SB 571: Emergencies: crimes.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2025-10-10
Current Status:
Passed
(2025-10-10: Chaptered by Secretary of State. Chapter 545, Statutes of 2025.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony.
This bill would authorize the court to consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime of looting while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would make the operation of its provisions contingent upon the enactment of AB 468 of the 202526 Regular Session.
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony.
This bill would authorize the court to consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime of looting while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would make the operation of its provisions contingent upon the enactment of AB 468 of the 202526 Regular Session.
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony.
This bill would authorize the court to consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime of looting while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor, misdemeanor or a felony, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would make the operation of its provisions contingent upon the enactment of AB 468 of the 202526 Regular Session.
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony.
This bill would authorize the court to consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime of looting while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, misdemeanor, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would make the operation of its provisions contingent upon the enactment of AB 468 of the 202526 Regular Session.
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony. Existing law requires a person convicted of these looting offenses who is granted probation to be confined to the county jail for a minimum of 180 days, but provides discretion to the court to reduce or eliminate that mandatory jail sentence, as specified.
This bill would instead make the above-described offenses punishable only as a felony and would remove the courts discretion to reduce or eliminate the mandatory jail sentence for an individual who is granted probation. The bill would additionally expand the definition of looting to include the 180 days after the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency. authorize the court to consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime of looting while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
Existing law defines the crime of burglary as entering specified buildings, places, or vehicles with the intent to commit grand or petty theft or a felony. Existing law clarifies that a structure designed for habitation is being used for dwelling purposes, if at the time of the burglary it was not occupied solely because a disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.This bill would specify that the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by a natural or other disaster shall not preclude conviction.By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
This bill would make the operation of its provisions contingent upon the enactment of AB 468 of the 202526 Regular Session.
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony. Existing law requires a person convicted of these looting offenses who is granted probation to be confined to the county jail for a minimum of 180 days, but provides discretion to the court to reduce or eliminate that mandatory jail sentence, as specified.
This bill would instead make the above-described offenses punishable only as a felony and would remove the courts discretion to reduce or eliminate the mandatory jail sentence for an individual who is granted probation. The bill would additionally expand the definition of looting to include the 180 days after the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
Existing law defines the crime of burglary as entering specified buildings, places, or vehicles with the intent to commit grand or petty theft or a felony. Existing law clarifies that a structure designed for habitation is being used for dwelling purposes, if at the time of the burglary it was not occupied solely because a disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.
This bill would specify that the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by a natural or other disaster shall not preclude conviction.
By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law defines looting as the commission of certain offenses during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified. Existing law includes any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft in the definition of looting, and makes looting based on those offenses punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony. Existing law requires a person convicted of these looting offenses who is granted probation to be confined to the county jail for a minimum of 180 days, but provides discretion to the court to reduce or eliminate that mandatory jail sentence, as specified.
This bill would instead make the above-described offenses punishable only as a felony and would remove the courts discretion to reduce or eliminate the mandatory jail sentence for an individual who is granted probation. The bill would additionally expand the definition of looting to include the 180 days after the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
This bill would make it a crime punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony for a person, other than a first responder to wear, exhibit, or use the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder within an area under an evacuation order, as specified. The bill would also make it a crime, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, to impersonate a first responder on the internet or by electronic means for the purpose of defrauding another, as specified.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation to strengthen penalties on looting during a state of emergency, impersonating first responders, and aggravated arson.This bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the above-described dollar amounts are to be applied prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the amendment.
Existing law defines the crime of burglary as entering specified buildings, places, or vehicles with the intent to commit grand or petty theft or a felony. Existing law clarifies that a structure designed for habitation is being used for dwelling purposes, if at the time of the burglary it was not occupied solely because a disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.
This bill would specify that the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by a natural or other disaster shall not preclude conviction.
By creating a new crime and by increasing the punishment of specified crimes, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law defines any 2nd-degree burglary or grand theft, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or local emergency, as specified, as looting, punishable by either imprisonment in a county jail for one year or as a felony.
Existing law prohibits credibly impersonating a peace officer, firefighter, or employee of a state or local government agency, or a search and rescue team, as specified. A violation of these prohibitions is punishable as a misdemeanor.
Existing law, until January 1, 2029, defines the offense of aggravated arson, and defines the aggravating factors for the offense as: the person has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years, the fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, or the fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, 5 or more inhabited dwellings. Existing law, commencing January 1, 2029, deletes the aggravating factor of property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 from the definition of aggravated arson.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation to strengthen penalties on looting during a state of emergency, impersonating first responders, and aggravated arson.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 463.2 is added to the Penal Code, to read:463.2.(a)In sentencing a person convicted of a violation of Section 463, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Emergency personnel means a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(2)Impersonating means willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are emergency personnel.
SEC. 3.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished by either imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Evacuation order has the same meaning as in Section 463.
(2)First responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SEC. 5.This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill 468 of the 202526 Regular Session is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2026.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 463.2 is added to the Penal Code, to read:463.2.(a)In sentencing a person convicted of a violation of Section 463, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Emergency personnel means a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(2)Impersonating means willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are emergency personnel.
SEC. 3.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished by either imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Evacuation order has the same meaning as in Section 463.
(2)First responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SEC. 5.This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill 468 of the 202526 Regular Session is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2026.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 463.2 is added to the Penal Code, to read:463.2.(a)In sentencing a person convicted of a violation of Section 463, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Emergency personnel means a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(2)Impersonating means willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are emergency personnel.
SEC. 3.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished by either imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Evacuation order has the same meaning as in Section 463.
(2)First responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SEC. 5.This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill 468 of the 202526 Regular Session is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2026.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 463.2 is added to the Penal Code, to read:463.2.(a)In sentencing a person convicted of a violation of Section 463, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Emergency personnel means a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(2)Impersonating means willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are emergency personnel.
SEC. 3.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) ($2,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). fine.
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Evacuation order has the same meaning as in Section 463.
(2)First responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SEC. 5.This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill 468 of the 20252026 202526 Regular Session is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2026.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 459 of the Penal Code is amended to read:459.(a)Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, inhabited means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.(b)The fact that the structure entered has been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction.SEC. 3.Section 463 of the Penal Code is amended to read:463.(a)Every person who violates Section 459, punishable as a second-degree burglary pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 461, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster or within 180 days of the termination of a state of emergency, local emergency, or evacuation order, is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 240 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.For purposes of this subdivision, the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction.(b)Every person who commits the crime of grand theft, as defined in Section 487 or subdivision (a) of Section 487a, except grand theft of a firearm, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or unnatural disaster or within 180 days of the termination of a state of emergency, local emergency, or evacuation order, is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Every person who commits the crime of grand theft of a firearm, as defined in Section 487, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or unnatural disaster is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, as set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 489. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 160 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.(c)Every person who commits the crime of petty theft, as defined in Section 488, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 90 days, except that the court may, in the case where the interest of justice would best be served, reduce or eliminate that mandatory minimum jail sentence, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would best be served by that disposition. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 80 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.(d)(1)For purposes of this section, state of emergency means conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.(2)For purposes of this section, local emergency means conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.(3)For purposes of this section, a state of emergency shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated pursuant to Section 8629 of the Government Code. For purposes of this section only, a local emergency shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated pursuant to Section 8630 of the Government Code.(4)For purposes of this section, evacuation order means an order from the Governor, or a county sheriff, chief of police, or fire marshal, under which persons subject to the order are required to relocate outside of the geographic area covered by the order due to an imminent danger resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster.(e)Consensual entry into a commercial structure with the intent to commit a violation of Section 470, 476, 476a, 484f, or 484g shall not be charged as a violation under this section.SEC. 2.Section 463.2 is added to the Penal Code, to read:463.2.(a)In sentencing a person convicted of a violation of Section 463, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
(b)For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Emergency personnel means a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(2)Impersonating means willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are emergency personnel.
SEC. 4.SEC. 3.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined in Section 463, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $20,000, two thousand dollars ($2,000) or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed $20,000. twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
(b)For purposes of this section, first the following terms have the following meanings:
(1)Evacuation order has the same meaning as in Section 463.
(2)First responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 5.SEC. 4.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SEC. 5.This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill 468 of the 20252026 Regular Session is enacted and becomes effective on or before January 1, 2026.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 459 of the Penal Code is amended to read:459.(a)Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, inhabited means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.
(b)The fact that the structure entered has been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction.
SEC. 3.Section 463 of the Penal Code is amended to read:463.(a)Every person who violates Section 459, punishable as a second-degree burglary pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 461, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster or within 180 days of the termination of a state of emergency, local emergency, or evacuation order, shall be is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 240 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.
For purposes of this subdivision, the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction.
(b)Every person who commits the crime of grand theft, as defined in Section 487 or subdivision (a) of Section 487a, except grand theft of a firearm, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or unnatural disaster or within 180 days of the termination of a state of emergency, local emergency, or evacuation order, shall be is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Every person who commits the crime of grand theft of a firearm, as defined in Section 487, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or unnatural disaster shall be is guilty of the crime of looting, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, as set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 489. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 160 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.
(c)Every person who commits the crime of petty theft, as defined in Section 488, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster shall be is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 90 days, except that the court may, in the case where the interest of justice would best be served, reduce or eliminate that mandatory minimum jail sentence, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would best be served by that disposition. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 80 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.
(d)(1)For purposes of this section, state of emergency means conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.
(2)For purposes of this section, local emergency means conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.
(3)For purposes of this section, a state of emergency shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated pursuant to Section 8629 of the Government Code. For purposes of this section only, a local emergency shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated pursuant to Section 8630 of the Government Code.
(4)For purposes of this section, evacuation order means an order from the Governor, or a county sheriff, chief of police, or fire marshal, under which persons subject to the order are required to relocate outside of the geographic area covered by the order due to an imminent danger resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster.
(e)Consensual entry into a commercial structure with the intent to commit a violation of Section 470, 476, 476a, 484f, or 484g shall not be charged as a violation under this section.
SEC. 4.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined in Section 463, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $20,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
(b)For purposes of this section, first responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)A person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
(1)The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years.
(2)(A)The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of ten million one hundred thousand dollars ($10,100,000), exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings.
(B)In calculating the total amount of property damage and other losses under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider the cost of fire suppression. It is the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph be reviewed within five years to consider the effects of inflation on the dollar amount stated herein.
(3)The fire caused damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings.
(b)A person who is convicted under subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life.
(c)A person who is sentenced under subdivision (b) shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed.
(d)It is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount set forth in this section are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
(d)(e)This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2029, and as of that date is repealed.
SEC. 2.Section 459 of the Penal Code is amended to read:459.(a)Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, inhabited means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.
(b)The fact that the structure entered has been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction.
SEC. 3.Section 463 of the Penal Code is amended to read:463.(a)Every person who violates Section 459, punishable as a second-degree burglary pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 461, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster or within 180 days of the termination of a state of emergency, local emergency, or evacuation order, shall be guilty of the crime of looting, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for one year or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days, except that the court may, in the case where the interest of justice would best be served, reduce or eliminate that mandatory jail sentence, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would best be served by that disposition. days. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 240 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.
For purposes of this subdivision, the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction.
(b)Every person who commits the crime of grand theft, as defined in Section 487 or subdivision (a) of Section 487a, except grand theft of a firearm, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or unnatural disaster or within 180 days of the termination of a state of emergency, local emergency, or evacuation order, shall be guilty of the crime of looting, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for one year or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. Every person who commits the crime of grand theft of a firearm, as defined in Section 487, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or unnatural disaster shall be guilty of the crime of looting, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, as set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 489. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 180 days, except that the court may, in the case where the interest of justice would best be served, reduce or eliminate that mandatory jail sentence, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would best be served by that disposition. days. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 160 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.
(c)Every person who commits the crime of petty theft, as defined in Section 488, during and within an affected county in a state of emergency or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order, resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. Any person convicted under this subdivision who is eligible for probation and who is granted probation shall, as a condition thereof, be confined in a county jail for at least 90 days, except that the court may, in the case where the interest of justice would best be served, reduce or eliminate that mandatory minimum jail sentence, if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would best be served by that disposition. In addition to whatever custody is ordered, the court, in its discretion, may require any person granted probation following conviction under this subdivision to serve up to 80 hours of community service in any program deemed appropriate by the court, including any program created to rebuild the community.
(d)(1)For purposes of this section, state of emergency means conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.
(2)For purposes of this section, local emergency means conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.
(3)For purposes of this section, a state of emergency shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated pursuant to Section 8629 of the Government Code. For purposes of this section only, a local emergency shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated pursuant to Section 8630 of the Government Code.
(4)For purposes of this section, evacuation order means an order from the Governor, or a county sheriff, chief of police, or fire marshal, under which persons subject to the order are required to relocate outside of the geographic area covered by the order due to an imminent danger resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster.
(5)(e)Consensual entry into a commercial structure with the intent to commit a violation of Section 470, 476, 476a, 484f, or 484g shall not be charged as a violation under this section.
SEC. 4.Section 538i is added to the Penal Code, to read:538i.(a)Any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined in Section 463, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $20,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
(b)For purposes of this section, first responder means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
SEC. 5.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SECTION 1.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation to strengthen penalties on all of the following:(a)Looting during a state of emergency.(b)Impersonating first responders, including firefighters and federal emergency management aid workers.(c)Aggravated arson.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation to strengthen penalties on all of the following:
(a)Looting during a state of emergency.
(b)Impersonating first responders, including firefighters and federal emergency management aid workers.
(c)Aggravated arson.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Oct 10, 2025 | Chaptered by Secretary of State. Chapter 545, Statutes of 2025. |
| Oct 10, 2025 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 22, 2025 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 2 p.m. |
| Sep 11, 2025 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 40. Noes 0. Page 2874.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Sep 9, 2025 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Sep 9, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 76. Noes 0. Page 3086.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Sep 4, 2025 | Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 4, 2025 | Read third time and amended. |
| Sep 3, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 2, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (August 29). |
| Aug 20, 2025 | August 20 set for first hearing. Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 17, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 16, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 0.) (July 15). |
| Jul 1, 2025 | July 1 hearing postponed by committee. |
| Jun 9, 2025 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 4, 2025 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Jun 3, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 1452.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 27, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 6. Noes 0. Page 1204.) (May 23). |
| May 16, 2025 | Set for hearing May 23. |
| May 5, 2025 | May 5 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 25, 2025 | Set for hearing May 5. |
| Apr 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 0. Page 842.) (April 22). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 9, 2025 | Set for hearing April 22. |
| Apr 2, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 25, 2025 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Mar 5, 2025 | Referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 21, 2025 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 23. |
| Feb 20, 2025 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 11, 2025 | Unfinished Business SB571 Archuleta et al. Concurrence | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 9, 2025 | SB 571 Archuleta Senate Third Reading By Gabriel | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 29, 2025 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 15, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jun 3, 2025 | Senate 3rd Reading SB571 Archuleta et al. | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 23, 2025 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| May 5, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 22, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Aclu California Action | ** Against | |
| All of Us or None Los Angeles | ** Against | |
| Arcadia Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Brea Police Association | ** Support | |
| Burbank Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| California Association Of Highway Patrolmen | ** Support | |
| California Association of School Police Chiefs | ** Support | |
| California Attorneys For Criminal Justice | ** Against | |
| California Coalition of School Safety Professionals | ** Support | |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | |
| California Fire Chiefs Association | ** Support | |
| California Narcotic Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Californians United for a Responsible Budget | ** Against | |
| California Police Chiefs Association | ** Support | |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Against | |
| California Reserve Peace Officers Association | ** Support | |
| City of Arcadia | ** Support | |
| CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights | ** Against | |
| Corona Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Culver City Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Against | |
| Essie Justice Group | ** Against | |
| Fire Districts Association Of California | ** Support | |
| Fullerton Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Immigrant Legal Resource Center | ** Against | |
| Initiate Justice | ** Against | |
| Initiate Justice Action | ** Against | |
| Justice2jobs Coalition | ** Against | |
| Ktown for All | ** Against | |
| LA Defensa | ** Against | |
| League Of California Cities | ** Support | |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Against | |
| Local 148 La County Public Defenders Union | ** Against | |
| Los Angeles County District Attorney'S Office | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles County Sheriff'S Department | ** Support | |
| Los Angeles School Police Management Association | ** Support | |
| los angeles school police officers association | ** Support | |
| Murrieta Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| National Day Laborer Organizing Network | ** Against | |
| Newport Beach Police Association | ** Support | |
| Palos Verdes Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Peace Officers Research Association Of California | ** Support | |
| Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| Pomona Police Officers' Association | ** Support | |
| Public Counsel | ** Against | |
| RIVERSIDE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Riverside Sheriffs' Association | ** Support | |
| San Bernardino County Sheriff'S Department | ** Support | |
| San Francisco Public Defender | ** Against | |
| Santa Ana Police Officers Association | ** Support | |
| Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network | ** Against | |
| Smart Justice California, a project of Tides Advocacy | ** Against | |
| Universidad Popular | ** Against | |
| Vera Institute Of Justice | ** Against |
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 571 |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 571
Author: Archuleta (D), Arreguín (D) and Valladares (R), et al.
Amended: 9/4/25
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-0, 5/23/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0, 6/3/25
AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Reyes
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 76-0, 9/9/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Emergencies: crimes
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill provides for increased penalties for impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order and provides that the fact that a person convicted of looting committed the offense while impersonating emergency personnel is a factor in aggravation at sentencing.
Assembly Amendments
of 9/4/25 delete provisions of this bill related to expanding the crime of looting; delete the provision related to burglary; allow a court to issue an aggravated sentence if a person convicted of looting committed the crime while impersonating a first responder; and make the enactment of this bill contingent on the enactment of AB 468 (Gabriel).
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that a person other than one who by law is given the authority of a peace officer, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing, of a peace officer, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a peace officer, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a peace officer, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a peace officer through or on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 538d, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person, other than an officer or member of a fire department, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538e, subd. (a).)
- States that a person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings, but inclusive of the cost of fire suppression; or,
- The fire caused damage, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited structures. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a).)
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- States legislative intent to review the monetary threshold amount within five years to consider the effects of inflation. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
- Punishes a person who is convicted of aggravated arson by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (b).)
- Provides that the court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
- Provides that notwithstanding the presumption for the middle term, and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, is a youth (under age 26), or is or has been a victim of domestic violence or human trafficking. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
- Provides that sentencing choices requiring a statement of a reason include "[s]electing one of the three authorized prison terms referred to in section 1170(b) for either an offense or an enhancement." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(b)(4).)
- Requires the sentencing judge to consider relevant criteria enumerated in the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409.)
- Enumerates circumstances in aggravation, relating both to the crime and to the defendant, as specified. In addition, any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed can be considered in aggravation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.)
- Enumerates circumstances in mitigation, relating both to the crime and to the defendant, as specified. In addition, any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in mitigation or that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed can be considered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423.)
This bill:
- Provides that any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $2,000, or by imprisonment in county jail for 16 months, or two or three years, and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
- Defines “first responder” as a peace officer, a firefighter, a paramedic, an emergency medical technician, a public safety dispatcher or telecommunicator, as specified, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- Provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
- Defines “emergency personnel” as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as specified.
- Defines “impersonating” as the willful wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a member of emergency personnel.
- Provides that, for the purposes of applying the aggravating factors for aggravated arson, it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate charges of the crime created by this bill and for longer sentencing proceedings for looting convictions. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of charges files, prosecutorial discretion, and the amount of court time needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2025-26 state budget provides $82 million ongoing General Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund for court operations.
Costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of the crimes in this bill. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
SUPPORT: (Verified 9/4/2025)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Fire Chiefs Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
City of Arcadia
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fire Districts Association of California
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
League of California Cities
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/4/2025)
ACLU California Action
All of US or None Los Angeles
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Essie Justice Group
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Initiate Justice
Initiate Justice Action
Justice2jobs Coalition
Ktown for All
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
National Day Laborer Organizing Network
Public Counsel
San Francisco Public Defender
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Universidad Popular
Vera Institute of Justice
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the California Police Chiefs Association:
During the January 2025 fires in Southern California, we saw reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims who were displaced by evacuation orders. They disguised themselves as firefighters, FEMA workers, and even police officers to gain access to fire-damaged areas. They went as far as using decommissioned firetrucks to pose as firefighters including wearing firefighter turnout gear, CAL Fire t-shirts, and equipping helmets and radios.
In addition to the impersonation of first responders, these unlawful actors engaged in looting and property theft rummaging through the ashes of victim's homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes forced the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are not proportional to the pain, loss, and grievance of victims.
The damage caused by impersonators and looters far exceeds the monetary losses to communities and victims' personal property. These abusers and their actions undermine evacuation orders, local official's authority, and victims' peace of mind. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the American Civil Liberties Union California Action:
While impersonating peace officers, paramedics, or firefighters during a state of emergency is clearly deceitful and wrong, existing law already imposes severe penalties for such offenses—and evidence suggests that escalating these penalties does nothing to improve public safety. Given the absence of a compelling reason for increasing these penalties, and the state’s history of prison overcrowding, we do not believe this bill is necessary or prudent.
Strong evidence indicates that SB 571’s proposed application of longer criminal sentences has failed to promote either deterrence or incapacitation. This notion is supported by the federal Department of Justice, which discourages increasing existing punishments, noting that longer sentencing does little to deter crime. Other studies have come to the conclusion that the severity of punishment does not generally have an increased effect on deterrence. Rather, studies have concluded that certainty of punishment—that someone will be punished for a particular crime—has a greater deterrence effect than the severity of the punishment itself.
Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief. Legislative proposals, such as SB 571, only contribute to prison over-crowding and excessive prison spending. The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the world—making up less than 5% of the world’s population, but nearly 25% of its total prison population. While California has recently made some progress in reducing its incarceration rate, that progress cannot continue if proposals for increasing criminal sentences are imposed for offenses that are already criminalized.
All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad. Moreover, this bill puts communities of color at risk of constitutional violations6 as well as potential police violence. It is our assessment that this policy is a short-sighted and wasteful measure that fails to address the immediate needs of disaster victims, including fire victims in Los Angeles. As we face the increased impacts of a climate crisis, we should focus on strengthening our state’s emergency preparedness and working with communities to rebuild public trust.
Assembly Floor 76 0 4
Ayes: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Johnson, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
Noes:
No Vote Recorded: Bryan, Caloza, Elhawary, Kalra
Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 651-4118
10/19/26 12:14:52
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 571 |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 571
Author: Archuleta (D), Arreguín (D) and Valladares (R), et al.
Amended: 9/4/25 in Assembly
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-0, 5/23/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0, 6/3/25
AYES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Reyes
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 68-1, 9/9/25 – Roll call not available.
SUBJECT: Emergencies: crimes
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill provides for increased penalties for impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order and provides that the fact that a person convicted of looting committed the offense while impersonating emergency personnel is a factor in aggravation at sentencing.
Assembly Amendments
of 9/4/25 delete provisions of this bill related to expanding the crime of looting; delete the provision related to burglary; allow a court to issue an aggravated sentence if a person convicted of looting committed the crime while impersonating a first responder; and make the enactment of this bill contingent on the enactment of AB 468 (Gabriel).
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Provides that a person other than one who by law is given the authority of a peace officer, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing, of a peace officer, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a peace officer, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a peace officer, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a peace officer through or on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 538d, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person, other than an officer or member of a fire department, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538e, subd. (a).)
- States that a person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings, but inclusive of the cost of fire suppression; or,
- The fire caused damage, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited structures. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a).)
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- States legislative intent to review the monetary threshold amount within five years to consider the effects of inflation. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
- Punishes a person who is convicted of aggravated arson by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (b).)
- Provides that the court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
- Provides that notwithstanding the presumption for the middle term, and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, is a youth (under age 26), or is or has been a victim of domestic violence or human trafficking. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
- Provides that sentencing choices requiring a statement of a reason include "[s]electing one of the three authorized prison terms referred to in section 1170(b) for either an offense or an enhancement." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(b)(4).)
- Requires the sentencing judge to consider relevant criteria enumerated in the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409.)
- Enumerates circumstances in aggravation, relating both to the crime and to the defendant, as specified. In addition, any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed can be considered in aggravation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.)
- Enumerates circumstances in mitigation, relating both to the crime and to the defendant, as specified. In addition, any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in mitigation or that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed can be considered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423.)
This bill:
- Provides that any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $2,000, or by imprisonment in county jail for 16 months, or two or three years, and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
- Defines “first responder” as a peace officer, a firefighter, a paramedic, an emergency medical technician, a public safety dispatcher or telecommunicator, as specified, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- Provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if pled and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation.
- Defines “emergency personnel” as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as specified.
- Defines “impersonating” as the willful wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a member of emergency personnel.
- Provides that, for the purposes of applying the aggravating factors for aggravated arson, it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate charges of the crime created by this bill and for longer sentencing proceedings for looting convictions. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of charges files, prosecutorial discretion, and the amount of court time needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2025-26 state budget provides $82 million ongoing General Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund for court operations.
Costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of the crimes in this bill. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
SUPPORT: (Verified 9/4/2025)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Fire Chiefs Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
City of Arcadia
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fire Districts Association of California
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
League of California Cities
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/4/2025)
ACLU California Action
All of US or None Los Angeles
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Essie Justice Group
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Initiate Justice
Initiate Justice Action
Justice2jobs Coalition
Ktown for All
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
National Day Laborer Organizing Network
Public Counsel
San Francisco Public Defender
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Universidad Popular
Vera Institute of Justice
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:
According to the California Police Chiefs Association:
During the January 2025 fires in Southern California, we saw reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims who were displaced by evacuation orders. They disguised themselves as firefighters, FEMA workers, and even police officers to gain access to fire-damaged areas. They went as far as using decommissioned firetrucks to pose as firefighters including wearing firefighter turnout gear, CAL Fire t-shirts, and equipping helmets and radios.
In addition to the impersonation of first responders, these unlawful actors engaged in looting and property theft rummaging through the ashes of victim's homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes forced the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are not proportional to the pain, loss, and grievance of victims.
The damage caused by impersonators and looters far exceeds the monetary losses to communities and victims' personal property. These abusers and their actions undermine evacuation orders, local official's authority, and victims' peace of mind. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION:
According to the American Civil Liberties Union California Action:
While impersonating peace officers, paramedics, or firefighters during a state of emergency is clearly deceitful and wrong, existing law already imposes severe penalties for such offenses—and evidence suggests that escalating these penalties does nothing to improve public safety. Given the absence of a compelling reason for increasing these penalties, and the state’s history of prison overcrowding, we do not believe this bill is necessary or prudent.
Strong evidence indicates that SB 571’s proposed application of longer criminal sentences has failed to promote either deterrence or incapacitation. This notion is supported by the federal Department of Justice, which discourages increasing existing punishments, noting that longer sentencing does little to deter crime. Other studies have come to the conclusion that the severity of punishment does not generally have an increased effect on deterrence. Rather, studies have concluded that certainty of punishment—that someone will be punished for a particular crime—has a greater deterrence effect than the severity of the punishment itself.
Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief. Legislative proposals, such as SB 571, only contribute to prison over-crowding and excessive prison spending. The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the world—making up less than 5% of the world’s population, but nearly 25% of its total prison population. While California has recently made some progress in reducing its incarceration rate, that progress cannot continue if proposals for increasing criminal sentences are imposed for offenses that are already criminalized.
All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad. Moreover, this bill puts communities of color at risk of constitutional violations6 as well as potential police violence. It is our assessment that this policy is a short-sighted and wasteful measure that fails to address the immediate needs of disaster victims, including fire victims in Los Angeles. As we face the increased impacts of a climate crisis, we should focus on strengthening our state’s emergency preparedness and working with communities to rebuild public trust.Click here to enter text.
Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. /
9/9/25 14:14:43
**** END ****
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 571
Author:(Archuleta, et al.)
As Amended Ver:September 4, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Makes impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order a wobbler and provides that the fact that a person convicted of looting committed the offense while impersonating emergency personnel is a factor in aggravation at sentencing.
Major Provisions
- Provides that any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $2,000, or by both, or by imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years in county jail and a fine of up $20,000.
- Provides that "first responder" means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
- Provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if plead and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
- Defines "emergency personnel" as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
- Defines "impersonating" as the willful wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a member of emergency personnel.
- Provides that, for the purposes of applying the aggravating factors for aggravated arson, it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
COMMENTS
According to the Author
"Almost immediately, after the firestorms erupted in Southern California in January 2025, there were reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims displaced by the fires. While Angelenos scrambled to find alternative shelter, there were reports of predatory behavior by individuals impersonating as first responders, firefighters, and disaster relief workers, including FEMA workers, in order to scam fire victims. Additionally, many news outlets reported looting and property theft by individuals rummaging through ashes and burned buildings looking for things of value. Early reports during the emergency found 20 individuals were apprehended and faced looting charges. Looting during the emergency led the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrol and provide a quicker response time, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Governor Newsom even called for looting in fire evacuation zones to be a felony. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. Penalties for these crimes should be proportional to the egregiousness of the pain and exploitation of victims. Strengthening these penalties will protect first responders, communities, and increase trust in California's ability to respond to state of emergencies and protect victims. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected."
Arguments in Support
According to the California Police Chiefs Association, "During the January 2025 fires in Southern California, we saw reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims who were displaced by evacuation orders. They disguised themselves as firefighters, FEMA workers, and even police officers to gain access to fire-damaged areas. They went as far as using decommissioned firetrucks to pose as firefighters including wearing firefighter turnout gear, CAL Fire t-shirts, and equipping helmets and radios.
"In addition to the impersonation of first responders, these unlawful actors engaged in looting and property theft rummaging through the ashes of victim's homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes forced the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are not proportional to the pain, loss, and grievance of victims.
"The damage caused by impersonators and looters far exceeds the monetary losses to communities and victims' personal property. These abusers and their actions undermine evacuation orders, local official's authority, and victims' peace of mind. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected."
Arguments in Opposition
According to the Vera Institute of Justice, "SB 571 is alarmingly broad and invites abuse. The bill's harsher penalties make property crimes during a state or local emergency a mandatory felony across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura County apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency (among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection). As a result, this bill would increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California's bail policies, and SB 571 invites similar abuses.
"The bill will also remove much needed judicial discretion. We trust judges to distinguish between ordinary property crime and intentionally harming communities during emergencies. By mandating incarceration time in every case, and removing judges' abilities to waive this requirement in the interest of justice – judges will be unable to consider someone's mental health, background, or intent, to ensure appropriate sentencing outcomes.
"Because SB 571 applies to such broad swaths of California, it also risks worsening racial disparities in the criminal legal system. For example, Black community members in Altadena experienced racial profiling during the recent Los Angeles fires with false accusations of looting. Past experience also shows that media coverage reinforces a harmful and racialized double standard in the wake of natural disasters. SB 571 may place already vulnerable communities at even greater risk under the guise of safety.
"Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. The Essie Justice Group surveyed 137 Altadena residents impacted by the Eaton Canyon Fire and not a single person mentioned looting or theft. Instead, Altadena residents want public officials to provide timely cash assistance, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness. Extensive research shows that SB 571 will not deter crime and improve public safety. There is no evidence the Los Angeles District Attorney, for example, was unable to charge any looting offenses during the recent fires in Los Angeles as a felony. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief.
"All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad and puts communities of color at risk with short-sighted and wasteful measures that fail to address the immediate needs of fire victims in Los Angeles. As we face the increased impacts of climate change, we should focus on strengthening our state's emergency preparedness and working with communities to rebuild public trust."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate charges of the crime created by this bill and for longer sentencing proceedings for looting convictions. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of charges files, prosecutorial discretion, and the amount of court time needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2025-26 state budget provides $82 million ongoing General Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund for court operations.
- Costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of organized retail theft. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
VOTES
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ABS, ABST OR NV: Reyes
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-0-4
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Ahrens, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez, Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: September 4, 2025
CONSULTANT: Andrew Ironside / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0001625
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 571
Author:(Archuleta, et al.)
As Amended Ver:September 02, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Makes impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order a misdemeanor and provides that the fact that a person convicted of looting committed the offense while impersonating emergency personnel is a factor in aggravation at sentencing.
Major Provisions
- Provides that any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $2,000, or by both.
- Provides that "first responder" means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
- Provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if plead and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
- Defines "emergency personnel" as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
- Defines "impersonating" as the willful wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a member of emergency personnel.
- Provides that, for the purposes of applying the aggravating factors for aggravated arson, it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
COMMENTS
According to the Author
"Almost immediately, after the firestorms erupted in Southern California in January 2025, there were reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims displaced by the fires. While Angelenos scrambled to find alternative shelter, there were reports of predatory behavior by individuals impersonating as first responders, firefighters, and disaster relief workers, including FEMA workers, in order to scam fire victims. Additionally, many news outlets reported looting and property theft by individuals rummaging through ashes and burned buildings looking for things of value. Early reports during the emergency found 20 individuals were apprehended and faced looting charges. Looting during the emergency led the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrol and provide a quicker response time, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Governor Newsom even called for looting in fire evacuation zones to be a felony. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. Penalties for these crimes should be proportional to the egregiousness of the pain and exploitation of victims. Strengthening these penalties will protect first responders, communities, and increase trust in California's ability to respond to state of emergencies and protect victims. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected."
Arguments in Support
According to the California Police Chiefs Association, "During the January 2025 fires in Southern California, we saw reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims who were displaced by evacuation orders. They disguised themselves as firefighters, FEMA workers, and even police officers to gain access to fire-damaged areas. They went as far as using decommissioned firetrucks to pose as firefighters including wearing firefighter turnout gear, CAL Fire t-shirts, and equipping helmets and radios.
"In addition to the impersonation of first responders, these unlawful actors engaged in looting and property theft rummaging through the ashes of victim's homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes forced the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are not proportional to the pain, loss, and grievance of victims.
"The damage caused by impersonators and looters far exceeds the monetary losses to communities and victims' personal property. These abusers and their actions undermine evacuation orders, local official's authority, and victims' peace of mind. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected."
Arguments in Opposition
According to the Vera Institute of Justice, "SB 571 is alarmingly broad and invites abuse. The bill's harsher penalties make property crimes during a state or local emergency a mandatory felony across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura County apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency (among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection). As a result, this bill would increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California's bail policies, and SB 571 invites similar abuses.
"The bill will also remove much needed judicial discretion. We trust judges to distinguish between ordinary property crime and intentionally harming communities during emergencies. By mandating incarceration time in every case, and removing judges' abilities to waive this requirement in the interest of justice – judges will be unable to consider someone's mental health, background, or intent, to ensure appropriate sentencing outcomes.
"Because SB 571 applies to such broad swaths of California, it also risks worsening racial disparities in the criminal legal system. For example, Black community members in Altadena experienced racial profiling during the recent Los Angeles fires with false accusations of looting. Past experience also shows that media coverage reinforces a harmful and racialized double standard in the wake of natural disasters. SB 571 may place already vulnerable communities at even greater risk under the guise of safety.
"Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. The Essie Justice Group surveyed 137 Altadena residents impacted by the Eaton Canyon Fire and not a single person mentioned looting or theft. Instead, Altadena residents want public officials to provide timely cash assistance, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness. Extensive research shows that SB 571 will not deter crime and improve public safety. There is no evidence the Los Angeles District Attorney, for example, was unable to charge any looting offenses during the recent fires in Los Angeles as a felony. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief.
"All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad and puts communities of color at risk with short-sighted and wasteful measures that fail to address the immediate needs of fire victims in Los Angeles. As we face the increased impacts of climate change, we should focus on strengthening our state's emergency preparedness and working with communities to rebuild public trust."
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate charges of the crime created by this bill and for longer sentencing proceedings for looting convictions. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of charges files, prosecutorial discretion, and the amount of court time needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2025-26 state budget provides $82 million ongoing General Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund for court operations.
- Costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of organized retail theft. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
VOTES
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Choi, Cortese, Dahle, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Pérez, Richardson, Rubio, Seyarto, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Strickland, Umberg, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
ABS, ABST OR NV: Reyes
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 9-0-0
YES: Schultz, Alanis, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Lackey, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-0-4
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Ahrens, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez, Dixon, Ta, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: September 02, 2025
CONSULTANT: Andrew Ironside / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0001461
Date of Hearing: August 20, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 571
Author:(Archuleta) – As Amended Ver:July 17, 2025
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 9 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill creates a new crime for impersonating a first responder during an evacuation order and allows a court to issue a longer sentence if a person convicted of looting committed the crime while impersonating a first responder.
Specifically, among other provisions, this bill:
- Creates a new alternate felony-misdemeanor for willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination. This offense is punishable as follows:
- As a misdemeanor by up to one year in county jail, a fine up to $2,000, or by both imprisonment and fine.
- As a felony by 16 months, two years, or three years in county jail and a fine up to $20,000, or by a term in state prison if the defendant has certain prior convictions.
- Authorizes a court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of looting, to consider as a factor in aggravation the fact that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel, and defines “emergency personnel” as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, specified Armed Forces and reserve members, or an emergency medical technician.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Cost pressures (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to the courts to adjudicate charges of the crime created by this bill and for longer sentencing proceedings for looting convictions. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor or felony is entitled to a jury trial and, if the defendant is indigent, legal representation provided by the government. Actual court costs will depend on the number of charges files, prosecutorial discretion, and the amount of court time needed to adjudicate each case. It generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on the Trial Court Trust Fund may create a demand for increased funding for courts from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2025-26 state budget provides $82 million ongoing General Fund to the Trial Court Trust Fund for court operations.
- Costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to incarcerate people convicted of organized retail theft. Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence must be served in county jail or state prison. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $29,000, though costs are higher in larger counties. The Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. County incarceration costs are not subject to reimbursement by the state. However, overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from public safety realignment.
COMMENTS:
- Background. False Impersonation. There are several crimes in the Penal Code for which false impersonation of another person is an element. Additionally, offenses involving impersonation of a peace officer or other official are subject to higher penalties than impersonation of another person. For example, willfully impersonating a peace officer, member of a fire department, or other specified government personnel is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county jail, a fine of $1,000, or both jail and fine. Other crimes include higher punishments for using badges or other insignia to impersonate such government personnel. This bill creates a new crime with higher penalties for impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order. Unlike most false impersonation offenses, the crime created by this bill may be charged as a felony.
Looting. The Penal Code defines and sets the applicable punishments for second-degree burglary, grand theft, and petty theft. If any of these offenses is committed during a declared state of emergency or local emergency or in an area subject to an evacuation order, the offense may be charged as looting and is subject to a longer sentence. Statute establishes three possible sentences for each looting offense – for example, grand theft is punishable under the looting statute by 16 months, two years, or three years in county jail. Where three possible sentences are prescribed by statute, the court must determine which sentence to impose in each case. Generally, the court must impose the lower or middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify imposing the upper term. The court may impose the upper term only if the defendant admits an aggravating circumstance or the aggravating circumstance is found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
This bill allows a judge to consider the fact that a defendant impersonated emergency personnel during the commission of the crime as an aggravating factor at sentencing for a looting offense. If this fact is admitted by the defendant or found true in trial, this bill permits a judge to impose a longer sentence. For a grand theft conviction, this means the judge may impose the upper sentence of three years in jail, rather than the middle term of two years or the lower term of 16 months. Because looting comprises multiple offenses and because the bill contains a very broad definition of “emergency personnel,” this bill – when combined with AB 468 (see below) – will likely significantly increase the amount of time defendants spend incarcerated for the affected offenses.
Research shows that lengthy criminal sentences, which are costly to state and local governments, do not effectively deter crime. In general, the certainty that someone will be punished for an offense plays a larger role in deterring their criminal activity, rather than the length of their potential punishment.
- Related Legislation. This bill’s provisions will become operative only if AB 468 (Gabriel), of this session, is also enacted. AB 468 expands the offense of looting and increases punishments for looting, subjecting more offenses committed in an evacuation zone to longer sentences and higher fines. The bill also applies these heightened penalties to a looting offense committed up to four years after an emergency at a residence undergoing construction for the emergency. AB 468 is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: July 15, 2025
Chief Counsel: Andrew Ironside
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Nick Schultz, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 571
Author:(Archuleta) – As Amended Ver:May 23, 2025
UPDATED
As Proposed to be Amended in Committee
SUMMARY: Provides for increased penalties for impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order and provides that the fact that a person convicted of looting committed the offense while impersonating emergency personnel is a factor in aggravation at sentencing. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that any person, other than a first responder, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order as defined, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means during an evacuation order or within 30 days of its termination, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $2,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment for 16 months, two years or three years and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
- Provides that “first responder” means a first responder as defined under Section 8562 of the Government Code, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency under Section 313 of Subchapter V of Chapter 1 of Title 6 of the United States Code.
- Provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if plead and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing.
- Defines “emergency personnel” as a peace officer, an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, an employee of a public utility or district, state, county, city, or special district, a city and county officer or employee, an officer or member of a governmental agency-managed or -affiliated search and rescue unit or team, an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the California National Guard, the State Guard, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
- Defines “impersonating” as the willful wearing, exhibiting, or using of an authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of emergency personnel with the intent of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a member of emergency personnel.
- Provides that, for the purposes of applying the aggravating factors for aggravated arson, it is the intent of the Legislature that amendments to the threshold dollar amount are to be applied prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that a person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if:
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000, exclusive of damage to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings; or,
- The fire cause damage to, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited dwellings. (Pen Code, § 451.5, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- Provides a sunset date for the aggravated arson statute of January 1, 2029.
- Makes willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate card, or writing, of a peace officer, a member of the fire department, an employee of a public utility or district, a government officer or employee, or search and rescue personnel, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating them or of fraudulently inducing the belief that the defendant is one of them, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to six months, by a fine of $1,000, or both. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (a); 538e, subd. (a); 538f, subd. (a); 538g, subd. (a); 538h, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 19.)
- Makes willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the badge of any of the above personnel, except that of a government employee or an employee of a public utility or district, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating them or of fraudulently inducing the belief that the defendant is one of them, a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in county jail, a fine of up to $2,000, or both. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (b)(1); 538e, subd. (b)(1); 538h, subd. (b)(1).)
- Provides that any person who willfully wears or uses any badge that falsely purports to be authorized for the use of one who by law is given the authority of any of the above personnel, or which so resembles the authorized badge of the above personnel as would deceive any ordinary reasonable person into believing that it is authorized for the use of one who by law is given that authority, for the purpose of fraudulently impersonating them or of fraudulently inducing a belief that they are one of them, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year, by a fine of $2,000, or by both. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (b)(2); 538e, subd. (b)(2); 538g, subd. (b)(2); 538h, subd. (b)(2).)
- Provides that any person who impersonates a peace officer during the commission of a felony shall receive an additional one-year term of imprisonment to be imposed consecutive to the term imposed for the felony, in lieu of the penalty that would have been imposed for impersonating a peace officer.” (Pen. Code, § 667.17.)
- Provides that any person who makes or sells a badge falsely purporting to be that of a peace officer, fire fighter, or government official as described above is subject to a fine of up to $15,000. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (c)(1); 538e, subd. (c); 538g, subd. (b).)
- Provides that any uniform vendor who sells a uniform identifying a law enforcement agency or firefighting agency, without verifying that the purchaser is an employee of the agency, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county jail or by a fine of up to $1,000. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, subd. (e)(2); 538e, subd. (e)(3).)
- Provides that a person who commits a specified offense during and within an affected county in a state or local emergency, or under an evacuation order, is guilty of looting and subject to punishment as follows:
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary, by imprisonment up to one year in county jail or by 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- Where the underlying offense is grand theft, except grand theft of a firearm, by imprisonment in a county jail for one year or by 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (b).)
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary or grand theft, a mandatory minimum term of 180 days in county jail for a person who receives probation, except that a court may reduce or eliminate the jail sentence in the interest of justice. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a) & (b).)
- Where the underlying offense is petty theft, for a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
- Where the underlying offense is petty theft, a mandatory minimum term of 90 days in county jail for a person who receives probation, except that a court may reduce or eliminate the jail sentence in the interest of justice. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary, by imprisonment up to one year in county jail or by 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- Provides that, for purposes of a looting involving second-degree burglary, the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- Defines burglary as entering a specified structure, vessel, or vehicle with the intent of committing theft or any felony therein. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
- States that burglary of an inhabited dwelling is first degree burglary, and that all other kinds of burglary are of the second degree. (Pen. Code, § 460.)
- Provides that, for the purposes of burglary, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
- Divides theft into two degrees, petty theft and grand theft. (Pen. Code, § 486.)
- Defines grand theft as when the money, labor, or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding $950 dollars, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 487.)
- Defines petty theft as obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed $950 and makes it a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000, by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 490.)
- Defines “state of emergency” as conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(1).)
- Defines “local emergency” as conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(2).)
- Provides that a “state of emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated, as specified, and that a “local emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(3).)
- Defines “evacuation order” as an order from the Governor, or a county sheriff, chief of police, or fire marshal, under which persons subject to the order are required to relocate outside of the geographic area covered by the order due to an imminent danger resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(4).)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Almost immediately, after the firestorms erupted in Southern California in January 2025, there were reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims displaced by the fires. While Angelenos scrambled to find alternative shelter, there were reports of predatory behavior by individuals impersonating as first responders, firefighters, and disaster relief workers, including FEMA workers, in order to scam fire victims. Additionally, many news outlets reported looting and property theft by individuals rummaging through ashes and burned buildings looking for things of value. Early reports during the emergency found 20 individuals were apprehended and faced looting charges. Looting during the emergency led the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrol and provide a quicker response time, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Governor Newsom even called for looting in fire evacuation zones to be a felony. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. Penalties for these crimes should be proportional to the egregiousness of the pain and exploitation of victims. Strengthening these penalties will protect first responders, communities, and increase trust in California’s ability to respond to state of emergencies and protect victims. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected.”
- False Impersonation: Existing law punishes false impersonation of emergency personnel as a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, §§ 538d, 538e, 538f, 538g, & 538h.) This bill would increase the penalty for false impersonation of emergency personnel in an evacuation zone to an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or for 16 months, two years, or three years.
Additionally, this bill provides that, in sentencing a person convicted of looting, the court may consider the fact, if plead and proven, that the defendant committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel as a factor in aggravation in sentencing. Existing law states that looting is the commission of specified crimes during a state or local emergency, or in a county that is under an evacuation, and creates penalties in addition to the underlying offense for looting. (Pen. Code, § 463.) Specifically, where the underlying offense is burglary or grand theft, the punishment for looting is an alternate felony-misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or by imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a) & (b).) Subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1170 provides that the court may not order imposition of the upper term unless an aggravating circumstances have been plead or proven; absent this showing, the sentence may not exceed the middle term. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(2).) Thus, under this bill, a person convicted of looting found to have committed the crime while impersonating emergency personnel could be found eligible for the upper term.
- Longer Sentences’ Impact on Recidivism and Deterrence: Research shows that increasing the severity of the punishment does little to deter the crime.[1] According to the National Institute of Justice, “Laws and policies designed to deter crime by focusing mainly on increasing the severity of punishment are ineffective partly because criminals know little about the sanctions for specific crimes. More severe punishments do not ‘chasten’ individuals convicted of crimes, and prisons may exacerbate recidivism… Studies show that for most individuals convicted of a crime, short to moderate prison sentences may be a deterrent but longer prison terms produce only a limited deterrent effect.”[2] Rather, increasing the perception that an individual will be caught and prosecuted is a vastly more effective deterrent than increased punishment. Studies also show that custodial sanctions have no effect on recidivism or slightly increase it when compared with the effects of noncustodial sanctions such as probation.[3]
- Aggravated Arson Provision: The aggravated arson statute, Penal Code section 451.5, became effective in 1995 through enactment of SB 1309 (Craven), Chapter 421, Statutes of 1994. The original statute contained a five-year sunset provision which stated that the purpose of the provision was to allow the Legislature to consider the effects of inflation on the property damage/losses threshold in the law. At the time of the aggravated arson offense’s implementation in 1995, the total monetary amount of property damage and other losses was set at $5 million.
Because of this, the cost of inflation is to be considered by the Legislature within five years when extending the sunset on the statute and/or making changes to the monetary threshold. The statute’s sunset and monetary threshold has increased several times since 1995. The most recent sunset extension, SB 281 (McGuire), Chapter 706, Statutes of 2023, raised the dollar limits required to trigger the statute to account for inflation from $8.3 million to $10.1 million. Additionally, the bill established a sunset date of January 1, 2029 for this excessive damage factor.
This bill would add legislative intent stating that amendments to the threshold dollar amount shall apply prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
Penal Code section 3, which was enacted in 1872, states that “No part of the Penal Code is retroactive unless expressly so declared.” So prospective application of a statute is presumed. This includes the changes made to the aggravated arson statute by SB 281.
However, a long-standing, limited exception to this rule has been recognized by the courts when ameliorative legislation (that which lessens punishment or reduces criminal liability) goes into effect. In this instance, courts generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all cases not yet final on appeal. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745.) The California Supreme Court explained its reasoning as follows:
There is one consideration of paramount importance. It leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Legislature must have intended, and by necessary implication provided, that the amendatory statute should prevail. When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology. (Id. at pp. 744–745.)
Recently, in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, the Supreme Court discussed the broad application of Estrada rule:
We have applied Estrada's inference of retroactivity to legislation that created an affirmative defense, contracted a criminal offense, or otherwise lessened punishment in some meaningful manner. These laws have included statutes addressing penalty enhancements as well as statutes concerned with substantive offenses. (E.g., People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 968–969 [statute reducing maximum probation term for nonviolent offenses applies retroactively]; People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 798 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [amendments that increase monetary amount of property loss to trigger sentencing enhancements apply retroactively]; Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 302 [amendatory statute decriminalizing the commission of certain sexual acts applies retroactively].) We have also applied the Estrada inference to statutes that give trial courts discretion to impose lesser punishment. (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 [statute eliminating restriction on trial court's ability to strike serious felony enhancement applies retroactively]; People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 76 (Francis) [modified treatment of marijuana possession from straight felony to either felony or misdemeanor applies retroactively].)
More recently, we have applied the Estrada inference to statutes that, while not limited to reducing punishment for a particular crime, created a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or avoid punishment altogether. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 624, 629 [statute creating pretrial diversion program in lieu of criminal prosecution for individuals suffering from qualifying mental health disorders applies retroactively]; People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 (Lara) [statute prohibiting prosecutors from directly filing criminal charges against minors in “adult” criminal court and giving juvenile courts sole discretion to decide whether to prosecute minors as adults applies retroactively].) (People v. Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 13, parallel citations omitted.)
This bill states intent that the time-honored Estrada rule should not apply to the changes updating the monetary thresholds in the aggravated arson statute. It is unclear whether the current Legislature can speak to the legislative intent of a bill enacted in a prior legislative session.[4] Regardless, this statement of intent undermines the efforts of the prior Legislature to update the monetary values to account for inflation, which is why there is a sunset date in the statute to begin with.
- Argument in Support: According to the California Police Chiefs Association, “During the January 2025 fires in Southern California, we saw reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims who were displaced by evacuation orders. They disguised themselves as firefighters, FEMA workers, and even police officers to gain access to fire-damaged areas. They went as far as using decommissioned firetrucks to pose as firefighters including wearing firefighter turnout gear, CAL Fire t-shirts, and equipping helmets and radios.
“In addition to the impersonation of first responders, these unlawful actors engaged in looting and property theft rummaging through the ashes of victim’s homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes forced the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are not proportional to the pain, loss, and grievance of victims.
“The damage caused by impersonators and looters far exceeds the monetary losses to communities and victims’ personal property. These abusers and their actions undermine evacuation orders, local official’s authority, and victims’ peace of mind. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected.” - Argument in Opposition: According to the Vera Institute of Justice, “SB 571 is alarmingly broad and invites abuse. The bill’s harsher penalties make property crimes during a state or local emergency a mandatory felony across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura County apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency (among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection). As a result, this bill would increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California’s bail policies, and SB 571 invites similar abuses.
“The bill will also remove much needed judicial discretion. We trust judges to distinguish between ordinary property crime and intentionally harming communities during emergencies. By mandating incarceration time in every case, and removing judges’ abilities to waive this requirement in the interest of justice – judges will be unable to consider someone’s mental health, background, or intent, to ensure appropriate sentencing outcomes.
“Because SB 571 applies to such broad swaths of California, it also risks worsening racial disparities in the criminal legal system. For example, Black community members in Altadena experienced racial profiling during the recent Los Angeles fires with false accusations of looting. Past experience also shows that media coverage reinforces a harmful and racialized double standard in the wake of natural disasters. SB 571 may place already vulnerable communities at even greater risk under the guise of safety.
“Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. The Essie Justice Group surveyed 137 Altadena residents impacted by the Eaton Canyon Fire and not a single person mentioned looting or theft. Instead, Altadena residents want public officials to provide timely cash assistance, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness. Extensive research shows that SB 571 will not deter crime and improve public safety. There is no evidence the Los Angeles District Attorney, for example, was unable to charge any looting offenses during the recent fires in Los Angeles as a felony. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief.
“All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad and puts communities of color at risk with short-sighted and wasteful measures that fail to address the immediate needs of fire victims in Los Angeles. As we face the increased impacts of climate change, we should focus on strengthening our state’s emergency preparedness and working with communities to rebuild public trust.” - Related Legislation:
- AB 271 (Hoover) would make looting a straight felony and would create a two-year enhancement for any looting conviction in which the defendant impersonated a first responder, as specified. The hearing on AB 271 was canceled at the request of the author.
- AB 468 (Gabriel) would establish increased penalties for looting in an evacuation zone and impersonating emergency personnel in an evacuation zone. AB 468 is scheduled to be heard today in the Senate Public Safety Committee.
- SB 265 (Valladares) would make looting where the underlying crime is second-degree burglary a straight felony. The hearing on SB 265 was canceled at the request of the author.
- AB 271 (Hoover) would make looting a straight felony and would create a two-year enhancement for any looting conviction in which the defendant impersonated a first responder, as specified. The hearing on AB 271 was canceled at the request of the author.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 1899 (Mathis), Chapter 954, Statutes of 2022, prohibited the false impersonation of peace officers, firefighters, and other public officers and employees through, or on, an Internet website, or by other electronic means.
- AB 1598 (Fong), of the 2019-2020 Legislative Session, would have created a new misdemeanor for knowingly and credibly impersonating another person by electronic means for the purpose of initiating a sexual relationship with another person. AB 1598 was not heard in this committee at the request of the author.
- AB 1920 (Grayson), Chapter 252, Statutes of 2018, made it a misdemeanor for a person to intentionally and fraudulently impersonate a member of a search and rescue team.
- AB 3078 (Gallagher), Chapter 132, Statutes of 2018, expanded the crime of looting to include theft which occurs while an area is under an evacuation order.
- AB 2820 (Chiu), Chapter 671, Statutes of 2016, revised the definition of state of emergency and local emergency for purposes of criminal price gouging.
- SB 702 (Anderson), Chapter 514, Statutes of 2014, increased the maximum misdemeanor fine for a person using a badge or emblem to impersonate a peace officer, from $1,000 to $2,000, and requires the local law enforcement agency that files charges to seize the item used to carry out the impersonation.
- SB 1411 (Simitian), Chapter 335, Statutes of 2010, made it misdemeanor for a person knowingly and without consent to credibly impersonate another actual person on the Internet, or via other electronic means in order to harm, intimidate, threaten, or defraud another person.
- AB 1448 (Niello), Chapter 241, Statutes of 2007, requires law enforcement uniform vendors to verify that a person buying a uniform is an employee of the law enforcement agency identified on the uniform, and makes it a misdemeanor to fail to verify identity.
- AB 1899 (Mathis), Chapter 954, Statutes of 2022, prohibited the false impersonation of peace officers, firefighters, and other public officers and employees through, or on, an Internet website, or by other electronic means.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of Highway Patrolmen
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Fire Chiefs Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
City of Arcadia
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fire Districts Association of California
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
League of California Cities
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC)
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Assocation
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
Oppose
ACLU California Action
All of US or None Los Angeles
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Public Defenders Association
California Public Defenders Association (CPDA)
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA)
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Essie Justice Group
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Initiate Justice
Initiate Justice Action
Justice2jobs Coalition
Ktown for All
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)
Public Counsel
San Francisco Public Defender
Services, Immigrant Rights and Education Network (SIREN)
Smart Justice California, a Project of Tides Advocacy
Universidad Popular
Vera Institute of Justice
Analysis Prepared by: Andrew Ironside / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
National Institute of Justice, Five Things about Deterrence <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf> [accessed Mar. 26, 2025]. ↑
Ibid. ↑
D.M. Petrich, et al., Custodial Sanctions and Reoffending: A Meta-Analytic Review (2021). ↑
Of note, there are close to 30 newly-elected Senators and Assembly Members serving in the Legislature for this first time this year that did not vote on SB 281. ↑
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 571 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 571
Author: Archuleta (D), Arreguín (D) and Valladares (R), et al.
Amended: 5/23/25
Vote: 21
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Arreguín, Seyarto, Caballero, Gonzalez, Pérez, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-0, 5/23/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle
SUBJECT: Looting
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill eliminates the misdemeanor punishment for the crime of looting when the conduct is based on a second-degree burglary or grand theft; extends the duration of the looting statute past the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency; clarifies that damage to a structure caused by a disaster does not preclude conviction for burglary; and increases the punishment for false personation of a first responder under specified circumstances.
ANALYSIS:
Existing Law:
- Defines “burglary” as entering a residential or commercial building with the intent to commit grand or petty larceny or any felony or a theft once inside. (Penal (Pen.) Code, § 459.)
- Provides that a person who commits a specified theft-related offense during and within an affected county in a state of emergency, or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order resulting from a natural or manmade disaster, is guilty of looting and subject to punishment as follows:
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary, by imprisonment in county jail for one year, or by or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- Where the underlying offense is grand theft, except grand theft of a firearm, by imprisonment in a county jail for one year, or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (b).)
- Where the underlying offense is petty theft, by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
- Provides that a “state of emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated, as specified, and that a “local emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(3).)
- Provides that if a person is convicted of looting and granted probation, the person is required to serve a mandatory minimum time in jail as specified, except that a court may reduce or eliminate the jail sentence in the interests of justice. (Pen. Code, § 463.)
- States that a person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 exclusive of dame to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings, but inclusive of the cost of fire suppression; or,
- The fire caused damage, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited structures. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a).)
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- States legislative intent to review the monetary threshold amount within five years to consider the effects of inflation. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
- Punishes a person who is convicted of aggravated arson by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (b).)
- Provides that a person other than one who by law is given the authority of a peace officer, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing, of a peace officer, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a peace officer, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a peace officer, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a peace officer through or on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538d, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person, other than an officer or member of a fire department, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538e, subd. (a).)
This Bill:
- Specifies that the fact that the structure entered has been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster shall not preclude a burglary conviction.
- Extends time frame of the looting provisions to include crimes committed within 180 days after the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency.
- Eliminates the misdemeanor penalty for looting based on burglary or grand theft.
- Eliminates judicial discretion to reduce or waive the mandatory jail term for an individual who is granted probation for looting based on these offenses.
- States legislative intent that amendments to the threshold dollar amount in the aggravated arson statute when it was amended in 2023 apply prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date.
- Provides that any person other than a first responder who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $20,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment as a felony with incarceration in the county jail for 16 months, or two or three years, and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
- Defines “first responder” as a peace officer, a firefighter, a paramedic, an emergency medical technician, a public safety dispatcher or telecommunicator, as specified, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Comments
Looting Provisions. Existing law defines looting as the commission of specified theft-related offenses during and within an affected county during a state or local of emergency, or under an evacuation order resulting from a natural or manmade disaster. (Pen. Code, § 463.) Where the underlying offense is burglary or grand theft, the punishment for looting is an alternate felony-misdemeanor (wobbler) punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year, or by imprisonment in county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a) & (b).) Where the underlying crime is petty theft, looting is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county jail. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a).) Unlike the punishment for the underlying theft crimes themselves, a person convicted of looting and granted probation must serve a mandatory minimum jail term, unless a judge exercises discretion, in the interests of justice, to reduce or eliminate that term. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a)-(c).)
This bill removes the option for misdemeanor punishment when looting is based on the commission of what would otherwise be a second-degree burglary or grand theft but which occurs during and within an affected county in a “state of emergency” or a “local emergency,” or under an “evacuation order.” Consequently, looting under these circumstances would be punishable as a felony with incarceration in the county jail. This bill does not change the punishment for looting based on petty theft. This bill also requires a defendant to serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days in jail in the event the defendant is granted probation because this bill would eliminate judicial discretion to reduce or eliminate that sanction in the interests of justice.
Significantly, for purposes of this bill, it should be noted that the looting statute applies “during and within an affected county in a ‘state of emergency’ or a ‘local emergency,’ or under an ‘evacuation order.’” Thus the geographic area which is encompassed by the looting statute is oftentimes much larger than the area or areas affected by the natural or manmade disaster. For example, Los Angeles County is one of the nation’s largest counties encompassing 4,084 square miles. (https://lacounty.gov/government/about-la-county/about/ [as of April 6, 2025].) So while a state or local emergency may apply to the entire county, large swaths of the county may not be affected by the natural or manmade disaster. If the author’s stated intent is to protect homes that have been evacuated and hold those individuals who take advantage of a disaster and its victims accountable, should this bill be amended so that the proposed increased penalty applies only in an area under an evacuation order?
This bill also extends the time frame for applicability of the looting statute up to 180 days past the termination of the state of emergency or local emergency. And yet the duration of a state of emergency or a local emergency can often be lengthy, and may last years. The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) website contains a list of open state of emergency proclamations. There are currently over 50 open state of emergency proclamations, covering not only fires and storms, but also bird flu, extreme heat events, and tree mortality. Some of these proclamations of state of emergency have been in effect for years. The enhanced penalties provided for in this bill would apply in all these situations, regardless of whether the initial emergency or disaster is now under control. What is the benefit of extending an arguably already overbroad statute for an additional six months after the Governor, the Legislature, or the local governing body have deemed that conditions warrant that the state of emergency or local emergency should be terminated?
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown, potentially significant cost to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to adjudicate the increased criminal penalties in this bill.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. Potential cost pressures (General Fund) to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), in order to adequately house, treat, and care for persons committed to DSH that otherwise would not. Cost pressures to DSH are connected with an increase in state prison sentences. Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (local funds) to county probation departments of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, if individuals convicted of offenses under this bill are supervised locally in the community in lieu of or in addition to incarceration.
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/23/25)
Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California District Attorneys Association
California Fire Chiefs Association
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fire Districts Association of California
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
League of California Cities
Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association
Santa Ana Police Officers Association
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/23/25)
ACLU California Action
All of US or None Los Angeles
California Public Defenders Association
Californians United for a Responsible Budget
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Essie Justice Group
Initiate Justice
Initiate Justice Action
LA Defensa
Legal Services for Prisoners With Children
Local 148 LA County Public Defenders Union
San Francisco Public Defender
Smart Justice California
Vera Institute of Justice
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:
According to the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office:
The January 2025 wildfires in Los Angeles County devastated communities and highlighted the need for stronger laws to combat crimes that take place during a state of emergency…. To date, law enforcement has arrested dozens of bad actors for looting and impersonating first responders. Some of these individuals were found rummaging through the debris of what was left of fire victims’ homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes led the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are disproportional to the pain and loss suffered by these victims.
SB 571 will strengthen California’s existing statutes involving crimes that take place during a state of emergency. Specifically, this bill will: 1) increase penalties for looting; 2) allow for increased penalties to continue for 180 days after the emergency or evacuation order has ended; 3) increase penalties for individuals impersonating first responders within an evacuation zone; and 4) clarify that the extent of any damage caused by a natural or other disaster to a structure entered does not preclude conviction for the crime of burglary.
Additionally, SB 571 will strengthen the State’s aggravated arson statute by clarifying that inflation-adjusted amendments to the monetary threshold in aggravated arson cases are intended to be prospective only. The existing aggravated arson statute has a sunset date, and the dollar threshold has been adjusted for inflation every 5 years preceding the last adjustment. Although it would be logical to assume that the threshold dollar amounts apply to crimes that take place while a specific threshold amount is in effect, the lack of an express statement of legislative intent in the statute has resulted in deleterious case outcomes.
The California Supreme Court ruled in People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784 that a similar criminal statute addressing theft enhancements, containing a provision for the Legislature to reassess a threshold dollar amount to account for inflation, was ameliorative in nature, and therefore inferred legislative intent to apply the new dollar amount retroactively, short of an express statement of legislative intent to the contrary. Citing Nasalga, at least one trial court in Los Angeles County has ruled that the new threshold amounts in PC 451.5, in effect since 2024, are retroactive, unless the Legislature states otherwise. This vagueness in the existing statute as to legislative intent resulted in the court’s dismissal of a serious aggravated arson charge, despite the fact that the crime was committed, and the case was filed during the effective period of the prior, lower threshold amount. As the case law now stands, an arsonist who sets fire to property and causes damage that meets the threshold for aggravated arson is incentivized to avoid law enforcement apprehension, delay their open case, and delay any appeal in order to wait out the current monetary threshold until the next inflation adjustment and avoid prosecution under the most serious charge. This was not the Legislature’s intent when it passed SB 281(McGuire) in 2023, and we are proud to contribute this clarifying amendment to SB 571.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office:
SB 571 is alarmingly broad and invites abuse. The bill’s harsher penalties make property crimes during a state or local emergency a mandatory felony across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura County apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency (among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection). As a result, this bill would increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California’s bail policies, and SB 571 invites similar abuses.
The bill will also remove much needed judicial discretion. We trust judges to distinguish between ordinary property crime and intentionally harming communities during emergencies. By mandating incarceration time in every case, and removing judges’ abilities to waive this requirement in the interest of justice – judges will be unable to consider someone’s mental health, background, or intent, to ensure appropriate sentencing outcomes. Because SB 571 applies to such broad swaths of California, it also risks worsening racial disparities in the criminal legal system. For example, Black community members in Altadena experienced racial profiling during the recent Los Angeles fires with false accusations of looting. Past experience also shows that media coverage reinforces a harmful and racialized double standard in the wake of natural disasters. SB 571 may place already vulnerable communities at even greater risk under the guise of safety. Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. The Essie Justice Group surveyed 137 Altadena residents impacted by the Eaton Canyon Fire and not a single person mentioned looting or theft. Instead, Altadena residents want public officials to provide timely cash assistance, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness. Extensive research shows that SB 571 will not deter crime and improve public safety. There is no evidence the Los Angeles District Attorney, for example, was unable to charge any looting offenses during the recent fires in Los Angeles as a felony. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief.
All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad and puts communities of color at risk with short-sighted and wasteful measures that fail to address the immediate needs of fire victims in Los Angeles.
Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. /
5/27/25 11:17:18
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
SB 571 (Archuleta) - Looting
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
SB 571 increases criminal punishment relating to looting.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on May 23, 2025
Fiscal Impact:
- Unknown, potentially significant cost to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to adjudicate the increased criminal penalties in this bill.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. Potential cost pressures (General Fund) to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), in order to adequately house, treat, and care for persons committed to DSH that otherwise would not. Cost pressures to DSH are connected with an increase in state prison sentences. Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (local funds) to county probation departments of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, if individuals convicted of offenses under this bill are supervised locally in the community in lieu of or in addition to incarceration.
Author Amendments:
Add Senator Valladares as a joint author.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
SB 571 (Archuleta) - Looting
Version: March 25, 2025 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 6 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: Yes |
Hearing Date: May 5, 2025 | Consultant: Liah Burnley |
Bill Summary:
SB 571 increases criminal punishment relating to looting.
Fiscal Impact:
- Unknown, potentially significant cost to the state funded trial court system (Trial Court Trust Fund, General Fund) to adjudicate the increased criminal penalties in this bill. Defendants are constitutionally guaranteed certain rights during criminal proceedings, including the right to a jury trial and the right to counsel (at public expense if the defendants are unable to afford the costs of representation). Increasing penalties leads to lengthier and more complex court proceedings with attendant workload and resource costs to the court. The fiscal impact of this bill to the courts will depend on many unknown factors, including the numbers of people charged with an offense and the factors unique to each case. An eight-hour court day costs approximately $10,500 in staff in workload. If court days exceed 10, costs to the trial courts could reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. In 2023–24, over 4.8 million cases were filed statewide in the superior courts, including 77,850 nontraffic infractions, 451,647 misdemeanor cases, and 179,821 felony cases. While the courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources and to increase the amount appropriated to backfill for trial court operations. The Governor’s 2025-26 budget proposes a $40 million ongoing increase in discretionary funding from the General Fund to help pay for increased trial court operation costs beginning in 2025-26.
- Unknown, potentially significant costs (local funds, General Fund) to the counties and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to incarcerate people for the crimes created by this bill. The average annual cost to incarcerate one person in county jail is approximately $77,252 per year. Actual incarceration costs to counties will depend on the number of convictions and the length of each sentence. This bill would add costs as it requires certain individuals be incarcerated in county jail in lieu of community supervision. Although county incarceration costs are generally not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012), overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the General Fund because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding resulting from 2011 public safety realignment.
While many individuals incarcerated under this bill will serve their sentences in county jail, this bill specifies that violations are punishable “pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.” Under subdivision (h) of Section 1170, if the defendant has specified prior felony convictions, the sentence for a felony shall be served in the state prison. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) estimates the average annual cost to incarcerate one person in state prison is $133,000. Even if just one person is sentenced to state prison for one year under this bill, it will add significant costs pressures to CDCR. The Governor’s budget estimates that Proposition 36 (2024), which increased punishment for various theft and drug crimes, will cause the average daily prison population to be about 1% higher in 2024‑25 and 4% higher in 2025‑26. Given the prevalence of mental health needs among incarcerated people, legislation that sends more people to state prison adds significant costs to CDCR for the delivery of mental health care. About one‑third of the prison population has a diagnosed mental health need. The annual cost of operating a mental health crisis bed at CDCR is around $400,000. As part of the ongoing Coleman court case, CDCR has been incurring fines monthly since April 2023 for failing to reduce vacancy rates for five mental health classifications. The state has paid over $200 million in fines to date, and is still accruing fines. (See Staff Comments)
- Potential cost pressures (General Fund) to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH), in order to adequately house, treat, and care for persons committed to DSH that otherwise would not. Cost pressures to DSH are connected with an increase in state prison sentences. Creating a new crime will increase the number of defendants declared incompetent to stand trial (IST), or committed to DSH due to their being not guilty by reason of insanity. DSH’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2025-26 totals $3.4 billion – an increase of $3.4 million from the 2024 Budget Act. An increase the DSH population would result in the need for additional funding.
- Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (local funds) to county probation departments of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, if individuals convicted of offenses under this bill are supervised locally in the community in lieu of or in addition to incarceration. In each criminal case, county probation departments conduct investigations to provide presentencing reports to the courts after a conviction, supervise people in the community to ensure they comply with the terms of their supervision, and refer people to programs intended to help them avoid committing new crimes and improve their lives. This bill would create workload and costs pressures for probation departments, namely ensuring the defendant attends the required court ordered counseling. Annual supervision costs could range from approximately $4,000 to $15,000 per person. Actual costs would depend on the cost of supervision by each county probation department and how many individuals are granted probation, mandatory supervision or post release community supervision for the offense. To the extent that defendants are able to avail themselves to drug courts, collaborative courts, and diversion programs as a result of a charge under this bill, there will be corresponding increases in workload and costs pressures to probation, county behavioral health services, district attorneys, and public defenders.
Background:
Looting is committing a specified theft-related offense during and within an affected county during a state or local of emergency, or under an evacuation order resulting from a natural or manmade disaster. (Pen. Code, § 463.) Where the underlying offense is burglary or grand theft, the punishment for looting is an alternate felony-misdemeanor (wobbler) punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year, or by imprisonment in county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a) & (b).) Where the underlying crime is petty theft, looting is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county jail. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a).) Unlike the punishment for the underlying theft crimes themselves, a person convicted of looting and granted probation must serve a mandatory minimum jail term, unless a judge exercises discretion, in the interests of justice, to reduce or eliminate that term. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a)-(c).)
Several provisions of the Penal Code already prohibit the fraudulent impersonation or attempted impersonation of peace officers, firefighters, and other public officers and employees. These provisions proscribe, among other things, willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the authorized badge, uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of those officers and employees to commit the fraudulent impersonation. (See Pen. Code, §§ 538d-538h.) The statutes criminalizing false personation of these first responders also criminalize impersonation committed on an internet website or by other electronic means when done for purposes of defrauding another.
Proposed Law:
- States legislative intent that amendments to the threshold dollar amount for aggravated arson apply prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date.
- Expands the crime of burglary to include structures that have been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster.
- Extends time frame of the looting provisions to include crimes committed within 180 days after the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency.
- Increases the penalty for looting based on burglary or grand theft from a misdemeanor to a felony.
- Creates a new crime of impersonating a first responder, makes it illegal to willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or to willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another.
- Makes this new offense punishable as a misdemeanor by imprisonment not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $20,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, as a felony, by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years, and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
- Defines “first responder” as a peace officer, a firefighter, a paramedic, an emergency medical technician, a public safety dispatcher or telecommunicator, as specified, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Staff Comments:
This bill is a substantial expansion of criminal penalties for property crimes. This bill increases the penalty for property crimes during a state or local emergency across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. This bill will increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura Counties apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency, among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection.[1]
This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California’s bail policies.[2] In addition, longer criminal sentences such as the ones proposed by this bill do not deter crime. [3]
Given the absence of a compelling reason for increasing these penalties, the risk of worsening disparities in the criminal justice system, and the state’s history of prison overcrowding, this bill is both costly and unnecessary, and will cause more harm than it seeks to prevent.
Mass incarceration in California did not occur in a vacuum; it was the result of decades of cumulative policy decisions—often well-intentioned on their own—that collectively expanded the scope and severity of the criminal justice system. Although individual pieces of legislation like this bill, and many others introduced this legislative session, may appear narrow or incremental, their combined effect will significantly increase incarceration rates. California has a well-documented history of prison overcrowding, which culminated in federal court intervention and a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Plata (2011) that found the state’s prison conditions unconstitutional due to severe overcrowding. Returning to such conditions would undermine fiscal sustainability, public safety, and rehabilitation goals.
-- END --
See https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/policy-administration/legal-affairs/emergency-proclamations/. ↑
Barranco, R. E., & May, D. C. (2023). Theft by Any Other Name is Still Theft: Examining “Looting” During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Deviant Behavior, 44(9), 1320–1333. https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2023.2182657.
↑National Institute of Justice, Five Things About Deterrence, U.S. Department of Justice (2016). ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Jesse Arreguín, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: SB 571 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025
Author: | Archuleta | ||
Version: | March 25, 2025 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SU | ||
Subject: Looting
HISTORY
Source: Author
Prior Legislation: AB 1899 (Mathis), Ch. 954, Stats. of 2022
AB 1920 (Grayson), Ch. 252, Stats. of 2018
AB 3078 (Gallagher), Ch. 132, Stats. of 2018
SB 702 (Anderson), Ch. 514, Stats. of 2014
AB 1448 (Niello), Ch. 241, Stats. of 2007
Support: Arcadia Police Officers' Association; Brea Police Association; Burbank Police Officers' Association; California Association of School Police Chiefs; California Coalition of School Safety Professionals; California District Attorneys Association; California Narcotic Officers' Association; California Police Chiefs Association; California Reserve Peace Officers Association; Claremont Police Officers Association; Corona Police Officers Association; Culver City Police Officers' Association; Fullerton Police Officers' Association; League of California Cities; Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office; Los Angeles School Police Management Association; Los Angeles School Police Officers Association; Murrieta Police Officers' Association; Newport Beach Police Association; Palos Verdes Police Officers Association; Peace Officers Research Association of California; Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association; Pomona Police Officers' Association; Riverside Police Officers Association; Riverside Sheriffs' Association; Santa Ana Police Officers Association
Opposition: ACLU California Action; All of Us or None Los Angeles; California Public Defenders Association; Californians United for a Responsible Budget; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; Initiate Justice; Initiate Justice Action; LA Defensa; Legal Services for Prisoners With Children; LA County Public Defenders Union, Local 148; San Francisco Public Defender; Vera Institute of Justice
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to eliminate the misdemeanor punishment for the crime of looting when the conduct is based on a second-degree burglary or grand theft; extend the duration of the looting statute past the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency; clarify that damage to a structure caused by a disaster does not preclude conviction for burglary; and increase the punishment for false personation of a first responder under specified circumstances.
Existing law states that a person who willfully, maliciously, deliberately, with premeditation, and with intent to cause injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to property under circumstances likely to produce injury to one or more persons, or to cause damage to one or more structures or inhabited dwellings, sets fire to, burns, or causes to be burned, or aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any residence, structure, forest land, or property, is guilty of aggravated arson if one or more of the following aggravating factors exists:
- The defendant has been previously convicted of arson on one or more occasions within the past 10 years;
- The fire caused property damage and other losses in excess of $10,100,000 exclusive of dame to, or destruction of, inhabited dwellings, but inclusive of the cost of fire suppression; or,
- The fire caused damage, or the destruction of, five or more inhabited structures. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a).)
Existing law states legislative intent to review the monetary threshold amount within five years to consider the effects of inflation. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
Existing law punishes a person who is convicted of aggravated arson by imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (b).)
Existing law states that a person who is sentenced under the aggravating arson factors shall not be eligible for release on parole until 10 calendar years have elapsed. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (c).)
Existing law repeals the monetary threshold factor on January 1, 2029. (Pen. Code, § 451.5, subd. (d).)
This bill states legislative intent that amendments to the threshold dollar amount when this bill was chaptered in 2023 apply prospectively and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed any crime or received any sentence before the effective date.
Existing law defines “burglary” as entering a residential or commercial building with the intent to commit grand or petty larceny or any felony or a theft once inside. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
Existing law divides burglary into two degrees. First degree burglary is burglary of an inhabited dwelling. All other burglaries are second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 460.)
Existing law states that for purposes of burglary, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
This bill specifies that the fact that the structure entered has been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster shall not preclude conviction.
Existing law provides that a person who commits specified theft-related offense during and within an affected county in a state of emergency, or a local emergency, or under an evacuation order resulting from a natural or manmade disaster, is guilty of looting and subject to punishment as follows:
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary, by imprisonment in county jail for one year, or by or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- Where the underlying offense is grand theft, except grand theft of a firearm, by imprisonment in a county jail for one year, or by imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (b).)
- Where the underlying offense is petty theft, by imprisonment in a county jail for six months. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
Existing law provides that if a person is convicted of looting and granted probation, the person is required to serve a mandatory minimum time in jail as follows, except that a court may reduce or eliminate the jail sentence in the interests of justice:
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary or grand theft, a mandatory minimum term of 180 days in county jail. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a) & (b).)
- Where the underlying offense is petty theft, a mandatory minimum term of 90 days in county jail. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
Existing law requires the court, if it reduces or eliminates the mandatory jail sentence for a person granted probation for a looting conviction, to specify on the record and enter into the minutes the circumstances indicating that the interest of justice would be served by that disposition. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a)-(c).)
Existing law provides that if a person is convicted of looting and granted probation, the court in its discretion may require the person to also serve specified hours of community service in any program the court deems appropriate, including any program created to rebuild the community, as follows:
- Where the underlying offense is second-degree burglary, up to 240 hours of community service. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
- Where the underlying offense is grand theft, up to 160 hours of community service. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (b).)
- Where the underlying offense is petty theft, up to 80 hours of community service. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (c).)
Existing law provides that, for purposes of a looting involving second-degree burglary, the fact that the structure entered has been damaged by the earthquake, fire, flood, or other natural or manmade disaster shall not, in and of itself, preclude conviction. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (a).)
Existing law defines “state of emergency” as “conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat.” (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(1).)
Existing law defines “local emergency” as conditions that, by reason of their magnitude, are, or are likely to be, beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(2).)
Existing law provides that a “state of emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency until terminated, as specified, and that a “local emergency” shall exist from the time of the proclamation of the condition of the emergency by the local governing body until terminated, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(3).)
Existing law defines “evacuation order” as an order from the Governor, or a county sheriff, chief of police, or fire marshal, under which persons subject to the order are required to relocate outside of the geographic area covered by the order due to an imminent danger resulting from an earthquake, fire, flood, riot, or other natural or manmade disaster. (Pen. Code, § 463, subd. (d)(4).)
This bill extends time frame of the looting provisions to include crimes committed within 180 days after the termination of a state of emergency or local emergency.
This bill eliminates the misdemeanor penalty for looting based on burglary or grand theft.
This bill eliminates judicial discretion to reduce or waive the mandatory jail term for an individual who is granted probation for looting based on these offenses.
Existing law provides that a person other than one who by law is given the authority of a peace officer, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing, of a peace officer, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a peace officer, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a peace officer, or who willfully and credibly impersonates a peace officer through or on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538d, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that a person, other than an officer or member of a fire department, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of an officer or member of a fire department or a deputy state fire marshal, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are an officer or member of a fire department or the Office of the State Fire Marshal, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538e, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that any person, other than an employee of a public utility or district, as specified, who willfully presents themselves to a utility or district customer with the intent of
fraudulently personating an employee of a public utility or district, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are an employee of a public utility or district, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538f.)
Existing law provides that any person, other than a state, county, city, special district, or city and county officer or employee, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized badge, photographic identification card, or insignia of such an officer or employee, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating an officer or employee, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are a state, county, city, special district, or city and county officer or employee, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538g, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that any person, other than an officer or member of a search and rescue unit or team, who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the authorized badge, uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of member of a search and rescue unit or team, with the intent of fraudulently impersonating such a person, or of fraudulently inducing the belief that they are an officer or member of a search and rescue unit or team, or uses the same to obtain aid, money, or assistance within this state, or who willfully and credibly impersonates such an officer or member on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 538h, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that a person who without authority impersonates, or wears the badge of, a member of the California Highway Patrol with intention to deceive anyone is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Veh. Code, § 27.)
Existing law provides for a one-year enhancement for impersonating a peace officer during the commission of a felony, to be imposed consecutive to the term imposed for the felony, in lieu of the penalty that would have been imposed under the false personation statute. (Pen. Code, § 667.17.)
This bill provides that any person other than a first responder who willfully wears, exhibits, or uses the uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order or who willfully and credibly impersonates a first responder on an internet website, or by other electronic means, for purposes of defrauding another, shall be punished either by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed $20,000, or by both that imprisonment and fine, or by imprisonment as a felony with incarceration in the county jail for 16 months, or two or three years, and by a fine not to exceed $20,000.
This bill defines “first responder” as a peace officer, a firefighter, a paramedic, an emergency medical technician, a public safety dispatcher or telecommunicator, as specified, or any employee of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
COMMENTS
- Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Almost immediately, after the firestorms erupted in Southern California in January 2025, there were reports of criminals attempting to take advantage of victims displaced by the fires. While Angelenos scrambled to find alternative shelter, there were reports of predatory behavior by individuals impersonating as first responders, firefighters, and disaster relief workers, including FEMA workers, in order to scam fire victims. Additionally, many news outlets reported looting and property theft by individuals rummaging through ashes and burned buildings looking for things of value. Early reports during the emergency found 20 individuals were apprehended and faced looting charges. Looting during the emergency led the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrol and provide a quicker response time, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Governor Newsom even called for looting in fire evacuation zones to be a felony. Ensuring the public can trust first responders and local public safety officials is crucial in keeping communities safe, especially during states of emergency when victims are in disarray. Penalties for these crimes should be proportional to the egregiousness of the pain and exploitation of victims. Strengthening these penalties will protect first responders, communities, and increase trust in California’s ability to respond to state of emergencies and protect victims. SB 571 will ensure California holds those who take advantage of a disaster and victims are held accountable. Strengthening penalties for looting and impersonation in evacuation zones will ensure victims feel safe and protected.
- Looting Provisions
Existing law defines looting as the commission of specified theft-related offenses during and within an affected county during a state or local of emergency, or under an evacuation order resulting from a natural or manmade disaster. (Pen. Code, § 463.) Where the underlying offense is burglary or grand theft, the punishment for looting is an alternate felony-misdemeanor (wobbler) punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year, or by imprisonment in county jail for 16 months, two years, or three years. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a) & (b).) Where the underlying crime is petty theft, looting is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county jail. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a).) Unlike the punishment for the underlying theft crimes themselves, a person convicted of looting and granted probation must serve a mandatory minimum jail term, unless a judge exercises discretion, in the interests of justice, to reduce or eliminate that term. (Pen. Code, § 463, subds. (a)-(c).)
In the wake of the Eaton and Palisades fires in Los Angeles County in January of this year, there were multiple reports of arrests for looting. (See e.g., S. Lin, Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-01-09/looting-arrests-wildfire-evacuation-zones; E. Baumgaertner & R. Mac, New York Times, January 11, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/11/us/la-fires-evacuation-looting.html [as of April 6, 2025].) On January 9, 2025, Governor Newsom announced deployment of the California National Guard to support local law enforcement to combat instances of looting. (https://www.gov.ca.gov/2025/01/09/governor-newsom-deploys-california-national-guard-to-los-angeles-fires-looting-will-not-be-tolerated/ [as of April 6, 2025].) The Governor subsequently called for looting in a fire evacuation zone to be a felony. (See https://www.foxnews.com/politics/newsom-calls-looting-felony-evacuation-zones-amid-la-inferno [as of April 6, 2025].)
This bill removes the option for misdemeanor punishment when looting is based on the commission of what would otherwise be a second-degree burglary or grand theft but which occurs during and within an affected county in a “state of emergency” or a “local emergency,” or under an “evacuation order.” Consequently, looting under these circumstances would be punishable as a felony with incarceration in the county jail. This bill does not change the punishment for looting based on petty theft. This bill also requires a defendant to serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days in jail in the event the defendant is granted probation because this bill would eliminate judicial discretion to reduce or eliminate that sanction in the interests of justice.
Significantly, for purposes of this bill, it should be noted that the looting statute applies “during and within an affected county in a ‘state of emergency’ or a ‘local emergency,’ or under an ‘evacuation order.’” Thus the geographic area which is encompassed by the looting statute is oftentimes much larger than the area or areas affected by the natural or manmade disaster. For example, Los Angeles County is one of the nation’s largest counties encompassing 4,084 square miles. (https://lacounty.gov/government/about-la-county/about/ [as of April 6, 2025].) Its territory includes Santa Catalina Island and San Clemente Island. (https://lacounty.gov/government/about-la-county/maps-and-geography/ [as of April 6, 2025].) So while a state or local emergency may apply to the entire county, large swaths of the county may not be affected by the natural or manmade disaster. Presumably, this is why the Governor called for an increased penalty to apply in an evacuation zone. If the author’s stated intent is to protect homes that have been evacuated and hold those individuals who take advantage of a disaster and its victims accountable, should this bill be amended so that the proposed increased penalty applies only in an area under an evacuation order?
Finally, this bill extends the time frame for applicability of the looting statute up to 180 days past the termination of the state of emergency or local emergency. And yet the duration of a state of emergency or a local emergency can often be lengthy, and may last years. The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) website contains a list of open state of emergency proclamations. There are currently over 50 open state of emergency proclamations, covering not only fires and storms, but also bird flu, extreme heat events, and tree mortality. Some of these proclamations of state of emergency have been in effect for years. They cover almost every county in the state. (https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/policy-administration/legal-affairs/emergency-proclamations/ [as of April 15, 2025].) The enhanced penalties provided for in this bill would apply in all these situations, regardless of whether the initial emergency or disaster is now under control. What is the benefit of extending an arguably already overbroad statute for an additional six months after the Governor, the Legislature, or the local governing body have deemed that conditions warrant that the state of emergency or local emergency should be terminated?
- Burglary Provision
The crime of burglary consists of an unlawful entry accompanied by the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony. A burglary of an inhabited dwelling house or an inhabited portion of any building is a first-degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 460.) “Inhabited” as used in the burglary statute means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not (i.e., a person is currently not present). (Pen. Code, § 459; see also People v. Marquez (1983) 143 Cal. App. 3d 797, 800.) Thus, one can be found guilty of first-degree burglary even when the perpetrator gains unlawful entry to an unoccupied building.
A formerly inhabited dwelling becomes uninhabited only when its occupants have moved out permanently and do not intend to return to continue using the structure as a dwelling. (See People v. Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483-484 [tenant who moved out of an apartment without intent to return and continue living there left it uninhabited despite leaving some property there]; People v. Jackson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4t 1185, 1187-1189 [tenant was resident of inhabited dwelling while in the midst of an uncompleted move of a burglarized apartment]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, at pp. 354–355 [the evidence reflects only that they victim had begun to move].)
In a scenario where a dwelling lies within an evacuation zone, pursuant to case law cited above a home is still inhabited (vs occupied) because the resident intends to return after the evacuation order is lifted. However, it is unclear if this would be the case if the dwelling is damaged to such an extent as to render it uninhabitable. This bill clarifies that the fact the structure entered has been damaged to any extent by a natural or other disaster does not preclude conviction for burglary.
- False Impersonation Provision
Several provisions of the Penal Code prohibit the fraudulent impersonation or attempted impersonation of peace officers, firefighters, and other public officers and employees. These provisions proscribe, among other things, willfully wearing, exhibiting, or using the authorized badge, uniform, insignia, emblem, device, label, certificate, card, or writing of those officers and employees to commit the fraudulent impersonation. (See Pen. Code, §§ 538d-538h.) The statutes criminalizing false personation of these first responders also criminalize impersonation committed on an internet website or by other electronic means when done for purposes of defrauding another. These crimes are punishable as misdemeanors. (Ibid.)
This bill makes it a wobbler for a person, other than a first responder, to willfully wear, exhibit or use the uniform, insignia, emblem device, label, certificate card or writing of a first responder with the intent of fraudulently impersonating a first responder in an area subject to an evacuation order. This bill also makes it a wobbler to willfully and credibly impersonate a first responder on an internet website or by other electronic means for purposes of defrauding another.
As drafted, false impersonation via internet or by electronic means is not subject to the “evacuation order.” limitation, but rather applies at any time. Should this bill be amended to provide that the enhanced punishment for impersonation of a first responder applies only while there is an active evacuation order within the county or until shortly thereafter?
Without this qualifying language, this bill appears to make the misdemeanor punishment currently established in the existing false personation statutes meaningless.
This bill adopts Government Code 8562’s definition of “first responder”, which includes a peace officer, a firefighter, a paramedic, an emergency medical technician, a public safety dispatcher or telecommunicator. This bill also includes under the definition of first responder employees of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). False impersonation of a FEMA worker is a federal offense. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code section 912 provides: “Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.” Should FEMA workers be included in this bill given that they are already covered under federal law?
- Aggravated Arson Provision
The aggravated arson statute, Penal Code section 451.5, became effective in 1995 through enactment of SB 1309 (Craven), Chapter 421, Statutes of 1994. The original statute contained a five-year sunset provision which stated that the purpose of the provision was to allow the Legislature to consider the effects of inflation on the property damage/losses threshold in the law. At the time of the aggravated arson offense’s implementation in 1995, the total monetary amount of property damage and other losses was set at $5 million.
Because of this, the cost of inflation is to be considered by the Legislature within five years when extending the sunset on the statute and/or making changes to the monetary threshold. The statute’s sunset and monetary threshold has increased several times since 1995. The most recent sunset extension, SB 281 (McGuire), Chapter 706, Statutes of 2023, raised the dollar limits required to trigger the statute to account for inflation from $8.3 million to $10.1 million. Additionally, the bill established a sunset date of January 1, 2029 for this excessive damage factor.
This bill would add legislative intent stating that amendments to the threshold dollar amount shall apply prospectively only and shall not be interpreted to benefit any defendant who committed a crime or received a sentence before the effective date of the threshold.
Penal Code section 3, which was enacted in 1872, states that “No part of the Penal Code is retroactive unless expressly so declared.” So prospective application of a statute is presumed. This includes the changes made to the aggravated arson statute by SB 281.
However, a long-standing, limited exception to this rule has been recognized by the courts when ameliorative legislation (that which lessens punishment or reduces criminal liability) goes into effect. In this instance, courts generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all cases not yet final on appeal. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745.) The California Supreme Court explained its reasoning as follows:
There is one consideration of paramount importance. It leads inevitably to the conclusion that the Legislature must have intended, and by necessary implication provided, that the amendatory statute should prevail. When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology. (Id. at pp. 744–745.)
Recently, in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, the Supreme Court discussed the broad application of Estrada rule:
We have applied Estrada's inference of retroactivity to legislation that created an affirmative defense, contracted a criminal offense, or otherwise lessened punishment in some meaningful manner. These laws have included statutes addressing penalty enhancements as well as statutes concerned with substantive offenses. (E.g., People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 968–969 [statute reducing maximum probation term for nonviolent offenses applies retroactively]; People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 [newly enacted affirmative defense to transporting marijuana applies retroactively]; Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 798 (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [amendments that increase monetary amount of property loss to trigger sentencing enhancements apply retroactively]; Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301 [statute specifying that certain death-penalty qualifying special circumstances must be intentional applies retroactively]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 302 [amendatory statute decriminalizing the commission of certain sexual acts applies retroactively].) We have also applied the Estrada inference to statutes that give trial courts discretion to impose lesser punishment. (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 699 [statute eliminating restriction on trial court's ability to strike serious felony enhancement applies retroactively]; People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 76 (Francis) [modified treatment of marijuana possession from straight felony to either felony or misdemeanor applies retroactively].)
More recently, we have applied the Estrada inference to statutes that, while not limited to reducing punishment for a particular crime, created a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or avoid punishment altogether. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 624, 629 [statute creating pretrial diversion program in lieu of criminal prosecution for individuals suffering from qualifying mental health disorders applies retroactively]; People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303 (Lara) [statute prohibiting prosecutors from directly filing criminal charges against minors in “adult” criminal court and giving juvenile courts sole discretion to decide whether to prosecute minors as adults applies retroactively].) (People v. Burgos, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 13, parallel citations omitted.)
This bill states intent that the time-honored Estrada rule should not apply to the changes updating the monetary thresholds in the aggravated arson statute. It is unclear whether the current Legislature can speak to the legislative intent of a bill enacted in a prior legislative session.[1] Regardless, this statement of intent undermines the efforts of the prior Legislature to update the monetary values to account for inflation, which is why there is a sunset date in the statute to begin with.
- Related Legislation
Several other legislative measures introduced this session also increase the punishment for impersonating first responders during a state of emergency or a local emergency. SB 264 (Valladares) would to increase the punishment for impersonating a peace officer or firefighter from a misdemeanor to a wobbler, if that impersonation occurs during a state or local emergency. SB 264 was pulled by the author. AB 271 (Hoover) creates a new two-year enhancement for a person who impersonates a first responder, including a peace officer or firefighter, during the commission of the crime of looting. AB 271 is pending hearing in the Assembly Public Safety Committee. AB 468 (Gabriel) would also increase penalties for impersonating emergency personnel in an evacuation zone, making the crime a wobbler. AB 468 is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
In addition, several legislative measure introduced this session increase the punishment for looting. SB 265 (Valladares) would eliminate the possible misdemeanor punishment for looting where the underlying crime is second-degree burglary, thereby making it a straight felony. SB 265 was pulled by the author. AB 271 (Hoover) would eliminate the misdemeanor punishment for looting based on second degree burglary or grand theft, and would also increase the penalty from a misdemeanor to an alternate felony/misdemeanor (“wobbler”) for looting based on petty theft. AB 271 is pending hearing in the Assembly Public Safety Committee. Finally, AB 468 (Gabriel) expands the crime of looting to also include trespass and theft from an unlocked vehicle as well as increases the penalties for crimes currently included in the looting statute. AB 468 would eliminate the misdemeanor penalty for looting based on second degree burglary and grand theft, thereby making it a straight felony. AB 468 is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- Argument in Support
According to the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office:
The January 2025 wildfires in Los Angeles County devastated communities and highlighted the need for stronger laws to combat crimes that take place during a state of emergency…. To date, law enforcement has arrested dozens of bad actors for looting and impersonating first responders. Some of these individuals were found rummaging through the debris of what was left of fire victims’ homes and personal belongings. The severity of these crimes led the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to form the Looter Suppression Team to increase patrols and provide quicker response times, diverting vital resources away from efforts to support our recovering Los Angeles community. Current penalties for these abuses are disproportional to the pain and loss suffered by these victims.
SB 571 will strengthen California’s existing statutes involving crimes that take place during a state of emergency. Specifically, this bill will: 1) increase penalties for looting; 2) allow for increased penalties to continue for 180 days after the emergency or evacuation order has ended; 3) increase penalties for individuals impersonating first responders within an evacuation zone; and 4) clarify that the extent of any damage caused by a natural or other disaster to a structure entered does not preclude conviction for the crime of burglary.
Additionally, SB 571 will strengthen the State’s aggravated arson statute by clarifying that inflation-adjusted amendments to the monetary threshold in aggravated arson cases are intended to be prospective only. The existing aggravated arson statute has a sunset date, and the dollar threshold has been adjusted for inflation every 5 years preceding the last adjustment. Although it would be logical to assume that the threshold dollar amounts apply to crimes that take place while a specific threshold amount is in effect, the lack of an express statement of legislative intent in the statute has resulted in deleterious case outcomes.
The California Supreme Court ruled in People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784 that a similar criminal statute addressing theft enhancements, containing a provision for the Legislature to reassess a threshold dollar amount to account for inflation, was ameliorative in nature, and therefore inferred legislative intent to apply the new dollar amount retroactively, short of an express statement of legislative intent to the contrary. Citing Nasalga, at least one trial court in Los Angeles County has ruled that the new threshold amounts in PC 451.5, in effect since 2024, are retroactive, unless the Legislature states otherwise. This vagueness in the existing statute as to legislative intent resulted in the court’s dismissal of a serious aggravated arson charge, despite the fact that the crime was committed, and the case was filed during the effective period of the prior, lower threshold amount. As the case law now stands, an arsonist who sets fire to property and causes damage that meets the threshold for aggravated arson is incentivized to avoid law enforcement apprehension, delay their open case, and delay any appeal in order to wait out the current monetary threshold until the next inflation adjustment and avoid prosecution under the most serious charge. This was not the Legislature’s intent when it passed SB 281(McGuire) in 2023, and we are proud to contribute this clarifying amendment to SB 571.
- Argument in Opposition
According to the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office:
SB 571 is alarmingly broad and invites abuse. The bill’s harsher penalties make property crimes during a state or local emergency a mandatory felony across the entire jurisdiction and for six months after the emergency. For example, the recent states of emergency declared in Los Angeles and Ventura County apply to more than 10 million people over almost 6,000 square miles—many nowhere near the fire zones—and they can be renewed for months or years. The entire State of California is also under several open states of emergency (among others, for bird flu and wildfire protection). As a result, this bill would increase the penalties for property crimes statewide regardless of their connection to an actual active emergency. This is not only vastly overbroad, but it also creates a risk for abuse. For example, during the COVID-19 state of emergency, prosecutors misused looting laws to sidestep California’s bail policies, and SB 571 invites similar abuses.
The bill will also remove much needed judicial discretion. We trust judges to distinguish between ordinary property crime and intentionally harming communities during emergencies. By mandating incarceration time in every case, and removing judges’ abilities to waive this requirement in the interest of justice – judges will be unable to consider someone’s mental health, background, or intent, to ensure appropriate sentencing outcomes. Because SB 571 applies to such broad swaths of California, it also risks worsening racial disparities in the criminal legal system. For example, Black community members in Altadena experienced racial profiling during the recent Los Angeles fires with false accusations of looting. Past experience also shows that media coverage reinforces a harmful and racialized double standard in the wake of natural disasters. SB 571 may place already vulnerable communities at even greater risk under the guise of safety. Instead of responding to the expressed needs of people impacted by the fires, SB 571 prioritizes a costly criminal legal response. The Essie Justice Group surveyed 137 Altadena residents impacted by the Eaton Canyon Fire and not a single person mentioned looting or theft. Instead, Altadena residents want public officials to provide timely cash assistance, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness. Extensive research shows that SB 571 will not deter crime and improve public safety. There is no evidence the Los Angeles District Attorney, for example, was unable to charge any looting offenses during the recent fires in Los Angeles as a felony. With the state spending more than $130,000 per year to incarcerate one person, these increased penalties are unnecessary and will only divert critical funds away from disaster relief.
All Californians deserve safe communities, especially during emergencies. SB 571, however, is overly broad and puts communities of color at risk with short-sighted and wasteful measures that fail to address the immediate needs of fire victims in Los Angeles.
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Of note, there are close to 30 newly-elected Senators and Assembly Members serving in the Legislature for this first time this year that did not vote on SB 281. ↑
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):