SB 1134: Habeas corpus: new evidence: motion to vacate judgment: indemnity.
- Session Year: 2015-2016
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2016-09-28
Existing law allows every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, but not limited to, false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial and false physical evidence which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty of the person.
This bill would additionally allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation Board to recommend an appropriation be made by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying a person if the evidence shows that a crime with which the person was charged was either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by that person. Existing law requires that the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to $140 per day of incarceration served. If a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence and finds that the new evidence points unerringly to innocence, existing law requires the board to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature pursuant to these provisions without a hearing.
This bill would require the board, without a hearing, to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature if the court finds that the person is factually innocent. The bill would make additional clarifying and technical changes.
Existing law allows every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, but not limited to, false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial and false physical evidence which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty of the person.
This bill would additionally allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation Board to recommend an appropriation be made by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying a person if the evidence shows that a crime with which the person was charged was either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by that person. Existing law requires that the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to $140 per day of incarceration served. If a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence and finds that the new evidence points unerringly to innocence, existing law requires the board to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature pursuant to these provisions without a hearing.
This bill would require the board, without a hearing, to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature if the court finds that the person is factually innocent. The bill would make additional clarifying and technical changes.
Existing law allows every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, but not limited to, false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial and false physical evidence which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty of the person.
This bill would additionally allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board to recommend an appropriation be made by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying a person if the evidence shows that a crime with which the person was charged was either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by that person. Existing law requires that the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to $140 per day of incarceration served. If a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence and finds that the new evidence points unerringly to innocence, existing law requires the board to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature pursuant to these provisions without a hearing.
This bill would require the board, without a hearing, to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature if the court finds that the person is factually innocent. The bill would make additional clarifying and technical changes.
Existing law allows every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, but not limited to, false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial and false physical evidence which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty of the person.
This bill would additionally allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board to recommend an appropriation be made by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying a person if the evidence shows that a crime with which the person was charged was either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by that person. Existing law requires that the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to $140 per day of incarceration served. If a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence and finds that the new evidence points unerringly to innocence, existing law requires the board to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature pursuant to these provisions without a hearing.
This bill would require the board, without a hearing, to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature if the court finds that the person is factually innocent. The bill would make additional clarifying and technical changes.
Existing law allows every person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty to prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. Existing law allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted for, but not limited to, false evidence that is substantially material or probative to the issue of guilt or punishment that was introduced at trial and false physical evidence which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty of the person.
This bill would additionally allow a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
Existing law requires the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board to recommend an appropriation be made by the Legislature for the purpose of indemnifying a person if the evidence shows that a crime with which the person was charged was either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by that person. Existing law requires that the appropriation recommended shall be a sum equivalent to $140 per day of incarceration served. If a court grants a writ of habeas corpus or vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence and finds that the new evidence points unerringly to innocence, existing law requires the board to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature pursuant to these provisions without a hearing.
This bill would require the board, without a hearing, to recommend an appropriation to the Legislature if the court finds that the person is factually innocent. The bill would make additional clarifying and technical changes.
(a)A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.
(b)A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
(1)False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration.
(2)False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(3)(A)New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
(B)For purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
(c)Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).
(d)This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.
(e)(1)For purposes of this section, false evidence includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
(2)This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates his or her original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.5.(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts ruling or order.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(c)If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, on any ground, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(d)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven his or her factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(e)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.
(b)A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
(1)False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration.
(2)False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(3)(A)New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
(B)For purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
(c)Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).
(d)This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.
(e)(1)For purposes of this section, false evidence includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
(2)This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates his or her original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.5.(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts ruling or order.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(c)If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, on any ground, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(d)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven his or her factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(e)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)Every A person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.
(b)A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
(1)False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration.
(2)False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(3)(A)New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
(B)For purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
(c)Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).
(d)This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.
(e)(1)For purposes of this section, false evidence includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
(2)This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates his or her original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.5.(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
(c)The In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts ruling or order.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested proceeding, if the court grants has granted a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, or or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, judgment, and if the court finds that new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)If In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(c)If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, ground, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(d)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven his or her factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(e)No presumption shall A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(g)For the purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that was not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.5.(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts ruling or order.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(c)If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, on any ground, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(d)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven his or her factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(e)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.
(b)A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
(1)False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration.
(2)False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(3)(A)New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
(B)For purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
(c)Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).
(d)This section does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or preclude the use of any other remedies.
(e)(1)For purposes of this section, false evidence includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
(2)This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates his or her original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.5.(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
(c)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts ruling or order.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court vacates a judgment, and if the court has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(c)If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, on any ground, the petitioner may move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(d)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven his or her factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(e)A presumption does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner factually innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(a)Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint.
(b)A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
(1)False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration.
(2)False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
(3)(A)New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
(B)For purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
(c)Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b).
(d)This section shall not be construed as limiting does not limit the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding preclude the use of any other remedies.
(e)(1)For purposes of this section, false evidence shall include includes opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
(2)This section does not create additional liabilities, beyond those already recognized, for an expert who repudiates his or her original opinion provided at a hearing or trial or whose opinion has been undermined by later scientific research or technological advancements.
SEC. 2.Section 1485.5 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.5.(a)If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the basis for the courts ruling or order shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
(b)The district attorney shall provide notice to the Attorney General prior to entering into a stipulation of facts that will be the basis for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment.
(c)The In a contested or uncontested proceeding, the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.
(d)For the purposes of this section, express factual findings are findings established as the basis for the courts ruling or order.
(e)For purposes of this section, court is defined as a state or federal court.
SEC. 3.Section 1485.55 of the Penal Code is amended to read:1485.55.(a)In a contested proceeding, if the court grants has granted a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, judgment, and if the court finds that new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, has found that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(b)If In a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(c)If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6, on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, ground, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.
(d)If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has proven his or her innocence by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(e)No A presumption shall does not exist in any other proceeding for failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).
(f)If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a petitioner innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim any claim filed shall be paid pursuant to Section 4904.
(g)For the purposes of this section, new evidence means evidence that was not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Aug 31, 2016 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3 p.m. |
| Aug 25, 2016 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 5430.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Aug 25, 2016 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 39. Noes 0.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Aug 23, 2016 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| Aug 19, 2016 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Aug 18, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 78. Noes 0. Page 5908.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Aug 18, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| Aug 15, 2016 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 12, 2016 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 20. Noes 0.) (August 11). |
| Aug 3, 2016 | August 3 set for first hearing. Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Aug 1, 2016 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 28, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (June 28). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 13, 2016 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 2, 2016 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Jun 1, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 4099.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Jun 1, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 39. Noes 0.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 31, 2016 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 27, 2016 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 6. Noes 1. Page 4004.) (May 27). |
| May 27, 2016 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 6. Noes 1.) (May 27). |
| May 20, 2016 | Set for hearing May 27. |
| Apr 18, 2016 | April 18 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 8, 2016 | Set for hearing April 18. |
| Apr 5, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0. Page 3395.) (April 5). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 5, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (April 5). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 15, 2016 | Set for hearing April 5. |
| Mar 3, 2016 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Feb 19, 2016 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 20. |
| Feb 18, 2016 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 25, 2016 | Special Consent SB1134 Leno | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 18, 2016 | SB 1134 Leno Senate Third Reading By LACKEY | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 11, 2016 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 28, 2016 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jun 1, 2016 | Senate 3rd Reading SB1134 Leno | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 27, 2016 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 18, 2016 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 5, 2016 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 1134
:
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 7-0, 4/5/16
AYES: Hancock, Anderson, Glazer, Leno, Liu, Monning, Stone
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-1, 5/27/16
AYES: Lara, Bates, Beall, Hill, McGuire, Mendoza
NOES: Nielsen
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0, 6/1/16
AYES: Allen, Anderson, Bates, Beall, Berryhill, Block, Cannella, De León, Fuller, Gaines, Galgiani, Glazer, Hall, Hancock, Hernandez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Huff, Jackson, Lara, Leno, Leyva, Liu, McGuire, Mendoza, Mitchell, Monning, Moorlach, Morrell, Nguyen, Nielsen, Pan, Pavley, Roth, Stone, Vidak, Wieckowski, Wolk
NO VOTE RECORDED: Runner
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 8/18/16 - See last page for vote
SOURCE: California Innocence Project
Northern California Innocence Project
Loyola Project for the Innocent
American Civil Liberties Union
DIGEST: This bill codifies a standard for habeas corpus petitions filed on the basis of new evidence
Assembly Amendments were technical amendments to address changes in the underlying statute that were made in the budget.
Existing law:
- Provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. (Penal Code § 1473(a).)
- States that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration; or
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person. (Penal Code § 1473 (b))
- Provides that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Penal Code § 1473(c).)
- States that nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies. (Penal Code § 1473(d).)
- Provides that if the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the bases for the court’s ruling or order shall be binding on the attorney General, the factfinder and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (VCB). (Penal Code § 1485.5 (a))
- Provides that the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for a habeas corpus, a motion to vacate or an application for a certificate of factual innocence shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the VCB. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (c))
- Provides that in a contested proceeding, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained and if the court finds that the new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the VCB for acclaim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid. (Penal Code § 148.55(a))
- States that if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her. (Penal Code § 148.55(b))
- Provides that for the purposes of this section, “new evidence” means evidence that is not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence. (Penal Code § 148.55(g))
This bill:
- Permits a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence, which would have more likely than not changed the outcome of the trial. However, this new evidence must be evidence that has been discovered after the trial and could not have been discovered prior to trial.
- Requires the VCB to recommend payment for incarceration of a person if the court finds that the person is factually innocent.
Background
Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus, also known as “the Great Writ”, is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from illegal restraint. The functions of the writ is set forth in Penal Code section 1473(a): “Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.” A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; and,
- Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus.
Standard
In California, there is no codified standard of proof for a writ of habeas corpus brought on the basis of new evidence. The current standard is based on case law. In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1239 found that newly discovered evidence “must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability;” and “if ‘a reasonable jury could have rejected the evidence presented, a petition has not satisfied his burden.” This bill instead sets the standard for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus as “ new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” As noted in the author’s statement, this standard will make California’s postconviction standard consistent with 43 other states.
According to the February 3, 2016 report of National Registry of Exonerations at the University of Michigan Law School there were 149 exonerations nationwide in 2015, five of which were in California. That was five exonerations under a standard that is higher than the standard in most other states, it is unclear how many others were denied a hearing because they did not meet the standard who would be eligible under this standard to have their habeas corpus petition heard.
Victims Compensation Board
This bill also makes conforming changes, making it clear if there is a finding of factual innocence by a court then the VCB shall make a recommendation for an appropriation to the Legislature.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee analysis:
- Potential significant costs in the millions (GF and Trial Court Trust Fund) to Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Trial Courts during the first two or three years. Although this bill specifies the "new evidence" must be evidence that was not available at the time of the trial, staff of the various courts will have to review the record and make that determination. Writs may be submitted to all three courts; and the higher the court, the higher the level of review. Denial by a lower court is subject to either appeal, or to the filing of an original petition at the next higher court, (or both). The Judicial Council estimates a large volume of new writs during the first two or three years after enactment, but a leveling off thereafter.
- Potential future increase in General Fund appropriations to VCB for payment of approved claims for compensation potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000. Administration cost to VCB would be minor.
- Potentially significant annual cost (GF) to the Department of Justice due to increases in workload to the extent a greater number of persons are allowed to prosecute writs of habeas corpus under the existence of new evidence, as redefined. Resources could potentially be required for post-verdict investigations, to litigate retrials, appeals, and collateral challenges.
- Potential future annual cost savings (General Fund) to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation due to averted incarceration of innocent persons to the extent future writs of habeas corpus are granted that otherwise would not have been eligible to be filed and innocence is established.
California Innocence Project (co-source)
Northern California Innocence Project (co-source)
Loyola Project for the Innocent (co-source)
American Civil Liberties Union (co-source)
A New Path
A New Way of Life Re-Entry Project
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
John Van de Kamp, former California Attorney General
Judge Ladoris H. Cordell (Ret.)
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/17/16)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:
In support, former Attorney General John Van de Kamp states:
To win a claim of factual innocence under current California case law, an individual must “undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence” with evidence that no “reasonable jury would reject.” This standard is the most difficult in the country and is so impossibly high that it functions as a barrier to wrongfully convicted individuals seeking justice in our criminal justice system. SB 1334 amends California Penal Code to incorporate a standard of proof in line with the standards in 43 other states.
SB 1134 will allow courts to grant relief to innocent people who have new evidence that is so strong that it “would likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” The “more likely that not” standard proposed by the bill is clear and is a standard familiar to the courts. It is still a very high standard, but a fair one. To prevail with a claim of factual innocence under the bill, an individual must still have new evidence that “is credible, material, presented without substantial delay,” and “admissible” and that “could not have been discovered prior to the trial by the exercise of due diligence.”
The bill provides a vital claim to innocent individuals who do not have another recourse under other habeas claims such as false testimony, Brady violations or ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the current standard, those innocent individuals have little chance of proving their innocence, so remain wrongfully imprisoned. SB 1134 gives these individuals a fair chance to prove their innocence and the criminal justice system a chance to rectify the wrongful imprisonment of innocent individuals.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 8/18/16
AYES: Achadjian, Alejo, Travis Allen, Arambula, Atkins, Baker, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonilla, Bonta, Brough, Brown, Burke, Calderon, Campos, Chang, Chau, Chávez, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Dababneh, Dahle, Daly, Dodd, Eggman, Frazier, Beth Gaines, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gatto, Gipson, Gomez, Gonzalez, Gordon, Gray, Grove, Hadley, Harper, Holden, Irwin, Jones, Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Levine, Linder, Lopez, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Nazarian, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Olsen, Patterson, Quirk, Ridley-Thomas, Rodriguez, Salas, Santiago, Steinorth, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Wagner, Waldron, Weber, Wilk, Williams, Wood, Rendon
NO VOTE RECORDED: Roger Hernández, Kim
8/19/16 19:21:49
**** END ****
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 1134
Author:(Leno and Anderson)
As Amended Ver:
Majority vote
SENATE VOTE: 39-0
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Public Safety | 7-0 | Jones-Sawyer, Melendez, Lackey, Lopez, Low, Quirk, Santiago | |
Appropriations | 20-0 | Gonzalez, Bigelow, Bloom, Bonilla, Bonta, Calderon, Chang, Daly, Eggman, Gallagher, Eduardo Garcia, Holden, Jones, Obernolte, Quirk, Santiago, Wagner, Weber, Wood, McCarty |
|
SUMMARY: Allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the ground that new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. Specifically, this bill:
- Defines, for purposes of this bill, "new evidence" as "evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching", and deletes the existing definition of "new evidence."
- Clarifies that the binding nature of the court's credibility determinations on the Attorney General (AG) and the California Victim Compensation Board is true in both contested and uncontested proceedings.
- States that, in a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus and found the person to be factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid.
- Provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.
- Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration; or,
- False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
- States that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to the above provisions is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus.
- States that the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for a habeas corpus, a motion to vacate or an application for a certificate of factual innocence shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (VCGCB).
- Provides that in a contested proceeding, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained and if the court finds that the new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the VCGCB for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid.
- States that if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her.
- Defines "new evidence" to mean "evidence that is not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence."
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Potential significant costs in the millions (General Fund (GF) and Trial Court Trust Fund) to Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Trial Courts during the first two or three years. Although this bill specifies the "new evidence" must be evidence that was not available at the time of the trial, staff of the various courts will have to review the record and make that determination. Writs may be submitted to all three courts; and the higher the court, the higher the level of review. Denial by a lower court is subject to either appeal, or to the filing of an original petition at the next higher court, (or both). The Judicial Council estimates a large volume of new writs during the first two or three years after enactment, but a leveling off thereafter.
- Potential future increase in GF appropriations to VCGCB for payment of approved claims for compensation potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000. Administration cost to VCGCB would be minor.
- Potentially significant annual cost (GF) to the Department of Justice due to increases in workload to the extent a greater number of persons are allowed to prosecute writs of habeas corpus under the existence of new evidence, as redefined. Resources could potentially be required for post-verdict investigations, to litigate retrials, appeals, and collateral challenges.
- Potential future annual cost savings (GF) to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation due to averted incarceration of innocent persons to the extent future writs of habeas corpus are granted that otherwise would not have been eligible to be filed and innocence is established.
COMMENTS: According to the author, "Under existing California law, an inmate who has been convicted of committing a crime for which he or she claims that s/he has new evidence that points to innocence may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The burden for proving that newly discovered evidence entitles an individual to a new trial is not currently defined by statute, but has evolved from appellate court opinions. In order to prevail on a new evidence claim, a petitioner must undermine the prosecution's entire case and 'point unerringly to innocence with evidence no reasonable jury could reject' (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239). The California Supreme Court has stated that this standard is very high, much higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs other habeas claims. (Ibid.)
"This standard is nearly impossible to meet absent DNA evidence, which exists only in a tiny portion of prosecutions and exonerations. For example, if a petitioner has newly discovered evidence that completely undermines all evidence of guilt and shows that the original jury would likely not have convicted, but the new evidence does not 'point unerringly to innocence' the petitioner will not have met the standard and will have no chance at a new trial. Thus, someone who would likely never have been convicted if the newly discovered evidence had been available in their original trial is almost guaranteed to remain in prison under the status quo in California.
"The proposed new standard in SB 1134 addresses this anomaly. Our criminal justice system was built on the understanding that even innocent people cannot always affirmatively prove innocence, which is why the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt when a charge is brought to trial, and absent evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, innocence is presumed. The new standard contained in this bill ensures that innocent men and women do not remain in prison even after new evidence shows that a conviction never would have occurred had it been available.
"SB 1134 seeks to bring California's innocence standard into line with the vast majority of other states' standards, forty-three in total, and to make it consistent with other postconviction standards for relief such as ineffective assistance of counsel, or prosecutorial misconduct. There is no justification for a different standard to govern these types of claims, as opposed to those brought on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Our laws must recognize that if evidence exists that a jury did not hear (regardless of whether it is the fault of a mistaken or lying witness, an ineffective attorney, or the misconduct of law enforcement), which creates a reasonable probability of a different outcome, the conviction should be reversed."
Please see the policy committee analysis for a full discussion of this bill.
Analysis Prepared by: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003999
Date of Hearing: August 3, 2016
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 1134
Author:(Leno) – As Amended Ver:August 1, 2016
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 7 - 0 |
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill codifies a standard for habeas corpus petitions filed on the basis of new evidence. Specifically, this bill:
- Permits a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the basis of new evidence, which would have more likely than not changed the outcome of the trial. However, this new evidence must be evidence that has been discovered after the trial and could not have been discovered prior to trial.
- Requires the Victims Compensation Board (VCB) to recommend payment for incarceration of a person if the court finds that the person is factually innocent.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Potential significant costs in the millions (GF and Trial Court Trust Fund) to Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Trial Courts during the first two or three years. Although this bill specifies the "new evidence" must be evidence that was not available at the time of the trial, staff of the various courts will have to review the record and make that determination. Writs may be submitted to all three courts; and the higher the court, the higher the level of review. Denial by a lower court is subject to either appeal, or to the filing of an original petition at the next higher court, (or both). The Judicial Council estimates a large volume of new writs during the first two or three years after enactment, but a leveling off thereafter.
- Potential future increase in General Fund appropriations to VCB for payment of approved claims for compensation potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000. Administration cost to VCB would be minor.
- Potentially significant annual cost (GF) to the Department of Justice due to increases in workload to the extent a greater number of persons are allowed to prosecute writs of habeas corpus under the existence of new evidence, as redefined. Resources could potentially be required for post-verdict investigations, to litigate retrials, appeals, and collateral challenges.
- Potential future annual cost savings (General Fund) to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation due to averted incarceration of innocent persons to the extent future writs of habeas corpus are granted that otherwise would not have been eligible to be filed and innocence is established.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author, "Under existing California law, an inmate who has been convicted of committing a crime for which he or she claims that s/he has new evidence that points to innocence may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The burden for proving that newly discovered evidence entitles an individual to a new trial is not currently defined by statute, but has evolved from appellate court opinions. In order to prevail on a new evidence claim, a petitioner must undermine the prosecution's entire case and 'point unerringly to innocence with evidence no reasonable jury could reject.” The California Supreme Court has stated that this standard is very high, much higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs other habeas claims.
"The proposed new standard in SB 1134 addresses this anomaly. Our criminal justice system was built on the understanding that even innocent people cannot always affirmatively prove innocence, which is why the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt when a charge is brought to trial, and absent evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, innocence is presumed. The new standard contained in this bill ensures that innocent men and women do not remain in prison even after new evidence shows that a conviction never would have occurred had it been available.
"SB 1134 seeks to bring California's innocence standard into line with the vast majority of other states' standards, forty-three [43] in total, and to make it consistent with other postconviction standards for relief such as ineffective assistance of counsel, or prosecutorial misconduct. There is no justification for a different standard to govern these types of claims, as opposed to those brought on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Our laws must recognize that if evidence exists that a jury did not hear (regardless of whether it is the fault of a mistaken or lying witness, an ineffective attorney, or the misconduct of law enforcement), which creates a reasonable probability of a different outcome, the conviction should be reversed."
- Background. Current law provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. Current law states that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
Current law provides that “new evidence” means evidence that was not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence. However, in California, there is no codified standard of proof for a writ of habeas corpus brought on the basis of new evidence. The current standard is based on case law.
SB 1134 specifies in statute that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted based on new evidence and codifies a new standard for granting habeas on this ground. This bill requires the new evidence to be "credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.s’ As noted in the author's statement, this standard will make California's postconviction standard consistent with 43 other states.
This bill also makes conforming changes, making it clear the standard is a finding of factual innocence by a court in the section requiring the Victim Compensation Board to make a recommendation for an appropriation when the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of new evidence.
- Support. According to The California Innocence Project, "The burden for proving one's actual innocence with new evidence of innocence is not defined by statute in California. Rather, California case law from more than sixty years ago requires a wrongfully convicted person seeking relief from their conviction to meet a very high burden. Specifically, they must present evidence no reasonable jury would reject, evidence which undermines the prosecution's entire case and points unerringly to innocence. Even the California Supreme Court has recognized this standard as much higher than other standards for relief which govern other habeas claims.
- Prior Legislation:
- SB 694 (Leno) of 2015, substantially similar to this bill, was held in this Committee’s Suspense file.
- SB 1058 (Leno), Chapter 623, Statutes of 2014, allowed a writ of habeas corpus when evidence given at trial has subsequently been repudiated by the expert that testified or undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
- SB 1471 (Runner), of the 2007-08 Legislative Session, would have required habeas petitions in death penalty cases to be filed within one year and changed the standards for competent counsel. SB 1471 failed passage in Senate Public Safety.
Analysis Prepared by: Pedro Reyes / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: June 28, 2016
Counsel: Stella Choe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 1134
Author:(Leno) – As Amended Ver:May 31, 2016
SUMMARY: Allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the ground that new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. Specifically, this bill:
- Defines, for purposes of this bill, "new evidence" as "evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching", and deletes the existing definition of "new evidence."
- Clarifies that the binding nature of the court's credibility determinations on the Attorney General (AG) and the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board (VCGCB) is true in both contested and uncontested proceedings.
- States that, in a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus and found the person to be factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the VCGCB for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid.
- Provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a).)
- Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration; or,
- False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b).)
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration; or,
- States that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence referred to the above provisions is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (c).)
- States that the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for a habeas corpus, a motion to vacate or an application for a certificate of factual innocence shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the VCGCB. (Pen. Code, § 1485.5, subd. (c).)
- Provides that in a contested proceeding, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained and if the court finds that the new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the VCGCB for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subd. (a).)
- States that if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her. (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subd. (b).)
- Defines "new evidence" to mean "evidence that is not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence." (Pen. Code, § 1485.55, subd. (g).)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, "Under existing California law, an inmate who has been convicted of committing a crime for which he or she claims that s/he has new evidence that points to innocence may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The burden for proving that newly discovered evidence entitles an individual to a new trial is not currently defined by statute, but has evolved from appellate court opinions. In order to prevail on a new evidence claim, a petitioner must undermine the prosecution's entire case and 'point unerringly to innocence with evidence no reasonable jury could reject' (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239). The California Supreme Court has stated that this standard is very high, much higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs other habeas claims. (Ibid.)
"This standard is nearly impossible to meet absent DNA evidence, which exists only in a tiny portion of prosecutions and exonerations. For example, if a petitioner has newly discovered evidence that completely undermines all evidence of guilt and shows that the original jury would likely not have convicted, but the new evidence does not 'point unerringly to innocence' the petitioner will not have met the standard and will have no chance at a new trial. Thus, someone who would likely never have been convicted if the newly discovered evidence had been available in their original trial is almost guaranteed to remain in prison under the status quo in California.
"The proposed new standard in SB 1134 addresses this anomaly. Our criminal justice system was built on the understanding that even innocent people cannot always affirmatively prove innocence, which is why the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt when a charge is brought to trial, and absent evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, innocence is presumed. The new standard contained in this bill ensures that innocent men and women do not remain in prison even after new evidence shows that a conviction never would have occurred had it been available.
"SB 1134 seeks to bring California's innocence standard into line with the vast majority of other states' standards, forty-three in total, and to make it consistent with other postconviction standards for relief such as ineffective assistance of counsel, or prosecutorial misconduct. There is no justification for a different standard to govern these types of claims, as opposed to those brought on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Our laws must recognize that if evidence exists that a jury did not hear (regardless of whether it is the fault of a mistaken or lying witness, an ineffective attorney, or the misconduct of law enforcement), which creates a reasonable probability of a different outcome, the conviction should be reversed."
- Writ of Habeas Corpus: Writ of habeas corpus, also known as "the Great Writ", is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from illegal restraint. The functions of the writ is set forth in Penal Code section 1473(a): "Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint." A habeas corpus claim may be based on proof of false evidence introduced at trial or new evidence that was unavailable at trial. (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1238, In re Bell (2007) 42 Cal.4th 630, 637; In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 453–454; In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 415–417; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724.) The standard for a habeas corpus petition based on false evidence is lower than the standard for a habeas corpus petition based on new evidence. (In re Lawley, supra, 42 Cal. 4th at 1239.)
Penal Code section 1473 provides that "[a] writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons: (1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration; or (2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person."
The standard for granting habeas petitions based on new evidence is not codified in statute. Instead, the standard stems from case law dating back to 1947. In order to be successful on a habeas corpus claim on the grounds that new evidence establishes the person's innocence, the newly discovered evidence "must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability;" and "if a reasonable jury could have rejected the evidence presented, a petition has not satisfied his burden." (In re Lawley, supra, 42 Cal. 4th at 1239; In re Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at 417; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246, In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 723.)
This bill would specify in statute that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted based on new evidence and codify a new standard for granting habeas on this ground. This bill would require the new evidence to be "credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.". As noted in the author's statement, this standard will make California's postconviction standard consistent with 43 other states.
According to the National Registry of Exonerations at the University of Michigan Law School there were 149 exonerations nationwide in 2015, five of which were in California. (National Registry of Exonerations, University of Michigan (Feb. 3, 2016) <http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf> (as of June 20, 2016).) That was five exonerations under a standard that is higher than the standard in most other states. It is unclear how many others were denied a hearing because they did not meet the current standard.
- Argument in Support: According to the Northern California Innocence Project, the sponsor of this bill, "To win a claim of factual innocence under current California case law, an individual must 'undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence.' This standard is the most difficult to meet of any standard in the country. Because the language in the current standard is so unusual, courts find it challenging to interpret. As a judge in the California Court of Appeal noted in NCIP's Obie Anthony case, there is no 'road map as to what it would look like from a factual standpoint' to meet the current standard. Thus, individuals trying to prove their innocence must meet a standard that even courts struggle to interpret. As a result, very few claims of new evidence of factual innocence have succeeded in California, and innocent people remain in prison.
"SB 1134 allows courts to grant relief to innocent people who have new evidence that is so strong that it 'would have more likely than not changed the outcome of the trial.' The 'more likely than not' standard proposed by the bill is clear and is a standard familiar to the courts. It is still a very high standard, but a fair one. At least 29 other states use 'more likely than not' or comparable language in their new evidence standard.
"Since 1989, more than 1,760 innocent people nationwide have been exonerated and freed from prison sentences after years, sometimes decades, of wrongful incarceration. The human and societal costs of wrongful incarceration are numerous and significant.
"The high number of exonerations is due in part to the advent of new forensic techniques, especially with regard to DNA. These developments mean that new evidence not known at the time of trial has become more commonplace. Courts across the country have reversed the convictions of hundreds of innocent individuals after determining that, based on new evidence, the conviction was wrong. But not in California where new evidence of factual innocence almost never meets the 'points unerringly to innocence' standard, and individuals must turn, despite this new evidence, to other post-conviction claims."
- Related Legislation: SB 694 (Leno) was substantially similar to this bill. SB 694 was held in the Committee on Appropriations.
- Prior Legislation:
- SB 1058 (Leno), Chapter 623, Statutes of 2014, allowed a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted when evidence given at trial has subsequently been repudiated by the expert that testified or undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
- SB 618 (Leno), Chapter 800, Statutes of 2013, streamlined the process for compensating persons who have been exonerated after being wrongfully convicted and imprisoned.
- AB 1593 (Ma), Chapter 809, Statutes of 2012, allows a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted if expert testimony relating to intimate partner battering and its effects was received into evidence but was limited at the trial court proceedings relating to a prisoner’s incarceration for the commission of a violent felony committed prior to August 29, 1996, and there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction, that if the testimony had not been limited, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
- SB 1471 (Runner), of the 2007-08 Legislative Session, would have required habeas petitions in death penalty cases to be filed within one year and change the standards for competent counsel. SB 1471 failed passage in Senate Public Safety.
- SB 1058 (Leno), Chapter 623, Statutes of 2014, allowed a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted when evidence given at trial has subsequently been repudiated by the expert that testified or undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Innocence Project (Sponsor)
Northern California Innocence Project (Sponsor)
American Civil Liberties Union of California (Co-sponsor)
A New PATH
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
Drug Policy Alliance
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter
Opposition
None
Analysis Prepared by: Stella Choe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 1134
:
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 7-0, 4/5/16
AYES: Hancock, Anderson, Glazer, Leno, Liu, Monning, Stone
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-1, 5/27/16
AYES: Lara, Bates, Beall, Hill, McGuire, Mendoza
NOES: Nielsen
SOURCE: American Civil Liberties Union
California Innocence Project
Loyola Project for the Innocent
Northern California Innocence Project
DIGEST: This bill allows the granting of a habeas corpus petition based on new evidence which “is credible, material and presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.”
Existing law:
- Provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. (Penal Code § 1473(a).)
- States that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration; or
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person. (Penal Code § 1473 (b))
- Provides that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Penal Code § 1473(c).)
- States that nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies. (Penal Code § 1473(d).)
- Provides that if the district attorney or Attorney General (AG) stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the bases for the court’s ruling or order shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (CVCGB) (Penal Code § 1485.5 (a))
- Provides that the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for a habeas corpus, a motion to vacate or an application for a certificate of factual innocence shall be binding on the AG, the factfinder, and the CVCGB. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (c))
- Provides that in a contested proceeding, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained and if the court finds that the new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the CVCGB for acclaim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the CVCGB shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid. (Penal Code § 148.55(a))
- Provides that if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her. (Penal Code § 148.55(b))
- Provides that for the purposes of this section, “new evidence” means evidence that is not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence. (Penal Code § 148.55(g))
This bill:
- Adds, as grounds for a writ of habeas corpus, when new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
- Provides that for purposes of this section “new evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial but the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
- Clarifies that the binding nature of the credibility determinations on the AG and the CVCGB is true in both contested and uncontested proceedings.
- Provides instead that in a contested proceeding before the CVCGB, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus, or when, the court vacates a judgement, and if the court has found the that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the CVCGB for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the CVCGB shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid.
- Provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petition may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her.
- Deletes the existing definition of “new evidence.”
Comments
Habeas Corpus. Habeas corpus, also known as “the Great Writ”, is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from illegal restraint. The functions of the writ is set forth in Penal Code section 1473(a): “Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.” A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; and,
- Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus.
Standard. In California, there is no codified standard of proof for a writ of habeas corpus brought on the basis of new evidence. The current standard is based on case law. In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1239 found that newly discovered evidence “must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability;” and “if ‘a reasonable jury could have rejected the evidence presented, a petition has not satisfied his burden.” This bill would instead set the standard for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus as “ new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” As noted in the author’s statement, this standard will make California’s postconviction standard consistent with 43 other states.
According to the February 3, 2016 report of National Registry of Exonerations at the University of Michigan Law School there were 149 exonerations nationwide in 2015, five of which were in California. That was five exonerations under a standard that is higher than the standard in most other states, it is unclear how many others were denied a hearing because they did not meet the standard who would be eligible under this standard to have their habeas corpus petition heard.
Victims Compensation Board. This bill also makes conforming changes, making it clear if there is a finding of factual innocence by a court then the CVCGB shall make a recommendation for an appropriation to the Legislature.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Courts: Potentially significant increase in new petitions for writs of habeas corpus to be filed under the authority of the bill. The Judicial Council has indicated potential costs in the millions of dollars (General Fund*) to the trial courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court to address the increase in workload.
- Payments for wrongful convictions: Potential future increase in General Fund appropriations for payment of approved claims for compensation potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000.
- Attorney General (AG): Potentially significant increase in workload (General Fund) to the extent a greater number of persons are allowed to prosecute writs of habeas corpus under the existence of new evidence, as redefined. Resources could potentially be required for post-verdict investigations, to litigate retrials, appeals, and collateral challenges.
- CVCGB: No significant workload impact to the CVCGB. Potential increases in the number of claims submitted for review are estimated to be offset in whole or in part by the reduced workload resulting from potentially fewer required hearings in order to recommend an appropriation for claims prospectively.
- State prisons: Potential future cost savings (General Fund) in averted incarceration of an unknown, but potentially significant amount to the extent future writs of habeas corpus are granted that otherwise would not have been eligible to be filed.
American Civil Liberties Union (co-source)
California Innocence Project (co-source)
Loyola Project for the Innocent (co-source)
Northern California Innocence Project (co-source)
A New Path
A New Way of Life Re-Entry Project
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
John Van de Kamp, former California Attorney General
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Association of Social Workers
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/31/16)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support former Attorney General John Van de Kamp states:
To win a claim of factual innocence under current California case law, an individual must “undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence” with evidence that no “reasonable jury would reject.” This standard is the most difficult in the country and is so impossibly high that it functions as a barrier to wrongfully convicted individuals seeking justice in our criminal justice system. SB 1334 amends California Penal Code to incorporate a standard of proof in line with the standards in 43 other states.
SB 1134 will allow courts to grant relief to innocent people who have new evidence that is so strong that it “would likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” The “more likely that not” standard proposed by the bill is clear and is a standard familiar to the courts. It is still a very high standard, but a fair one. To prevail with a claim of factual innocence under the bill, an individual must still have new evidence that “is credible, material, presented without substantial delay,” and “admissible” and that “could not have been discovered prior to the trial by the exercise of due diligence.”
The bill provides a vital claim to innocent individuals who do not have another recourse under other habeas claims such as false testimony, Brady violations or ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the current standard, those innocent individuals have little chance of proving their innocence, so remain wrongfully imprisoned. SB 1134 gives these individuals a fair chance to prove their innocence and the criminal justice system a chance to rectify the wrongful imprisonment of innocent individuals.
5/31/16 20:45:26
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Ricardo Lara, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular Session
SB 1134 (Leno) - Habeas corpus: new evidence: motion to vacate judgment: indemnity
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
SB 1134 would permit a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the existence of “new evidence,” as defined, that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. This bill requires the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board (VCGCB) to recommend payment without a hearing for incarceration of a person if the court finds that the person is factually innocent.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on May 27, 2016
Fiscal Impact:
- Courts: Potentially significant increase in new petitions for writs of habeas corpus to be filed under the authority of the bill. The Judicial Council has indicated potential costs in the millions of dollars (General Fund*) to the trial courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court to address the increase in workload.
- Payments for wrongful convictions: Potential future increase in General Fund appropriations for payment of approved claims for compensation potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000.
- Attorney General (AG): Potentially significant increase in workload (General Fund) to the extent a greater number of persons are allowed to prosecute writs of habeas corpus under the existence of new evidence, as redefined. Resources could potentially be required for post-verdict investigations, to litigate retrials, appeals, and collateral challenges.
- VCGCB: No significant workload impact to the Board. Potential increases in the number of claims submitted for review are estimated to be offset in whole or in part by the reduced workload resulting from potentially fewer required hearings in order to recommend an appropriation for claims prospectively.
- State prisons: Potential future cost savings (General Fund) in averted incarceration of an unknown, but potentially significant amount to the extent future writs of habeas corpus are granted that otherwise would not have been eligible to be filed.
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Author Amendments:
Make clarifying changes to specify “factual” innocence and add coauthors.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Ricardo Lara, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular Session
SB 1134 (Leno) - Habeas corpus: new evidence: motion to vacate judgment: indemnity
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: April 18, 2016 | Consultant: |
This bill meets the criteria for referral to the Suspense File.
Bill Summary:
SB 1134 would permit a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the existence of “new evidence,” as defined, that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. This bill requires the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board (VCGCB) to recommend payment without a hearing for incarceration of a person if the court finds that the person is factually innocent.
Fiscal Impact:
- Courts: Potentially significant increase in new petitions for writs of habeas corpus to be filed under the authority of the bill. The Judicial Council has indicated potential costs in the millions of dollars (General Fund*) to the trial courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court to address the increase in workload.
- Payments for wrongful convictions: Potential future increase in General Fund appropriations for payment of approved claims for compensation potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000.
- Attorney General (AG): Potentially significant increase in workload (General Fund) to the extent a greater number of persons are allowed to prosecute writs of habeas corpus under the existence of new evidence, as redefined. Resources could potentially be required for post-verdict investigations, to litigate retrials, appeals, and collateral challenges.
- VCGCB: No significant workload impact to the Board. Potential increases in the number of claims submitted for review are estimated to be offset in whole or in part by the reduced workload resulting from potentially fewer required hearings in order to recommend an appropriation for claims prospectively.
- State prisons: Potential future cost savings (General Fund) in averted incarceration of an unknown, but potentially significant amount to the extent future writs of habeas corpus are granted that otherwise would not have been eligible to be filed.
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Background:
Existing law provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of his or her imprisonment or restraint. (Penal Code (PC) § 1473(a).)
Existing law states that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration.
- False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person. (PC § 1473(b).)
Existing law provides that in a contested proceeding, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, or when the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, and if the court finds that the new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for a claim presented to the Board, and upon application by the person, the Board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim paid. (PC § 1485.55(a).)
Under existing law, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her. (PC § 1485.55(b).)
Under existing law, if a court vacates a judgment pursuant to PC § 1473.6 on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him or her. (PC 1485.55(c).)
Existing law provides that “new evidence” means evidence that was not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence. (PC § 1485.55(g).)
Under current law, any person no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained may prosecute a motion to vacate a judgment for newly discovered evidence, as specified. Existing law states that the procedure for bringing and adjudicating a motion to vacate judgment, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof, shall be the same as for prosecuting a writ of habeas corpus. (PC § 1473.6.)
Proposed Law:
This bill would authorize a writ of habeas corpus to be prosecuted on the grounds of the existence of new evidence that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. Specifically, this bill:
- Defines “new evidence” as evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
- Revises the standard for a court finding in order to require VCGCB to recommend a claim be paid without a hearing from a finding that “new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence” to a court finding “that the person is factually innocent.”
- Makes other conforming and technical changes.
Prior Legislation:
SB 694 (Leno) 2015 was identical to this measure. SB 694 was held on the Suspense File of the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
SB 635 (Nielsen) Chapter 422/2015 raises the compensation for innocent persons who were wrongly convicted from $100 to $140 per day of incarceration served, as specified, and expands the scope of a compensable injury to include non-pecuniary injuries, as specified.
SB 1058 (Leno) Chapter 623/2013 allows a writ of habeas corpus when evidence given at trial has subsequently been repudiated by the expert that testified or undermined by later scientific research or technological advances.
SB 618 (Leno) Chapter 800/2013 streamlined and provided clarity to the process for compensating persons who have been exonerated after serving time incarcerated.
Staff Comments:
By lowering the standard of review for habeas corpus petitions alleging new evidence from evidence that would “undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence,” to the existence of evidence “that is credible, material, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial,” this bill could result in an increase in habeas corpus petition filings with the courts. The Judicial Council has indicated potential costs for increased filings of habeas corpus petitions of $7.5 million assuming a 15 percent increase in habeas corpus petition filings at the trial court, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court level. Actual costs would be proportionally higher or lower based on the percentage increase in filings experienced by each of the courts. To the extent the new filings result in orders to show cause, the Judicial Council has indicated additional costs in excess of $5 million assuming 10 percent of the estimated 15 percent increase in habeas corpus petitions received such orders.
By increasing the number of petitions eligible to be filed, this measure could subsequently result in the courts granting additional writs of habeas corpus and motions to vacate judgment. As a result, payments from the General Fund to compensate individuals for wrongful incarceration could potentially increase. While it is unknown how many cases this bill will impact, costs could range potentially in the hundreds of thousands to low millions of dollars in any one year. Annual costs would vary based on the number of claims filed and the duration of unlawful imprisonment specific to each individual. Since 2002, 17 claims have been paid totaling $8.1 million, ranging in amount from $17,000 to $757,000. Five approved claims totaling about $1.2 million are pending Legislative approval. The average compensation amount for the 22 claims is $420,000.
The AG has indicated the provisions of this bill could result in an unquantifiable but potentially significant workload impact that could require increased staffing. The additional need for resources for post-verdict investigations and to litigate retrials, appeals and collateral challenges is unknown, but could be significant.
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular
Bill No: SB 1134 Hearing Date: April 5, 2016
Author: | Leno | ||
Version: | February 18, 2016 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | MK | ||
Subject: Habeas Corpus: New Evidence: Motion to Vacate Judgment: Indemnity
HISTORY
Source: California Innocence Project
Northern California Innocence Project
Loyola Project for the Innocent
American Civil Liberties Union
Prior Legislation: SB 694 (Leno) held in Assembly Appropriations 2015
SB 1058 (Leno) Chapter 623, Stats. 2014
SB 618 (Leno) Chapter 800, Stats. 2013
AB 1593(Ma) Chapter 809, Stats. 2012
Support: A New Path; A New Way of Life Re-Entry Project; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Catholic Conference; California Civil Liberties Advocacy; Friends Committee on Legislation of California; John Van de Kamp, former California Attorney General; Judge Ladoris H. Cordell (Ret.); Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
Opposition: None known
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to allow the granting of a habeas corpus petition based on new evidence which “is credible, material and presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.”
Existing law provides that every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint. (Penal Code § 1473(a).)
Existing law states that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration; or
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person. (Penal Code § 1473 (b))
Existing law provides that any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus. (Penal Code § 1473(c).)
Existing law states that nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the grounds for which a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted or as precluding the use of any other remedies. (Penal Code § 1473(d).)
This bill would add, as grounds for a writ of habeas corpus, when new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.
This bill provides that for purposes of this section “new evidence” means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial but the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.
Existing law provides that if the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts underlying the bases for the court’s ruling or order shall be binding on the attorney General, the factfinder and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (a))
Existing law provides that the express factual findings made by the court, including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for a habeas corpus, a motion to vacate or an application for a certificate of factual innocence shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims board. (Penal Code § 1485.5 (c))
This bill clarifies that the above is true in both contested and uncontested proceedings.
Existing law provides that in a contested proceeding, if a court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained and if the court finds that the new evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the California Crime Victims Compensation and Government Claims board for acclaim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid. (Penal Code § 148.55(a))
This bill provides instead that in a contested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas corpus, or when, the court vacates a judgement, and if the court has found the that the person is factually innocent, that finding shall be binding on the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for a claim presented to the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be made and a claim paid.
Existing law if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her. (Penal Code § 148.55(b))
This bill instead provides that in a contested or uncontested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of habeas corpus and did not find the person factually innocent in the habeas corpus proceedings, the petition may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged was either not committed at all, or if committed, was not by him or her.
Existing law provides that for the purposes of this section, “new evidence” means evidence that is not available or known at the time of trial that completely undermines the prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence. (Penal Code § 148.55(g))
This bill deletes the above provision.
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
For the past several years this Committee has scrutinized legislation referred to its jurisdiction for any potential impact on prison overcrowding. Mindful of the United States Supreme Court ruling and federal court orders relating to the state’s ability to provide a constitutional level of health care to its inmate population and the related issue of prison overcrowding, this Committee has applied its “ROCA” policy as a content-neutral, provisional measure necessary to ensure that the Legislature does not erode progress in reducing prison overcrowding.
On February 10, 2014, the federal court ordered California to reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5% of design capacity by February 28, 2016, as follows:
- 143% of design bed capacity by June 30, 2014;
- 141.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2015; and,
- 137.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2016.
In December of 2015 the administration reported that as “of December 9, 2015, 112,510 inmates were housed in the State’s 34 adult institutions, which amounts to 136.0% of design bed capacity, and 5,264 inmates were housed in out-of-state facilities. The current population is 1,212 inmates below the final court-ordered population benchmark of 137.5% of design bed capacity, and has been under that benchmark since February 2015.” (Defendants’ December 2015 Status Report in Response to February 10, 2014 Order, 2:90-cv-00520 KJM DAD PC, 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (fn. omitted).) One year ago, 115,826 inmates were housed in the State’s 34 adult institutions, which amounted to 140.0% of design bed capacity, and 8,864 inmates were housed in out-of-state facilities. (Defendants’ December 2014 Status Report in Response to February 10, 2014 Order, 2:90-cv-00520 KJM DAD PC, 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (fn. omitted).)
While significant gains have been made in reducing the prison population, the state must stabilize these advances and demonstrate to the federal court that California has in place the “durable solution” to prison overcrowding “consistently demanded” by the court. (Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request For Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, NO. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (2-10-14). The Committee’s consideration of bills that may impact the prison population therefore will be informed by the following questions:
- Whether a proposal erodes a measure which has contributed to reducing the prison population;
- Whether a proposal addresses a major area of public safety or criminal activity for which there is no other reasonable, appropriate remedy;
- Whether a proposal addresses a crime which is directly dangerous to the physical safety of others for which there is no other reasonably appropriate sanction;
- Whether a proposal corrects a constitutional problem or legislative drafting error; and
- Whether a proposal proposes penalties which are proportionate, and cannot be achieved through any other reasonably appropriate remedy.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Under existing California law, an inmate who has been convicted of committing a crime for which he or she claims that s/he has new evidence that points to innocence may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The burden for proving that newly discovered evidence entitles an individual to a new trial is not currently defined by statute, but has evolved from appellate court and California Supreme Court opinions. In order to prevail on a new evidence claim, a petitioner must undermine the prosecution's entire case and “point unerringly to innocence with evidence no reasonable jury could reject” (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239). The California Supreme Court has stated that this standard is very high, much higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard that governs other habeas claims. (Ibid.)
In fact, this standard is so high that it is nearly impossible to meet absent DNA evidence, which exists only in a tiny portion of prosecutions and exonerations. For example, if a petitioner has newly discovered evidence that completely undermines all evidence of guilt—in other words, if the evidence completely disproves every piece of evidence in the prosecution’s original case—and shows that the original jury would therefore definitely not have convicted, but the new evidence does not “point unerringly to innocence,” the petitioner will not have met the standard and will have no chance at a new trial. Thus, someone who would likely never have been convicted if the newly discovered evidence had been available in their original trial is almost guaranteed to remain in prison under the status quo in California.
The proposed new standard in SB 1134 addresses this anomaly. Our criminal justice system was built on the understanding that even innocent people cannot always affirmatively prove innocence, which is why the burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt when a charge is brought to trial, and absent evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, innocence is presumed. The new standard contained in this bill ensures that innocent men and women do not remain in prison even after new evidence shows that a conviction would not have occurred had it been available.
SB 1134 seeks to bring California's innocence standard into line with the vast majority of other states' standards, forty-three in total, and to bring it closer in line with other postconviction standards for relief such as ineffective assistance of counsel, or prosecutorial misconduct, and not so unreasonably high.
As a result of the onerously high standard governing new evidence claims, individuals often choose to re-package evidence of innocence into other types of claims, such as infective assistance of counsel for example. The impact of this is not just a dearth in case law on new evidence claims but it also means that some exonerees may never receive legal recognition of their innocence. To illustrate, consider the case of Maurice Caldwell. Caldwell was convicted of murder in 1991 based on the mistaken identification of a single eyewitness. Investigators later established that it was scientifically impossible for the witness to have identified the perpetrator from her vantage point, thus rendering his conviction invalid. It was not for the fact that there was new evidence available, however, that the conviction was overturned. It was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that ultimately ended Caldwell’s wrongful incarceration.
This misleading and often farcical repackaging of legitimate claims of innocence into other unrelated claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, is the direct result of the impossibly high standard for new evidence as it currently stands. California judges are forced to determine not whether the person’s new evidence shows that he is innocent, but whether the new evidence shows his attorney was ineffective, even when the attorney could not have known about the evidence, as in the case of DNA. The effect of the law is that courts must decide whether a person’s conviction should be reversed based on something other than their claim of innocence, and innocent people are often denied because their claims (understandably) do not fit into a category they were not intended to.
2. Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus, also known as “the Great Writ”, is a process guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions to obtain prompt judicial relief from illegal restraint. The functions of the writ is set forth in Penal Code section 1473(a): “Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.” A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following reasons:
- False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt, or punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;
- False physical evidence believed by a person to be factual, material or probative on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty and which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person; and,
- Any allegation that the prosecution knew or should have known of the false nature of the evidence is immaterial to the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus.
3. Standard
In California, there is no codified standard of proof for a writ of habeas corpus brought on the basis of new evidence. The current standard is based on case law. In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1239 found that newly discovered evidence “must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability;” and “if ‘a reasonable jury could have rejected the evidence presented, a petition has not satisfied his burden.” This bill would instead set the standard for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus as “ new evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” As noted in the author’s statement, this standard will make California’s postconviction standard consistent with 43 other states.
According to the February 3, 2016 report of National Registry of Exonerations at the University of Michigan Law School there were 149 exonerations nationwide in 2015, five of which were in California. That was five exonerations under a standard that is higher than the standard in most other states, it is unclear how many others were denied a hearing because they did not meet the standard who would be eligible under this standard to have their habeas corpus petition heard.
4. Victims Compensation Board
This bill also makes conforming changes, making it clear if there is a finding of factual innocence by a court then the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board shall make a recommendation for an appropriation to the Legislature.
5. Support
In support former Attorney General John Van de Kamp states:
To win a claim of factual innocence under current California case law, an individual must “undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence” with evidence that no “reasonable jury would reject.” This standard is the most difficult in the country and is so impossibly high that it functions as a barrier to wrongfully convicted individuals seeking justice in our criminal justice system. SB 1334 amends California Penal Code to incorporate a standard of proof in line with the standards in 43 other states.
SB 1134 will allow courts to grant relief to innocent people who have new evidence that is so strong that it “would likely than not changed the outcome at trial.” The “more likely that not” standard proposed by the bill is clear and is a standard familiar to the courts. It is still a very high standard, but a fair one. To prevail with a claim of factual innocence under the bill, an individual must still have new evidence that “is credible, material, presented without substantial delay,” and “admissible” and that “could not have been discovered prior to the trial by the exercise of due diligence.”
The bill provides a vital claim to innocent individuals who do not have another recourse under other habeas claims such as false testimony, Brady violations or ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the current standard, those innocent individuals have little chance of proving their innocence, so remain wrongfully imprisoned. SB 1134 gives these individuals a fair chance to prove their innocence and the criminal justice system a chance to rectify the wrongful imprisonment of innocent individuals.
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Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):