AB 3120: Damages: childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations.
- Session Year: 2017-2018
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2018-09-04
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which would instead be referred to as childhood sexual assault. This bill would increase the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault 22 years from the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual assault, whichever is later. This bill would also provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions, and would revive time-lapsed claims in certain circumstances.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
This bill would incorporate additional changes to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure proposed by SB 1494 to be operative as specified.
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which would instead be referred to as childhood sexual assault. This bill would increase the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault 22 years from the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual assault, whichever is later. This bill would also provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions. actions, and would revive time-lapsed claims in certain circumstances.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
This bill would incorporate additional changes to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure proposed by SB 1494 to be operative as specified.
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which would instead be referred to as childhood sexual assault. This bill would increase the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault 22 years from the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual assault, whichever is later. This bill would also provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which it would instead refer be referred to as childhood sexual assault. This bill would eliminate increase the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault and 22 years from the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 5 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual assault, whichever is later. This bill would also provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions. This bill would also require a person who holds a license in the state to report any childhood sexual assault claim made against him or her, and any ensuing judgment, to the relevant licensing agency.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which it would instead refer to childhood sexual assault. This bill would eliminate the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault and would provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions. This bill would also require a person who holds a license in the state to report any childhood sexual assault claim made against him or her, and any ensuing judgment, to the relevant licensing agency.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which it would instead refer to childhood sexual assault. This bill would eliminate the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault and would provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions. This bill would also require an alleged perpetrators a person who holds a license in the state to self-report report any childhood sexual assault claim made against him or her. her, and any ensuing judgment, to the relevant licensing agency.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
Existing law requires that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, be commenced within 8 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual abuse, whichever occurs later, and provides that certain of those actions may not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. Existing law also prohibits confidentiality provisions within a settlement agreement arising from a claim of childhood sexual abuse.
This bill would expand the definition of childhood sexual abuse, which it would instead refer to childhood sexual assault. This bill would eliminate the time limit for commencing an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault and would provide for the recovery of treble damages against certain defendants in these actions. This bill would also require an alleged perpetrators who holds a license in the state to self-report any childhood sexual assault claim made against him or her.
Existing law, the Government Claims Act, generally requires the presentation of all claims for money or damages against local public entities. The Government Claims Act excludes from this requirement claims made for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as defined, arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would change that reference from childhood sexual abuse to childhood sexual assault, as defined, and it would remove the requirement that the conduct occurred on or after that specified date. The bill would also make a conforming change to the provision governing confidentiality provisions in childhood sexual abuse claims.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
(c)An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(d)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(e)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(f)Every plaintiff 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (g).
(g)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(h)If certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (f), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(i)In any action subject to subdivision (f), a defendant shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (g) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(j)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(k)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(l)In any action subject to subdivision (f), a defendant shall be named by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(m)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)If the application to name a defendant is made before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)If the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(n)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(o)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (m).
(p)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (g) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (g) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(q)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
(r)The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 1.5.Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:340.1.(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
(c) An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(d)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 287 or of former Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(e)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(f)Every plaintiff 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (g).
(g)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(h)If certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (f), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(i)In any action subject to subdivision (f), a defendant shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (g) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(j)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(k)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(l)In any action subject to subdivision (f), a defendant shall be named by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(m)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)If the application to name a defendant is made before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)If the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(n)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(o)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (m).
(p)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (g) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (g) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(q)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3) inclusive of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
(r)The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or related charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 4.Section 1.5 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure proposed by both this bill and Senate Bill 1494. Section 1.5 shall only become operative if (1) both bills are enacted, without regard to the order of enactment, and become effective on or before January 1, 2019, and (2) each bill amends Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which case Section 1 of this bill shall not become operative.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
(c)An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(d)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(e)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(f)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.(g)(f)Every plaintiff 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (h). (g).
(h)(g)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(i)(h)If certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g), (f), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(j)(i)In any action subject to subdivision (g), (f), a defendant shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (h) (g) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(k)(j)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(l)(k)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(m)(l)In any action subject to subdivision (g), (f), a defendant shall be named by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(n)(m)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)If the application to name a defendant is made before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)If the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(o)(n)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(p)(o)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (n). (m).
(q)(p)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) (g) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (h) (g) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(r)(q)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
(r)The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 1.5.Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:340.1.(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse. assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity where if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)No In an action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) may be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday. subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
(2)(c)This subdivision does not apply if the An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps, and steps or to implement reasonable safeguards, safeguards to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment. childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) that is permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003.(d)Subdivision (c) does not apply to either of the following:(1)Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003. Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits.(2)Any written, compromised settlement agreement which has been entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant where the plaintiff was represented by an attorney who was admitted to practice law in this state at the time of the settlement, and the plaintiff signed the agreement.(e)(d)Childhood sexual abuse assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 287 or of former Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. Nothing in this subdivision limits This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(f)(e)Nothing in this This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(g)(f)Every plaintiff 26 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (h). (g).
(h)(g)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the attorney has consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who is licensed to practice and practices in this state and who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action. The person consulted may not be a party to the litigation.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(i)(h)WhereIf certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g), (f), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(j)(i)In any action subject to subdivision (g), no (f), a defendant may shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (h) (g) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(k)(j)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(l)(k)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(m)(l)In any action subject to subdivision (g), no (f), a defendant may shall be named except by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(n)(m)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)WhereIf the application to name a defendant is made prior to before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)WhereIf the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(o)(n)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(p)(o)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (n). (m).
(q)(p)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) (g) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (h) (g) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(r)The amendments to this section enacted at the 1990 portion of the 198990 Regular Session shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.(s)The Legislature declares that it is the intent of the Legislature, in enacting the amendments to this section enacted at the 1994 portion of the 199394 Regular Session, that the express language of revival added to this section by those amendments shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991.(t)Nothing in the amendments to this section enacted at the 1998 portion of the 199798 Regular Session is intended to create a new theory of liability.(u)The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at the 1998 portion of the 199798 Regular Session, shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999.(q)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3) inclusive of subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
(r)The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or related charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
SEC. 4.Section 1.5 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure proposed by both this bill and Senate Bill 1494. Section 1.5 shall only become operative if (1) both bills are enacted, without regard to the order of enactment, and become effective on or before January 1, 2019, and (2) each bill amends Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which case Section 1 of this bill shall not become operative.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
(c)An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(d)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(e)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(f)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
(g)Every plaintiff 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (h).
(h)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(i)If certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(j)In any action subject to subdivision (g), a defendant shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (h) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(k)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(l)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(m)In any action subject to subdivision (g), a defendant shall be named by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(n)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)If the application to name a defendant is made before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)If the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(o)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(p)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (n).
(q)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (h) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(r)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in subdivision (a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or related charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, there is no time limit for commencement of the time for commencement of the action shall be within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault, which includes moving a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities and adults at the new location, giving an accused perpetrator a positive recommendation for further employment without disclosing the accusations of childhood sexual assault, or destroying documents to conceal childhood sexual assault.
(c)A person holding a professional license from the state shall report to the licensing agency that an action pursuant to subdivision (a) has been filed against him or her. If a judgment is entered, the licensee shall also report the entry of judgment to the licensing agency. Reports made pursuant to this subdivision shall be made in writing within 30 days of the licensee learning of the action or judgment. Failure to comply with this subdivision may be grounds for the licensing agency to discipline the licensee. (d)In an action described in subdivision (a), a court shall not keep confidential the name of any alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault, and the fact that he or she has been accused shall not be sealed in any court records unless the party requesting the confidentiality or sealing establishes good cause.(c)An action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.
(e)(d)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; Section 288.2 of the Penal Code; Section 288.4 of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 311.3 of the Penal Code; Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(f)(e)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(g)(f)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment. This subdivision is not intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication before the date of enactment.
(g)Every plaintiff 40 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (h).
(h)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:
(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action.
(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.
(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.
(i)If certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.
(j)In any action subject to subdivision (g), a defendant shall not be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (h) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.
(k)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be grounds for discipline against the attorney.
(l)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.
(m)In any action subject to subdivision (g), a defendant shall be named by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.
(n)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:
(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.
(2)If the application to name a defendant is made before that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.
(3)If the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.
(o)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.
(p)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (n).
(q)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (h) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.
(r)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in subdivision (a) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three year time period under this subdivision or the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by the act that added this subdivision.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or related charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, there is no time limit for commencement of any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault, which includes moving a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities and adults at the new location, giving an accused perpetrator a positive recommendation for further employment without disclosing the accusations of childhood sex sexual assault, or destroying documents to conceal childhood sex sexual assault.
(c)A person holding a professional license from the state shall report to the licensing agency that an action pursuant to subdivision (a) has been filed against him or her. If a judgment is entered, the licensee shall also report the entry of judgment to the licensing agency. Reports made pursuant to this subdivision shall be made in writing within 30 days of the licensee learning of the action or judgment. Failure to comply with this subdivision is may be grounds for the licensing agency to discipline the licensee.
(d)In an action described in subdivision (a), a court shall not keep confidential the name of any alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault, and the fact that he or she has been accused shall not be sealed in any court records unless the party requesting the confidentiality or sealing establishes good cause.
(e)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; Section 288.2 of the Penal Code; Section 288.4 of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 311.3 of the Penal Code; Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(f)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(g)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment. This subdivision is not intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or related charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
(a)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault, there is no time limit for commencement of any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(c)(b)(1)In an action described in subdivision (b), (a), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(d)If an alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault holds a license from this state, he or she shall self-report to the appropriate licensing agency the accusation made against him or her, within 30 days of the service of, or the settlement of, an action or claim arising from the assault. A licensing agency may consider failure to comply with this section in making licensing determinations.(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault, which includes moving a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities and adults at the new location, giving an accused perpetrator a positive recommendation for further employment without disclosing the accusations of childhood sex assault, or destroying documents to conceal childhood sex assault.
(c)A person holding a professional license from the state shall report to the licensing agency that an action pursuant to subdivision (a) has been filed against him or her. If a judgment is entered, the licensee shall also report the entry of judgment to the licensing agency. Reports made pursuant to this subdivision shall be made in writing within 30 days of the licensee learning of the action or judgment. Failure to comply with this subdivision is grounds for the licensing agency to discipline the licensee.
(e)The(d)In an action described in subdivision (a), a court shall not keep confidential the name of any alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault assault, and the fact that he or she has been accused shall not be sealed in any court records unless the demanding party shows requesting the confidentiality or sealing establishes good cause.
(f)(e)Childhood sexual assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; Section 288.2 of the Penal Code; Section 288.4 of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 311.3 of the Penal Code; Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. This subdivision does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(g)(f)This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(h)(g)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment. This subdivision is not intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or related charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
(a)For purposes of this section, a cover up is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault, such as moving a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities and adults at the new location, giving an accused perpetrator a positive recommendation for further employment without disclosing the accusations of childhood sex assault, or destroying documents to conceal childhood sex assault.
(a)(b)In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the assault, there is no time limit for commencement of action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
(1)An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse. assault.
(2)An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(3)An action for liability against any person or entity where if an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.
(b)(1)No action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) may be commenced on or after the plaintiffs 26th birthday.(2)This subdivision does not apply if the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment. For purposes of this subdivision, providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard.(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) that is permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003.(d)Subdivision (c) does not apply to either of the following:(1)Any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003. Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits.(2)Any written, compromised settlement agreement which has been entered into between a plaintiff and a defendant where the plaintiff was represented by an attorney who was admitted to practice law in this state at the time of the settlement, and the plaintiff signed the agreement.(c)In an action described in subdivision (b), a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.
(d)If an alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault holds a license from this state, he or she shall self-report to the appropriate licensing agency the accusation made against him or her, within 30 days of the service of, or the settlement of, an action or claim arising from the assault. A licensing agency may consider failure to comply with this section in making licensing determinations.
(e)The name of any alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault and the fact that he or she has been accused shall not be sealed in any court records unless the demanding party shows good cause.
(e)(f)Childhood sexual abuse assault as used in this section includes any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; Section 288.2 of the Penal Code; Section 288.4 of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 311.3 of the Penal Code; Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. Nothing in this This subdivision limits does not limit the availability of causes of action permitted under subdivision (a), including causes of action against persons or entities other than the alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(f)(g)Nothing in this This section shall not be construed to alter the otherwise applicable burden of proof, as defined in Section 115 of the Evidence Code, that a plaintiff has in a civil action subject to this section.
(g)Every plaintiff 26 years of age or older at the time the action is filed shall file certificates of merit as specified in subdivision (h).(h)Certificates of merit shall be executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively, as follows, setting forth the facts which support the declaration:(1)That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the attorney has consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who is licensed to practice and practices in this state and who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action. The person consulted may not be a party to the litigation.(2)That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse.(3)That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by paragraph (1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of the action. If a certificate is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificates required by paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be filed within 60 days after filing the complaint.(i)Where certificates are required pursuant to subdivision (g), the attorney for the plaintiff shall execute a separate certificate of merit for each defendant named in the complaint.(j)In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be served, and the duty to serve a defendant with process does not attach, until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed pursuant to subdivision (h) with respect to that defendant, and has found, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant. At that time, the duty to serve that defendant with process shall attach.(k)A violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attorney.(l)The failure to file certificates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.(m)In any action subject to subdivision (g), no defendant may be named except by Doe designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.(n)At any time after the action is filed, the plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to amend the complaint to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants for the fictitious designation, as follows:(1)The application shall be accompanied by a certificate of corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff. The certificate shall declare that the attorney has discovered one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant or defendants, and shall set forth in clear and concise terms the nature and substance of the corroborative fact. If the corroborative fact is evidenced by the statement of a witness or the contents of a document, the certificate shall declare that the attorney has personal knowledge of the statement of the witness or of the contents of the document, and the identity and location of the witness or document shall be included in the certificate. For purposes of this section, a fact is corroborative of an allegation if it confirms or supports the allegation. The opinion of any mental health practitioner concerning the plaintiff shall not constitute a corroborative fact for purposes of this section.(2)Where the application to name a defendant is made prior to that defendants appearance in the action, neither the application nor the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall be served on the defendant or defendants, nor on any other party or their counsel of record.(3)Where the application to name a defendant is made after that defendants appearance in the action, the application shall be served on all parties and proof of service provided to the court, but the certificate of corroborative fact by the attorney shall not be served on any party or their counsel of record.(o)The court shall review the application and the certificate of corroborative fact in camera and, based solely on the certificate and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the certificate, shall, if one or more facts corroborative of one or more of the charging allegations against a defendant has been shown, order that the complaint may be amended to substitute the name of the defendant or defendants.(p)The court shall keep under seal and confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation, other than the plaintiff, any and all certificates of corroborative fact filed pursuant to subdivision (n).(q)Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certificate of merit was filed or for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party or upon the courts own motion, verify compliance with this section by requiring the attorney for the plaintiff who was required by subdivision (h) to execute the certificate to reveal the name, address, and telephone number of the person or persons consulted with pursuant to subdivision (h) that were relied upon by the attorney in preparation of the certificate of merit. The name, address, and telephone number shall be disclosed to the trial judge in camera and in the absence of the moving party. If the court finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, the court may order a party, a partys attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.(r)The amendments to this section enacted at the 1990 portion of the 198990 Regular Session shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991, including any action otherwise barred by the period of limitations in effect prior to January 1, 1991, thereby reviving those causes of action which had lapsed or technically expired under the law existing prior to January 1, 1991.(s)The Legislature declares that it is the intent of the Legislature, in enacting the amendments to this section enacted at the 1994 portion of the 199394 Regular Session, that the express language of revival added to this section by those amendments shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1991.(t)Nothing in the amendments to this section enacted at the 1998 portion of the 199798 Regular Session is intended to create a new theory of liability.(u)The amendments to subdivision (a) of this section, enacted at the 1998 portion of the 199798 Regular Session, shall apply to any action commenced on or after January 1, 1999, and to any action filed prior to January 1, 1999, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action which would have been barred by the laws in effect prior to January 1, 1999. Nothing in this subdivision is intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication prior to January 1, 1999.(h)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment. This subdivision is not intended to revive actions or causes of action as to which there has been a final adjudication before the date of enactment.
SEC. 2.Section 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:1002.(a)Notwithstanding any other law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a cause of action for civil damages for any of the following:
(1)An act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.
(2)An act of childhood sexual abuse, assault, as defined in Section 340.1.
(3)An act of sexual exploitation of a minor, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code, or conduct prohibited with respect to a minor pursuant to Section 311.1, 311.5, or 311.6 of the Penal Code.
(4)An act of sexual assault, as defined in paragraphs (1) to (9), inclusive, of subdivision (e) of Section 15610.63 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, against an elder or dependent adult, as defined in Sections 15610.23 and 15610.27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(b)Notwithstanding any other law, in a civil action described in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a), a court shall not enter, by stipulation or otherwise, an order that restricts the disclosure of information in a manner that conflicts with subdivision (a).
(c)Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not preclude an agreement preventing the disclosure of any medical information or personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55 of the Penal Code, regarding the victim of the offense listed in subdivision (a) or of any information revealing the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit the right of a crime victim to disclose this information.
(d)Except as authorized by subdivision (c), a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is entered into on or after January 1, 2017, is void as a matter of law and against public policy.
(e)An attorneys failure to comply with the requirements of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.
SEC. 3.Section 905 of the Government Code is amended to read:905.There shall be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) all claims for money or damages against local public entities except any of the following:
(a)Claims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund, rebate, exemption, cancellation, amendment, modification, or adjustment of any tax, assessment, fee, or charge or any portion thereof, of the charge, or of any penalties, costs, or charges related thereto. charges.
(b)Claims in connection with which the filing of a notice of lien, statement of claim, or stop notice is required under any law relating to liens of mechanics, laborers, or materialmen.
(c)Claims by public employees for fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses and allowances.
(d)Claims for which the workers compensation authorized by Division 4 (commencing with Section 3200) of the Labor Code is the exclusive remedy.
(e)Applications or claims for any form of public assistance under the Welfare and Institutions Code or other provisions of law relating to public assistance programs, and claims for goods, services, provisions, or other assistance rendered for or on behalf of any recipient of any form of public assistance.
(f)Applications or claims for money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.
(g)Claims for principal or interest upon any bonds, notes, warrants, or other evidences of indebtedness.
(h)Claims that relate to a special assessment constituting a specific lien against the property assessed and that are payable from the proceeds of the assessment, by offset of a claim for damages against it or by delivery of any warrant or bonds representing it.
(i)Claims by the state or by a state department or agency or by another local public entity or by a judicial branch entity.
(j)Claims arising under any provision of the Unemployment Insurance Code, including, but not limited to, claims for money or benefits, or for refunds or credits of employer or worker contributions, penalties, or interest, or for refunds to workers of deductions from wages in excess of the amount prescribed.
(k)Claims for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1720) of Chapter 1 of Part 7 of Division 2 of the Labor Code.
(l)Claims governed by the Pedestrian Mall Law of 1960 (Part 1 (commencing with Section 11000) of Division 13 of the Streets and Highways Code).
(m)Claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse. This subdivision shall apply only to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. assault.
(n)Claims made pursuant to Section 701.820 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of money pursuant to Section 26680.
(o)Claims made pursuant to Section 49013 of the Education Code for reimbursement of pupil fees for participation in educational activities.
(p)The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Sep 30, 2018 | Vetoed by Governor. |
| Sep 11, 2018 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4:30 p.m. |
| Aug 30, 2018 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 29, 2018 | Assembly Rule 77 suspended. |
| Aug 28, 2018 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. May be considered on or after August 30 pursuant to Assembly Rule 77. |
| Aug 28, 2018 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Aug 24, 2018 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 23, 2018 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Aug 17, 2018 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 13, 2018 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Aug 7, 2018 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Aug 6, 2018 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (July 3). |
| Jun 13, 2018 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and APPR. |
| May 31, 2018 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 30, 2018 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 25, 2018 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 12. Noes 2.) (May 25). |
| May 25, 2018 | Joint Rule 62(a), file notice suspended. |
| May 23, 2018 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| May 22, 2018 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| May 21, 2018 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on APPR. Read second time and amended. |
| May 1, 2018 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 30, 2018 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 26, 2018 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 8. Noes 0.) (April 24). |
| Apr 23, 2018 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 19, 2018 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on JUD. Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 12, 2018 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 17, 2018 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 19. |
| Feb 16, 2018 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 30, 2018 | AB 3120 GONZALEZ FLETCHER Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Aug 28, 2018 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB3120 Gonzalez Fletcher By Jackson | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 16, 2018 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 13, 2018 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 3, 2018 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| May 30, 2018 | AB 3120 GONZALEZ FLETCHER Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 25, 2018 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 24, 2018 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
GOVERNOR'S VETO
GV Bill Id:AB 3120
Author:(Gonzalez Fletcher)
As Enrolled Ver:September 11, 2018
2/3 vote
ASSEMBLY: | 54-9 | (May 30, 2018) | SENATE: | 33-2 | (August 28, 2018) |
ASSEMBLY: | 59-12 | (August 30, 2018) |
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Original Committee Reference: JUD.
SUMMARY: Extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives, for three years, old claims, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. Specifically, this bill:
- Redefines childhood sexual abuse as childhood sexual assault and expands the definition to include certain simulated acts.
- Extends the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual assault to twenty-two years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 40 years of age) or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later.
- Prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or failed to take reasonable steps, or to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
- Revives, until three years of January 1, 2019 or the time period under 2), above, whichever is later, any actions for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019 because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit.
- Allows a person, in an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault, to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a sexual assault of a minor. Defines "cover-up" as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
- Eliminates the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act and instead exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, all claims for childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, including those arising out of conduct occurring before January 1, 2009.
- Adds chaptering out amendments with SB 1494 (Public Safety Committee) of the current legislative session.
The Senate amendments eliminate from case revival under 4), above, those cases that have been litigated to finality and add chaptering out amendments.
EXISTING LAW:
- Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340. All further references are to this code unless otherwise noted.)
- Provides that the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined, is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. (Section 340.1(a).)
- Allows suit against the perpetrator or specified third parties, but prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, as specified. (Section 340.1(b).)
- Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Government Code Section 905.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS: Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether it occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state's statute of limitations limits how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, revives for three years claims that had previously expired, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and applies to all local public entities. This bill also allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant.
It often takes victims of childhood sexual abuse years to come forward and face their abusers. All too often, victims of childhood sexual abuse fail to report their abuse timely or sometimes even fail to report it at all. While the victims almost always know their abusers, they often fail to come forward timely because of threats of harm, being ashamed, blaming themselves, fear of not being believed, failing to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, or suppressing very painful memories. As a result, it may take years, if at all, for victims to bring civil (or seek criminal) actions against both direct perpetrators of child sexual abuse and those who allowed the abuse to occur and to continue.
Childhood sexual abuse claims often have extended statutes of limitation. As a result of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion, many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. Eight jurisdictions – Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Guam – have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Other states allow for very lengthy discovery periods in adulthood, including Oregon, which permits claims to be filed until the victim is 40 years old or within five years of discovery.
California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990.) The latter provision – within 3 years of making the relevant connection – is called a "delayed discovery" rule.
Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses' memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear. It is often difficult for the child or young adult victim to understand the harm done to them and know how to take action.
This bill, like the law in Oregon, extends the statute of limitations for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against both direct perpetrators and third parties who may have helped facilitate the abuse to 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains majority (40 years old) or five years from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the plaintiff became an adult was caused by the sexual assault, whichever occurs later. It also revives, for three years, any action for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit. As a result, this bill provides a forum for civil redress for victims of childhood sexual assault who today are barred from court.
This bill makes amendments to the statute of limitations relating to claims of childhood sexual abuse.
In 2013 I vetoed a substantially similar bill, SB 131 (Beall). My views have not changed. As I said then:
Statutes of limitation reach back to Roman law and were specifically enshrined in the English common law by the Limitations Act of 1623. Ever since, and in every state, including California, various limits have been imposed on the time when lawsuits may still be initiated. Even though valid and profoundly important claims are at stake, all jurisdictions have seen fit to bar actions after a lapse of years.
The reason for such a universal practice is one of fairness. There comes a time when an individual or organization should be secure in the reasonable expectation that past acts are indeed in the past and not subject to further lawsuits. With the passage of time, evidence may be lost or disposed of, memories fade and witnesses move away or die.
Over the years, California's laws regarding time limits for childhood sexual abuse cases have been amended many times. The changes have affected not only how long a person has to make a claim, but also who may be sued for the sexual abuse. The issue of who is subject to liability is an important distinction as the law in this area has always and rightfully imposed longer periods of liability for an actual perpetrator of sexual abuse than for an organization that employed that perpetrator. This makes sense as third parties are in a very different position than perpetrators with respect to both evidence and memories.
For claims against a perpetrator of abuse, the current law is that a claimant must sue within eight years of attaining the age of majority (i.e. age 26) or "within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later
" However, for claims against a third party - e.g. an organization that employed the perpetrator of the abuse - the general rule since 1998 was that a claimant must sue before he or she turns 26. A later discovered psychological injury - no matter how compelling - could not be brought against a third party by a person older than 26.
When a number of high profile sex abuse scandals in both public and private institutions came to light, many felt that the third party limitation rule described above was too harsh and that claimants over 26 should be able to recover damages for later discovered injuries from certain, more culpable entities.
In 2002, the California Legislature weighed the competing considerations on this issue and enacted SB 1779, which did the following: (1) It identified for the first time a new subcategory of third party defendants which no longer would have the protection of the age 26 cutoff for claims. Going forward these defendants - entities who knew or should have known of the sexual abuse and failed to take action - now could be sued within three years of the date of discovery of a claim. (2) Looking backwards, SB 1779 also revived for one year only (2003) all claims that had previously lapsed because of the statute of limitation. This very unusual "one year revival" of lapsed claims allowed victims relief but also set a defined cut-off time for these lapsed claims.
In reliance on the clear language and intent of this statute, the private third party defendants covered by this bill took actions to resolve these legacy claims of victims older than 26. Over 1,000 claims were filed against the Catholic Church alone, some involving alleged abuse as far back as the 1930s. By 2007, the Catholic Church in California had paid out more than $1.2 billion to settle the claims filed during this one year revival period. Other private and non-profit employers were sued and paid out as well.
For the public third parties covered by this bill, however, a very different result occurred. There is no doubt that in 2002, when SB 1779 was enacted, it was intended to apply to both public and private entities. Indeed, it would be unreasonable, if not shocking, for the Legislature to intentionally discriminate against one set of victims, e.g. those whose abusers happened to be employed by a public instead of a private entity. However, due to a drafting error, the California Supreme Court held in 2007 that SB 1779 did not actually apply to public or governmental agencies. So, unlike private institutions, public schools and government entities were shielded from the one year revival of lapsed claims. As a result, the similarly situated victims of these entities were not accorded the remedies of SB 1779.
In 2008, the Legislature addressed this unfair distinction between victims of public as opposed to private institutions. Note, however, that the bill enacted, SB 640, did not restore equity between these two sets of victims. Instead of subjecting public/governmental entities to all of the provisions of the 2002 law, the Legislature only allowed victims of public institutions to sue under the new rules prospectively-from 2009 forward-and provided no "one year revival" period.
In passing this 2008 law, I can't believe the legislature decided that victims of abuse by a public entity are somehow less deserving than those who suffered abuse by a private entity. The children assaulted by Jerry Sandusky at Penn State or the teachers at Miramonte Elementary School in Los Angeles are no less worthy because of the nature of the institution they attended. Rather, I believe that legislators, in good faith, weighed the merits of such claims against the equities of allowing claims to be brought against third parties years after the abuse occurred. The Legislature concluded that fairness required that certain claims should be allowed, but only going forward.
The bill now before me, AB 3120, is broader than SB 131, does not fully address the inequity between state defendants and others, and provides a longer revival period for otherwise barred claims. For these reasons, as well as those previously enumerated in the veto message referenced above, I cannot sign this bill.
Analysis Prepared by: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0005333 FN:
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 3120
Author:(Gonzalez Fletcher)
As Amended Ver:August 23, 2018
Majority vote
ASSEMBLY: | 54-9 | (May 30, 2018) | SENATE: | 33-2 | (August 28, 2018) |
Original Committee Reference: JUD.
SUMMARY: Extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives, for three years, old claims, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. Specifically, this bill:
- Redefines childhood sexual abuse as childhood sexual assault and expands the definition to include certain simulated acts.
- Extends the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual assault to twenty-two years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 40 years of age) or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later.
- Prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or failed to take reasonable steps, or to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
- Revives, until three years of January 1, 2019 or the time period under 2), above, whichever is later, any actions for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019 because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit.
- Allows a person, in an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault, to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a sexual assault of a minor. Defines "cover-up" as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
- Eliminates the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act and instead exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, all claims for childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, including those arising out of conduct occurring before January 1, 2009.
- Adds chaptering out amendments with SB 1494 (Public Safety Committee) of the current legislative session..
The Senate amendments eliminate from case revival under 4), above, those cases that have been litigated to finality and add chaptering out amendments.
EXISTING LAW:
- Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340. All further references are to this code unless otherwise noted.)
- Provides that the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined, is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. (Section 340.1(a).)
- Allows suit against the perpetrator or specified third parties, but prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, as specified. (Section 340.1(b).)
- Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Government Code Section 905.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown
COMMENTS: Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether it occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state's statute of limitations limits how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, revives for three years claims that had previously expired, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and applies to all local public entities. This bill also allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant.
It often takes victims of childhood sexual abuse years to come forward and face their abusers. All too often, victims of childhood sexual abuse fail to report their abuse timely or sometimes even fail to report it at all. While the victims almost always know their abusers, they often fail to come forward timely because of threats of harm, being ashamed, blaming themselves, fear of not being believed, failing to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, or suppressing very painful memories. As a result, it may take years, if at all, for victims to bring civil (or seek criminal) actions against both direct perpetrators of child sexual abuse and those who allowed the abuse to occur and to continue.
Childhood sexual abuse claims often have extended statutes of limitation. As a result of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion, many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. Eight jurisdictions – Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Guam – have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Other states allow for very lengthy discovery periods in adulthood, including Oregon, which permits claims to be filed until the victim is 40 years old or within five years of discovery.
California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990.) The latter provision – within 3 years of making the relevant connection – is called a "delayed discovery" rule.
Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses' memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear. It is often difficult for the child or young adult victim to understand the harm done to them and know how to take action.
This bill, like the law in Oregon, extends the statute of limitations for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against both direct perpetrators and third parties who may have helped facilitate the abuse to 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains majority (40 years old) or five years from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the plaintiff became an adult was caused by the sexual assault, whichever occurs later. It also revives, for three years, any action for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit. As a result, this bill provides a forum for civil redress for victims of childhood sexual assault who today are barred from court.
Analysis Prepared by: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0004922 FN:
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 3120
:
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 5-2, 7/3/18
AYES: Jackson, Hertzberg, Monning, Stern, Wieckowski
NOES: Moorlach, Anderson
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-0, 8/16/18
AYES: Portantino, Beall, Bradford, Hill, Nielsen, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bates
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-9, 5/30/18 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Damages: childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
SOURCE: National Center for Victims of Crime
DIGEST:
This bill extends the time for commencement of actions for childhood sexual assault to 40 years of age or five years from discovery of the injury; provides enhanced damages for a cover up, as defined, of the assault; and provides a three-year window in which expired claims would be revived.
Senate Floor Amendments of 8/23/18 address chaptering out issues and clarify the application of the revival provision included in the bill.
Existing law:
- Provides that in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
- an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse;
- an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; or,
- an action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(a).)
- Provides that the actions described above against persons or entities other than the person who committed an act of childhood sexual abuse must be commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. However, this restriction does not apply if the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment. Existing law states that providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard as used therein. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(b).)
- Provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described above relating to a nonperpetrator defendant that is permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. This revival does not apply to any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003. Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits. It also does not apply to any written, compromised settlement agreement between the parties, as specified. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(c), (d).)
- Defines “childhood sexual abuse” as used in the above provisions to include any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by specified sections of the Penal Code or prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(e).)
- Exempts claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse from the Government Tort Claims Act. This provision only applies to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Gov. Code Sec. 905.)
- Defines “sexual conduct” for the purposes of certain Penal Code provisions to include any of the following, whether actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, oral copulation, anal intercourse, anal oral copulation, masturbation, bestiality, sexual sadism, sexual masochism, penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object in a lewd or lascivious manner, exhibition of the genitals or pubic or rectal area for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer, any lewd or lascivious sexual act as defined in Section 288, or excretory functions performed in a lewd or lascivious manner, whether or not any of the above conduct is performed alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals. An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being sexual conduct. (Pen. Code Sec. 311.4.)
This bill:
- Replaces “sexual abuse” with “sexual assault” in Section 340.1 and add to the definition “sexual conduct” as the term is defined in Penal Code Section 311.4.
- Provides that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault must be commenced within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the causal relationship between the assault and psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority.
- Provides that in such actions a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor. “Cover up” is defined as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
- Provides that actions described in Section 340.1 involving a nonperpetrator defendant shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
- Removes provisions relating to earlier revival periods that have since elapsed.
- Provides that its changes to the time period provided in subdivision (a) apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in Section 340.1(a)(1)-(3) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this provision or the time period under subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 as amended by this bill.
- Exempts claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 from the Government Tort Claims Act regardless of when the conduct took place. This change is retroactive and applies to new or pending cases.
Background
In 2002, the Legislature enacted SB 1779 (Burton, Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002), to provide that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse may be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday if the third party defendant person or entity knew, had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps and implement reasonable safeguards to avoid future acts of unlawful sexual conduct. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(b)(2).) SB 1779 also enacted Section 340.1(c) to allow a claim under Section 340.1(b)(2) to be brought within a one-year window, January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2003, even if that claim would otherwise be time barred as of January 1, 2003, because of an applicable statute of limitations.
The Government Tort Claims Act (the Act) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. (Gov. Code Sec. 815 et seq.) In addition to any time limitations placed by other statutes on such claims, the Act requires that a claim that is brought against a public entity relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after accrual of the cause or causes of action. (Gov. Code Sec. 911.2.)
In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding Section 340.1, a timely claim to a public entity pursuant to the Act is a prerequisite to maintaining an action for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity school district. The Court based its holding primarily on its finding that nothing in the express language of SB 1779 or the bill’s legislative history indicated an intent by the Legislature to exempt Section 340.1 claims from the Act and its six-month claim presentation requirement. Essentially, many claims for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity could not benefit from the change to Section 340.1 because the six-month presentation requirement for such claims was not addressed by SB 1779.
To address this loophole for childhood sexual abuse claims against public entities, SB 640 (Simitian, Chapter 383, Statutes of 2008) was enacted into law. It added an explicit exception to the claims presentation requirements to Section 905 of the Act for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” (Gov. Code Sec. 905(m).) Section 905(m) applied to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill modifies the statute of limitations for these claims in various ways and provides another revival period for bringing expired claims.
Comments
The author states:
California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse.
AB 3120 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by expanding the time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Victims of childhood sexual assault who were not ready to come forward during the one-year window allowed under SB 1779 (Burton 2002), perhaps because they had not even made the connection between their abuse and current psychological injuries, would be able to come forward under a new three-year window. Given the weakening cultural taboos that prevented people from coming forward 15 years ago, there is a belief that given a chance, additional survivors will now come forward. Several states have already taken this step or have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.
AB 3120 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports leagues, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.
NOTE: For a more thorough analysis of this bill, please see the Senate Judiciary Committee’s analysis.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown, potentially-significant workload cost pressures to the court to adjudicate cases filed within the expanded statute of limitations that otherwise would have been time barred. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the 2018 Budget Act appropriated $64 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and penalty revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Unknown, potentially-major out-year costs to local school districts to the extent litigation is successfully brought outside the current statute of limitations and/or the districts are liable for treble damages.
Additionally, to the extent an extended statute of limitations affects liability insurance premiums, school district could experience unknown, potentially-significant costs related to procuring liability insurance, apart from any specific claims. (Local funds)
National Center for Victims of Crime (source)
California Police Chiefs Association
California State PTA
Coalition for Children
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United of California
Joyful Heart Foundation
Los Angeles Police Protective League
National Association of Social Workers
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Restorative Justice International
Work Equity
One individual
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/21/18)
American Insurance Association
Association of California School Administrators
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
California Association of Private School Organizations
California Association of School Business Officials
California Catholic Conference
California School Boards Association
CSAC Excess Insurance Authority
Golden State Risk Management
Independent Insurance Agents and Bankers of California
Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund
Northern California Schools Insurance Group
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Schools Excess Liability Fund
South Bay Area Schools Insurance Authority
Southern California Regional Liability Excess Fund
Statewide Association of Community Colleges
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The National Center for Victims of Crime, the sponsor of this bill, writes: “The current law lets too many abusers avoid accountability for their actions. The only good thing to come out of recent scandals was an environment that encouraged well-known women - actors or Olympians - who were victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward. It is time for the law to recognize what we all now know – that it can take decades before some survivors are capable of coming forward. Children being assaulted today may not be ready to come forward until decades in the future.”
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: A coalition of organizations, including the California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and the California School Boards Association, write in opposition: “From a purely fiscal perspective, however, I am concerned that eliminating the statute of limitations on when a public entity can be sued is going to result in significant increased claims and legal costs that will adversely impact the financial viability of public entity budgets and quality of education and public services for all Californians.
“Even in advance of the first lawsuit, this bill will have an immediate fiscal impact on our organizations due to the need to assess and fund risk for old and potentially large exposures. This retroactive exposure will result in significantly increased rates, hard caps, or exclusions on liability coverage public agencies can obtain.”
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-9, 5/30/18
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Travis Allen, Arambula, Baker, Berman, Bloom, Bonta, Burke, Caballero, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Eggman, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez Fletcher, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Rodriguez, Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Steinorth, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Waldron, Weber, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Chávez, Dahle, Harper, Kiley, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Voepel
NO VOTE RECORDED: Acosta, Chen, Choi, Cunningham, Daly, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Gallagher, Kamlager-Dove, Mathis, Mayes, Medina, Melendez, Patterson
8/24/18 14:39:55
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 3120
:
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 5-2, 7/3/18
AYES: Jackson, Hertzberg, Monning, Stern, Wieckowski
NOES: Moorlach, Anderson
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-0, 8/16/18
AYES: Portantino, Beall, Bradford, Hill, Nielsen, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bates
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-9, 5/30/18 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Damages: childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
SOURCE: National Center for Victims of Crime
DIGEST:
This bill extends the time for commencement of actions for childhood sexual assault to 40 years of age or five years from discovery of the injury; provides enhanced damages for a cover up, as defined, of the assault; and provides a three-year window in which expired claims would be revived.
Existing law:
- Provides that in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
- an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse;
- an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; or,
- an action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(a).)
- Provides that the actions described above against persons or entities other than the person who committed an act of childhood sexual abuse must be commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. However, this restriction does not apply if the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment. Existing law states that providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard as used therein. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(b).)
- Provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described above relating to a nonperpetrator defendant that is permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. This revival does not apply to any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003. Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits. It also does not apply to any written, compromised settlement agreement between the parties, as specified. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(c), (d).)
- Defines “childhood sexual abuse” as used in the above provisions to include any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(e).)
- Exempts claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse from the Government Tort Claims Act. This provision only applies to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Gov. Code Sec. 905.)
- Defines “sexual conduct” for the purposes of certain Penal Code provisions to include any of the following, whether actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, oral copulation, anal intercourse, anal oral copulation, masturbation, bestiality, sexual sadism, sexual masochism, penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object in a lewd or lascivious manner, exhibition of the genitals or pubic or rectal area for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer, any lewd or lascivious sexual act as defined in Section 288, or excretory functions performed in a lewd or lascivious manner, whether or not any of the above conduct is performed alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals. An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being sexual conduct. (Pen. Code Sec. 311.4.)
This bill:
- Replaces “sexual abuse” with “sexual assault” in Section 340.1 and add to the definition “sexual conduct” as the term is defined in Penal Code Section 311.4.
- Provides that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault must be commenced within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the causal relationship between the assault and psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority.
- Provides that in such actions a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor. “Cover up” is defined as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
- Provides that actions described in Section 340.1 involving a nonperpetrator defendant shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
- Removes provisions relating to earlier revival periods that have since elapsed.
- Provides that its changes apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
- Provides that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in Section 340.1(a) that has not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this provision or the time period under subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 as amended by this bill.
- Exempts claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 from the Government Tort Claims Act regardless of when the conduct took place. This change is retroactive and applies to new or pending cases.
Background
In 2002, the Legislature enacted SB 1779 (Burton, Chapter 149, Statutes of 2002), to provide that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse may be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday if the third party defendant person or entity knew, had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps and implement reasonable safeguards to avoid future acts of unlawful sexual conduct. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(b)(2).) SB 1779 also enacted Section 340.1(c) to allow a claim under Section 340.1(b)(2) to be brought within a one-year window, January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2003, even if that claim would otherwise be time barred as of January 1, 2003, because of an applicable statute of limitations.
The Government Tort Claims Act (the Act) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. (Gov. Code Sec. 815 et seq.) In addition to any time limitations placed by other statutes on such claims, the Act requires that a claim that is brought against a public entity relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after accrual of the cause or causes of action. (Gov. Code Sec. 911.2.)
In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding Section 340.1 and its delayed discovery provisions, a timely claim to a public entity pursuant to the Act is a prerequisite to maintaining an action for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity school district. The Court based its holding primarily on its finding that nothing in the express language of SB 1779 or the bill’s legislative history indicated an intent by the Legislature to exempt Section 340.1 claims from the Act and its six-month claim presentation requirement. Essentially, many claims for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity could not benefit from the change to Section 340.1 because the six-month presentation requirement for such claims was not addressed by SB 1779.
To address this loophole for childhood sexual abuse claims against public entities, SB 640 (Simitian, Chapter 383, Statutes of 2008) was enacted into law. It added an explicit exception to the claims presentation requirements to Section 905 of the Act for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” (Gov. Code Sec. 905(m).) Section 905(m) applied to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill modifies the statute of limitations for these claims in various ways and provides another revival period for bringing expired claims.
Comments
The author states:
California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse.
AB 3120 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by expanding the time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Victims of childhood sexual assault who were not ready to come forward during the one-year window allowed under SB 1779 (Burton 2002), perhaps because they had not even made the connection between their abuse and current psychological injuries, would be able to come forward under a new three-year window. Given the weakening cultural taboos that prevented people from coming forward 15 years ago, there is a belief that given a chance, additional survivors will now come forward. Several states have already taken this step or have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.
AB 3120 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports leagues, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.
NOTE: For a more thorough analysis of this bill, please see the Senate Judiciary Committee’s analysis.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown, potentially-significant workload cost pressures to the court to adjudicate cases filed within the expanded statute of limitations that otherwise would have been time barred. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the 2018 Budget Act appropriated $64 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and penalty revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Unknown, potentially-major out-year costs to local school districts to the extent litigation is successfully brought outside the current statute of limitations and/or the districts are liable for treble damages.
Additionally, to the extent an extended statute of limitations affects liability insurance premiums, school district could experience unknown, potentially-significant costs related to procuring liability insurance, apart from any specific claims. (Local funds)
National Center for Victims of Crime (source)
California State PTA
Coalition for Children
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United of California
Joyful Heart Foundation
National Association of Social Workers
Restorative Justice International
Work Equity
One individual
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/17/18)
American Insurance Association
Association of California School Administrators
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
California Association of Private School Organizations
California Association of School Business Officials
California Catholic Conference
California School Boards Association
CSAC Excess Insurance Authority
Golden State Risk Management
Independent Insurance Agents and Bankers of California
Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund
Northern California Schools Insurance Group
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Schools Excess Liability Fund
South Bay Area Schools Insurance Authority
Southern California Regional Liability Excess Fund
Statewide Association of Community Colleges
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The National Center for Victims of Crime, the sponsor of this bill, writes: “The current law lets too many abusers avoid accountability for their actions. The only good thing to come out of recent scandals was an environment that encouraged well-known women - actors or Olympians - who were victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward. It is time for the law to recognize what we all now know – that it can take decades before some survivors are capable of coming forward. Children being assaulted today may not be ready to come forward until decades in the future.”
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: A coalition of organizations, including the California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and the California School Boards Association, write in opposition: “From a purely fiscal perspective, however, I am concerned that eliminating the statute of limitations on when a public entity can be sued is going to result in significant increased claims and legal costs that will adversely impact the financial viability of public entity budgets and quality of education and public services for all Californians.
“Even in advance of the first lawsuit, this bill will have an immediate fiscal impact on our organizations due to the need to assess and fund risk for old and potentially large exposures. This retroactive exposure will result in significantly increased rates, hard caps, or exclusions on liability coverage public agencies can obtain.”
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 54-9, 5/30/18
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Travis Allen, Arambula, Baker, Berman, Bloom, Bonta, Burke, Caballero, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Eggman, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez Fletcher, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Rodriguez, Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Steinorth, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Waldron, Weber, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Chávez, Dahle, Harper, Kiley, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Voepel
NO VOTE RECORDED: Acosta, Chen, Choi, Cunningham, Daly, Flora, Fong, Frazier, Gallagher, Kamlager-Dove, Mathis, Mayes, Medina, Melendez, Patterson
Prepared by: Christian Kurpiewski / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
8/18/18 13:23:29
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2017 - 2018 Regular Session
AB 3120 (Gonzalez Fletcher) - Damages: childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations.
Version: August 7, 2018 | Policy Vote: JUD. 5 - 2 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: August 13, 2018 | Consultant: Shaun Naidu |
This bill meets the criteria for referral to the Suspense File.
Bill Summary:
AB 3120 would extend the timeframe within which to file civil childhood sexual assault actions, as specified; allow enhanced damages for a cover up, as defined; and revive expired claims for a three-year period.
Fiscal Impact:
- Unknown, potentially-significant workload cost pressures to the court to adjudicate cases filed within the expanded statute of limitations that otherwise would have been time barred. While the superior courts are not funded on a workload basis, an increase in workload could result in delayed court services and would put pressure on the General Fund to fund additional staff and resources. For example, the 2018 Budget Act appropriated $64 million from the General Fund to backfill continued reduction in fine and penalty revenue for trial court operations. (General Fund*)
- Unknown, potentially-major out-year costs to local school districts to the extent litigation is successfully brought outside the current statute of limitations and/or the districts are liable for treble damages.
Additionally, to the extent an extended statute of limitations affects liability insurance premiums, school district could experience unknown, potentially-significant costs related to procuring liability insurance, apart from any specific claims. (Local funds)
*Trial Court Trust Fund
Background:
Until 1991, the timeframe within which to commence a civil childhood sexual assault action was one year from the time of the alleged assault. In 1990, the Legislature extended the statute of limitations for these claims to the later of within eight years after the victim-plaintiff becomes an adult (i.e., age twenty-six) or within three years of the date of discovery. Subsequently, the statute of limitations for actions against third parties was extended as well. In 2002, the Legislature extended the timeframe to begin these types of actions beyond a person’s twenty-sixth birthday when a third party knew or had reason to know of complaints against an employee, volunteer, representative or agent and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent similar unlawful conduct. For conduct on or after January 1, 2015, the Legislature extended the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual assault claims to the later of within twenty-two years after the victim-plaintiff becomes an adult (i.e., age forty) or within three years of the date of discovery.
Additionally, the Government Tort Claims Act generally governs tort actions against public entities, including claims related to childhood sexual assault. (See Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201.) Separate from the statute of limitations, the act requires that an action that is filed against a public entity related to a cause of action for the death of or injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity before six months after accrual of the cause of action. The effect was that civil childhood sexual assault actions that were initiated within the expanded statute of limitations were barred from moving forward because of this six-month claim presentation requirement. Consequently, in 2008, the Legislature exempted suits seeking damages for childhood sexual assault from the claim presentation requirement. The exemption was prospective, applying only to claims alleging conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009. Earlier this year, the Legislature amended the Government Tort Claims Act to state explicitly that the act does not apply to claims of childhood sexual abuse.
Proposed Law:
This bill would extend the statute of limitations to begin an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault to the later of either within twenty-two years from the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority (i.e., age forty) or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by sexual assault. Additionally, this measure would provide for the recovery of treble damages against defendants who are found to have “covered up” the sexual assault of a minor, which would be defined as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to the assault.
This measure would allow for a three-year revival period, starting January 1, 2019, of any claim for damages for childhood sexual assault that has not been litigated to finality and that otherwise would be barred as of January 1, 2019 because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired.
Lastly, AB 3120 would replace the term “childhood sexual abuse” with the “childhood sexual assault” in the Government Tort Claims Act and would remove the applicability of the act’s claim presentation requirement to childhood sexual assault claims for conduct occurring before January 1, 2009.
Related Legislation:
AB 334 (Cooper, 2017) would have extended the statute of limitation for any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual assault, in situations when an adult was assaulted, as specified. It also would have made a number of changes to existing law regarding sexual assault forensic medical examinations (SAFMEs), including the reimbursement rate for SAFMEs of survivors who do not aid or otherwise participate with law enforcement. AB 334 was never heard in the Senate Committee on Public Safety.
AB 1619 (Berman, 2018) would extend the statute of limitations for civil actions seeking damages suffered as a result of sexual assault, in situations when an adult was assaulted. AB 1619 is pending on the Suspense File of this Committee.
Prior Legislation: SB 108 (Lockyer, Ch. 1578, Stats. 1990) extended the time limit for commencing an action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse to the later of within eight years after the age of majority or within three years of the date of discovery.
AB 1651 (Ortiz, Ch. 1021, Stats. 1998) applied the extended statute of limitations to actions against third parties.
SB 1779 (Burton, Ch. 149, Stats. 2002) extended the statute of limitations in cases against a third party beyond the victim-plaintiff’s twenty-sixth birthday when the third party knew or had reason to know of complaints against an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent similar unlawful conduct.
SB 640 (Simitian, Ch. 383, Stats. 2008) exempted from the claims presentation requirements in the Government Tort Claims Act claims for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, as specified.
AB 1628 (Beall, 2012), among other things, would have extended the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual assault claims to the later of within the victim-plaintiff reaching age thirty-five or within three years of discovery. AB 1628 was held on the Suspense File of the Assembly Committee on Appropriations.
SB 131 (Beall, 2013), among other things, would have provided that the time limits to bring an action for civil childhood sexual abuse be applied retroactively to any claim that had not been adjudicated to finality on the merits as of January 1, 2014 and would have revived, for a period of one year, a cause of action, as specified, that otherwise would have been barred by the statute of limitations as of January 1, 2014, provided that the victim-plaintiff’s twenty-sixth birthday was before January 1, 2003 and the plaintiff discovered the cause of his or her injury on or after January 1, 2004. SB 131 was vetoed by the governor, who stated, in part:
[SB 131] does not change a victim's ability to sue a perpetrator. This bill also does not change the significant inequity that exists between private and public entities. What this bill does do is go back to the only group, i.e. private institutions, that have already been subjected to the unusual "one year revival period" and makes them, and them alone, subject to suit indefinitely. This extraordinary extension of the statute of limitations, which legislators chose not to apply to public institutions, is simply too open-ended and unfair.
SB 924 (Beall, Ch. 921, Stats. 2014) extended the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual abuse claims arising from conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2015 to the later of within twenty-two years of the date the plaintiff becomes an adult or within three years of the date of discovery.
SB 1053 (Beall, Ch. 153, Stats. 2018) explicitly provided that the Government Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims of childhood sexual abuse.
Staff Comments:
The workload impact of this bill to the court will depend on how many civil actions are filed outside of the current statute of limitations but within the extended statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault. While it is unknown how many actions would be filed within the expanded time period ultimately, it costs the court a little over $2,600, on average, in personnel and resources to adjudicate a limited civil case and a little over $11,600 in personnel and resources to adjudicate an unlimited civil case. These costs take into consideration the time from when a petition or motion is received by the court, processing and calendaring by the clerks, any hearings presided over by a judicial officer, and the finalizing of the outcome by the clerk. It does not include the salaries of judges or the cost of sheriff-provided court security. If this bill led to more than nineteen limited civil cases or more than four unlimited civil cases in one year that otherwise would have been time barred because of the current statute of limitations, the workload cost pressures of this bill to the court would surpass the Suspense File threshold.
-- END --
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2017-2018 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 3120 (Author:Gonzalez Fletcher)
Version: May 21, 2018
Hearing Date: July 3, 2018
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Damages: childhood sexual assault: statute of limitations
DESCRIPTION
This bill would extend the time for commencement of actions for childhood sexual assault to 40 years of age or five years from discovery of the injury. It would provide enhanced damages for a cover up, as defined, of the assault. It would also provide a three-year window in which expired claims would be revived.
BACKGROUND
In 2002, the Legislature enacted SB 1779 (Burton, Ch. 149, Stats. 2002), to provide that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse may be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday if the third party defendant person or entity knew, had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps and implement reasonable safeguards to avoid future acts of unlawful sexual conduct. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(b)(2).) SB 1779 also enacted Section 340.1(c) to allow a claim under Section 340.1(b)(2) to be brought within a one-year window, January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2003, even if that claim would otherwise be time barred as of January 1, 2003, because of an applicable statute of limitations.
The Government Tort Claims Act (the Act) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. (Gov. Code Sec. 815 et seq.) In addition to any time limitations placed by other statutes on such claims, the Act requires that a claim that is brought against a public entity relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after accrual of the cause or causes of action. (Gov. Code Sec. 911.2.)
In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding Section 340.1 and its delayed discovery provisions, a timely claim to a public entity pursuant to the Act is a prerequisite to maintaining an action for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity school district. The Court based its holding primarily on its finding that nothing in the express language of SB 1779 or the bill’s legislative history indicated an intent by the Legislature to exempt Section 340.1 claims from the Act and its six-month claim presentation requirement. Essentially, many claims for childhood sexual abuse against a public entity could not benefit from the change to Section 340.1 because the six-month presentation requirement for such claims was not addressed by SB 1779.
To address this loophole for childhood sexual abuse claims against public entities, SB 640 (Simitian, Ch. 383, Stats. 2008) was enacted into law. It added an explicit exception to the claims presentation requirements to Section 905 of the Act for “[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” (Gov. Code Sec. 905(m).) Section 905(m) applied to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009.
This bill would modify the statute of limitations for these claims in various ways and provide another revival period for bringing expired claims.
CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
Existing law provides that in an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions:
- an action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse;
- an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; or,
- an action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(a).)
Existing law provides that the actions described above against persons or entities other than the person who committed an act of childhood sexual abuse must be commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. However, this restriction does not apply if the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment. Existing law states that providing or requiring counseling is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a reasonable step or reasonable safeguard as used therein. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(b).)
Existing law provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described above relating to a nonperpetrator defendant that is permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. This revival does not apply to any claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits in any court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2003. Termination of a prior action on the basis of the statute of limitations does not constitute a claim that has been litigated to finality on the merits. It also does not apply to any written, compromised settlement agreement between the parties, as specified. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(c), (d).)
Existing law defines “childhood sexual abuse” as used in the above provisions to include any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1(e).)
Existing law exempts claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse from the Government Tort Claims Act. This provision only applies to claims arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Gov. Code Sec. 905.)
Existing law defines “sexual conduct” for the purposes of certain Penal Code provisions to include any of the following, whether actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, oral copulation, anal intercourse, anal oral copulation, masturbation, bestiality, sexual sadism, sexual masochism, penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object in a lewd or lascivious manner, exhibition of the genitals or pubic or rectal area for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer, any lewd or lascivious sexual act as defined in Section 288, or excretory functions performed in a lewd or lascivious manner, whether or not any of the above conduct is performed alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals. An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being sexual conduct. (Pen. Code Sec. 311.4.)
This bill would replace “sexual abuse” with “sexual assault” in Section 340.1 and add to the definition “sexual conduct” as the term is defined in Penal Code Section 311.4.
This bill would provide that an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault must be commenced within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the causal relationship between the assault and psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority.
This bill would provide that in such actions a person who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor. “Cover up” is defined as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
This bill would provide that actions described in Section 340.1 involving a nonperpetrator defendant shall not be commenced on or after the plaintiff’s 40th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or the person or entity failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
This bill would remove provisions relating to earlier revival periods that have since elapsed.
This bill would provide that its changes apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.
This bill would provide that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in Section 340.1 that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is revived, and these claims may be commenced within three years of January 1, 2019. A plaintiff shall have the later of the three-year time period under this provision or the time period under subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 as amended by this bill.
This bill would exempt claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 from the Government Tort Claims Act regardless of when the conduct took place. This change would be retroactive and apply to new or pending cases.
COMMENT
1. Stated need for the bill
According to the author:
California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse.
AB 3120 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by expanding the time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Victims of childhood sexual assault who were not ready to come forward during the one-year window allowed under SB 1779 (Burton 2002), perhaps because they had not even made the connection between their abuse and current psychological injuries, would be able to come forward under a new three-year window. Given the weakening cultural taboos that prevented people from coming forward 15 years ago, there is a belief that given a chance, additional survivors will now come forward. Several states have already taken this step or have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.
AB 3120 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports leagues, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.
2. Extending the statute of limitations period
A statute of limitations is a requirement to commence legal proceedings (either civil or criminal) within a specific period of time. Statutes of limitations are tailored to the cause of action at issue – for example, cases involving injury must be brought within two years from the date of injury, cases relating to written contracts must be brought four years from the date the contract was broken, and, as commonly referenced in the media, there is no statute of limitations for murder. Although it may appear unfair to bar actions after the statute of limitations has elapsed, that limitations period serves important policy goals that help to preserve both the integrity of our legal system and the due process rights of individuals.
For example, one significant reason that a limitations period is necessary in many cases is that evidence may disappear over time – paperwork gets lost, witnesses forget details or pass away, and physical locations that may be critical to a case change over time. Limitations periods also promote finality by encouraging an individual who has been wronged to bring an action sooner rather than later – timely actions arguably ensure that the greatest amount of evidence is available to all parties.
In general, California law requires all civil actions be commenced within applicable statutes of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 312.) Under existing law, the general statute of limitations in California to bring an action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, is two years. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 335.1)
Currently, certain actions for childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. This lengthy limitations period applies to actions against:
- the person alleged to have committed the childhood sexual abuse;
- any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff; and
- any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 340.1.)
This bill would lengthen the limitations period from eight years past the age of majority, which amounts to 26 years of age, to 22 years past the age of majority, or 40 years of age. In addition, it would extend the period tied to the discovery of the childhood sexual assault from within three years to within five years. The extension from three to five years based on discovery seems a minor and reasonable change to the law to provide more flexibility to victims. It is in line with other states’ laws.
As a frame of reference, Massachusetts requires such actions to be brought within 35 years of the alleged acts or within seven years of discovery of the causal relationship between the abuse and the injury. This period is tolled until the child reaches the age of majority. In addition, Connecticut provides victims 30 years from the age of majority to bring a claim. Florida allows actions within seven years of the age of majority or within four years from discovery of the causal relationship. Idaho allows claims to be brought within five years of the age of majority or discovery.
There is clearly a wide range of approaches among the states. A number of states have no specific limitations period applying to child sexual abuse. On the other end of the spectrum, Maine does not even apply limits to when actions based upon sexual acts toward minors may be brought.
These changes are reasonable especially in light of other states’ laws.
3. Reviving expired claims
This bill would provide that the claims provided for in Section 340.1 that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019, because an applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired, is explicitly revived by the bill. Such claims would have a three-year window in which they could be brought, or, if later, within the statute of limitations period established by the bill.
The California Supreme Court has squarely addressed the modification of statutes of limitations and the revival of stale claims:
The Legislature has authority to establish—and to enlarge—limitations periods. . . . [H]owever, legislative enlargement of a limitations period does not revive lapsed claims in the absence of express language of revival. This rule of construction grows out of an understanding of the difference between prospective and retroactive application of statutes. . . . As long as the former limitations period has not expired, an enlarged limitations period ordinarily applies and is said to apply prospectively to govern cases that are pending when, or instituted after, the enactment took effect. This is true even though the underlying conduct that is the subject of the litigation occurred prior to the new enactment. . . . However, when it comes to applying amendments that enlarge the limitations period to claims as to which the limitations period has expired before the amendment became law—that is, claims that have lapsed—the analysis is different. Once a claim has lapsed (under the formerly applicable statute of limitations), revival of the claim is seen as a retroactive application of the law under an enlarged statute of limitations. Lapsed claims will not be considered revived without express language of revival.
(Quarry v. Doe I (Quarry) (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955-957, internal citations omitted.)
The court continues, specifically addressing the policy reasons against revival:
“The reason for this rule is a judicial perception of unfairness in reviving a cause after the prospective defendant has assumed its expiration and has conducted his affairs accordingly.” As one court commented, “a statute of limitations grants prospective defendants relief from the burdens of indefinite exposure to stale claims. By reviving lapsed claims, the Legislature may appear to renege on this promise. As Judge [Learned] Hand wrote, there may be something ‘unfair and dishonest’ in after-the-fact withdrawal of this legislative assurance of safety.” Individuals, as well as businesses and other enterprises ordinarily rely upon the running of the limitations period: “The keeping of records, the maintenance of reserves, and the commitment of funds may all be affected by such reliance . . . . To defeat such reliance . . . deprives [enterprises] of the ability to plan intelligently with respect to stale and apparently abandoned claims.”
(Quarry, at 958, internal citations omitted.)
The California Supreme Court thus makes the case against reviving claims that have expired, highlighting the principle that such revival should not be provided lightly. However, given the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault, these claims are arguably worthy of such revival, despite the general disregard for doing so. In fact, the only example found where claims have been revived is in this context. SB 1779 (Burton, Ch. 149, Stats. 2002) provided a one-year revival period for otherwise expired claims for childhood sexual abuse.
As argued by the author, there has been a dramatic shift in cultural sensitivities around sexual abuse and a more accepting societal climate for victims. Rather than fearing stigma, past victims are more likely to be willing to come forward now with claims. There are complex psychological effects that result from being victimized in this way. This bill would provide another chance for victims, who are currently barred from pursing claims based solely on the passage of time, to seek justice.
California would not be alone. Georgia passed a law that created a two-year window starting July 1, 2015, in which victims could file actions for claims of childhood sexual abuse that were otherwise time barred as of the enactment of the statute. Guam created a similar two-year window. In 2012, Hawaii created a similar window, allowing time-barred claims to be brought within a two-year window. In 2014, Hawaii extended that window for an additional two years. There is currently a bill before the Governor of Hawaii that would once again revive claims of childhood sexual abuse.
One concern that has been raised is that the previous revival period specifically indicated that it did not apply to claims that had been litigated to finality, not including actions terminated on statute of limitations grounds. Although it may not be necessary, the Committee suggests including a similar provision into the revival provision in this bill:
Committee Amendment:
Insert in subdivision (r) of Section 340.1 language that limits its application to claims that have been litigated to finality
4. Recent revival attempt
In 2013, SB 131 (Beall, 2013) was passed by the Legislature. It would have, among other things, provided a one-year period of revival for otherwise time-barred claims arising from childhood sexual abuse. However, it would only have applied to private entities and not public entities.
In his veto message, Governor Jerry Brown traced the history of Section 340.1 and highlighted the fact that public entities were not subject to the revival of claims as private entities were. The Governor wrote:
[D]ue to a drafting error, the California Supreme Court held in 2007 that SB 1779 did not actually apply to public or governmental agencies. So, unlike private institutions, public schools and government entities were shielded from the one year revival of lapsed claims. As a result, the similarly situated victims of these entities were not accorded the remedies of SB 1779.
In 2008, the Legislature addressed this unfair distinction between victims of public as opposed to private institutions. Note, however, that the bill enacted, SB 640, did not restore equity between these two sets of victims. Instead of subjecting public/governmental entities to all of the provisions of the 2002 law, the Legislature only allowed victims of public institutions to sue under the new rules prospectively-from 2009 forward-and provided no “one year revival” period.
In passing this 2008 law, I can’t believe the legislature decided that victims of abuse by a public entity are somehow less deserving than those who suffered abuse by a private entity. . . .
This brings us to the bill now before me, SB 131. This bill does not change a victim’s ability to sue a perpetrator. This bill also does not change the significant inequity that exists between private and public entities. What this bill does do is go back to the only group, i.e. private institutions, that have already been subjected to the unusual “one year revival period” and makes them, and them alone, subject to suit indefinitely. This extraordinary extension of the statute of limitations, which legislators chose not to apply to public institutions, is simply too open-ended and unfair.
5. Standard of proof
Section 340.1 provides that actions against persons or entities owing a duty of care to a victim where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse, or against persons or entities where an intentional act by them was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse, cannot be commenced after the victim’s 26th birthday. However, in subdivision (b)(2), this limitation is removed where two elements are found:
- the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent; and
- failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment.
The exact contours of subdivision (b)(2) were outlined by the California Supreme Court in Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531. The Court analyzed the legislative history of the enacting statute, SB 1779, to determine the purpose of subdivision (b)(2):
We conclude that subdivision (b)(2) is a remedial statute that the Legislature intended to be construed broadly to effectuate the intent that illuminates section 340.1 as a whole; to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries. This principle of broad construction is not consistent with language in the opinion of the Court of Appeal below that imposed heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs seeking to bring their actions within this expansion of the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases.
(Id. at 536-537.) Despite this conclusion, the court found that the statute requires more specific allegations than were made by the party to the case:
Fairly construed, then, subdivision (b)(2) requires the victim to establish that the nonperpetrator defendant had actual knowledge, constructive knowledge (as measured by the reason to know standard), or was otherwise on notice that the perpetrator had engaged in past unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and, possessed of this knowledge or notice, failed to take reasonable preventative steps or implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of future unlawful sexual conduct by the perpetrator.
(Id. at 549, emphasis added.)
This bill would modify the provisions of subdivision (b)(2) [now subdivision (c) in the bill]. First, it would provide that the nonperpetrator defendant would only need to know, have reason to know, or otherwise be on notice, of any misconduct creating a risk of childhood sexual assault, whereas current law requires the relevant misconduct to be specifically “unlawful sexual conduct.” In addition, it would modify the second factor to requiring proof that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
Most importantly, this bill would replace an “and” with an “or” and only require one of the two factors to be proven to move forward with a claim after the relevant limitations period. These changes would lessen the burden on a victim to bring such a case after having passed the cutoff age.
These changes would apply to any future cases, as well as cases pending as of the enactment of this bill’s provisions.
6. Expanded definition, penalties, and reach
This bill would also replace “childhood sexual abuse” throughout the statute with “childhood sexual assault.” The only difference in the relevant definition would be the addition of “any sexual conduct” as defined in Penal Code Section 311.4(d)(1). That definition includes certain sexual acts or displays whether actual or simulated.
(Pen. Code Sec. 311.4.) This would increase the conduct to which the extended limitations period and the enhanced damages apply.
This bill would also provide that, in any action described therein, a victim who is sexually assaulted as the result of a cover up may recover treble damages against a defendant who has engaged in that cover up of the sexual assault. The bill would define “cover up” to mean a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
These changes would apply to new cases and to cases pending as of the enactment of this bill’s provisions.
Existing Section 905 of the Government Code exempts from the Government Tort Claims Act all claims made pursuant to Section 340.1 that arise out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. This bill would delete this time component from the provision and would make the change retroactive. Therefore, claims arising from relevant misconduct on the part of public entities and their employees occurring before 2009 that would have been barred by the Government Tort Claims Act, would now be subject to the statute of limitations laid out in Section 340.1 and would be revived pursuant to the relevant provision creating the three-year window. As discussed in the background, most of these claims were not eligible for the revival established by SB 1779.
7. Support and Opposition
The National Center for Victims of Crime, the sponsor of this bill, writes:
The current law lets too many abusers avoid accountability for their actions. The only good thing to come out of recent scandals was an environment that encouraged well-known women - actors or Olympians - who were victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward. It is time for the law to recognize what we all now know – that it can take decades before some survivors are capable of coming forward. Children being assaulted today may not be ready to come forward until decades in the future.
California State PTA writes in support because the bill “would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by removing arbitrary time limits that are placed upon victims while increasing the amount of damages a victim may recover from those who sought to cover up the abuse.”
A coalition of organizations, including the California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and the California School Boards Association, write in opposition:
From a purely fiscal perspective, however, I am concerned that eliminating the statute of limitations on when a public entity can be sued is going to result in significant increased claims and legal costs that will adversely impact the financial viability of public entity budgets and quality of education and public services for all Californians.
Even in advance of the first lawsuit, this bill will have an immediate fiscal impact on our organizations due to the need to assess and fund risk for old and potentially large exposures. This retroactive exposure will result in significantly increased rates, hard caps, or exclusions on liability coverage public agencies can obtain.
Support: California State PTA; Coalition for Children; Consumer Attorneys of California; Crime Victims United of California; Dr. Laura M. Ibsen, Professor of Pediatrics and Anesthesiology, Oregon Health and Science University; Joyful Heart Foundation; National Association of Social Workers; Restorative Justice International; Work Equity
Opposition: American Insurance Association; Association of California School Administrators; California Association of Joint Powers Authorities; California Association of School Business Officials; California Catholic Conference; California School Boards Association; CSAC Excess Insurance Authority; Golden State Risk Management; Independent Insurance Agents and Bankers of California; Northern California Schools Insurance Group; Property Casualty Insurers Association of America; Schools Excess Liability Fund; South Bay Area Schools Insurance Authority
HISTORY
Source: National Center for Victims of Crime
Related Pending Legislation: SB 1053 (Beall, 2018) would provide that the procedures authorized to be prescribed by Section 935 of the Government Code relating to claims for money or damages against local public entities do not apply to claims of childhood sexual abuse made as described in Section 905(m) of the Government Code. The bill would provide that this provision is declaratory of existing law. This bill is on the Senate Floor.
Prior Legislation:
SB 131 (Beall, 2013) See Comment 4.
SB 640 (Simitian, Ch. 383, Stats. 2008) See Background.
SB 1779 (Burton, Ch. 149, Stats. 2002) See Background.
Prior Vote:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 54, Noes 9)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 12, Noes 2)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 8, Noes 0)
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ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 3120
Author:(Gonzalez Fletcher)
As Amended Ver:May 21, 2018
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Judiciary | 8-0 | Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Weber, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Reyes | |
Appropriations | 12-2 | Gonzalez Fletcher, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Friedman, Eduardo Garcia, Nazarian, Quirk, Reyes | Bigelow, Obernolte |
SUMMARY: Extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives, for three years, old claims, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. Specifically, this bill:
- Redefines childhood sexual abuse as childhood sexual assault and expands the definition to include certain simulated acts.
- Extends the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual assault to twenty-two years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 40 years of age) or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later.
- Prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 40th birthday unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any misconduct that creates a risk of childhood sexual assault by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, or failed to take reasonable steps, or to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of childhood sexual assault.
- Revives, until three years of January 1, 2019 or the time period under 2), whichever is later, any actions for childhood sexual assault that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2019 because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit.
- Allows a person, in an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault, to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a sexual assault of a minor. Defines "cover-up" as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault.
- Eliminates the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act and instead exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, all claims for childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, including those arising out of conduct occurring before January 1, 2009.
EXISTING LAW:
- Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340. All further references are to this code unless otherwise noted.)
- Provides that the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined, is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. (Section 340.1(a).)
- Allows suit against the perpetrator or specified third parties, but prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff's 26th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, as specified. (Section 340.1(b).)
- Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Government Code Section 905.)
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Unknown annual state trial court costs, potentially in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, to the extent extending the statute of limitations results in additional civil cases. For example, if this bill results in 10 additional cases that average two weeks of court time, annual costs could be in the range of several hundred thousand dollars. Court costs would be higher or lower depending on the number of cases, the types of cases, and how cases are handled. Some cases would be settled without significant court time. Some may be grouped together. Others may require lengthier hearings and trials.
- Indeterminable, potentially significant, out-year costs to local school districts, to the extent prospective sex abuse offenses are committed and civil litigation is successfully brought outside the current statute of limitations. To the extent civil judgments cannot be absorbed by school districts and the state must make loans or augment appropriations, there could be a state cost.
In addition, to the extent an extended statute of limitations affects liability insurance premiums, school district could experience unknown, potentially significant, costs related to procuring liability insurance, apart from any claims.
COMMENTS: Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether it occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state's statute of limitations limits how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, revives for three years claims that had previously expired, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and applies to all local public entities. This bill also allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant.
It often takes victims of childhood sexual abuse years to come forward and face their abusers. All too often, victims of childhood sexual abuse fail to report their abuse timely or sometimes even fail to report it at all. While the victims almost always know their abusers, they often fail to come forward timely because of threats of harm, being ashamed, blaming themselves, fear of not being believed, failing to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, or suppressing very painful memories. As a result, it may take years, if at all, for victims to bring civil (or seek criminal) actions against both direct perpetrators of child sexual abuse and those who allowed the abuse to occur and to continue.
Childhood sexual abuse claims often have extended statutes of limitation. As a result of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion, many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. Eight jurisdictions – Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Guam – have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Other states allow for very lengthy discovery periods in adulthood, including Oregon, which permits claims to be filed until the victim is 40 years old or within five years of discovery.
California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chapter 1578, Statutes of 1990.) The latter provision – within 3 years of making the relevant connection — is called a "delayed discovery" rule.
Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses' memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear. It is often difficult for the child or young adult victim to understand the harm done to them and know how to take action.
This bill, like the law in Oregon, extends the statute of limitations for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against both direct perpetrators and third parties who may have helped facilitate the abuse to 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains majority (40 years old) or five years from when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the plaintiff became an adult was caused by the sexual assault, whichever occurs later. It also revives, for three years, any action for childhood sexual assault that would otherwise be barred because of applicable statute of limitations, claims presentation deadline, or any other time limit. As a result, this bill provides a forum for civil redress for victims of childhood sexual assault who today are barred from court.
Analysis Prepared by: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0003052
Date of Hearing: May 23, 2018
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 3120
Author:(Gonzalez Fletcher) – As Amended Ver:April 30, 2018
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 8 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill extends the statute of limitation on civil actions for childhood sexual assault. Specifically, this bill:
- Extends the statute of limitation on civil actions for childhood sexual assault to within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault and increases damages associated with such assault. (Current law sets the limitation at eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later)
- Generally prohibits a court from keeping confidential the name of any alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault.
- Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, thereby applying to public schools and other public institutions the extended statute of limitations that currently applies to private institutions.
- Makes other related changes.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Unknown annual state trial court costs, potentially in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, to the extent extending the statute of limitations results in additional civil cases. For example, if this bill results in 10 additional cases that average two weeks of court time, annual costs could be in the range of several hundred thousand dollars. Court costs would be higher or lower depending on the number of cases, the types of cases, and how cases are handled. Some cases would be settled without significant court time. Some may be grouped together. Others may require lengthier hearings and trials.
- Indeterminable, potentially significant, out-year costs to local school districts, to the extent prospective sex abuse offenses are committed and civil litigation is successfully brought outside the current statute of limitations. To the extent civil judgments cannot be absorbed by school districts and the state must make loans or augment appropriations, there could be a state cost.
In addition, to the extent an extended statute of limitations affects liability insurance premiums, school district could experience unknown, potentially significant, costs related to procuring liability insurance, apart from any claims.
COMMENTS:
- Background and Purpose. The statute of limitations regarding child sexual abuse has been amended repeatedly as it applies to third parties. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties who were legal causes of the abuse had to begin within a year of the plaintiff’s 18th birthday. In 1998, the law was amended to allow the same time limits against third parties as against the abuser, provided the suits were commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. In 2002, the law was amended to allow delayed-discovery suits (cases in which the plaintiff discovers psychological damage within three-years of the offense) against third parties after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday under specified conditions, and to allow a one-year revival of actions against third parties that were otherwise expired under the statute of limitations.
As noted in the Judiciary Committee analysis of the bill, courts have opined that statutes of limitation are a matter of expediency and convenience, not a matter of logic. That analysis also notes several states have removed or lengthened statutes of limitation for matters relating to childhood sexual abuse.
In support of the bill, the author notes:
California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse…Several states have already taken this step and have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.
AB 3120 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports league, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.
Opponents of the bill—mainly organizations representing school financial authorities—contend current law already contains appropriate due process for crimes against children and object to the potential this bill has to divert funding from the classroom to the courtroom.
- Prior Legislation. SB 924 (Beall), Chapter 921, Statutes of 2014, extends the civil statute of limitations involving child sexual abuse occurring after January 1, 2015, until the plaintiff reaches 40 years of age. SB 131 (Beall), of the 2013-14 Legislative Session, would have extended the statute of limitations for civil claims based on childhood sexual abuse. The bill was vetoed. AB 1628 (Beall), of the 2011-12 Legislative Session, would have extended the statute of limitations for civil claims based on childhood sexual abuse. The bill was held on this committee's Suspense File.
Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 24, 2018
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 3120
Author:(Gonzalez Fletcher) – As Amended Ver:April 19, 2018
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: childhood sexual ASSAULT: ELIMINATION OF statute of limitations and INCREASE in Damages
KEY ISSUES:
- IN ORDER TO ENSURE VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RECOVERING FOR THEIR INJURIES, SHOULD THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT CIVIL ACTIONS BE ELIMINATED AND SHOULD THAT ELIMINATION APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO ANY CASES FOR WHICH THERE HAS NOT BEEN A FINAL ADJUDICATION PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF THIS BILL?
- SHOULD A VICTIM OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT BE PERMITTED TO COLLECT TREBLE DAMAGES AGAINST A DEFENDANT WHOSE ACTIONS IN COVERING UP A PRIOR SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST A MINOR HAVE RESULTED IN THE ASSAULT OF THE VICTIM?
- SHOULD LICENSED PROFESSIONALS IN THE STATE BE REQUIRED TO REPORT TO THEIR LICENSING AGENCIES WHEN THEY ARE SUED FOR CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT AND WHEN SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS RENDERED AGAINST THEM?
- SHOULD CASES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT BASED ON CONDUCT OCCURRING BEFORE 2009 BE EXEMPTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT?
SYNOPSIS
Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether it occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state’s statute of limitations limits how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse.
Many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse because of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty that younger victims may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion. Seven states — Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and Minnesota — have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Many other states allow for lengthy discovery periods in adulthood. California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.)
This bill, sponsored by the National Center for Victims of Crime, makes a number of large and small changes to address childhood sexual abuse. First and foremost, this bill entirely eliminates the statute of limitations for bringing an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault and revives any actions for childhood sexual abuse that may have expired due to the existing statute of limitations, except cases that have had a final adjudication prior to the enactment of this bill. It expands the existing exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act that today only applies to conduct occurring after January 1, 2009, to include all claims of childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, regardless of when the abuse occurred. Thus local public entities, including schools, could be liable for damages for childhood sexual assaults that occurred before 2009. This bill also allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor. Lastly, the bill requires licensed professionals in California, such as accountants, attorneys, and doctors, to report to their licensing agencies, within 30 days, when they have been sued for childhood sexual assault and when a judgement has been entered against them.
This measure is supported by, among others, children's advocates and crime victims organizations, who write that the psychological injuries from sexually assault emerge later in life and that victims routinely need decades to arrive at the psychological place where they can come forward. If the statute of limitations is too short, then there can be no justice and more children will be abused. The bill is opposed by the California Catholic Conference (unless amended), insurance associations, school officials, and a joint powers association. All of the opponents raise the same basic concerns – it is very difficult to defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the impacted entities from being able to support their main work.
SUMMARY: Eliminates the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, revives old claims, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. Specifically, this bill:
- Redefines childhood sexual abuse as childhood sexual assault and expands the definition to include, among other things, creation, development, and distribution of child pornography.
- Eliminates the existing statute of limitations for bringing an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault. As a result, eliminates existing discovery rules and certificate of merit relating to when a victim discovered or reasonable should have discovered injury as a result of childhood sexual assault which impact the existing statute of limitations.
- Revives any actions for childhood sexual abuse commenced on or after the enactment of this bill or filed before enactment of the bill, except does not revive any action for which there has been a final adjudication before enactment of this bill.
- Allows a person, in an action for recovery of damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual assault, to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a sexual assault of a minor. Defines “cover-up” as a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault, which includes, but is not limited to, moving a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities and adults at the new location, giving an accused perpetrator a positive recommendation for further employment without disclosing the accusations of childhood sex assault, or destroying documents to conceal childhood sex assault.
- Requires holders of state professional licenses to report to their licensing agencies, within 30 days, when they have been sued for childhood sexual assault and when a judgement has been entered against them. Allows the licensing agency to consider a failure to report when making licensing determinations.
- Prohibits the court from keeping confidential the name of any alleged perpetrator of childhood sexual assault unless the party requesting the sealing establishes good cause.
- Eliminates the existing limitation on exemption from the Government Tort Claims Act and instead exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, all claims for childhood sexual assault against a local public entity, including those arising out of conduct occurring before January 1, 2009.
EXISTING LAW:
- Generally provides that the time for commencing a civil action for damages is within two years of the injury or death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 340. All further references are to this code unless otherwise noted.)
- Provides that the time for commencing a civil action based on injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse, as defined, is eight years after the plaintiff reaches majority (i.e., until 26 years of age) or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later. (Section 340.1 (a).)
- Allows suit against the perpetrator or specified third parties, but prohibits suit against third parties after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday, unless the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, as specified. (Section 340.1 (b).)
- Exempts, from the Government Tort Claims Act, claims for childhood sexual abuse against a local public entity, arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (Government Code Section 905.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: Childhood sexual abuse continues to ruin children lives and continues to shock the nation because, unfortunately, perpetrators continue to abuse, often with impunity, and sometimes with the help of third parties who either choose not to get involved or actively cover-up the abuse. Whether it occurred through gymnastics, swimming, school, or a religious institution, too many children have been victims of abuse and their lives have been forever impacted by that abuse. Despite the lifetime of damage that this abuse causes its victims, the state’s statute of limitations limits how long actions can be brought to recover for damages caused by childhood sexual abuse. In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill eliminates the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, revives old claims against both public and private institutions, and increases certain penalties for childhood sexual assault. This bill applies equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and applies to all local public entities. The bill also allows a victim of childhood sexual abuse to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the sexual assault is the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor. Lastly, the bill requires licensed professionals in California, such as accountants, attorneys, and doctors, to report to their licensing agencies, within 30 days, when they have been sued for childhood sexual assault and when a judgement has been entered against them.
In support of the bill, the author writes:
California law already recognizes childhood sexual abuse as a unique circumstance with regards to the civil statute of limitations, but has not gone far enough to ensure that victims will have access to justice. It is clear due to psychological trauma, shame, fear, and various other reasons, it can take a long time for victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward publically, to recognize or remember the assault, or want to pursue legal recourse.
AB 3120 would expand access to justice for victims of childhood sexual assault by removing the arbitrary time limits upon victims to pursue a case. Several states have already taken this step and have eliminated the civil statute of limitations for these cases. There should not be a reasonable expectation that if simply enough time passes, there will be no accountability for these despicable past acts by individuals and entities. This bill ensures that “time’s up” for the perpetrators of childhood sexual assault, not for victims.
AB 3120 would also confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from schools to sports league, which result in continuing victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly needed both to compensate victims who never should have been victims- and would not have been if past sexual assault had been properly brought to light- and also as an effective deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.
It often takes victims of childhood sexual abuse years to come forward and face their abusers. All too often, victims of childhood sexual abuse fail to report their abuse timely or sometimes even fail to report it at all. While the victims almost always know their abusers, they often fail to come forward timely because of threats of harm, being ashamed, blaming themselves, fear of not being believed, failing to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, or suppressing very painful memories. Writes the sponsor, the National Center for Victims of Crime:
It often takes decades before victims recognize what was done to them as abuse, realize how they have been harmed by the abuse, or simply find the strength to come forward. When victims are finally able to disclose the abuse, they often find that the civil statute of limitations has already expired.
The current law lets too many abusers avoid accountability for their actions. The only good thing to come out of recent scandals was an environment that encouraged well-known women - actors or Olympians - who were victims of childhood sexual assault to come forward. It is time for the law to recognize what we all now know – that it can take decades before some survivors are capable of coming forward. Children being assaulted today may not be ready to come forward until decades in the future.
Consumer Attorneys of California adds:
Childhood sexual abuse must be addressed and addressed now. According to a 1983 UCLA Medical Center report, the five most common reactions of children to sexual assault can be classified as the “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.” The five categories of reaction are: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, unconvincing disclosure; and, retraction. Often time’s younger children will not even know they have been abused, like the 81 third graders of the Miramonte teacher who spoon fed semen to his students. And older children are often “groomed,” and led to believe they are in love with their abuser. There is shame, denial, emotional problems . . . .
As a result, it may take years, if at all, for victims to bring civil (or seek criminal) actions against both direct perpetrators of child sexual abuse and those who allowed the abuse to occur and to continue.
Childhood sexual abuse claims often have extended statutes of limitation. As a result of the uniqueness of childhood sexual abuse and the difficulty younger victims may have fully understanding the abuse, coming to terms with what has occurred, and then coming forward in a timely fashion, many states have special, extended statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. Eight jurisdictions — Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Guam — have gone as far as to eliminate the civil statute of limitations with respect to some or all claims based on childhood sexual abuse. Other states allow for very lengthy discovery periods in adulthood, including Oregon, which permits claims to be filed until the victim is 40 years old or within five years of discovery.
California law, as amended in 1990, requires that such actions be brought within 8 years of the age of majority (generally up to 26 years old) or within 3 years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later. (SB 108 (Lockyer), Chap. 1578, Stats. 1990.) The latter provision — within 3 years of making the relevant connection — is called a “delayed discovery” rule.
This statute of limitations has been amended repeatedly as it applies to third parties. Prior to 1998, actions against third parties who were the legal cause of the abuse had to be commenced within a year of the plaintiff’s 18th birthday. In 1998, the law was amended to allow the same time limits against third parties as against the abuser, provided that the suits were commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. (AB 1651 (Ortiz), Chap. 1032, Stats. 1998.) In 2002, the law was amended again to allow, among other things, delayed-discovery suits against such third parties after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday under limited conditions. (SB 1779 (Burton), Chap. 149, Stats. 2002.)
This bill eliminates, entirely, the statute of limitations for civil actions for childhood sexual assault against both direct perpetrators and third parties who may have helped facilitate the abuse. The bill also applies this provision retroactively to any case not litigated to finality before the bill's enactment.
The Legislature has the power to create, extend, and change statutes of limitation as it deems appropriate. The policy behind statutes of limitations provides that they "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." (3 Witkin, California Procedure Section 433, 4th Ed.)
Nonetheless, courts have acknowledged that "the need for repose is not so overarching that the Legislature cannot by express legislative provision allow certain actions to be brought at any time, and it has occasionally done so." (Duty v. Abex Corp (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749, citations omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has long held that:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. . . . They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate against the just and the unjust claim, or the avoidable or unavoidable delay . . . . Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a "fundamental right" . . . . [T]he history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control. (Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 314.)
With regard to reviving cases previously barred by a statute of limitations, in Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828 and Lent v. Doe (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1177, the courts cited Chase Securities and affirmed the Legislature's power to revive civil causes of action, even if the actions were otherwise barred by the running of the statute of limitations. In both cases, the court upheld against constitutional attack the retroactive application of prior legislation amending Section 340.1 (the statute at issue in this bill) to revive childhood abuse actions that had lapsed or technically expired under prior law.
Similarly, in Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, the court upheld the Legislature's revival of certain insurance claims arising out of the Northridge Earthquake that were not brought previously and that otherwise were time-barred, and allowed these claimants a one-year window to file the revived action. (SB 1899 (Burton) Chap. 1090, Stats. 2000, enacting Section 340.9.)
Another precedent for reviving civil claims or extending the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases is SB 1678 (Dunn), Chap. 741, Stats. 2004. That bill revived, for a one-year period commencing on January 1, 2005, a civil cause of action for child sexual abuse against the perpetrator if a criminal case filed against the perpetrator for that abuse was dismissed or overturned pursuant to a United States Supreme Court decision which held that the underlying statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law in authorizing a criminal prosecution (as opposed to a civil action) after the original statute of limitations for the offense had run.
Perhaps most importantly for this bill, the Supreme Court in Quarry v. Doe I (2009) 53 Cal.4th 945, which held that the provision allowing a plaintiff over 26 years of age to file suit against specified third parties in specified circumstances did not apply to claims that lapsed under prior law, did not say that the Legislature could not revive the claims by express terms; the majority simply held that the Legislature had not done so.
Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the Legislature believes that there are sufficient public policy reasons to support extending the statute of limitations and reviving otherwise barred claims under this bill, and whether such an extension and revival would maintain the protections afforded by the statute of limitations, that is, balancing the interests of the victims with the defendants' right to defend against the claim.
In support of the need for eliminating the statute of limitations, the author states:
Current law has also failed to provide an effective deterrent on entities with a duty of care to children from sweeping sexual assault under the rug and engaging in cover-ups. These cover-ups have protected perpetrators of sexual assault over the well-being of the children in their care, and allowed perpetrators to victimize more children.
For instance, A Southern California News Group investigation found that hundreds of underage USA swimmers have been subject to sexual abuse at the hands of their coaches and others in positions of power. “Top USA Swimming executives, board members, top officials and coaches acknowledge […] that they were aware of sexually predatory coaches for years, in some cases even decades, but did not take action against them”.
In another recent example at a high school in the San Diego area, a teacher was investigated for improper behavior towards students multiple times and even removed from the classroom once by the district. However, an investigation by Voice of San Diego found a lack of records for additional complaints that were made to the administration over a 10 year period, stating “some student complaints may have never left the principal’s office”. The former students coming forward are now are in their 20s and 30s. (Citations omitted.)
Statutes of limitations reflect the reality that, over time, documents are lost or destroyed, witnesses’ memories fade, and evidence erodes. However, the current laws regarding the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims reflect another reality, namely that victims often have difficulty coming forward soon after the abuse for a variety of reasons, including threats, shame, self-blame, lack of trust, and fear. It is often difficult for the child victims to understand the harm done and know how to take action. Current law for younger victims accommodates these difficulties with its delayed-discovery rule. However, current law for older victims (born in 1976 or earlier) does not. This bill would change the law to provide uniform protection to victims regardless of age.
The Governor has been willing to extend criminal statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse, but not civil ones. In 2013 and 2014, the Legislature passed legislation extending the statute of limitations for criminal and civil actions for childhood sexual abuse. The Governor signed the bill extending the criminal statute of limitations from 26 years of age to 40 years of age (SB 926 (Beall), Chap. 921, Stats. 2014), but vetoed the two civil extensions, one for the exact same time period as the criminal expansion (SB 131 (Beall), 2013; SB 924 (Beall), 2014). The Governor, in his veto of SB 924, stated:
Statutes of limitations exist as a matter of fundamental fairness. As I wrote last year, there comes a time when an individual or organization should be secure in the reasonable expectation that past acts are indeed in the past and not subject to further lawsuits. With the passage of time, evidence may be lost or disposed of, memories fade and witnesses move away or die.
There needs to be a compelling reason to lengthen the statute of limitations for civil claims against third parties. I do not see evidence of that here.
It is not clear why the Governor was willing to extend the statute of limitations from 26 years of age to 40 for criminal prosecutions, where a defendant's fundamental liberty is at stake (SB 926, 2014), but was unwilling to approve the exact same extension for civil actions when money, but not liberty, is at stake. The same arguments about faded memories and lost evidence apply in both cases and, in both cases, the plaintiff/prosecution retains the burden of proof. However, regardless of that seemingly logical inconsistency, this bill, which does not just extend the statute of limitations, but eliminates it entirely and applies retroactively, will likely raise the same concerns for the Governor, although the latest revelations of long-term sexual abuse of children and institutions turning blind eyes may have some impact.
This measure also applies retroactively to local public agencies. The Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA) generally governs damage claims brought against public entities. The GTCA requires that a claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person be presented in writing to the public entity not later than six months after the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the applicable statutes of limitation. In Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, the California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations timeframes in Section 340.1 and its delayed discovery rule, an abuse victim must follow the six-month presentation rule in the GTCA and cannot, without having done so, take advantage of the delayed-discovery rule otherwise applicable to abuse victims.
However, the Legislature in 2008 waived, going forward, the local government six-month notice of claim limitation requirement that applies to all other tort claims for victims of child sexual abuse. (SB 640 (Simitian), Chap. 383, Stats. 2008.) Thus, beginning in 2009, victims, have the same time period to file a claim against local public entities as against private institutions. This bill now extends that GTCA exemption to conduct occurring before 2009. As a result, this bill treats public and private entities the same.
It should be noted that, despite the clear intent of SB 640 to waive the GTCA for claims of childhood sexual abuse against public entities, some of these entities, including school districts, have apparently been using another Government Code section to circumvent SB 640. SB 1053 (Beall, 2018), which recently passed the Senate Judiciary Committee, specifically exempts childhood sexual abuse claims from these additional procedural hurdles enacted by local public entities under the GTCA.
The bill also expands protections to victims and exposes those who sexually assault children to additional punishments. In addition to eliminating the statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault, applying that retroactively, and removing the protections of the GTCA from local public entities, this bill creates three other provisions to protect children and punish perpetrators. First, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual assault to recover tremble damages against a defendant if the victim's assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior sexual assault of a minor. For example, if the defendant moved a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities or gave the defendant a positive job recommendation without disclosing the sexual assault accusations, and the victim was assaulted as a result, the victim could recover treble damages. The victim would, of course, first have to prove the case.
Amendments needed to clarify that the list of cover-up examples is just that. As currently in print, the bill provides examples of what might amount to a cover-up. This list is certainly not meant to be exhaustive, but the bill currently fails to state that the list of examples is just that. The following amendment will address that concern:
Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 (b)(2): For purposes of this subdivision, a “cover up” is a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault, which includes, but is not limited to, moving a perpetrator to another location without notifying authorities and adults at the new location, giving an accused perpetrator a positive recommendation for further employment without disclosing the accusations of childhood sex assault, or destroying documents to conceal childhood sex assault.
Additionally, the bill requires licensed professionals in the state, such as accountants, attorneys, and doctors, to report to their licensing agencies, within 30 days, when they have been sued for childhood sexual assault and again when a judgement has been entered against them. The bill then allows – but does not require – the licensing agencies to discipline a professional that fails to make the required reporting. This provision helps ensure that licensing agencies know of claims or judgements of childhood sexual assault against their licensees and allows them to take appropriate action, if any.
Finally, the bill prohibits a court from keeping confidential the name of any alleged perpetrator unless the party requesting the sealing establishes good cause. This is simply a recognition that our courts operate in the open and that, absent good cause, the public should know what transpires there, especially as relates to those accused of childhood sexual assault.
Opponents believe that the bill would be financially devastating to, among others, schools, religious institutions, and insurers, and is unfair, especially as applied to third parties. This bill is opposed by the California Catholic Conference (unless amended, as discussed below), insurance associations, school officials, and a joint powers association. All of the opponents raise the same basic concerns – it is very difficult to defend against old claims when records and witnesses may be unavailable, insurance may no longer be available, and the cost of defending these actions could be astronomical and could prevent the impacted entities from being able to support their main work.
For example, the California Association of School Business Officials, California Association of Joint Powers Authority, CSAC Excess Insurance Authority, and Schools Excess Liability Fund write that from "a purely fiscal perspective . . . we are concerned that eliminating the statute of limitations on when a public school employer can be sued is going to result in significant increased claims and legal costs that will adversely impact the financial viability of a school district’s budget and quality of education for all children. . . . As written, AB 3120 would put every public agency in the position of having to defend itself against decades-old claims when witnesses may be scarce and there has been a turnover of staff. This will surely result in classroom funding intended to educate students to instead be spent on paying for increased legal costs and for defending nuisance claims."
The insurance associations are concerned about the bill's impact on the availability of insurance: "AB 3120 will have an adverse impact on the ability of the insurance industry to provide coverage to businesses, healthcare organizations, non-profits, professionals and educational institutions for sexual molestation. At worst, this coverage will no longer be available in California if AB 3120 were to become law. At best, the coverage will likely become much more expensive and/or restricted. . . . The educational and human services organizations which undertake the difficult work in our communities need the predictability that comes with obligations imposed by the current statute of limitations. That is also true of their insurers."
Obviously, the flip side of the cost of these claims and that impact on the institutions that may have protected sexual abusers of children is the lifetime damage done to those children. Additionally, it should be noted that the elimination of the statute of limitations and the revival of actions against perpetrators or third parties only assures that a claim can be heard on its merits. Any other applicable defense would not be affected, and plaintiffs would still have to prove all elements of their case.
The California Catholic Conference (CCC) opposes the bill, unless it is amended, because while there is no objection to the changes with respect to direct perpetrators, CCC believes that the changes proposed by the bill would be "unfair to employers, because leadership and management of an organization can change many times over the years, and witnesses and documents can be lost." CCC believes that the bill's treble damages provisions could be particularly financially devastating, which "is of particular concern to the Church in California because for those dioceses that have no remaining insurance coverage to attend to such claims, AB 3120 could result in millions of dollars being siphoned away from the Church's outreach efforts to serve immigrants, those in need, the homeless, and the hungry." Again, it is important to note that before the Church could be found liable for treble damages under this bill, plaintiffs would have to prove not only that they were sexually assaulted as children, but that the Church made a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to prior childhood sexual assaults and, as a result of that hiding, the plaintiffs were assaulted.
CCC has offered to remove its opposition if the bill is amended to (1) extend the statute of limitations prospectively by nine years, from 26 years of age to 35 years of age; (2) limit retroactivity to claims arising after 2004 [given (1), it is unclear if this provision has any impact or actually extends liability]; and (3) ensure equal application to claims against the state as well as to claims against local government entities. These changes would narrow the scope of the bill considerably, reducing costs to employers and insurance companies, but limiting access to the courts for victims of childhood sexual assault.
Current and Prior Related Legislation: SB 1053 (Beall, 2018) specifically exempts childhood sexual abuse claims from procedural hurdles enacted by local public entities under the Government Tort Claims Act. That bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee and is now before the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 926 (Beall, Chap. 921, Stats. 2014) extended the statute of limitations for felony child sex crimes until the victim is 40 years old.
SB 924 (Beall, 2014) would have extended the statute of limitations for civil childhood sexual abuse until age 40 and would have exempted those claims brought against a local public entity from the Government Tort Claims Act. That bill was vetoed by the Governor.
SB 131 (Beall, 2013) would have made prior extensions of the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse retroactive and would have revived certain claims for a year. That bill was vetoed by the Governor.
AB 1628 (Beall, 2012) would have extended the statute of limitations in civil cases involving child sex abuse to 35 years of age, prohibited confidential settlements, and imposed new duties on private entities. This bill died in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 640 (Simitian, Chap. 383, Stats. 2008) provided that child sex abuse claims arising out of conduct on or after January 1, 2009 are not subject to the Government Tort Claims Act, which requires that a claim against a public entity be presented within 6 months of its accrual.
SB 1779 (Burton and Escutia, Chap. 149, Stats. 2002) provided that claims against a third party do not lapse when the plaintiff turned 26, but only if specified requirements are met. It also revived certain expired claims for one year.
SB 674 (Ortiz, Chap. 120, Stats. 1999) made the then-current statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse cases against third parties retroactive.
AB 1651 (Ortiz, Chap. 1021, Stats. 1998) extended the statute of limitations in actions against third parties. However, any action against a third party had to be commenced before the plaintiff’s 26th birthday.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
National Center for Victims of Crime (sponsor)
California State PTA
Consumer Attorneys of California
Crime Victims United of California
National Association of Social Workers – California Chapter
Opposition
American Insurance Association
California Association of School Business Officials
California Association of Joint Powers Authority
California Catholic Conference (unless amended)
CSAC Excess Insurance Authority
Independent Insurance Agents & Bankers of California
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Schools Excess Liability Fund
Analysis Prepared by: Leora Gershenzon / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):