SB 1052: Custodial interrogation: juveniles.
- Session Year: 2015-2016
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2016-09-02
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived. The bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation. The bill also clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are met.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with legal counsel, the The bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. requirement in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation. The bill also clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are met.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with legal counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. The bill would require the Judicial Council to develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction. The bill also clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are met.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with legal counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. The bill would require the Judicial Council to develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction. The bill also clarifies that these provisions do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if certain criteria are met.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above specified above-specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with legal counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with legal counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of legal counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. The bill would require the Judicial Council to develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to juveniles.
This bill would require that a youth under 18 years of age consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any of the above specified rights. The bill would provide that consultation with counsel cannot be waived. If a custodial interrogation takes place before the youth has consulted with counsel, the bill would require the court to consider the effect of the failure to comply with the above-specified requirement and to consider the circumstances surrounding statements made without the assistance of counsel. The bill would make a failure to comply with its provisions admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable. The bill would require the Judicial Council to develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of these provisions be viewed with caution and would require the court to provide the jury or trier of fact with the instruction.
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. In these circumstances, existing law requires the peace officer to advise the minor that anything he or she says can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to remain silent, that he or she has a right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and that he or she has a right to have counsel appointed if he or she is unable to afford counsel.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to juveniles.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Developmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes dynamic changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood. (See Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth generally are less mature and responsible than adults, (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); they are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures than adults (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
(b)Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g., Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting; William Gardner and Janna Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, the United States Supreme Court observed that events that would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)), and noted that no matter how sophisticated, a juvenile subject of police interrogation cannot be compared to an adult subject (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
(c)For these reasons, in situations of custodial interrogation and prior to making a waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal counsel to assist in their understanding of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights.
SEC. 2.Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:625.6.(a)Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.
(b)The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a).
(c)This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
(1)The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
(2)The officers questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
(d)This section does not require a probation officer to comply with subdivision (a) in the normal performance of his or her duties under Sections 625, 627.5, or 628.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Developmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes dynamic changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood. (See Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth generally are less mature and responsible than adults, (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); they are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures than adults (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
(b)Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g., Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting; William Gardner and Janna Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, the United States Supreme Court observed that events that would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)), and noted that no matter how sophisticated, a juvenile subject of police interrogation cannot be compared to an adult subject (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
(c)For these reasons, in situations of custodial interrogation and prior to making a waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account the special concerns that are present when a young person is involved, including a child or youths limited experience, education and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a childs or youths age or experience indicates that his or her request for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725). counsel to assist in their understanding of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights.
SEC. 2.Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:625.6.(a)Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel. counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.
(b)If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, both of the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance with subdivision (a):
(1)
(b)The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c). (a).
(2)Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
(c)In determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1)The youths age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
(2)The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
(3)The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
(4)The youths reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
(5)Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda rights.
(6)Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
(7)Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
(8)Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
(9)Whether the youth requested to leave.
(10)Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
(11)The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to comply with Section 627.
(12)Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to waiver.
(13)Any other relevant evidence.
(d)
(c)This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
(1)The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
(2)The officers questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
(e)For purposes of this section, Miranda rights refers to the rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.
(d)This section does not require a probation officer to comply with subdivision (a) in the normal performance of his or her duties under Sections 625, 627.5, or 628.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Developmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes dynamic changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood. (See Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth generally are less mature and responsible than adults, (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); they are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures than adults (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
(b)Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g., Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting; William Gardner and Janna Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, the United States Supreme Court observed that events that would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)), and noted that no matter how sophisticated, a juvenile subject of police interrogation cannot be compared to an adult subject (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
(c)For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account the special concerns that are present when a young person is involved, including a child or youths limited experience, education and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a childs or youths age or experience indicates that his or her request for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
SEC. 2.Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:625.6.(a)Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel. The consultation may not be waived.
(b)If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, all both of the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance with subdivision (a):
(1)The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).
(2)Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
(3)If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact, with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).
(c)In determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1)The youths age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
(2)The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
(3)The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
(4)The youths reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
(5)Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda rights.
(6)Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
(7)Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
(8)Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
(9)Whether the youth requested to leave.
(10)Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
(11)The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to comply with Section 627.
(12)Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to waiver.
(13)Any other relevant evidence.
(d)The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.
(e)
(d)This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
(1)The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
(2)The officers questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
(f)
(e)For purposes of this section, Miranda rights refers to the rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Developmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes dynamic changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood. (See Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth generally are less mature and responsible than adults, (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); they are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures than adults (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
(b)Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g., Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting; William Gardner and Janna Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, the United States Supreme Court observed that events that would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)), and noted that no matter how sophisticated, a juvenile subject of police interrogation cannot be compared to an adult subject (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
(c)For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account the special concerns that are present when a young person is involved, including a child or youths limited experience, education and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a childs or youths age or experience indicates that his or her request for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
SEC. 2.Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:625.6.(a)Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel. The consultation may not be waived.
(b)If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance with subdivision (a):
(1)The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).
(2)Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
(3)If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact, with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).
(c)In determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1)The youths age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
(2)The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
(3)The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
(4)The youths reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
(5)Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda rights.
(6)Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
(7)Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
(8)Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
(9)Whether the youth requested to leave.
(10)Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
(11)The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to comply with Section 627.
(12)Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to waiver.
(13)Any other relevant evidence.
(d)The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.
(e)This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
(1)The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
(2)The officers questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
(e)
(f)For purposes of this section, Miranda rights refers to the rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Developmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes dynamic changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood. (See Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth generally are less mature and responsible than adults, (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); they are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures than adults (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
(b)Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g., Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting; William Gardner and Janna Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, the United States Supreme Court observed that events that would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)), and noted that no matter how sophisticated, a juvenile subject of police interrogation cannot be compared to an adult subject, J.D.B., subject (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
(c)For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult with legal counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account the special concerns that are present when a young person is involved, including a child or youths limited experience, education and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a childs or youths age or experience indicates that his or her request for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
SEC. 2.Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:625.6.(a)Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel. The consultation may not be waived.
(b)If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance with subdivision (a):
(1)The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).
(2)Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
(3)If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact, with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).
(c)In determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1)The youths age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
(2)The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how legal counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
(3)The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
(4)The youths reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
(5)Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda rights.
(6)Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
(7)Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
(8)Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
(9)Whether the youth requested to leave.
(10)Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
(11)The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to comply with Section 627.
(12)Whether the youth consulted with legal counsel prior to waiver.
(13)Any other relevant evidence.
(d)The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.
(e)For purposes of this section, Miranda rights refers to the rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)Developmental and neurological science concludes that the process of cognitive brain development continues into adulthood, and that the human brain undergoes dynamic changes throughout adolescence and well into young adulthood. (See Richard J. Bonnie, et al., Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach, National Academies of Science (2012), page 96, and Chapter 4.) As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, children and youth generally are less mature and responsible than adults, (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 115); they often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979) 443 U.S. 622, 635); they are more vulnerable or susceptible to... outside pressures than adults (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397, quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569); they have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78); and children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them (J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2397).
(b)Custodial interrogation of an individual by the state requires that the individual be advised of his or her rights and make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily waiver of those rights before the interrogation proceeds. People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver. Additionally, a large body of research has established that adolescent thinking tends to either ignore or discount future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of important decisions. (See, e.g., Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting; William Gardner and Janna Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in Adolescents in the AIDS Epidemic, ed. William Gardner et al. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1990), pp. 17, 25-26; Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, Kentucky Child Rights Journal, vol. 7 (Summer 1999), pp. 16-17; National Juvenile Justice Network, Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, September 2012, pp. 1-2; Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, Child Development, vol. 52 (1981), pp. 538, 541-42). Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, the United States Supreme Court observed that events that would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens (Haley v. Ohio, (1948) 332 U.S. 596 (plurality opinion)), and noted that no matter how sophisticated, a juvenile subject of police interrogation cannot be compared to an adult subject, J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2394, quoting Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S. 49, 54). The law enforcement community now widely accepts what science and the courts have recognized: Children and adolescents are much more vulnerable to psychologically coercive interrogations and in other dealings with the police than resilient adults experienced with the criminal justice system.
(c)For these reasons, youth under 18 years of age should consult with counsel prior to making a waiver of rights. In the determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, a court must take into account the special concerns that are present when a young person is involved, including a child or youths limited experience, education and immature judgment (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725). These concerns must also take into consideration whether a childs or youths age or experience indicates that his or her request for a probation officer, parent, or other adult is in fact an invocation of his or her right to remain silent (Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
SEC. 2.Section 625.6 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:625.6.(a)Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with counsel. The consultation may not be waived.
(b)If a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance with subdivision (a):
(1)The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a) and the factors specified in subdivision (c).
(2)Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with subdivision (a) shall be admissible in support of claims that the youths statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
(3)If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact, with the instruction developed pursuant to subdivision (d).
(c)In determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all the circumstances surrounding the statements, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1)The youths age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
(2)The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
(3)The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
(4)The youths reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
(5)Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda rights.
(6)Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
(7)Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
(8)Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
(9)Whether the youth requested to leave.
(10)Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
(11)The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to comply with Section 627.
(12)Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver.
(13)Any other relevant evidence.
(d)The Judicial Council shall develop an instruction, to be used pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of subdivision (a) shall be viewed with caution.
(e)For purposes of this section, Miranda rights refers to the rights specified in subdivision (c) of Section 625.
SECTION 1.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to juveniles.
It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to juveniles.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Jun 2, 2016 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Sep 8, 2016 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 5 p.m. |
| Aug 30, 2016 | In Senate. Concurrence in Assembly amendments pending. |
| Aug 30, 2016 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 26. Noes 13.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Aug 30, 2016 | Assembly amendments concurred in. (Ayes 26. Noes 13. Page 5523.) Ordered to engrossing and enrolling. |
| Aug 23, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 50. Noes 28. Page 6082.) Ordered to the Senate. |
| Aug 23, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| Aug 18, 2016 | Read third time and amended. |
| Aug 18, 2016 | Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 15, 2016 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 12, 2016 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 14. Noes 6.) (August 11). |
| Aug 3, 2016 | August 3 set for first hearing. Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Aug 1, 2016 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 28, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (June 28). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 16, 2016 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Jun 13, 2016 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Feb 16, 2016 | Introduced. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
| Jun 1, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 24. Noes 14.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Jun 1, 2016 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 24. Noes 14. Page 4087.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 31, 2016 | Read second time and amended. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 27, 2016 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (May 27). |
| May 27, 2016 | From committee: Do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2. Page 4002.) (May 27). |
| May 20, 2016 | Set for hearing May 27. |
| May 16, 2016 | May 16 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) |
| May 6, 2016 | Set for hearing May 16. |
| Apr 20, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 1.) (April 19). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 20, 2016 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 5. Noes 1. Page 3613.) (April 19). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 1, 2016 | Set for hearing April 19. |
| Mar 31, 2016 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 28, 2016 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 25, 2016 | Referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 17, 2016 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 18. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 30, 2016 | Unfinished Business (Supplemental File 1) SB1052 Lara Concurrence | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 23, 2016 | SB 1052 Lara Senate Third Reading By BLOOM | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 11, 2016 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jun 28, 2016 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jun 1, 2016 | Senate 3rd Reading SB1052 Lara | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 27, 2016 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| May 16, 2016 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 19, 2016 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Amnesty International | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Anti-Recidivism Coalition | * Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Asian Law Alliance | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| California Attorneys For Criminal Justice | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| California Catholic Conference | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Against | Aug 30, 2016 |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| California State Sheriffs' Association | ** Against | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Californians for Safety and Justice | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Campaign for Youth Justice | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Children'S Defense Fund - California | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Coalition for Justice and Accountability | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Disability Rights California | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Ella Baker Center For Human Rights | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Fathers and Families of San Joaquin | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Fathers and Families of San Joaquin in Stockton | * Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Felony Murder Elimination Project | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| First Focus Campaign for Children | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Friends Committee On Legislation Of California | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Healing Dialogue and Action | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Hernandez Strategy Group | * Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Human Rights Watch | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| International Association of Chiefs of Police | * Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Justice Not Jails | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Law Office of Jeremy D. Blank | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Legal Services for Children | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Legal Services for Prisoners with Children | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Los Angeles District Attorney's Office | ** Against | Jun 28, 2016 |
| National Center for Youth Law | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| National Council on Crime and Delinquency | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| National Juvenile Justice Network | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| National Lawyers Guild | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Office of the Americas | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Pacific Juvenile Defender Center | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Public Counsel | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| San Jose | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Services, Immigrant Rights & Education Network | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| SFChildrenslaw | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Silicon Valley Branch | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Silicon Valley De-Bug | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Silicon Valley De-Bug American Civil Liberties Union | ** Support | Jun 28, 2016 |
| Silicon Valley NAACP | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Youth Justice Coalition | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
| Youth United for Community Action | ** Support | Aug 30, 2016 |
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB |
VETO
Bill No: SB 1052
:
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 4/19/16
AYES: Hancock, Anderson, Leno, Liu, Monning
NOES: Stone
NO VOTE RECORDED: Glazer
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 5/27/16
AYES: Lara, Beall, Hill, McGuire, Mendoza
NOES: Bates, Nielsen
SENATE FLOOR: 24-14, 6/1/16
AYES: Allen, Beall, Block, Cannella, De León, Hall, Hancock, Hernandez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Lara, Leno, Leyva, Liu, McGuire, Mendoza, Mitchell, Monning, Pan, Pavley, Roth, Wieckowski, Wolk
NOES: Anderson, Bates, Berryhill, Fuller, Gaines, Galgiani, Glazer, Huff, Moorlach, Morrell, Nguyen, Nielsen, Stone, Vidak
NO VOTE RECORDED: Jackson, Runner
SENATE FLOOR: 26-13, 8/30/16
AYES: Allen, Beall, Block, Cannella, De León, Galgiani, Hall, Hancock, Hernandez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Jackson, Lara, Leno, Leyva, Liu, McGuire, Mendoza, Mitchell, Monning, Pan, Pavley, Roth, Wieckowski, Wolk
NOES: Anderson, Bates, Berryhill, Fuller, Gaines, Glazer, Huff, Moorlach, Morrell, Nguyen, Nielsen, Stone, Vidak
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 50-28, 8/23/16 - See last page for vote
DIGEST: This bill requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights.
Existing law:
- Provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625)
- Provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625 (c))
- Provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 627)
This bill:
- Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel.
- Provides that the consultation with legal counsel shall not be waived.
- Provides that consultation with counsel may be in person, by telephone or by video conference.
- Requires the court, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement.
- Provides this bill does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
- The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
- The officer’s questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information
- Does not require a probation officer to comply with the consultation with counsel requirement in the normal performance of his or her duties.
Comments
Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the Court (5-4) decided four cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart) and imposed new constitutional requirements for custodial police interrogation, beyond those laid down [previously]. The Court required that a person be informed of his or her right to remain silent and stated that the right can be waived it must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If a person indicates that he or she wishes to speak to an attorney or states that he or she does not wish to be interrogated at any time in the process there can be no further questioning. “The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." (86 S.Ct. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 706.) (5 Witkin Cal. Crim. Law Crim Trial § 107)
Minors and Miranda. Under this bill, a youth under 18 years of age would be required to consult with legal counsel prior to waiving his or her rights under Miranda. The right to legal counsel cannot be waived.
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. In a Policy Statement dated March 7, 2013 the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry expressed its beliefs that juveniles should have counsel present when interrogated by law enforcement:
Research has demonstrated that brain development continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood. The frontal lobes, responsible for mature thought, reasoning and judgment, develop last. Adolescents use their brains in a fundamentally different manner than adults. They are more likely to act on impulse, without fully considering the consequences of their decisions or actions.
The Supreme Court has recognized these biological and developmental differences in their recent decisions on the juvenile death penalty, juvenile life without parole and the interrogations of juvenile suspects. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a heightened risk that juvenile suspects will falsely confess when pressured by police during the interrogation process. Research also demonstrates that when in police custody, many juveniles do not fully understand or appreciate their rights, options or alternatives.
Accordingly, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry believes that juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies. While the Academy believes that juveniles should have a right to consult with parents prior to and during questioning, parental presence alone may not be sufficient to protect juvenile suspects. Moreover, many parents may not be competent to advise their children on whether to speak to the police and may also be persuaded that cooperation with the police will bring leniency. There are numerous cases of juveniles who have falsely confessed with their parents present during questioning…. [citations omitted](https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.aspx)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee analysis:
- Significant non-reimbursable annual costs, potentially in the millions of dollars, to local agencies to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations. Proposition 30 exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for “public safety services” including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date; however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, SB 1052 could potentially result in additional costs to the State
- Minor one-time cost in the $50,000 range, and ongoing cost in the $50,000 range to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). One-time cost to update DJJ regulations and procedures, and ongoing costs to provide a higher level of legal services to DJJ wards.
- Minor costs to several state agencies with law enforcement responsibilities (other than CDCR), such as CHP, Department of Justice, and Department of Fish and Wildlife, who may interact juvenile offenders, to update their regulations and procedures.
Human Rights Watch (source)
American Civil Liberties Union
Asian Law Alliance
California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
California Public Defenders Association
Campaign for Youth Justice
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
Children’s Defense Fund – California
Coalition for Justice and Accountability
Disability Rights California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Fathers and Families of San Joaquin
First Focus Campaign for Children
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Justice Not Jails
Law Office of Jeremy D. Blank
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Center for Youth Law
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
National Lawyers Guild
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center
San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP
Services, Immigrant Rights & Education Network
SFChildrenslaw
Silicon Valley De-Bug
The Peace and Justice Commission of St. Mark Presbyterian Church
Youth Justice Coalition
Youth United for Community Action
OPPOSITION: (Verified 10/17/16)
California District Attorneys Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The National Center for Youth Law supports this bill stating:
Currently, youth in California can waive their Miranda rights on their own, as long as the waiver is made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. Yet research demonstrates that young people often fail to comprehend the meaning of Miranda rights. Even more troubling is the fact that young people are unlikely to appreciate the consequences of giving up those rights. They are also more likely than adults to waive their rights and confess to crimes they did not commit.
Widely accepted research concludes that young people have less capacity to exercise mature judgment and are more likely than adults to disregard the long-term consequences of their behavior. Over the last 10 years, the United States and California Supreme Courts, recognizing that developmental abilities of youth are relevant to criminal culpability and the capacity to understand procedures of the criminal justice system, have enunciated a new jurisprudence grounded in this research.
Moreover, courts have noted that young people are more vulnerable than adults to interrogation and have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system. These problems are amplified for youth who are very young, or who have developmental disabilities, cognitive delays or mental health challenges. A recent study of exonerations found that 42 percent of juveniles had falsely confessed as compared to just 13 percent of adults. The ramifications for both the individual and society of soliciting unreliable evidence and false confessions are far-reaching….
People who work closely with youth and help them navigate legal decision-making know that a young person can understand the literal meanings of Miranda rights, but fail to appreciate the implications of giving up those rights.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the California District Attorneys Association:
We believe that the procedure sought by this bill would frustrate criminal investigations and cast doubt upon voluntary confessions introduced at trial.
As subdivision (c) of Section 1 of the bill notes, juveniles already receive a more generous interpretation of Miranda rights, in that the court must take the juvenile’s age, education, and immaturity into account when considering whether there has been a valid Miranda waiver. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725).
SB 1052 would expand those protections even further, by mandating a consultation between a juvenile and an attorney – a consultation that the juvenile is prohibited from waiving. Failure to follow this procedure would result in a host of sanctions designed to undermine the credibility of any statements made by the juvenile, regardless of whether any actual coercion took place.
To illustrate one such problem with this approach, consider the following example. A juvenile is arrested, and properly advised of his Miranda rights. While in custody, and being transported to the police station, he makes statements incriminating himself, or perhaps even confesses to the crime for which he has been arrested. Upon reaching the police station, the juvenile consults with counsel, per the mandate in SB 1052.
According to the language of the bill, this would be a “failure to comply” since the statement was made in a custodial setting prior to the juvenile consulting with counsel. Under proposed Welfare & Institutions Code section 625.6(b)(2), this failure” would be admissible in support of a claim that the statement was made in violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
That, of course, is simply untrue. There was no violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, as he was properly advised of them, and the court is already required to consider the additional factors pertaining to juveniles under Fare. The only “right” that was arguably violated was this new statutory right under WIC 625.6 – and even then, the arresting officers attempted to comply at the first available opportunity. Unless every officer is going to have a defense attorney at his or her side when taking juveniles into custody, it’s unclear how this would work in practice.
GOVERNOR'S VETO MESSAGE:
I am returning Senate Bill 1052 without my signature.
This bill would require -- in almost all cases -- that a youth under 18 must consult an attorney before a custodial interrogation begins.
This bill presents profoundly important questions involving the constitutional right not to incriminate oneself and the ability of the police to interrogate juveniles. Ever since 1966, the rule has been that interrogations of criminal suspects be preceded by the Miranda warning of the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney.
In more cases than not, both adult and juvenile suspects waive these rights and go on to answer an investigator's questions. Courts uphold these "waivers" of rights as long as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. It is rare for a court to invalidate such a waiver.
Recent studies, however, argue that juveniles are more vulnerable than adults and easily succumb to police pressure to talk instead of remaining silent. Other studies show a much higher percentage of false confessions in the case of juveniles.
On the other hand, in countless cases, police investigators solve very serious crimes through questioning and the resulting admissions or statements that follow.
These competing realities raise difficult and troubling issues and that is why I have consulted widely to gain a better understanding of what is at stake. I have spoken to juvenile judges, police investigators, public defenders, prosecutors and the proponents of this bill. I have also read several research studies cited by the proponents and the most recent cases dealing with juvenile confessions.
After carefully considering all the above, I am not prepared to put into law SB 1052's categorical requirement that juveniles consult an attorney before waiving their Miranda rights. Frankly, we need a much fuller understanding of the ramifications of this measure.
In the coming year, I will work with proponents, law enforcement and other interested parties to fashion reforms that protect public safety and constitutional rights. There is much to be done.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 50-28, 8/23/16
AYES: Alejo, Atkins, Bloom, Bonilla, Bonta, Brown, Burke, Calderon, Campos, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Dababneh, Daly, Dodd, Eggman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gomez, Gonzalez, Gordon, Gray, Roger Hernández, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Levine, Lopez, Low, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Olsen, Quirk, Ridley-Thomas, Rodriguez, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Weber, Williams, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Achadjian, Travis Allen, Arambula, Baker, Bigelow, Brough, Chang, Chávez, Dahle, Beth Gaines, Gallagher, Gatto, Grove, Hadley, Harper, Jones, Kim, Lackey, Linder, Mathis, Mayes, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Steinorth, Wagner, Waldron, Wilk
NO VOTE RECORDED: Frazier, Maienschein
10/25/16 13:28:59
**** END ****
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB |
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Bill No: SB 1052
:
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 4/19/16
AYES: Hancock, Anderson, Leno, Liu, Monning
NOES: Stone
NO VOTE RECORDED: Glazer
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 5/27/16
AYES: Lara, Beall, Hill, McGuire, Mendoza
NOES: Bates, Nielsen
SENATE FLOOR: 24-14, 6/1/16
AYES: Allen, Beall, Block, Cannella, De León, Hall, Hancock, Hernandez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Lara, Leno, Leyva, Liu, McGuire, Mendoza, Mitchell, Monning, Pan, Pavley, Roth, Wieckowski, Wolk
NOES: Anderson, Bates, Berryhill, Fuller, Gaines, Galgiani, Glazer, Huff, Moorlach, Morrell, Nguyen, Nielsen, Stone, Vidak
NO VOTE RECORDED: Jackson, Runner
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 50-28, 8/23/16 - See last page for vote
DIGEST: This bill requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights.
Assembly Amendments (1) clarify that the consultation with counsel can be in person, by telephone or by video conference; (2) remove the provision requiring Judicial Council to develop a jury instruction and the courts to use it; (3) delete the factors the court must consider when the requirement that a juvenile consult with counsel before being interrogated was not complied with; (4) delete the factors the court shall consider when determining whether a statement by a juvenile was made voluntarily; and (5) make other technical changes.
Existing law:
- Provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625)
- Provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625 (c))
- Provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 627)
This bill:
- Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel.
- Provides that the consultation with legal counsel shall not be waived.
- Provides that consultation with counsel may be in person, by telephone or by video conference.
- The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement.
- Provides this bill does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
- The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
- The officer’s questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information
- Does not require a probation officer to comply with the consultation with counsel requirement in the normal performance of his or her duties.
Comments
Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the Court (5-4) decided four cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart) and imposed new constitutional requirements for custodial police interrogation, beyond those laid down [previously]. The Court required that a person be informed of his or her right to remain silent and stated that the right can be waived it must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If a person indicates that he or she wishes to speak to an attorney or states that he or she does not wish to be interrogated at any time in the process there can be no further questioning. “The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." (86 S.Ct. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 706.) (5 Witkin Cal. Crim. Law Crim Trial § 107)
Minors and Miranda. Under this bill, a youth under 18 years of age would be required to consult with legal counsel prior to waiving his or her rights under Miranda. The right to legal counsel cannot be waived.
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. In a Policy Statement dated March 7, 2013 the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry expressed its beliefs that juveniles should have counsel present when interrogated by law enforcement:
Research has demonstrated that brain development continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood. The frontal lobes, responsible for mature thought, reasoning and judgment, develop last. Adolescents use their brains in a fundamentally different manner than adults. They are more likely to act on impulse, without fully considering the consequences of their decisions or actions.
The Supreme Court has recognized these biological and developmental differences in their recent decisions on the juvenile death penalty, juvenile life without parole and the interrogations of juvenile suspects. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a heightened risk that juvenile suspects will falsely confess when pressured by police during the interrogation process. Research also demonstrates that when in police custody, many juveniles do not fully understand or appreciate their rights, options or alternatives.
Accordingly, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry believes that juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies. While the Academy believes that juveniles should have a right to consult with parents prior to and during questioning, parental presence alone may not be sufficient to protect juvenile suspects. Moreover, many parents may not be competent to advise their children on whether to speak to the police and may also be persuaded that cooperation with the police will bring leniency. There are numerous cases of juveniles who have falsely confessed with their parents present during questioning…. [citations omitted](https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.aspx)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee analysis:
- Significant non-reimbursable annual costs, potentially in the millions of dollars, to local agencies to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations. Proposition 30 exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for “public safety services” including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date; however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, SB 1052 could potentially result in additional costs to the State
- Minor one-time cost in the $50,000 range, and ongoing cost in the $50,000 range to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). One-time cost to update DJJ regulations and procedures, and ongoing costs to provide a higher level of legal services to DJJ wards.
- Minor costs to several state agencies with law enforcement responsibilities (other than CDCR), such as CHP, Department of Justice, and Department of Fish and Wildlife, who may interact juvenile offenders, to update their regulations and procedures.
Human Rights Watch (source)
American Civil Liberties Union
Asian Law Alliance
California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
California Public Defenders Association
Campaign for Youth Justice
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
Children’s Defense Fund – California
Coalition for Justice and Accountability
Disability Rights California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Fathers and Families of San Joaquin
First Focus Campaign for Children
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Justice Not Jails
Law Office of Jeremy D. Blank
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Center for Youth Law
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
National Lawyers Guild
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center
San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP
Services, Immigrant Rights & Education Network
SFChildrenslaw
Silicon Valley De-Bug
The Peace and Justice Commission of St. Mark Presbyterian Church
Youth Justice Coalition
Youth United for Community Action
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/23/16)
California District Attorneys Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The National Center for Youth Law supports this bill stating:
Currently, youth in California can waive their Miranda rights on their own, as long as the waiver is made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. Yet research demonstrates that young people often fail to comprehend the meaning of Miranda rights. Even more troubling is the fact that young people are unlikely to appreciate the consequences of giving up those rights. They are also more likely than adults to waive their rights and confess to crimes they did not commit.
Widely accepted research concludes that young people have less capacity to exercise mature judgment and are more likely than adults to disregard the long-term consequences of their behavior. Over the last 10 years, the United States and California Supreme Courts, recognizing that developmental abilities of youth are relevant to criminal culpability and the capacity to understand procedures of the criminal justice system, have enunciated a new jurisprudence grounded in this research.
Moreover, courts have noted that young people are more vulnerable than adults to interrogation and have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system. These problems are amplified for youth who are very young, or who have developmental disabilities, cognitive delays or mental health challenges. A recent study of exonerations found that 42 percent of juveniles had falsely confessed as compared to just 13 percent of adults. The ramifications for both the individual and society of soliciting unreliable evidence and false confessions are far-reaching….
People who work closely with youth and help them navigate legal decision-making know that a young person can understand the literal meanings of Miranda rights, but fail to appreciate the implications of giving up those rights.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: According to the California District Attorneys Association:
We believe that the procedure sought by this bill would frustrate criminal investigations and cast doubt upon voluntary confessions introduced at trial.
As subdivision (c) of Section 1 of the bill notes, juveniles already receive a more generous interpretation of Miranda rights, in that the court must take the juvenile’s age, education, and immaturity into account when considering whether there has been a valid Miranda waiver. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725).
SB 1052 would expand those protections even further, by mandating a consultation between a juvenile and an attorney – a consultation that the juvenile is prohibited from waiving. Failure to follow this procedure would result in a host of sanctions designed to undermine the credibility of any statements made by the juvenile, regardless of whether any actual coercion took place.
To illustrate one such problem with this approach, consider the following example. A juvenile is arrested, and properly advised of his Miranda rights. While in custody, and being transported to the police station, he makes statements incriminating himself, or perhaps even confesses to the crime for which he has been arrested. Upon reaching the police station, the juvenile consults with counsel, per the mandate in SB 1052.
According to the language of the bill, this would be a “failure to comply” since the statement was made in a custodial setting prior to the juvenile consulting with counsel. Under proposed Welfare & Institutions Code section 625.6(b)(2), this failure” would be admissible in support of a claim that the statement was made in violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
That, of course, is simply untrue. There was no violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, as he was properly advised of them, and the court is already required to consider the additional factors pertaining to juveniles under Fare. The only “right” that was arguably violated was this new statutory right under WIC 625.6 – and even then, the arresting officers attempted to comply at the first available opportunity. Unless every officer is going to have a defense attorney at his or her side when taking juveniles into custody, it’s unclear how this would work in practice.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 50-28, 8/23/16
AYES: Alejo, Atkins, Bloom, Bonilla, Bonta, Brown, Burke, Calderon, Campos, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Dababneh, Daly, Dodd, Eggman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gomez, Gonzalez, Gordon, Gray, Roger Hernández, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Levine, Lopez, Low, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Olsen, Quirk, Ridley-Thomas, Rodriguez, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Weber, Williams, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Achadjian, Travis Allen, Arambula, Baker, Bigelow, Brough, Chang, Chávez, Dahle, Beth Gaines, Gallagher, Gatto, Grove, Hadley, Harper, Jones, Kim, Lackey, Linder, Mathis, Mayes, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Steinorth, Wagner, Waldron, Wilk
NO VOTE RECORDED: Frazier, Maienschein
8/29/16 10:34:44
**** END ****
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 1052
Author:(Lara and Mitchell)
As Amended Ver:August 1, 2016
Majority vote
SENATE VOTE: 24-14
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Public Safety | 5-2 | Jones-Sawyer, Lopez, Low, Quirk, Santiago | Melendez, Lackey |
Appropriations | 14-6 | Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonilla, Bonta, Calderon, Daly, Eggman, Eduardo Garcia, Holden, Quirk, Santiago, Weber, Wood, McCarty | Bigelow, Chang, Gallagher, Jones, Obernolte, Wagner |
SUMMARY: Requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel.
- Provides that the consultation with legal counsel shall not be waived.
- Provides that if a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as a relief for noncompliance:
- The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement and factors set forth in this bill;
- Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with the consultation with counsel requirement shall be admissible in support of claims that the youth's statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable; and,
- If the court finds that youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of the consultation with counsel requirement the court shall provide the jury or the trier of fact with a specified jury instruction.
- Provides that in determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all circumstances surrounding the statement, including, but not limited to all of the following:
- The youth's age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental and emotional health;
- The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during interrogation;
- The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement;
- The youth's reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of Miranda rights given by law enforcement;
- Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody;
- Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation;
- Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously;
- Whether the youth requested to leave;
- Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made;
- The manner in which the interrogation occurred;
- Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver; and,
- Any other relevant evidence.
- Specifies that the provisions of this bill do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
- The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
- The officer's questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor.
- Provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel.
- Provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney.
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Significant non-reimbursable annual costs, potentially in the millions of dollars, to local agencies to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations. Proposition 30 exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for "public safety services" including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date; however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, this bill could potentially result in additional costs to the State.
- Minor one-time cost in the $50,000 range, and ongoing cost in the $50,000 range to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). One-time cost to update DJJ regulations and procedures, and ongoing costs to provide a higher level of legal services to DJJ wards.
- Minor costs to several state agencies with law enforcement responsibilities (other than CDCR), such as California Highway Patrol (CHP), Department of Justice, and Department of Fish and Wildlife, who may interact juvenile offenders, to update their regulations and procedures.
COMMENTS: According to the author, "Currently in California, children—no matter how young — can waive their Miranda rights. When law enforcement conducts a custodial interrogation, they are required to recite basic constitutional rights to the individual, known as Miranda rights, and secure a waiver of those rights before proceeding. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Miranda waivers by juveniles present distinct issues. Recent advances in cognitive science research have shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal rights is less than that of an adult.
"SB 1052 will require youth under the age of 18 to consult with legal counsel before they waive their constitutional rights. The bill also provides guidance for courts in determining whether a youth's Miranda waiver was made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner as required under existing law."
Please see the policy committee analysis for a full discussion of this bill.
Analysis Prepared by: Gabriel Caswell / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0003997
SENATE THIRD READING
STR Bill Id:SB 1052
Author:(Lara and Mitchell)
As Amended Ver:August 18, 2016
Majority vote
SENATE VOTE: 24-14
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Public Safety | 5-2 | Jones-Sawyer, Lopez, Low, Quirk, Santiago | Melendez, Lackey |
Appropriations | 14-6 | Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonilla, Bonta, Calderon, Daly, Eggman, Eduardo Garcia, Holden, Quirk, Santiago, Weber, Wood, McCarty | Bigelow, Chang, Gallagher, Jones, Obernolte, Wagner |
SUMMARY: Requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel to assist in their understanding of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights.
- Specifies that consultation with legal counsel may be in person, by telephone, or by video teleconference, and the consultation may not be waived.
- States that the court, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth offender under 18-years of age made during a custodial interrogation, shall consider the effect of a failure to comply with the requirement that they consult with counsel.
- Specifies that the provisions of this bill do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
- The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
- The officer's questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
- Clarify that the provisions of this bill do not require a probation officer to comply with interviews in the normal performance of his or her duties, as specified.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor.
- Provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel.
- Provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney.
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Significant non-reimbursable annual costs, potentially in the millions of dollars, to local agencies to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations. Proposition 30 exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for "public safety services" including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date; however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, this bill could potentially result in additional costs to the State
- Minor one-time cost in the $50,000 range, and ongoing cost in the $50,000 range to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). One-time cost to update DJJ regulations and procedures, and ongoing costs to provide a higher level of legal services to DJJ wards.
- Minor costs to several state agencies with law enforcement responsibilities (other than CDCR), such as California Highway Patrol (CHP), Department of Justice, and Department of Fish and Wildlife, who may interact juvenile offenders, to update their regulations and procedures.
COMMENTS: According to the author, "Currently in California, children—no matter how young— can waive their Miranda rights. When law enforcement conducts a custodial interrogation, they are required to recite basic constitutional rights to the individual, known as Miranda rights, and secure a waiver of those rights before proceeding. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Miranda waivers by juveniles present distinct issues. Recent advances in cognitive science research have shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal rights is less than that of an adult.
"SB 1052 will require youth under the age of 18 to consult with legal counsel before they waive their constitutional rights. The bill also provides guidance for courts in determining whether a youth's Miranda waiver was made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner as required under existing law."
Please see the policy committee analysis for a full discussion of this bill.
Analysis Prepared by: Gabriel Caswell / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0004415
Date of Hearing: August 3, 2016
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 1052
Author:(Lara) – As Amended Ver: August 1, 2016
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 5 - 2 |
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, as specified. This bill provides that the consultation may not be waived.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Significant non-reimbursable annual costs, potentially in the millions of dollars, to local agencies to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations. Proposition 30 exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for “public safety services” including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date; however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, SB 1052 could potentially result in additional costs to the State
- Minor one-time cost in the $50,000 range, and ongoing cost in the $50,000 range to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). One-time cost to update DJJ regulations and procedures, and ongoing costs to provide a higher level of legal services to DJJ wards.
- Minor costs to several state agencies with law enforcement responsibilities (other than CDCR), such as CHP, Department of Justice, and Department of Fish and Wildlife, who may interact juvenile offenders, to update their regulations and procedures.
COMMENTS:
- Background. Current law provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on grounds that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer must advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and must advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel.
When law enforcement conducts a custodial interrogation, they are required to recite basic constitutional rights to the individual, known as Miranda rights, and secure a waiver of those rights before proceeding. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
- Purpose. According to the author, "Currently in California, children—no matter how young— can waive their Miranda rights. Recent advances in cognitive science research have shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal rights is less than that of an adult.
"SB 1052 will require youth under the age of 18 to consult with legal counsel before they waive their constitutional rights. The bill also provides guidance for courts in determining whether a youth’s Miranda waiver was made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner as required under existing law."
- American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry: In a Policy Statement dated March 7, 2013 the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry expressed its beliefs that juveniles should have counsel present when interrogated by law enforcement. In part, the Academy states:
Adolescents use their brains in a fundamentally different manner than adults. They are more likely to act on impulse, without fully considering the consequences of their decisions or actions.
Juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies. While the Academy believes that juveniles should have a right to consult with parents prior to and during questioning, parental presence alone may not be sufficient to protect juvenile suspects. Moreover, many parents may not be competent to advise their children on whether to speak to the police and may also be persuaded that cooperation with the police will bring leniency. There are numerous cases of juveniles who have falsely confessed with their parents present during questioning.
- Support. According to Human Rights Watch, "This bill recognizes both the vulnerability and potential of children and youth, and would create a process to protect their constitutional rights. If passed, a person under the age of 18 will consult with legal counsel before waiving constitutional rights. Youth not only have reduced capacity as compared to adults in comprehending complex legal issues, they also frequently lack the ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions.”
- Opposition: According to the California District Attorneys Association. “Given the additional protections in place to guard against unlawfully obtained juvenile confessions, we believe this bill creates an unworkable and costly process that would frustrate our criminal justice system.”
Analysis Prepared by: Pedro Reyes / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: June 28, 2016
Counsel: Gabriel Caswell
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 1052
Author:(Lara) – As Amended Ver:June 16, 2016
SUMMARY: Requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel.
- Provides that the consultation with legal counsel shall not be waived.
- Provides that if a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as a relief for noncompliance:
- The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement and factors set forth in this bill;
- Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with the consultation with counsel requirement shall be admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable; and,
- If the court finds that youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of the consultation with counsel requirement the court shall provide the jury or the trier of fact with a specified jury instruction.
- The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement and factors set forth in this bill;
- Provides that in determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all circumstances surrounding the statement, including, but not limited to all of the following:
- The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental and emotional health;
- The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during interrogation;
- The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement;
- The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of Miranda rights given by law enforcement;
- Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody;
- Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation;
- Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously;
- Whether the youth requested to leave;
- Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made;
- The manner in which the interrogation occurred;
- Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver; and,
- Any other relevant evidence.
- Provides that the Judicial Council shall develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of this bill shall be viewed with caution.
- Specifies that the provisions of this bill do not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age if both of the following criteria are met:
- The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
- The officer’s questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain this information.
- The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 625)
- Provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 625, subd. (c).)
- Provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 627.)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown.
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, "Currently in California, children—no matter how young— can waive their Miranda rights. When law enforcement conducts a custodial interrogation, they are required to recite basic constitutional rights to the individual, known as Miranda rights, and secure a waiver of those rights before proceeding. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Miranda waivers by juveniles present distinct issues. Recent advances in cognitive science research have shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal rights is less than that of an adult.
"SB 1052 will require youth under the age of 18 to consult with legal counsel before they waive their constitutional rights. The bill also provides guidance for courts in determining whether a youth’s Miranda waiver was made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner as required under existing law."
- "Miranda Rights" Generally: In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the Court (5-4) decided four cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart) and imposed new constitutional requirements for custodial police interrogation, beyond those laid down [previously].
The Court's decision may be "briefly stated" as follows: "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." (86 S.Ct. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 706.) (5 Witkin Cal. Crim. Law Crim Trial § 107)
- Miranda as Applied to Minors: Under this bill, a youth under 18 years of age would be required to consult with counsel prior to waiving his or her rights under Miranda. The right to counsel cannot be waived.
California’s law on youth waiver of rights has not appreciably changed in decades. “We have not,” notes California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu, “extensively examined the issue of juvenile Miranda waivers since…almost a half-century ago.” In re Joseph H., (2015) Case Number S227929 Cal Supreme Court, petition for review denied. Dissenting statement of Justice Liu. As the proponents have pointed out there have been a number of appreciable discoveries in the area of juveniles and cognitive development. It is now widely accepted that cognitive scientific research has shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal concepts is less than that of adults. Youth not only have reduced capacity as compared to adults in comprehending complex legal issues, they also frequently lack the ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions. In fact, recent research has shown that 35 percent of proven false confessions were obtained from suspects under the age of 18. Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906–907 (2004).
If the requirement that the minor consult with counsel before waiving his or her rights is not met the court shall weigh specified factors in determining whether it is admissible. If it is admitted then a jury instruction, as created by Judicial Council should be read that will advise that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of this bill should be viewed with caution. This bill further states that the fact that this requirement was not complied with should be admissible in arguments challenging any statements made by the minor.
- American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry: In a Policy Statement dated March 7, 2013 the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry expressed its beliefs that juveniles should have counsel present when interrogated by law enforcement:
Research has demonstrated that brain development continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood. The frontal lobes, responsible for mature thought, reasoning and judgment, develop last. Adolescents use their brains in a fundamentally different manner than adults. They are more likely to act on impulse, without fully considering the consequences of their decisions or actions.
The Supreme Court has recognized these biological and developmental differences in their recent decisions on the juvenile death penalty, juvenile life without parole and the interrogations of juvenile suspects. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a heightened risk that juvenile suspects will falsely confess when pressured by police during the interrogation process. Research also demonstrates that when in police custody, many juveniles do not fully understand or appreciate their rights, options or alternatives.
Accordingly, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry believes that juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies. While the Academy believes that juveniles should have a right to consult with parents prior to and during questioning, parental presence alone may not be sufficient to protect juvenile suspects. Moreover, many parents may not be competent to advise their children on whether to speak to the police and may also be persuaded that cooperation with the police will bring leniency. There are numerous cases of juveniles who have falsely confessed with their parents present during questioning…. [citations omitted] (https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.aspx)
- Argument in Support: According to Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Watch is honored to sponsor Senate Bill (SB) 1052. This bill recognizes both the vulnerability and potential of children and youth, and would create a process to protect their constitutional rights. If passed, a person under the age of 18 will consult with legal counsel before waiving constitutional rights. Senate Bill 1052 also provides guidance for courts in determining whether a young person’s Miranda waiver was made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner as required under existing law.
"Human Rights Watch is a non-profit, independent organization that exposes human rights violations and challenges governments to protect the human rights of all persons, including children and prisoners. We investigate allegations of human rights violations in some 90 countries, interviewing victims and witnesses and gathering information from governmental and other sources.
"Under existing law, when a law enforcement officer conducts a custodial interrogation he or she is required to recite what is commonly called the Miranda rights, briefly describing several constitutional rights and asking whether the individual waives those rights. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
"In California, any child under the age of 18 can relinquish his or her constitutional rights.[1] This would not change under SB 1052; instead, by providing a youth with the opportunity for consultation with counsel, the state will ensure that young people understand their rights before waiving them. Senate Bill 1052 additionally provides guidance grounded in law and science for courts to assess the validity of a waiver. These procedures will prevent Miranda 'warnings from becoming merely a ritualistic recitation wherein the effect of actual comprehension by the juvenile is ignored.'[2]
"This bill is necessary because California’s law on youth waiver of rights has not appreciably changed in decades. 'We have not,' notes California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu, 'extensively examined the issue of juvenile Miranda waivers since…almost a half-century ago.'[3] As a result, California’s current law fails to reflect 20 years of dramatic advances in knowledge about adolescent development and capacity. Cognitive scientific research has shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal concepts is less than that of adults.
"Youth not only have reduced capacity as compared to adults in comprehending complex legal issues, they also frequently lack the ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions. In recent years, the state of California has enacted a number of laws providing safeguards for youth in the criminal justice system. These laws recognize widely-accepted developmental and neurological evidence about adolescents and young adults. Neuroscientific research finds that the process of cognitive brain development continues from childhood into early adulthood. The still-developing areas of the brain, particularly those that affect judgment and decision-making, are highly relevant to the ability to comprehend Miranda rights and the effect of giving up those rights. Courts, too, have made clear that constitutional rights must be examined in light of youthfulness. In the last 10 years, the US Supreme Court has recognized immaturity and age as factors in a series of cases determining the constitutionality of the death penalty, life without parole, sentencing practices, and Miranda custody analysis. The Supreme Court has noted that '[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.'[4]
"The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry in its policy statement, Interviewing and Interrogating Juvenile Suspects, recommends that in every case juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies.[5] This is a more far-reaching and restrictive policy than the one proffered by SB 1052, but it reflects the expertise of psychiatrists who know well the needs of children and youth.
"Youth should be protected from the effects of their immaturity. In the situation of waiving rights, protection means simply ensuring they understand what they are doing. To argue this is not necessary would imply that youth should have lesser constitutional rights than adults, because a typical adult is capable of understanding their rights and the effect of waiving them.
"Opposition has suggested that this bill will impede police work. Protecting the constitutional rights of people is, of course, one of the most important duties of police. Regardless, this bill’s requirement for assistance of counsel would only be triggered in situations where Miranda warnings are mandated, and most police interactions with youth do not require Miranda warnings. Neither does the bill disallow youth from waiving their rights, as some states have done for certain age groups. Additionally, there are exceptions for situations in which Miranda would normally be required, but an officer believes that questioning a suspect is necessary to protect life or property. There, well-established existing law allows Miranda to be disregarded, and thus the requirements of this bill would not apply.[6]
"However, a real concern is the possibility of false confession. The purpose of custodial interrogation is to compel a confession. The US Supreme Court has noted the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, and that the pressure can be substantial, even for adults. “Indeed, the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense that it ‘can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.’”[7] Estimates of false confessions as the leading cause wrongful convictions range from 14 to 25 percent, and a disproportionate number of false confession cases involve youth under age 18. Recent research has shown that 35 percent of proven false confessions were obtained from suspects under the age of 18.[8]
" 'We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came, and the fervor with which it was defended,' the Supreme Court stated in the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona. 'Those who framed our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that ‘illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing…by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.’ '[9] What we know now is that youth need the protection of a process to ensure they understand their rights, and without that process, individual rights are diminished. Thank you for your support of the constitutional rights of children and youth."
- Argument in Opposition: According to the California District Attorneys Association. "On behalf of the California District Attorneys Association (CDAA), I regret to inform you that we are opposed to your measure, SB 1052. This bill would require that a juvenile consult with counsel prior to any custodial interrogation, and before waiving his or her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
"We believe that the procedure sought by this bill would frustrate criminal investigations and cast doubt upon voluntary confessions introduced at trial.
"As subdivision (c) of Section 1 of the bill notes, juveniles already receive a more generous interpretation of Miranda rights, in that the court must take the juvenile’s age, education, and immaturity into account when considering whether there has been a valid Miranda waiver. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725).
"SB 1052 would expand those protections even further, by mandating a consultation between a juvenile and an attorney – a consultation that the juvenile is prohibited from waiving. Failure to follow this procedure would result in a host of sanctions designed to undermine the credibility of any statements made by the juvenile, regardless of whether any actual coercion took place.
"To illustrate one such problem with this approach, consider the following example. A juvenile is arrested, and properly advised of his Miranda rights. While in custody, and being transported to the police station, he makes statements incriminating himself, or perhaps even confesses to the crime for which he has been arrested. Upon reaching the police station, the juvenile consults with counsel, per the mandate in SB 1052.
"According to the language of the bill, this would be a 'failure to comply' since the statement was made in a custodial setting prior to the juvenile consulting with counsel. Under proposed Welfare & Institutions Code section 625.6(b)(2), this 'failure' would be admissible in support of a claim that the statement was made in violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
"That, of course, is simply untrue. There was no violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, as he was properly advised of them, and the court is already required to consider the additional factors pertaining to juveniles under Fare. The only 'right' that was arguably violated was this new statutory right under WIC 625.6 – and even then, the arresting officers attempted to comply at the first available opportunity. Unless every officer is going to have a defense attorney at his or her side when taking juveniles into custody, it’s unclear how this would work in practice.
"Given the additional protections in place to guard against unlawfully obtained juvenile confessions, we believe this bill creates an unworkable and costly process that would frustrate our criminal justice system.
"For these reasons, we must respectfully oppose SB 1052."
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Human Rights Watch (Co-sponsor)
Silicon Valley De-Bug (Co-sponsor)
American Civil Liberties Union
Amnesty International
Anti-Recidivism Coalition
Asian Law Alliance
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
California Public Defenders Association
Californians for Safety and Justice
Children’s Defense Fund – California
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
Children’s Defense Fund-California
Coalition for Justice and Accountability
Disability Rights California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Fathers & Families of San Joaquin
Felony Murder Elimination Project
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Healing Dialogue and Action
Justice Not Jails
Legal Services for Children
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
NAACP – San Jose/Silicon Valley Branch
National Center for Youth Law
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
National Juvenile Justice Network
National Lawyers Guild
Office of the Americas
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center
Peace and Justice Commission of St. Mark Presbyterian Church
Post-Conviction Justice Project of the USC Gould School of Law
Public Counsel
Services, Immigrant Rights, and Education Network
Youth Justice Coalition
Youth United for Community Action
Opposition
California District Attorneys Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Los Angeles District Attorney's Office
Analysis Prepared by: Gabriel Caswell / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 389 (Lara); In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 55. ↑
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, (Mass. 1983) 449 N.E.2d 654, 656. ↑
In re Joseph H., (2015) Case Number S227929 Cal Supreme Court, petition for review denied. Dissenting statement of Justice Liu. ↑
Roper v. Simmons, (2005) 543 U.S. 551; Graham v. Florida, (2010) 130 S. Ct. 2011; Miller v. Alabama, (2012) 567 U.S. ___; JDB v. North Carolina, (2011) 131 S. Ct. 2394. ↑
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, (March 7, 2013), Policy Statement: Interviewing and Interrogating Juvenile Suspects. ↑
People v. Dean, (1974) 39Cal. App.3rd 875, 882. ↑
Corley v. United States, 556 U. S. __ (2009) (slip op., at 16); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 455, n. 23. ↑
Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906–907 (2004). ↑
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966), citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886). ↑
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 1052
:
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 4/19/16
AYES: Hancock, Anderson, Leno, Liu, Monning
NOES: Stone
NO VOTE RECORDED: Glazer
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 5/27/16
AYES: Lara, Beall, Hill, McGuire, Mendoza
NOES: Bates, Nielsen
DIGEST: This bill requires that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights.
Existing law:
- Provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625)
- Provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625 (c))
- Provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 627)
This bill:
- Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal counsel.
- Provides that the consultation with legal counsel shall not be waived.
- Provides that if a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with legal counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as a relief for noncompliance:
- The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement and factors set in subdivision (c) of the section.
- Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with the consultation with counsel requirement shall be admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
- If the court finds that youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of the consultation with counsel requirement the court shall provide the jury or the trier of fact with the specified jury instruction.
- Provides that in determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all circumstances surrounding the statement, including, but not limited to all of the following:
- The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental and emotional health.
- The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
- The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
- The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
- Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
- Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
- Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
- Whether the youth requested to leave.
- Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
- The manner in which the interrogation occurred.
- Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver.
- Any other relevant evidence.
- Provides that the Judicial Council shall develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of this bill shall be viewed with caution.
Comments
Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the Court (5-4) decided four cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart) and imposed new constitutional requirements for custodial police interrogation, beyond those laid down [previously]. The Court required that a person be informed of his or her right to remain silent and stated that the right can be waived it must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If a person indicates that he or she wishes to speak to an attorney or states that he or she does not wish to be interrogated at any time in the process there can be no further questioning. “The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." (86 S.Ct. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 706.) (5 Witkin Cal. Crim. Law Crim Trial § 107)
Minors and Miranda. Under this bill, a youth under 18 years of age would be required to consult with legal counsel prior to waiving his or her rights under Miranda. The right to legal counsel cannot be waived.
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. In a Policy Statement dated March 7, 2013 the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry expressed its beliefs that juveniles should have counsel present when interrogated by law enforcement:
Research has demonstrated that brain development continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood. The frontal lobes, responsible for mature thought, reasoning and judgment, develop last. Adolescents use their brains in a fundamentally different manner than adults. They are more likely to act on impulse, without fully considering the consequences of their decisions or actions.
The Supreme Court has recognized these biological and developmental differences in their recent decisions on the juvenile death penalty, juvenile life without parole and the interrogations of juvenile suspects. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a heightened risk that juvenile suspects will falsely confess when pressured by police during the interrogation process. Research also demonstrates that when in police custody, many juveniles do not fully understand or appreciate their rights, options or alternatives.
Accordingly, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry believes that juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies. While the Academy believes that juveniles should have a right to consult with parents prior to and during questioning, parental presence alone may not be sufficient to protect juvenile suspects. Moreover, many parents may not be competent to advise their children on whether to speak to the police and may also be persuaded that cooperation with the police will bring leniency. There are numerous cases of juveniles who have falsely confessed with their parents present during questioning…. [citations omitted](https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.aspx)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Local law enforcement agencies: Major non-reimbursable local costs, potentially in the millions of dollars (Local Funds) annually to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations, to the extent local law enforcement agencies (482 cities and 58 counties) incur additional costs to provide counsel and/or incur operational delays. The DOJ Juvenile Justice in California report indicates nearly 87,000 juvenile arrests reported in 2014. A portion of these costs could potentially be subject to Proposition 30 funding requirements (General Fund*).
- Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR): One-time costs of up to $50,000 (General Fund) to revise regulations. Ongoing minor costs of $37,000 (General Fund) annually to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to have legal counsel available for DJJ youth. The DJJ has indicated an average of six DJJ youth subject to custodial interrogation per month.
- California Highway Patrol: Minor, absorbable costs (Special Fund) to modify juvenile interrogation policy and training.
- Court instruction: Minor one-time cost (General Fund) to the Judicial Council to develop the court instruction, as specified.
- Court workload: No significant impact estimated to ongoing court workload (General Fund) resulting from this measure.
- Proposition 30*: Exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for “public safety services” including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date, however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, could potentially result in additional costs to the State.
Human Rights Watch (source)
American Civil Liberties Union
Asian Law Alliance
California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California Catholic Conference
California Public Defenders Association
Campaign for youth Justice
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
Children’s Defense Fund – California
Coalition for Justice and Accountability
Disability Rights California
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights
Fathers and Families of San Joaquin
First Focus Campaign for Children
Friends Committee on Legislation of California
Justice Not Jails
Law Office of Jeremy D. Blank
Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
National Center for Youth Law
National Council on Crime and Delinquency
National Lawyers Guild
Pacific Juvenile Defender Center
San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP
Services, Immigrant Rights & Education Network
SFChildrenslaw
Silicon Valley De-Bug
The Peace and Justice Commission of St. Mark Presbyterian Church
Youth Justice Coalition
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/31/16)
California District Attorneys Association
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT:
The National Center for Youth Law supports this bill stating:
Currently, youth in California can waive their Miranda rights on their own, as long as the waiver is made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. Yet research demonstrates that young people often fail to comprehend the meaning of Miranda rights. Even more troubling is the fact that young people are unlikely to appreciate the consequences of giving up those rights. They are also more likely than adults to waive their rights and confess to crimes they did not commit.
Widely accepted research concludes that young people have less capacity to exercise mature judgement and are more likely than adults to disregard the long-term consequences of their behavior. Over the last 10 years, the United States and California Supreme Courts, recognizing that developmental abilities of youth are relevant to criminal culpability and the capacity to understand procedures of the criminal justice system, have enunciated a new jurisprudence grounded in this research.
Moreover, courts have noted that young people are more vulnerable than adults to interrogation and have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system. These problems are amplified for youth who are very young, or who have developmental disabilities, cognitive delays or mental health challenges. A recent study of exonerations found that 42 percent of juveniles had falsely confessed as compared to just 13 percent of adults. The ramifications for both the individual and society of soliciting unreliable evidence and false confessions are far-reaching….
People who work closely with youth and help them navigate legal decision-making know that a young person can understand the literal meanings of Miranda rights, but fail to appreciate the implications of giving up those rights.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION:
According to the California District Attorneys Association:
We believe that the procedure sought by this bill would frustrate criminal investigations and cast doubt upon voluntary confessions introduced at trial.
As subdivision (c) of Section 1 of the bill notes, juveniles already receive a more generous interpretation of Miranda rights, in that the court must take the juvenile’s age, education, and immaturity into account when considering whether there has been a valid Miranda waiver. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725).
SB 1052 would expand those protections even further, by mandating a consultation between a juvenile and an attorney – a consultation that the juvenile is prohibited from waiving. Failure to follow this procedure would result in a host of sanctions designed to undermine the credibility of any statements made by the juvenile, regardless of whether any actual coercion took place.
To illustrate one such problem with this approach, consider the following example. A juvenile is arrested, and properly advised of his Miranda rights. While in custody, and being transported to the police station, he makes statements incriminating himself, or perhaps even confesses to the crime for which he has been arrested. Upon reaching the police station, the juvenile consults with counsel, per the mandate in SB 1052.
According to the language of the bill, this would be a “failure to comply” since the statement was made in a custodial setting prior to the juvenile consulting with counsel. Under proposed Welfare & Institutions Code section 625.6(b)(2), this failure” would be admissible in support of a claim that the statement was made in violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
That, of course, is simply untrue. There was no violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, as he was properly advised of them, and the court is already required to consider the additional factors pertaining to juveniles under Fare. The only “right” that was arguably violated was this new statutory right under WIC 625.6 – and even then, the arresting officers attempted to comply at the first available opportunity. Unless every officer is going to have a defense attorney at his or her side when taking juveniles into custody, it’s unclear how this would work in practice.
Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /
5/31/16 20:45:42
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Ricardo Lara, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular Session
SB 1052 (Lara) - Custodial interrogation: juveniles
Version: March 28, 2016 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 5 - 1 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: May 27, 2016 | Consultant: Jolie Onodera |
Bill Summary:
SB 1052 would require a youth under 18 years of age to consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, as specified. This bill provides that the consultation may not be waived.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on May 27, 2016
Fiscal Impact:
- Local law enforcement agencies: Major non-reimbursable local costs, potentially in the millions of dollars (Local Funds) annually to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations, to the extent local law enforcement agencies (482 cities and 58 counties) incur additional costs to provide counsel and/or incur operational delays. The DOJ Juvenile Justice in California report indicates nearly 87,000 juvenile arrests reported in 2014. A portion of these costs could potentially be subject to Proposition 30 funding requirements (General Fund*).
- Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR): One-time costs of up to $50,000 (General Fund) to revise regulations. Ongoing minor costs of $37,000 (General Fund) annually to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to have legal counsel available for DJJ youth. The DJJ has indicated an average of six DJJ youth subject to custodial interrogation per month.
- California Highway Patrol: Minor, absorbable costs (Special Fund**) to modify juvenile interrogation policy and training.
- Court instruction: Minor one-time cost (General Fund***) to the Judicial Council to develop the court instruction, as specified.
- Court workload: No significant impact estimated to ongoing court workload (General Fund***) resulting from this measure.
- Proposition 30*: Exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for “public safety services” including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date, however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, could potentially result in additional costs to the State.
**Motor Vehicle Account
***Trial Court Trust Fund
Author Amendments:
Clarify that references to counsel in the bill mean “legal” counsel.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Ricardo Lara, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular Session
SB 1052 (Lara) - Custodial interrogation: juveniles
Version: March 28, 2016 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 5 - 1 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: May 16, 2016 | Consultant: Jolie Onodera |
This bill meets the criteria for referral to the Suspense File.
Bill Summary:
SB 1052 would require a youth under 18 years of age to consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, as specified. This bill provides that the consultation may not be waived.
Fiscal Impact:
- Local law enforcement agencies: Major non-reimbursable local costs, potentially in the millions of dollars (Local Funds) annually to provide legal counsel to minors prior to custodial interrogations, to the extent local law enforcement agencies (482 cities and 58 counties) incur additional costs to provide counsel and/or incur operational delays. The DOJ Juvenile Justice in California report indicates nearly 87,000 juvenile arrests reported in 2014. A portion of these costs could potentially be subject to Proposition 30 funding requirements (General Fund*).
- Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR): One-time costs of up to $50,000 (General Fund) to revise regulations. Ongoing minor costs of $37,000 (General Fund) annually to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to have legal counsel available for DJJ youth. The DJJ has indicated an average of six DJJ youth subject to custodial interrogation per month.
- California Highway Patrol: Minor, absorbable costs (Special Fund**) to modify juvenile interrogation policy and training.
- Court instruction: Minor one-time cost (General Fund***) to the Judicial Council to develop the court instruction, as specified.
- Court workload: No significant impact estimated to ongoing court workload (General Fund***) resulting from this measure.
- Proposition 30*: Exempts the State from mandate reimbursement for realigned responsibilities for “public safety services” including the provision of services for, and supervision of, juvenile offenders. However, legislation enacted after September 30, 2012, that has an overall effect of increasing the costs already borne by a local agency for public safety services applies to local agencies only to the extent that the State provides annual funding for the cost increase. The provisions of Proposition 30 have not been interpreted through the formal court process to date, however, to the extent local agency costs to county probation and sheriff departments resulting from this measure are determined to be applicable under the provisions of Proposition 30, could potentially result in additional costs to the State.
**Motor Vehicle Account
***Trial Court Trust Fund
Background:
Existing law authorizes a peace officer to take a minor into temporary custody when that officer has reasonable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime or violated an order of the juvenile court. (Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) § 625.)
Existing law provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel. (WIC § 625 (c).)
Existing law provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement, the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney. (WIC § 627.)
In the case of In re Joseph H (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 535, Justice Goodwin Liu protested the Court’s vote against hearing a case in which a 10-year-old was deemed capable of waiving his right to remain silent. His dissenting statement reads, in part, as follows:
I write to explain why I believe this case merits our review. Petitioner Joseph H., at age 10, shot and killed his sleeping father and then confessed to a police detective during a custodial interview. A video recording of the interview shows Joseph sitting on a couch next to his stepmother, Krista McCary, whose husband Joseph had just killed. Riverside Police Detective Roberta Hopewell sat in an adjacent chair; she was courteous and not overbearing. At the beginning of the interview, Detective Hopewell informed Joseph of his Miranda rights, and he purported to waive them. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal found that "Joseph's responses indicated he understood" his Miranda rights and that he validly waived his rights "despite his young age, his ADHD, and low-average intelligence."
In 2011, Joseph was one of 613 children under the age of 12 arrested for a felony in California. This case raises an important legal issue that likely affects hundreds of children each year: whether and, if so, how the concept of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent Miranda waiver can be meaningfully applied to a child as young as 10 years old. A Miranda waiver, to be valid, must be "made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." The waiver must be made "with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." In assessing the validity of a waiver, a reviewing court must "conduct an independent review of the trial court's legal determination" of "whether the Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation."
Juveniles, like adults, may waive their Miranda rights. Yet Miranda waivers by juveniles present special concerns. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the "commonsense" conclusion that "children 'generally are less mature and responsible than adults'; that they 'often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them'; that they 'are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures' than adults. Addressing the specific context of police interrogation, we have observed that events that 'would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.' The "very real differences between children and adults" must be factored into any assessment of whether a child validly waived his Miranda rights. "When a juvenile's waiver is at issue, consideration must be given to factors such as 'the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' “
It is not uncommon for California courts to find valid Miranda waivers by children 15 years old or older. There are also cases finding valid Miranda waivers by 14-year-olds. In People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384-385, this court found a valid Miranda waiver by a 13-year-old. And I have found one published case upholding a Miranda waiver by a 12-year-old. Apart from this case, there does not appear to be any California decision upholding a Miranda waiver by a child younger than 12. The one published case to address a Miranda waiver for a child in this age range, In re Michael B. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1084-1086, concluded that the waiver by a nine-year-old was invalid…
Here the petition for review and supporting letters contend that as a matter of "social science and cognitive science" as well as "what 'any parent knows'-indeed, what any person knows-about children generally," it is doubtful that Joseph understood or was capable of understanding the nature of Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving those rights… Having reviewed the transcript and video of the interview, I believe the issue of whether Joseph validly waived his Miranda rights subsumes several questions worthy of our review: (1) whether there is an age below which the concept of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver has no meaningful application, (2) whether and, if so, how the Miranda warnings and waiver decision can realistically be made intelligible to very young children, and (3) what role parents, guardians, or counsel should play in aiding a valid waiver decision by such children, and under what conditions a parent or guardian would be unable to play that role…
In evaluating whether this case merits our review, I note that other state high courts have addressed these issues by formulating standards and procedures specific to young children. [adopting a "bright-line rule" that "[w]hen the juvenile is under the age of fourteen, the adult's absence will render the young offender's statement inadmissible as a matter of law-unless the adult is truly unavailable, in which case, the voluntariness of the waiver should be determined by considering the totality of circumstances"].
We have not extensively examined the issue of juvenile Miranda waivers since our decision in Lara almost a half-century ago… Lara also predates by several decades the growing body of scientific research that the high court has repeatedly found relevant in assessing differences in mental capabilities between children and adults… Although we are barred from adopting an exclusionary rule that is not required by the federal Constitution, whether federal constitutional law requires the type of safeguards that other courts have adopted for children as young as Joseph is a question that neither the high court nor this court has examined…The proper application of Miranda to children in Joseph's age range likely affects hundreds of cases each year, even though few such cases result in a trial and appeal. For these reasons, I vote to grant review.
Finally, it bears mention that consideration of special safeguards for young children need not await judicial action. Many states have found the issue worthy of legislative attention. Our Legislature may wish to take up this issue in light of this court's decision not to do so here.
This bill seeks to respond to Justice Liu’s invitation to the Legislature to address this issue.
Proposed Law:
This bill would require a youth under 18 years of age to consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, as specified. This bill provides that the consultation may not be waived. Additionally, this bill:
- Provides that if a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as relief for noncompliance:
- Requires the court to consider the effect of failure to comply and the following factors when adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation:
- The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental, and emotional health.
- The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
- The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
- The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of the Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
- Whether there was an express or implied waiver of Miranda rights.
- Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
- Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
- Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
- Whether the youth requested to leave.
- Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
- The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable, the failure to comply with WIC § 627.
- Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver, and any other relevant evidence.
- Specifies that provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with the provisions of this bill shall be admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
- If the court finds that a youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of the bill’s provisions, requires the court to provide the jury, or if a bench trial, the trier of fact, with the instruction developed pursuant to this bill.
- Requires the Judicial Council to develop an instruction, as specified, advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of this bill’s provisions shall be viewed with caution.
- Provides that for purposes of this section, “Miranda rights” refers to the rights specified in WIC § 625(c).
- Specifies numerous uncodified legislative findings and declarations.
Recommended Amendments: While not specifically referenced, the author may wish to consider an amendment to add the word “legal” to all references to counsel in the bill if the intent is to provide juveniles with attorney representation in lieu of advice from parents, guardians, or other adults.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Loni Hancock, Chair
2015 - 2016 Regular
Bill No: SB 1052 Hearing Date: April 19, 2016
Author: | Lara | ||
Version: | March 28, 2016 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | MK | ||
Subject: Custodial Interrogation: Juveniles
HISTORY
Source: Human Rights Watch
Prior Legislation: None
Support: Asian Law Alliance; California Alliance for Youth and Community Justice; California Attorneys for Criminal Justice; California Catholic Conference; California Public Defenders Association; Children’s Defense Fund – California; Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice; Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth; Children’s Defense Fund-California; Coalition for Justice and Accountability; Ella Baker Center for Human Rights; First Focus Campaign for Children; Friends Committee on Legislation of California; Justice Not Jails; Law Office of Jeremy D. Blank; Legal Services for Prisoners with Children; National Center for Youth Law; National Council on Crime and Delinquency; National Lawyers Guild; Pacific Juvenile Defender Center; Services, Immigrant Rights & Education Network; The Peace and Justice Commission of St. Mark Presbyterian Church; San Jose/Silicon Valley NAACP; Services, Immigrant Rights, and Education Network; Silicon Valley De-Bug; SFChildrenslaw; Youth Justice Coalition; 2 individuals
Opposition: California District Attorneys Association; California State Sheriffs’ Association
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to require that a youth under the age of 18 consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any specified rights.
Existing law provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625)
Existing law provides that in any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor will be adjudged a ward of the court or charged with a criminal action, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 625 (c))
Existing law provides that when a minor is taken into a place of confinement the minor shall be advised that he has the right to make at least two telephone calls, one completed to a parent or guardian, responsible adult or employer and one to an attorney. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 627)
This bill provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with counsel.
This bill provides that the consultation with counsel shall not be waived.
This bill provides that if a custodial interrogation of a minor under 18 years of age occurs prior to the youth consulting with counsel, all of the following remedies shall be granted as a relief for noncompliance:
- The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of youth under 18 years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with the consultation to counsel requirement and factors set in subdivision (c) of the section.
- Provided the evidence is otherwise admissible, the failure to comply with the consultation with counsel requirement shall be admissible in support of claims that the youth’s statement was obtained in violation of his or her Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
- If the court finds that youth under 18 years of age was subject to a custodial interrogation in violation of the consultation with counsel requirement the court shall provide the jury or the trier of fact with the specified jury instruction.
This bill provides that in determining whether an admission, statement, or confession made by a youth under 18 years of age was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the court shall consider all circumstances surrounding the statement, including, but not limited to all of the following:
- The youth’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, education level, and physical, mental and emotional health.
- The capacity of the youth to understand Miranda rights, including the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination under the United States and California Constitutions, the consequences of waiving those rights and privileges, whether the youth perceived the adversarial nature of the situation, and whether the youth was aware of how counsel could assist the youth during interrogation.
- The manner in which the youth was advised of his or her rights, and whether the rights specified in the Miranda rule were minimized by law enforcement.
- The youth’s reading and comprehension level and his or her understanding of Miranda rights given by law enforcement.
- Whether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other adult at any time while in law enforcement custody.
- Whether law enforcement offered to allow the youth to consult with a parent or guardian prior to the interrogation, or whether law enforcement took steps to prevent a parent or guardian from speaking to the youth prior to interrogation.
- Whether the youth had been interrogated previously by law enforcement and whether the youth invoked his or her Miranda rights previously.
- Whether the youth requested to leave.
- Whether law enforcement either by express or implied conduct intimated that the youth could leave after speaking, or if any other promises of leniency were made.
- The manner in which the interrogation occurred, including length of time, method of interrogation, location, number of individuals present, the treatment of the youth by law enforcement, the tone and manner of questioning during the interrogation, whether law enforcement personnel were in uniform, if ruses were used, if express or implied threats were made, and if applicable the failure to comply with the requirement that the juvenile receive two phone calls, one to a parent or guardian and one to an attorney.
- Whether the youth consulted with counsel prior to waiver.
- Any other relevant evidence.
This bill provides that the Judicial Council shall develop an instruction advising that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of this bill shall be viewed with caution.
This bill provides that for purposes of this bill “Miranda rights” refers to the rights specified in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 625(c).
This bill makes a number of uncodified legislative declarations and findings regarding developmental and neurological sciences as it pertains to the interrogation of a minor.
RECEIVERSHIP/OVERCROWDING CRISIS AGGRAVATION
For the past several years this Committee has scrutinized legislation referred to its jurisdiction for any potential impact on prison overcrowding. Mindful of the United States Supreme Court ruling and federal court orders relating to the state’s ability to provide a constitutional level of health care to its inmate population and the related issue of prison overcrowding, this Committee has applied its “ROCA” policy as a content-neutral, provisional measure necessary to ensure that the Legislature does not erode progress in reducing prison overcrowding.
On February 10, 2014, the federal court ordered California to reduce its in-state adult institution population to 137.5% of design capacity by February 28, 2016, as follows:
- 143% of design bed capacity by June 30, 2014;
- 141.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2015; and,
- 137.5% of design bed capacity by February 28, 2016.
In December of 2015 the administration reported that as “of December 9, 2015, 112,510 inmates were housed in the State’s 34 adult institutions, which amounts to 136.0% of design bed capacity, and 5,264 inmates were housed in out-of-state facilities. The current population is 1,212 inmates below the final court-ordered population benchmark of 137.5% of design bed capacity, and has been under that benchmark since February 2015.” (Defendants’ December 2015 Status Report in Response to February 10, 2014 Order, 2:90-cv-00520 KJM DAD PC, 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (fn. omitted).) One year ago, 115,826 inmates were housed in the State’s 34 adult institutions, which amounted to 140.0% of design bed capacity, and 8,864 inmates were housed in out-of-state facilities. (Defendants’ December 2014 Status Report in Response to February 10, 2014 Order, 2:90-cv-00520 KJM DAD PC, 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (fn. omitted).)
While significant gains have been made in reducing the prison population, the state must stabilize these advances and demonstrate to the federal court that California has in place the “durable solution” to prison overcrowding “consistently demanded” by the court. (Opinion Re: Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Request For Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline, NO. 2:90-cv-0520 LKK DAD (PC), 3-Judge Court, Coleman v. Brown, Plata v. Brown (2-10-14). The Committee’s consideration of bills that may impact the prison population therefore will be informed by the following questions:
- Whether a proposal erodes a measure which has contributed to reducing the prison population;
- Whether a proposal addresses a major area of public safety or criminal activity for which there is no other reasonable, appropriate remedy;
- Whether a proposal addresses a crime which is directly dangerous to the physical safety of others for which there is no other reasonably appropriate sanction;
- Whether a proposal corrects a constitutional problem or legislative drafting error; and
- Whether a proposal proposes penalties which are proportionate, and cannot be achieved through any other reasonably appropriate remedy.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Currently in California, children—no matter how young— can waive their Miranda rights. When law enforcement conducts a custodial interrogation, they are required to recite basic constitutional rights to the individual, known as Miranda rights, and secure a waiver of those rights before proceeding. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Miranda waivers by juveniles present distinct issues. Recent advances in cognitive science research have shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal rights is less than that of an adult.
Although existing law assures counsel for youth accused of crimes, the law does not require law enforcement and the courts to recognize that youth are different from adults. It is criticalto ensure a youth understands their rights before waving them and courts should have clear criteria for evaluating the validity of waivers.
Recently an appellate court held that a 10 year old boy made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. When the police asked if he understood the right to remain silent, he replied, “Yes, that means that I have the right to stay calm.” The California Supreme Court declined to review the lower court’s decision. Several justices disagreed, and in his dissenting statement Justice Liu suggests the Legislature should address the issue, stating that California law on juvenile waivers is a half-century old and, “predates by several decades the growing body of scientific research that the [U.S. Supreme Court] has repeatedly found relevant in assessing differences in mental capabilities between children and adults.”
SB 1052 will require youth under the age of 18 to consult with legal counsel before they waive their constitutional rights. The bill also provides guidance for courts in determining whether a youth’s Miranda waiver was made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner as required under existing law.
2. Miranda v. Arizona
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the Court (5-4) decided four cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart) and imposed new constitutional requirements for custodial police interrogation, beyond those laid down [previously].
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The Court's decision may be "briefly stated" as follows: "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." (86 S.Ct. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 706.) (5 Witkin Cal. Crim. Law Crim Trial § 107)
3. Minors and Miranda
Under this bill, a youth under 18 years of age would be required to consult with counsel prior to waiving his or her rights under Miranda. The right to counsel cannot be waived.
If the requirement that the minor consult with counsel before waiving his or her rights is not met the court shall weigh specified factors in determining whether it is admissible. If it is admitted then a jury instruction, as created by Judicial Council should be read that will advise that statements made in a custodial interrogation in violation of this bill should be viewed with caution. The bill further states that the fact that the requirement in this bill was not complied with should be admissible in arguments challenging any statements made by the minor.
4. American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
In a Policy Statement dated March 7, 2013 the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry expressed its beliefs that juveniles should have counsel present when interrogated by law enforcement:
Research has demonstrated that brain development continues throughout adolescence and into early adulthood. The frontal lobes, responsible for mature thought, reasoning and judgment, develop last. Adolescents use their brains in a fundamentally different manner than adults. They are more likely to act on impulse, without fully considering the consequences of their decisions or actions.
The Supreme Court has recognized these biological and developmental differences in their recent decisions on the juvenile death penalty, juvenile life without parole and the interrogations of juvenile suspects. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a heightened risk that juvenile suspects will falsely confess when pressured by police during the interrogation process. Research also demonstrates that when in police custody, many juveniles do not fully understand or appreciate their rights, options or alternatives.
Accordingly, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry believes that juveniles should have an attorney present during questioning by police or other law enforcement agencies. While the Academy believes that juveniles should have a right to consult with parents prior to and during questioning, parental presence alone may not be sufficient to protect juvenile suspects. Moreover, many parents may not be competent to advise their children on whether to speak to the police and may also be persuaded that cooperation with the police will bring leniency. There are numerous cases of juveniles who have falsely confessed with their parents present during questioning…. [citations omitted] (https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2013/Interviewing_and_Interrogating_Juvenile_Suspects.aspx)
5. Support
The National Center for Youth Law supports this bill stating:
Currently, youth in California can waive their Miranda rights on their own, as long as the waiver is made in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. Yet research demonstrates that young people often fail to comprehend the meaning of Miranda rights. Even more troubling is the fact that young people are unlikely to appreciate the consequences of giving up those rights. They are also more likely than adults to waive their rights and confess to crimes they did not commit.
Widely accepted research concludes that young people have less capacity to exercise mature judgement and are more likely than adults to disregard the long-term consequences of their behavior. Over the last 10 years, the United States and California Supreme Courts, recognizing that developmental abilities of youth are relevant to criminal culpability and the capacity to understand procedures of the criminal justice system, have enunciated a new jurisprudence grounded in this research.
Moreover, courts have noted that young people are more vulnerable than adults to interrogation and have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system. These problems are amplified for youth who are very young, or who have developmental disabilities, cognitive delays or mental health challenges. A recent study of exonerations found that 42 percent of juveniles had falsely confessed as compared to just 13 percent of adults. The ramifications for both the individual and society of soliciting unreliable evidence and false confessions are far-reaching….
People who work closely with youth and help them navigate legal decision-making know that a young person can understand the literal meanings of Miranda rights, but fail to appreciate the implications of giving up those rights. Some youth are persuaded to give statements because they believe doing so will reduce the likelihood of “getting into trouble.” They are left feeling betrayed by interrogation tactics permitted and perhaps appropriate for adult suspects, but overwhelming for youth. These experiences can leave youth traumatized for years and harm trust in law enforcement and the justice system.
6. Opposition
According to the California District Attorneys Association:
We believe that the procedure sought by this bill would frustrate criminal investigations and cast doubt upon voluntary confessions introduced at trial.
As subdivision (c) of Section 1 of the bill notes, juveniles already receive a more generous interpretation of Miranda rights, in that the court must take the juvenile’s age, education, and immaturity into account when considering whether there has been a valid Miranda waiver. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725).
SB 1052 would expand those protections even further, by mandating a consultation between a juvenile and an attorney – a consultation that the juvenile is prohibited from waiving. Failure to follow this procedure would result in a host of sanctions designed to undermine the credibility of any statements made by the juvenile, regardless of whether any actual coercion took place.
To illustrate one such problem with this approach, consider the following example. A juvenile is arrested, and properly advised of his Miranda rights. While in custody, and being transported to the police station, he makes statements incriminating himself, or perhaps even confesses to the crime for which he has been arrested. Upon reaching the police station, the juvenile consults with counsel, per the mandate in SB 1052.
According to the language of the bill, this would be a “failure to comply” since the statement was made in a custodial setting prior to the juvenile consulting with counsel. Under proposed Welfare & Institutions Code section 625.6(b)(2), this failure” would be admissible in support of a claim that the statement was made in violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, was involuntary, or is unreliable.
That, of course, is simply untrue. There was no violation of the juvenile’s Miranda rights, as he was properly advised of them, and the court is already required to consider the additional factors pertaining to juveniles under Fare. The only “right” that was arguably violated was this new statutory right under WIC 625.6 – and even then, the arresting officers attempted to comply at the first available opportunity. Unless every officer is going to have a defense attorney at his or her side when taking juveniles into custody, it’s unclear how this would work in practice.
Given the additional protections in place to guard against unlawfully obtained juvenile confessions, we believe this bill creates an unworkable and costly process that would frustrate our criminal justice system.
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Bill Co-Author(s):
