AB 1576: Modeling agencies: licensure: models: employees.
- Session Year: 2017-2018
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2018-01-08
The California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 establishes certain safety and other responsibilities of employers and employees. Existing law establishes the Department of Industrial Relations to, among other things, foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.
Existing law provides for the licensure and regulation of talent agencies, as defined, by the Labor Commissioner. Existing law requires moneys collected for licenses and fines collected for violations of these provisions to be paid into the State Treasury and credited to the General Fund.
This bill would require a person engaging in the occupation of a modeling agency, as defined, to be licensed by the Labor Commissioner under the licensing provisions that apply to talent agencies.
The bill would require all employees of a licensee who work with artists, within 30 days of being hired, and all artists represented by a licensee, within 30 days of engaging a talent service, to receive sexual harassment prevention and health standards training in a manner approved by the Labor Commissioner, and once per calendar year thereafter. The bill would define terms, including artist, licensee, model, and modeling agency for purposes of these provisions and would make related findings.
The bill would require the Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board to, no later than June 30, 2019, and in consultation with accredited specialists in the prevention and treatment of eating disorders, adopt an occupational safety and health standard for models, as specified.
Existing law, the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, prohibits a business establishment from discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind. Existing law excepts from this prohibition price differences based specifically upon the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services. This bill would amend the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995 to additionally prohibit a business from discriminating with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted user of the good, as specified. The bill would authorize specifically the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney to prosecute a civil action for preventive relief for a violation of the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995.Existing law, the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, prohibits a business establishment from discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind. Existing law excepts from this prohibition price differences based specifically upon the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services.
This bill would enact the Gender Price Discrimination Act. The bill would amend the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995 to additionally prohibit a business from discriminating with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted user of the good, as specified. The bill would authorize specifically the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney to prosecute a civil action for preventive relief for a violation of this prohibition. the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995.
Existing law, the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, prohibits a business establishment from discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind. Existing law excepts from this prohibition price differences based specifically upon the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services.
This bill would enact the Gender Price Discrimination Act. The bill would prohibit a business from discriminating with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted user of the good, as specified. The bill would authorize the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney to prosecute a civil action for preventive relief for a violation of this prohibition.
Existing law requires a credit card issuer to provide written notice to all persons who are holders of the issuers credit cards if the issuer discloses marketing information, as defined, concerning a consumer that discloses the consumers identity to any person, except as specified.This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to these provisions.Existing law requires a credit card issuer to provide written notice to all persons who are holders of the issuers credit cards if the issuer discloses marketing information, as defined, concerning a consumer that discloses the consumers identity to any person, except as specified.
This bill would make nonsubstantive changes to these provisions.
(a)Professional fashion models face pervasive and hazardous occupational demands to maintain extreme and unhealthy thinness. These occupational pressures create a dangerous work environment. Models experience a substantially elevated risk of eating disorders and other severe health problems associated with starvation.
(b)The majority of models enter the industry as minors, making them especially vulnerable to mistreatment and to the physical and psychological damage caused by eating disorders. Women working as professional fashion models are more likely to have a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, dangerously low body mass index, and amenorrhea, which is a serious medical indicator of hormonal dysregulation that can have negative health consequences for life.
(c)As with all workers, professional fashion models are entitled to safe working conditions. The time, place, and means of the services provided by professional models are typically controlled by the company paying their compensation. Many models, including minors, are wrongly treated as independent contractors and currently do not receive workplace protections. Clarifying their classification as employees of the companies paying their compensation will enhance workplace protections.
(d)The impact of the fashion industry on health reaches far beyond the hazardous occupational conditions that professional models endure. Through its dominant presence in the mass media and pervasive influence on setting cultural standards for apparel, particularly for girls and young women, the fashion industry helps to define, transmit, and reinforce an unrealistic standard of thinness, a well-documented risk factor for eating disorders.
(e)Scientific research has shown that viewing media images of extremely thin models leads to body dissatisfaction in adolescent girls and young women, especially those who already have heightened vulnerability to eating disorders. In addition, scientific studies have shown that body dissatisfaction in adolescence is a strong indicator that a young person may develop an eating disorder.
(f)Improving working conditions to reduce excessive thinness among professional models is likely to lead to healthier images of models weight. This change in media portrayals of models weight may help to achieve a larger societal value in making media images more healthful and less damaging to girls and young womens body image, ultimately reducing their risk for eating disorders.
(g)In 2017, hundreds of artists came out with reports of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the entertainment industry. The reports are horrendous and indicate a culture of harassment that requires workplace education and training to change that culture. Some reports involve criminal assault and acts involving minors.
(h)It has been widely known in the entertainment industry that certain specific individuals have a history of sexual harassment. So much so that an Academy Award winner was the subject of a joke about sexual harassment during public comments at an awards ceremony. That individual has more than 70 complaints of harassment.
(i)Talent agencies often ignore harassment and send artists to work with individuals who have a history of harassment without warning the artist. Several artists have recently publicly called out the talent agencies for a lack of support and reported that some talent agencies have retaliated against artists who have spoken out about harassment.
1707.1.For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions shall apply:
(a)Artist has the same meaning as that term is defined in Section 1701.
(b)License means a license issued by the Labor Commissioner for a talent agency to carry on the business of a modeling agency under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700).
(c)Licensee means a modeling agency that holds a valid license as a talent agency under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700).
(d)Model means an artist under Section 1701 covered under Wage Order 4 of the Industrial Welfare Commission who, in the course of his or her occupation, performs modeling services for, or who consents in writing to the transfer of his or her legal right to the use of his or her name, portrait, picture, or image for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade directly to, a retail store, a manufacturer, an advertising agency, a photographer, a publishing company, or a modeling agency.
(e)Modeling agency means a person that facilitates an employment opportunity as defined in Section 1701 for a model and that holds a valid license under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700).
(f)Modeling services means the appearance by a model in photographic sessions or the engagement of a model in runway, live, filmed, or taped performances requiring him or her to pose, provide an example or standard of artistic expression, or to be a representation to show the construction or appearance of some thing or place for purposes of display or advertising.
1707.2.(a)The Labor Commissioner shall approve a sexual harassment prevention and health standards training program and post on her or his Internet Web site a list of vendors who provide sexual harassment prevention and health standards training under this section. The Labor Commissioner may approve different programs specifically designed to meet the purposes of subdivisions (b) and (c). An approved sexual harassment prevention and health standards training program shall include but not be limited to the following:
(1)Health standards provided for in Section 1707.4.
(2)Types of harassment.
(3)Workplace discrimination.
(4)Workplace safety issues related to physical and emotional health.
(5)How to identify and prevent inappropriate behavior.
(6)Worker rights and protections provided in law.
(7)Potential liabilities for those who engage in, encourage, facilitate, or ignore sexual harassment and failure to comply with health standards.
(8)The potential responsibilities of a licensee to advise and represent the best interests of artists relative to sexual harassment prevention and health standards. This includes, but is not limited to, responding to complaints by artists, refusing to send artists to potentially unhealthy situations, reporting accusations of assault to law enforcement, helping artists recognize and identify sexual harassment and unhealthy activities.
(9)Meet the requirements of Section 12950.1 of the Government Code regardless of the number of employees.
(b)All employees of a licensee who work with artists, either directly or indirectly, shall receive training in a manner approved by the Labor Commissioner under subdivision (a) within 30 days of being hired and once per calendar year thereafter. For purposes of this subdivision, employee includes all those acting as representatives of licensees. The training shall be in the language understood by the employee. The person may comply with this language requirement either by providing the training in that language or by having the training interpreted for the employee in the language that he or she understands.
(c)All artists represented by a licensee shall receive training in a manner approved by the Labor Commissioner under subdivision (a) within 30 days of engaging a talent service and once per calendar year thereafter. The training shall be in the language understood by the artist. The person may comply with this language requirement either by providing the training in that language or by having the training interpreted for the artist in the language that he or she understands.
(d)(1)The licensee shall annually report to the Labor Commissioner, in a manner prescribed by the Labor Commissioner, the total number of employees and artists trained under subdivisions (b) and (c) in the previous calendar year and the complete list of all materials or resources utilized to provide the training.
(2)The Labor Commissioner shall annually aggregate the data provided by licensees under this subdivision and publish on the Internet Web site of the Labor Commissioner the total number of employees and artists trained in the previous calendar year.
1707.3.A person shall not engage in or carry on the occupation of a modeling agency without first procuring a license under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700).
1707.4.(a)The Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board shall, no later than June 30, 2019, and in consultation with accredited specialists in the prevention and treatment of eating disorders, adopt an occupational safety and health standard for models, with an operative date of July 1, 2020, to be fully complied with by December 31, 2020. The standard shall apply to services provided in California by models under this chapter and Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1700). The Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board may update these standards from time to time as it deems necessary.
(b)The standard shall address issues including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1)Protection of the models rights to health care privacy under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-191) and all other provisions of law.
(2)Workplace safety, especially for minors, including protection from sexual exploitation and sexual predators.
(3)Prevention and treatment of eating disorders.
SECTION 1.Section 51.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read:51.6.(a)This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995.(b)(1)No business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of the persons gender.(2)(A)No business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for goods of a substantially similar or like kind, because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. A good is targeted to a user of a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer of the good based on his or her gender as evidenced by either of the following:(i)The content of any marketing materials, advertising materials, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.(ii)The business establishment placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.(B)For the purposes of this paragraph, goods are of a substantially similar or like kind if the goods meet all of the following conditions: (i)Share the same brand, kind, and quality.(ii)Share the same functional components.(iii)Share substantially the same materials or ingredients.(c)(1)Nothing in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) prohibits price differences based specifically upon the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services.(2)Nothing in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) prohibits:(A)Price differences based on gender-neutral factors, including, but not limited to, labor, materials, tariffs, or inventory management.(B)A retail establishment from passing through a price to the consumer that is set by a manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or other entity that the retailer cannot control.(d)Except as provided in subdivision (f), the remedies for a violation of this section are the remedies provided in subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 52. However, an action under this section is independent of any other remedy or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved party.(e)This act does not alter or affect the provisions of the Health and Safety Code, the Insurance Code, or other laws that govern health care service plan or insurer underwriting or rating practices.(f)(1)The following business establishments shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to the customer in writing the pricing for each standard service provided:(A)Tailors or businesses providing aftermarket clothing alterations.(B)Barbers or hair salons.(C)Dry cleaners and laundries providing services to individuals.(2)The price list shall be posted in an area conspicuous to customers. Posted price lists shall be in no less than 14-point boldface type and clearly and completely display pricing for every standard service offered by the business under paragraph (1).(3)The business establishment shall provide the customer with a complete written price list upon request.(4)The business establishment shall display in a conspicuous place at least one clearly visible sign, printed in no less than 24-point boldface type, which reads: CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBITS ANY BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT FROM DISCRIMINATING, WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICE CHARGED FOR SERVICES OF SIMILAR OR LIKE KIND, AGAINST A PERSON BECAUSE OF THE PERSONS GENDER. A COMPLETE PRICE LIST IS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST.(5)A business establishment that fails to correct a violation of this subdivision within 30 days of receiving written notice of the violation is liable for a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000).(6)For the purposes of this subdivision, standard service means the 15 most frequently requested services provided by the business.(a)This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995.
(b)(1)No business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of the persons gender.
(2)(A)No business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for goods of a substantially similar or like kind, because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. A good is targeted to a user of a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer of the good based on his or her gender as evidenced by either of the following:
(i)The content of any marketing materials, advertising materials, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.
(ii)The business establishment placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.
(B)For the purposes of this paragraph, goods are of a substantially similar or like kind if the goods meet all of the following conditions:
(i)Share the same brand, kind, and quality.
(ii)Share the same functional components.
(iii)Share substantially the same materials or ingredients.
(c)(1)Nothing in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) prohibits price differences based specifically upon the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services.
(2)Nothing in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) prohibits:
(A)Price differences based on gender-neutral factors, including, but not limited to, labor, materials, tariffs, or inventory management.
(B)A retail establishment from passing through a price to the consumer that is set by a manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or other entity that the retailer cannot control.
(d)Except as provided in subdivision (f), the remedies for a violation of this section are the remedies provided in subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 52. However, an action under this section is independent of any other remedy or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved party.
(e)This act does not alter or affect the provisions of the Health and Safety Code, the Insurance Code, or other laws that govern health care service plan or insurer underwriting or rating practices.
(f)(1)The following business establishments shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to the customer in writing the pricing for each standard service provided:
(A)Tailors or businesses providing aftermarket clothing alterations.
(B)Barbers or hair salons.
(C)Dry cleaners and laundries providing services to individuals.
(2)The price list shall be posted in an area conspicuous to customers. Posted price lists shall be in no less than 14-point boldface type and clearly and completely display pricing for every standard service offered by the business under paragraph (1).
(3)The business establishment shall provide the customer with a complete written price list upon request.
(4)The business establishment shall display in a conspicuous place at least one clearly visible sign, printed in no less than 24-point boldface type, which reads: CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBITS ANY BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT FROM DISCRIMINATING, WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICE CHARGED FOR SERVICES OF SIMILAR OR LIKE KIND, AGAINST A PERSON BECAUSE OF THE PERSONS GENDER. A COMPLETE PRICE LIST IS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST.
(5)A business establishment that fails to correct a violation of this subdivision within 30 days of receiving written notice of the violation is liable for a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(6)For the purposes of this subdivision, standard service means the 15 most frequently requested services provided by the business.
SECTION 1.Section 51.14 is added to the Civil Code, to read:51.14.(a)This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Gender Price Discrimination Act.(b)A business shall not discriminate with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. A good is targeted to a user of a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer based on his or her gender as evidenced by either of the following:(1)The content of marketing materials, advertising, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.(2)The business placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.(c)A violation of subdivision (b) may be prosecuted only by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney by a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for the conduct.(d)An action brought under this section is independent of any other remedy or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved party.(a)This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Gender Price Discrimination Act.
(b)A business shall not discriminate with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. A good is targeted to a user of a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer based on his or her gender as evidenced by either of the following:
(1)The content of marketing materials, advertising, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.
(2)The business placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.
(c)A violation of subdivision (b) may be prosecuted only by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney by a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons responsible for the conduct.
(d)An action brought under this section is independent of any other remedy or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved party.
SECTION 1.Section 1748.12 of the Civil Code is amended to read:1748.12.(a)For purposes of this section:(1)Cardholder means any consumer to whom a credit card is issued, provided that, when more than one credit card has been issued for the same account, all persons holding those credit cards may be treated as a single cardholder.(2)Credit card means any card, plate, coupon book, or other single credit device existing for the purpose of being used from time to time upon presentation to obtain money, property, labor, or services on credit. Credit card does not mean any of the following:(A)Any single credit device used to obtain telephone property, labor, or services in any transaction under public utility tariffs.(B)Any device that may be used to obtain credit pursuant to an electronic fund transfer but only if the credit is obtained under an agreement between a consumer and a financial institution to extend credit when the consumers asset account is overdrawn or to maintain a specified minimum balance in the consumers asset account.(C)Any key or card key used at an automated dispensing outlet to obtain or purchase petroleum products, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 13401 of the Business and Professions Code, which will be used primarily for business rather than personal or family purposes.(3)Marketing information means the categorization of cardholders compiled by a credit card issuer, based on a cardholders shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity which is provided to a marketer of goods or services or a subsidiary or affiliate organization of the company that collects the information for consideration. Marketing information does not include aggregate data that does not identify a cardholder based on the cardholders shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity or any communications to any person in connection with any transfer, processing, billing, collection, chargeback, fraud prevention, credit card recovery, or acquisition of or for credit card accounts.(b)If the credit card issuer discloses marketing information concerning a cardholder to any person, the credit card issuer shall provide a written notice to the cardholder that clearly and conspicuously describes the cardholders right to prohibit the disclosure of marketing information concerning the cardholder that discloses the cardholders identity. The notice shall be in 10-point type and shall advise the cardholder of his or her ability to respond either by completing a preprinted form or a toll-free telephone number that the cardholder may call to exercise this right.(c)The requirements of subdivision (b) shall be satisfied by furnishing the notice to the cardholder:(1)At least 60 days prior to the initial disclosure of marketing information concerning the cardholder by the credit card issuer.(2)For all new credit cards issued on or after April 1, 2002, on the form containing the new credit card when the credit card is delivered to the cardholder.(3)At least once per calendar year, to every cardholder entitled to receive an annual statement of billings rights pursuant to Section 226.9 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations (12 C.F.R. 226.9) (Regulation Z). The notice required by this paragraph may be included on or with any periodic statement or with the delivery of the renewal card.(d)(1)The cardholders election to prohibit disclosure of marketing information shall be effective only with respect to marketing information that is disclosed to any party beginning 30 days after the credit card issuer has received, at the designated address on the form containing the new credit card or on the preprinted form, or by telephone, the cardholders election to prohibit disclosure. This does not apply to the disclosure of marketing information prior to the cardholders notification to the credit card issuer of the cardholders election.(2)An election to prohibit disclosure of marketing information shall terminate upon receipt by the credit card issuer of notice from the cardholder that the cardholders election to prohibit disclosure is no longer effective.(e)The requirements of this section do not apply to any of the following communications of marketing information by a credit card issuer:(1)Communications to any party to, or merchant specified in, the credit card agreement, or to any person whose name appears on the credit card or on whose behalf the credit card is issued.(2)Communications to consumer credit reporting agencies, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 1785.3.(3)To the extent that the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the requirements of this section as to communication by a credit card issuer to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate, the credit card issuer may communicate information about a cardholder to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate to the extent and in the manner permitted under that act.(4)Communications to a third party when the third party is responsible for conveying information from the card issuer to any of its cardholders.(f)If the laws of the United States require disclosure to cardholders regarding the use of personal information, compliance with the federal requirements shall be deemed to be compliance with this section.(g)This section shall become operative on April 1, 2002.(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Cardholder means any consumer to whom a credit card is issued, provided that, when more than one credit card has been issued for the same account, all persons holding those credit cards may be treated as a single cardholder.
(2)Credit card means any card, plate, coupon book, or other single credit device existing for the purpose of being used from time to time upon presentation to obtain money, property, labor, or services on credit. Credit card does not mean any of the following:
(A)Any single credit device used to obtain telephone property, labor, or services in any transaction under public utility tariffs.
(B)Any device that may be used to obtain credit pursuant to an electronic fund transfer but only if the credit is obtained under an agreement between a consumer and a financial institution to extend credit when the consumers asset account is overdrawn or to maintain a specified minimum balance in the consumers asset account.
(C)Any key or card key used at an automated dispensing outlet to obtain or purchase petroleum products, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 13401 of the Business and Professions Code, which will be used primarily for business rather than personal or family purposes.
(3)Marketing information means the categorization of cardholders compiled by a credit card issuer, based on a cardholders shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity which is provided to a marketer of goods or services or a subsidiary or affiliate organization of the company that collects the information for consideration. Marketing information does not include aggregate data that does not identify a cardholder based on the cardholders shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity or any communications to any person in connection with any transfer, processing, billing, collection, chargeback, fraud prevention, credit card recovery, or acquisition of or for credit card accounts.
(b)If the credit card issuer discloses marketing information concerning a cardholder to any person, the credit card issuer shall provide a written notice to the cardholder that clearly and conspicuously describes the cardholders right to prohibit the disclosure of marketing information concerning the cardholder which that discloses the cardholders identity. The notice shall be in 10-point type and shall advise the cardholder of his or her ability to respond either by completing a preprinted form or a toll-free telephone number that the cardholder may call to exercise this right.
(c)The requirements of subdivision (b) shall be satisfied by furnishing the notice to the cardholder:
(1)At least 60 days prior to the initial disclosure of marketing information concerning the cardholder by the credit card issuer.
(2)For all new credit cards issued on or after April 1, 2002, on the form containing the new credit card when the credit card is delivered to the cardholder.
(3)At least once per calendar year, to every cardholder entitled to receive an annual statement of billings rights pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 226.9 Section 226.9 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations (12 C.F.R. 226.9) (Regulation Z). The notice required by this paragraph may be included on or with any periodic statement or with the delivery of the renewal card.
(d)(1)The cardholders election to prohibit disclosure of marketing information shall be effective only with respect to marketing information that is disclosed to any party beginning 30 days after the credit card issuer has received, at the designated address on the form containing the new credit card or on the preprinted form, or by telephone, the cardholders election to prohibit disclosure. This does not apply to the disclosure of marketing information prior to the cardholders notification to the credit card issuer of the cardholders election.
(2)An election to prohibit disclosure of marketing information shall terminate upon receipt by the credit card issuer of notice from the cardholder that the cardholders election to prohibit disclosure is no longer effective.
(e)The requirements of this section do not apply to any of the following communications of marketing information by a credit card issuer:
(1)Communications to any party to, or merchant specified in, the credit card agreement, or to any person whose name appears on the credit card or on whose behalf the credit card is issued.
(2)Communications to consumer credit reporting agencies, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 1785.3.
(3)To the extent that the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the requirements of this section as to communication by a credit card issuer to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate, the credit card issuer may communicate information about a cardholder to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate to the extent and in the manner permitted under that act.
(4)Communications to a third party when the third party is responsible for conveying information from the card issuer to any of its cardholders.
(f)If the laws of the United States require disclosure to cardholders regarding the use of personal information, compliance with the federal requirements shall be deemed to be compliance with this section.
(g)This section shall become operative on April 1, 2002.
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Date
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Status
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| Feb 1, 2018 | From committee: Filed with the Chief Clerk pursuant to Joint Rule 56. |
| Jan 31, 2018 | Died pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 10(c) of the Constitution. |
| Jan 18, 2018 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jan 11, 2018 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (January 11). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jan 8, 2018 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jan 4, 2018 | From inactive file. |
| Jan 3, 2018 | Notice of intention to remove from inactive file given by Assembly Member Levine. |
| Jun 5, 2017 | Ordered to inactive file at the request of Assembly Member Levine. |
| May 4, 2017 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 3, 2017 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| May 2, 2017 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 7. Noes 2.) (May 2). |
| Mar 22, 2017 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Mar 21, 2017 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 20, 2017 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 19, 2017 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 21. |
| Feb 17, 2017 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Jan 11, 2018 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Labor and Employment |
Passed |
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| May 2, 2017 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
Date of Hearing: January 18, 2018
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1576
Author:(Levine) – As Amended Ver:January 8, 2018
Policy Committee: | Labor and Employment | Vote: | 7 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill establishes health- and sexual harassment- related standards and requirements for models and modeling agencies. Specifically, this bill:
- Requires a person engaging in the occupation of a modeling agency, as defined, to be licensed by the Labor Commissioner (LC) under the licensing provisions that apply to talent agencies.
- Requires all employees of a modeling agency licensed by the Labor Commissioner (LC) who work with artists, within 30 days of being hired, and all artists represented by a licensee, within 30 days of engaging a talent service, to receive sexual harassment prevention and health standards training in a manner approved by the LC.
- Requires the Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (Standards Board) to, no later than June 30, 2019, and in consultation with accredited specialists in the prevention and treatment of eating disorders, adopt an occupation safety and health standard for models.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- One-time costs in the range of $200,000 to $400,000 (special fund) for the Division on Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) to develop or contract for a training program to be provided to employees and models.
- An additional $340,000 in one-time costs (special fund) for the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA), the Standards Board, and the Department and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency to develop regulations around safety and health standards for models. These cost estimates assume future amendments that make the timeline for adopting standards feasible (See Comment #3).
- Ongoing enforcement costs likely in excess of $100,000 annually (special fund) to enforce both the safety and health standards and the training program requirement.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author models face pervasive and hazardous occupational demands to maintain an extreme and unhealthy level of thinness, which can promote eating disorders and in turn creates a dangerous work environment for models. Additionally, in 2017 hundreds of artists came out with reports of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the entertainment industry.
- Background. Traditionally, the LC is not directly involved in the development or enforcement of rules and training requirements related to sexual harassment in the workplace. Those duties have usually been with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) because the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) currently requires employers with 50 or more employees to provide at least two hours of sexual harassment training to all supervisory employees within a defined schedule. However, increasingly the LC has been tasked with developing programs around sexual harassment prevention. For example, SB 1087 (Monning), Chapter 750, Statutes of 2014, requires all farm labor contractors operating in California, as a condition of obtaining or renewing a license, to provide sexual harassment prevention training to employees. AB 1576 introduces a similarly-designed program for the modeling industry.
- Implementation timeline. AB 1576 requires the Standards Board to adopt a set of standards by June 30, 2019. However, Cal/OSHA currently has 20 other rulemaking efforts pending. Given this backlog, it is unfeasible to meet this deadline. The Committee recommends delaying this deadline back one additional year if this bill moves forward.
- Recent Legislation. AB 2539 (Levine), of the 2015-16 Legislative Session, had similar provisions to AB 1576. AB 2529 would have classified models as employees of the person for whom the model’s services are directly provided and would have required Cal/OSHA to adopt safety and health standards for models. It was held on Suspense in this Committee.
Analysis Prepared by: Luke Reidenbach / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: January 11, 2018
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Tony Thurmond, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1576 (
Author:Levine) – As Amended Ver:January 8, 2018
SUBJECT: Modeling agencies: licensure: models: employees
SUMMARY: Establishes various requirements regarding models and modeling agencies, as specified Specifically, this bill:
- Requires a person engaging in the occupation of a modeling agency, as defined, to be licensed by the Labor Commissioner (LC) under the licensing provisions that apply to talent agencies.
- Requires all employees of a licensee who work with artists, within 30 days of being hired, and all artists represented by a licensee, within 30 days of engaging a talent service, to receive sexual harassment prevention and health standards training in a manner approved by the LC, and once per calendar year thereafter.
- Defines terms, including “artist,” “licensee,” “model,” and “modeling agency” for purposes of these provisions and would make related findings.
- Requires Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board to, no later than June 30, 2019, and in consultation with accredited specialists in the prevention and treatment of eating disorders, adopt an occupational safety and health standards for models, as specified.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes through the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 certain safety and other responsibilities of employers and employees.
- Establishes the Department of Industrial Relations to, among other things, foster, promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.
- Provides for the licensure and regulation of talent agencies, as defined, by the Labor Commissioner.
- Requires moneys collected for licenses and fines collected for violations of these provisions to be paid into the State Treasury and credited to the General Fund.
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS: According to the author models face pervasive and hazardous occupational demands to maintain an extreme and unhealthy level of thinness, which can promote eating disorders and in turn creates a dangerous work environment for models. Additionally, in 2017 hundreds of artists came out with reports of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the entertainment industry.
The author asserts that talent agencies often ignore harassment and send artists to work with individuals who have a history of harassment without warning the artist that they are at risk.
Requiring Modeling Agencies to be Licensed Talent Agencies
Since 1959, California law has regulated "talent agencies" by, among other things, requiring the licensure of such agencies with the LC. This statute has largely been referred to as the Talent Agents Act (TAA).
Existing law defines a "talent agency" as a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an artist or artists. Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their professional careers. (Labor Code Section 1700.4(a)).
Existing law defines an "artist" to mean actors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical organizations, directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, musical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists and persons rendering professional services in motion picture, theatrical, radio, television and other entertainment enterprises. (Labor Code Section 1700.4(b)).
In general, a talent agency does not charge an up-front fee but instead procures employment for an artist and then charges a commission fee or similar compensation. However, prior to 1999, California law did not regulate persons engaged in the solicitation of advance-fee payments from an artist prior to employment being secured. At the time, concerns were expressed that unscrupulous individuals were posing as talent agents or talent managers and were requesting large payments in exchange for promises of employment that they could never deliver.
That changed with the enactment of AB 884 (Kuehl), Chapter 626, Statutes of 1999. Among other things, AB 884 required a contract between an advance-fee talent service and an artist to be in writing and to contain specified provisions, including a right to cancel the contract and to receive a refund, as specified. AB 884 also required an advance-fee talent service to file a bond or deposit in the amount of $10,000 with the LC. Subsequent legislation, AB 2860 (Kuehl), Chapter 878, Statutes of 2000, corrected a drafting error to narrow the law to avoid regulating individuals who served merely as photographers, costume designers, drama coaches or in similar occupations but not engaging in advance-fee talent services. In 2005, legislation was enacted to close an alleged loophole in which unscrupulous individuals were finding a way around the law by continuing to charge up-front fees for photographs or "casting kits" while indicating that these services will lead to employment. That measure was enacted as SB 1687 (Murray) Chapter 2008, Statutes of 2004. The advanced-fee talent services provisions were further revised and recast under AB 1319 (Krekorian), Chapter 286, Statutes of 2009.
Those who support requiring modeling agencies to register as talent agencies have argued in the past that many (but not all) modeling agencies are already licensed as talent agencies under existing law, affording models the protections that apply to talent agencies, such as registration with the LC and other requirements. This bill would prohibit a person from engaging in or carrying on the occupation of a modeling agency without first procuring a license under the existing law related to talent agencies.
Sexual Harassment Training
The Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) currently requires employers with 50 or more employees to provide at least two hours of sexual harassment training to all supervisory employees within six months of the assumption of a supervisory position and once every two years thereafter. It also requires employers with five or more employees to post a copy of the DFEH poster discussing prohibitions against discrimination and harassment at a “prominent and accessible location in the workplace.”
This bill would require all employees of talent agencies (including modeling agencies) within 30 days of being hired, and all artists represented by a talent agency, within 30 days of engaging a talent service, to receive additional sexual harassment prevention and health standards training in a manner approved by the LC, and once per calendar year thereafter. This training would be in addition to the sexual harassment training requirements and timelines provided for under FEHA.
Since the LC does not enforce sexual harassment protections in the workplace, requiring the LC to approve sexual harassment prevention and health standards training for the modeling industry may prove to be problematic.
OSHA Standard
Concerns have been raised about various health and safety issues involving models and modeling. Therefore, this bill would require the OSHA Standards Board, in consultation with accredited specialists in the prevention and treatment of eating disorders, to adopt an occupational safety and health standard for models. The bill specifies that the standard shall address issues including, but not limited to (1) protection of the model's rights to health care privacy under federal law and all other provisions of law, (2) workplace safety, especially for minors, including protection from sexual exploitation and sexual predators, and (3) prevention and treatment of eating disorders.
Prior Legislation
AB 2539 (Levine) of 2015-16 would have established various requirements regarding models and modeling agencies. AB 2539 had three main provisions: 1) prohibiting a person from engaging in or carrying on the occupation of a modeling agency without first procuring a license under existing law related to talent agencies; 2) providing that a model shall be classified as an employee of the person for whom the model's services are directly provided; 3) requiring the OSHA Standards Board to adopt an occupational safety and health standard for models, as specified. AB 2539 was held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee suspense file.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None on file.
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: Jennifer Richard / L. & E. /
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1576
Author:(Levine)
As Amended Ver:
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Judiciary | 7-2 | Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Cristina Garcia, Kalra, Reyes, Ting | Cunningham, Kiley |
SUMMARY: Prohibits a business establishment from discriminating, with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted consumer. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a business establishment from discriminating with respect to the price charged for goods of a substantially similar or like kind, because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. Specifies that a good is targeted to a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer of the good based on his or her gender, as evidenced by either of the following:
- The content of any marketing materials, advertising materials, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.
- The business establishment placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.
- Specifies that, for purposes of the above, goods are of a substantially similar or like kind if they meet all of the following conditions:
- Share the same brand, kind, or quality.
- Share the same functional components.
- Share substantially the same materials or ingredients.
- Specifies that nothing in this bill prohibits:
- Price differences based on gender-neutral factors, including, but not limited to, labor, materials, tariffs, or inventory management.
- A retail establishment from passing through a price to the consumer that is set by a manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or other entity that the retailer cannot control.
- Provides that the remedies for a violation of this bill shall be the same as those provided under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as specified.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, that all persons within this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of any kind whatsover. (Civil Code Section 51)
- Provides, under the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, that no business establishment of any kind whatsover may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of the person's gender. However, nothing in this provision prohibits price differences based specifically on the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services. (Civil Code Section 51.6)
- Provides that any person who violates either of the above provisions is liable for each offense for actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a judge or jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case no less than $4,000, and any attorney's fees determined by the court. (Civil Code Section 52)
FISCAL EFFECT: None
COMMENTS: The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits a business establishment from discriminating against a person based on a number of protected characteristics, including but not limited to a person's sex or gender. Although the Unruh Civil Rights Act arguably already prohibited price discrimination in goods and services based on a person's gender, the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995 nonetheless added a new section to the Civil Code to explicitly state that a business could not discriminate with respect to the price charged for "services" of a like or similar kind based on a person's gender and made the violation punishable with the same remedies as those provided by the Unruh Civil Rights Act. In particular, the Act sought to address the generally higher prices charged to women for services such as dry cleaning and haircuts, among other personal services.
This bill will amend the Gender Tax Repeal Act so that it applies to price discrimination in goods as well as services. Specifically, this bill prohibits any business from charging a different price for "substantially similar" goods because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. The bill specifies that a good is targeted to a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer based on his or her gender. Under the bill, the good is deemed targeted toward a particular gender if the marketing, packaging, and store placement of the good would lead a reasonable person to believe that it was targeted to a particular gender. The bill specifies that goods are only considered to be "substantially similar or of like kind" if they share all of the following: the same brand, kind, or quality; the same functional components; and substantially the same materials or ingredients. The bill specifies that nothing in the bill is intended to prohibit prices differences based on gender-neutral factors, including, but not limited to, labor, materials, tariffs, or inventory management. Finally, retailers would be allowed to pass through prices differences that are set by the manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or any other entity that the retailer cannot control.
Consistent with the existing Gender Tax Repeal Act, the remedy for a violation of this bill would be the same as that provided by the Unruh Act. Specifically, an aggrieved person could bring a private action for treble damages, but not less than $4,000, and attorney's fees and costs. Additionally, an action could be brought by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney for injunctive or preventive relief, as specified.
According to the author, while the Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in business establishments, generally, and the Gender Repeal Tax Act of 1995 prohibits gender discrimination in the pricing of "services," there is no statute that clearly prohibits gender discrimination in the pricing of "goods." Therefore, the author states, "this bill creates the Gender Price Discrimination Act, which would prohibit discrimination for consumer goods." As an example of the need for this bill, the author cites a 2015 report conducted by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs which "looked at nearly 800 products that were marketed toward men and women and found that women’s products cost more 42% of the time and on average cost 7% more. Many times the only difference between these products was the color. This bill would prohibit price differences for like or substantially similar products based on the targeted user of the good if those price differences are based on the gender of the targeted user of the good." Supporters contend that gender-based price discrimination is a civil rights issue that primarily harms women, who, on average, face the double burden of lower wages and higher prices for consumer goods.
Retail and other business groups oppose this bill for a variety of reasons. First, opponents stress that prices are determined by a complex set of market factors that this bill does not account for; prices are not determined merely by the labor, materials, or even the overall quality of the product. Second, opponents contend that this bill will require businesses, especially retailers, to survey all of their inventory to determine if: 1) a good is targeted to a person of a particular gender; 2) if so, if the goods are "substantially similar or of like kind"; and 3) if any price differences reflect "gender-neutral" factors. Third, in light of the ambiguities in making such determinations, opponents contend that the bill will lead to costly and time-consuming litigation as litigants and courts try to sort out the meaning of the bill's terms. Finally, opponents note that retailers will have to make these initial determinations on their own. In doing so, they will need to consider whether certain colors or other features are considered "male" or "female." The coalition believes that this requirement to "gender-identify" all products "seems like a step backward, especially as our society works to eliminate gender bias."
Analysis Prepared by: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000233
Date of Hearing: May 2, 2017
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1576
Author:(Levine) – As Amended Ver:March 21, 2017
SUBJECT: Gender discrimination: pricing: goods
KEY ISSUE: should a business establishment be prohibited from charging a different price for the same or similar good, if the price difference is based only on the gender of the targeted user of the good?
SYNOPSIS
The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits a business establishment from discriminating against a person based on a number of protected characteristics, including but not limited to, a person's sex, gender, or gender identity. Although prior to 1995 the Unruh Civil Rights Act arguably prohibited gender-based price discrimination, the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995 nonetheless expressly stated that a business could not discriminate with respect to the price charged for services of a like or similar kind based on a customer's gender. In particular, this Act sought to address the generally higher prices charged to women for services such as dry cleaning and haircuts. This bill, as currently in print, would add a new section to the Civil Code that similarly prohibits gender-based price discrimination in the sale of goods (as opposed to services). Unlike the Gender Tax Repeal Act, which provides for a private right of action to an aggrieved consumer, this bill, as now in print, would limit enforcement actions to those brought by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or city attorney. The bill in print also lacks any clear exception for pricing in men's and women's products based on gender-neutral factors. The author and supporters of this bill rightly contend that for products that do not differ in terms of labor, materials, or related production or marketing costs, it is unfair to charge more based on the gender of the intended consumer, especially when the only difference between those products are colors, packaging, or other superficial features designed to appeal to a particular gender. Opponents, on the other hand, contend that this bill ignores other market factors that determine prices (such as demand, quality of materials and design, competitor pricing, etc.) and that it will force retailers to make two arbitrary determinations: (1) which gender is the targeted user of the particular product; and (2) when two goods are "of a substantially similar or like kind." While the Committee supports the general goals of this bill, the Committee analysis recommends amendments that will (1) place the provisions of this bill within the existing Gender Tax Repeal Act; (2) create clear exceptions for price differences based on gender-neutral factors; and (3) allow retailers to pass through prices set by manufacturers, wholesalers, or others over which they have no control. The reasons for these strongly urged Committee amendments are discussed in the analysis. The bill summary immediately below, however, reflects the bill in print.
SUMMARY: Prohibits a business establishment from discriminating, with respect to the price charged for the same, or substantially similar, goods because of the gender of the targeted consumer. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits a business establishment from discriminating with respect to the price charged for goods of a substantially similar or like kind, because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. Specifies that a good is targeted to a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer of the good based on his or her gender, as evidenced by either of the following:
- The content of any marketing materials, advertising materials, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.
- The business establishment placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.
- Provides that a violation of 1) above may be prosecuted only by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney in an action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against a person or persons responsible for the conduct.
- Specifies that an action brought under this section is independent of any other remedy or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved party.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, that all persons within this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of any kind whatsover. (Civil Code Section 51.)
- Provides, under the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, that no business establishment of any kind whatsover may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of the person's gender. However, nothing in this provision prohibits price differences based specifically on the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services. (Civil Code Section 51.6.)
- Provides that any person who violates either of the above provisions is liable for each offense for actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a judge or jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case no less than $4,000, and any attorney's fees determined by the court. (Civil Code Section 52.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits a business establishment from discriminating against a person based on a number of protected characteristics, including but not limited to a person's sex or gender. Although the Unruh Civil Rights Act arguably already prohibited price discrimination in goods and services based on a person's gender, the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995 nonetheless added a new section to the Civil Code to explicitly state that a business could not discriminate with respect to the price charged for "services" of a like or similar kind based on a person's gender and made the violation punishable with the same remedies as those provided by the Unruh Civil Rights Act. In particular, the Act sought to address the generally higher prices charged to women for services such as dry cleaning and haircuts, among other personal services.
This bill would add a new section to the Civil Code to prohibit gender-based price discrimination in the sale of goods (as opposed to services). However, the bill in print would limit the remedies for a violation of this bill to injunctive relief sought by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or city attorney. For reasons discussed below, the Committee will recommend that the substantive provisions of this bill be placed within the existing framework of the Gender Tax Repeal Act, in particular to provide consistency in remedies whether the discrimination is for goods or services. In addition, the Committee recommends reasonable exceptions, expressly exempting price differences based on gender-neutral factors and allow retailers to pass through prices differences established by manufacturers, distributors, and wholesalers, be added to the bill. It is unclear how and if these proposed amendments will affect the position of the groups in opposition to the bill in print; on the one hand, the exemptions address many, but by no means all, concerns raised by the opposition; on the other hand, by placing the language of the bill within the existing Gender Tax Repeal Act, the proposed amendments would allow an aggrieved person (as well as an Attorney General or public prosecutor) to bring an action against a business that violates the bill’s prohibition on gender-based price discrimination in the sale of goods.
Studies on Gender-Based Pricing Discrimination: In the past three decades, a number of studies have documented examples of sharp differences between the prices of comparable goods depending upon whether the goods are designed for, or marketed to, men or women. A 1992 study by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, found that when women bought used cars, they were twice as likely to be quoted a higher price as men. The same study, based on a survey of 80 hair salons in New York City, found that, on average, women paid 25 percent more for the same haircuts as men and 27 percent more for the identical service of laundering a basic white cotton shirt. More recently, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs issued a report in December of 2015 and found that little had changed since 1992. The study examined 800 products, with purportedly male and female versions, that were offered both online and in stores. The report concluded that 42% of the time women’s products cost more than similar products for men and on average cost 7% more. The products include children's toys and clothing, adult clothing, personal care products, and health care products.
Closer to home, in the 1990s the California Legislature held hearings and conducted a survey that found results similar to the New York studies. For example, a survey of five California cities conducted by the Assembly Office of Research found that 40% of haircutting establishments charged women, on average, five dollars more than men for a haircut, and 64% of dry cleaning and laundry establishments charged women, on average, $1.71 more to clean a simple white shirt. The California Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of AB 1100, which enacted the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, cited research showing that pricing discrimination – dubbed a "gender tax" – cost "each woman approximately $1,351 annually, or about $15 million for all women in California." (For a summary of this and other studies reaching similar results see Jennifer Kerr, "Gender Equity Bill Wins Assembly Approval," Orange County Register May, 27, 1994; and Comment, Harvard Law Review 109 (May 1996) 1839-1944.)
It should be noted, however, that many of the price differences for goods noted in the various studies would not necessarily violate this bill. For example, some of the higher price differences appear to be in women's clothing, beauty products, and personal care products, such as shampoos, conditioners, and deodorants purportedly designed for women. If these products are, in fact, substantially different than products designed for men due to physiological or other differences, then they would not be "goods of a substantially similar or like kind." In short, if the price reflects the costs of making the product – due to labor, ingredients, or design, for example – then arguably the price is not based on the gender of the targeted user, but on real differences in the quality of the product. In other cases, where the only apparent difference between the products is mere color or packaging, designed to target a consumer of a particular gender, then a price differential would seemingly violate the provisions of this bill. Opponents, however, reasonably argue that, as a practical matter, it will be very difficult to determine whether particular goods are designed for a specific gender, and if it is, it may be difficult to determine in many situations, if the goods are the "same or substantially similar" that would require them to be the same price or, conversely, whether the goods are sufficiently different to justify a different price. As discussed below, the proposed Committee amendments attempt to address some of these concerns and clarify that the bill does not eliminate all prices differences between men's and women's goods, so long as the reason for the price difference is based on something other than the gender of the intended user.
Unintended Consequences: Koire v. Metro Car Wash and the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995: California's first response to the problem of gender pricing discrimination came not from the Legislature but from the courts. In Koire v. Metro Car Wash, the California Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civil Code Section 51) prohibited sex-based price discounts. In this case, the male plaintiff had visited several car washes that offered female customers a discount on "Ladies' Day." He asked to have his car washed at the discounted price but was refused, presumably because he was a male. The same plaintiff also visited several night clubs that offered free admission to women on "Ladies' Night." Once again the plaintiff sought the free admission, but was once again refused. Eventually the plaintiff filed a suit against seven car washes and one night club alleging violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The language of the Unruh Act, as the Court noted, "is clear and unambiguous." It prohibits a business establishment from denying any person "full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services" on the basis of sex. Although the business defendants argued that the Unruh Act only prohibited the "exclusion" of a member of a protected class from a business establishment, the California Supreme Court rejected this narrow reading, noting that the Act not only guarantees access but, once there, "full and equal advantages, facilities, privileges, or services." The Legislature's choice of words, the Court reasoned, shows concern "not only with access to business establishments, but with equal treatment of patrons in all aspects of the business." (Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 24, 29.) The Court held, therefore, that the Unruh Act prohibited the sex-based price discounts offered by the several car washes and the nightclub to female patrons. The Court added that price discrimination based on sex not only harmed the male plaintiff, it was "generally detrimental to both men and women because it reinforces harmful stereotypes."
Despite the California Supreme Court's holding that the general language of the Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibited sex-based price discrimination, in 1995, the Legislature enacted the arguably redundant Gender Tax Repeal Act (Civil Code Section 51.6.) which provided that "no business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of a person's gender." The legislative history suggests that the Gender Tax Repeal Act was primarily targeted at services like dry cleaners that typically charged more to clean women's clothes, even when the clothes were substantially similar to men's clothes in terms of size and fabric. The bill also targeted barbers and similar haircutting establishments that typically charged more to cut women's hair than men's hair. To the extent that these services were truly of similar, or like kind, gender-based pricing was most likely already prohibited by the Unruh Act as interpreted by Koire. Presumably, the intent of the 1995 legislation may have been to codify that holding. Indeed, the original version of the legislation would have applied to both services and goods. However, because the Gender Tax Repeal Act, as finally enacted, only applied to "services," it unintentionally created a presumption that price discrimination was not prohibited when it came to "goods" – otherwise, the Legislature would have included "goods" when it decided to address the issue of gender-based pricing discrimination. In short, the unintended consequence of the Gender Tax Repeal Act may have weakened the protection afforded by the Unruh Act, as interpreted by the Koire ruling. Prior to the Gender Tax Repeal Act, a plaintiff could have argued that discriminatory pricing in goods violated the Unruh Act. But once the Legislature expressly prohibited that discrimination in the pricing of "services," the standard canons of statutory interpretation suggested that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit gender discrimination in the pricing of "goods." However, the Legislature is now free to correct this unintended consequence by extending the application of the Gender Tax Repeal Act to goods. This is precisely the reason why the Committee recommends amending the Gender Tax Repeal Act to include goods, rather than creating a new section.
Identifying gender-specific products and goods of "substantially similar or like kind:" As noted below, opponents of this bill, especially those representing retailers, contend that it will be very difficult for them to comply with this law for two critical reasons. First, in considering the legitimacy of price differences, retailers will need to determine whether the goods are gender-neutral or gender-specific. Second, if the goods are gender-specific, but priced differently, then the retailer will need to determine if the goods are "of a substantially similar or like kind." If the two products are substantially similar, then the price of the two products will need to be identical unless some "gender-neutral" pricing factor applies. Opponents contend that, in practice, making these determinations will be extremely difficult. While some goods may be clearly designed or expressly labeled for one gender or the other, other goods may be more ambiguous. Similarly, determining whether goods are "substantially similar" may be easy where the only difference between two products is the color or the packaging; however, many more products that offer different versions for men and women will have varying degrees of difference that reflect the supposedly different needs or desires of men and women. Calculating what degree of difference will justify a price difference may be quite difficult and somewhat arbitrary. The proposed Committee amendments, listed and discussed below, are intended to provide further guidance in making these determinations, while recognizing that these amendments may not address all opposition concerns.
Is this bill progressive or regressive? This bill raises intriguing policy questions. On the one hand, the weight of evidence suggests that even though women, on average, make less money than men, they also, on average, pay more for seemingly similar products. It is not clear why this is so; no doubt it is due to some complex set of cultural and ideological biases and stereotypes that cause women, in the aggregate, to place greater value on certain products and effectively consent to pay more for them. Advertisers and sellers rely upon – and to some extent manipulate – those cultural and ideological biases to charge what the market will bear. The cultural and ideological biases may well be the product of patriarchy, but pricing discrimination reflecting those biases is a product of market capitalism. What, if anything, can be done about this state of affairs? According to the proponents, the Legislature should prohibit retailers and manufacturers from exploiting gender stereotypes to maximize their profits. Supporters appear to hope that, in the long run, laws like this will not only prohibit gender discrimination in pricing, but will also cause manufacturers and retailers to abandon a gendered approach to marketing altogether. Opponents, on the other hand, suggest that this bill is out-of-touch with the times and only serves to reinforce gendered stereotypes. Indeed, this bill seems to require retailers to make decisions based on the very gender stereotypes that our society is trying to move away from. Indeed, one might argue that this bill is premised on the sexist belief that women are not as strong as men when it comes to resisting marketing pressures and have no choice but to choose pink razors over blue razors, even if the pink razors are more expensive. Opponents, on the other hand, contend that men and women are equally capable of making informed choices and resisting the pressure of advertisers.
PROPOSED COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS: Last year this Committee heard SB 899 (Hueso), which like this bill sought to prohibit gender-based pricing discrimination for goods. Unlike the bill under consideration, SB 899 would have accomplished its goal by amending the Gender Tax Repeal Act, rather than creating a new section. The Committee proposed several amendments to that bill, leaving it in the Gender Tax Repeal Act, but adding certain clarifications and exceptions. The author of SB 899, however, chose not to take those amendments and instead pulled SB 889 from the final Committee hearing. The Committee still believes that those amendments were appropriate, and Committee members, therefore, may wish to urge the author of the present measure to take those well-considered amendments. Below is a discussion of, and rationale for, the proposed Committee amendments.
Create consistency by moving the substance of the bill into the existing Gender Tax Repeal Act. The Committee believes that the bill language should be placed in the existing Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995, given that the stated intent of the bill is to effectively extend its prohibitions to goods, as well as services. While there may be some differences between services and goods – for example, the service is provided directly to the end user of the service, while the product may be purchased by one person, but used or consumed by another – it is not clear why these differences necessitate a different statute with different remedies. Most notably, placing this bill within the Gender Tax Repeal Act will result in more logically consistent remedies. Under the Gender Tax Repeal Act, if a business establishment violates the Act by charging prices for services based upon gender, an aggrieved party may bring an action and recover treble damages, but for an amount not less than $4,000. This statutory damage amount was deemed necessary because the monetary damage will likely be small, and even with treble damages it would not be worthwhile for any individual to bring an action. However, under the bill in print, if businesses charged different prices for goods based upon gender, the aggrieved party would have no remedy. The bill, as currently in print, limits any a civil action to one prosecuted by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, and then provides injunctive relief as the only remedy. It seems unlikely that the Attorney General or district attorneys would make this issue a priority, or that they would have the ability to extensively investigate the issue, given the fact that they could only obtain injunctive relief. This is precisely why, in the existing Gender Tax Repeal Act, as well as other statutes prohibiting discrimination, the law allows persons affected by the discrimination to bring an action. One could debate the merits of limiting civil actions to those brought by a public prosecutor, but there is no apparent reason why the remedies for gender discrimination in the pricing of services would justify a private right of action, whereas gender discrimination in the pricing of goods would not.
Provide guidance on what constitutes" substantially similar" goods. Opponents contend that the bill provides little guidance as to how a business, and a retailer in particular, would know if two goods were "substantially similar" enough to prohibit charging of different prices for the goods, or whether differences in labor, design, or materials were sufficient to justify a higher price for one good that may be intended for, or targeted to, a consumer of a particular gender. Therefore, similar to the approach taken in last year's SB 899, the Committee recommends that the bill include identifying factors which may be considered in determining whether price differences are justified. As proposed to be amended by the Committee, goods are of "substantially similar or like kind" only if the goods meet all of the following conditions: (1) they share the same brand, kind, and quality; (2) they share the same functional components; and (3) they are made of substantially the same materials or ingredients. While these factors could also lend themselves to varying interpretations, they provide more guidance than the bill in print currently provides. For example, the coalition of retailers and other business groups opposing this bill asks, "Is toothpaste considered a gender-specific product if a female was featured in an advertisement and a competitor's advertisement featured a male?" In that particular example, it would not matter, because by definition the "competitor's" product would be of a different "brand," and therefore would not meet the bill's definition of "substantially similar or like" goods. Moreover, if the toothpastes were the same brand, the critical question in determining whether a price difference would be justified, under the proposed amendments, would not be whether an advertisement featured a man or a woman; it would rather be whether one toothpaste itself was different from the other in some way that justified a higher price. If the only difference between the toothpaste was the gender of the person who pitched the advertisement or whose picture was on the package, or words on the packaging or advertising saying that the product was aimed at a specific gender, then different prices would clearly violate the provisions of the bill.
Furthermore, the proposed Committee amendments expressly clarify that a business may charge a different price (even for a good targeted to a consumer of a particular gender) if the price is based on "gender-neutral factors," including, but not limited to, labor, materials, tariffs, or inventory management. For example, if a retailer found that goods targeted to a particular gender were not selling, the exemption for "inventory management" would allow the retailer to lower the price in order to move the good and better manage inventory – even if lowering the price of that good for this gender-neutral purpose would give it a price that was less than a similar good targeted to a person of a different gender. If a business determined that any goods targeted to a particular gender meet the criteria for substantially similar goods, and there is no gender-neutral basis for the price difference, then this bill would require the business to charge the same price for those goods.
Allow retailers to pass through prices differences beyond their control. This bill prohibits gender-based pricing discrimination by any business establishment, not just a retail establishment. However, because the price difference charged to the targeted consumer will manifest itself in the retail establishment, retailers will be the ones most likely accused of violating the provisions of the bill. However, initial price differences may be set, not by the retailer, but by the manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler. For example, if a wholesaler charges a different price for substantially similar goods based on the gender of the targeted user, the retailer must also charge more in order to maintain the same profit margin. Indeed, if the difference charged by the wholesaler were substantial enough, the retailer might need to sell the higher-priced good at a loss in order to charge an equal price. In order to account for these situations, the proposed Committee amendments specify that the retailer may pass along to consumers a price difference set by a manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or other entity that the retailer cannot control.
Specifically, the amendments described above will be as follows:
- Strike the contents of the bill in print and insert:
SECTON 1. Section 51.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
(a) This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995.
(b) (1) No business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services of similar or like kind, against a person because of the person’s gender.
(2) (A) No business establishment of any kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for goods of a substantially similar or like kind, because of the gender of the targeted user of the good. A good is targeted to a user of a particular gender if the good is designed or intended to be used by, or appeal to, a consumer of the good based on his or her gender as evidenced by either of the following:
(i) The content of any marketing materials, advertising materials, or packaging would suggest to a reasonable person that the product is targeted to a specific gender.
(ii) The business establishment placed the product in a location that was labeled for a specific gender.
(B) For the purposes of this paragraph, goods are of a substantially similar or like kind if the goods meet all of the following conditions:
(i) Share the same, brand, kind, and quality.
(ii) Share the same functional components.
(iii) Share substantially the same materials or ingredients.
(c) Nothing in paragraph (1) subdivision (b) prohibits price differences based specifically upon the amount of time, difficulty, or cost of providing the services.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) prohibits:
- Prices differences based on gender-neutral factors, including, but not limited to, labor, materials, tariffs, or inventory management.
- A retail establishment from passing through a price to the consumer that is set by a manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, or other entity that the retailer cannot control.
(d) Except as provided in subdivision (f), the remedies for a violation of this section are the remedies provided in subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 52. However, an action under this section is independent of any other remedy or procedure that may be available to an aggrieved party.
(e) This act does not alter or affect the provisions of the Health and Safety Code, the Insurance Code, or other laws that govern health care service plan or insurer underwriting or rating practices.
(f) (1) The following business establishments shall clearly and conspicuously disclose to the customer in writing the pricing for each standard service provided:
(A) Tailors or businesses providing aftermarket clothing alterations.
(B) Barbers or hair salons.
(C) Dry cleaners and laundries providing services to individuals.
(2) The price list shall be posted in an area conspicuous to customers. Posted price lists shall be in no less than 14-point boldface type and clearly and completely display pricing for every standard service offered by the business under paragraph (1).
(3) The business establishment shall provide the customer with a complete written price list upon request.
(4) The business establishment shall display in a conspicuous place at least one clearly visible sign, printed in no less than 24-point boldface type, which reads: “CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBITS ANY BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT FROM DISCRIMINATING, WITH RESPECT TO THE PRICE CHARGED FOR SERVICES OF SIMILAR OR LIKE KIND, AGAINST A PERSON BECAUSE OF THE PERSON’S GENDER. A COMPLETE PRICE LIST IS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST.”
(5) A business establishment that fails to correct a violation of this subdivision within 30 days of receiving written notice of the violation is liable for a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(6) For the purposes of this subdivision, “standard service” means the 15 most frequently requested services provided by the business.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author, while the Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in business establishments, generally, and the Gender Repeal Tax Act of 1995 prohibits gender discrimination in the pricing of "services," there is no statute that clearly prohibits gender discrimination in the pricing of "goods." Therefore, the author states, "this bill creates the Gender Price Discrimination Act, which would prohibit discrimination for consumer goods.” As an example of the need for this bill, the author cites a 2015 report conducted by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs which "looked at nearly 800 products that were marketed toward men and women and found that women’s products cost more 42% of the time and on average cost 7% more. Many times the only difference between these products was the color. This bill would prohibit price differences for like or substantially similar products based on the targeted user of the good if those price differences are based on the gender of the targeted user of the good."
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California (PPAC) contends that "California has been a leader in fighting gender discrimination in our economy. Since 1995, California has specifically prohibited gender price discrimination for consumer services. Two years ago, California passed the strongest law in the country prohibiting gender discrimination in wages. While California has tackled discrimination on these two fronts, no such prohibition for gender price discrimination for consumer goods exists." PPAC writes that it "supports policies that ensure that all people are treated equally, without discrimination, which includes the prices they pay for the goods they purchase."
The Women's Foundation of California (WFC) supports this bill for many of the same reasons as the author and PPAC, but adds that these price differences affect women in particular, and "in every sector of the economy from their childhood to their old age," from girls' toys to senior home and health care products.
The United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930, California NOW, YWCA of San Francisco and Marin, and U.S. Representative Jackie Speier (the author of the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995) support this measure for substantially the same reasons as those noted above.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: A coalition of retail, business, and marketing associations oppose this bill for a variety of reasons. However, they stress primarily that the bill misunderstands the full set of factors that determine a good's price. The coalition writes, for example, that price determinations "are fluid and affected by numerous factors," not just the labor or materials necessary to make the product. Prices are also determined by many other factors, opponents contend, such as "competitor pricing, brand, country of origin, cost of production, availability of supply, promotional campaigns, cost of design, cost of marketing, cost of packaging, merchandising, tariffs, method of manufacture determine product pricing to name a few."
The coalition is also concerned about the likelihood of litigation, especially given that the bill "imposes pricing requirements on a highly a complex supply chain that constantly changes." Under this bill, the coalition claims, "thousands of products would be subject to the scrutiny of the legal system, even products with price differences ranging from a penny to several dollars." In short, the coalition believes that "AB 1576 is extremely subjective and consequently invites enforcement by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney."
Finally, the coalition notes that this bill offers no guidance as to what goods are considered gender-specific and thus subject to the law. In order to know if a product was "targeted" to a particular gender, businesses would have to be aware of all of the advertising and marketing associated with all their goods. Some products, the coalition believes, may be clearly labeled for a specific gender and placed in a section of the store labeled for a specific gender. But many more products will not "fall neatly" into those categories. "For example," the coalition wonders, "is toothpaste considered a gender-specific product if a female was featured in an advertisement and a competitor's advertisement featured a male?" Finally, the coalition notes that retailers will have to make these determinations on their own and in doing so they will need to consider whether certain colors or other features are considered "male" or "female." The coalition believes that this requirement to "gender-identify" all products "seems like a step backward, especially as our society works to eliminate gender bias."
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California National Organization of Women
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California
United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930
U.S. Representative Jackie Speier
Women's Foundation of California
YWCA San Francisco and Marin
Opposition
American Apparel Footwear Association
California Chamber of Commerce
California New Car Dealers Association
California Retailers Association
Consumer Specialty Products Association
Grocery Manufacturers of America
National Federation of Independent Businesses
The Toy Association
Valley Industry and Commerce Association
Analysis Prepared by: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations
Assembly Standing Committee on Labor and Employment
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):