 | August 20 set for first hearing. Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 17, 2025 | (Ayes 49. Noes 15. Page 2578.) |
| Jul 17, 2025 | Assembly Rule 63 suspended. |
| Jul 17, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 17, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 10. Noes 4.) (July 16). |
| Jul 8, 2025 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jul 2, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. (Ayes 9. Noes 3.) (July 1). Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jun 26, 2025 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 9, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and P. & C.P. |
| Jun 3, 2025 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Jun 2, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 28. Noes 9. Page 1362.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 23, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 5. Noes 1. Page 1189.) (May 23). |
| May 16, 2025 | Set for hearing May 23. |
| May 5, 2025 | May 5 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 29, 2025 | Set for hearing May 5. |
| Apr 24, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 11. Noes 0. Page 833.) (April 22). |
| Apr 8, 2025 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 3, 2025 | Set for hearing April 22. |
| Jan 29, 2025 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jan 6, 2025 | Read first time. |
| Dec 23, 2024 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after January 20. |
| Dec 20, 2024 | Introduced. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 16, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
|
| Jul 1, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Privacy and Consumer Protection] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Jun 2, 2025 | Senate 3rd Reading SB52 Pérez | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 23, 2025 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| May 5, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 22, 2025 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| AAPIs for Civic Empowerment | ** Support | |
| AARP | ** Support | |
| Aclu California Action | ** Support | |
| Aids Healthcare Foundation | ** Support | |
| Alliance Of Californians For Community Empowerment | ** Support | |
| American Economic Liberties Project | ** Support | |
| Apartment Association, California Southern Cities | ** Against | |
| Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles | ** Against | |
| Apartment Association Of Orange County | ** Against | |
| Basta, INC. | ** Support | |
| Bay Area Legal Aid | ** Support | |
| Berkeley Property Owners Association | ** Against | |
| California Apartment Association | ** Against | |
| California Association Of Realtors | ** Against | |
| California Center for Movement Legal Services | ** Support | |
| California Community Land Trust Network | ** Support | |
| California Democratic Renters Council | ** Support | |
| California Green New Deal Coalition | ** Support | |
| California Housing Partnership | ** Support | |
| California Rental Housing Association | ** Against | |
| California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation | ** Support | |
| California School Employees Association | ** Support | |
| Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice | ** Support | |
| CFT- a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, Aft, Afl-cio | ** Support | |
| Christian Church Homes | ** Support | |
| City of Santa Monica | ** Support | |
| Consumer Federation Of California | ** Support | |
| County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors | ** Support | |
| Disability Rights California | ** Support | |
| Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund | ** Support | |
| East Bay Housing Organizations | ** Support | |
| East Bay Rental Housing Association | ** Against | |
| Economic Security California Action | ** Support | |
| evolve california | ** Support | |
| Housing and Economic Rights Advocates | ** Support | |
| Housing California | ** Support | |
| Housing Now! | ** Support | |
| Human Impact Partners | ** Support | |
| Inner City Law Center | ** Support | |
| Kapor Center | ** Support | |
| Nor Cal Rental Property Association | ** Against | |
| North Valley Property Owners Association | ** Against | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| PICO California | ** Support | |
| Powerca Action | ** Support | |
| Power California Action | ** Support | |
| Private Equity Stakeholder Project | ** Support | |
| Realpage, Inc. | ** Against | |
| SAN DIEGO; COUNTY OF | ** Support | |
| San Diego Regional Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Santa Barbara Rental Property Association | ** Against | |
| Santa Monica Rent Control Board | ** Support | |
| Several individuals | ** Against | |
| Southern California Rental Housing Association | ** Against | |
| Techequity Action | ** Support | |
| The Big Tent San Leandro | ** Support | |
| UDW/AFSCME Local 3930 | ** Support | |
| UNITE HERE Local 11 | ** Support | |
| Urban Habitat | ** Support | |
| western center on law and poverty | ** Support | |
| West Hollywood/hernan Molina, Governmental Affairs Liaison | ** Support |
Date of Hearing: August 20, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 52
Author:(Pérez) – As Amended Ver:July 17, 2025
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 9 - 3 |
Privacy and Consumer Protection | 10 - 4 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill prohibits specified uses of rental pricing algorithms that process nonpublic competitor data.
Specifically, among other provisions, this bill:
- Prohibits a person from selling, licensing, or otherwise providing to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent or reasonable expectation that it be used by two or more persons in the same market to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
- Prohibits a person from setting or adopting rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms and the algorithm or the recommendation of the algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the same market.
- Authorizes enforcement by the Attorney General and the city or county counsel in the county in which a rental unit is located, who may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation.
- Authorizes a person harmed by a violation to file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
- Defines a violation as follows:
- For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this bill, each month that a violation exists or continues is a separate and distinct violation.
- Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this bill is a separate and distinct violation.
- Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used in violation of this bill is a separate and distinct violation.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs (Unfair Competition Law Fund) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to bring enforcement actions as authorized by this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of enforcement actions pursued by DOJ and the amount of additional work created by each action, but costs may be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. DOJ anticipates costs of $371,000 in fiscal year 2025-26 and $650,000 ongoing annually thereafter for an additional attorney, analyst, and legal secretary in its Consumer Protection Section to handle this workload. DOJ reports it cannot implement the requirements of this bill without an appropriation of additional funds.
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate civil actions authorized by this bill. Actual costs will depend on the number of cases filed and the amount of court time needed to resolve each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2025-26 state budget provides $82 million ongoing General Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund for court operations.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. The author argues use of price-setting algorithms by landlords and property managers is an anti-competitive business practice that must be expressly prohibited by state law. According to the author:
Real estate giants are harnessing algorithms to recommend rent prices based on rental data from thousands of landlords and other sources…Although federal and state law clearly sets precedent for illegal antitrust and anticompetitive practices, landlords continue to rely on algorithms like RealPage provides, arguing that their practices are not covered under those laws. As such, landlords continue to share and compile competitive data through this platform in order to set inflated rental prices in a manner eerily similar to examples of antitrust violations.
- Background. Coordinated price-fixing is an anticompetitive business practice prohibited by federal law and the Cartwright Act, California’s primary antitrust statute. The traditional conception of price-fixing involves direct communication by two business competitors who agree to increase their prices in the same market so they each make more money at the expense of consumers. Algorithmic price fixing refers to the use of software to set or recommend prices in ways that result in coordinated outcomes between competitors without any formal agreement. In the contemporary economy, many businesses use algorithms that process huge quantities of data and make recommendations about the prices a business should set. Depending on what data is processed by an algorithm, how many businesses are using the same algorithm in the same market, and other factors, these algorithmic tools can create the same result as coordinated price-fixing: businesses setting similarly high prices to the detriment of consumers. However, the business community reports that use of price-setting algorithms is ubiquitous and not inherently collusive.
This bill is one of several this session that tries to define when use and distribution of price-setting algorithms becomes an anticompetitive practice tantamount to price-fixing. Unlike the bills referenced below, which more broadly apply to any good or service, SB 52 focuses specifically on algorithms used to make recommendations and set prices for residential housing. According to the author’s office, the bill is based on local ordinances banning algorithmic rent-pricing software, which have been adopted by the cities of San Francisco, San Diego, and Berkeley, among others.
- Related Legislation. AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry) specifies that using or distributing a common pricing algorithm to further a price-fixing conspiracy is a violation of the Cartwright Act. AB 325 is pending on the Senate Appropriations Committee’s suspense file.
SB 295 (Hurtado) prohibits a person from distributing a pricing algorithm, or making recommendations based on a pricing algorithm, to two or more competitors if the person knows or should know that the algorithm processes competitor data. The prohibition applies to price-setting for products, services, and rental property within the same market. SB 295 is pending in this committee.
SB 384 (Wahab) prohibits a person from selling, licensing, providing, or using a price-setting algorithm with the intent or reasonable expectation that it be used by two or more competitors in the same market if the person knows or should know that the algorithm processes nonpublic data. The prohibition applies to price-setting for goods, services, and rental property within the same market. SB 384 is pending in this committee.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: July 16, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 52
Author:(Pérez) – As Amended Ver:July 8, 2025
SENATE VOTE: 28-9
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
SUBJECT: Housing rental terms: algorithmic devices
SYNOPSIS
Antitrust laws have been on the books for over a century and have evolved along with the means of reaching unlawful price-fixing agreements. As smoke-filled backrooms and handshakes gave way to the phone, fax, pager, and email, the law has adapted to address new challenges. The new frontier is algorithmic price-fixing, which can attain uncompetitive ends with greater efficiency and scale – and yet is even more difficult to detect, let alone prove in court.
While algorithmic collusion appears to be on the rise in certain sectors of the economy, competition in the legislative marketplace of ideas is thriving. Before the Committee today are three overlapping bills – this bill, SB 295 (Hurtado), and SB 384 (Wahab) – that, in similar ways, seek to prohibit the distribution and use of algorithmic price-fixing tools that process nonpublic competitor data. Whereas SB 295 and SB 384 apply to a broader array of categories, this bill focuses specifically on rental housing.
Specifically, the bill makes it unlawful for a person to provide a rental pricing algorithm that uses nonpublic competitor data, if the person intends for it to be used by two or more persons in the same or related market. The bill also makes it unlawful to use the rental pricing algorithm if they know or should know that the rental pricing algorithm has been used by two or more landlords in the same or related market, or if they coerce a person into adopting a recommended rental term, as specified. Finally, the bill makes it unlawful to set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know the algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data and the recommendation was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term in the same or related market. The bill is enforceable by public prosecutors and a private right of action.
Committee amendments, described in Comment #8, eliminate a duplicative provision, make minor changes to align the bill with its companion bills, and make other clarifying changes.
The bill is author-sponsored and supported by a broad coalition, including public interest and housing advocates. It is opposed by rental housing associations, among others.
The bill was previously heard by the Judiciary Committee, where it passed on a 9-3 vote.
THIS BILL:
- Makes certain findings and declarations.
- Makes the following unlawful for a person to:
- Sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
- Use a rental pricing algorithm if either 1) the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms for a residential premises by two or more landlords in the same market or a related market, or 2) the person coerces any other person to set or adopt a recommended rental term for a residential premises located in the same market or a related market.
- Set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or its recommendation was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the same market or a related market.
- Provides that, with respect to the provision and use of a rental pricing algorithm in violation of the provisions described above, each month that a violation exists constitutes a separate and distinct violation. Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is provided or used in violation of the provisions described above additionally constitutes a separate and distinct violation.
- Defines, among other terms:
- “Rental pricing algorithm” as a service or product, commonly known as revenue management software, that uses one or more algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rental terms for the purpose of advising a landlord on setting or recommending rental terms for residential premises, except as provided.
- “Nonpublic data” as information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public.
- “Nonpublic competitor data” as nonpublic data derived from two or more competitors, directly or indirectly, regarding information about actual rental amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that is obtained through nonpublic means. Excepts from this definition certain information, including data processed by the rental pricing algorithm collected more than one year before the use or distribution of the rental pricing algorithm.
- Provides that public prosecutors may file a civil action for a violation of the bill for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
- Additionally provides that a person harmed by a violation of the bill may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties of up to $1,000, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Provides that a lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorney’s fees or that caps the tenant’s fee award is void as contrary to public policy in a tenant’s claim against their landlord under the bill.
- Provides that it does not limit the applicability of other antitrust laws and that the remedies and penalties under the bill are in addition to any others available under state law.
EXISTING LAW:
- Under the federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, prohibits any contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, that unreasonably restrains trade. (15 U.S.C. § 1.) Prohibits monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize, trade or commerce. (15 U.S.C. § 2.)
- Under California’s Cartwright Act, makes every “trust” unlawful, against public policy, and void. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16726.) Defines a “trust” as a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons in order to do any of the following:
- Create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- Limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.
- Prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity.
- Fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer is in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended for sale, barter, use or consumption in California.
- Make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any or any combination of any of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720.)
- Provides that the Attorney General and county district attorneys may bring criminal or civil actions to enforce the Cartwright Act. Corporations are subject to fines of up to $1 million; individuals are subject to fines of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for three years. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 16755.)
- Grants a private right of action in which plaintiffs may recover treble damages, injunctive relief, costs, attorney’s fees, and interest on actual damages. (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16750, 16761.)
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
California has a rental housing affordability crisis. This state is the most expensive state to rent in, requiring an average hourly wage of $47.38 to afford a 2-bedroom apartment. More than half of the state’s renters are rent-burdened as they have to contribute more than 30% of their income to rent. While the rental housing affordability crisis isn’t new, exacerbating this crisis is how landlords are using tech to inflate rents above what is fair.
Real estate giants are harnessing algorithms to recommend rent prices based on rental data from thousands of landlords and other sources. These AI-backed rent-setting tools turn competitors into collaborators for a potentially already unlawful information sharing collusion operation that provides landlords with an unfair and unsustainable advantage. This is tech-powered exploitation and worsening the already dire affordability crisis.
Although federal and state law clearly sets precedent for illegal antitrust and anticompetitive practices, landlords continue to rely on algorithms like RealPage provides, arguing that their practices are not covered under those laws. As such, landlords continue to share and compile competitive data through this platform in order to set inflated rental prices in a manner eerily similar to examples of antitrust violations. Due to the sketchy nature of algorithmic utilization among landlord competitors, federal, state, and local government officials have begun taking action to address what has been depicted as “an unlawful information-sharing scheme.
SB 52 addresses the question of price-fixing in rental markets through third party algorithms by clearly defining in state law that using such methods is illegal. Further, SB 52 provides mechanisms for accountability and enforcement for using these algorithms illegally.
2) Antitrust laws. Two closely related antitrust laws – the federal Sherman Act and the state’s Cartwright Act – are implicated in any form of price-fixing.
Sherman Act. Section 1 of the federal Sherman Act prohibits concerted action that restrains trade, while Section 2 covers concerted action and independent action, but “only when it threatens actual monopolization,” a higher bar than restraint of trade.[1] According to the United States Supreme Court:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.[2]
“The relevant inquiry” under section 1 “is whether there is a ‘contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy’ amongst ‘separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, such that the agreement ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,’ and therefore of ‘diversity of entrepreneurial interests,’ and thus of actual or potential competition.”[3] In other words, “The ‘crucial question’ prompting Section 1 liability is ‘whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct ‘stems from [lawful] independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.’”[4]
Cartwright Act. “[B]roader in range and deeper in reach”[5] than its federal counterpart, California’s Cartwright Act (Act) “‘generally outlaws any combinations or agreements which restrain trade or competition or which fix or control prices.’”[6] The Act is “premised on the notion that competition yields efficient resource allocation, lower prices, higher quality, and greater social welfare.”[7] “‘At its heart is a prohibition against agreements that prevent the growth of healthy, competitive markets for goods and services and the establishment of prices through market forces.’”[8] “The [A]ct’s principal goal is the preservation of consumer welfare.”[9]
Under the Act, a violation requires “a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons” that seeks to achieve an anticompetitive end.[10] A complaint pursuant to the Act must allege: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts.”[11]
Concerted action. “Two forms of conspiracy may be used to establish a violation of antitrust laws: a horizontal restraint, consisting of a collaboration among competitors; or a vertical restraint, based upon an agreement between business entities occupying different levels of the marketing chain.”[12] A hybrid of horizontal and vertical agreements is sometimes referred to as a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy, in which a central actor, or hub, enters into vertical agreements with spokes, such as competing manufacturers or distributors. If the spokes have horizontal agreements with each other, the conspiracy is “rimmed”, whereas if they do not, it is a “rimless” hub-and-spoke.
Certain types of agreements that restrain trade are illegal per se because they almost always undermine competition, while others are subject to a “rule of reason” review, which requires the plaintiff to show that the agreement harms competition more than it helps.[13] Most horizontal agreements are per se violations,[14] whereas vertical agreements are usually analyzed under the rule of reason.[15] Price fixing, however, is per se illegal regardless of whether it occurs between competitors or businesses at different economic levels.[16]
On the other hand, merely exchanging information, including about prices, is not itself illegal unless it is part of an express or tacit agreement to fix prices.[17] Agreements “may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors.”[18] Plus factors can include “a common motive to conspire, evidence that shows that the parallel acts were against the apparent individual economic self-interest of the alleged conspirators, and evidence of a high level of interfirm communications.”[19]
3) Price-fixing algorithms. Pricing algorithms are commonly used to help set prices that are responsive to market conditions, which may increase market efficiency in competitive markets. However, they can also facilitate price-fixing, thereby decreasing market efficiency and hampering competition.
Algorithmic collusion is not new. In 1992, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against eight of the nation’s largest airlines in connection with an algorithmic pricing system, known as the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATP), which was used to increase the cost of airplane tickets by potentially upwards of a billion dollars during a four-year period. “By supplying or withdrawing changes in fares, the airlines told each other what fares they wanted to charge in which markets, what competitors’ fares were acceptable to them, and what deals they were willing to make.” [20] The attorney in charge of DOJ’s Antitrust Division stated, ‘The airlines used the ATP fare dissemination system to carry on conversations just as direct and detailed as those traditionally conducted, by conspirators over the telephone or in hotel rooms. Although their method was novel, their conduct amounted to price fixing, plain and simple.’ Two of the airlines entered a consent decree and the other six entered into a settlement with the DOJ.[21]
The rise of machine-learning pricing algorithms has intensified concerns about anti-competitive behavior, particularly tacit collusion.[22] Unlike older rule-based systems, modern algorithms can rapidly assimilate market data, predict demand fluctuations, and adjust prices based on competitor behavior, often reinforcing strategies that maximize profits in an anticompetitive fashion.[23] In particular, models that use reinforcement learning – a training process that uses rewards and punishments to orient a model’s behavior towards attaining a specific goal[24] – and real-time data feedback loops can adapt to function in a manner that sustains high prices, effectively facilitating tacit collusion without explicit human agreement.[25] Moreover, algorithms’ faster response times and improved demand predictions may help firms sustain collusive pricing structures by swiftly detecting and punishing deviations, leading to supra-competitive prices.[26]
With respect to the impact of pricing algorithms in the housing context, in 2024 the White House issued a report concluding as follows: “We find that anticompetitive pricing costs renters in algorithm-utilizing buildings an average of $70 a month. In total, we estimate the costs to renters in 2023 was $3.8 billion. This estimate is likely a lower bound on the true costs.”[27]
4) AI collusion cases. A number of pending federal cases allege that the use of a common pricing algorithms violates the Sherman Act. Some key examples follow.
RealPage. In October of 2022, ProPublica published an investigation of RealPage’s rental housing pricing algorithm. This popular software, used by many of the largest property managers who control thousands of apartments in metropolitan areas throughout the country, collects information from the property managers, including private lease transactions and occupancy data, that is then fed into a common algorithm that recommends optimal rental rates.[28] This led to numerous class-action lawsuits against RealPage, as well as a lawsuit by Attorney General Rob Bonta, along with the DOJ and eight other attorneys general. The litigation is ongoing.[29]
In a filing with the court, the DOJ set forth its view that “[a]s with other actions taken in concert, competitors’ joint use of common algorithms can remove independent decision making. . . . Put another way, whether firms effectuate a price-fixing scheme through a software algorithm or through human-to-human interaction should be of no legal significance. Automating an anticompetitive scheme does not make it less anticompetitive.” The DOJ continued:
The question in this case is whether the defendants have violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by allegedly knowingly combining their sensitive, nonpublic pricing and supply information in an algorithm that they rely upon in making pricing decisions, with the knowledge and expectation that other competitors will do the same. Although not every use of an algorithm to set price qualifies as a per se violation of Section 1, taking the allegations set forth in the complaints as true, the alleged scheme meets the legal criteria for per se unlawful price fixing.[30]
RENTmaximizer. Another pending case similarly involves allegations that competing landlords violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by, among other things, unlawfully agreeing to use a centralized pricing algorithm to artificially inflate multifamily rental prices.[31] The DOJ argued that “competitors’ jointly delegating key aspects of their decisionmaking to a common algorithm” amounts to per se concerted action “because doing so ‘joins together separate decisionmakers’ and thus ‘deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking.’”[32] Furthermore, “[w]here, as here, plaintiffs’ allegations involve a conspiracy to centralize pricing decisions in a third-party algorithm, it is irrelevant to the scheme whether landlords share confidential information among themselves or with only the pricing agent; the alleged scheme is designed to obviate the need for competitors to share information directly with each other.”[33]
Cendyn. A federal district court recently dismissed a class action lawsuit alleging that Las Vegas hotel operators engaged in illegal price-fixing by using Cendyn’s revenue management software.[34] The court highlighted that the pricing recommendations were not based on nonpublic, competitively sensitive information; rather, it was public information available from online listings and travel agencies. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege that hotel operators “agreed to be bound by [Cendyn’s] pricing recommendations, much less that they all agreed to charge the same prices.”[35] The decision is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The DOJ has argued that “an invitation for collective action followed by conduct showing acceptance” such as “joint use” of the pricing algorithm amounts to concerted action, which may be a per se violation if the algorithm sets a “default or starting point price,” if it the hotel ultimately charges a different price.[36]
A similar case involving use of Cendyn’s pricing software by Atlantic City hotels was also dismissed. Although the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission argued usage of pricing algorithms is unlawful even when co-conspirators retain pricing discretion and do not communicate directly with each other, the court found that the alleged co-conspirators used the pricing algorithm at different points in time, no confidential or otherwise nonpublic information was exchanged, and the alleged co-conspirators were not bound to accept the algorithm’s pricing recommendations.[37]
5) Law Revision Commission working group report. AR 95 (Cunningham, 2021) called upon the California Law Revision Commission to study whether the Cartwright Act requires updating. To assist in its study, the Commission formed working groups of experts, one of which issued a report on “Competition and Artificial Intelligence.” Regarding algorithmic collusion, the working group concludes:
. . . The Cartwright Act generally prohibits any combinations or agreements which unreasonably restrain trade or fix or control prices. As currently interpreted by the courts, the Cartwright Act requires a “combination” or “concerted action” between 2 or more independent economic entities. Given the increasing use of software programs containing or relying on pricing algorithms, the Legislature might consider declaring that the “concerted action” requirement of the Cartwright Act encompasses multiple competitors that knowingly use the same or similar revenue management software programs containing or relying on pricing algorithms that utilize nonpublic competitor information to train or inform any price recommendations.
Consistent with the position of the DOJ . . ., the Legislature might also clarify that direct communications are not required to show proof of a “combination” or “concerted action” among competitors, as the Cartwright Act covers tacit as well as express agreements. This is in accord with the position of the DOJ . . . that Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “tacit agreements”—that is where one co-conspirator invites participation in an illegal price-fixing scheme and other co-conspirators act in accordance with the scheme, showing acceptance through a course of conduct.
Further, the Legislature might make clear that the Act prohibits competitors from “delegating key aspects of pricing decision making to a common entity, even if the competitors never communicate with each other directly.” Further, to refute the argument that there can be no actionable claim of price fixing because the algorithm’s recommendations are not binding, the Legislature could declare that, under the Cartwright Act, “an agreement among competitors to fix the starting point of pricing is per se unlawful, no matter what prices the competitors ultimately charge.” [38]
6) This bill seeks to prevent algorithmic collusion in the rental housing sector. This bill targets rental pricing algorithms that rely on nonpublic competitor data and are used by multiple landlords in the same or related market to set or recommend rental terms. Specifically, the bill makes it unlawful for a person to:
- Sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
- Use a rental pricing algorithm if either 1) the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms for a residential premises by two or more landlords in the same market or a related market, or 2) the person coerces any other person to set or adopt a recommended rental term for a residential premises located in the same market or a related market.
- Set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or its recommendation was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the same market or a related market.
“Rental pricing algorithms” are those that use competitor data that is “nonpublic,” defined as information not widely available or easily accessible to the public. Excluded from the definition of “nonpublic competitor data” are government-maintained rental registries, public advertisements, census data, and data more than one year old.
With respect to enforcement, public prosecutors and any person harmed by a violation of the bill may file civil actions against violators, and may seek standard remedies and a civil penalty of $1,000 per violation. For violations based on the use of the algorithm, each month in which the pricing algorithm is used constitutes a separate and distinct violation. For violations based on the distribution and use of the algorithm, each separate residential premises for which the algorithm is provided or used constitutes a separate and distinct violation. The bill expressly supplements existing anti-trust laws, such as the Cartwright Act.
Proponents argue that traditional antitrust law’s focus on the presence of some form of agreement fails to clearly address algorithmically-mediated price coordination that occurs without a collusive meeting of the minds. This bill is necessary, they assert, to combat this growing phenomenon, and thereby help reduce soaring rents.
In describing how the bill would apply, the Assembly Judiciary Committee analysis of the bill set forth the following hypothetical scenarios:
Hypothetical #1 – Lawful under SB 52. Consider a real estate platform that provides rent estimates—like Zillow’s Zestimate—based on publicly available data. The platform pulls rental listing prices, tax records, census information, and other public sources to generate estimated rental values for residential properties. It does not accept or process nonpublic lease data from property owners, such as actual rents charged to specific tenants, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates. Nor does it distribute pricing recommendations to landlords or attempt to align their rental terms. Because the estimates are derived from public information and are intended to inform consumer-facing platforms or general market awareness—not to coordinate pricing among landlords—this conduct would not be covered by SB 52. As long as the algorithm relies solely on public, aggregated, or de-identified data, and is not used to facilitate shared pricing behavior among competitors, it falls outside the bill’s prohibitions.
Hypothetical #2 – Unlawful under SB 52. In contrast, consider a hypothetical where a third-party software vendor licenses a dynamic rent-pricing tool to multiple landlords operating in the same geographic market. The software collects confidential rental rates, occupancy figures, and leasing data from each participating landlord and uses that information to generate pricing recommendations for all of them. The software is marketed as a way to “maximize market rents” and reduce undercutting. Because the algorithm accepts nonpublic input data from multiple competitors and is used with the intent to align pricing behavior in the same market, and because the vendor and clients either know or should know this, the conduct would fall squarely within the prohibitions of SB 52.[39]
7) Related legislation. Several legislative proposals that seek to address algorithmic collusion have recently been proposed, including:
- At the federal level, Senator Amy Klobuchar recently reintroduced her “Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act” (S. 232) which makes it presumptively unlawful for a person to use or distribute a pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with nonpublic competitor data.
- Colorado Governor Jared Polis recently vetoed a bill that would have prohibited the sale, distribution, or use of algorithmic devices using public and nonpublic data to coordinate the setting of price or occupancy levels between two or more landlords, a violation of which would be deemed a violation of the Colorado Antitrust Act of 2023. In his veto message, Governor Polis cited concerns around inadvertently banning tools that may assist in efficiently managing residential real estate to ensure people can access housing. He stated he would open to supporting a bill that “makes a distinction between collusive and non-collusive uses of nonpublic competitor data.”
- AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry, 2025) provides that it is unlawful to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm as part of a contract, combination in the form of a trust, or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce in violation of the Cartwright Act. The bill also provides that it is unlawful for a person to use or distribute such algorithms if the person coerces another to set or adopt a recommended price or commercial term for the same or similar products or services. The bill additionally changes the pleading standard in Cartwright Act cases. The bill is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
- SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) is similar to this bill but applies to products, services, and rental property more generally. The bill provides an affirmative defense if the person demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that they exercised reasonable due diligence before using the recommendation of a pricing algorithm. A violation is subject to public prosecutor enforcement, which may include restitution, punitive damages, and a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per violation.
- SB 384 (Wahab, 2025) is similar SB 295, but applies to goods rather than products, and the civil penalty is capped at $1,000 per violation.
8) Amendments. The author has agreed to the following clean-up amendments, which eliminate duplicative provisions and bring the bill more in line with its companion bills, including by adding “reasonable expectation” as a basis for liability for distributors and limiting the bill’s application to competitor markets. The amendments also include additional clarifying changes requested by California Apartment Association. Collectively, the amendments resolve some, but not all of their concerns.
1947.16. (a) It is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent or reasonable expectation that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm for residential premises if either of the following applies:
(1) The person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm would be used to set rental terms for a residential premises by two or more landlords in the same market or a related market.
(2) The person coerces any other person to set or adopt a recommended rental terms for a residential premises located in the same market or a related market.
(b) It is unlawful for a person to set or adopt rental terms based on the recommendation of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms and that the pricing algorithm or the recommendation of the pricing algorithm was used by another person to set or recommend a rental term for a residential premises in the same market or a related market.
(c) (1) For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section, each month that a violation exists or continues shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(2) Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3) Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(d) The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:
(1) “Antitrust laws” has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this section, Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code, commencing with Section 16600, commonly known as the Cartwright Act .
(2) (A) “Nonpublic competitor data” means nonpublic data derived from two or more competitors, directly or indirectly, regarding information about actual rental amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that is obtained through nonpublic means.
(B) “Nonpublic competitor data” does not include any of the following:
(i) Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from publicly accessible sources, including, but not limited to:
(I) Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager or third party.
(II) Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
(ii) Information obtained from public records subject to disclosure pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1 of the Government Code) or the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552).
(iii) Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
(iv) Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
(v) Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
(vi) Data processed by the rental pricing algorithm collected more than one year before the use or distribution of the rental pricing algorithm.
(3) “Nonpublic data” means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public.
(4) “Rental pricing algorithm” means a service or product, commonly known as revenue management software, that uses one or more algorithms to perform calculations of nonpublic competitor data concerning local or statewide rental terms for the purpose of advising a landlord on setting or recommending rental terms for residential premises.
(A) “Rental pricing algorithm” includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
(B) “Rental pricing algorithm” does not include either of the following:
(i) A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases.
(ii) A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
(5) “Rental term” means rental rate, lease term, or occupancy level.
(6) A parent entity and its wholly owned subsidiaries shall be considered one person.
(e) (1) The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of this section for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
(2) A person who is harmed by a violation of this section may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorney’s fees or that caps the tenant’s fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenant’s claim against their landlord under this section.
(f) (1) Nothing in this section shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions described herein apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
(2) The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Power CA Action writes:
California consistently has one of the largest renter populations of any state, with millions of households burdened by spending more than a third of their incomes on rent. Now, tech has come in to supercharge the affordability crisis. The emergence of rental pricing algorithms has turned competitors into collaborators by assessing collective price data to find the highest rate–and directing its landlord users to adopt it. Ongoing lawsuits allege that 80-90% of users implement AI-backed, profit-maximizing recommendations.
Conservative estimates from the Council of Economic Advisors found that these algorithms added $3.8 billion in costs for American renters in 2023 alone. Continued reliance on rental pricing algorithms will further distort California’s housing market and exacerbate the state’s housing crisis. SB 52 addresses this issue by clarifying that technology cannot be used to circumvent existing antitrust laws on the backs of already-burdened renter households.
In order to stop illegal activity that is driving up rents, SB 52 will prohibit the sale, license, and use of algorithms to set housing rental rates or other commercial terms. Specifically, SB 52 makes it illegal to provide algorithms with the intent that they be used by two or more landlords to set rental terms, and illegal to use them if the person knew or should have known that someone else was using the same algorithm to set rental terms. It also creates a civil right of action for attorneys and those harmed.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The California Apartment Association writes:
CAA appreciates the significant progress that has been made on SB 52, as reflected in the June 26, 2025, amendments. However, these amendments do not sufficiently address CAA’s concerns because:
- The bill holds users of rental pricing algorithms liable simply because they should have known that another person uses the same product – a standard that would always be met for a commercially available product – even if the user did not know, and had no reason to know, that the rental pricing algorithm ran afoul of the law. This holds landlords to a much higher standard than users of other pricing algorithms under existing law and as proposed to be regulated under AB 325. Further, the liability standards in subdivisions (b) and (c) conflict, thereby creating confusion about the applicable standard.
- The definition of nonpublic competitor data remains too narrow for two key reasons. First, it fails to exclude internet listing services. Second, the exclusion of aggregated data applies only to the extent that it is derived from sources that themselves are not nonpublic competitor data – thereby making the exclusion largely meaningless.
- The way penalties are determined is excessive, as it makes each month in which a rental pricing algorithm is used and for each premises for which it is used to be considered a separate violation. This means that a single decision by a landlord to use an algorithm will result in numerous violations, each of which carries a separate penalty. This is particularly concerning given the low standard of liability.
CAA argues the bill should be rewritten to accord with established concepts from antitrust laws, including incorporating the term “independent centers of decisionmaking” from case law, as described above. CAA writes:
In an effort to seek a good faith compromise that addresses the concerns raised by the sponsors, CAA has proposed an alternative framework that would do the following:
- Provide that it is unlawful for any person to facilitate an agreement among landlords that restricts competition with respect to rental housing through the sale, license, or other provisions of a rental pricing algorithm if the person knows or should know that the rental pricing algorithm deprives landlords of “independent centers of decision making” with respect to setting rental terms.
- Clearly define the factors a court would use to determine whether “independent centers of decision making” are preserved, which would include, but not be limited to, consideration of whether nonpublic competitor data is used.
- Remove liability based solely on the use of a rental pricing algorithm, while still allowing the enforcement of existing antitrust laws.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Aapis for Civic Empowerment
AARP
Aids Healthcare Foundation
American Economic Liberties Project
Basta, INC.
California Center for Movement Legal Services
California Community Land Trust Network
California Green New Deal Coalition
California Housing Partnership
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California School Employees Association
Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice (CCAEJ)
Cft- a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, Aft, Afl-cio
City of Santa Monica
Consumer Federation of California
County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors
Disability Rights California
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
East Bay Housing Organizations
Economic Security California Action
Evolve California
Housing and Economic Rights Advocates
Housing California
Housing Now!
Human Impact Partners
Inner City Law Center
Kapor Center
Oakland Privacy
Pico California
Power California Action
Powerca Action
Private Equity Stakeholder Project
San Diego; County of
Santa Monica Rent Control Board
The Big Tent San Leandro
Udw/afscme Local 3930
Unite Here Local 11
Urban Habitat
Oppose
Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles
Apartment Association of Orange County
Apartment Association, California Southern Cities
Berkeley Property Owner's Association
California Rental Housing Association
East Bay Rental Housing Association
Nor Cal Rental Property Association
North Valley Property Owners Association
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce
Santa Barbara Rental Property Association
Southern California Rental Housing Association
Oppose Unless Amended
California Apartment Association
Realpage, INC.
Analysis Prepared by: Josh Tosney / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. (1984) 467 U.S. 752, 767. ↑
Id. at pp. 768-769. ↑
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL (2010) 560 U.S. 183, 195, citations omitted. ↑
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig. (9th Cir. 2022) 28 F.4th 42, 46, quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 553. ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 160-161. However, the Cartwright Act does not prohibit unilateral conduct. ↑
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1147. ↑
Ahn v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 168, 179. ↑
Ibid. ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II, supra, 61 Cal. 4th at p. 136. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720. ↑
Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 700, 722; Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. CoTherix, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1, 8; Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 31 F.4th 651, 665, fn. 8. ↑
G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 267, emphasis in original. ↑
People v. Bldg. Maint. Contractors’ Ass’n (1957) 41 Cal. 2d 719, 727. ↑
See Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 1979) 232 F.3d 979, 986. ↑
In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig. (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3d 1186 n.3; United States v. Joyce (9th Cir. 2018) 895 F.3d 673, 677. ↑
Mailand v. Burckle (1978) 20 Cal.3d 367, 377. ↑
Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 862-863 (“‘Competition does not become less free merely because the conduct of commercial operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge of all the essential factors entering into the commercial transaction’”). ↑
In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2015) 1 Cal.App.5th 127, 169, citations and nested quotation marks omitted. ↑
Ibid. ↑
“Justice Department Settles Airlines Price Fixing Suit, May Save Consumers Hundreds of Millions of Dollars” (1994), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1994/211786.htm. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Clark et al, “Pricing Algorithms as Third-Party Facillitators of Collusion” American Bar Association (Dec. 2024), p. 3, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/source/2024/december/pricing-algorithms-third-party-facilitators-collusion.pdf. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Mummert et al., “What is reinforcement learning?” IBM Developer (September 15, 2022), developer.ibm.com/learningpaths/get-started-automated-ai-for-decision-making-api/what-is-automated-ai-for-decision-making. ↑
“Pricing Algorithms as Third-Party Facillitators of Collusion,” supra, pp. 3-5. ↑
Ibid. ↑
White House, The Cost of Anticompetitive Pricing Algorithms in Rental Housing (Dec. 17, 2024), https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/cea/written-materials/2024/12/17/the-cost-of-anticompetitive-pricing-algorithms-in-rental-housing/. ↑
Heath Vogell, “Rent Going Up? One Company’s Algorithm Could Be Why,” ProPublica (Oct. 15, 2022), https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-realpage-rent. ↑
See In re RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litig. (No. II) (M.D.Tenn. 2023) 709 F. Supp. 3d 478, 492. ↑
Memorandum of Law in Support of Statement of Interest of the United States, In re RealPage, Case No. 3:23-MD-3071 (M.D. Tenn Nov. 15, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-11/418053.pdf. (Emphasis added.) ↑
See Duffy v. Yardi Sys., Inc. (W.D.Wash. Dec. 5, 2024, No. 2:23-cv-01391-RSL) 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 220641. ↑
Statement of Interest (March 1, 2024), in Yardi, supra, pp. 2-3, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-03/420301.pdf. ↑
Id. at p. 7, fn. 4. (Emphasis in original.) ↑
Gibson v. Cendyn Grp., LLC (D.Nev. May 8, 2024, No. 2:23-cv-00140-MMD-DJA) 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 83547. ↑
Id. at 6. ↑
Brief for the DOJ as Amicus Curiae, Gibson v. Cendyn Group LLC, No. 24-3576 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 24, 2024), Dkt. No. 28.1, pp. 18, 22-24. ↑
Cornish-Adebiyi, et al. v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., et al., No. 1:23-CV-02536-KMW-EAP (D. N.J. Sept. 30, 2024). ↑
“Report to the California Law Review Commission Antitrust Law: Study B-750: Competition and Artificial Intelligence,” p. 5, https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/ExRpt-B750-Grp8.pdf. Emphasis in first paragraph added; emphasis in third paragraph in original. ↑
Asm. Jud. Analysis AB 52, as amended June 26, 2025, at p. 10. ↑
Date of Hearing: July 1, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 52
Author:(Pérez) – As Amended Ver:June 26, 2025
SENATE VOTE: 28-9
SUBJECT: Housing rental terms: algorithmic devices
KEY ISSUE: Should California prohibit the sale, use, or adoption of rental pricing algorithms where two or more landlords in the same or related market rely on the same tool to set or recommend rental terms?
SYNOPSIS
SB 52 (Perez) is one of four bills this session targeting algorithmic price coordination—but unlike a price-fixing cartel, the authors have not colluded. SB 295(Hurtado) and SB 384(Wahab), which target similar behavior, are independently up for consideration by this Committee today. This bill specifically targets coordination in the rental housing market.
According to the author, modern pricing algorithms are capable of analyzing sensitive lease data, identifying market trends, and generating uniform rent recommendations that multiple landlords may adopt in parallel, effectively achieving the outcomes of price fixing without direct communication. This bill seeks to address that concern by establishing a statutory prohibition on the sale, use, or adoption of rental pricing algorithms under specified conditions. Specifically, SB 52 makes it unlawful to: (1) sell, license, or otherwise provide a rental pricing algorithm to two or more persons in the same or related market with the intent that it be used to set or recommend rental terms; (2) use a rental pricing algorithm if the user knows or should know it will be used by multiple landlords in the same market; or (3) adopt rental terms based on algorithmic recommendations if the algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data and has been used by another market participant. The bill defines “nonpublic competitor data” to include confidential information such as actual rent amounts, lease terms, and occupancy rates, and provides carveouts for publicly available and aggregated data. SB 52 creates a civil violation enforceable by both public and private actors. It authorizes public prosecutors to bring enforcement actions for injunctive relief, restitution, attorney’s fees and civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation. The bill also provides a private right of action. Critics contend the bill would create a chilling effect on the use of data-driven tools that can help ensure fair and competitive pricing. But SB 52, as recently amended, is focused on a specific misuse of pricing tools: when multiple firms rely on a shared algorithm that processes confidential data to align prices. SB 52 attempts to draw a clear legal boundary around an increasingly common practice that could undermine price competition in rental markets. Similar amendments have been taken in all three price-fixing bills pending today (SB 384, SB 295 and SB 52) to ensure that these measures address the problem of collusion rather than stifling the promise of technology.
SB 52 is co-sponsored by TechEquity, Western Center on Law and Poverty, and ACCE and supported by a broad coalition, including public interest and housing advocates. It is opposed by rental housing associations, among others. In the event of its successful passage out of this Committee, this measure will be heard in the Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee. SUMMARY: Prohibits the sale, use, or distribution of rental pricing algorithms that rely on nonpublic competitor data and are intended to be used by two or more landlords in the same or related rental market. Specifically, this bill:
- Makes findings and declarations regarding the price of rent, the impact of algorithmic pricing software on rental housing markets, and legislative and judicial efforts to curb the negative effects of algorithmic pricing software on rental housing pricing.
- Prohibits a person from selling, licensing, or otherwise providing a rental pricing algorithm to two or more persons in the same or related market with the intent that it be used to set or recommend rental terms for residential premises.
- Prohibits a person from using a rental pricing algorithm for residential premises if:
- The person knows or should know that the algorithm will be used by two or more landlords in the same or related market to set rental terms; or
- The person coerces another to set or adopt algorithmically recommended rental terms in the same or related market.
- Prohibits a person from setting or adopting rental terms based on a rental pricing algorithm’s recommendation if the person knows or should know that the algorithm both:
- Processes nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms; and
- Has been used by another person to set or recommend rental terms in the same or related market.
- Defines key terms, including:
- “Rental pricing algorithm” as revenue management software that calculates rental terms based on nonpublic competitor data.
- “Nonpublic competitor data” as nonpublic information derived from two or more competitors, including rent amounts, occupancy rates, and lease dates, with enumerated exclusions for public, aggregated, or data collected more than one year before the use/distribution of the algorithm.
- “Rental terms” to mean rental rate, lease term, or occupancy level.
- Provides that each month a person uses or distributes a prohibited algorithm constitutes a separate and distinct violation, and that each affected residential premises constitutes an additional violation.
- Authorizes public enforcement by the Attorney General, city attorneys, and county counsel.
- Permits a private right of action by any person harmed by a violation of this section.
- Permits recovery of any of the following remedies, or a combination thereof:
- Injunctive relief;
- Restitution; and
- Civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation.
- Requires courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing public prosecutors or private plaintiffs, and voids any lease term that purports to waive or cap such awards.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 U.S.C. Sections 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. Section 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. Section 15c.)
- Establishes the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. Sections 12-27.)
- Defines, under the Clayton Act, “antitrust laws” to include the Sherman Act, certain provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Clayton Act, as amended. (15 U.S.C. Section 12.)
- Makes illegal, under the Clayton Act, certain exclusive dealing agreements, tying contracts, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and interlocking directorates, as specified. (15 U.S.C. Sections 13-14.)
- Prohibits every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is, including specified noncompete clauses, subject to specified exemptions. (Business and Professions Code Section 16600 et seq. All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise specified.)
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Section 16700 et seq.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of, merchandise or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any combination of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Section 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Section 16726.)
- Establishes the Unfair Practices Act (UPA), which is intended to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented. (Section 17000 et seq.)
- Prohibits, under the UPA, a range of behavior that reduces competition in pricing, including specified locality discrimination in pricing, sales under costs or loss leaders made with the intent of injuring competitors or destroying competition, and contracts for the performance of warranty service and repair below the cost of the service or repair. (Sections 17040-17051.)
- Permits the head of any department in the state to make investigations and prosecute actions concerning violations of law; as part of those investigations, the department head may inspect and copy books, records, and other items, issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents or other tangible things, and promulgate interrogatories. (Government Code Sections 11180, 11181.)
- For purposes of investigating potential violations of the Cartwright Act and the UPA, extends all of the investigative powers granted to the Attorney General pursuant to 13) to the district attorney of any county when the district attorney reasonably believes that a violation has occurred. (Government Code Section 16759 (a).)
- Establishes that a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that they are asserting. (Evidence Code Section 500.)
- Establishes the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), which provides a statutory cause of action for any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising, including over the internet. (Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.)
- Establishes the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), which proscribes certain unfair methods of competition and certain unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by a person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to a consumer, including advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised. (Civil Code Section 1770 et seq.)
- Establishes the California Public Records Act (CPRA), which generally provides for the public inspection of government records unless an exemption applies. Records maintained by public agencies—including housing data and rental registries—are accessible unless specifically exempted. (Government Code Section 7920.000 et seq.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: SB 52 is one of three measures currently pending before the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary seeking to address “algorithmic price fixing.” Unlike SB 384 and SB 295, which have a broader application, SB 52 focuses exclusively on algorithmic price fixing in rental housing.
Algorithmic price fixing refers to the use of software—often powered by artificial intelligence—to set or recommend prices in ways that result in coordinated outcomes between competitors without any formal agreement. Third-party vendors now offer pricing tools trained on large datasets, sometimes including nonpublic or sensitive market information, which can be deployed across competing firms. These tools can respond rapidly to market changes, discouraging price competition and creating uniform pricing—all while preserving the outward appearance of independent decision-making. The result is a technologically enabled form of price-fixing that achieves the same anticompetitive effects as traditional collusion, but without overt coordination, making it difficult to detect or prosecute under current antitrust law.
As explained by the author:
California has a rental housing affordability crisis. This state is the most expensive state to rent in, requiring an average hourly wage of $47.38 to afford a 2-bedroom apartment. More than half of the state’s renters are rent-burdened as they have to contribute more than 30% of their income to rent. While the rental housing affordability crisis isn’t new, exacerbating this crisis is how landlords are using tech to inflate rents above what is fair.
Real estate giants are harnessing algorithms to recommend rent prices based on rental data from thousands of landlords and other sources. These AI-backed rent-setting tools turn competitors into collaborators for a potentially already unlawful information sharing collusion operation that provides landlords with an unfair and unsustainable advantage. This is tech-powered exploitation and worsening the already dire affordability crisis.
Although federal and state law clearly sets precedent for illegal antitrust and anticompetitive practices, landlords continue to rely on algorithms like RealPage provides, arguing that their practices are not covered under those laws. As such, landlords continue to share and compile competitive data through this platform in order to set inflated rental prices in a manner eerily similar to examples of antitrust violations. Due to the sketchy nature of algorithmic utilization among landlord competitors, federal, state, and local government officials have begun taking action to address what has been depicted as “an unlawful information-sharing scheme.
SB 52 addresses the question of price-fixing in rental markets through third party algorithms by clearly defining in state law that using such methods is illegal. Further, SB 52 provides mechanisms for accountability and enforcement for using these algorithms illegally.
Algorithmic price fixing. Modern algorithmic coordination has its institutional roots in the aftermath of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which eliminated federal oversight of airline fares. Shortly thereafter, major carriers created the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO), a centralized platform for submitting and disseminating fare data. Although ATPCO nominally served as a neutral repository, it allowed airlines to signal pricing intentions and monitor rival responses in near real-time, thereby enabling tacit collusion—a form of price coordination not easily captured by conventional antitrust tools. The Department of Justice (DOJ) challenged ATPCO’s structure in the early 1990s under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, arguing that it facilitated price signaling among competitors. The resulting settlement permitted ATPCO to continue with minimal restrictions, effectively sanctioning data-driven pricing coordination in the absence of direct collusion or express agreements.
Today’s version of this phenomenon has been dramatically amplified by advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and data infrastructure. Third-party vendors now offer algorithmic pricing systems trained on vast market datasets—sometimes including nonpublic or competitively sensitive information—which are simultaneously deployed across competing firms. These systems can rapidly adjust prices in reaction to competitors’ changes, discouraging undercutting and reducing market variability, all while maintaining the appearance of independent decision-making. Unlike traditional cartels, these algorithmic tools do not require express communication between competitors and may even operate without any human intervention at all. The result is a technologically mediated form of price fixing that can achieve the same anticompetitive effect as a classic conspiracy—higher prices, suppressed competition, and consumer harm—but in a way that existing legal frameworks struggle to capture. (David Dayen, Three Algorithms in a Room: How Big Data Supercharged Collusion, The American Prospect (June 5, 2024) https://prospect.org/economy/2024-06-05-three-algorithms-in-a-room.) The absence of legislative action in the wake of ATPCO, and the continued judicial reliance on formal notions of “agreement,” have left a legal gray area in which algorithmic collusion remains both highly illegal in principle and difficult to prosecute in practice.
Existing law - The Cartwright Act. California’s main antitrust statute is the Cartwright Act, codified at Business and Professions Code Sections 16700 to 16770. Enacted in 1907, the Act predates the federal Clayton Act and closely parallels Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 United States Code Section 1), which prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Like its federal counterpart, the Cartwright Act is designed to preserve and promote free competition in commercial markets. However, California courts have construed it as “broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act.” (Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 903, 920.)
Business and Professions Code Section 16720(e)(4) defines a “trust” to include combinations or agreements in which competitors “agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.” In other words, the Cartwright Act proscribes even indirect or subtle forms of coordinated behavior that may affect market prices or restrict trade.
To violate the Act, conduct must typically involve:
1. An agreement or concerted action between two or more people (so-called “single firm conduct” is not encompassed by the Act); and
2. Conduct that unreasonably restrains trade.
Under the Cartwright Act, an “agreement” or “concerted action” refers to a mutual understanding or coordinated conduct between two or more persons to restrain trade. It is the foundational element of any antitrust claim under both the Cartwright Act and the federal Sherman Act Section 1. (Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 928 (Cartwright Act requires concerted action); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher (2006) 547 U.S. 1, 5 (federal antitrust law also requires concerted action).)
An agreement under the Cartwright Act does not require a written contract or direct evidence of collusion. California courts recognize that circumstantial evidence may be used to infer concerted action, particularly because direct evidence of collusion is often unavailable in antitrust cases. (In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 146.) The concerted action may be established through indirect mechanisms, such as the exchange of competitively sensitive information, market signaling, or the shared use of pricing algorithms that lead to parallel pricing behavior.
However, parallel conduct alone is insufficient to prove concerted action. Courts require additional “plus factors” that support an inference of agreement, such as the existence of facilitating practices, opportunities to collude, or monitoring mechanisms that suggest firms are consciously coordinating their behavior.
Once concerted action is established (either through direct or circumstantial evidence), the court turns to the second prong: whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.
Under California law, a restraint is considered unreasonable if it harms competition, rather than merely harming individual competitors. (G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 269.) (“It is often repeated in antitrust cases that the law seeks to protect competition, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned.”) (internal quotations omitted).) Courts evaluate this through either the per se rule or the rule of reason. Certain types of restraints are deemed per se unlawful—such as horizontal price fixing, market allocation, and bid rigging—because they are presumed to always harm competition and lack any legitimate justification. Other restraints are analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires a case-specific inquiry into the conduct’s actual or likely anticompetitive effects, the parties’ market power, and any procompetitive justifications. (Palsson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 934-35.)
AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry), which is currently pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee, seeks to amend the Cartwright Act to prohibit the use or distribution of a common pricing algorithm by separate entities if it is part of a conspiracy to restrain trade or if they distribute or use a common pricing algorithm with the intent to fix prices or terms for similar products or services in California, especially if they coerce others to adopt those prices or knowingly participate in a coordinated pricing scheme.
Existing law – the California Legal Remedies Act, the Unfair Competition Law, and the Unfair Practices Act. While the Cartwright Act remains California’s primary vehicle for antitrust enforcement, the state also possesses powerful consumer and commercial protection statutes that play a complementary role in deterring unfair, deceptive, and anticompetitive conduct—including the use of algorithmic pricing tools that distort markets or mislead consumers.
California’s Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” The statute is broadly framed to encompass not only conduct that violates other laws (including the Cartwright Act), but also business behavior that is deceptive, anticompetitive, or contrary to public policy, even if not independently unlawful. (See Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180–182.) Courts have recognized that the UCL provides a flexible enforcement tool for redressing market harms that fall outside traditional antitrust theories, including the coordinated use of information systems or platform tools that suppress price competition or obscure competitive choices. In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court affirmed that the UCL is broader than traditional antitrust statutes and can reach “incipient violations of antitrust laws” or conduct that “violates the policy or spirit” of those laws, even if not independently actionable under the Cartwright Act or Sherman Act. (Id. at 187.) The Court emphasized that a “practice may be deemed unfair even if not specifically proscribed by some other law.” (Id. at 180.) While the Court adopted a narrower “tethering” standard for claims between competitors, it made clear that practices that threaten competition through coordination or structural market manipulation may be challenged under the UCL—particularly where the conduct violates antitrust principles in spirit if not in letter. (Id. at 186-87.) Recent court cases are proceeding under that theory. For example, in People v. Amazon.com, Inc. (Super. Ct. San Francisco City & County, No. CGC-22-601202) (2022), the Attorney General alleges that Amazon’s contractual pricing rules and algorithmic pricing enforcement mechanisms operate to suppress price competition across the digital marketplace. The state’s theory is that Amazon discourages sellers from offering lower prices elsewhere by using algorithms to demote or delist those products, thereby distorting competitive outcomes and harming consumers—even without a classic “agreement” among competitors. This case has survived demurrer and is moving forward on the merits.
In tandem, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civil Code Section 1750 et seq.) protects consumers from deceptive methods of competition and unfair or misleading acts or practices in the sale or lease of goods or services. The CLRA prohibits, among other things, misrepresenting the source, characteristics, or benefits of a product or service, as well as bait-and-switch pricing tactics and other forms of consumer manipulation. (Civil Code Section 1770(a).)
What problem is this bill trying to solve? According to the author and sponsors, SB 52 is intended to address the use of shared algorithmic pricing software by landlords in the rental housing market, which they argue may facilitate coordinated rent increases and reduce price competition without requiring traditional forms of collusion. The bill targets rental pricing algorithms that rely on nonpublic competitor data and are used by multiple landlords in the same or related market to set or recommend rental terms. Proponents argue that these tools—developed and licensed by third-party vendors—can lead to parallel pricing behavior across firms, particularly when the same software is used market-wide.
Supporters of the bill cite a range of investigative reports, government findings, and academic research to suggest that algorithmic rent-setting may contribute to higher housing costs. A report by the White House Council of Economic Advisers, estimates that renters whose landlords use such tools pay on average $70 more per month, translating to approximately $4 billion in additional rent annually. (The Cost of Anticompetitive Pricing Algorithms in Rental Housing | CEA, The White House, 17 Dec. 2024, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/cea/written-materials/2024/12/17/the-cost-of-anticompetitive-pricing-algorithms-in-rental-housing/.) A ProPublica investigation into RealPage’s pricing practices found that properties using the software charged rents 3% to 7% higher than comparable units, with some reported increases of up to 14.5%. (Rent Going Up? One Company’s Algorithm Could Be Why, ProPublica, 15 Oct. 2022, https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-realpage-rent.)
Proponents of SB 52 contend that existing legal frameworks—such as the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act—may be ill-suited to address algorithmic coordination that occurs without direct communication between market participants. Because these statutes generally require proof of an agreement or meeting of the minds, regulators may face challenges applying them to software-mediated conduct that replicates the effects of collusion. SB 52, according to the author, is designed to close this perceived enforcement gap by prohibiting the distribution and use of pricing algorithms under specific conditions.
Who does this bill target? SB 52 targets both vendors and users of rental pricing algorithms in the housing market when those tools are used to coordinate rental terms across multiple landlords. Specifically, it prohibits (1) the sale, licensing, or provision of a rental pricing algorithm to two or more persons in the same or related market with the intent that it be used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels; (2) the use of such an algorithm when the user knows or should know that other landlords are using it in the same market; and (3) adopting algorithm-generated rental terms where the tool processes nonpublic competitor data and has also been used by another person in the same market. The bill expressly includes coercive conduct—where one landlord pressures another to adopt algorithmic terms—and defines “nonpublic competitor data” to include confidential rent rolls, lease durations, and occupancy figures, subject to limited carveouts. It applies only to algorithmic coordination in the rental housing market and does not reach firms that rely solely on their own data or publicly available sources.
What does this bill do? SB 52 establishes a new civil prohibition under the Civil Code aimed at preventing algorithmic rent-setting practices that result in parallel pricing or occupancy decisions among landlords. The bill creates liability for three categories of conduct: distributing rental pricing algorithms with the intent that they be used by multiple landlords in the same market; using such algorithms while knowing (or having reason to know) that others are also using them; and relying on algorithmic recommendations derived from nonpublic competitor data where another market participant has done the same. The bill defines key terms with precision, including a narrow definition of “nonpublic competitor data” that excludes government-maintained rental registries, public advertisements, census data, and data more than one year old. This approach seeks to strike a balance between prohibiting algorithmic collusion and preserving legitimate benchmarking tools.
By establishing a statutory prohibition on certain uses of algorithmic rent-setting tools, SB 52 shifts the enforcement paradigm from traditional cartel detection to a proactive regulatory framework that does not require proof of overt agreement or antitrust injury. The bill recognizes that algorithmic coordination in rental markets can yield the same harms as a landlord cartel—higher rents, reduced competition, and housing instability—but without traditional evidence of collusion. In doing so, it supplements California’s existing antitrust regime by identifying a discrete category of conduct—parallel adoption of algorithmic pricing tools trained on nonpublic competitor data—as inherently anticompetitive in the housing context.
Hypothetical #1 – Lawful under SB 52. Consider a real estate platform that provides rent estimates—like Zillow’s Zestimate—based on publicly available data. The platform pulls rental listing prices, tax records, census information, and other public sources to generate estimated rental values for residential properties. It does not accept or process nonpublic lease data from property owners, such as actual rents charged to specific tenants, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates. Nor does it distribute pricing recommendations to landlords or attempt to align their rental terms. Because the estimates are derived from public information and are intended to inform consumer-facing platforms or general market awareness—not to coordinate pricing among landlords—this conduct would not be covered by SB 52. As long as the algorithm relies solely on public, aggregated, or de-identified data, and is not used to facilitate shared pricing behavior among competitors, it falls outside the bill’s prohibitions.
Hypothetical #2 – Unlawful under SB 52. In contrast, consider a hypothetical where a third-party software vendor licenses a dynamic rent-pricing tool to multiple landlords operating in the same geographic market. The software collects confidential rental rates, occupancy figures, and leasing data from each participating landlord and uses that information to generate pricing recommendations for all of them. The software is marketed as a way to “maximize market rents” and reduce undercutting. Because the algorithm accepts nonpublic input data from multiple competitors and is used with the intent to align pricing behavior in the same market, and because the vendor and clients either know or should know this, the conduct would fall squarely within the prohibitions of SB 52.
How will SB 52 be enforced? SB 52 authorizes a combination of public and private enforcement to address unlawful algorithmic rent-setting practices. Specifically, the bill empowers the Attorney General, city attorneys, and county counsel to bring civil actions against individuals or entities that violate the bill’s prohibitions on distributing or using rental pricing algorithms in a manner that facilitates collusion among landlords. Public prosecutors may seek injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation. Each calendar month of illegal use, and each affected residential premises, constitutes a separate and distinct violation—resulting in potentially significant cumulative penalties in cases involving widespread or repeated conduct. In addition to public enforcement, SB 52 creates a private right of action for any person harmed by a violation, presumably including tenants who experience inflated rents or reduced housing availability as a result of algorithmic collusion. Prevailing public prosecutors and private plaintiffs are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The bill further voids any lease provision that seeks to cap or waive a tenant’s right to recover such fees, deeming such clauses contrary to public policy.
How does this bill compare to SB 295 and SB 384? SB 52 is the most targeted of the three measures, focusing exclusively on algorithmic price coordination in the rental housing market. It prohibits the use, distribution, or adoption of rental pricing algorithms where two or more landlords in the same or related market are involved and where the algorithm processes nonpublic competitor data. SB 52 also uniquely prohibits coercive conduct—such as pressuring other landlords to adopt algorithmic recommendations—and defines liability in relation to specific market effects like rent, lease terms, and occupancy levels. Unlike SB 295, which applies across all sectors and addresses a broader set of “commercial terms” (e.g., level of service, availability, output, and discounts), or SB 384, which addresses price-fixing more generally across goods, services, and housing, SB 52 is confined to rental housing and delineates unlawful conduct tied to knowledge, coercion, and reliance on sensitive data.
SB 52 also takes a more detailed approach to safe harbors and exempted data sources. It enumerates categories of public, aggregated, and de-identified data that do not constitute “nonpublic competitor data,” such as government-maintained rental registries, tenant-accessible websites, and census data. This is more specific than SB 295, which includes a narrow safe harbor for algorithmic conduct only if all competitor data used was collected more than one year prior to deployment. SB 384, by contrast, provides an affirmative defense for actors who conduct reasonable due diligence and obtain written assurances that the algorithm does not process nonpublic data—an approach SB 52 does not adopt.
Pending litigation on algorithmic collusion and the California Law Review Commission (CLRC). The simultaneous consideration of SB 295, SB 52, and SB 384 (as well as AB 325 currently pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee) is not happening in a vacuum. As discussed in detail in the Assembly Privacy Committee analysis of AB 325, at pp. 6-8, case law on these issues is evolving and there is an active CLRC working group tasked with studying whether the Cartwright Act needs updating, especially in light of technological changes.
As discussed there, a number of high-profile federal and state enforcement actions are actively testing whether algorithmic pricing platforms like RealPage, RENTmaximizer, and Cendyn violate existing antitrust and consumer protection statutes. In the RealPage litigation, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice and multiple state attorneys general, including California’s, are pressing forward with claims under the Sherman Act without needing any new statutory authority. In that case, the DOJ has made clear its position: “Automating an anticompetitive scheme does not make it less anticompetitive.” (Memorandum of Law in Support of Statement of Interest of the United States, In re RealPage, Case No. 3:23-MD-3071 (M.D. Tenn Nov. 15, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-11/418053.pdf.) Similarly, in ongoing cases involving Cendyn’s hotel pricing software, courts are grappling with whether joint use of algorithms constitutes concerted action under existing federal antitrust law.
Furthermore, the CLRC working group has proposed several modest reforms, such as clarifying that concerted action can include the knowing use of common algorithms trained on competitor data, even in the absence of direct communication. The Commission’s final recommendations may offer a more comprehensive and integrated approach to updating California antitrust law.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: TechEquity, Western Center on Law and Poverty, and Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment, the bill’s sponsors, explain their support:
California renters face a dire housing crisis that SB 52 can help mitigate. Rental pricing algorithms, which compile data from myriad sources to recommend optimum prices to housing operators, conservatively added $3.8 billion in costs for renters in 2023 alone. Research also shows that tenants subject to pricing algorithms are as much as 15% more likely to be evicted due to the high cost of housing.
California is the most expensive state for tenants, requiring $47.38 an hour to afford a 2-bedroom apartment creates a financial hardship for more than half of California’s renters. Now, technology is exacerbating the problem by illegally coordinating prices that are disconnected from market realities.
Pricing companies have acknowledged that their products are designed to do this. Companies are on record referring to their pricing algorithms as, “driving every possible opportunity to increase price,” “avoid[ing] the race to the bottom in down markets,” and “a rising tide raises all ships.” Additionally, one landlord remarked, “I always liked this product because your algorithm uses proprietary data from other subscribers to suggest rents and terms. That’s classic price fixing…”
…
SB 52 will deliver real relief to California’s renters by establishing that no matter how technology is designed, if it’s used to circumvent the law, it is illegal. The bill will help the state lead the way with a nimble response to tech overreach that focuses on the impact of the models. Price fixing is not new—what is new is how technology brings speed, scale, and secrecy to illegal actions. We respectfully urge the Legislature’s support for reasonable guardrails on rental pricing algorithms.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: Many of the proposed amendments by the California Apartment Association have been incorporated into the bill in print, but it is unclear whether these recent amendments have removed their opposition.
A coalition of rental housing associations oppose the earlier version of this bill, and make the following arguments:
1. Vague and Overly Broad Language: The bill's definitions are ambiguous and could ensnare a wide range of common business practices under its prohibitions. The definition of "rental pricing algorithm" is broad, including any "service or product" that uses one or more algorithms to analyze data for the purpose of "advising a landlord on setting or recommending rental terms." This could be interpreted to include basic spreadsheets, market analysis reports, or even simple online tools that provide rent comps. The term "nonpublic competitor data" is also vaguely defined and could include any data not "widely available or easily accessible to the public," which could unintentionally criminalize the use of widely accepted industry-standard data sources.
2. Criminalization of Legitimate Business Practices: The bill would make a violation an "unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act" and an "act of unfair competition." This would not only subject individuals to significant civil penalties but also expose them to criminal prosecution. This is a disproportionate and punitive response to what may be a legitimate business practice. Property managers, especially small landlords, often rely on data and software to make informed decisions about pricing, just as businesses in any other sector do. This bill would create a chilling effect and discourage the use of data-driven tools that can help ensure fair and competitive pricing.
3. Unintended Consequences for Small Landlords: The bill’s provisions disproportionately affect small, independent landlords who do not have the resources or expertise to conduct extensive market analysis on their own. These landlords rely on software and services to access aggregated market data and remain competitive. By banning the use of these tools, SB 52 would put small landlords at a significant disadvantage, potentially leading to increased vacancies, reduced investment in rental housing, and a further consolidation of the market into the hands of large corporate entities that can afford in-house data analytics teams.
4. It Fails to Address the Root Cause of High Rents: The bill's premise is that algorithmic pricing software is a primary driver of rent increases. However, the true drivers of California’s housing affordability crisis are well-documented: a severe housing shortage, burdensome regulations, and high construction costs. Singling out a tool used for pricing, rather than addressing the fundamental supply and demand imbalance, is a misguided approach that will do little to lower rents.
5. It May Increase, Not Decrease, Rents: By restricting the use of data-driven tools, SB 52 could lead to less efficient and less informed pricing decisions. This could result in landlords overpricing or underpricing units, leading to greater market instability. If a landlord is unable to use a tool to accurately assess the market value of their unit, they may be more likely to err on the side of caution and set a higher rent to cover their costs, potentially leading to an overall increase in rents.
6. Duplication of Existing Law: Existing antitrust laws, such as the Cartwright Act and the Unfair Competition Law, already prohibit price-fixing and other anticompetitive behavior. If there is evidence of collusion or price-fixing, the Attorney General already has the authority to investigate and prosecute these violations. The United States Department of Justice has already launched investigations into the use of these tools under existing law, demonstrating that new legislation is not necessary to address these concerns.
The Committee has also received late opposition from numerous individuals opposing SB 52, expressing deep frustration that the Legislature is devoting time to bills that, in their view, do not build a single unit of housing. These self-identified working-class Californians or aspiring first-time homeowners, argue that symbolic debates over algorithmic pricing tools are a distraction from the urgent need to address California’s housing supply shortage. They urge the Legislature to focus instead on streamlining housing production, enforcing accountability on local governments, and enacting practical reforms that result in actual units being built. Some criticize the bills as “political theater” or “symbolic responses” that, while perhaps well-intentioned, do not alleviate the lived realities of high rents, long commutes, and persistent barriers to homeownership.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE Action) (co-sponsor)
Techequity Action (co-sponsor)
Western Center on Law and Poverty (co-sponsor)
Aapis for Civic Empowerment
AARP
ACLU California Action
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
American Economic Liberties Project
Basta, INC.
Bay Area Legal Aid
California Center for Movement Legal Services
California Community Land Trust Network
California Democratic Renters Council
California Green New Deal Coalition
California Housing Partnership
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California School Employees Association
Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice (CCAEJ)
CFT- a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, AFT, AFL-CIO
Christian Church Homes (CCH)
City of Santa Monica
Consumer Federation of California
County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors
Disability Rights California
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
East Bay Housing Organizations
Economic Security California Action
Evolve California
Housing and Economic Rights Advocates
Housing California
Housing Now!
Human Impact Partners
Inner City Law Center
Kapor Center
Oakland Privacy
Pico California
Power CA Action
Powerca Action
Private Equity Stakeholder Project
San Diego; County of
Santa Monica Rent Control Board
The Big Tent San Leandro
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Urban Habitat
West Hollywood/hernan Molina, Governmental Affairs Liaison
Opposition
Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles
Apartment Association of Orange County
Apartment Association, California Southern Cities
Berkeley Property Owner's Association
California Association of Realtors
California Rental Housing Association
East Bay Rental Housing Association
Nor Cal Rental Property Association
North Valley Property Owners Association
Realpage, INC.
San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce
Santa Barbara Rental Property Association
Southern California Rental Housing Association
Several Individuals
Opposition (Unless Amended)
California Apartment Association
Analysis Prepared by: Shiran Zohar / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 52 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 52
Author: Pérez (D)
Amended: 4/24/25
Vote: 21
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Umberg, Allen, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Laird, Stern, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Niello, Valladares
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-1, 5/23/25
AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NOES: Seyarto
NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle
SUBJECT: Housing rental rates and occupancy levels: algorithmic devices
SOURCE: ACCE
TechEquity
Western Center on Law and Poverty
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits a person from offering a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same or a related market, prohibits a person from knowingly using such an algorithm, and prohibits the use of nonpublic competitor data, as defined, in any rental pricing algorithm.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. (BPC) Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (BPC § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any specified purposes, including creating or carrying out restrictions in trade or commerce or preventing competition. (BPC § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (BPC § 16726.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act; and authorizes the Attorney General or a person injured by a Cartwright Act violation to file a civil action for monetary relief, as specified. (BPC §§ 16750, 16754, 16760.)
- Provides that a violation of the Cartwright Act is a conspiracy against trade, and that knowingly engaging or participating in such a conspiracy is a crime, punishable as follows:
- If the violator is a corporation, by a fine of not more than $1 million or the amount under (c), whichever is greater.
- If the violator is an individual, by imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code Section 1170(h) for one, two, or three years; by imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail; by a fine of not more $250,000 or the amount under (c), whichever is greater; or by both a fine and imprisonment.
- If any person derives pecuniary gain from a violation of the Cartwright Act, or the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the violator may be fined not more than twice the amount of the gain or loss. (BPC § 16755(a).)
This bill:
- Provides that it is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises.
- Provides that it is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises.
- Provides that a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises, and that is not otherwise prohibited under 1), shall not use nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state.
- Provides that, for purposes of 1)-3), each month that a violating algorithm is made available or used, and each residential premises for which the algorithm is made available or used, constitutes a separate violation.
- Defines “nonpublic competitor data,” for purposes of 1)-4), as follows:
- “Nonpublic competitor data” means nonpublic data derived from two or more persons, directly or indirectly, including information about actual rental rates, lease terms, occupancy rates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market.
- “Nonpublic competitor data” does not include specified data, including information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates obtained from specified publicly accessible sources; aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data; and other forums, including websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
- Defines the following additional terms for purposes of 1)-5):
- “Antitrust laws” has the same meaning as in specified state and federal laws.
- “Nonpublic data” means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” means a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of residential premises:
- “Rental pricing algorithm” includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” does not include either (1) a report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases, or (2) a product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
- Provides remedies for a violation of 1)-3), as follows:
- The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of 1)-3) for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 for violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel if they are the prevailing party in the action.
- A person may file a civil action for a violation of 1)-3) for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, or any combination of those remedies, and the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. If a lease provision limits a tenant from recovering attorney’s fees, it shall not be enforceable against a tenant’s claim for attorney’s fees in an action under 1)-3).
- Provides that nothing in 1)-7) shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws, and that the prohibitions described in 1)-3) apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
- Provides that a violation of 1)-3) shall constitute an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL); and that the remedies and penalties provided in 4) and 7) are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws.
Comments
A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning to weigh variables including supply and demand, a competitor’s prices, and anticipated delivery time, as well as any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information. Algorithms that rely on public data alone can still give a seller a massive advantage over a consumer who does not have access to the same volume of data.
Recently, some businesses have started to offer algorithmic pricing models that expressly incorporate competitors’ competitively sensitive data—for example, by factoring confidential rental rate and occupancy levels, provided by the users of the algorithm, to make pricing and occupancy recommendations to each landlord on the basis of that confidential information. The federal government and California are in a pending lawsuit against one such algorithm producer, arguing that incorporating the competitively sensitive data of multiple competitors violates the federal Sherman Antitrust Act. But because antitrust laws are drafted in broad terms, rather than prohibiting specific acts and practices, it will likely take substantial time and litigation costs to reach a decision in the pending suit, or other suits against similar algorithm providers.
This bill is intended to supplement, not displace, the Sherman Act or its state counterpart, the Cartwright Act, by expressly prohibiting algorithmic collusion in the residential rental market, whether deliberate or inadvertent. To that end, this bill prohibits (1) the offering for sale, or use, of any single algorithm by two or more landlords in the same or related market; and (2) the offering for sale, or use, of a single algorithm that incorporates nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state as an input in the algorithm. This bill permits the Attorney General, or a person injured by a violation, to file a civil suit for specified relief. The author has agreed to amend this bill to clarify certain terms and what constitutes a violation, and to clarify that a person must be harmed by a violation in order to bring a cause of action.
This bill is one of several bills pending in the Legislature relating to pricing algorithms, including SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025), SB 384 (Wahab, 2025), and AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry).
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the fiscal impact of the bill is as follows:
- Local prosecutors: Workload cost pressures (local funds) to local prosecutors of an unknown but potentially significant amount. If local prosecutors file civil enforcement actions as authorized by this bill it will result in a significant workload increase.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): DOJ indicates a fiscal impact of $650,000 or less (Unfair Competition Law Fund) and notes that implementation of this bill will be dependent upon the appropriation of funds. DOJ will be unable to absorb the costs to comply with or implement the requirements of the bill within existing budgeted resources. The Consumer Protection Section (CPS) within the Public Rights Division of the DOJ anticipates increased workloads in enforcing SB 52 beginning on January 1, 2026, and ongoing. The workload includes investigating and prosecuting violations of not adhering to SB 52. The Section will require 1.0 Deputy Attorney General, 1.0 Senior Legal Analyst, and 1.0 Legal Secretary, which will have an impact to the Unfair Competition Law Fund.
- Trial Courts: Unknown, potentially significant cost to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to additional adjudicate civil actions. By creating a new a private cause of action with statutory damages, and authorizing a new civil penalty with statutory damages, this bill may lead to additional civil cases. Expanding civil penalties and creating new causes of action could lead to lengthier and more complex court proceedings with attendant workload and resource costs to the court. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknown factors, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. In 2023–24, over 4.8 million cases were filed statewide in the superior courts. Filings increased over the past year, driven mostly by misdemeanors and infractions, and civil limited cases. The increase in filings from the previous year is greater than 5% for civil limited and unlimited, appellate division appeals, juvenile delinquency, misdemeanors and infractions, and probate. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations. The Governor’s 2025-26 budget proposes a $40 million ongoing increase in discretionary funding from the General Fund to help pay for increased trial court operation costs beginning in 2025-26.
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/23/25)
ACCE (co-source)
TechEquity (co-source)
Western Center on Law and Poverty (co-source)
AAPIs for Civic Empowerment
AARP California
ACLU California Action
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
American Economic Liberties Project
BASTA, Inc.
Bay Area Legal Aid
California Center for Movement Legal Services
California Democratic Renters Council
California Green New Deal Coalition
California Housing Partnership
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
California School Employees Association, AFL-CIO
CFT, a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, AFT, AFL-CIO
Christian Church Homes
Consumer Federation of California
County of San Diego
Disability Rights California
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
East Bay Housing Organizations
Economic Security California Action
Evolve California
Green New Deal Coalition
Housing and Economic Rights Advocates
Housing California
Housing Now!
Human Impact Partners
Inner City Law Center
Kapor Center
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Oakland Privacy
PICO California
PowerCA Action
Private Equity Stakeholder Project
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Urban Habitat
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/23/25)
Apartment Association of Orange County
California Apartment Association
California Association of Realtors
East Bay Rental Housing Association
RealPage, Inc.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to AACE, TechEquity, and the Western Center on Law and Poverty:
SB 52 allows landlords to use whatever data they want to make independent pricing decisions. The bill addresses when competitors are coordinating to make pricing decisions and establishes that regardless of the source of data, collusion is collusion.
Banning all of the ways that algorithms aid collusion is critical. Rental algorithm companies have stated that their software can help competitors maximize prices using just public data, and have suggested that policies banning only non-public data will not address housing affordability.
SB 52 also does not distinguish between whether a rental pricing algorithm “sets” a price or merely “advises” or suggests” a rental amount. As noted in DOJ lawsuits, whether there is full adherence to the price fixing scheme does not affect the legality; what matters is the existence of an agreement to fix the price, as that agreement distorts the competitive process whether binding or not…
SB 52 accounts for the various data inputs, interface designs, and contractual differences between various pricing algorithm models by focusing not on how they are designed (which is frequently changing and proprietary), but on the impact that they have. Competitors cannot agree to use the same information to set their rental rates.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to RealPage, Inc.:
Senate Bill 52 is overbroad and ambiguous. If passed in its current form, housing providers will be deprived of an important market analysis tool that is available to every other seller in virtually every other industry. The bill will encourage frivolous lawsuits against apartment owners and discourage badly needed investment in the state.
The definition of "rental pricing algorithm" as outlined in the bill is excessively broad and poorly defined, leading to significant risks of misapplication and unintended consequences. By encompassing "a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool," the bill indiscriminately includes a vast array of technologies, many of which may have no direct connection to rental pricing decisions. This sweeping inclusion creates unnecessary ambiguity, potentially ensnaring tools or products that analyze data without influencing rental pricing.
The bill could also be interpreted to ban the use of all external data—both public and nonpublic—in rental pricing algorithms. This interpretation would effectively function as a blanket prohibition on the use of pricing software in the rental industry. Such a restriction would deprive apartment owners of access to a widely utilized technology that has been around for more than two decades and remains commonplace in virtually every other industry where pricing decisions are made. The absence of these tools could hinder competitiveness and efficiency, leaving apartment owners at a technological disadvantage compared to sellers in other markets.
Prepared by: Allison Whitt Meredith / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
5/25/25 12:40:57
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
SB 52 (Pérez) - Housing rental rates and occupancy levels: algorithmic devices
Version: April 24, 2025 | Policy Vote: JUD. 11 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: Yes |
Hearing Date: May 5, 2025 | Consultant: Liah Burnley |
Bill Summary:
SB 52 establishes civil penalties related to rental pricing algorithms that use nonpublic competitor data.
Fiscal Impact:
- Local prosecutors: Workload cost pressures (local funds) to local prosecutors of an unknown but potentially significant amount. If local prosecutors file civil enforcement actions as authorized by this bill it will result in a significant workload increase.
- Department of Justice (DOJ): DOJ indicates a fiscal impact of $650,000 or less (Unfair Competition Law Fund) and notes that implementation of this bill will be dependent upon the appropriation of funds. DOJ will be unable to absorb the costs to comply with or implement the requirements of the bill within existing budgeted resources. The Consumer Protection Section (CPS) within the Public Rights Division of the DOJ anticipates increased workloads in enforcing SB 52 beginning on January 1, 2026, and ongoing. The workload includes investigating and prosecuting violations of not adhering to SB 52. The Section will require 1.0 Deputy Attorney General, 1.0 Senior Legal Analyst, and 1.0 Legal Secretary, which will have an impact to the Unfair Competition Law Fund.
- Trial Courts: Unknown, potentially significant cost to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to additional adjudicate civil actions. By creating a new a private cause of action with statutory damages, and authorizing a new civil penalty with statutory damages, this bill may lead to additional civil cases. Expanding civil penalties and creating new causes of action could lead to lengthier and more complex court proceedings with attendant workload and resource costs to the court. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknown factors, including the number of cases filed and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. In 2023–24, over 4.8 million cases were filed statewide in the superior courts. Filings increased over the past year, driven mostly by misdemeanors and infractions, and civil limited cases. The increase in filings from the previous year is greater than 5% for civil limited and unlimited, appellate division appeals, juvenile delinquency, misdemeanors and infractions, and probate. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations. The Governor’s 2025-26 budget proposes a $40 million ongoing increase in discretionary funding from the General Fund to help pay for increased trial court operation costs beginning in 2025-26.
Background:
Rental pricing algorithms use extensive market data to predict and recommend profit-maximizing rents. This nonpublic, material, and granular rental data includes, among other information, a landlord’s rental prices from executed leases, lease terms, and future occupancy. Companies like RealPage collect swaths of such data from competing landlords, combine it, and feed it to an algorithm to provide daily, near real time pricing recommendations to landlords. Algorithmic pricing weakens competition because it can facilitate price coordination among landlords who would otherwise be competing. A free market requires that landlords compete on the merits, not coordinate pricing. If price coordination was eliminated, there would be an economically meaningful decrease in price mark-ups for rental units using pricing algorithms.[1] The costs to renters in 2023 has been estimated at $3.8 billion. [2]
Proposed Law:
- Makes it unlawful to do any of the following:
- To sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises;
- To use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises; and,
- To sell or provide a rental pricing algorithm that uses nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state.
- Provides for separate and distinct violations, as follows:
- For a person who uses a rental pricing algorithm in violation of these provisions, each month that a violation exists or continues constitutes a separate and distinct violation.
- Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, a rental pricing algorithm in violation these provisions, constitute a separate and distinct violation.
- Each separate residential premises for which the rental pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used constitutes a separate and distinct violation.
- Authorizes the Attorney General, city attorneys, and county counsel to file a civil action for a violation for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel, as applicable, if they are the prevailing party in the action.
- Creates a private right of action for any person who is harmed by a violation. A person may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. A lease provision that limits a tenant from recovering attorney’s fees or that caps the tenant’s fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenant’s claim against their landlord.
- Specifies that these provisions do not impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws. The prohibitions apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
- Provides that a violation constitutes an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the Unfair Competition Law. The remedies and penalties provided by this section are cumulative to each other and the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
- Includes the following definitions:
- “Antitrust laws” as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12) and the Cartwright Act.
- “Nonpublic competitor data” as nonpublic data derived from two or more persons, directly or indirectly, including information about actual rental rates, lease terms, occupancy rates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market. “Nonpublic competitor data” does not include information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from the following publicly accessible sources:
- Advertisements of available rental properties, including listings published on internet websites maintained by a property owner or manager;
- Rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency;
- Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center;
- Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data; and,
- Other forums, including internet websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
- “Nonpublic data” as information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” as a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of residential premises.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” does not include either of the following:
- A report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases; and,
- A product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
Related Legislation:
- AB 316 (Krell) prohibits a defendant that used AI from asserting a defense that the AI autonomously caused the harm to the plaintiff. AB 316 is pending in the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection.
- AB 412 (Bauer Kahan) requires a of a generative AI model to document any copyrighted materials used to train the model. AB 412 is pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
- SB 384 (Wahab) prohibits a person from selling or using a price-fixing algorithm, to set either a price or supply level of a good or service or rent or occupancy level of rental property. SB 384 is pending in this Committee.
- SB 420 (Padilla) regulates high-risk automated decision systems. SB 420 is pending in this Committee.
- SB 468 (Becker) imposes a duty on business that deploy a high-risk AI systems that processes personal information to protect personal information. SB 468 is pending in this Committee.
- AB 1018 (Bauer-Kahan) regulates automated decision systems. AB 1018 is pending in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
-- END --
https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/cea/written-materials/2024/12/17/the-cost-of-anticompetitive-pricing-algorithms-in-rental-housing/#:~:text=In%20this%20CEA%20analysis%2C%20we%20quantify%20the%20anticompetitive,harmed%20when%20competition%20in%20rental%20housing%20is%20weakened.
↑https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/media/1364976/dl?inline ↑
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: SB 52 (Author:Pérez)
Version: April 8, 2025
Hearing Date: April 22, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: AWM
SUBJECT
Housing rental rates and occupancy levels: algorithmic devices
DIGEST
This bill prohibits a person from offering a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same or a related market, and prohibits a person from knowingly using such an algorithm; and prohibits the use of nonpublic competitor data, as defined, in any rental pricing algorithm.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning to weigh variables including supply and demand, a competitor’s prices, and anticipated delivery time, as well as any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information. Algorithms that rely on public data alone can still give a seller a massive advantage over a consumer who does not have access to the same volume of data.
Recently, some businesses have started to offer algorithmic pricing models that expressly incorporate competitors’ competitively sensitive data—for example, by factoring confidential rental rate and occupancy levels, provided by the users of the algorithm, to make pricing and occupancy recommendations to each landlord on the basis of that confidential information. The federal government and California are in a pending lawsuit against one such algorithm producer, arguing that incorporating the competitively sensitive data of multiple competitors violates the federal Sherman Antitrust Act. But because antitrust laws are drafted in broad terms, rather than prohibiting specific acts and practices, it will likely take substantial time and litigation costs to reach a decision in the pending suit, or other suits against similar algorithm providers.
This bill is intended to supplement, not displace, the Sherman Act or its state counterpart, the Cartwright Act, by expressly prohibiting algorithmic collusion in the residential rental market, whether deliberate or inadvertent. To that end, this bill prohibits (1) the offering for sale, or use, of any single algorithm by two or more landlords in the same or related market; and (2) the offering for sale, or use, of a single algorithm that incorporates nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state as an input in the algorithm. The bill permits the Attorney General, or a person injured by a violation, to file a civil suit for specified relief. The author has agreed to amend the bill to clarify certain terms and what constitutes a violation, and to clarify that a person must be harmed by a violation in order to bring a cause of action.
This bill is sponsored by ACCE, TechEquity, and the Western Center on Law and Poverty, and is supported by 27 housing, labor, consumer protection, and governmental entities. This bill is opposed by the California Apartment Association, the California Association of Realtors, and RealPage, Inc.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of, merchandise, or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in the manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any combination of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- The state and its political subdivisions and public agencies are “persons” for the purposes of 7).
- The Attorney General or a district attorney may file a suit for damages on behalf of a state or county political subdivision, respectively (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that a violation of the Cartwright Act is a conspiracy against trade, and that knowingly engaging or participating in such a conspiracy is a crime, punishable as follows:
- If the violator is a corporation, by a fine of not more than $1 million or the amount under (c), whichever is greater.
- If the violator is an individual, by imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h) for one, two, or three years; by imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail; by a fine of not more $250,000 or the amount under (c), whichever is greater; or by both a fine and imprisonment.
- If any person derives pecuniary gain from a violation of the Cartwright Act, or the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the violator may be fined not more than twice the amount of the gain or loss. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(a).)
This bill:
- Provides that it is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises.
- Provides that it is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises.
- Provides that a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises, and that is not otherwise prohibited under 1), shall not use nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state.
- Provides that each month a violation exists, and each residential premises for which the person uses the rental pricing algorithm, shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
- Defines “nonpublic competitor data,” for purposes of 1)-4), as follows:
- “Nonpublic competitor data” means nonpublic data, including information about actual rental rates, lease terms, occupancy rates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market.
- “Nonpublic competitor data” does not include any of the following:
- Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from the following publicly accessible sources: (1) advertisements of available rental properties, including lists published on websites maintained by a property owner or manager; or (2) rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
- Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
- Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
- Other forums, including websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
- Defines the following additional terms for purposes of 1)-5):
- “Nonpublic data” means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” means a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of residential premises.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” does not include either (1) a report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases, or (2) a product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
- Provides remedies for a violation of 1)-3), as follows:
- The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of 1)-3) for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 for violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel if they are the prevailing party in the action.
- A person may file a civil action for a violation of 1)-3) for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, or any combination of those remedies, and the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. If a lease provision limits a tenant from recovering attorney’s fees, it shall not be enforceable against a tenant’s claim for attorney’s fees in an action under 1)-3).
- Provides that nothing in 1)-7) shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws, and that the prohibitions described in 1)-3) apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
- Provides that a violation of 1)-3) shall constitute an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the UCL; and that the remedies and penalties provided in 4) and 7) are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws.
COMMENTS
- Author’s comment
According to the author:
California has a rental housing affordability crisis. This state is the most expensive state to rent in, requiring an average hourly wage of $47.38 to afford a 2-bedroom apartment. More than half of the state’s renters are rent-burdened as they have to contribute more than 30% of their income to rent. While the rental housing affordability crisis isn’t new, exacerbating this crisis is how landlords are using tech to inflate rents above what is fair.
Real estate giants are harnessing algorithms to recommend rent prices based on rental data from thousands of landlords and other sources. These AI-backed rent-setting tools turn competitors into collaborators for a potentially already unlawful information sharing collusion operation that provides landlords with an unfair and unsustainable advantage. This is tech-powered exploitation and worsening the already dire affordability crisis.
Although federal and state law clearly sets precedent for illegal antitrust and anticompetitive practices, landlords continue to rely on algorithms like RealPage provides, arguing that their practices are not covered under those laws. As such, landlords continue to share and compile competitive data through this platform in order to set inflated rental prices in a manner eerily similar to examples of antitrust violations. The White House Council of Economic Advisors recently estimated that the use of algorithmic rent-fixing software costs individual renters an average of $70 per month more than a renter whose landlord does not rely on this software, a collective cost of nearly four-billion dollars more in annual rent caused by this practice.
Due to the sketchy nature of algorithmic utilization among landlord competitors, federal, state, and local government officials have begun taking action to address what has been depicted as “an unlawful information-sharing scheme. Companies like RealPage also rely on inaccurately-trained algorithms to perform background checks, often leading to unjust housing denials and further exacerbating access to housing
As such, these practices distort the rental market beyond competitive dynamics, further exacerbating the housing crisis facing California.
SB 52 addresses the question of price-fixing in rental markets through third party algorithms by clearly defining in state law that using such methods is illegal. Further, SB 52 provides mechanisms for accountability and enforcement for using these algorithms illegally.
2. Background on price-fixing algorithms
“Pricing algorithms are intended to help firms determine optimal pricing on a near real-time basis.”[1] A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning “to weigh variables such as supply and demand, competitor pricing, and delivery time,” as well as any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information.[2] Studies indicate that the use of certain pricing algorithms results in higher prices for consumers,[3] particularly when one seller is using a more sophisticated reinforced learning algorithm and its competitors are using a rule-based algorithm that incorporates that seller’s price as an input.[4]
As algorithms grew more expansive in the 2010s, scholars raised concerns that algorithms—particularly reinforced learning algorithms—could “learn” to tacitly collude with competitors’ algorithms, thereby keeping prices high.[5] More recently, however, some businesses have offered algorithmic pricing models that expressly incorporate competitors’ nonpublic, competitively sensitive data—for example, by factoring confidential rental rate and occupancy levels, provided by the users of the algorithm, to make pricing and occupancy recommendations to each landlord on the basis of that confidential information. As explained below, there are allegations that these algorithms not only harm consumers, but also violate existing state and federal antitrust laws.
3. Antitrust law and algorithms
Under the federal Sherman Act,[6] “[horizontal] price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se.”[7] This per se bar extends to any “combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity” in interstate or foreign commerce.[8] Likewise, under the State’s own antitrust law, the Cartwright Act,[9] “agreements fixing or tampering with prices are illegal per se.”[10] These prohibitions “rest on the premise that unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”[11] The Cartwright Act’s prohibitions on anticompetitive behavior are “broader and deeper in range” than the federal Sherman Act’s.[12]
Former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Maureen K. Ohlhausen argues that the use of a vendor that provides algorithmic pricing services derived from confidential pricing information provided by multiple competitors is not, as an antitrust matter, new territory.[13] She believes such services are merely an updated version of a long-prohibited practice, known as the “hub-and-spoke conspiracy”: “[j]ust as the antitrust laws do not allow competitors to exchange competitively sensitive information directly in an effort to stabilize or control industry pricing, they also prohibit using an intermediary to facilitate the exchange of confidential business information.”[14] To understand why this is such an easy call, Ohlhausen recommended replacing “algorithm” with “ ‘a guy named Bob’ ”:
Is it ok for a guy named Bob to collect confidential price strategy information from all the participants in a market, and then tell everybody how they should price? If it isn’t ok for a guy named Bob to do it, then it probably isn’t ok for an algorithm to do it either.[15]
This approach reflects the longstanding antitrust principle that “competitors cannot simply get around antitrust liability by acting through a third-party intermediary or joint venture.”[16]
Consistent with this interpretation, the U.S Department of Justice (USDOJ) and several states, including California, have filed an antitrust lawsuit against RealPage and several property management companies.[17] According to the First Amended Complaint, RealPage’s Vice President of Revenue Management Advisory Services described RealPage’s benefit to landlords thusly: “ ‘[T]here is greater good in everybody succeeding versus essentially trying to compete against one another in a way that actually keeps the entire industry down.’ ”[18] At the time this analysis was released, RealPage’s motion to dismiss was pending before the court.
Rather than wait for the results of the lawsuit against RealPage, San Francisco enacted an ordinance prohibiting the sale or use of algorithms that use nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms or occupancy levels.[19] This bill’s language is similar to, but broader than, the San Francisco ordinance, as explained further in Part 5 of this analysis, below.
4. California’s housing crisis and sky-high rents
As explained by the California Department of Housing and Community Development’s most recent Statewide Housing Plan (SHP):
California’s housing crisis is half a century in the making. After decades of underproduction, supply is far behind need and housing and rental costs are soaring. As a result, millions of Californians must make hard decisions about paying for housing at the expense of food, health care, child care, and transportation, directly impacting quality of life in the state. One in three households in the state doesn’t earn enough money to meet their basic needs.[20]
The SHP reported that, to afford the rent for a two-bedroom apartment without being cost-burdened in 2022, a household would have to earn $81,191 per year, which translates to an hourly wage of $39.03.[21] The National Low Income Housing Coalition reports that, as of 2024, the two-bedroom wage has increased to $96,545 annually, or $47.38 hourly.[22] In certain Bay Area and Central Coast areas, the hourly wage needed to afford a two-bedroom apartment is above $60 dollars.[23] The statewide minimum hourly wage is currently $16.50,[24] except that fast-food workers must be paid at least $20 per hour,[25] and some localities have higher minimum wages ranging from $16.89 to $19.65.[26] “The top five most common occupations in California pay less than the wage needed to afford a home.”[27]
Renters have to pay more for the simple reason that California does not have enough housing.[28] Against this backdrop of insufficient supply and sky-high demand, the author and sponsors argue that anticompetitive behavior by landlords exacerbates the pain already felt by Californians looking for a place to live. For example, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors writes:
Algorithmic pricing tools may be used to exploit already strained rental housing markets, enabling owners and landlords to maximize profits in ways that do not reflect fair or reasonable market conditions. These inflated prices can exacerbate California’s housing crisis and reduce prospective residents' access to stable, affordable housing.
5. This bill expressly limits the use of residential rental pricing algorithms
Because the Cartwright Act is drafted in broad terms, rather than prohibiting specific acts and practices, it can take time and substantial costs to litigate whether a specific business practice is covered by the Cartwright Act. This bill is intended to supplement, not displace, the Cartwright Act’s application to algorithmic collusion and provide certainty in the market by expressly prohibiting algorithmic collusion in the residential rental market, whether deliberate or inadvertent. To that end, this bill imposes prohibitions on two types of rental pricing algorithms. The amendments discussed in this Part are set forth in Part 6, below.
First, the bill prohibits a person from selling, licensing, or otherwise providing a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same, or a related, market to recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises. To be clear, this does not prevent a person from offering multiple algorithmic products to multiple landlords within the same rental market; it simply prohibits a person from providing to multiple landlords a single algorithmic product that could, by virtue of the inputs received from those competing landlords, result in a sort of tacit collusive effect. The bill also prohibits a person from using such an algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises if that person knew, or should have known, that it was being offered or provided to other landlords in the same, or a related, market. Because the term “related market” is potentially ambiguous, the author has agreed to amendments that instead refer to a “housing provider” on a statewide basis.
Second, this bill prohibits a person engaged in the business of providing a rental housing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises from using nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state as an input in the algorithm. “Nonpublic competitor data” is defined to include information that is not readily available to the public and that relates to the rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates of competitors in the same or a related rental market. The bill also specifies that information obtained from a range of publicly available sources, including industry reports and advertisements, or from disaggregated data sources, is not considered “nonpublic.”[29]
The bill provides two enforcement mechanisms. The Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties for up to $1,000 per violation. The bill also provides a private right of action, permitting a person harmed by the violation to file their own civil action seeking the same remedies. A prevailing plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fee and costs, and the bill specifies that a lease provision that limits a tenant from awarding attorney’s fees shall not be enforceable against the tenant’s claim. The author has agreed to amend the bill to specify that a person must have been harmed by the violation in order to file suit, and to amendments clarifying what constitutes a separate violation for purposes of the award of civil penalties.
Finally, the bill clarifies that the bill’s prohibitions do not impair or limit the applicability of any antitrust laws, and that they apply in addition to, not in lieu of, any prohibition in state or federal antitrust laws. The author has agreed to amendments that clarify this provision further, to ensure there is no question as to this bill’s additive effect.
As noted above, this bill is based on, but not identical to, a San Francisco ordinance adopted in 2024 that prohibits the use of “revenue management programs” that use algorithms to recommend prices or occupancy rates in rental housing.[30] This bill is broader insofar as it prohibits the use of a pricing algorithm to recommend or set leasing terms beyond rental rates, and this bill has more specific exemptions explaining what type of information is not “nonpublic data” or “nonpublic competitor data” covered by the bill.
5. Amendments
As noted above, the author has agreed to amend the bill to respond to stakeholder concerns and clarify certain provisions. The amendments are set forth below, subject to any changes the Office of Legislative Counsel may make.
Amendment 1
At page 4, in line 25, after “(d)” insert “(1) For a person who uses an algorithm in violation of this section, ”; and in lines 25 through 27, delete “, and each residential premises for which the person uses the rental pricing algorithm,”
Amendment 2
At page 4, after line 28, insert:
(2) Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3) Each separate residential premises for which the pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
Amendment 3
At page 5, in line 9, after “data” insert “derived from two or more persons, directly or indirectly,”
Amendment 4
At page 5, between lines 37 and 38, insert:
(2) “Antitrust laws” has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this chapter, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
Amendment 5
At page 5, delete line 39 after “public” and delete all of page 6, lines 1 and 2.
Amendment 6
At page 5, in line 29, after “person” insert “who is harmed by a violation of this section” and in lines 29 and 30, delete “for a violation of this section”
Amendment 7
At page 5, delete line 35 after “fees” and lines 36 and 37, and insert “or that caps the tenant’s fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenant’s claim against their landlord under this section.”
6. Arguments in support
According to the bill’s sponsors:
SB 52 allows landlords to use whatever data they want to make independent pricing decisions. The bill addresses when competitors are coordinating to make pricing decisions and establishes that regardless of the source of data, collusion is collusion.
Banning all of the ways that algorithms aid collusion is critical. Rental algorithm companies have stated that their software can help competitors maximize prices using just public data, and have suggested that policies banning only non-public data will not address housing affordability.
SB 52 also does not distinguish between whether a rental pricing algorithm “sets” a price or merely “advises” or suggests” a rental amount. As noted in DOJ lawsuits, whether there is full adherence to the price fixing scheme does not affect the legality; what matters is the existence of an agreement to fix the price, as that agreement distorts the competitive process whether binding or not…
SB 52 accounts for the various data inputs, interface designs, and contractual differences between various pricing algorithm models by focusing not on how they are designed (which is frequently changing and proprietary), but on the
7. Arguments in opposition
According to RealPage, Inc.:
Senate Bill 52 is overbroad and ambiguous. If passed in its current form, housing providers will be deprived of an important market analysis tool that is available to every other seller in virtually every other industry. The bill will encourage frivolous lawsuits against apartment owners and discourage badly needed investment in the state.
The definition of "rental pricing algorithm" as outlined in the bill is excessively broad and poorly defined, leading to significant risks of misapplication and unintended consequences. By encompassing "a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool," the bill indiscriminately includes a vast array of technologies, many of which may have no direct connection to rental pricing decisions. This sweeping inclusion creates unnecessary ambiguity, potentially ensnaring tools or products that analyze data without influencing rental pricing.
The bill could also be interpreted to ban the use of all external data—both public and nonpublic—in rental pricing algorithms. This interpretation would effectively function as a blanket prohibition on the use of pricing software in the rental industry. Such a restriction would deprive apartment owners of access to a widely utilized technology that has been around for more than two decades and remains commonplace in virtually every other industry where pricing decisions are made. The absence of these tools could hinder competitiveness and efficiency, leaving apartment owners at a technological disadvantage compared to sellers in other markets.
RealPage uses data responsibly to connect renters with homes quickly and efficiently, creating a win-win for both property owners and tenants. Unfortunately, SB 52 unfairly targets a key management tool used across the industry—one that helps address housing needs, not cause them. The bill is based on inaccurate assumptions and undermines innovation in housing access.
SUPPORT
ACCE (co-sponsor)
TechEquity (co-sponsor)
Western Center on Law and Poverty (co-sponsor)
AAPIs for Civic Empowerment
ACLU California Action
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
American Economic Liberties Project
BASTA, Inc.
Bay Area Legal Aid
California Center for Movement Legal Services
California Green New Deal Coalition
California Housing Partnership
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
CFT, a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals
Consumer Federation of California
Disability Rights California
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
East Bay Housing Organizations
Economic Security California Action
Evolve California
Green New Deal Coalition
Housing and Economic Rights Advocates
Housing California
Housing Now!
Human Impact Partners
Inner City Law Center
Kapor Center
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Oakland Privacy
PICO California
PowerCA Action
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Urban Habitat
OPPOSITION
California Apartment Association
California Association of Realtors
RealPage, Inc.
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending legislation:
SB 384 (Wahab, 2025) establishes the Preventing Algorithmic Price Fixing Act, which prohibits a business from using a price-fixing algorithm, as defined, to set a price or supply level of a good or service. SB 384 is pending before this Committee and is set to be heard on the same date as this bill.
SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) establishes the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2025, which prohibits a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with competitor data; requires a person using a pricing algorithm to recommend or set a price or commercial term to make certain commercial disclosures; and requires a person to provide specified information to the Attorney General relating to the use of pricing algorithms. SB 295 is pending before this Committee.
AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry, 2025) expressly prohibits, within the Cartwright Act, the use or distribution of pricing algorithms that use, incorporate, or were trained on nonpublic competitor data. AB 325 is pending before the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.
Prior legislation:
SB 1154 (Hurtado, 2024) would have established the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2024, which would have prohibited the use of pricing algorithms to set or recommend a price or commercial term in this state that incorporates nonpublic competitor data, as defined, which may be enforced by the Attorney General; established a partially rebuttable presumption that the use of a prohibited pricing algorithm is a violation of specified state laws prohibiting anticompetitive behavior; and added additional provisions relating to the Attorney General’s investigation of, and disclosures of the use of, pricing algorithms. SB 1154 died in this Committee.
AB 2230 (Bennett, 2024) would have established the Residential Housing Unfair Practices Act of 2023, which would have amended the Cartwright Act to expressly list certain practices relating to the provision of housing. AB 2230 died in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
**************
Bertini & Koenigsberg, The Pitfalls of Pricing Algorithms, Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct. 2021), available at https://hbr.org/2021/09/the-pitfalls-of-pricing-algorithms. All links in this analysis are current as of April 18, 2025. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Calvano, et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion (2020) 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 3267. ↑
Wang, et al., Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence and Simple Rule-Based Pricing (Jun. 29, 2022) SSRN, p. 40, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4144905. ↑
Calvano, supra, at p. 3268. ↑
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. ↑
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 150, 218. ↑
Id. at p. 223. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq. ↑
Oakland-Alameda County Builders’ Exchange v. F. P. Lathrop Constr. Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 354, 363. ↑
Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 935 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
Remarks of Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairwoman, U.S. FTC, “Should We Fear The Things That Go Beep In the Night? Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust Law and Algorithmic Pricing,” Remarks from the Concurrences Antitrust Financial Sector Conference (May 23, 2017), p. 10, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/should-we-fear-things-go-beep-night-some-initial-thoughts-intersection-antitrust-law-algorithmic. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League (2010) 560 U.S. 183, 202 (cleaned up). ↑
See U.S. v. RealPage, Inc.(M.D.N.C.) Case No. 1:24-cv-00710-LCB-JLW. ↑
First Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 47, U.S. v. RealPage, Inc.(M.D.N.C.) Case No. 1:24-cv-00710-LCB-JLW, ¶ 2 (emphasis in original). ↑
See S.F. Admin. Code, § 37.10C. ↑
California Department of Housing and Community Development, A Home for Every Californian: 2022 Statewide Housing Plan (2022) p. 4, available at https://statewide-housing-plan-cahcd.hub.arcgis.com/. ↑
Id. at p. 5. ↑
National Low Income Housing Coalition, Report: California (2024), pp. 1-2, available at https://nlihc.org/oor/state/ca. ↑
Id. at p. 1 (listing hourly housing wages for: Santa Cruz-Watsonville, at $77.96/hour; San Francisco, at $64/60; and San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara at $60.23). ↑
California Department of Industrial Relations, Labor Commissioner’s Office, Minimum Wage, https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/minimum_wage.htm. ↑
Ibid. ↑
UC Berkeley Labor Center, Inventory of US City and County Minimum Wage Ordinances: California City and County Minimum Wages, January 1, 2025, https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/#s-2. ↑
A Home for Every Californian: 2022 Statewide Housing Plan, supra, at pp. 5-6. ↑
Id. at p. 23. ↑
The California Apartment Association, in an “oppose unless amended” letter, includes a list of information sources which they argue should not be considered nonpublic; the majority of the items on their list are, in fact, already expressly exempted from the definition of “nonpublic competitor data.” ↑
See S.F. Admin. Code, § 37.10C. ↑
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: SB 52 (Author:Pérez)
Version: April 8, 2025
Hearing Date: April 22, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: AWM
SUBJECT
Housing rental rates and occupancy levels: algorithmic devices
DIGEST
This bill prohibits a person from offering a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same or a related market, and prohibits a person from knowingly using such an algorithm; and prohibits the use of nonpublic competitor data, as defined, in any rental pricing algorithm.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning to weigh variables including supply and demand, a competitor’s prices, and anticipated delivery time, as well as any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information. Algorithms that rely on public data alone can still give a seller a massive advantage over a consumer who does not have access to the same volume of data.
Recently, some businesses have started to offer algorithmic pricing models that expressly incorporate competitors’ competitively sensitive data—for example, by factoring confidential rental rate and occupancy levels, provided by the users of the algorithm, to make pricing and occupancy recommendations to each landlord on the basis of that confidential information. The federal government and California are in a pending lawsuit against one such algorithm producer, arguing that incorporating the competitively sensitive data of multiple competitors violates the federal Sherman Antitrust Act. But because antitrust laws are drafted in broad terms, rather than prohibiting specific acts and practices, it will likely take substantial time and litigation costs to reach a decision in the pending suit, or other suits against similar algorithm providers.
This bill is intended to supplement, not displace, the Sherman Act or its state counterpart, the Cartwright Act, by expressly prohibiting algorithmic collusion in the residential rental market, whether deliberate or inadvertent. To that end, this bill prohibits (1) the offering for sale, or use, of any single algorithm by two or more landlords in the same or related market; and (2) the offering for sale, or use, of a single algorithm that incorporates nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state as an input in the algorithm. The bill permits the Attorney General, or a person injured by a violation, to file a civil suit for specified relief. The author has agreed to amend the bill to clarify certain terms and what constitutes a violation, and to clarify that a person must be harmed by a violation in order to bring a cause of action.
This bill is sponsored by ACCE, TechEquity, and the Western Center on Law and Poverty, and is supported by 27 housing, labor, consumer protection, and governmental entities. This bill is opposed by the California Apartment Association, the California Association of Realtors, and RealPage, Inc.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Establishes the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (Sherman Act). (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.)
- Makes illegal, under the Sherman Act, every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or with foreign nations. (15 U.S.C. § 1.)
- Authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action in the name of the state in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the defendant to secure monetary relief, as provided, for violations of the Sherman Act. (15 U.S.C. § 15c.)
Existing state law:
- Establishes the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 7, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq.)
- Defines “person” within the Cartwright Act to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16702.)
- Defines a “trust” under the Cartwright Act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for any of the following purposes:
- To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.
- To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of, merchandise, or of any commodity.
- To prevent competition in the manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or any commodity.
- To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, barter, use, or consumption in the state.
- To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do all or any combination of the following:
- Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce, or consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value.
- Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure.
- Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity.
- Agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price in any manner might be affected. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720.)
- Makes every trust unlawful, against public policy, and void, except as exempted under the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16726.)
- Provides that any contract or agreement in violation of the Cartwright Act is absolutely void and not enforceable. (Bus & Prof. Code, § 16722.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General, or the district attorney of any county, subject to specified notice requirements, to initiate a civil action or criminal proceeding for a violation of the Cartwright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754.)
- Authorizes any person who is injured in their business or property by reason of anything forbidden under the Cartwright Act, regardless of whether the injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, to file a civil action to recover treble damages, interest, and injunctive relief.
- The state and its political subdivisions and public agencies are “persons” for the purposes of 7).
- The Attorney General or a district attorney may file a suit for damages on behalf of a state or county political subdivision, respectively (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16750.)
- Authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action in the name of the people of the State of California, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in the state, for a violation of the Cartwright Act, to secure monetary relief in the form of treble damages sustained by those natural persons, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney fees. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16760.)
- Provides that a violation of the Cartwright Act is a conspiracy against trade, and that knowingly engaging or participating in such a conspiracy is a crime, punishable as follows:
- If the violator is a corporation, by a fine of not more than $1 million or the amount under (c), whichever is greater.
- If the violator is an individual, by imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h) for one, two, or three years; by imprisonment for up to one year in a county jail; by a fine of not more $250,000 or the amount under (c), whichever is greater; or by both a fine and imprisonment.
- If any person derives pecuniary gain from a violation of the Cartwright Act, or the violation results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the violator, the violator may be fined not more than twice the amount of the gain or loss. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16755(a).)
This bill:
- Provides that it is unlawful for any person to sell, license, or otherwise provide to two or more persons a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same market or a related market to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises.
- Provides that it is unlawful for any person to use a rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises if the person knew or should have known that another person in the same or related market used or will use the rental pricing algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises.
- Provides that a person engaged in the business of providing a rental pricing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises, and that is not otherwise prohibited under 1), shall not use nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state.
- Provides that each month a violation exists, and each residential premises for which the person uses the rental pricing algorithm, shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
- Defines “nonpublic competitor data,” for purposes of 1)-4), as follows:
- “Nonpublic competitor data” means nonpublic data, including information about actual rental rates, lease terms, occupancy rates, and similar data, regardless of whether the information is attributable to a specific competitor or anonymized, and regardless of whether the information is derived from or otherwise provided by another person that competes in the same or a related market.
- “Nonpublic competitor data” does not include any of the following:
- Information regarding actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, and lease start and end dates that are obtained from the following publicly accessible sources: (1) advertisements of available rental properties, including lists published on websites maintained by a property owner or manager; or (2) rental registries maintained by a city, county, city and county, or state or federal agency.
- Information obtained from the United States Census Bureau or State Census Data Center.
- Aggregated information distributed, reported, or otherwise communicated in a way that is not reasonably linkable to a competitor, such as narrative industry reports, news reports, business commentaries, or generalized industry survey results, provided that such aggregated information is not derived from sources which may be considered nonpublic competitor data.
- Other forums, including websites, in which information about actual rent amounts charged to a tenant, occupancy rates, or lease start and end dates is equally accessible to tenants or prospective tenants and landlords.
- Defines the following additional terms for purposes of 1)-5):
- “Nonpublic data” means information that is not widely available or easily accessible to the public, including public-facing data made available under terms of service that prohibit the use of that data.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” means a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool, that uses one or more algorithms to analyze or process data regarding historical or contemporaneous rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels of residential premises.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” includes a product that incorporates a rental pricing algorithm.
- “Rental pricing algorithm” does not include either (1) a report that publishes publicly available rental data in an aggregated manner but does not recommend rental rates or occupancy levels for future leases, or (2) a product used for the purposes of establishing rent or income limits in accordance with the affordable housing program guidelines of a local, state, or federal program.
- Provides remedies for a violation of 1)-3), as follows:
- The Attorney General, in the name of the people of the State of California, and the city attorney or county counsel in the jurisdiction in which the rental unit is located, in the name of the city or county, may file a civil action for a violation of 1)-3) for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 for violation, or any combination of those remedies. The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the Attorney General, city attorney, or county counsel if they are the prevailing party in the action.
- A person may file a civil action for a violation of 1)-3) for damages, injunctive relief, or civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation, or any combination of those remedies, and the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff in the action. If a lease provision limits a tenant from recovering attorney’s fees, it shall not be enforceable against a tenant’s claim for attorney’s fees in an action under 1)-3).
- Provides that nothing in 1)-7) shall impair or limit the applicability of antitrust laws, and that the prohibitions described in 1)-3) apply in addition to, and not in lieu of, any prohibitions described in applicable state or federal antitrust laws.
- Provides that a violation of 1)-3) shall constitute an unlawful restraint on competition within the meaning of the Cartwright Act and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of the UCL; and that the remedies and penalties provided in 4) and 7) are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws.
COMMENTS
- Author’s comment
According to the author:
California has a rental housing affordability crisis. This state is the most expensive state to rent in, requiring an average hourly wage of $47.38 to afford a 2-bedroom apartment. More than half of the state’s renters are rent-burdened as they have to contribute more than 30% of their income to rent. While the rental housing affordability crisis isn’t new, exacerbating this crisis is how landlords are using tech to inflate rents above what is fair.
Real estate giants are harnessing algorithms to recommend rent prices based on rental data from thousands of landlords and other sources. These AI-backed rent-setting tools turn competitors into collaborators for a potentially already unlawful information sharing collusion operation that provides landlords with an unfair and unsustainable advantage. This is tech-powered exploitation and worsening the already dire affordability crisis.
Although federal and state law clearly sets precedent for illegal antitrust and anticompetitive practices, landlords continue to rely on algorithms like RealPage provides, arguing that their practices are not covered under those laws. As such, landlords continue to share and compile competitive data through this platform in order to set inflated rental prices in a manner eerily similar to examples of antitrust violations. The White House Council of Economic Advisors recently estimated that the use of algorithmic rent-fixing software costs individual renters an average of $70 per month more than a renter whose landlord does not rely on this software, a collective cost of nearly four-billion dollars more in annual rent caused by this practice.
Due to the sketchy nature of algorithmic utilization among landlord competitors, federal, state, and local government officials have begun taking action to address what has been depicted as “an unlawful information-sharing scheme. Companies like RealPage also rely on inaccurately-trained algorithms to perform background checks, often leading to unjust housing denials and further exacerbating access to housing
As such, these practices distort the rental market beyond competitive dynamics, further exacerbating the housing crisis facing California.
SB 52 addresses the question of price-fixing in rental markets through third party algorithms by clearly defining in state law that using such methods is illegal. Further, SB 52 provides mechanisms for accountability and enforcement for using these algorithms illegally.
2. Background on price-fixing algorithms
“Pricing algorithms are intended to help firms determine optimal pricing on a near real-time basis.”[1] A human setting prices has to (1) take in new information, (2) analyze the effect of the new information on their own prices, and (3) determine whether to raise or lower prices, and by how much. A pricing algorithm, on the other hand, often uses artificial intelligence and machine learning “to weigh variables such as supply and demand, competitor pricing, and delivery time,” as well as any other factors its programmers have baked into the formula, and can set new prices nearly instantaneously in response to new information.[2] Studies indicate that the use of certain pricing algorithms results in higher prices for consumers,[3] particularly when one seller is using a more sophisticated reinforced learning algorithm and its competitors are using a rule-based algorithm that incorporates that seller’s price as an input.[4]
As algorithms grew more expansive in the 2010s, scholars raised concerns that algorithms—particularly reinforced learning algorithms—could “learn” to tacitly collude with competitors’ algorithms, thereby keeping prices high.[5] More recently, however, some businesses have offered algorithmic pricing models that expressly incorporate competitors’ nonpublic, competitively sensitive data—for example, by factoring confidential rental rate and occupancy levels, provided by the users of the algorithm, to make pricing and occupancy recommendations to each landlord on the basis of that confidential information. As explained below, there are allegations that these algorithms not only harm consumers, but also violate existing state and federal antitrust laws.
3. Antitrust law and algorithms
Under the federal Sherman Act,[6] “[horizontal] price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se.”[7] This per se bar extends to any “combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity” in interstate or foreign commerce.[8] Likewise, under the State’s own antitrust law, the Cartwright Act,[9] “agreements fixing or tampering with prices are illegal per se.”[10] These prohibitions “rest on the premise that unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”[11] The Cartwright Act’s prohibitions on anticompetitive behavior are “broader and deeper in range” than the federal Sherman Act’s.[12]
Former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Maureen K. Ohlhausen argues that the use of a vendor that provides algorithmic pricing services derived from confidential pricing information provided by multiple competitors is not, as an antitrust matter, new territory.[13] She believes such services are merely an updated version of a long-prohibited practice, known as the “hub-and-spoke conspiracy”: “[j]ust as the antitrust laws do not allow competitors to exchange competitively sensitive information directly in an effort to stabilize or control industry pricing, they also prohibit using an intermediary to facilitate the exchange of confidential business information.”[14] To understand why this is such an easy call, Ohlhausen recommended replacing “algorithm” with “ ‘a guy named Bob’ ”:
Is it ok for a guy named Bob to collect confidential price strategy information from all the participants in a market, and then tell everybody how they should price? If it isn’t ok for a guy named Bob to do it, then it probably isn’t ok for an algorithm to do it either.[15]
This approach reflects the longstanding antitrust principle that “competitors cannot simply get around antitrust liability by acting through a third-party intermediary or joint venture.”[16]
Consistent with this interpretation, the U.S Department of Justice (USDOJ) and several states, including California, have filed an antitrust lawsuit against RealPage and several property management companies.[17] According to the First Amended Complaint, RealPage’s Vice President of Revenue Management Advisory Services described RealPage’s benefit to landlords thusly: “ ‘[T]here is greater good in everybody succeeding versus essentially trying to compete against one another in a way that actually keeps the entire industry down.’ ”[18] At the time this analysis was released, RealPage’s motion to dismiss was pending before the court.
Rather than wait for the results of the lawsuit against RealPage, San Francisco enacted an ordinance prohibiting the sale or use of algorithms that use nonpublic competitor data to set rental terms or occupancy levels.[19] This bill’s language is similar to, but broader than, the San Francisco ordinance, as explained further in Part 5 of this analysis, below.
4. California’s housing crisis and sky-high rents
As explained by the California Department of Housing and Community Development’s most recent Statewide Housing Plan (SHP):
California’s housing crisis is half a century in the making. After decades of underproduction, supply is far behind need and housing and rental costs are soaring. As a result, millions of Californians must make hard decisions about paying for housing at the expense of food, health care, child care, and transportation, directly impacting quality of life in the state. One in three households in the state doesn’t earn enough money to meet their basic needs.[20]
The SHP reported that, to afford the rent for a two-bedroom apartment without being cost-burdened in 2022, a household would have to earn $81,191 per year, which translates to an hourly wage of $39.03.[21] The National Low Income Housing Coalition reports that, as of 2024, the two-bedroom wage has increased to $96,545 annually, or $47.38 hourly.[22] In certain Bay Area and Central Coast areas, the hourly wage needed to afford a two-bedroom apartment is above $60 dollars.[23] The statewide minimum hourly wage is currently $16.50,[24] except that fast-food workers must be paid at least $20 per hour,[25] and some localities have higher minimum wages ranging from $16.89 to $19.65.[26] “The top five most common occupations in California pay less than the wage needed to afford a home.”[27]
Renters have to pay more for the simple reason that California does not have enough housing.[28] Against this backdrop of insufficient supply and sky-high demand, the author and sponsors argue that anticompetitive behavior by landlords exacerbates the pain already felt by Californians looking for a place to live. For example, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors writes:
Algorithmic pricing tools may be used to exploit already strained rental housing markets, enabling owners and landlords to maximize profits in ways that do not reflect fair or reasonable market conditions. These inflated prices can exacerbate California’s housing crisis and reduce prospective residents' access to stable, affordable housing.
5. This bill expressly limits the use of residential rental pricing algorithms
Because the Cartwright Act is drafted in broad terms, rather than prohibiting specific acts and practices, it can take time and substantial costs to litigate whether a specific business practice is covered by the Cartwright Act. This bill is intended to supplement, not displace, the Cartwright Act’s application to algorithmic collusion and provide certainty in the market by expressly prohibiting algorithmic collusion in the residential rental market, whether deliberate or inadvertent. To that end, this bill imposes prohibitions on two types of rental pricing algorithms. The amendments discussed in this Part are set forth in Part 6, below.
First, the bill prohibits a person from selling, licensing, or otherwise providing a rental pricing algorithm with the intent that it be used by two or more persons in the same, or a related, market to recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises. To be clear, this does not prevent a person from offering multiple algorithmic products to multiple landlords within the same rental market; it simply prohibits a person from providing to multiple landlords a single algorithmic product that could, by virtue of the inputs received from those competing landlords, result in a sort of tacit collusive effect. The bill also prohibits a person from using such an algorithm to set rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for a residential premises if that person knew, or should have known, that it was being offered or provided to other landlords in the same, or a related, market. Because the term “related market” is potentially ambiguous, the author has agreed to amendments that instead refer to a “housing provider” on a statewide basis.
Second, this bill prohibits a person engaged in the business of providing a rental housing algorithm that is used to set or recommend rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy levels for residential premises from using nonpublic competitor data pertaining to residential premises in the state as an input in the algorithm. “Nonpublic competitor data” is defined to include information that is not readily available to the public and that relates to the rental rates, lease terms, or occupancy rates of competitors in the same or a related rental market. The bill also specifies that information obtained from a range of publicly available sources, including industry reports and advertisements, or from disaggregated data sources, is not considered “nonpublic.”[29]
The bill provides two enforcement mechanisms. The Attorney General, a city attorney, or a county counsel may file a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, restitution, or civil penalties for up to $1,000 per violation. The bill also provides a private right of action, permitting a person harmed by the violation to file their own civil action seeking the same remedies. A prevailing plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fee and costs, and the bill specifies that a lease provision that limits a tenant from awarding attorney’s fees shall not be enforceable against the tenant’s claim. The author has agreed to amend the bill to specify that a person must have been harmed by the violation in order to file suit, and to amendments clarifying what constitutes a separate violation for purposes of the award of civil penalties.
Finally, the bill clarifies that the bill’s prohibitions do not impair or limit the applicability of any antitrust laws, and that they apply in addition to, not in lieu of, any prohibition in state or federal antitrust laws. The author has agreed to amendments that clarify this provision further, to ensure there is no question as to this bill’s additive effect.
As noted above, this bill is based on, but not identical to, a San Francisco ordinance adopted in 2024 that prohibits the use of “revenue management programs” that use algorithms to recommend prices or occupancy rates in rental housing.[30] This bill is broader insofar as it prohibits the use of a pricing algorithm to recommend or set leasing terms beyond rental rates, and this bill has more specific exemptions explaining what type of information is not “nonpublic data” or “nonpublic competitor data” covered by the bill.
5. Amendments
As noted above, the author has agreed to amend the bill to respond to stakeholder concerns and clarify certain provisions. The amendments are set forth below, subject to any changes the Office of Legislative Counsel may make.
Amendment 1
At page 4, in line 25, after “(d)” insert “(1) For a person who uses an algorithm in violation of this section, ”; and in lines 25 through 27, delete “, and each residential premises for which the person uses the rental pricing algorithm,”
Amendment 2
At page 4, after line 28, insert:
(2) Each month that a person sells, licenses, or otherwise provides, or each month that a seller uses, the rental pricing algorithm in violation of this section shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
(3) Each separate residential premises for which the pricing algorithm is sold, licensed, provided, or used shall constitute a separate and distinct violation.
Amendment 3
At page 5, in line 9, after “data” insert “derived from two or more persons, directly or indirectly,”
Amendment 4
At page 5, between lines 37 and 38, insert:
(2) “Person” means any person or their agent with residential premises made available for rent in the state of California.
(3) “Antitrust laws” has the same meaning as defined in the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 12), and includes Section 45 of Title 15 of the United States Code, and this part, including provisions in this chapter, commonly known as the Cartwright Act.
Amendment 5
At page 5, delete line 39 after “public” and delete all of page 6, lines 1 and 2.
Amendment 6
At page 5, in line 29, after “person” insert “who is harmed by a violation of this section” and in lines 29 and 30, delete “for a violation of this section”
Amendment 7
At page 5, delete line 35 after “fees” and lines 36 and 37, and insert “or that caps the tenant’s fee award shall be void as contrary to public policy in a tenant’s claim against their landlord under this section.”
6. Arguments in support
According to the bill’s sponsors:
SB 52 allows landlords to use whatever data they want to make independent pricing decisions. The bill addresses when competitors are coordinating to make pricing decisions and establishes that regardless of the source of data, collusion is collusion.
Banning all of the ways that algorithms aid collusion is critical. Rental algorithm companies have stated that their software can help competitors maximize prices using just public data, and have suggested that policies banning only non-public data will not address housing affordability.
SB 52 also does not distinguish between whether a rental pricing algorithm “sets” a price or merely “advises” or suggests” a rental amount. As noted in DOJ lawsuits, whether there is full adherence to the price fixing scheme does not affect the legality; what matters is the existence of an agreement to fix the price, as that agreement distorts the competitive process whether binding or not…
SB 52 accounts for the various data inputs, interface designs, and contractual differences between various pricing algorithm models by focusing not on how they are designed (which is frequently changing and proprietary), but on the
7. Arguments in opposition
According to RealPage, Inc.:
Senate Bill 52 is overbroad and ambiguous. If passed in its current form, housing providers will be deprived of an important market analysis tool that is available to every other seller in virtually every other industry. The bill will encourage frivolous lawsuits against apartment owners and discourage badly needed investment in the state.
The definition of "rental pricing algorithm" as outlined in the bill is excessively broad and poorly defined, leading to significant risks of misapplication and unintended consequences. By encompassing "a service or product, including, but not limited to, an artificial intelligence, algorithmic program, or software tool," the bill indiscriminately includes a vast array of technologies, many of which may have no direct connection to rental pricing decisions. This sweeping inclusion creates unnecessary ambiguity, potentially ensnaring tools or products that analyze data without influencing rental pricing.
The bill could also be interpreted to ban the use of all external data—both public and nonpublic—in rental pricing algorithms. This interpretation would effectively function as a blanket prohibition on the use of pricing software in the rental industry. Such a restriction would deprive apartment owners of access to a widely utilized technology that has been around for more than two decades and remains commonplace in virtually every other industry where pricing decisions are made. The absence of these tools could hinder competitiveness and efficiency, leaving apartment owners at a technological disadvantage compared to sellers in other markets.
RealPage uses data responsibly to connect renters with homes quickly and efficiently, creating a win-win for both property owners and tenants. Unfortunately, SB 52 unfairly targets a key management tool used across the industry—one that helps address housing needs, not cause them. The bill is based on inaccurate assumptions and undermines innovation in housing access.
SUPPORT
ACCE (co-sponsor)
TechEquity (co-sponsor)
Western Center on Law and Poverty (co-sponsor)
AAPIs for Civic Empowerment
ACLU California Action
AIDS Healthcare Foundation
American Economic Liberties Project
BASTA, Inc.
Bay Area Legal Aid
California Center for Movement Legal Services
California Green New Deal Coalition
California Housing Partnership
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
CFT, a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals
Consumer Federation of California
Disability Rights California
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund
East Bay Housing Organizations
Economic Security California Action
Evolve California
Green New Deal Coalition
Housing and Economic Rights Advocates
Housing California
Housing Now!
Human Impact Partners
Inner City Law Center
Kapor Center
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Oakland Privacy
PICO California
PowerCA Action
UDW/AFSCME Local 3930
Urban Habitat
OPPOSITION
California Apartment Association
California Association of Realtors
RealPage, Inc.
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending legislation:
SB 384 (Wahab, 2025) establishes the Preventing Algorithmic Price Fixing Act, which prohibits a business from using a price-fixing algorithm, as defined, to set a price or supply level of a good or service. SB 384 is pending before this Committee and is set to be heard on the same date as this bill.
SB 295 (Hurtado, 2025) establishes the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2025, which prohibits a person from using or distributing any pricing algorithm that uses, incorporates, or was trained with competitor data; requires a person using a pricing algorithm to recommend or set a price or commercial term to make certain commercial disclosures; and requires a person to provide specified information to the Attorney General relating to the use of pricing algorithms. SB 295 is pending before this Committee.
AB 325 (Aguiar-Curry, 2025) expressly prohibits, within the Cartwright Act, the use or distribution of pricing algorithms that use, incorporate, or were trained on nonpublic competitor data. AB 325 is pending before the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.
Prior legislation:
SB 1154 (Hurtado, 2024) would have established the California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2024, which would have prohibited the use of pricing algorithms to set or recommend a price or commercial term in this state that incorporates nonpublic competitor data, as defined, which may be enforced by the Attorney General; established a partially rebuttable presumption that the use of a prohibited pricing algorithm is a violation of specified state laws prohibiting anticompetitive behavior; and added additional provisions relating to the Attorney General’s investigation of, and disclosures of the use of, pricing algorithms. SB 1154 died in this Committee.
AB 2230 (Bennett, 2024) would have established the Residential Housing Unfair Practices Act of 2023, which would have amended the Cartwright Act to expressly list certain practices relating to the provision of housing. AB 2230 died in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
**************
Bertini & Koenigsberg, The Pitfalls of Pricing Algorithms, Harvard Business Review (Sept.-Oct. 2021), available at https://hbr.org/2021/09/the-pitfalls-of-pricing-algorithms. All links in this analysis are current as of April 18, 2025. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Calvano, et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion (2020) 110 Am. Econ. Rev. 3267. ↑
Wang, et al., Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence and Simple Rule-Based Pricing (Jun. 29, 2022) SSRN, p. 40, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4144905. ↑
Calvano, supra, at p. 3268. ↑
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. ↑
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 150, 218. ↑
Id. at p. 223. ↑
Bus. & Prof. Code, pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 16700 et seq. ↑
Oakland-Alameda County Builders’ Exchange v. F. P. Lathrop Constr. Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 354, 363. ↑
Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 935 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
In re Cipro Cases I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116, 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). ↑
Remarks of Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairwoman, U.S. FTC, “Should We Fear The Things That Go Beep In the Night? Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust Law and Algorithmic Pricing,” Remarks from the Concurrences Antitrust Financial Sector Conference (May 23, 2017), p. 10, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/should-we-fear-things-go-beep-night-some-initial-thoughts-intersection-antitrust-law-algorithmic. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League (2010) 560 U.S. 183, 202 (cleaned up). ↑
See U.S. v. RealPage, Inc.(M.D.N.C.) Case No. 1:24-cv-00710-LCB-JLW. ↑
First Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 47, U.S. v. RealPage, Inc.(M.D.N.C.) Case No. 1:24-cv-00710-LCB-JLW, ¶ 2 (emphasis in original). ↑
See S.F. Admin. Code, § 37.10C. ↑
California Department of Housing and Community Development, A Home for Every Californian: 2022 Statewide Housing Plan (2022) p. 4, available at https://statewide-housing-plan-cahcd.hub.arcgis.com/. ↑
Id. at p. 5. ↑
National Low Income Housing Coalition, Report: California (2024), pp. 1-2, available at https://nlihc.org/oor/state/ca. ↑
Id. at p. 1 (listing hourly housing wages for: Santa Cruz-Watsonville, at $77.96/hour; San Francisco, at $64/60; and San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara at $60.23). ↑
California Department of Industrial Relations, Labor Commissioner’s Office, Minimum Wage, https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/minimum_wage.htm. ↑
Ibid. ↑
UC Berkeley Labor Center, Inventory of US City and County Minimum Wage Ordinances: California City and County Minimum Wages, January 1, 2025, https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/#s-2. ↑
A Home for Every Californian: 2022 Statewide Housing Plan, supra, at pp. 5-6. ↑
Id. at p. 23. ↑
The California Apartment Association, in an “oppose unless amended” letter, includes a list of information sources which they argue should not be considered nonpublic; the majority of the items on their list are, in fact, already expressly exempted from the definition of “nonpublic competitor data.” ↑
See S.F. Admin. Code, § 37.10C. ↑
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):