SB 875: Public utilities: eminent domain: just compensation.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2026-04-06
Current Status:
Failed
(2026-04-21: April 21 set for first hearing. Failed passage in committee. (Ayes 4. Noes 1. Page 3973.))
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
(1)Existing law, the Eminent Domain Law, authorizes a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a public use if the use for which the property is sought to be taken is a more necessary public use than the use to which the property is appropriated, as specified. Existing law specifies that if property has been appropriated to public use by any person other than a public entity, the use of the property by a public entity for the same or any other public use is a more necessary use than the current use. Existing law also specifies that if property that has been appropriated to a public use is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, as defined, that the public entity intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, except as specified. Existing law requires a court to award a defendant their litigation expenses if the eminent domain proceeding is dismissed or if there is a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire the property by eminent domain, as provided.
This bill would specify that if exempt from that rebuttable presumption property that has been appropriated to a public use that is electrical, gas, or water electrical or gas public utility property that a public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use is conclusive and not rebuttable. The bill would specify that the above-described litigation expenses provisions do not apply to those proceedings. area.
(2)Existing law authorizes a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity, as specified. Under existing law, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of a public entity conclusively establishes that, among other matters, the public interest and necessity require the project. Existing law specifies that, if a taking is by a local public entity and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that those matters are true.
This bill would provide that, if a taking is by a local public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area and the property is electrical, gas, or water electrical or gas public utility property, and the local public entity intends to put the property to the same use, property, the resolution of necessity instead creates a conclusive and not rebuttable presumption that those matters are true. conclusively establishes those matters.
(3)Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. Existing law prohibits public utilities, other than certain common carriers, from selling, leasing, assigning, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of, or encumbering, its assets that are necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, unless the public utility has secured an order or approval from the commission to do so, as provided. Existing law requires, for any voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical corporation or gas corporation to ownership by a public entity, the commission to determine, as part of its review under these provisions, whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees.
This bill would instead require the commission, in its review of a voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical or gas corporation to a public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area, entity, to limit its review to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees. The bill would require the review to occur after a change in ownership agreement is made for a voluntary change in ownership, or after the completion of the condemnation proceeding for an involuntary change in ownership.
(4)Existing law provides procedures for the acquisition under eminent domain proceedings, or otherwise, of lands, property, and rights of a public utility by a political subdivision, and requires the commission to fix the just compensation to be paid by the political subdivision for the lands, property, and rights, as provided.
This bill would require the owner of a public utility, within 90 days of a political subdivision submitting an amount for just compensation or a plan for the separation of the public utilitys assets, to also submit an amount for just compensation or provide a response to the separation plan, as provided. The bill would authorize the commission, if it finds that the total just compensation should include costs for the physical separation of the public utilitys assets, to establish a process for the reimbursement of those costs and to determine the reasonableness of those expenses. The bill would require the commission to make and file its findings regarding just compensation with respect to the public utility within 18 months of the date the petition is filed.
This bill would prohibit a public utility from recovering from ratepayers any litigation costs associated with a political subdivisions efforts to acquire utility property, as provided.
This(5)This bill would make legislative findings and declarations as to the necessity of a special statute for public entities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area.
Under(6)Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.
Because certain provisions of this bill would be a part of the act and a violation of a commission action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
(4)TheThe California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(1)Existing law, the Eminent Domain Law, authorizes a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a public use if the use for which the property is sought to be taken is a more necessary public use than the use to which the property is appropriated, as specified. Existing law specifies that if property has been appropriated to public use by any person other than a public entity, the use of the property by a public entity for the same or any other public use is a more necessary use than the current use. Existing law also specifies that if property that has been appropriated to a public use is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, as defined, that the public entity intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, except as specified. Existing law requires a court to award a defendant their litigation expenses if the eminent domain proceeding is dismissed or if there is a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire the property by eminent domain, as provided.
This bill would specify that if property that has been appropriated to a public use is electrical, gas, or water public utility property that a public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use is conclusive and not rebuttable. The bill would specify that the above-described litigation expenses provisions do not apply to those proceedings.
(2)Existing law authorizes a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity, as specified. Under existing law, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of a public entity conclusively establishes that, among other matters, the public interest and necessity require the project. Existing law specifies that, if a taking is by a local public entity and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that those matters are true.
This bill would provide that, if a taking is by a local public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, and the local public entity intends to put the property to the same use, the resolution of necessity instead creates a conclusive and not rebuttable presumption that those matters are true.
Existing(3)Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations. Existing law prohibits public utilities, other than certain common carriers, from selling, leasing, assigning, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of, or encumbering, its assets that are necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, unless the public utility has secured an order or approval from the commission to do so, as provided. Existing law requires, for any voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical corporation or gas corporation to ownership by a public entity, the commission to determine, as part of its review under these provisions, whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would authorize cities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) service area, including, but not limited to, the City and County of San Francisco, to withdraw and separate from PG&E and either (1) create their own public utility, owned by and accountable to the public and not private shareholders or (2) join an existing municipal utility.This bill would require the commission, in its review of a voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical or gas corporation to a public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area, to limit its review to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees.
This bill would make legislative findings and declarations as to the necessity of a special statute for public entities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area.
Under existing law, a violation of the Public Utilities Act or any order, decision, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission is a crime.
Because certain provisions of this bill would be a part of the act and a violation of a commission action implementing the bills requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
(4)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Existing law vests the Public Utilities Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical corporations and gas corporations.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would authorize cities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) service area, including, but not limited to, the City and County of San Francisco, to withdraw and separate from PG&E and either (1) create their own public utility, owned by and accountable to the public and not private shareholders or (2) join an existing municipal utility.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Local publicly owned utilities are safe and reliable, and charge lower rates than investor-owned utilities. They are accountable to their customers through local legislative bodies, transparent due to public records laws, and focused on the needs of their local communities.(b)(a)Section 9 of Article XI of the California Constitution authorizes a city to provide its own electrical service or to contract with another utility to provide it.
(b)California statutes require public utilities to deliver safe and reliable service to their customers at a reasonable cost.
(c)California statutes authorize other public agencies to establish local publicly owned utilities for the provision of to provide electrical service.
(d)Investor-owned utilities deny local governments the right to provide electrical service by refusing to negotiate the price of facilities, excessively litigating condemnation and other proceedings, and requiring unnecessary expenditures for public entities and investor-owned utility customers.(d)Eminent domain is the constitutional right of the people or their government to take private property for public use.
(e)Until 1993, Section 1240.650 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided a conclusive presumption that the same use by public entities of the property to be taken is a more necessary use than the use for which the property was already being used by the private entity.
(f)Investor-owned utilities, like Pacific Gas and Electric Company, were granted special statutory protections in 1992 making it unusually difficult and costly for local governments to exercise their constitutional and statutory authority to acquire utility infrastructure or establish municipal energy services.
(g)In 1992, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992) to change the requirements for eminent domain of utility property that has been put to a public use. Senate Bill 1757 removed the conclusive presumption of public necessity and more necessary use and replaced it with a rebuttable presumption for electric, gas, or water public utility property.
(h)The Legislature passed, and Governor Wilson signed into law, this change with the express purpose of enabling investor-owned utilities to further challenge eminent domain proceedings initiated by local governments.
(i)In a 1992 letter, the Governors Office of Planning and Research recommended that Governor Wilson make clear this rationale, arguing, The reality of this bill is that it would strengthen private utilities hand in negotiating and probably dissuade some public acquisitions. This office believes that would be a good thing. The private sector can provide utility services more efficiently [than] the public sector.
(j)California made this change at a time when it was also broadly deregulating the energy market through bills like Assembly Bill 1890 (Chapter 854 of the Statutes of 1996).
(k)The Legislature enacted these changes with the promise that this legislation would lead to lower electricity rates.
(l)Instead of lowering electricity rates, the Legislatures deregulatory efforts led to the Enron crisis.
(m)Competition in the energy industry was one of the goals of Assembly Bill 1890 (Chapter 854 of the Statutes of 1996), which would provide better and cheaper service, and local publicly owned utilities provide one of the few sources of competition with investor-owned utilities in the energy industry.
(n)Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992) helped investor-owned utilities hamstring their main competitor, and, in the years since the passage of Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992), investor-owned utilities have not proven to more efficiently provide utility services than local publicly owned utilities.
(o)Local publicly owned utilities already provide more accountable, reliable, clean, and affordable alternatives to investor-owned utilities throughout California.
(p)Unlike investor-owned utilities, which are accountable to private shareholders and highly paid executives, local publicly owned utilities are uniquely accountable to the ratepayers whom they serve. Local publicly owned utilities understand, and are focused on, the needs of their local communities because they are locally based. Decisions about rates, investments, and priorities are made by and for the communities served, through elected or publicly accountable boards comprising people from that community, not far away shareholders. These decisions are transparent as local publicly owned utilities are subject to public records laws.
(q)Local publicly owned electric utilities historically, and repeatedly, deliver superior reliability. The primary measures of utility reliability are System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) and System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). According to the American Public Power Association (APPA), local publicly owned electric utilities across the United States show superior reliability compared to investor-owned utilities. According to APPA, on average, local publicly owned electric utilities resolve outages 61 percent faster than other utilities.
(r)Local publicly owned electric utilities are not-for-profit entities that work everyday to drive down costs and reinvest in their communities. Investor-owned utilities are for-profit entities that aim to maximize profits for private shareholders. Local publicly owned electric utilities can only charge utility customers the actual cost of providing service, and rates paid by customers are reinvested into their communities for programs that enhance efficiency, reliability, and infrastructure, and balance customer costs with meeting climate goals. According to APPA, local publicly owned electric utilities direct contributions into the communities they serve are on average 9 percent higher than the amount investor-owned utilities pay in taxes to state and local governments.
(s)Local publicly owned electric utilities are consistently the most affordable energy option for Californians when compared to investor-owned utilities, saving residents and businesses millions of dollars every year. Data on rate comparison information consistently shows local publicly owned electric utilities are, on average, at least 17 percent lower in cost than other alternatives, and often the savings are even higher.
(t)According to the APPA 2025 Public Power Statistical Report, residential customers of local publicly owned electric utilities in 34 states including California have the lowest electricity rates of any utility type. According to APPAs report, local publicly owned electric utility customers in California save an average of between 20 to 30 percent on their electricity bills compared to customers served by other utilities.
(u)In local jurisdictions that have adopted aggressive climate goals, local publicly owned electric utilities would improve the ability of municipalities to meet the Senate Bill 100 (Chapter 312 of the Statutes of 2018) clean energy target of 100 percent carbon-free electricity by 2045. For example, whereas Pacific Gas and Electric is a natural gas corporation with a vested interest in the gas distribution system, the City and County of San Franciscos Climate Action Plan aims for 100 percent renewable energy supply and net-zero emissions citywide by 2040. Acquisition of parts of Pacific Gas and Electrics energy system would enable municipalities such as San Francisco to exercise greater control over the modernization of their energy systems and to achieve a clean energy future through the electrification of transportation systems, building decarbonization, and the reduction of natural gas use.
(v)Acquisition of parts of Pacific Gas and Electrics energy system by a public entity would address many of the shortcomings of Pacific Gas and Electrics utility service, including, for example, having a smaller well-defined service area where Pacific Gas and Electric can focus its resources.
(w)Acquisition of parts of Pacific Gas and Electrics energy system by a public entity would also enable a more efficient, cost-effective, and timely energization of new public projects.
(x)For example, Pacific Gas and Electric has historically delayed the energization of new projects in the City and County of San Francisco by requiring unnecessary infrastructure investments to be paid for by the City and County of San Franciscos ratepayers. Since 2018, in publicly available reports to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, the City and County of San Francisco has reported on 187 projects, including over 2,000 units of affordable housing, that have experienced delays or obstruction to energization by Pacific Gas and Electric. These delays have resulted in $74,000,000 in additional project costs and lost revenue to the City and County of San Francisco.
(y)Since the late 1980s, Californians have paid electricity rates at least 10 percent higher than the country as a whole. But, electricity rates surged dramatically following the passage of Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992), from about one-third higher than the national average in 2015 to over 80 percent higher in 2024.
(z)According to a KQED analysis of Pacific Gas and Electric rates, the average utility bill for Pacific Gas and Electric customers increased by about 67 percent between 2020 and 2025, driven in large part by a steep hike in electricity rates.
(aa)These associated increases in rates have not been accompanied by an increase in efficiency or improvements in service, as promised by the supporters of Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992).
(ab)Pacific Gas and Electrics inability to provide safe service is well documented.
(ac)Pacific Gas and Electric customers have endured catastrophic wildfires and mass blackouts caused by utility mismanagement, all while paying the second highest electricity rates in the country.
(ad)In 2019, the Public Advocates Office of the Public Utilities Commission enumerated that the cumulative impact of Pacific Gas and Electrics safety failures has caused over 100 fatalities and has cost tens of billions in direct financial damages to Californians.
(ae)Pacific Gas and Electric itself has acknowledged that it has had serious safety issues and that it needs to do better to meet its responsibility to provide safe and reliable service.
(af)As a result of Pacific Gas and Electrics dismal safety record, local jurisdictions have attempted to exercise their existing rights to provide electrical service to their constituents.
(ag)Proponents of Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992), at the time of its passage, argued that the bill would allow reasonable challenges to condemnation that may be in the best interest of the ratepayer and would not affect public entities eminent domain power over utilities that are not serving the public efficiently.
(ah)California has approximately 45 local publicly owned electric utilities. Of these local publicly owned electric utilities, only eight were formed after 1992.
(ai)Of these local publicly owned electric utilities, only two were formed within the Pacific Gas and Electric service territory and remain in service today.
(aj)Recognizing the harmful impacts of Senate Bill 1757, the Legislature, through Assembly Bill 47 of the 200102 First Extraordinary Session, tried to reverse these changes just nine years later. Although the bill passed by a supermajority vote out of its first committee, the bill did not move forward due to efforts by investor-owned utilities to stymie the bill.
(ak)Pacific Gas and Electric has hindered and continues to hinder the municipalization efforts of entities such as the City and County of San Francisco and South San Joaquin Irrigation District (SSJID). Pacific Gas and Electric has routinely obstructed proceedings through delay tactics and unresponsiveness and efforts to make proceedings as drawn out and costly as possible.
(al)For example, in September 2019, after conducting a financial feasibility analysis, the City and County of San Francisco made a $2,500,000,000 offer to Pacific Gas and Electric to own and operate the electricity grid in the City and County of San Francisco.
(am)The City and County of San Francisco reiterated the same offer in August 2020.
(an)Pacific Gas and Electric rejected the City and County of San Franciscos offer both times, claiming that the offer was substantially below what Pacific Gas and Electric believed to be the fair market value of its electrical grid assets in the City and County of San Francisco.
(ao)Despite this, Pacific Gas and Electric repeatedly failed to provide any analysis or other evidence to support its claim that the City and County of San Franciscos offer was too low, nor is Pacific Gas and Electric willing to offer or negotiate a higher value.
(ap)On July 27, 2021, the City and County of San Francisco submitted a valuation petition to the Public Utilities Commission that initiated a Public Utilities Commission proceeding to establish the value for Pacific Gas and Electrics electrical assets that serve the City and County of San Francisco.
(aq)Since the start of the valuation proceeding in July 2021, Pacific Gas and Electric has filed over 10 motions that have effectively delayed the utilitys obligation to submit testimony. These include three separate motions to dismiss the proceeding, four motions to compel discovery, and three procedural motions. Collectively, Pacific Gas and Electrics motions have extended the proceeding timeline and have caused the City and County of San Francisco to spend additional time relitigating the same arguments.
(ar)In addition to filing motions, which have delayed the valuation proceeding, Pacific Gas and Electric has frequently produced nonresponsive or partially responsive data in replying to discovery requests. Pacific Gas and Electrics reluctance and refusal to provide information necessary to advance the proceeding has led to intervention by the Public Utilities Commission and has further delayed progress in the proceeding.
(as)On October 30, 2025, the Public Utilities Commission adopted an interim decision that sets out the fundamental principles for the proceeding and provides guidance regarding applicable valuation methodologies.
(at)On February 18, 2026, the Public Utilities Commission issued a ruling setting a partial schedule for serving testimony in the valuation proceeding. The schedule provides an overview of the next 390 days of testimony.
(au)The remainder of the Public Utilities Commission proceeding for the City and County of San Francisco, including, but not limited to, evidentiary hearings, filings of briefs, writing of the proposed decision, and final Public Utilities Commission approval, is to be announced.
(av)Over four and one-half years after the City and County of San Francisco filed the petition initiating the proceeding, Pacific Gas and Electric has continued to drag its feet and delay providing testimony on the value of its assets in the City and County of San Francisco, despite Section 1701.5 of the Public Utilities Code requiring resolution of the proceeding within 18 months.
(aw)(1)Pacific Gas and Electrics efforts to delay the City and County of San Francisco and the South San Joaquin Irrigation District have included the misapplication of Section 851 of the Public Utilities Code to argue that the Public Utilities Commission is required to conduct a lengthy review under Section 854 of the Public Utilities Code that is not required for acquisitions by public entities.
(2)Assembly Bill 1054 (Chapter 79 of the Statutes of 2019), amended Section 854.2 of the Public Utilities Code to explicitly require the Public Utilities Commission to review impacts of an acquisition on utility workers, including an acquisition by a public entity. Before that, the commission did not review public entity acquisitions under Section 851 of the Public Utilities Code because public entities already have the constitutional or statutory right to acquire private utility property to provide their own service, and those entities are already committed to the public interest.
(3)The legislative intent to adopt this narrow review for public entity acquisitions was further clarified in a letter to the file from the joint authors of Assembly Bill 1054. This intent was further clarified in Senate Bill 550 (Chapter 409 of the Statutes of 2019) a few months later.
(4)Further clarification is needed to prevent Pacific Gas and Electric from unnecessarily delaying current and future proceedings and provide a process to reduce excessive delay in just compensation proceedings.
(5)The Public Utilities Commissions ability to protect existing utility ratepayers would not be changed by this acts proposed amendment to Section 851 of the Public Utilities Code. The commission has the authority to impose charges on departing ratepayers to ensure they pay their fair share of utility costs, including wildfire and bankruptcy costs paid by ratepayers. The appropriate nonbypassable charges would apply to the City and County of San Franciscos acquisition.
(ax)The people of California deserve lower electricity rates and the provision of clean and reliable energy service by utility providers that are accountable to the public interest.
(ay)Consistent with their constitutional and statutory authority, the people of California and the public entities that represent them are entitled to a clear, fair, and timely process to pursue municipalization and sovereignty over their energy system. This includes, but is not limited to, proceedings involving the determination of the fair value of grid infrastructure, the more necessary public use of that infrastructure by public entities, the transfer or exchange of utility assets, just compensation, and the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain.
SEC. 2.Section 1240.650 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1240.650.(a)If property has been appropriated to public use by any person other than a public entity, the use of the property by a public entity for the same use or any other public use is a more necessary use than the use to which the property has already been appropriated.
(b)If property has been appropriated to public use by a public entity, the use of the property by the public entity is a more necessary use than any use to which the property might be put by any person other than a public entity.
(c)Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d), if If property that has been appropriated to a public use is electrical, gas, or water public utility property that the public entity intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use established by subdivision (a) is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, unless the either of the following conditions exist:
(1)The acquiring public entity is a sanitary district exercising the powers of a county water district pursuant to Section 6512.7 of the Health and Safety Code.
(d)If(2)The property that has been appropriated to a public use is electrical, gas, or water electrical or gas public utility property that a public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use established by subdivision (a) is conclusive and not rebuttable. area.
SEC. 3.Section 1245.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1245.250.(a)Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to this article conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030.
(b)(1)Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), if the taking is by a local public entity, other than a sanitary district exercising the powers of a county water district pursuant to Section 6512.7 of the Health and Safety Code, and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
(2)If Notwithstanding any other law, if the taking is by a local public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area and the property is electrical, gas, or water electrical or gas public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true, except that the presumption is conclusive and not rebuttable in the circumstance described in subdivision (d) of Section 1240.650. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof. 1240.030.
(c)If the taking is by a local public entity and the property described in the resolution is not located entirely within the boundaries of the local public entity, the resolution of necessity creates a presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.
(d)For the purposes of subdivision (b), a taking by the State Reclamation Board Central Valley Flood Protection Board for the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District is not a taking by a local public entity.
SEC. 4.Section 1268.610 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1268.610.(a)Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), the court shall award the defendant litigation expenses whenever:(1)The proceeding is wholly or partly dismissed for any reason.(2)Final judgment in the proceeding is that the plaintiff cannot acquire property it sought to acquire in the proceeding.(b)Where there is a partial dismissal or a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire a portion of the property originally sought to be acquired, or a dismissal of one or more plaintiffs pursuant to Section 1260.020, the court shall award the defendant only those litigation expenses, or portion thereof, that would not have been incurred had the property sought to be acquired following the dismissal or judgment been the property originally sought to be acquired.(c)If the plaintiff files a notice of abandonment as to a particular defendant, or a request for dismissal of a particular defendant, and the court determines that the defendant did not own or have any interest in the property that the plaintiff sought to acquire in the proceeding, the court shall award that defendant only those litigation expenses incurred up to the time of filing the notice of abandonment or request for dismissal.(d) Litigation expenses under this section shall be claimed in and by a cost bill to be prepared, served, filed, and taxed as in a civil action. If the proceeding is dismissed upon motion of the plaintiff, the cost bill shall be filed within 30 days after notice of entry of judgment.(e)This section does not apply if subdivision (d) of Section 1240.650 applies to the proceeding.SEC. 5.SEC. 4.Section 851 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:851.(a)Except as provided in subdivision (c), a public utility, other than a common carrier by railroad subject to Part A of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. Sec. 10101 et seq.), shall not sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, or encumber the whole or any part of, its railroad, street railroad, line, plant, system, or other property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, or any franchise or permit or any right thereunder, or by any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, merge or consolidate its railroad, street railroad, line, plant, system, or other property, or franchises or permits or any part thereof, without first having either secured an order from the commission authorizing it to do so for qualified transactions valued above five million dollars ($5,000,000), or for qualified transactions valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, filed an advice letter and obtained approval from the commission authorizing it to do so. If the advice letter is uncontested, approval may be given by the executive director or the director of the division of the commission having regulatory jurisdiction over the utility. The commission shall determine the types of transactions valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, that qualify for advice letter handling. For a qualified transaction valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, the commission may designate a procedure different than the advice letter procedure if it determines that the transaction warrants a more comprehensive review. Absent protest or incomplete documentation, the commission shall approve or deny the advice letter within 120 days of its filing by the applicant public utility. The commission shall reject any advice letter that seeks to circumvent the five-million-dollar ($5,000,000) threshold by dividing a single asset with a value of more than five million dollars ($5,000,000) into component parts, each valued at less than five million dollars ($5,000,000). Every sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, disposition, encumbrance, merger, or consolidation made other than in accordance with the advice letter and approval from the commission authorizing it is void. The permission and approval of the commission to the exercise of a franchise or permit under Article 1 (commencing with Section 1001) of Chapter 5, or the sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, or other disposition or encumbrance of a franchise or permit under this article, shall not revive or validate any lapsed or invalid franchise or permit, or enlarge or add to the powers or privileges contained in the grant of any franchise or permit, or waive any forfeiture.
(b)(1)Subdivision (a) shall apply to any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2.
(2)(A)Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), for For any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2, as part of its review under subdivision (a), the commission shall determine the commissions review pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be limited to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees, including both union and nonunion employees.
(B)For any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2 in which the public entity is within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area, the commissions review pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be limited to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees, including both union and nonunion employees.(3)For a voluntary change in ownership between an electrical corporation or gas corporation and a public entity, the commissions review pursuant to subdivision (a) shall occur after an agreement for the change in ownership has been made between the public entity and the electrical corporation or gas corporation.
(4)For an involuntary change in ownership between an electrical corporation or gas corporation and a public entity, the commissions review pursuant to subdivision (a) shall occur after the completion of the condemnation proceedings.
(c)(1)Subdivision (a) shall not apply to an easement, or a change to an easement, that has a ratepayer financial impact valued at one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or less if a public utility that is a party to the qualified transaction has gross annual California revenues of five hundred million dollars ($500,000,000) or more.
(2)On January 1, 2030, and every five years thereafter, the threshold values specified in paragraph (1) shall be adjusted to reflect any increase in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(3)Each public utility shall annually file a Tier 1 advice letter with the commission by April 1, with a report of all transactions performed pursuant to paragraph (1), enumerated by date, value, location, and party.
(d)This section does not prevent the sale, lease, encumbrance, or other disposition by any public utility of property that is not necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, and any disposition of property by a public utility shall be conclusively presumed to be of property that is not useful or necessary in the performance of its duties to the public, as to any purchaser, lessee, or encumbrancer dealing with that property in good faith for value, provided that this section does not apply to the interchange of equipment in the regular course of transportation between connecting common carriers.
SEC. 6.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact additional statutory changes beyond the statutory changes made in this bill to expedite the timeline for Public Utilities Commission approval of valuation, including, but not limited to, enforcing specified timelines for commission review of valuation, processes and removing unnecessary barriers to public entities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area implementing their constitutional or statutory authority to withdraw and separate from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company.SEC. 5.Section 1410.5 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:1410.5.(a)If a political subdivision, after filing the petition and before the commission makes and files its findings as to just compensation, submits an amount for the just compensation for the lands, property, and rights of any character that the political subdivision identified in the petition, the owner of the public utility shall, within 90 days of the political subdivisions submission, also submit an amount for the just compensation for the lands, property, and rights of any character that the public utility owns.
(b)If the political subdivision, at any time after filing the petition and before the commission makes and files its findings as to just compensation, submits a plan for how the public utilitys assets would be separated for the purpose of determining a just compensation award, the owner of the public utility shall, within 90 days of the political subdivisions submission, provide a response to that plan. The response may consist of either, or both, of the following:
(1)Agreement with the political subdivisions plan, in whole or in part.
(2)Identification of specific issues of disagreement and an alternative approach to address those specific issues.
SEC. 6.Section 1411 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:1411.(a)When the proceeding has been submitted, the commission shall make and file its written finding fixing, in a single sum, the just compensation to be paid by the political subdivision for the lands, property, and rights. If the commission finds that severance damages should be paid, the just compensation for such the damages shall be found and stated separately. The just compensation shall be fixed by the commission as of the day on which the petition was filed with the commission.
(b)Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if the commission finds that the total just compensation should include costs to be incurred from the physical separation of the public utilitys assets, including the cost of constructing new facilities or relocating or modifying existing facilities, the commission may set forth a process for the reimbursement of those costs and to determine whether those costs are reasonable.
(c)The commission shall make and file its findings required by subdivision (a) within 18 months of the date the petition is filed.
SEC. 7.Section 1425 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:1425.A public utility shall not recover from ratepayers any litigation costs associated with a political subdivisions efforts to acquire public utility property, including actions pursuant to this chapter or Article 6 (commencing with Section 851) of Chapter 4 or eminent domain actions.
SEC. 7.SEC. 8.The Legislature finds and declares that a special statute is necessary and that a general statute cannot be made applicable within the meaning of Section 16 of Article IV of the California Constitution because of the unique circumstances pertaining to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
SEC. 8.SEC. 9.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Local publicly owned utilities are safe and reliable, and charge lower rates than investor-owned utilities. They are accountable to their customers through local legislative bodies, transparent due to public records laws, and focused on the needs of their local communities.
(b)Section 9 of Article XI of the California Constitution authorizes a city to provide its own electrical service or to contract with another utility to provide it.
(c)California statutes authorize other public agencies to establish local publicly owned utilities for the provision of electrical service.
(d)Investor-owned utilities deny local governments the right to provide electrical service by refusing to negotiate the price of facilities, excessively litigating condemnation and other proceedings, and requiring unnecessary expenditures for public entities and investor-owned utility customers.
SEC. 2.Section 1240.650 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1240.650.(a)Where If property has been appropriated to public use by any person other than a public entity, the use thereof of the property by a public entity for the same use or any other public use is a more necessary use than the use to which such the property has already been appropriated.
(b)Where If property has been appropriated to public use by a public entity, the use thereof of the property by the public entity is a more necessary use than any use to which such the property might be put by any person other than a public entity.
(c)Where Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d), if property which that has been appropriated to a public use is electric, electrical, gas, or water public utility property which that the public entity intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use established by subdivision (a) is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, unless the acquiring public entity is a sanitary district exercising the powers of a county water district pursuant to Section 6512.7 of the Health and Safety Code.
(d)If property that has been appropriated to a public use is electrical, gas, or water public utility property that a public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area intends to put to the same use, the presumption of a more necessary use established by subdivision (a) is conclusive and not rebuttable.
SEC. 3.Section 1245.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1245.250.(a)Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to this article conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030.
(b)If (1)Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), if the taking is by a local public entity, other than a sanitary district exercising the powers of a county water district pursuant to Section 6512.7 of the Health and Safety Code, and the property is electric, electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
(2)If the taking is by a local public entity within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true, except that the presumption is conclusive and not rebuttable in the circumstance described in subdivision (d) of Section 1240.650. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
(c)If the taking is by a local public entity and the property described in the resolution is not located entirely within the boundaries of the local public entity, the resolution of necessity creates a presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.
(d)For the purposes of subdivision (b), a taking by the State Reclamation Board for the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District is not a taking by a local public entity.
SEC. 4.Section 1268.610 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1268.610.(a)Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), the court shall award the defendant his or her litigation expenses whenever:
(1)The proceeding is wholly or partly dismissed for any reason.
(2)Final judgment in the proceeding is that the plaintiff cannot acquire property it sought to acquire in the proceeding.
(b)Where there is a partial dismissal or a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire a portion of the property originally sought to be acquired, or a dismissal of one or more plaintiffs pursuant to Section 1260.020, the court shall award the defendant only those litigation expenses, or portion thereof, that would not have been incurred had the property sought to be acquired following the dismissal or judgment been the property originally sought to be acquired.
(c)If the plaintiff files a notice of abandonment as to a particular defendant, or a request for dismissal of a particular defendant, and the court determines that the defendant did not own or have any interest in the property that the plaintiff sought to acquire in the proceeding, the court shall award that defendant only those litigation expenses incurred up to the time of filing the notice of abandonment or request for dismissal.
(d) Litigation expenses under this section shall be claimed in and by a cost bill to be prepared, served, filed, and taxed as in a civil action. If the proceeding is dismissed upon motion of the plaintiff, the cost bill shall be filed within 30 days after notice of entry of judgment.
(e)This section does not apply if subdivision (d) of Section 1240.650 applies to the proceeding.
SEC. 5.Section 851 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:851.(a)Except as provided in subdivision (c), a public utility, other than a common carrier by railroad subject to Part A of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. Sec. 10101 et seq.), shall not sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, or encumber the whole or any part of, its railroad, street railroad, line, plant, system, or other property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, or any franchise or permit or any right thereunder, or by any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, merge or consolidate its railroad, street railroad, line, plant, system, or other property, or franchises or permits or any part thereof, without first having either secured an order from the commission authorizing it to do so for qualified transactions valued above five million dollars ($5,000,000), or for qualified transactions valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, filed an advice letter and obtained approval from the commission authorizing it to do so. If the advice letter is uncontested, approval may be given by the executive director or the director of the division of the commission having regulatory jurisdiction over the utility. The commission shall determine the types of transactions valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, that qualify for advice letter handling. For a qualified transaction valued at five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less, the commission may designate a procedure different than the advice letter procedure if it determines that the transaction warrants a more comprehensive review. Absent protest or incomplete documentation, the commission shall approve or deny the advice letter within 120 days of its filing by the applicant public utility. The commission shall reject any advice letter that seeks to circumvent the five-million-dollar ($5,000,000) threshold by dividing a single asset with a value of more than five million dollars ($5,000,000) into component parts, each valued at less than five million dollars ($5,000,000). Every sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, disposition, encumbrance, merger, or consolidation made other than in accordance with the advice letter and approval from the commission authorizing it is void. The permission and approval of the commission to the exercise of a franchise or permit under Article 1 (commencing with Section 1001) of Chapter 5, or the sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, or other disposition or encumbrance of a franchise or permit under this article, shall not revive or validate any lapsed or invalid franchise or permit, or enlarge or add to the powers or privileges contained in the grant of any franchise or permit, or waive any forfeiture.
(b)(1)Subdivision (a) shall apply to any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2.
(2)For (A)Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), for any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2, as part of its review under subdivision (a), the commission shall determine whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees, including both union and nonunion employees.
(B)For any transaction described in subparagraph (F) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2 in which the public entity is within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area, the commissions review pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be limited to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees, including both union and nonunion employees.
(c)(1)Subdivision (a) shall not apply to an easement, or a change to an easement, that has a ratepayer financial impact valued at one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or less if a public utility that is a party to the qualified transaction has gross annual California revenues of five hundred million dollars ($500,000,000) or more.
(2)On January 1, 2030, and every five years thereafter, the threshold values specified in paragraph (1) shall be adjusted to reflect any increase in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) published by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(3)Each public utility shall annually file a Tier 1 advice letter with the commission by April 1, with a report of all transactions performed pursuant to paragraph (1), enumerated by date, value, location, and party.
(d)This section does not prevent the sale, lease, encumbrance, or other disposition by any public utility of property that is not necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, and any disposition of property by a public utility shall be conclusively presumed to be of property that is not useful or necessary in the performance of its duties to the public, as to any purchaser, lessee, or encumbrancer dealing with that property in good faith for value, provided that this section does not apply to the interchange of equipment in the regular course of transportation between connecting common carriers.
SEC. 6.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact additional statutory changes beyond the statutory changes made in this bill to expedite the timeline for Public Utilities Commission approval of valuation, including, but not limited to, enforcing specified timelines for commission review of valuation, processes and removing unnecessary barriers to public entities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company service area implementing their constitutional or statutory authority to withdraw and separate from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
SEC. 7.The Legislature finds and declares that a special statute is necessary and that a general statute cannot be made applicable within the meaning of Section 16 of Article IV of the California Constitution because of the unique circumstances pertaining to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
SEC. 8.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
SECTION 1.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would authorize cities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) service area, including, but not limited to, the City and County of San Francisco, to withdraw and separate from PG&E and either (a) create their own public utility, owned by and accountable to the public and not private shareholders or (b) join an existing municipal utility.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would authorize cities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) service area, including, but not limited to, the City and County of San Francisco, to withdraw and separate from PG&E and either (a) create their own public utility, owned by and accountable to the public and not private shareholders or (b) join an existing municipal utility.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Apr 21, 2026 | April 21 set for first hearing. Failed passage in committee. (Ayes 4. Noes 1. Page 3973.) |
| Apr 21, 2026 | April 21 set for first hearing. Failed passage in committee. (Ayes 4. Noes 1.) |
| Apr 16, 2026 | Set for hearing April 21. |
| Apr 15, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on E., U & C. (Ayes 7. Noes 1. Page 3867.) (April 14). Re-referred to Com. on E., U & C. |
| Apr 15, 2026 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on E., U & C. (Ayes 7. Noes 1.) (April 14). Re-referred to Com. on E., U & C. |
| Apr 6, 2026 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Mar 18, 2026 | Set for hearing April 14. |
| Mar 4, 2026 | Re-referred to Coms. on JUD. and E., U & C. |
| Feb 24, 2026 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 11, 2026 | Referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Jan 7, 2026 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after February 6. |
| Jan 6, 2026 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 21, 2026 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications |
Failed |
|
| Apr 14, 2026 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Energy, Utilities and Communications] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Advance SF | ** Against | |
| Bay Area Council | ** Against | |
| California Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California State Association Of Electrical Workers | ** Against | |
| California Water Association | ** Against | |
| City and County of San Francisco | ** Support | |
| Coalition of California Utility Employees | ** Against | |
| Consumer Watchdog | ** Support | |
| Engineers and Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20, AFL-CIO | ** Against | |
| Environmental Working Group | ** Support | |
| International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 6 | ** Against | |
| Kern County Taxpayers Association | ** Against | |
| Liberty Utilities | ** Against | |
| Liberty Utilities (Apple Valley Ranchos Water) Corp. | ** Against | |
| Pacific Gas And Electric Company | ** Against | |
| San Diego Gas and Electric Company | ** Against | |
| San Francisco Chamber of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Southern California Edison | ** Against | |
| Southern California Gas Company | ** Against | |
| StopWaste | ** Support |
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
Senator Benjamin Allen, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: Hearing Date: 4/21/2026
Author: | |||
Version: | Amended | ||
Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
SUBJECT:
DIGEST: This bill limits the ability of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to review the voluntary or involuntary change of ownership assets of an electrical or gas corporation to a public entity, including ensuring that such transactions are in the public interest, and instead requires the CPUC to only consider the impacts to public utility employees. This bill also requires specified timeframes by when a public utility must respond to the local government that files a petition with the CPUC as to just compensation for the property of the public utility. This bill also prohibits recovery from public utility ratepayers of any litigation costs associated with a local government’s efforts to acquire the public utility’s property.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Prohibits private property from being taken without just compensation. (Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution)
- Prohibit the taking of (or damage to) private property for a public use unless just compensation is paid to the owner. Authorizes the Legislature to provide for possession by the condemnor following commencement of eminent domain proceedings upon deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of money determined by the court to be the probable amount of just compensation. (Article 1, §19 of the California Constitution)
- Establishes and vests the CPUC with regulatory authority over public utilities, including electrical, gas, telephone, and water corporations. Provides that the Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of the California Constitution but consistent with Article 12, to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the CPUC to establish the manner and scope of review of CPUC action in a court of record, and to enable it to fix just compensation for utility property taken by eminent domain. (Article 12, §5 of the California Constitution)
- Authorizes, pursuant to the Eminent Domain Law, a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a public use if the use for which the property is sought to be taken is a more necessary public use than the use to which the property is appropriated, as specified. (Code of Civil Procedure §1230.010 et seq.)
- Provides that in an eminent domain action, where property (other than privately owned public utility property) is being used for a public use, the decision of a public entity to take that property for the same or any other public use is conclusively presumed to be a more necessary use than the property’s current use. (Code of Civil Procedures §1240.650 (b))
- Specifies, in cases where the private property which has been appropriated to public use is electric, gas or water public utility property, that the presumption of a more necessary use by a is a rebuttable presumption, rather than a conclusive presumption, affecting the burden of proof if the public entity intends to put the property to the same use, with some exceptions. (Code of Civil Procedures §1240.650 (c))
- Authorizes a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity, as specified, which contains a declaration that the public entity has found and determined, among other things: a) the public interest and necessity of the project; b) that the proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and, c) that the property described in the resolution is necessary for the proposed project. A resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of a public entity conclusively establishes that, among other matters, the public interest and necessity require the project. Specifies that, if a taking is by a local public entity and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that those matters are true. (Code of Civil Procedures §§1245.220, 1245.230, 1245.250)
- Requires a court to award a defendant their litigation expenses if the eminent domain proceeding is dismissed or if there is a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire the property by eminent domain, as provided. (Code of Civil Procedures §1245.060)
- Prohibits public utilities, other than certain common carriers, from selling, leasing, assigning, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of, or encumbering, its assets that are necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, unless the public utility has secured an order or approval from the CPUC to do so, as provided. (Public Utilities Code §851(a))
- Requires, for any voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical corporation or gas corporation to ownership by a public entity, the CPUC to determine, as part of its review under these provisions, whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees. (Public Utilities Code §851(b))
- Prohibits a person or corporation, whether or not organized under the laws of this state, from directly or indirectly merging, acquiring, or controlling, including pursuant to a change in control as described in subparagraphs (D) or (E) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 854.2, any public utility organized and doing business in this state without first securing authorization to do so from the CPUC. (Public Utilities Code §854)
- Requires a successor employer to retain all covered employees for at least the transition period following a change of control, unless the CPUC approves a reduction in the workforce. During the transition period, the successor employer shall not reduce the total compensation of a covered employee. (Public Utilities Code §854.2)
- Provides procedures for the acquisition under eminent domain proceedings, or otherwise, of lands, property, and rights of a public utility by a political subdivision, and requires the CPUC to fix the just compensation to be paid by the political subdivision for the lands, property, and rights, as provided. (Public Utilities Code §1401 et seq.)
- Requires the CPUC to resolve, in a ratesetting or quasi-legislative case, the issues raised in the scoping memo within 18 months of the date of the proceeding is initiated, unless the CPUC makes a written determination that the deadline cannot be met, including findings as to the reason, and issues an order extending the deadline. Authorizes the CPUC to specify in a scoping memo a resolution date later than 18 months from the date the proceeding is initiated, if the assigned commissioner approves of the date and reasons are provided for the necessity of the later date. (Public Utilities Code §1701.5 et seq.)
This bill:
- Makes extensive legislative findings and declarations as to the necessity of a special statute for public entities within the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) service area.
- Exempts from rebuttable presumption property that has been appropriated to a public use that is electrical or gas public utility property within the PG&E service area.
- Provides that, if a taking is by a local public entity within the PG&E service area and the property is electrical or gas public utility property, the resolution of necessity instead conclusively establishes those matters.
- Requires the CPUC, in its review of a voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical or gas corporation to a public entity, to limit its review to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees. Requires the review to occur after a change in ownership agreement is made for a voluntary change in ownership, or after the completion of the condemnation proceeding for an involuntary change in ownership.
- Requires the owner of a public utility, within 90 days of a political subdivision submitting an amount for just compensation or a plan for the separation of the public utility’s assets, to also submit an amount for just compensation or provide a response to the separation plan, as provided.
- Authorizes the CPUC, if it finds that the total just compensation should include costs for the physical separation of the public utility’s assets, to establish a process for the reimbursement of those costs and to determine the reasonableness of those expenses. Requires the CPUC to make and file its findings regarding just compensation with respect to the public utility within 18 months of the date the petition is filed.
- Prohibits a public utility from recovering from ratepayers any litigation costs associated with a political subdivision’s efforts to acquire utility property, as provided.
Background
CPUC authorization to sell, lease, assign or otherwise dispose of public utility property. Pursuant to Public Utilities Code §851, public utilities, including electrical and gas corporations, are required to obtain CPUC authorization prior to selling, leasing, assigning, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of the whole or any part of its line, plant, system, or other property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public. Public Utilities Code §851 does not provide specific criteria for the CPUC to use in authorizing or not authorizing a transaction. Rather, longstanding CPUC precedent has held that Section 851 requires it to review the proposed transaction in order to assure that it is in the public interest, or not adverse to the public interest. The CPUC can use either standard in its review.
According to the CPUC, the considerations for these transactions can be highly dependent on the facts of the transaction, and can include:
- whether “utility property is used for other productive purposes without interfering with the utility’s operation or affecting service to utility customers;”[1]
- the fitness of the proposed transferee;[2]
- the impact of the transfer on customers; or,
- if there is no economic harm to be mitigated.[3]
If the CPUC finds the circumstances require a more in-depth review, the CPUC has also used the criteria in Section 854 of the Public Utilities Code, which relates to mergers and acquisitions, to evaluate transactions under Section 851.[4] Section 854 includes specific criteria for transactions involving $500 million or more of gross annual California revenue to find that on balance the transaction is in the public interest. These include: maintain or improve the financial condition of the resulting public utility, maintain or improve the quality of service, maintain or improve the quality of management of the resulting public utility, be fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees (including both union and nonunion employees), be fair and reasonable to the majority of shareholders be beneficial on an overall basis to state and local economies and communities in the area, preserve the jurisdiction of the CPUC and the capacity of the CPUC to effectively regulate and audit public utility operations, and provide mitigation measures to prevent significant adverse consequences. Additional requirements for transactions involving $400 million or more in gross annual California revenues, the CPUC must consider safety management system, comprehensive safety plan, metrics to measure safety, and others. Importantly, while the CPUC has considered these criteria for the typical voluntary transaction under Public Utilities Code §851, the CPUC has not historically applied it to Section 851 decisions involving utility property subject to a condemnation action. For transactions disposing or transferring property of $5 million dollars or less, the CPUC may use an expedited review and the considerations and criteria in the CPUC’s General Order (GO)173 applies.
Changes to CPUC review from recent legislation. More recently, SB 901 (Dodd, Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018) and then SB 550 (Hill, Chapter 409, Statutes of 2020) modified the review the CPUC should apply to condemnation actions. In particular, SB 550 added Section 851(b)(1), which requires that Section 851(a) – requiring CPUC authorization for a public utility to sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part of its line, plant, system, or other property – apply to any voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical or gas corporation to ownership by a public entity. Public Utilities Code §851(b)(1) further requires that the CPUC determine, as part of its review, whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees.
According to the CPUC, they have yet to apply the new statutory language to an involuntary transfer to a public entity. The CPUC is currently considering the City of San Francisco’s petition (Petition of the City and County of San Francisco for a Valuation of Certain Pacific Gas & Electric Company Property Pursuant to Public Utilities Code Sections 1401-1421. P.21-07-012, Filed July 27, 2021) to the CPUC for the valuation of Pacific Gas and Electric’s assets pursuant to Pub. Util. Code Section 1401 et seq. Under those code sections, cities have the voluntary option of petitioning the CPUC for a valuation of the assets to be condemned, with the appropriateness of the condemnation action still subject to court action, and not CPUC review. The City of San Francisco has voluntarily chosen to seek from the CPUC a determination of the valuation of the assets it seeks to acquire from PG&E as opposed to relying on the eminent domain court’s valuation. The CPUC has not addressed the extent that Section 851 applies, and parties have made various arguments about the applicability and scope of the new statutory language.[5]
Eminent domain law. From the Senate Judiciary Committee: California law provides that a public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain. California's Eminent Domain Law was adopted in 1975 pursuant to the
study and recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission. The
purpose of the 1975 law was to reorganize and restate existing California
condemnation law. The framework for how the process works is in the Code of Civil Procedure at §1240.010, et seq. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property only for a public use. (Code of Civil Procedure §1240.010) The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if all of the following are established: that the public interest and necessity require the project; the project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and the property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project. (Code of Civil Procedure §1240.030.) Additionally, a public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity, as specified in the Code of Civil Procedure §§1245.210-1245.270. This bill reinstates the conclusive presumption rules for the condemnation of privately owned electric or gas utility property within the service area of PG&E.
In People ex rel. Pub. Utilities Com. v. Fresno, (1967) 254 Cal. App. 2d 76, the Court of Appeal held that the CPUC did not have jurisdiction to approve or reject or condition a city’s power to condemn public utility property under the then-existing version of Section 851. As such, the condemnation steps have traditionally been found in California’s eminent domain law in Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1230.010–1273.050. The CPUC has had little to no review of a city’s condemnation of public utility property.[6]
Comments
Need for this bill. According to the author:
For decades, utilities like PG&E run by big investors have rigged our regulatory system to block cities’ attempts to break up with them and form public utilities. They are afraid that cities and municipalities can do what they do cheaper and better. They are right to be afraid — cities like Sacramento with public utilities pay around 50% less for electricity and receive better service than PG&E offers. They don’t deal with the same constant blackouts from poor maintenance, or the poor communication when blackouts happen. SB 875 will unrig the breakup process so that cities like San Francisco can get back on their feet and start delivering affordable, reliable energy to Californians.
SB 875 would remove these IOU-written barriers and ensure that the process local jurisdictions must follow to municipalize is clear and consistent with historical precedent by:
Reverting the Eminent Domain Standard to Historical Precedent
SB 875 would revert the rebuttable presumption to the pre-1992 conclusive presumption standard such that for utility property appropriated to a public use by a public entity within the PG&E service territory, the presumption of more necessary use is conclusive and non-rebuttable.
When SB 1757 (Morgan, Chapter 812, Statutes of 1992) was moving through the legislative process, opponents (local governments, CMUA, etc.) argued that the passage of this bill would result in serious concerns as to whether a public utility could successfully condemn a utility.
This was no accident. SB 1757 was the result of a successful effort by investor-owned utilities (IOUs) lobbying to amend provisions to make acquisitions by public entities more difficult by raising the burden on public entities to establish their right to acquire utility facilities.
In a report to Governor Pete Wilson recommending that he sign SB 1757, OPR staff noted the following, “The reality of this bill is that it would strengthen the private utilities’ hand in negotiating, and probably dissuade some public acquisitions. This office believes that would be a good thing. The private sector can provide utility services more efficiently [than] the public sector. The whole world round, utilities are being privatized. California should not be marching in the opposite direction.”
In the intervening years, the IOU’s performance problems have shown us the value of utility service by publicly owned utilities and the need to remove unreasonable barriers that the IOUs put up to stymie publicly owned utilities.
SB 875 changes would additionally benefit local governments that do not intend to use eminent domain to municipalize. In addition to allowing for the public acquisition of poorly managed utilities, the mere threat of municipalization puts pressure on private entities to perform to a certain standard. The threat of eminent domain serves as a tool for cities when they are negotiating franchises/fees (the fees paid to cities by utility companies for allowing them to operate in the city).
Even if SB 875 were to go into effect and revert the 1992 changes, private utility owners in eminent domain cases would still have the ability to litigate the value of their property. As the League of Cities noted in their opposition to SB 1757 (1992), “the fair market value of the assets to be acquired in an eminent domain proceeding is contestable and often is decided by a court of law. Therefore, the court may find that the private utility is a well-managed, viable business whose assets are valued substantially higher than the acquiring public entity has anticipated. In this case, a public entity could reexamine whether a takeover is truly necessary. The League believes that current law provides sufficient safeguards for private utility companies during the eminent domain process.”
Clarifying the CPUC’s Scope of Review
PG&E has tried to exploit some potential ambiguity in section 851, urging the Commission to adopt an extremely expansive and time consuming scope for its review (that it claims would take “years” to complete) and using the 851 review to delay and deter local public entities from utilizing their rights under the eminent domain statute and the just compensation statute.
SB 875 would clarify that the CPUC’s review of transactions by a public entity is narrow, consistent with the CPUC’s historic precedent and the legislative history of AB 1054. SB 875 would clarify that the CPUC’s review of acquisitions by public entities is limited to determining whether the transaction is fair and reasonable to affected public utility employees when the acquiring entity is a public entity.
Changes to 1992 eminent domain law. As it pertains to the proposed changes to the eminent domain law, this bill seeks to shift back to a conclusive determination when a local government seeks to condemn IOU property, specifically for only electrical or gas utility operations within the PG&E service area. While this bill that changed this presumption, SB 1757 applied to public utilities across the board, particularly since the bill was sponsored by the California Water Association which argued that they sought to prevent local governments from seeking to condemn IOU water utility property for the purpose of the city seeking the revenue from the water utility operations for systems that had no issues. The change to the rebuttal presumption was intended to afford IOUs the ability to argue as to the necessity given the IOU was already providing service. Publicly owned utilities, including the California Municipal Utility Association (CMUA), opposed SB 1757. At the time, the Office of Planning and Research, under Governor Pete Wilson, argued that private companies would be more efficient at providing utility services than the public sector. The Legislature may wish to consider whether a unique application to PG&E service area has merits or whether this should affect all utility services in the state.
CPUC role to review transactions. As noted above, condemnation cases do not necessarily require CPUC review, as they undergo a court procedure. However, the bill’s provisions concerning limiting the CPUC’s review would apply for any change of control for electrical or gas corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary, and would therefore limit the CPUC’s review of these transactions to only the impact on public utility employees. Additionally, by this bill’s provisions, these reviews would be timed after an agreement in a voluntary case or after the completion of the condemnation proceeding. The timing of these reviews would make it difficult at best to do much about any impacts to public utility employees. Such a limit on the CPUC’s regulatory authority would undermine their ability to consider the broader public interest. Given the wide application of this bill, as it does not apply to a specific case, but any situation of change of ownership of an electrical or gas corporation, could have wide-reaching unintended consequences. The CPUC staff have also concurred with this risk. They believe this is a meaningful change from current law that would limit the CPUC’s ability to consider affordability, reliability, safety, and other impacts on remaining customers from a condemnation case. In this regard, the author and committee may wish to strike the proposed changes to Public Utilities Code §851 from the bill and restore the CPUC’s authority to consider the public interest.
Timelines for public utilities to respond are likely too restrictive. This bill requires a public utility to respond within 90 days when a political subdivision (local government) submits an amount for the just compensation for the lands, property, and rights of any character that the political subdivision identified. The experience of San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) has been one of frustration. They allege PG&E has failed to respond adequately and in a reasonable timely manner to their offers to purchase their property. PG&E claims SFPUC has failed to provide a detailed list of all the properties for which it seeks to purchase from PG&E making it difficult for PG&E to respond. It is unclear whose claims are valid. The bill’s timelines likely express the frustration of SFPUC’s experience. As the bill moves forward, the author may wish to consider adjusting these timeframes to provide adequate time to respond. Relatedly, this bill requires the CPUC to make findings concerning within 18 months regarding the just compensation needing to include costs related to the physical separation of the public utility’s assets, including costs for new facilities. While well-intentioned to provide greater certainty, the author may wish to consider that other proceedings at the CPUC, of less consequence, can take more than 18 months. Under Public Utilities Code §1701.5, the CPUC can extend the 18 month deadline for a proceeding, so long as they make a written determination as to the reason for the extension. This bill does not extend the same authority to the CPUC to extend the determination for just compensation for separation of assets.
Dual referral. This bill passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 14, 2026 with a vote of 7-1-5.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 327 (McNerney) of 2025, prohibits certain political influence activities and expenses by electrical or gas corporations, those related to opposing efforts to municipalize energy utility service, from being recorded in certain accounts and having the costs recovered from ratepayers. The bill is pending in the Assembly.
SB 350 (Hill, Chapter 27, Statutes of 2020) among its provisions, authorized Golden State Energy to commence an eminent domain action to acquire all or substantially all of PG&E only if the CPUC determines that PG&E’s certificate of public convenience and necessity for the provision of electrical or gas service should be revoked pursuant to any process or procedures adopted by the CPUC in its Decision 20-05-053.
SB 550 (Hill, Chapter 409, Statutes of 2020) Explicitly required the CPUC to approve or reject any voluntary or involuntary change in ownership of assets from an electrical or gas corporation to ownership by a public entity and would require the CPUC to determine whether that transaction is fair and reasonable to the affected public utility employees as part of that review.
AB 1054 (Holden, Chapter 79, Statutes of 2019) included numerous provisions related to addressing wildfires caused by electric utility infrastructure, including: bolstering safety oversight and processes, recasting recovery of costs from damages to third-parties, including the authorization for an electrical corporation and ratepayer jointly funded Wildfire Fund to address future damages, and changes to provisions concerning the workforce of a change of ownership of a full or portion of an electrical or gas corporation.
SB 901 (Dodd, Chapter 626, Statutes of 2018) among its provisions, added language regarding requirements to maintain covered employees, as defined, whenever there is a change of control of an electrical or gas corporation.
SB 1757 (Morgan, Chapter 812, Statutes of 1992) changed the conclusive presumption to a rebuttable presumption in an eminent domain transaction involving a public entity seeking to condemn utility property of an IOU for which the public entity wishes to provide the same utility service.
SB 52 (Rosenthal, Chapter 484, Statutes of 1989) established criteria that the CPUC must consider in reviewing a merger, acquisition, or change of control related to an IOU.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
SUPPORT:
City and County of San Francisco
Consumer Watchdog
Environmental Working Group
StopWaste
OPPOSITION:
Advance SF
Bay Area Council
California Chamber of Commerce
California State Association of Electrical Workers
California Water Association
Coalition of California Utility Employees
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 6
Liberty Utilities
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
Southern California Edison
Southern California Gas Company
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Consumer Watchdog states:
PG&E has repeatedly delayed and frustrated municipalization efforts through excessive litigation, refusal to negotiate fair asset valuations, and manipulation of regulatory processes. In San Francisco, efforts to acquire transmission infrastructure have been stalled for years., with more than 130 legal filings delaying proceedings well beyond statutory timelines. Similar delays have hindered other communities, such as the South San Joaquin Irrigation District, for over a decade.
SB 875 addresses these issues by restoring fairness and clarity to the municipalization process. The bill would lower the burden of proof for public entities to acquire utility infrastructure, clarify the scope of review the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and establish enforceable timelines to prevent indefinite delays. These reforms are essential to ensuring that communities can meaningfully exercise their right to pursue local control over their energy systems.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The Coalition of California Utility Employees and the California State Association of Electrical Workers state:
The bill would eliminate key requirements that protect the public interest when a municipality seeks to seize private property owned by an investor-owned utility in PG&E’s territory. California enacted these key oversight and protection measures to ensure that utility takeovers are in the public interest. SB 875 is reckless, dangerous and will do nothing to lower utility bills or improve electric reliability. On the contrary it would increase electric rates for PG&E’s customers and reduce reliability and disaster response in San Francisco. The bill should be swiftly and categorically rejected.
They further state:
…municipal takeover would significantly impact PG&E employees. It could bankrupt the pension fund if many workers are removed from it who would otherwise be contributing to the pension fund. If it doesn’t bankrupt the pension fund, many people will lose their pension if they lose their jobs because of the takeover and the pension is not fully vested. Workers would lose bargaining power by being in smaller units, would lose job mobility that they currently have, and would lose advancement opportunities and earning power. These consequences create the risk these workers will choose NOT to work for the municipal utility. Where would the municipal utility find enough qualified workers? An inadequate city utility workforce would reduce reliability in San Francisco.
-- END --
D.25-04-032 (Decision Granting Joint Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (U 39 G), Pleasant Creek Gas Storage Holdings, LLC, and eCORP Natural Gas Storage Holdings, LLC for Approval of the Sale of the Pleasant Creek Gas Storage Field Under Public Utilities Code Section 851). ↑
D.06-05-008 (Sale and transfer of Alisal Water Corporation to Pajaro Community Service District). ↑
D.90-10-018 (Application of Pacific Gas and Electric and the City of Redding for an order under Section 851 authorizing the former to sell and convey to the latter that certain electric distribution system, in accordance with the terms of an agreement dated May 4, 1983.) ↑
D.24-05-004 (Denying Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (U39E) and Pacific Generation LLC for Approval to Transfer Certain Generation Assets, for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, for Authorization to File Tariffs and to Issue Debt, and for Related Determinations). ↑
Similar arguments were made in A.24-08-013, which was ultimately dismissed as unripe. (See D.25-10-037.) ↑
See for example, CPUC decisions: D.14-02-041; D.87-07-082; and, D.84-03-018. ↑
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: SB 875 (Author:Wiener)
Version: April 6, 2026
Hearing Date: April 14, 2026
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: ME
SUBJECT
Public utilities: eminent domain: just compensation
DIGEST
This bill reinstates the conclusive presumption rules in the Code of Civil Procedure for the condemnation of privately owned electric or gas utility property within the service area of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Eminent domain refers to the taking of private property by a public entity for a proper public use. The Code of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for a public entity to take private property for a public use. This Committee’s analysis is confined to the issues within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, which are sections 2 and 3 of the bill that amend sections 1240.650 and 1245.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 7 is also within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee as it relates to the recovery of litigation costs. The other portions of the bill are within the jurisdiction of the Senate Energy, Utilities and Communications Committee and will be analyzed by that policy Committee.
The City and County of San Francisco would like to create a public utility to provide electricity to the residents of San Francisco. Currently Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a private corporation regulated by the Public Utilities Commission, provides electricity to San Francisco. The author contends that PG&E has been a problematic provider of electricity in San Francisco and in other parts of the state. Additionally, the author asserts that the current rebuttable presumption offers PG&E an opportunity to thwart San Francisco’s attempt to establish a public utility. The author further asserts that current law makes it extremely difficult for a local government to create a public utility and brings this bill to make it easier for local governments to provide utility services to their constituents. With regard to this Committee’s jurisdiction over changes to the Code of Civil Procedure, this bill would essentially revert the relevant Civil Procedure statutes to how they read before SB 1757 ((Morgan) Ch. 812, Stats. 1992) went into effect in 1993. Specifically, this bill conclusively provides that where a public entity seeks to take privately owned electric or gas public utility property by eminent domain within the PG&E service area for the same use, such use is a public necessity and more necessary than its current use. The bill also provides that the adoption of a resolution of necessity by a local entity conclusively establishes the prerequisites for taking the property. This was the law before SB 1757 ((Morgan) Ch. 812, Stats. 1992) changed the conclusive presumptions to rebuttable presumptions. The bill further prohibits a public utility from recovering from ratepayers any litigation costs associated with a political subdivision’s efforts to acquire public utility property, as specified, including eminent domain actions.
The bill is supported by Consumer Watchdog, StopWaste, and the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco and is opposed by unions, private utility companies, and others. A coalition of organizations request that the author not confine the bill to PG&E service areas and instead have it apply to all utilities. If the bill passes out of this Committee it will move on to the Senate Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communication.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Permits public entities to exercise the power of eminent domain to take private property for public use. (Civ. Proc. §§ 1230.010 et seq.)
- Requires the public entities to provide the property owner with just compensation when the public entity exercises the power of eminent domain. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend; Calif. Const., Art. 1, sec. 19.)
- Provides that in an eminent domain action, where property (other than privately owned public utility property) is being used for a public use, the decision of a public entity to take that property for the same or any other public use is conclusively presumed to be a more necessary use than the property’s current use. (Civ. Proc. § 1240.650 (b).)
- Specifies, in cases where the private property which has been appropriated to public use is electric, gas or water public utility property, that the presumption of a more necessary use is a rebuttable, rather than a conclusive, presumption affecting the burden of proof if the public entity intends to put the property to the same use. (Civ. Proc. § 1240.650 (c).)
- Provides that a public entity may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until its governing body has adopted a resolution of necessity which contains a declaration that the public entity has found and determined, among other things: a) the public interest and necessity of the project; b) that the proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and, c) that the property described in the resolution is necessary for the proposed project. A resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of a public entity conclusively establishes that, among other matters, the public interest and necessity require the project. However, if a taking is by a local public entity and the property is electrical, gas, or water public utility property, the resolution of necessity creates a rebuttable presumption that those matters are true. (Civ. Proc. §§ 1245.220, 1245.230, 1245.250.)
This bill:
- This bill would exempt from that rebuttable presumption described in paragraph 4), above, property that has been appropriated to a public use that is electrical or gas public utility property within the PG&E service area.
- Provides that, if a taking is by a local public entity within the PG&E service area and the property is electrical or gas public utility property, the resolution of necessity, described in paragraph 5), above, instead conclusively establishes those matters.
- Prohibits a public utility from recovering from ratepayers any litigation costs associated with a political subdivision’s efforts to acquire public utility property, as specified, including eminent domain actions.
COMMENTS
- Stated need for the bill
According to the author:
For decades, electrical utilities like PG&E run by big investors have rigged our regulatory system to block cities’ attempts to break up with them and form public utilities. They are afraid that cities and municipalities can do what they do cheaper and better. They are right to be afraid — cities like Sacramento with public utilities pay around 50% less for electricity and receive better service than PG&E offers. They don’t deal with the same constant blackouts from poor maintenance, or the poor communication when blackouts happen.
SB 875 does not create a new public electric utility, nor does it require cities to municipalize. This bill simply clarifies the process for cities choosing to pursue municipalization, including those that seek to do so through a consensual transaction with an electrical utility.
SB 875 will unrig the breakup process so that cities like San Francisco can get back on their feet and start delivering affordable, reliable energy to Californians.
Consumer Watchdog writes the following in support of SB 875:
For years, California ratepayers, particularly those served by PG&E, have faced the consequences of utility mismanagement, including catastrophic wildfires, prolonged blackouts, and skyrocketing electricity rates. Customers continue to pay among the highest rates in the nation while experiencing unreliable service and unacceptable safety failures. These outcomes underscore the urgent need for greater accountability and alternative models of utility governance.
Publicly owned utilities (POUs) have consistently demonstrated that they can deliver electricity at lower cost while maintaining higher standards of safety, transparency, and responsiveness. Unlike investor-owned utilities, POUs are directly accountable to the communities they serve and operate under public oversight and open records laws. However, despite existing legal authority to municipalize, local jurisdictions have been effectively blocked from doing so due to obstructionist tactics by investor-owned utilities like PG&E.
PG&E has repeatedly delayed and frustrated municipalization efforts through excessive litigation, refusal to negotiate fair asset valuations, and manipulation of regulatory processes. In San Francisco, efforts to acquire transmission infrastructure have been stalled for years, with more than 130 legal filings delaying proceedings well beyond statutory timelines. Similar delays have hindered other communities, such as the South San Joaquin Irrigation District, for over a decade.
SB 875 addresses these issues by restoring fairness and clarity to the municipalization process. The bill would lower the burden of proof for public entities to acquire utility infrastructure, clarify the scope of review at the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and establish enforceable timelines to prevent indefinite delays. These reforms are essential to ensuring that communities can meaningfully exercise their right to pursue local control over their energy systems.
According to the Environmental Working Group, also in support of SB 875:
This bill helps empower all northern California communities to pursue and realize energy independence and local control of their electricity supplies. Local control has become imperative to the health and safety of our communities.
Back in the early 1900s, when PG&E was first granted status as a regulated monopoly, it was never the intention to forever wed California consumers or their communities to PG&E and prevent them from supplying and distributing electricity themselves. The monopoly utility was intended to provide value to consumers; value they could not otherwise provide themselves. It was never intended for PG&E to become a burden. Yet, a burden is what PG&E has undeniably become. We can do better. Minimally, Californians and their communities should have the ability to break free and manage their own energy future. This is what [SB] 875 is all about.
SB 875 would lower the burden of proof a local jurisdiction must meet to exercise its right to acquire investor-owned utility infrastructure and facilities through eminent domain. It would also reinstate the valuation standards and procedural framework that governed such acquisitions prior to 1992. The post-1992 standards are onerous and have effectively rendered the right of municipalization illusory. In addition, SB 875 would clarify and narrow the role of the California Public Utilities Commission, relieving the agency of undue administrative burden. In short, [SB 875] would restore municipalization as a meaningful and viable option for communities seeking a locally accountable alternative to investor-owned utility service. As such, this is an important bill that empowers local jurisdictions to evaluate a better way of generating, self-providing, and delivering electricity in the public interest.
2. California law permits public entities to exercise the power of eminent domain
California law provides that a public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain. California's Eminent Domain Law was adopted in 1975 pursuant to the
study and recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission. The
purpose of the 1975 law was to reorganize and restate existing California
condemnation law. The framework for how the process works is in the Code of Civil Procedure at section 1240.010, et. seq. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property only for a public use. (Civ. Proc. § 1240.010.) The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if all of the following are established: that the public interest and necessity require the project; the project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and the property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project. (Civ. Proc. § 1240.030.) Additionally, a public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity, as specified in the Code of Civil Procedure sections 1245.210-1245.270. This bill reinstates the conclusive presumption rules for the condemnation of privately owned electric or gas utility property within the service area of PG&E.
The author explains a history of the issue in the bill’s findings and declarations:
Eminent domain is the constitutional right of the people or their government to take private property for public use. Until 1993, Section 1240.650 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided a conclusive presumption that the same use by public entities of the property to be taken is a “more necessary use” than the use for which the property was already being used by the private entity. Investor-owned utilities, like Pacific Gas and Electric Company, were granted special statutory protections in 1992 making it unusually difficult and costly for local governments to exercise their constitutional and statutory authority to acquire utility infrastructure or establish municipal energy services. In 1992, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992) to change the requirements for eminent domain of utility property that has been put to a public use. Senate Bill 1757 removed the conclusive presumption of “public necessity” and “more necessary use” and replaced it with a “rebuttable presumption” for electric, gas, or water public utility property. The Legislature passed, and Governor Wilson signed into law, this change with the express purpose of enabling investor-owned utilities to further challenge eminent domain proceedings initiated by local governments. In a 1992 letter, the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research recommended that Governor Wilson make clear this rationale, arguing, “The reality of this bill is that it would strengthen private utilities’ hand in negotiating and probably dissuade some public acquisitions. This office believes that would be a good thing. The private sector can provide utility services more efficiently [than] the public sector.” California made this change at a time when it was also broadly deregulating the energy market through bills like Assembly Bill 1890 (Chapter 854 of the Statutes of 1996). The Legislature enacted these changes with the promise that this legislation would lead to lower electricity rates. Instead of lowering electricity rates, the Legislature’s deregulatory efforts led to the Enron crisis. Competition in the energy industry was one of the goals of Assembly Bill 1890 (Chapter 854 of the Statutes of 1996), which would provide better and cheaper service, and local publicly owned utilities provide one of the few sources of competition with investor-owned utilities in the energy industry. Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992) helped investor-owned utilities hamstring their main competitor, and, in the years since the passage of Senate Bill 1757 (Chapter 812 of the Statutes of 1992), investor-owned utilities have not proven to more efficiently provide utility services than local publicly owned utilities.
The 1992 Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of SB 1757 explained the following about rebuttable and conclusive presumptions with regard to the relevant sections of the Code of Civil Procedure[1]:
Eminent domain is the sovereign right of the people or their government to take private property for public use. While the taking must be for a proper public purpose, the legislative determination of a public use, purpose, or function is a conclusive determination except where the declaration is clearly erroneous (C.C.P. Section 1240.010). Further, Section 1240.650 generally provides a conclusive presumption that the same use by public entities of the property to be taken is a “more necessary use” than the use for which the property was already being used by the private entity. The purpose of the presumptions is to avoid litigation and challenges to a public entity’s legislative determination of public use and necessity.
The bill would remove those conclusive presumptions in the case of privately owned public utility property which is being taken for the same public use. The bill would instead substitute a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof in favor of the condemnor public entity. Unlike a conclusive presumption, which cannot be challenged or contradicted, a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof permits a challenge to the fact being assumed. Under Evidence Code Section 605, “the effect of a presumption affecting the burden of proof is to impose upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the non-existence of the presumed fact.” Thus, in a case where the public entity proposes to take privately owned public utility property by eminent domain for the same use, SB 1757 would enable the private utility to challenge the proposed taking as to its necessity and purpose. However, it would be the condemnee private entity’s burden to show that the taking was not a “public necessity” and that the proposed use was not a more necessary use.
A similar rebuttable presumption of “more necessary use” applies where the state seeks to take property which is already put to the same use as is intended by the state (C.C.P. Section 1240.640).
This bill essentially reverts the burden of proof for eminent domain of electrical or gas utility property within the PG&E service territory to the standard before SB 1757 was codified. Additionally, this bill prohibits a public utility from recovering from ratepayers any litigation costs associated with a political subdivision’s efforts to acquire public utility property, as specified, including eminent domain actions.
3. Opposition
Pacific Gas and Electric write the following in opposition to this bill:
SB 875 would amend the Code of Civil Procedure to eliminate judicial review of a city’s finding that the transfer of the IOU’s property as part of a municipalization reflects a more necessary use of the same property—a finding that may involve factual determinations related to rate impacts, operational feasibility, safety, and reliability, among other public interest considerations. Said differently, SB 875 removes the ability to challenge—let alone consider—the validity of a city’s determination of greater necessity, eliminating a fair and meaningful opportunity to be heard (procedural due process rights) for PG&E as the current property owner, as well as from interested, affected stakeholders.
Conclusive presumptions in eminent domain proceedings are extraordinarily rare because they eliminate any meaningful opportunity for parties and courts to evaluate the facts in a proceeding where property rights may be extinguished. By replacing an independent, balanced judicial review with the municipality’s own facts and outcomes, SB 875 undermines the role of the judiciary to make well-reasoned, fact-based determinations, protect fundamental rights, and ensure procedural due process and fair outcomes for all Californians. Not only is this bad policy, but it is unconstitutional under state and federal law. A unilateral determination by San Francisco, for example, that a taking of IOU property creates a “more necessary” public use without permitting the IOU or anyone to evaluate or challenge the criteria used to make that determination, and without consideration of any evidence relied upon in reaching that determination, plainly violates procedural due process under the California Constitution. While the legislature may define standards for eminent domain, it cannot foreclose all judicial inquiry where property rights could be extinguished.
The Coalition of California Utility Employees and the California State Association of Electrical Workers write the following in opposition of this bill:
[ . . . ] Eminent Domain Protections Ensure Full Accountability and Public Interest Review Under eminent domain law, a city can take IOU assets to form a municipal utility. The city must show a court, among other things, that the taking is necessary and in the public interest. There is a rebuttable presumption that this is so, but an IOU may present contrary evidence. For example, an IOU may show that a takeover would harm the state’s ability to mitigate catastrophic wildfires which is not in the public interest. A rebuttable presumption ensures courts have the full picture on safety, reliability, affordability and other policies before determining whether a takeover would genuinely be a more beneficial use of IOU assets. […]
Victims of wildfires would lose access to the wildfire insurance fund even though they, as PG&E ratepayers, already paid the premiums. Who would pay billions of dollars in wildfire liabilities if a municipal utility starts a wildfire? Under inverse condemnation, the municipal utility customers would be obligated to pay all damages from wildfires caused by the utility or the city would go bankrupt. [ . . . ]
[A] municipal takeover would significantly impact PG&E employees. It could bankrupt the pension fund if many workers are removed from it who would otherwise be contributing to the fund. If it doesn’t bankrupt the pension, many people would lose their pension if they lose their jobs because of the takeover and the pension is not fully vested. Workers would lose bargaining power by being in smaller units, would lose job mobility that they currently have, and would lose advancement opportunities and earning power. These consequences create the risk these workers will choose NOT to work for the municipal utility. Where would the municipal utility find enough qualified workers? An inadequate city utility workforce would reduce reliability in San Francisco.
SUPPORT
Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco
Consumer Watchdog
Environmental Working Group
StopWaste
OPPOSITION
Advance SF
Bay Area Council
California Chamber of Commerce
California State Association of Electrical Workers
California Water Association
Coalition of California Utility Employees
Engineers and Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20, AFL-CIO
Kern County Taxpayers Association
Liberty Utilities (Apple Valley Ranchos Water) Corp.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
San Diego Gas and Electric Company
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce
Southern California Edison
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending legislation: SB 327 (McNerney, 2026) prohibits certain political influence activities and expenses by electrical or gas corporations, those related to opposing efforts to municipalize energy utility service, from being recorded in certain accounts and having the costs recovered from ratepayers; states the Public Advocates Office has the same authority as the California Public Utilities Commission to discover information and review the accounts of public utilities. The bill is at the Assembly Desk.
Prior Legislation: AB 47X1 (Wiggins, 2001) sought to reverse SB 1757 changes to the conclusive presumption.
SB 1757 (Morgan, Ch. 812, Stats. 1992) changed the conclusive presumption to a rebuttable presumption.
**************
Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of SB 1757 (Morgan) Ch. 812, Stats. 1992, p. 3, as amended May 4, 1992 for hearing on May 5. 1992 (Reg. Sess. 1991-92.)). ↑
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Energy, Utilities and Communications
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):