AB 3121: Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege.
- Session Year: 2017-2018
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2018-03-22
Existing law governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and generally provides a privilege as to communications made in the course of certain relations, including the attorney-client, physician-patient, and psychotherapist-patient relationship, as specified. Under existing law, the right of any person to claim those evidentiary privileges is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to a disclosure made by anyone.
This bill would provide that a union agent, as defined, and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity, except as specified. The bill would provide that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another person from disclosing a privileged communication, except as specified. The bill would further provide that this privilege may be waived in accordance with existing law and does not apply in criminal proceedings.
Existing law specifies that the right of a person to claim certain evidentiary privileges is waived if the holder of a privilege discloses a significant part of the privileged communication or has consented to that disclosure, as specified.This bill would make technical, nonsubstantive changes to that provision.Existing law specifies that the right of a person to claim certain evidentiary privileges is waived if the holder of a privilege discloses a significant part of the privileged communication or has consented to that disclosure, as specified.
This bill would make technical, nonsubstantive changes to that provision.
(a)Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of a person to claim a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1033 (privilege of penitent), 1034 (privilege of clergy member), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege) privilege), or 1048 (union agent-represented worker privilege) is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if a holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by a statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in a proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege.
(b)If two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege), or 1048 (union agent-represented worker privilege), a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the privilege provided by Section 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), a waiver of the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege.
(c)A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver of a privilege.
(d)A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege), or 1048 (union agent-represented worker privilege), when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer, lawyer referral service, physician, psychotherapist, sexual assault counselor, domestic violence counselor, or human trafficking caseworker caseworker, or union agent was consulted, is not a waiver of the privilege.
SEC. 2.Section 917 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:917.(a)If a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of the lawyer-client, lawyer referral service-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent, marital or domestic partnership, sexual assault counselor-victim, domestic violence counselor-victim, or human trafficking caseworker-victim or union agent-represented worker relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.
(b)A communication between persons in a relationship listed in subdivision (a) does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication.
(c)For purposes of this section, electronic has the same meaning provided in Section 1633.2 of the Civil Code.
SEC. 3.Article 9.5 (commencing with Section 1048) is added to Chapter 4 of Division 8 of the Evidence Code, to read:9.5.Union Agent-Represented Worker Privilege1048.(a)Except as required by subdivision (b), and subject to Section 912, a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity. A represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this section.
(b)A union agent may use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
(1)In actions against the union agent in his or her personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union of affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities.
(2)When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit members estate or guardian or conservator.
(c)A union agent shall use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
1048.1.For purposes of this article, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a)Confidential communication means information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent and in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of a representational relationship.
(b)Union agent means a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance and the appointed employee steward was a steward at the time the communication was made.
1048.2.There is no privilege under this article if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
1048.3.There is no privilege under this article with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
1048.4.The privilege established under this article does not apply in criminal proceedings.
(a)Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of any a person to claim a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1033 (privilege of penitent), 1034 (privilege of clergy member), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege) is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any a holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any a statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any a proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege.
(b)Where If two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege), a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the privilege provided by Section 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), a waiver of the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege.
(c)A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver of any a privilege.
(d)A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege), when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer, lawyer referral service, physician, psychotherapist, sexual assault counselor, domestic violence counselor, or human trafficking caseworker was consulted, is not a waiver of the privilege.
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Date
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Status
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| Aug 29, 2018 | Ordered to inactive file at the request of Senator Monning. |
| Jun 21, 2018 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jun 20, 2018 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (June 19). |
| May 10, 2018 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Apr 26, 2018 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| Apr 26, 2018 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| Apr 18, 2018 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 17, 2018 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 8. Noes 2.) (April 17). |
| Apr 2, 2018 | Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Mar 22, 2018 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 17, 2018 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 19. |
| Feb 16, 2018 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Jun 19, 2018 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
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| Apr 26, 2018 | AB 3121 KALRA Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Apr 17, 2018 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 3121
:
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 5-2, 6/19/18
AYES: Jackson, Hertzberg, Monning, Stern, Wieckowski
NOES: Moorlach, Anderson
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 45-22, 4/26/18 - See last page for vote
California Labor Federation
DIGEST:
This bill establishes an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee.
Existing law:
- Provides that no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness; to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to produce any writing, object, or other thing, or prevent another person from the same, unless otherwise provided by statute. (Evid. Code Sec. 911.)
- Governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and generally provides a privilege to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relationships. (Evid. Code Secs. 954, 966, 980, 994, 1014, 1033, 1034, 1035.8, 1037.5, 1038.)
- Provides that the right of a person to claim specified privileges is waived with respect to a protected communication if the holder of the privilege has disclosed a significant part of that communication or consented to disclosure, without coercion. Existing law provides that a disclosure does not constitute a waiver where it was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the lawyer, lawyer referral service, physician, psychotherapist, sexual assault counselor, domestic violence counselor, or human trafficking caseworker was consulted. (Evid. Code Sec. 912(a), (d).)
- Provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Evid. Code Sec. 912 (b).)
- Provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence, and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. A communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Evid. Code Sec. 917.)
This bill:
- Establishes the union agent-represented worker privilege and provides that a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity.
- Specifies that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged.
- Authorizes a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the agent’s representative capacity in specified circumstances, including actions against the union agent or against the local union or with consent.
- Requires a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
- Defines “confidential communication” to mean information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent and in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agency in the course of a representational relationship.
- Defines “union agent” to mean a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance.
- Provides that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
- Provides that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
- Provides that the union agent-represented worker privilege would not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Applies the various provisions of the Evidence Code regarding waiver, joint holders, burden of proof, and other related provisions concerning privilege to the union agent-represented worker privilege.
Background
An evidentiary privilege permits an otherwise competent witness to refuse to testify and/or prevent another from testifying. Privileges are policy exclusions, unrelated to the reliability of the information involved, which are granted because it is considered more important to keep that information confidential than it is to require disclosure of all the information relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding. For example, to protect the lawyer-client relationship, it is necessary to prevent disclosure of confidential communications made in the course of that relationship. (Comments to Evid. Code Sec. 910.) Whereas privileges of a witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence are governed by the principles of common law as interpreted by United States district courts in light of “reason and experience,” the only privileges that are recognized in California are those statutory privileges expressly codified in the Evidence Code. (See Fed. Rules of Evid., Rule 501; Evid. Code Sec. 911.)
To date, California has codified numerous evidentiary privileges, recognizing the need to protect the confidentiality of certain communications. Among those are the: lawyer-client privilege, spousal privilege, confidential marital communications privilege, physician-patient privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, clergyman-penitent privilege, sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, domestic violence counselor-victim privilege, and human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege. Yet other statutory privileges protect official information acquired in confidence by a public employee and the identity of informants, protect persons from having to reveal their votes in public elections, and protect against disclosure of trade secrets. (Evid. Code Sec. 930 et seq.)
This bill creates an evidentiary privilege for union agent-represented worker communications. Case law has held that no such privilege exists. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881, the court held that California law does not expressly provide for any such privilege; rather, the creation of evidentiary privileges is “the province of the Legislature.” (Id. at 890-891.) This bill follows the decision in Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P.3d 559, 565, decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska, which extended by implication the union agent-represented worker evidentiary privilege from Alaskan law.
Comments
The author states:
Although it is unfortunate, many workers today face issues of discrimination, exploitation, harassment, and retaliation. When employees discuss issues affecting their employment with their official union representative, most already assume that such communications are confidential and that information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third parties. However, no state statute provides such communications with an evidentiary privilege – nor does case law recognize such a privilege.
At a time when the #metoo movement has empowered women and others to report and speak out about harassment in the workplace, additional confidential avenues to report these incidences are in greater need.
AB 3121 would add union agent and represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we can help to ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs.
NOTE: For a more thorough analysis, please see the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of this bill.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (co-source)
California Labor Federation (co-source)
California Association of Psychiatric Technicians
California Federation of Teachers
California Professional Firefighters
California School Employees Association
California Teachers Association
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Professional Engineers in California Government
United Public Employees
OPPOSITION: (Verified 6/22/18)
Association of California Healthcare Districts
Association of California School Administrators
California Ambulance Association
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
California Association of School Business Officials
California Chamber of Commerce
California Farm Bureau Federation
California League of Food Producers
California Manufacturers and Technology Association
California Retailers Association
California Special District Association
California State Association of Counties
League of California Cities
Marin County Council of Mayor and Councilmembers
Official Police Garages of Los Angeles
Rural County Representatives of California
School Employers Association of California
Small School Districts Association
Urban Counties of California
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The California Teachers Association, in support, argues: “The role of a union representative is to represent members and they should not be hindered in that role. This proposal represents an improvement to collective bargaining law in California, and supports settling disputes more efficiently. There are times when our staff and elected leaders might be the preferred individual to resolve a dispute, but they make referrals to an attorney simply to establish attorney-client privilege. Members should feel comfortable and confident with their union representative and being able to confide all elements of their situation with the union representative is essential.”
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The League of California Cities and a coalition of groups write in opposition to this bill. The coalition disagrees with the notion that the relationship between a union agent and a represented worker is similar to others that are afforded privilege in California and point to Governor Brown’s veto message. It argues this bill “is not only misguided, it also creates legal and operational challenges for public agencies while establishing a new, one-sided level of evidentiary privilege for union employees.” The coalition points to the issue of workplace discrimination and harassment and stresses the importance of local government employers judiciously investigating allegations of workplace misconduct. It states that to investigate properly, “it is imperative that a public employer have the ability to interview all potential parties and witnesses to ascertain the facts and understand the matter fully.” The coalition contends that this bill “interferes with the ability to interview witnesses,” “permits the silencing of employees who wish to voluntarily report an incident or testify,” and “provides an opportunity for employees of an agency to put a roadblock in front of necessary employer investigations into misconduct.”
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 45-22, 4/26/18
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Berman, Bloom, Bonta, Burke, Caballero, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez Fletcher, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Limón, Low, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Santiago, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Weber, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Acosta, Baker, Bigelow, Brough, Chávez, Chen, Choi, Cunningham, Dahle, Gallagher, Harper, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Mathis, Mayes, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Salas, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Travis Allen, Cooley, Daly, Flora, Fong, Cristina Garcia, Gray, Maienschein, Rodriguez, Rubio, Steinorth
6/22/18 14:09:07
**** END ****
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2017-2018 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 3121 (Author:Kalra)
Version: March 22, 2018
Hearing Date: June 19, 2018
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege
DESCRIPTION
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. That privilege could be used to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, excluding criminal proceedings, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity.
This bill would provide that there is no privilege if disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act reasonably believed is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual or if the communication was made to help a person commit, or plan to commit, a crime or fraud. This bill would additionally provide that the union agent-represented worker privilege could be waived in accordance with existing law.
BACKGROUND
An evidentiary privilege permits an otherwise competent witness to refuse to testify and/or prevent another from testifying. Privileges are policy exclusions, unrelated to the reliability of the information involved, which are granted because it is considered more important to keep that information confidential than it is to require disclosure of all the information relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding. For example, to protect the lawyer-client relationship, it is necessary to prevent disclosure of confidential communications made in the course of that relationship. (Comments to Evid. Code Sec. 910.) Whereas privileges of a witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence are governed by the principles of common law as interpreted by United States district courts in light of “reason and experience,” the only privileges that are recognized in California are those statutory privileges expressly codified in the Evidence Code. (See Fed. Rules of Evid., Rule 501; Evid. Code Sec. 911.)
To date, California has codified numerous evidentiary privileges, recognizing the need to protect the confidentiality of certain communications. Among those are the: lawyer-client privilege, lawyer referral service-client privilege, spousal privilege, confidential marital communications privilege, physician-patient privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, clergyman-penitent privilege, sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, domestic violence counselor-victim privilege, and human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege. Yet other statutory privileges protect official information acquired in confidence by a public employee and the identity of informants, protect persons from having to reveal their votes in public elections, and protect against disclosure of trade secrets. (Evid. Code Sec. 930 et seq.)
This bill seeks to create an evidentiary privilege for union agent-represented worker communications. Case law has held that no such privilege exists. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881, the court held that California law does not expressly provide for any such privilege; rather, the creation of evidentiary privileges is “the province of the Legislature.” (Id. at 890-891.) This bill would follow the decision in Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P.3d 559, 565, decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska, which extended by implication the union agent-represented worker evidentiary privilege from the Alaska Public Employment Relations Act.
CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW
Existing law provides that no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness; to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to produce any writing, object, or other thing, or prevent another person from the same, unless otherwise provided by statute. (Evid. Code Sec. 911.)
Existing law governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and generally provides a privilege to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relationships, including the following:
- attorney-client (Evid. Code Sec. 954);
- lawyer referral service-client (Evid. Code Sec. 966);
- spouses (Evid. Code Sec. 980);
- physician-patient (Evid. Code Sec. 994);
- psychotherapist-patient (Evid. Code Sec. 1014);
- clergy-penitent (Evid. Code Sec. 1033, 1034);
- sexual assault counselor-victim (Evid. Code Sec. 1035.8);
- domestic violence counselor-victim (Evid. Code Sec. 1037.5); and
- human trafficking caseworker-victim (Evid. Code Sec. 1038).
Existing law provides that the right of a person to claim specified privileges is waived with respect to a protected communication if the holder of the privilege has disclosed a significant part of that communication or consented to disclosure, without coercion. Existing law provides that a disclosure does not constitute a waiver where it was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the lawyer, lawyer referral service, physician, psychotherapist, sexual assault counselor, domestic violence counselor, or human trafficking caseworker was consulted. (Evid. Code Sec. 912(a), (d).)
Existing law provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Evid. Code Sec. 912 (b).)
Existing law provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence, and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. A communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Evid. Code Sec. 917.)
This bill would establish the union agent-represented worker privilege and provide that a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity.
This bill would specify that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged.
This bill would authorize a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the agent’s representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- in actions against the union agent in his or her personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union of affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities; or
- when, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member’s estate or guardian or conservator.
This bill would require a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
This bill would define “confidential communication” to mean information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent and in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agency in the course of a representational relationship.
This bill would define “union agent” to mean a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance.
This bill would provide that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
This bill would provide that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
This bill would provide that the union agent-represented worker privilege would not apply in criminal proceedings.
This bill would apply the various provisions of the Evidence Code regarding waiver, joint holders, burden of proof, and other related provisions concerning privilege to the union agent-represented worker privilege.
COMMENT
1. Stated need for the bill
According to the author:
Although it is unfortunate, many workers today face issues of discrimination, exploitation, harassment, and retaliation. When employees discuss issues affecting their employment with their official union representative, most already assume that such communications are confidential and that information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third parties. However, no state statute provides such communications with an evidentiary privilege – nor does case law recognize such a privilege.
At a time when the #metoo movement has empowered women and others to report and speak out about harassment in the workplace, additional confidential avenues to report these incidences are in greater need.
AB 3121 would add union agent and represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we can help to ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs.
2. Communications between a union agent and a represented employee
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. That privilege could be used to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity.
The author argues that most employees, when discussing issues affecting their employment with their union representative, assume that such communications are confidential and that the information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third parties. The author states that allowing such a privilege protects communications that focus on workers’ rights and supports California’s fair employment standards.
Various cases involving union agent-represented employee communications demonstrate the conflict between providing an employee with appropriate safety in communications with the union representative and the employer’s right to information regarding employment disputes. In Cook Paint & Varnish Co. (1979) 246 NLRB 646, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recognized the need for a represented employee’s communications with the union agent to be confidential. The NLRB analyzed the balance necessary between the employer’s right to investigate employment-related allegations and the employee’s right to confidentiality in union communications. The NLRB reiterated that during the employer’s investigation of misconduct by an employee, the employer is entitled to disclosure. However, the NLRB held that after disciplinary proceedings have been finalized but the employer’s decision has been submitted to arbitration, an employee has a privilege against disclosing union-related communications because the employer is seeking to validate its disciplinary decision and obtain the union’s arbitration position. (Id.) Notably, this decision was limited to cases involving the National Labor Relations Act.
However, for California labor disputes, American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881 is controlling. In that case, the court analyzed the balance between the employer’s right to information and the union representative’s privilege for non-disclosure of communications with employees:
Indeed, creating the type of evidentiary privilege proposed by DiMarco could severely compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations pertaining to claims of harassment, discrimination, unlawful conduct, or other employer rules violations, all to the detriment of union members. For example, the [Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)] enunciates this state’s public policy to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. (See Gov. Code [Secs.] 12920 [and] 12920.5; Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 366–367 [ ].) Under FEHA, an employer, as well as a labor union, has an obligation to “take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring” in the workplace. (Gov. Code [Sec.] 12940, subd. (k).) The affirmative and mandatory duty to ensure a discrimination-free work environment requires the employer to conduct a prompt investigation of a discrimination claim. (See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1035–1036 [ ].) To carry out its obligation to prevent discrimination by investigating claims, an employer likely will need to obtain information from a wrongdoer’s co-workers who were in a position to witness the misconduct and identify the wrongdoer. In a unionized workplace, an employer’s investigation could be hampered by a union representative-union member privilege, thus conceivably undermining an employer and a labor union’s statutory obligation to ensure a discrimination-free work environment.
Although there may be various countervailing policy reasons why a union representative should not be compelled during civil litigation to disclose factual information obtained from other union members he or she represents, that policy determination (and the parameters of any concomitant evidentiary privilege) is the province of the Legislature, not this court. [Citations omitted.] This is especially true in an area where the Legislature has declared the state’s public policy in such detail. (See Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 80 [ ] [describing FEHA as “comprehensive scheme” for combating employment discrimination].)
(Id. at 890-891; emphasis in original.) The court explicitly held that California law does not provide for any such privilege. (Id. at 890.) This bill would create such a privilege.
Other states have such a privilege. Illinois and Maryland have both established a union agent-representative worker privilege. Maryland’s statute provides: “[A] labor organization or an agent of a labor organization may not be compelled to disclose any communication or information the labor organization or agent received or acquired in confidence from an employee while the labor organization or agent was acting in a representative capacity concerning an employee grievance.” (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-124.) Illinois’s law states:
[A] union agent, during the agency or representative relationship or after termination of the agency or representative relationship with the bargaining unit member, shall not be compelled to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency arbitration or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, any information he or she may have acquired in attending to his or her professional duties or while acting in his or her representative capacity.
(735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-803.5.) Courts have found Illinois’ statute provides “a relatively broad privilege” for the relevant communications.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Alaska, in Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P.3d 559, 565, extended by implication the union agent-represented worker evidentiary privilege from the Alaska Public Employment Relations Act (PERA). In Peterson, the court held that:
We emphasize that the expectation of confidentiality is critical to the privilege because without it “union members would be hesitant to be fully forthcoming with their representatives, detrimentally impacting a union representative’s ability to advise and represent union members with questions or problems.” Thus, “[a]bsent an expectation of confidentiality, there is little need to protect the communications.” We also emphasize that the privilege is only applicable when the union representative is acting in an official union role because “[p]rotecting informal conversations would extend the privilege too far, unnecessarily burdening the search for truth.”
(Id. at p. 567.)
The Peterson court clarified that the union agent-represented worker privilege “extends to communications made: (1) in confidence; (2) in connection with representative services relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary or grievance proceedings; (3) between an employee (or the employee’s attorney) and union representatives; and (4) by union representatives acting in official representative capacity. The privilege may be asserted by the employee or by the union on behalf of the employee. Like the attorney-client privilege, the union-relations privilege extends only to communications, not to underlying facts.” (Id.)
Similarly, this bill would provide the evidentiary privilege for certain communications between the union agent and represented worker. This bill would apply the privilege to confidential communications between the employee and union representative that are made while the union representative is acting in his or her representative capacity. The privilege could be asserted by either the employee or the union representative, and the employee could prevent another from disclosing the confidential information between the employee and union representative.
3. The policy goals of a privilege must be sufficiently important to outweigh the
public’s right to evidence
As a general matter, privileges function to exclude evidence, no matter how relevant or reliable that evidence might be, in order to promote some other extrinsic policy. Because they tend to suppress otherwise relevant evidence, statutory privileges are strictly construed and in California, unlike under federal law, the courts are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial policy; they may only apply those privileges created by statute or those that arise out of state or federal constitutional law. (Evid. Code Sec. 911; Sullivan v. Superior Court (Spingola) 29 Cal.App.3rd 64 (1972).)
As noted in the Background, privileges are policy-based exclusions that are granted because it is considered more important to keep that information confidential than it is to require disclosure of all the information relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding. Thus, the central policy consideration raised by this bill is whether or not the policy promoted by the proposed union agent-represented worker privilege outweighs the public’s right to truth in evidence.
- Ensuring confidentiality of information shared with a union agent
While the public does have a right to all evidence, in codifying other evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the Legislature has previously judged that the importance of ensuring that people obtain effective counsel to protect their legal rights may outweigh that interest. (See Comment 2.)
Proponents assert that the lack of evidentiary privilege for union agent-represented worker communications has a chilling effect on these communications. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, a co-sponsor of this bill, explains:
When employees discuss issues affecting their employment with their union representative, such as those involving workplace discipline or grievance-related issues, most assume that such communications are confidential and that information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third parties. However, no state statute provides such communications with an evidentiary privilege, undermining the value of an employee’s right to union representation. Under current law, an employer or other litigant can subpoena internal union documents during discovery. Unions would then be required to disclose sensitive communications with the member, putting an unfair and unnecessary strain on labor relations and a union’s ability to properly represent their members without fear of possibly having to disclose the information in subsequent litigation or face legal jeopardy for refusing to do so.
By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we can help to ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs.
Because a workers union is authorized under California law to represent the concerns and needs of employees, and free communication between the union agents and members is essential to providing adequate representation in employment contracts and labor concerns, a limited privilege is arguably appropriate to assure the union members and agents of the confidentiality of these communications. Pursuant to this bill, the employee, as the holder of the privilege, could claim the privilege to refuse disclosure or prevent any other person from disclosing those confidential communications. The union representative would also be authorized to claim the privilege and would be required to do so unless otherwise permitted by the employee.
- This bill largely models the existing lawyer-client privilege and its limits
It should be noted that evidentiary privileges have been carefully limited to balance the need for confidentiality with the fundamental right of the public to evidence. To this end, existing law outlines both situations in which no privilege applies at all, and circumstances in which an otherwise valid claim of privilege will be deemed waived. Additionally, certain other elements, such as the definitions provided for “the holder of the privilege” and for “confidential communication,” serve as inherent limits on a privilege as well. As a result, not just anyone is authorized to claim or waive the privilege, and not all communications are considered confidential. In establishing a union agent-represented worker privilege, this bill largely models the lawyer client privilege, including limits to that privilege.
For example, under existing law, there is no lawyer-client privilege where either the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud, or the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to representation of a client is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual. This bill would apply those same exceptions to the proposed union agent-represented worker privilege.
Similarly, the term “confidential communication between client and lawyer” is defined under existing law as the information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means that, so far as the client is aware, does not disclose the information to third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted. In other words, communications made in an open elevator full of third parties would not be privileged, nor would communications that are irrelevant to the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted. This bill would similarly track that definition, among others, thereby ensuring that the proposed privilege would also operate in a limited fashion.
Furthermore, this bill would authorize a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- in actions against the union agent in his or her personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union of affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities; or
- when, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member’s estate or guardian or conservator.
Arguably, these limitations on the evidentiary privilege provide an appropriate balance of the need for confidentiality with the fundamental right of the public to evidence. To this end, existing law outlines both situations in which no privilege applies at all, and circumstances in which an otherwise valid claim of privilege will be deemed waived.
4. Previous attempt to establish a union agent-represented worker privilege
In 2013, AB 729 (Hernández, 2013) was passed by the Legislature. It would have established an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. In fact, this bill largely tracks the language of AB 729. However, AB 729 was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown. In his veto message, the Governor wrote:
I am returning Assembly Bill 729 without my signature.
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege to prohibit the disclosure of confidential communications between represented employees and their union agents.
I don’t believe it is appropriate to put communications with a union agent on equal footing with communications with one’s spouse, priest, physician or attorney. Moreover, this bill could compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment and other allegations.
It should be noted that although there are concerns about a privilege such as this interfering with workplace investigations, protecting communications between victims of discrimination and harassment in the workplace and their union representatives may encourage more victims to come forward to understand their options.
5. Support and Opposition
The Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association writes in strong support of this bill:
An employee may confide to a union representative information that is sensitive, explaining that they were late due to a medical condition or missed work to obtain a domestic violence restraining order. They may want to report employer harassment without fearing retaliation if they came forward publicly. AB 3121 simply extends a privilege to confidential communications shared with a union representative.
Writing in support, the United Public Employees states that “[t]here are many important reasons to extend this privilege.”
The California Teachers Association, in support, argues:
The role of a union representative is to represent members and they should not be hindered in that role. This proposal represents an improvement to collective bargaining law in California, and supports settling disputes more efficiently. There are times when our staff and elected leaders might be the preferred individual to resolve a dispute, but they make referrals to an attorney simply to establish attorney-client privilege.
Members should feel comfortable and confident with their union representative and being able to confide all elements of their situation with the union representative is essential.
The League of California Cities and a coalition of groups write in opposition to the bill. The coalition disagrees with the notion that the relationship between a union agent and a represented worker is similar to others that are afforded privilege in California and point to Governor Brown’s veto message. It argues the bill “is not only misguided, it also creates legal and operational challenges for public agencies while establishing a new, one-sided level of evidentiary privilege for union employees.” The coalition points to the issue of workplace discrimination and harassment and stresses the importance of local government employers judiciously investigating allegations of workplace misconduct. It states that to investigate properly, “it is imperative that a public employer have the ability to interview all potential parties and witnesses to ascertain the facts and understand the matter fully.” The coalition contends that this bill “interferes with the ability to interview witnesses,” “permits the silencing of employees who wish to voluntarily report an incident or testify,” and “provides an opportunity for employees of an agency to put a roadblock in front of necessary employer investigations into misconduct.”
Further, the California Chamber of Commerce, in opposition, argues that this bill “appears to be a one-sided proposed evidentiary privilege that can be misused by labor union representatives to preclude non-represented employees who voluntarily want to testify, from testifying regarding discussions with union representatives and interfere with workplace investigations.”
Support: California Association of Psychiatric Technicians; California Federation of Teachers; California Professional Firefighters; California Teachers Association; California School Employees Association; Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association; Professional Engineers in California Government; United Public Employees
Opposition: Association of California Healthcare Districts; Association of California School Administrators; California Ambulance Association; California Association of Joint Powers Authorities; California Association of School Business Officials; California Chamber of Commerce; California Farm Bureau Federation; California League of Food Producers; California Manufacturers and Technology Association; California Retailers Association; California Special District Association; California State Association of Counties; League of California Cities; Marin County Council of Mayor and Councilmembers; Official Police Garages of Los Angeles; Rural County Representatives of California; School Employers Association of California; Small School Districts Association; Urban Counties of California
HISTORY
Source: American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO; California Labor Federation
Related Pending Legislation: None Known
Prior Legislation: AB 729 (Hernández, 2013) See Comment #4.
Prior Vote:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 45, Noes 22)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 8, Noes 2)
**************
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 3121
Author:(Kalra)
As Amended Ver:March 22, 2018
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Judiciary | 8-2 | Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez Fletcher, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Reyes | Cunningham, Kiley |
SUMMARY: Creates a new evidentiary privilege for communications between union agents and represented employees, and extends certain evidentiary rules relating to existing privileged communications to the union agent-represented employee communications. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that a union agent, as defined, has a privilege to refuse to disclose any confidential communication with a represented employee or former employee while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity, in any court or in any administrative, arbitration, or other proceeding.
- Provides that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another person from disclosing a privileged communication, except as specified.
- Permits a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while acting in his or her representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- In actions, civil or criminal, against the union agent in his or her personal or official representative capacity, or against the union or its agents, as specified.
- When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained, or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent, the representative of the member, as specified.
- Requires a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
- Specifies that there is no privilege in either of the following circumstances:
- When the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
- With respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing or planning to commit a crime or fraud.
- Specifies that the privilege created by this bill does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Defines "confidential communication" as follows: an oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent which is not disclosed to a third party other than those who are present to further the interest of the current or former employee or union agent, or is reasonably necessary to disclose to accomplish the purpose for which the communication was made. It includes advice given by the agent in a representational capacity.
- Defines "union agent" as follows: a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization who negotiates on behalf of employees as a bargaining unit and/or the labor organization for a labor agreement. This term does not extend "appointed employee stewards" except when an employee or former employee makes a confidential communication to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance during the time the steward is in their appointed position.
EXISTING LAW:
- Governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and provides a privilege to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relations, including the following:
- The attorney-client relationship. (Evidence Code Section 954. All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise indicated.)
- The spousal relationship. (Section 980.)
- Professional relationships such as physician and patient (Section 994), psychotherapist and patient (Section 1014), sexual assault counselor and victim (Section 1035.8), and domestic violence counselor and victim. (Section 1037.5)
- The clergy and penitent relationship. (Sections 1033 and 1034)
- Provides that a person's right to claim a privilege based on one of the relations listed above is waived if a holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented, as specified, to a disclosure made by anyone. (Section 912(a))
- Provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Section 912(b))
- Provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, then the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. A communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Section 917)
FISCAL EFFECT: None.
COMMENTS: This bill creates a new evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between union agents and represented employees, similar to those traditionally granted to other relations characterized by, or assuming, confidentiality, including those between spouses, attorney and client, doctor and patient, and clergy and penitent. More recently, the privilege was extended to cover relations between a psychotherapist and a patient, a domestic violence counselor and a victim of domestic violence, and a sexual assault counselor and a victim of sexual assault. The privilege is an exclusionary rule of evidence that permits the holder of the privilege, or the professional on behalf of the holder, to refuse to disclose the content of a confidential communication in an adjudicative proceeding.
According to the author, extending the evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives will encourage employees to speak freely and openly with the union agent about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation. This bill, therefore, would allow both the union agent and the represented employee (or represented former employee) to invoke the privilege to refuse to disclose the communication "in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding." It would also allow the employee, but not the union agent, to prevent another person, including the union agent, from disclosing a confidential communication. The bill creates exceptions that are standard in other recognized privileges. For example, a union agent could disclose a confidential communication in actions against the union agent. The union agent could also reveal the confidential communication if necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily injury. Finally, the privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
The privilege for communications between the union agent and the represented employee is most analogous to the attorney-client privilege. Like an attorney, the union agent represents the employee and often speaks, negotiates, and bargains on the employee's behalf. However, there is one notable difference between the attorney and the union agent, which this bill appropriately takes into account. Unlike the attorney, the union agent represents all of the workers within the workplace, not just the individual employee who the agent may be representing on a particular matter. Under the attorney-client privilege, both the attorney and client may invoke the privilege in order to refuse to disclose a confidential communication made by the client to the attorney. However, if the client waives the privilege, the attorney may no longer invoke the privilege. This is because the client, not the attorney, is the "holder of the privilege," and once the privilege is waived, there is no longer a privilege for the attorney to invoke. Under this bill, both the union agent and the represented employee may invoke the privilege and refuse to testify or otherwise disclose the communication. However, if the employee waives the communication, the union agent (unlike the attorney) may still refuse to disclose the content of confidential communications, because disclosure may adversely affect the union agent's other represented employees. In all other ways, however, the privilege created by this bill is appropriately similar to the attorney-client privilege.
Analysis Prepared by: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0002702
Date of Hearing: April 17, 2018
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 3121
Author:(Kalra) – As Amended Ver:March 22, 2018
SUBJECT: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES: UNION AGENT-REPRESENTED WORKER PRIVILEGE
KEY ISSUE: SHOULD THE EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE PROTECTING the confidentiality of COMMUNICATIONS in the context of certain relationships, where confidentiality is necessary or assumed because of the nature of the relationship, BE EXTENDED TO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN a union representative and a represented employee?
SYNOPSIS
This bill would create a new evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between union agents and represented employees, similar to those traditionally granted to other relations that are characterized by, or that assume, confidentiality, including those between spouses, attorney and client, doctor and patient, and a clergy and penitent. The privilege is an exclusionary rule of evidence that permits the holder of the privilege, or the professional acting on behalf of the holder, to refuse to disclose the content of a communication that occurs in the context of that confidential relationship. Extending an evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, the author believes, will encourage employees to speak freely and openly with the union agent about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation from the employer. Similar to the privileged relationship between an attorney and a client, the union agent represents a worker in adversarial grievance and disciplinary procedures, and the employee should be free to discuss these matters with the union agent in confidence. This bill is almost identical to AB 729 (Hernández, 2013), which was vetoed. The Governor offered two reasons for the veto: (1) communications between a union agent and an employee are not on equal footing with confidential communications made to a spouse, doctor, priest, or attorney; and (2) the privilege will compromise an employer's ability to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment, and other allegations. These are the same arguments made by opponents of AB 729. At the time when AB 729 was pending in this Committee, the Committee rejected those arguments as follows: (1) while the union agent-employee relation is not on par with the spousal, doctor-patient, or priest-penitent relation, it is quite similar to the attorney-client relations, because, like an attorney, the union agent represents the employee in adversarial proceedings; and (2) the privilege granted by this bill is an evidentiary privilege invoked in the context of a judicial, administrative, or arbitration proceeding. The analysis explains that the same reasoning applies to this bill. It would not, as claimed by the opposition and in the Governor's veto, prevent an employer from interviewing employees or otherwise investigating allegations of harassment or other workplace misconduct. In short, the privilege does not kick in until there is a judicial or administrative proceeding underway; it would not, in the Committee's view, apply to any pre-proceeding inquiries by the employer.
This bill is co-sponsored by the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the California Labor Federation. It is opposed by the League of California Cities on behalf of itself and several associations representing government entities.
SUMMARY: Creates a new evidentiary privilege for communications between union agents and represented employees, and extends certain evidentiary rules relating to existing privileged communications to the union agent-represented employee communications. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that a union agent, as defined, has a privilege to refuse to disclose any confidential communication with a represented employee or former employee while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity, in any court or in any administrative, arbitration, or other proceeding.
- Provides that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another person from disclosing a privileged communication, except as specified.
- Permits a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while acting in his or her representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- In actions, civil or criminal, against the union agent in his or her personal or official representative capacity, or against the union or its agents, as specified.
- When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained, or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent, the representative of the member, as specified.
- Requires a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in his or her representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
- Specifies that there is no privilege in either of the following circumstances:
- When the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
- With respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing or planning to commit a crime or fraud.
- Specifies that the privilege created by this bill does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Defines “confidential communication” as follows: an oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent which is not disclosed to a third party other than those who are present to further the interest of the current or former employee or union agent, or is reasonably necessary to disclose to accomplish the purpose for which the communication was made. It includes advice given by the agent in a representational capacity.
- Defines “union agent” as follows: a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization who negotiates on behalf of employees as a bargaining unit and/or the labor organization for a labor agreement. This term does not extend “appointed employee stewards” except when an employee or former employee makes a confidential communication to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance during the time the steward is in their appointed position.
EXISTING LAW:
- Governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and provides a privilege to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relations, including the following:
- The attorney-client relationship. (Evidence Code Section 954. All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise indicated.)
- The spousal relationship. (Section 980.)
- Professional relationships such as physician and patient (Section 994), psychotherapist and patient (Section 1014), sexual assault counselor and victim (Section 1035.8), and domestic violence counselor and victim. (Section 1037.5.)
- The clergy and penitent relationship. (Sections 1033 and 1034.)
- Provides that a person's right to claim a privilege based on one of the relations listed above is waived if a holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented, as specified, to a disclosure made by anyone. (Section 912 (a).)
- Provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Section 912 (b).)
- Provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, then the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. A communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Section 917.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: This bill creates a new evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between union agents and represented employees, similar to those traditionally granted to other relations characterized by, or assuming, confidentiality, including those between spouses, attorney and client, doctor and patient, and clergy and penitent. More recently, the privilege was extended to cover relations between a psychotherapist and a patient, a domestic violence counselor and a victim of domestic violence, and a sexual assault counselor and a victim of sexual assault. The privilege is an exclusionary rule of evidence that permits the holder of the privilege, or the professional on behalf of the holder, to refuse to disclose the content of a confidential communication in an adjudicative proceeding.
According to the author, extending the evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives will encourage employees to speak freely and openly with the union agent about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation. Moreover, similar to the privileged relationship between an attorney and a client, the union agent represents a worker in adversarial grievance and disciplinary procedures, and the employee should be free to discuss these sensitive matters with the union agent openly and in confidence. The bill achieves this goal by creating a new chapter establishing the parameters of the new privilege and amending relevant existing sections of the Evidence Code to cross-reference the new chapter.
The privilege created by this bill would allow both the union agent and the represented employee to invoke the privilege to refuse to disclose the information “in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding.” It would also allow the employee, but not the union agent, to prevent another person, including the union agent, from disclosing a confidential communication. The bill creates exceptions that are standard in other recognized privileges. For example, a union agent could disclose a confidential communication in actions against the union agent. The union agent could also reveal the confidential communication if necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily injury. Finally, the privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
Comparison to Privileges in Existing Law: Aside from the spousal privilege, most of the other evidentiary privileges recognized in existing law involve a relationship between a professional of some sort and a "client" who divulges confidential information to that professional in the course of that professional relationship: for example, attorney- client, doctor-patient, psychotherapist-patient, trained domestic violence or sexual assault counselor-victim, and clergy-penitent. Usually it is the "client" or the "patient"–that is, the non-professional in the relationship–who is the "holder of the privilege," or the one who is meant to be protected and has the right to invoke or waive the privilege. Not only can the patient or client invoke the privilege in order to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose the contents of the privileged communication, but the patient or client can prevent others, including the trained professional, from testifying about, or otherwise disclosing the communication in an adjudicative proceeding. In short, the privilege is primarily intended to protect the person who discloses confidential information to a trusted professional. The spousal privilege, similarly, is based upon relations of trust, cultural norms, and assumptions regarding marital privacy. In addition to protections provided by the Evidence Code (which prevents admission of evidence in a proceeding) doctors, lawyers, and clergy are also prevented by professional norms, professional rules of conduct, and applicable privacy statutes from disclosing confidential communications in other contexts. This bill, however, speaks only to the evidentiary privilege.
The privilege for communications between the union agent and the represented employee is most analogous to the attorney-client privilege. Like an attorney, the union agent represents the employee and often speaks, negotiates, and bargains on the employee's behalf. However, there is one notable difference between the attorney and the union agent, which this bill appropriately takes into account. Unlike the attorney, the union agent represents all of the workers within the workplace, not just the individual employee who the agent may be representing on a particular matter. Under the attorney-client privilege, both the attorney and client may invoke the privilege in order to refuse to disclose a confidential communication made by the client to the attorney. However, if the client waives the privilege, the attorney may no longer invoke the privilege. This is because the client, not the attorney, is the "holder of the privilege," and once the privilege is waived, there is no longer a privilege for the attorney to invoke. Under this bill, both the union agent and the represented employee may invoke the privilege and refuse to testify or otherwise disclose the communication. However, if the employee waives the communication, the union agent (unlike the attorney) may still refuse to disclose the content of confidential communications, because disclosure may adversely affect the union agent's other represented employees. In all other ways, however, the privilege created by this bill is appropriately similar to the attorney-client privilege. For example, while an employee may invoke the privilege to prevent another person, including the union agent, from disclosing information in a proceeding, the union agent does not have the right to prevent another person (including the represented employee) from electing to voluntarily disclose the confidential communication in a proceeding.
Usually a "confidential communication" is one made between just two persons, and once it is disclosed to a third party, the privilege is lost. However the definition of "confidential communication" in this bill, like the definition for the attorney-client privilege, recognizes that a confidential communication could occur where a third party was present at the time the communication was made, but only if the third person was there to "further the interest of the employee or union agent . . . or [was] reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information." For example, if a shop steward were present in order to assist the employee in the communication to a union agent, all three would be bound by privilege. If the employee made the communication to the union agent in the presence of a person who was not there to further the interest of the employee or union agent, or who was not reasonably necessary for the transmission of information, there would no "confidential communication" and, therefore, no basis for the privilege. The language of this provision is nearly identical to the language describing the attorney-client privilege in existing law. (See Labor Code Section 952.)
Recognition of the Privilege in other States: The right to protect the confidentiality of certain communications between an employee and a union agent has been recognized by at least three other states, either by statute or court ruling. In 2012, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that a privilege between union agents and employees, similar to that between lawyers and their clients, was necessary in order to encourage employees to “communicate fully and frankly” with their union agents. (Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P. 3d. 559, 565.) The court noted that to force disclosure of such communication, particularly in the context of grievance discussions, would have a chilling effect on the employee's willingness to come forward and speak candidly with their agents. (Id., at p. 563; pp. 565-567.)
For the same reasons, Illinois and Maryland codified the privilege between employees and their union representatives. In Maryland, labor organizations and agents of labor organizations cannot be compelled to disclose the information that is given to them by an employee so long as that information relates to an employee grievance. (Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-124.) The Illinois provision extends even greater protection to the union agent and employee privilege. Under Illinois state law the privilege between the union agent and employee extends to both civil and criminal proceedings, unlike the Maryland statute and the proposed California legislation. (Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Ch. 733 Section 5/8-803.5.)
Governor's Veto of Similar Legislation: AB 729 (Hernández, 2013), in its final form, was virtually identical to this bill. AB 729 was vetoed by the Governor. In his veto message, the Governor stated:
I don't believe it is appropriate to put communications with a union agent on equal footing with communications with one's spouse, priest, physician or attorney. Moreover, this bill could compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment and other allegations.
Opposition (and Veto) Concerns Seem Unwarranted: The reasons set forth in the veto message are the same as those made by opponents of AB 729, and they are the same arguments that opponents continue to make against the bill under consideration. Four years ago this Committee questioned the arguments against AB 729, and continues to question these arguments now that they are being made against AB 3121. As to the comparison to traditional privileged relations, the Governor and the opponents may be correct that the union agent-employee relation is not on par with the spousal, doctor-patient, or clergy-penitent relation; however, it is quite similar to the attorney-client relationship. Like an attorney, the union agent represents the employee in adversarial proceedings. That the union agent represents the employee is important, especially in light of the opposition's criticism that this bill is "one-sided" because it does not similarly protect communications between the employee and the employer. However, this criticism is not very persuasive. Employer-employee communications are not similarly privileged for the simple reason that the employer does not represent the employee in adversarial or disciplinary proceedings; indeed, the employer most often is the employee’s adversary when a dispute arises.
As to the claim that this bill would inhibit an employer's ability to conduct investigations of misconduct, it must be stressed that the privilege granted by this bill is an evidentiary privilege invoked in the context of a judicial, administrative, or arbitration proceeding. In the Committee's view it would not, as claimed by the opposition, prevent an employer from interviewing employees or otherwise investigating allegations of harassment or other workplace misconduct. In short, the privilege does not kick in until there is a judicial or administrative proceeding underway; it would not, in the Committee's view, apply to any pre-proceeding inquiries or interviews conducted by the employer. The privilege could, however, be invoked in response to a discovery request, because a party may only seek discovery of information that could lead to admissible evidence. Since the content of a confidential communication cannot be admitted as evidence, then it follows that it could be withheld from a discovery request.
It appears that the opposition reads the provision allowing an employee to invoke the privilege to "prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication" as preventing other employees from responding to an employer's questions about an allegation of misconduct. There are, however, two problems with this reading. First, as noted, like all privileges in the Evidence Code, this is an evidentiary privilege that prevents introducing the communication as evidence in a proceeding. Second, other employees, by definition, will not have been privy to a "confidential" communication between the union agent and the represented employee. Other employees may have independent knowledge of facts relevant to the communication, but the privilege would not prevent those other employees from disclosing facts relating to the subject of the communication, as opposed to the communication itself. These independently acquired facts and information could be disclosed to the employer in an interview; indeed, they could even be disclosed in judicial, administrative, or arbitration proceedings. The opposition claims that this will thwart an investigation, therefore, appears to be based on an overly broad view of an evidentiary privilege.
The Chamber of Commerce also reads this bill to allow a union agent to prevent an unrepresented employee from voluntarily disclosing the content of a confidential communication. The Chamber's position is presumably based upon the view that, under this bill "both the union agent and the represented employee are holders of the privilege." However, as discussed above, the union agent is the "holder of privilege" only in the limited sense of having the right to "refuse to disclose" the content of the communication, even where the represented employee has waived the privilege. However, the Chamber somehow concludes that "a union agent would be able to preclude an unrepresented employee from disclosing information by asserting the privilege." However, the Committee does not read the critical provision – subdivision (a) of proposed Section 1048 – in the same manner, nor does it see how it could be read in that fashion. As noted above, the ability to "refuse to disclose" and the ability to prevent "another" from disclosing is clearly separated in this bill. The first part of subdivision (a) – page 4, lines 9-15 – does indeed apply to both the union agent and the represented employee or represented former employee, but it only gives them the right to "refuse to disclose" the communication in a court, administrative, or arbitration proceeding. However, the second part of subdivision (a) – page 4, lines 15-18 – which creates a privilege to "prevent another from disclosing" the communication, only applies to the "represented employee or represented former employee." The union agent clearly has the right to refuse to disclose; but just as clearly, the union agent does not have the right to prevent another from disclosing.
Also, as noted above, it is not clear how the "unrepresented employee" would ever have been privy to the confidential communication. The Chamber appears to base its claim that a union agent could stop an unrepresented employee from disclosing a communication because of the reference to a "third persons" in the definition of "confidential communication." However, as explained above, the "third persons" refers to a person present at the time of the communication who was present in order to serve the interest of the employee or union agent or whose presence was reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. Moreover, the "third persons" language is not unique to this bill; it tracks the language in the parallel section of the attorney-client privilege. But whoever the "third persons" may be, and whether or not it is "another" referred to in subdivision (a) of Section 1048, it does not matter when it comes to the union agent's ability to silence that person. The right to prevent another from disclosing is only afforded to the employee. Only the right to "refuse to disclose" is granted to both the union agent and employee.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author, when employees discuss issues affecting their employment with their official union representative about workplace issues, most employees "assume that such communications are confidential and that information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third parties. However, no state statute provides such communications with an evidentiary privilege – nor does case law recognize such a privilege." The author believes that by "allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs."
AFSCME, one of the co-sponsors of this bill, similarly notes that no statute currently protects communications between a union agent and an employee, even though most employees assume that such communications are confidential. AFSCME notes that, under current law, an employer or other litigant could "subpoena internal union documents during discovery. Unions would then be required to disclose sensitive communications with the member, putting an unfair and unnecessary strain on labor relations and a union's ability to properly represent their members without fear of possibly having to disclose the information in subsequent litigation."
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: The League of California Cities, writing on behalf of several other associations representing government entities, opposes this bill. In addition to believing that the union agent-employee relation is not at all similar to the existing privileged relations, the League makes three additional arguments. First, the League claims that this bill will "inhibit agencies ability to conduct timely and thorough investigations into alleged misconduct." For example, the League claims that this privilege could prevent an employer from interviewing other employees or other witnesses when there is an allegation of sexual harassment, discrimination, or some other form of workplace misconduct. Second, the League alleges that this is a "one-sided" privilege because it "only protects the union agent and represented worker communication. It does not equally protect management-employee communications." Consequently, the League believes, "an employer would be forced to disclose all related communications, while the union agent or employee could pick and choose which communications they wanted to disclose." Third, the League notes that for all other, non-familial privileges, the privilege applies to a communication conveyed to a professional who must have "minimum qualifications based on education levels and licensure. . . AB 3121 fails to recognize this well-established threshold and instead applies this privilege unilaterally to any recognized union agent."
The California Chamber of Commerce opposes this bill for substantially the same reasons as those articulated above, but adds its contention that to the extent that this bill interferes with disclosure requirements of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) with regard to collective bargaining, it would be preempted by federal law. In support of this, the Chamber cites Cook Paint and Varnish v. NLRB (1981) 648 F.2d 712, which the Chamber claims held that "this proposed privilege" was unfair.
[Staff note: It is not clear what the Chamber means by "this proposed privilege" in its reference to the Cook Paint and Varnish case, since such a "privilege" was not at issue in that case. Rather, in that case, the court reversed an NLRB board ruling because, in the court's view, "the Board adopted what appears to be a per se rule that an employer may never use a threat of discipline to obtain information from an employee concerning a matter that has been set for arbitration." The court's objection was to a "blanket rule" as to what an employer could "never" do. The only place the word "privilege" or "privileged" appeared was in the dissenting opinion. The court concluded that the employer may conduct a "legitimate investigatory interview in preparation for a pending arbitration." This bill would not prevent an employer from asking questions "in preparation for a pending arbitration." Nor would it impose a “blanket rule” like the one discussed in Cook Paint and Varnish.]
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (co-sponsor)
California Labor Federation (co-sponsor)
California Federation of Teachers
California School Employees Association
Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association
Opposition
Association of California Healthcare Districts
Association of California School Administrators
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities
California Association of School Business Officials
California Chamber of Commerce
California State Association of Counties
League of California Cities
Rural County Representatives of California
School Employers Association of California
Small School Districts Association
Analysis Prepared by: Allison Adey and Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):