AB 1559: Elections.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2023-06-14
Current Status:
Failed
(2023-09-01: In committee: Held under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
(1)Existing law generally requires electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, ballot on demand systems, voting systems, and remote accessible vote by mail systems to be approved by the Secretary of State before their use in an election.
This bill would authorize the Secretary of State to impose additional conditions of approval for these purposes.
(2)Existing law requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to notify the Secretary of State and affected local elections officials in writing within 2 business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
This bill would instead require a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to provide that notice within 24 hours.
(3)Under existing law, specified election materials, including voted ballots, are required to be kept by county elections officials for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections.
This bill would add paper cast vote records to the list of materials county elections officials are required to keep. The bill would also require county elections officials to keep certain electronic data for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections. By imposing additional duties on county elections officials, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
(4)Under existing law, it is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 4 years to interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program sources codes or to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used.
This bill would specify that, with respect to the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program sources codes, the phrase interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards. The bill would also expand the crime of knowing and unauthorized possession of a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used to include knowing and unauthorized possession of credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used. By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The bill would authorize the destruction or secure disposal of certified voting technology at the end of lifecycle with the written approval of the Secretary of State and the manufacturer. The bill would also require specified actions to be taken for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or for which security has been breached or attempted to be breached, including that the technology be removed from service immediately.
(5)Existing law prohibits a voting system from being connected to the internet and from receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
This bill would prohibit establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions and would prohibit communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission. The bill would require a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap, as defined.
(6)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
(1)Existing law generally requires electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, ballot on demand systems, voting systems, and remote accessible vote by mail systems to be approved by the Secretary of State before their use in an election.
This bill would authorize the Secretary of State to impose additional conditions of approval for these purposes.
(2)Existing law requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to notify the Secretary of State and affected local elections officials in writing within 2 business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
This bill would instead require a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to provide that notice within 24 hours.
(3)Under existing law, specified election materials, including voted ballots, are required to be kept by county elections officials for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections.
This bill would add paper cast vote records to the list of materials county elections officials are required to keep. The bill would also require county elections officials to keep certain electronic data for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections. By imposing additional duties on county elections officials, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
(4)Under existing law, it is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 4 years to interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program sources codes or to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used.
This bill would specify that, with respect to the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program sources codes, the phrase interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards. The bill would also expand that the crime of knowing and unauthorized possession of a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used to include knowing and unauthorized possession of credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used. The bill would make it a felony punishable by the same term of imprisonment to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data. The bill would also make it a felony punishable by the same term of imprisonment, and specified fines, to knowingly, and without authorization, provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology, as defined, or finished or unfinished ballot cards. By expanding the scope of an existing crime and creating new crimes, crime, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The bill would authorize the destruction or secure disposal of certified voting technology at the end of lifecycle with the written approval of the Secretary of State and the manufacturer. The bill would also require specified actions to be taken for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or for which security has been breached or attempted to be breached, including that the technology be removed from service immediately.
(5)Existing law prohibits a voting system from being connected to the internet and from receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
This bill would prohibit establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions and would prohibit communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission. The bill would require a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap, as defined.
(6)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
(1)Existing law generally requires electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, ballot on demand systems, voting systems, and remote accessible vote by mail systems to be approved by the Secretary of State before their use in an election.
This bill would authorize the Secretary of State to impose additional conditions of approval for these purposes.
(2)Existing law requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to notify the Secretary of State and affected local elections officials in writing within 2 business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
This bill would instead require a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to provide that notice within 24 hours.
(3)Under existing law, specified election materials, including voted ballots, are required to be kept by county elections officials for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections.
This bill would add paper cast vote records to the list of materials county elections officials are required to keep. The bill would also require county elections officials to keep certain electronic data for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections. By imposing additional duties on county elections officials, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
(4)Under existing law, it is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 4 years to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used.
This bill would expand that crime to include knowing and unauthorized possession of credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used. The bill would make it a felony punishable by the same term of imprisonment to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data. The bill would also make it a felony punishable by the same term of imprisonment, and specified fines, to knowingly, and without authorization, provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology, as defined, or finished or unfinished ballot cards. By expanding the scope of an existing crime and creating new crimes, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The bill would authorize the destruction or secure disposal of certified voting technology at the end of lifecycle with the written approval of the Secretary of State and the manufacturer. The bill would also require specified actions to be taken for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or for which security has been breached or attempted to be breached, including that the technology be removed from service immediately.
(5)Existing law prohibits a voting system from being connected to the internet and from receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
This bill would prohibit establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions and would prohibit communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission. The bill would require a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap, as defined.
(6)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
(1)Existing law generally requires electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, ballot on demand systems, voting systems, and remote accessible vote by mail systems to be approved by the Secretary of State before their use in an election.
This bill would authorize the Secretary of State to impose additional conditions of approval for these purposes.
(2)Existing law requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to notify the Secretary of State and affected local elections officials in writing within 2 business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
This bill would instead require a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to provide that notice within 24 hours.
(3)Under existing law, specified election materials, including voted ballots, are required to be kept by county elections officials for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections.
This bill would add paper cast vote records to the list of materials county elections officials are required to keep. The bill would also require county elections officials to keep certain electronic data for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or for 6 months for all other elections. By imposing additional duties on county elections officials, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
(4)Under existing law, it is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 4 years to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used.
This bill would expand that crime to include knowing and unauthorized possession of credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used. The bill would make it a felony punishable by the same term of imprisonment to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data. The bill would also make it a felony punishable by the same term of imprisonment, and specified fines, to knowingly, and without authorization, provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology, as defined, or finished or unfinished ballot cards. By expanding the scope of an existing crime and creating new crimes, this bill would create a state-mandated local program.
The bill would authorize the destruction or secure disposal of certified voting technology at the end of lifecycle with the written approval of the Secretary of State and the manufacturer. The bill would also require specified actions to be taken for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or for which security has been breached or attempted to be breached, including that the technology be removed from service immediately.
(5)Existing law prohibits a voting system from being connected to the internet and from receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
This bill would prohibit establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions and would prohibit communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission. The bill would require a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap, as defined.
(6)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Jurisdiction means any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to this code.
SEC. 2.Section 2550 of the Elections Code is amended to read:2550.(a)For purposes of this section, electronic poll book means an electronic list of registered voters that may be transported to the polling location. An electronic poll book shall contain all of the following voter registration data:
(1)Name.
(2)Address.
(3)Precinct.
(4)Party preference.
(5)Whether or not the voter has been issued a vote by mail ballot.
(6)Whether or not the vote by mail ballot has been recorded as received by the elections official.
(b)An electronic poll book shall not be used unless it has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish electronic poll book standards and regulations governing the certification and use of electronic poll books.
(d)The Secretary of State shall not certify an electronic poll book unless it fulfills the requirements of this section and the Secretary of States standards and regulations. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
SEC. 3.Section 13004 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.(a)The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations governing the manufacture, finishing, quality standards, distribution, and inventory control of ballot cards and ballot on demand systems.
(b)A ballot printer shall not manufacture or finish ballot cards, or manufacture unfinished ballot cards, for use in California elections, or accept or solicit orders for ballot cards or unfinished ballot cards, before certification as a ballot printer by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(c)For commercial ballot manufacturers and finishers, the Secretary of State shall require a biennial inspection of the certified manufacturing, finishing, and storage facilities.
(d)Not later than five working days before the Secretary of State begins the initial inspection, the ballot card manufacturer or finisher shall notify or disclose to the Secretary of State in writing any known flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. Once approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot card manufacturer or finisher shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)For purposes of this section, ballot printer means any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to this code.
SEC. 4.Section 13004.5 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.5.(a)A jurisdiction shall not purchase, lease, or contract for a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)A vendor, company, or person shall not sell, lease, or contract with a jurisdiction for the use of a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)This section does not preclude a jurisdiction from conducting research and development of a ballot on demand system. A ballot on demand system that is used for purposes of this subdivision shall not be used in an election conducted pursuant to this code unless the system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(d)Once a ballot on demand system is approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot on demand system vendor shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot on demand system that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations for purposes of certifying ballot on demand systems.
SEC. 5.Section 15209 of the Elections Code is amended to read:15209.Any magnetic or electronic storage medium, or copy thereof, used for the ballot tabulation program and any magnetic or electronic storage medium, or copy thereof, containing election results shall be kept in a secure location and shall be retained for 6 months following any local election and 22 months following any federal election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the local or federal election remains undetermined.
SEC. 6.Section 17301 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17301.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelope shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the ballots destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 7.Section 17302 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17302.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17301. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelopes shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the packages destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 8.Section 17305 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17305.(a)The following provisions apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for 22 months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 9.Section 17306 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17306.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17305. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for six months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 10.Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 17600) is added to Division 17 of the Elections Code, to read:7.Preservation of Electronic Data17600.For purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a)Ballot image means an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
(b)Certified voting technology means any certified voting technologies certified by the Secretary of State, including voting systems, ballot on demand printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
(c)Chain of custody means a process used to track the movement and control of certified voting technology, as defined in subdivision (b), through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles certified voting technology, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of the certified voting technology is uncertain and during which actions taken on the certified voting technology are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
(d)Electronic data includes voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
(e)End of lifecycle means the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
(f)HASH means a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
(g)Lifecycle of certified voting technology means the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
17601.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17602.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17601. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images. images, if applicable.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17603.(a)Certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle may be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the Secretary of State.
(b)With respect to any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached, all of the following shall occur:
(1)The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the Secretary of State shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery.
(2)The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible.
(3)The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
SEC. 11.Section 18564 of the Elections Code is amended to read:18564.(a)Any person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years who, before or during an election:
(1)Tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damages in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes.
(2)Interferes or attempts to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes. For the purposes of this paragraph, interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
(3)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in the persons possession credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in this state.
(4)Willfully substitutes or attempts to substitute forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes.
(b)The definitions in Section 17600 apply for purposes of this section.
SEC. 12.Section 19201 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19201.(a)(1)The Secretary of State may grant conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system under either of the following circumstances:
(A)A voting system or part of a voting system was decertified as a result of a review by the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 19232.
(B)A certified voting system or part of that voting system is modified to comply with voting system standards or changes in statute.
(2)For purposes of granting conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)The Secretary of State may withdraw conditional approval at any time pursuant to Section 19232.
SEC. 13.Section 19205 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19205.A voting system shall comply with all of the following:
(a)No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
(b)No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
(c)(1)No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
(2)A network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions shall not be established. Communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time is prohibited. A component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, shall not be connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
(d)(1)The voting system shall be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, air-gap includes all of the following:
(A)A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
(B)A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection, that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
(C)A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
SEC. 14.Section 19281 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19281.(a)A remote accessible vote by mail system, in whole or in part, shall not be used unless it has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State before the election at which it is to be first used. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary for the certification of the remote accessible vote by mail system.
(b)All other uses of a remote accessible vote by mail system shall be subject to the provisions of Section 19202.
SEC. 15.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution for certain costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district because, in that regard, this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
Jurisdiction means any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to this code.
SEC. 2.Section 2550 of the Elections Code is amended to read:2550.(a)For purposes of this section, electronic poll book means an electronic list of registered voters that may be transported to the polling location. An electronic poll book shall contain all of the following voter registration data:
(1)Name.
(2)Address.
(3)Precinct.
(4)Party preference.
(5)Whether or not the voter has been issued a vote by mail ballot.
(6)Whether or not the vote by mail ballot has been recorded as received by the elections official.
(b)An electronic poll book shall not be used unless it has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish electronic poll book standards and regulations governing the certification and use of electronic poll books.
(d)The Secretary of State shall not certify an electronic poll book unless it fulfills the requirements of this section and the Secretary of States standards and regulations. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
SEC. 3.Section 13004 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.(a)The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations governing the manufacture, finishing, quality standards, distribution, and inventory control of ballot cards and ballot on demand systems.
(b)A ballot printer shall not manufacture or finish ballot cards, or manufacture unfinished ballot cards, for use in California elections, or accept or solicit orders for ballot cards or unfinished ballot cards, before certification as a ballot printer by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(c)For commercial ballot manufacturers and finishers, the Secretary of State shall require a biennial inspection of the certified manufacturing, finishing, and storage facilities.
(d)Not later than five working days before the Secretary of State begins the initial inspection, the ballot card manufacturer or finisher shall notify or disclose to the Secretary of State in writing any known flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. Once approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot card manufacturer or finisher shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)For purposes of this section, ballot printer means any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to this code.
SEC. 4.Section 13004.5 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.5.(a)A jurisdiction shall not purchase, lease, or contract for a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)A vendor, company, or person shall not sell, lease, or contract with a jurisdiction for the use of a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)This section does not preclude a jurisdiction from conducting research and development of a ballot on demand system. A ballot on demand system that is used for purposes of this subdivision shall not be used in an election conducted pursuant to this code unless the system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(d)Once a ballot on demand system is approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot on demand system vendor shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot on demand system that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations for purposes of certifying ballot on demand systems.
SEC. 5.Section 15209 of the Elections Code is amended to read:15209.Any magnetic or electronic storage medium, or copy thereof, used for the ballot tabulation program and any magnetic or electronic storage medium, or copy thereof, containing election results shall be kept in a secure location and shall be retained for six 6 months following any local election and 22 months following any federal election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the local or federal election remains undetermined.
SEC. 6.Section 17301 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17301.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelope shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the ballots destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 7.Section 17302 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17302.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17301. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelopes shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the packages destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 8.Section 17305 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17305.(a)The following provisions apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for 22 months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 9.Section 17306 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17306.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17305. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for six months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 10.Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 17600) is added to Division 17 of the Elections Code, to read:7.Preservation of Electronic Data17600.For purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a)Ballot image means an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
(b)Certified voting technology means any certified voting technologies certified by the Secretary of State, including voting systems, ballot on demand printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
(c)Chain of custody means a process used to track the movement and control of certified voting technology, as defined in subdivision (b), through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles certified voting technology, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of the certified voting technology is uncertain and during which actions taken on the certified voting technology are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
(d)Electronic data includes voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
(e)End of lifecycle means the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
(f)HASH means a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
(g)Lifecycle of certified voting technology means the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
17601.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17602.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17601. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17603.(a)Certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle may be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the Secretary of State.
(b)With respect to any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached, all of the following shall occur:
(1)The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the Secretary of State shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery.
(2)The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible.
(3)The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
SEC. 11.Section 18564 of the Elections Code is amended to read:18564.(a)Any person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years who, before or during an election:
(1)Tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damages in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes.
(2)Interferes or attempts to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes. For the purposes of this paragraph, interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
(3)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in the persons possession credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in this state.
(4)Willfully substitutes or attempts to substitute forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes.
(5)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in the persons possession copies of electronic data.(b)Knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards, is a crime punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years, by a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment. (c)(b)The definitions in Section 17600 apply for purposes of this section.
SEC. 12.Section 19201 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19201.(a)(1)The Secretary of State may grant conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system under either of the following circumstances:
(A)A voting system or part of a voting system was decertified as a result of a review by the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 19232.
(B)A certified voting system or part of that voting system is modified to comply with voting system standards or changes in statute.
(2)For purposes of granting conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)The Secretary of State may withdraw conditional approval at any time pursuant to Section 19232.
SEC. 13.Section 19205 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19205.A voting system shall comply with all of the following:
(a)No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
(b)No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
(c)(1)No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
(2)A network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions shall not be established. Communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time is prohibited. A component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, shall not be connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
(d)(1)The voting system shall be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, air-gap includes all of the following:
(A)A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
(B)A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection, that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
(C)A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
SEC. 14.Section 19281 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19281.(a)A remote accessible vote by mail system, in whole or in part, shall not be used unless it has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State before the election at which it is to be first used. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary for the certification of the remote accessible vote by mail system.
(b)All other uses of a remote accessible vote by mail system shall be subject to the provisions of Section 19202.
SEC. 15.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution for certain costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district because, in that regard, this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
Jurisdiction means any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to this code.
SEC. 2.Section 2550 of the Elections Code is amended to read:2550.(a)For purposes of this section, electronic poll book means an electronic list of registered voters that may be transported to the polling location. An electronic poll book shall contain all of the following voter registration data:
(1)Name.
(2)Address.
(3)Precinct.
(4)Party preference.
(5)Whether or not the voter has been issued a vote by mail ballot.
(6)Whether or not the vote by mail ballot has been recorded as received by the elections official.
(b)An electronic poll book shall not be used unless it has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish electronic poll book standards and regulations governing the certification and use of electronic poll books.
(d)The Secretary of State shall not certify an electronic poll book unless it fulfills the requirements of this section and the Secretary of States standards and regulations. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
SEC. 3.Section 13004 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.(a)The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations governing the manufacture, finishing, quality standards, distribution, and inventory control of ballot cards and ballot on demand systems.
(b)A ballot printer shall not manufacture or finish ballot cards, or manufacture unfinished ballot cards, for use in California elections, or accept or solicit orders for ballot cards or unfinished ballot cards, before certification as a ballot printer by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(c)For commercial ballot manufacturers and finishers, the Secretary of State shall require a biennial inspection of the certified manufacturing, finishing, and storage facilities.
(d)Not later than five working days before the Secretary of State begins the initial inspection, the ballot card manufacturer or finisher shall notify or disclose to the Secretary of State in writing any known flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. Once approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot card manufacturer or finisher shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)For purposes of this section, ballot printer means any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to this code.
SEC. 4.Section 13004.5 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.5.(a)A jurisdiction shall not purchase, lease, or contract for a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)A vendor, company, or person shall not sell, lease, or contract with a jurisdiction for the use of a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)This section does not preclude a jurisdiction from conducting research and development of a ballot on demand system. A ballot on demand system that is used for purposes of this subdivision shall not be used in an election conducted pursuant to this code unless the system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(d)Once a ballot on demand system is approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot on demand system vendor shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot on demand system that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations for purposes of certifying ballot on demand systems.
SEC. 5.Section 15209 of the Elections Code is amended to read:15209.Any magnetic or electronic storage medium, or copy thereof, used for the ballot tabulation program and any magnetic or electronic storage medium, or copy thereof, containing election results shall be kept in a secure location and shall be retained for six months following any local election and 22 months following any federal election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the local or federal election remains undetermined.
SEC. 6.Section 17301 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17301.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelope shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the ballots destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 7.Section 17302 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17302.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17301. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelopes shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the packages destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 8.Section 17305 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17305.(a)The following provisions apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for 22 months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 9.Section 17306 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17306.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17305. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for six months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 10.Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 17600) is added to Division 17 of the Elections Code, to read:7.Preservation of Electronic Data17600.For purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a)Ballot image means an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
(b)Certified voting technology means any certified voting technologies certified by the Secretary of State, including voting systems, ballot on demand printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
(c)Chain of custody means a process used to track the movement and control of an asset certified voting technology, as defined in subdivision (b), through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, certified voting technology, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset the certified voting technology is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset certified voting technology are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
(d)Electronic data includes voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
(e)End of lifecycle lifecycle means the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
(f)HASH means a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
(g)Lifecycle of certified voting technology means the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
17601.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17602.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17601. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17603.(a)Certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle may be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the Secretary of State.
(b)With respect to any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached, all of the following shall occur:
(1)The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the Secretary of State shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery.
(2)The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible.
(3)The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
SEC. 11.Section 18564 of the Elections Code is amended to read:18564.(a)Any person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years who, before or during an election:
(1)Tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damages in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes.
(2)Interferes or attempts to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes.
(3)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in the persons possession credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in this state.
(4)Willfully substitutes or attempts to substitute forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes.
(5)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in the persons possession copies of electronic data.
(b)Knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards, is a crime punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years, by a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(c)The definitions in Section 17600 apply for purposes of this section.
SEC. 12.Section 19201 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19201.(a)(1)The Secretary of State may grant conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system under either of the following circumstances:
(A)A voting system or part of a voting system was decertified as a result of a review by the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 19232.
(B)A certified voting system or part of that voting system is modified to comply with voting system standards or changes in statute.
(2)For purposes of granting conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)The Secretary of State may withdraw conditional approval at any time pursuant to Section 19232.
SEC. 13.Section 19205 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19205.A voting system shall comply with all of the following:
(a)No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
(b)No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
(c)(1)No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
(2)A network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions shall not be established. Communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time is prohibited. A component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, shall not be connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
(d)(1)The voting system shall be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, air-gap includes all of the following:
(A)A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
(B)A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection, that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
(C)A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
SEC. 14.Section 19281 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19281.(a)A remote accessible vote by mail system, in whole or in part, shall not be used unless it has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State before the election at which it is to be first used. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary for the certification of the remote accessible vote by mail system.
(b)All other uses of a remote accessible vote by mail system shall be subject to the provisions of Section 19202.
SEC. 15.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution for certain costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district because, in that regard, this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
Jurisdiction means any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to this code.
SEC. 2.Section 2550 of the Elections Code is amended to read:2550.(a)For purposes of this section, electronic poll book means an electronic list of registered voters that may be transported to the polling location. An electronic poll book shall contain all of the following voter registration data:
(1)Name.
(2)Address.
(3)Precinct.
(4)Party preference.
(5)Whether or not the voter has been issued a vote by mail ballot.
(6)Whether or not the vote by mail ballot has been recorded as received by the elections official.
(b)An electronic poll book shall not be used unless it has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish electronic poll book standards and regulations governing the certification and use of electronic poll books.
(d)The Secretary of State shall not certify an electronic poll book unless it fulfills the requirements of this section and the Secretary of States standards and regulations. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
SEC. 3.Section 13004 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.(a)The Secretary of State shall adopt regulations governing the manufacture, finishing, quality standards, distribution, and inventory control of ballot cards and ballot on demand systems. For commercial ballot manufacturers and finishers, the Secretary of State shall require a biennial inspection of the certified manufacturing, finishing, and storage facilities. The Secretary of State shall also approve each ballot card manufacturer, finisher, and ballot on demand system before manufacturing or finishing ballot cards, or deploying a ballot on demand system, for use in California elections.
(b)A ballot printer shall not manufacture or finish ballot cards, or manufacture unfinished ballot cards, for use in California elections, or accept or solicit orders for ballot cards or unfinished ballot cards, before certification as a ballot printer by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(c)For commercial ballot manufacturers and finishers, the Secretary of State shall require a biennial inspection of the certified manufacturing, finishing, and storage facilities.
(b)(d)Not later than five working days before the Secretary of State begins his or her the initial inspection, the ballot card manufacturer, finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor manufacturer or finisher shall notify or disclose to the Secretary of State in writing any known flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, or ballot on demand system that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. Once approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot card manufacturer, finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor manufacturer or finisher shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within two business days 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot card manufacturing or finishing process, or its manufactured or finished ballot cards, or ballot on demand system that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(e)For purposes of this section, ballot printer means any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to this code.
SEC. 4.Section 13004.5 of the Elections Code is amended to read:13004.5.(a)A jurisdiction shall not purchase, lease, or contract for a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)A vendor, company, or person shall not sell, lease, or contract with a jurisdiction for the use of a ballot on demand system unless the ballot on demand system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(c)This section does not preclude a jurisdiction from conducting research and development of a ballot on demand system. A ballot on demand system that is used for purposes of this subdivision shall not be used in an election conducted pursuant to this code unless the system has been certified by the Secretary of State.
(d)Once a ballot on demand system is approved by the Secretary of State, the ballot on demand system vendor shall notify the Secretary of State and the affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after it discovers any flaw or defect in its ballot on demand system that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
(d)(e)The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations for purposes of certifying ballot on demand systems.
SEC. 5.Section 15209 of the Elections Code is amended to read:15209.Any magnetic or electronic storage medium medium, or copy thereof, used for the ballot tabulation program and any magnetic or electronic storage medium medium, or copy thereof, containing election results shall be kept in a secure location and shall be retained for six months following any local election and 22 months following any federal election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the local or federal election remains undetermined.
SEC. 6.Section 17301 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17301.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelope shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the ballots destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 7.Section 17302 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17302.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17301. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The packages containing the following ballots and identification envelopes shall be kept by the elections official, unopened and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)Voted polling place ballots.
(2)Paper record copies, as defined by Section 19271, if any, of voted polling place ballots.
(3)Voted vote by mail voter ballots.
(4)Vote by mail voter identification envelopes.
(5)Voted provisional voter ballots.
(6)Provisional ballot voter identification envelopes.
(7)Spoiled ballots.
(8)Canceled ballots.
(9)Unused vote by mail ballots surrendered by the voter pursuant to Section 3015.
(10)Ballot receipts.
(11)Paper cast vote records.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, marking or falsification of ballots, or forgery of vote by mail voters signatures is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the packages destroyed or recycled. The packages shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 8.Section 17305 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17305.(a)The following provisions apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for 22 months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 9.Section 17306 of the Elections Code is amended to read:17306.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17305. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)Upon the completion of the counting of the votes as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 15640) of Chapter 9 of Division 15, all ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be kept by the elections official for six months from the date of the election or so long thereafter as any contest involving the vote at the election remains undetermined.
(c)Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the final disposition of all voted ballot cards and paper cast vote records shall be determined by the elections official.
(d)Sealed ballot containers may be opened if the elections official determines it is necessary in a shredding or recycling process. This section shall not be construed to allow packages or containers to be opened except for purposes specified herein. The packages or containers shall otherwise remain unopened until the ballots and paper cast vote records are destroyed or recycled.
SEC. 10.Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 17600) is added to Division 17 of the Elections Code, to read:7.Preservation of Electronic Data17600.For purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a)Ballot image means an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
(b)Certified voting technology means any certified voting technologies certified by the Secretary of State, including voting systems, ballot on demand printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
(c)Chain of custody means a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
(d)Electronic data includes voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
(e)End of lifecycle means the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
(f)HASH means a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
(g)Lifecycle of certified voting technology means the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
17601.(a)The following provisions shall apply to those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States Senator, and United States Representative.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the 22-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17602.(a)The following provisions shall apply to all state or local elections not provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 17601. An election is not deemed a state or local election if votes for candidates for federal office may be cast on the same ballot as votes for candidates for state or local office.
(b)The following data shall be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for six months from the date of the election:
(1)All voting system electronic data.
(2)All ballot on demand system electronic data, if applicable.
(3)All adjudication electronic data.
(4)All remote accessible vote by mail system electronic data, if applicable.
(5)All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
(6)HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
(7)All ballot images.
(c)If a contest is not commenced within the six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system is not commenced within the six-month period, either of which may involve the vote count of the precinct from which voted ballots were received, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
17603.(a)Certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle may be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the Secretary of State.
(b)With respect to any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached, all of the following shall occur:
(1)The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the Secretary of State shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery.
(2)The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible.
(3)The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
SEC. 11.Section 18564 of the Elections Code is amended to read:18564.(a)Any person is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years who, before or during an election:
(a)(1)Tampers with, interferes with, or attempts to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damages in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes.
(b)(2)Interferes or attempts to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes.
(c)(3)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in his or her possession a key the persons possession credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in this state.
(d)(4)Willfully substitutes or attempts to substitute forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes.
(5)Knowingly, and without authorization, makes or has in the persons possession copies of electronic data.
(b)Knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards, is a crime punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code for two, three, or four years, by a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(c)The definitions in Section 17600 apply for purposes of this section.
SEC. 12.Section 19201 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19201.(a)(1)The Secretary of State may grant conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system under either of the following circumstances:
(1)(A)A voting system or part of a voting system was decertified as a result of a review by the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 19232.
(2)(B)A certified voting system or part of that voting system is modified to comply with voting system standards or changes in statute.
(2)For purposes of granting conditional approval to a voting system or part of a voting system pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the Secretary of State.
(b)The Secretary of State may withdraw conditional approval at any time pursuant to Section 19232.
SEC. 13.Section 19205 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19205.A voting system shall comply with all of the following:
(a)No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
(b)No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
(c)(1)No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
(2)A network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions shall not be established. Communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time is prohibited. A component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, shall not be connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
(d)(1)The voting system shall be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, air-gap includes all of the following:
(A)A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
(B)A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection, that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
(C)A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
SEC. 14.Section 19281 of the Elections Code is amended to read:19281.(a)A remote accessible vote by mail system, in whole or in part, shall not be used unless it has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State prior to before the election at which it is to be first used. The Secretary of State may impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary for the certification of the remote accessible vote by mail system.
(b)All other uses of a remote accessible vote by mail system shall be subject to the provisions of Section 19202.
SEC. 15.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution for certain costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district because, in that regard, this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
However, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains other costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
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Date
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Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 1, 2023 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| Aug 14, 2023 | In committee: Referred to APPR suspense file. |
| Jul 12, 2023 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 4. Noes 0.) (July 11). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 20, 2023 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on PUB S. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (June 20). Re-referred to Com. on PUB S. |
| Jun 14, 2023 | Referred to Coms. on E. & C.A. and PUB S. |
| Jun 14, 2023 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on E. & C.A. |
| Jun 1, 2023 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 31, 2023 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 80. Noes 0. Page 2048.) |
| May 18, 2023 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (May 18). |
| May 18, 2023 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 10, 2023 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 27, 2023 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 26, 2023 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 25, 2023 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 8. Noes 0.) (April 25). |
| Apr 6, 2023 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Apr 5, 2023 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 5, 2023 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 8. Noes 0.) (March 29). |
| Mar 9, 2023 | Referred to Coms. on ELECTIONS and PUB. S. |
| Feb 18, 2023 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 20. |
| Feb 17, 2023 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 14, 2023 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 11, 2023 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Jun 20, 2023 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Public Safety] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Elections and Constitutional Amendments |
Passed |
|
| May 31, 2023 | AB 1559 Jackson Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 18, 2023 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 25, 2023 | Do pass as amended, and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| Mar 29, 2023 | Do pass as amended, and be re-referred to the Committee on [Public Safety] with recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Assembly Standing Committee on Elections |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
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Organization
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Position
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Date
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|---|---|---|
| California Association of Clerks and Election Officials | ** Support | |
| California Secretary of State | ** Support |
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular Session
AB 1559 (Jackson) - Elections
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1559 would (1) update existing election record retention, preservation, and destruction requirements, as specified, and (2) expand and clarify two existing felonies related to voting technology security.
Fiscal Impact:
- This bill would result in minor and absorbable costs to the Secretary of State (SOS) to update requirements for voting systems and materials.
- By requiring county elections officials to maintain voting systems and materials in a specified manner, this bill creates a state-mandated local program. To the extent the Commission on State Mandates determines that the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service on local agencies, local agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs (General Fund). The magnitude is unknown, but potentially in excess of $50,000 annually.
Background:
The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure that the State has the most rigorous and stringent voting system and voting equipment standards and approval procedures. Notably, SB 360 (Padilla, 2013) made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines. All voting technology must be certified for use prior to being sold or used in any California election.
In counties that use electronic voting systems, current law requires election officials to provide paper ballots at the polling place. State law additionally prohibits any part of a voting system from being connected to the Internet at any time, and California's voting system standards prohibit voting systems from having the capability to communicate individual votes or vote totals over public communications networks or from having wireless communications capabilities.
Proposed Law:
This bill would, among other things, do the following:
- Define the term “jurisdiction” to mean any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to the Elections Code.
- Authorize SOS to impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by SOS for the certification of electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, BOD systems, voting systems, and RAVBM systems.
- Reduce, from two business days to 24 hours, the amount of time that a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor has to notify SOS and affected local elections officials after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
- Add paper cast vote records to the list of election materials required to be kept by a county elections official for 22 months for elections involving a federal office, or six months for all other elections.
- Require any copy of a magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified.
- Define the term “ballot printer” to mean any company or jurisdiction (as defined)that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to the Elections Code, and recasts provisions of law that require a ballot printer, as defined, to be approved by the SOS before manufacturing or finishing ballot cards, or accepting or soliciting orders for ballot cards.
- Define the following terms for the preservation of electronic data related to voting technology:
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- “Certified voting technology” to mean any certified voting technologies certified by the SOS, including voting systems, BOD printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
- “Chain of custody” to mean a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- “Electronic data” to include voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
- “End of lifecycle” to mean the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
- “HASH” to mean a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
- “Lifecycle” of certified voting technology to mean the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
- Require the following data to be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months for those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States (US) Senator, and US Representative; and for six months for all other state and local elections: (1) all voting system electronic data, (2) all BOD system electronic data, if applicable, (3) all adjudication electronic data, (4) all RAVBM system electronic data, if applicable, (5) all electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable, (6) HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable, and (7) all ballot images, if applicable.
- Provide that if a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period or within a six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the relevant period, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
- Authorize certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle to be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the SOS.
- Require all of the following to occur for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached: (1) the chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery, (2) the equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible, and (3) the integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
- Expand an existing crime that makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California, to additionally include possessing credentials, passwords, or access keys to such a voting machine.
- Clarify an existing crime that makes it a felony to interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes, by adding a provision that states, for the purposes of this paragraph, interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
- Prohibit a voting system from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions. Prohibit communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time. Prohibit a component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, from being connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
Related Legislation:
- AB 1539 (Berman) would make it a misdemeanor for any person to vote or to attempt to vote both in an election held in this state and in an election held in another state on the same date. AB 1539 is currently pending in this Committee.
- AB 777 (Harper, 2017) would have increased the maximum fine amount from $1,000 to $10,000 for fraudulently signing a ballot. The bill failed passage in the Assembly Committee on Elections and Redistricting.
- SB 360 (Padilla, Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013) made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines
- SB 1376 (Perata), Chapter 813, Statutes of 2004, authorized the SOS, and in some cases the AG and county elections officials, to take legal actions regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections.
Staff Comments:
As noted above, this bill would clarify the scope of an existing felony. Consequently, it could make it easier to try and convict an individual for the specified felony, resulting in potential non-reimbursable costs in the tens of thousands of dollars annually for increased incarceration costs. New crimes are not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012); however, overcrowding in county jails creates a General Fund cost pressure because the State has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding after the 2011 Realignment Act.
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular Session
AB 1559 (Jackson) - Elections
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1559 would (1) update existing election record retention, preservation, and destruction requirements, as specified, and (2) expand and clarify two existing felonies related to voting technology security.
Fiscal Impact:
- This bill would result in minor and absorbable costs to the Secretary of State (SOS) to update requirements for voting systems and materials.
- By requiring county elections officials to maintain voting systems and materials in a specified manner, this bill creates a state-mandated local program. To the extent the Commission on State Mandates determines that the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service on local agencies, local agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs (General Fund). The magnitude is unknown, but potentially in excess of $50,000 annually.
Background:
The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure that the State has the most rigorous and stringent voting system and voting equipment standards and approval procedures. Notably, SB 360 (Padilla, 2013) made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines. All voting technology must be certified for use prior to being sold or used in any California election.
In counties that use electronic voting systems, current law requires election officials to provide paper ballots at the polling place. State law additionally prohibits any part of a voting system from being connected to the Internet at any time, and California's voting system standards prohibit voting systems from having the capability to communicate individual votes or vote totals over public communications networks or from having wireless communications capabilities.
Proposed Law:
This bill would, among other things, do the following:
- Define the term “jurisdiction” to mean any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to the Elections Code.
- Authorize SOS to impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by SOS for the certification of electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, BOD systems, voting systems, and RAVBM systems.
- Reduce, from two business days to 24 hours, the amount of time that a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor has to notify SOS and affected local elections officials after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
- Add paper cast vote records to the list of election materials required to be kept by a county elections official for 22 months for elections involving a federal office, or six months for all other elections.
- Require any copy of a magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified.
- Define the term “ballot printer” to mean any company or jurisdiction (as defined)that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to the Elections Code, and recasts provisions of law that require a ballot printer, as defined, to be approved by the SOS before manufacturing or finishing ballot cards, or accepting or soliciting orders for ballot cards.
- Define the following terms for the preservation of electronic data related to voting technology:
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- “Certified voting technology” to mean any certified voting technologies certified by the SOS, including voting systems, BOD printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
- “Chain of custody” to mean a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- “Electronic data” to include voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
- “End of lifecycle” to mean the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
- “HASH” to mean a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
- “Lifecycle” of certified voting technology to mean the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
- Require the following data to be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months for those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States (US) Senator, and US Representative; and for six months for all other state and local elections: (1) all voting system electronic data, (2) all BOD system electronic data, if applicable, (3) all adjudication electronic data, (4) all RAVBM system electronic data, if applicable, (5) all electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable, (6) HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable, and (7) all ballot images, if applicable.
- Provide that if a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period or within a six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the relevant period, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
- Authorize certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle to be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the SOS.
- Require all of the following to occur for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached: (1) the chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery, (2) the equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible, and (3) the integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
- Expand an existing crime that makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California, to additionally include possessing credentials, passwords, or access keys to such a voting machine.
- Clarify an existing crime that makes it a felony to interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes, by adding a provision that states, for the purposes of this paragraph, interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
- Prohibit a voting system from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions. Prohibit communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time. Prohibit a component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, from being connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
Related Legislation:
- AB 1539 (Berman) would make it a misdemeanor for any person to vote or to attempt to vote both in an election held in this state and in an election held in another state on the same date. AB 1539 is currently pending in this Committee.
- AB 777 (Harper, 2017) would have increased the maximum fine amount from $1,000 to $10,000 for fraudulently signing a ballot. The bill failed passage in the Assembly Committee on Elections and Redistricting.
- SB 360 (Padilla, Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013) made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines
- SB 1376 (Perata), Chapter 813, Statutes of 2004, authorized the SOS, and in some cases the AG and county elections officials, to take legal actions regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections.
Staff Comments:
As noted above, this bill would clarify the scope of an existing felony. Consequently, it could make it easier to try and convict an individual for the specified felony, resulting in potential non-reimbursable costs in the tens of thousands of dollars annually for increased incarceration costs. New crimes are not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012); however, overcrowding in county jails creates a General Fund cost pressure because the State has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding after the 2011 Realignment Act.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Aisha Wahab, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular
Bill No: AB 1559 Hearing Date: July 11, 2023
Author: | Jackson | ||
Version: | June 14, 2023 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | MK | ||
Subject: Elections
HISTORY
Source: California Secretary of State
Prior Legislation: None applicable
Support: California Association of Clerks & Election Officials
Opposition: None known
Assembly Floor Vote: 80 - 0
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to update existing election record retention, preservation, and destruction requirements to provide clear guidance for electronic voting data, as specified, and to expands and clarifies two existing felonies related to voting technology security.
Existing law defines a “paper cast vote record” to mean an auditable document that corresponds to the selection made on the voter’s ballot and lists the contests on the ballot and the voter’s selections for those contests. (Elections Code §305.5)
Existing law requires, generally, electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, BOD systems, voting systems, and RAVBM systems to be approved by the SOS before their use in an election. (Elections Code §§2250, 13004.5, 19201, 19281)
Existing law requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials in writing within two business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. (Elections Code §13004(d))
Existing law requires an electronic poll book vendor to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. (2 Code of California Regulations §20161)
Existing law requires any magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified. (Elections Code §15209)
Existing law requires specified ballots and identification envelopes to be kept by an elections official unopened and unaltered, as specified, for 22 months following a federal election, and for six months following any other state or local election. (Elections Code §§17301, 17302)
Existing law makes it a felony for a person to knowingly, and without authorization, make or have in their possession a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California. (Elections Code §18564)
Existing law prohibits any part of a voting system from doing any of the following: being connected to the Internet at any time; electronically receiving or transmitting election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center; or, receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers. (Elections Code §19205)
This bill defines the term “jurisdiction” to mean any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to the Elections Code.
This bill authorizes the SOS to impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the SOS for the certification of electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, BOD systems, voting systems, and RAVBM systems.
This bill reduces, from two business days to 24 hours, the amount of time that a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor has to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
This bill adds paper cast vote records to the list of election materials required to be kept by a county elections official for 22 months for elections involving a federal office, or 6 months for all other elections.
This bill requires any copy of a magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified.
This bill defines the term “ballot printer” to mean any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to the Elections Code, and recasts provisions of law that require a ballot printer, as defined, to be approved by the SOS before manufacturing or finishing ballot cards, or accepting or soliciting orders for ballot cards.
This bill defines the following terms for the preservation of electronic data related to voting technology:
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- “Certified voting technology” to mean any certified voting technologies certified by the SOS, including voting systems, BOD printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
- “Chain of custody” to mean a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- “Electronic data” to include voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
- “End of lifecycle” to mean the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
- “HASH” to mean a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
- “Lifecycle” of certified voting technology to mean the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
This bill requires the following data to be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months for those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States (US) Senator, and US Representative; and for six months for all other state and local elections:
- All voting system electronic data.
- All BOD system electronic data, if applicable.
- All adjudication electronic data.
- All RAVBM system electronic data, if applicable.
- All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
- HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
- All ballot images, if applicable.
This bill provides that if a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period or within a six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the relevant period, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
This bill authorizes certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle to be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the SOS.
This bill requires all of the following to occur for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached:
- The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery;
- The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible; and
- The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
This bill expands an existing crime that makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California, to additionally include possessing credentials, passwords, or access keys to such a voting machine.
This bill clarifies an existing crime that makes it a felony to interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes, by adding a provision that states, for the purposes of this paragraph, interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
This bill prohibits a voting system from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions. Prohibits communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time. Prohibits a component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, from being connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
This bill requires a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap. Provides that an “air-gap” includes all of the following:
- A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
- A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
- A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
This bill makes technical, clarifying, and conforming changes
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
In California, home to nearly 20 percent of the nation’s electors, election security is of the highest priority. As the nonpartisan, chief election official for the state, the California Secretary of State’s Office works around the clock to ensure every vote is safe and secure.
California has the most stringent voting system testing, certification and use requirements in the country. The Secretary of State has impressively kept our voting security on the cutting edge. For example, Secretary of State’s office has administered over $400 million dollars in state and federal funding for voting infrastructure updates, including strengthening the accessibility, accuracy, security, and safety of our elections.
2. Expansion of felony for election tampering
Existing law makes it a felony to tamper with, interfere with voting systems, voting software programs etc. before or during an election. This bill clarifies that interferes with or attempts to interfere with to include but not be limited to knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to , or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
Exiting law also makes it a felony to knowingly and without authorization make or have in his or her possession a key to a voting machine that will e used in elections in this state. This bill updates that definitional to instead prohibit the knowingly and without authorizations the possession of credentials, passwords or access keys to a voting machine that will be used in an election.
3. Other changes
This bill passed Senate Elections and Constitutional Amendments on June 20 to look at the other election issues in this bill which include:
- Updating and clarifying existing procedures and requirements to ensure they include electronic election materials, such as paper cast records and magnetic or electronic storage mediums, and establishes specific requirements for the preservation of election data.
- Various provisions that update and expand existing procedures and requirements related to election technology. For example, this bill codifies the authority for the SOS to impose additional conditions on voting equipment approved for use in any election, and requirements for a vendor to provide notice within 24 hours of any flaw or defect for certain voting equipment. Additionally, this bill clarifies current prohibitions and specifies that a voting system is prohibited from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for the voting system functions, and any communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission.
4. Argument in Support
The California Association of Clerks & Election Officials supports this bill stating:
Existing law requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or ballot on demand system vendor to notify the Secretary of State and affected local elections officials in writing within 2 business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could negatively impact the future casting or tallying of votes. AB 1559 would require notification within 24 hours. Under current law, voted ballots, are required to be kept by county elections officials for 22 months for elections involving a federal office or 6 months for all other elections. This bill would expand this to include paper cast vote records. The bill would also require county elections officials to keep certain electronic data for 22 months for elections for federal office or six months for all other elections.
Currently, it is a felony punishable by imprisonment for two to four years to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to voting equipment that has been adopted and will be used. AB 1559 would expand this crime to include knowing and unauthorized possession of credentials, passwords, or access keys to voting equipment. AB 1559 would also authorize the destruction or secure disposal of certified voting technology at the end of lifecycle with the written approval of the Secretary of State and the manufacturer.
Existing law prohibits a voting system from being connected to the internet and from receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers. This bill would prohibit establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions. The bill would require a voting system to be separated by an air-gap.
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Senator Steven Glazer, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular
Bill No: 1559 Hearing Date: 6/20/23
Author: | Jackson | ||
Version: |
| ||
Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
Subject:
DIGEST
This bill updates existing election record retention, preservation, and destruction requirements to provide clear guidance for electronic voting data, as specified. This bill also expands and clarifies two existing felonies related to voting technology security.
ANALYSIS
Existing law:
- Defines a “paper cast vote record” to mean an auditable document that corresponds to the selection made on the voter’s ballot and lists the contests on the ballot and the voter’s selections for those contests.
- Requires, generally, electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, ballot on demand (BOD) systems, voting systems, and remote accessible vote by mail (RAVBM) systems to be approved by the Secretary of State (SOS) before their use in an election.
- Requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials in writing within two business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
- Requires an electronic poll book vendor to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
- Requires any magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified.
- Requires specified ballots and identification envelopes to be kept by an elections official unopened and unaltered, as specified, for 22 months following a federal election, and for six months following any other state or local election.
- Makes it a felony for a person to knowingly, and without authorization, make or have in their possession a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California.
- Prohibits any part of a voting system from doing any of the following: being connected to the Internet at any time; electronically receiving or transmitting election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center; or receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers.
This bill:
- Defines the term “jurisdiction” to mean any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to the Elections Code.
- Authorizes the SOS to impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the SOS for the certification of electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, BOD systems, voting systems, and RAVBM systems.
- Reduces, from two business days to 24 hours, the amount of time that a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor has to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
- Adds paper cast vote records to the list of election materials required to be kept by a county elections official for 22 months for elections involving a federal office, or 6 months for all other elections.
- Requires any copy of a magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified.
- Defines the term “ballot printer” to mean any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to the Elections Code, and recasts provisions of law that require a ballot printer, as defined, to be approved by the SOS before manufacturing or finishing ballot cards, or accepting or soliciting orders for ballot cards.
- Defines the following terms for the preservation of electronic data related to voting technology:
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- “Certified voting technology” to mean any certified voting technologies certified by the SOS, including voting systems, BOD printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
- “Chain of custody” to mean a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- “Electronic data” to include voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
- “End of lifecycle” to mean the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
- “HASH” to mean a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
- “Lifecycle” of certified voting technology to mean the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- Requires the following data to be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months for those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States (US) Senator, and US Representative; and for six months for all other state and local elections:
- All voting system electronic data.
- All BOD system electronic data, if applicable.
- All adjudication electronic data.
- All RAVBM system electronic data, if applicable.
- All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
- HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
- All ballot images, if applicable.
- All voting system electronic data.
- Provides that if a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period or within a six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the relevant period, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
- Authorizes certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle to be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the SOS.
- Requires all of the following to occur for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached:
- The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery;
- The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible; and
- The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
- The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery;
- Expands an existing crime that makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California, to additionally include possessing credentials, passwords, or access keys to such a voting machine.
- Clarifies an existing crime that makes it a felony to interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes, by adding a provision that states, for the purposes of this paragraph, interferes or attempts to interfere with, includes but is not limited to, knowingly, and without authorization, providing unauthorized access to, or breaking the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that certified voting technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
- Prohibits a voting system from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions. Prohibits communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time. Prohibits a component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, from being connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
- Requires a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap. Provides that an “air-gap” includes all of the following:
- A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
- A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
- A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
- A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
- Makes technical, clarifying, and conforming changes.
BACKGROUND
Voting Technology. The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure California has the most rigorous and stringent voting system and voting equipment standards and approval procedures. Notably, SB 360 (Padilla), Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013, made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG) set forth by the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) or its successor agency, as specified.
Accordingly, in 2014, California established its own standards – California voting system standards (CVSS) – for electronic components of voting systems which were derived from the EAC’s VVSG versions 1.1 and 2.0. The CVSS provides a set of specifications and requirements to which voting systems are required to be tested to determine if they provide all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems. All voting technology, including, but not limited to voting systems, electronic pollbooks, and RAVBM systems, are required to be certified for use prior to being sold or used in any California election.
In counties that use electronic voting systems, state law requires election officials to provide paper ballots at the polling place. State law additionally prohibits any part of a voting system from being connected to the Internet at any time, and California's voting system standards prohibit voting systems from having the capability to communicate individual votes or vote totals over public communications networks or from having wireless communications capabilities.
Electronic Election Materials. Existing law specifies the requirements for retention, preservation, and destruction of certain election materials, such as ballots, voter rosters and indexes. However, according to the author and sponsor of this bill, existing law related to the storage, maintenance, preservation, and destruction of election data has not kept pace with the evolution of voting technologies and does not provide clear guidance for retention of electronic voting data. Accordingly, this bill updates and clarifies existing procedures and requirements to ensure they include electronic election materials, such as paper cast records and magnetic or electronic storage mediums, and establishes specific requirements for the preservation of election data.
New Threats to Election Integrity. According to news articles, since the 2020 general election, there have been suspected or attempted “insider” security breaches in local election offices across the nation. One highly publicized breach occurred in Colorado in which a county clerk was indicted for her role in facilitating unauthorized access to voting machines.
According to the author and sponsor, while there have not been any suspected or attempted security breach incidents in California, this bill will nonetheless strengthen existing law and provide clear authority to prosecute should a violation occur. Specifically, this bill expands existing law to make it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California. Additionally, this bill makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data, to provide unauthorized access to, or to break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology.
Critical Infrastructure Designation. On January 6, 2017, then-Secretary of the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Jeh Johnson announced that he was designating election infrastructure in the country as critical infrastructure, a decision that was later reaffirmed by the Trump administration. According to information from DHS, critical infrastructure is a designation "established by the Patriot Act and given to 'systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.'" In his announcement, Secretary Johnson noted that the designation generally gives DHS the ability to provide additional cybersecurity assistance to state and local elections officials, but does not mean that there will be new or additional federal regulation or oversight of the conduct of elections by state and local governments.
The DHS has prepared a Cybersecurity Services Catalog for Election Infrastructure that outlines the services and other assistance available to the election infrastructure community, including state and local elections officials. Among the services provided are various no-cost cybersecurity assessments, information sharing about cybersecurity threats, cybersecurity training, assistance in cyber incident planning and cyber incident response, and network protection. This bill includes various provisions that update and expand existing procedures and requirements related to election technology. For example, this bill codifies the authority for the SOS to impose additional conditions on voting equipment approved for use in any election, and requirements for a vendor to provide notice within 24 hours of any flaw or defect for certain voting equipment. Additionally, this bill clarifies current prohibitions and specifies that a voting system is prohibited from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for the voting system functions, and any communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission.
COMMENTS
- According to the author: In California, home to nearly 20 percent of the nation’s electors, election security is of the highest priority. As the nonpartisan, chief election official for the state, the California Secretary of State’s Office works around the clock to ensure every vote is safe and secure. California has the most stringent voting system testing, certification and use requirements in the country
Even with all that California has done – and spends – we must continue to do more to ensure that our requirements for chain of custody, retention, use, and security are clear and unambiguous.
Now California must act to ensure that voting systems and associated material are protected from those who would act irresponsibly in their privileged role that grants them access to this highly sensitive material. We must also send a strong message that these privileged individuals will suffer substantial consequences for attempting to undermine voters and one of the most basic principles of our democracy – fair and secure elections.
- Argument in Support. In a letter sponsoring AB 1559, Secretary of State Shirley N. Weber, Ph.D., states, in part, the following:
AB 1559 provides that the storage, maintenance, and destruction of election material are clear in law by updating the preservation guidelines of election materials, covering the lifecycle of voting technology. Specifically, this measure defines the parameters of the chain of custody of voting technology not yet covered in existing law.
AB 1559 is necessary to ensure that our requirements in the state of California are clear and unambiguous around the chain of custody, retention, use, and security of voting infrastructure. This measure will enhance the already stringent voting system security protocols imposed by the Office of Voting System Technology and Assessment (OVSTA) within the Office of the California Secretary of State.
- Additional Prosecution and Civil Action Available under Existing Law. Conduct included in this bill can also be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or felony under the State’s hacking statute, Penal Code Section 502. Under this law, a person is guilty of an offense if they knowingly access, without permission, any data, computer, computer system, or computer network in order to wrongfully control or obtain property or data. This would include voting systems. If convicted for a felony, the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or as a misdemeanor, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both. In addition to fines and imprisonment, a court can also order forfeiture of any computer system used by the person to commit the offense and prohibit the person from accessing and using computers. In addition, existing law authorizes the SOS, and in some cases the Attorney General (AG) and county elections officials, to take civil legal action regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections. The penalty is not to exceed $50,000 for each act and for injunctive relief.
- Double Referral. If approved by this committee, AB 1559 will be referred to the Committee on Public Safety.
RELATED/PRIOR LEGISLATION
AB 1539 (Berman) of 2023 would make it a misdemeanor for any person to vote or to attempt to vote both in an election held in this state and in an election held in another state on the same date. AB 1539 is pending in the Senate Committee on Public Safety.
AB 777 (Harper) of 2017 would have increased the maximum fine amount from $1,000 to $10,000 for fraudulently signing a ballot. AB 777 failed passage in the Assembly Committee on Elections and Redistricting.
SB 360 (Padilla), Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013, made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines
SB 1376 (Perata), Chapter 813, Statutes of 2004, authorized the SOS, and in some cases the AG and county elections officials, to take legal actions regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections.
PRIOR ACTION
Assembly Floor: | 80 - 0 |
Assembly Appropriations Committee: | 15 - 0 |
Assembly Committee: | 8 - 0 |
POSITIONS
Sponsor: Secretary of State Shirley N. Weber, Ph.D.
Support: California Association of Clerks and Election Officials
Oppose: None received
-- END –
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1559
Author:(Jackson)
As Amended Ver:April 26, 2023
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Updates and revises election record retention, preservation, and destruction procedures to provide clear guidance for electronic voting data, as specified. Clarifies that it is a felony to knowingly provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology and finished or unfinished ballot cards.
Major Provisions
- Authorizes the Secretary of State (SOS) to impose additional conditions of approval for electronic poll books, ballot systems, and voting systems before the use of such items in an election. Permits the SOS to set processes for the items' disposal.
- Requires a county elections official to keep paper cast vote records and certain electronic data for the same minimum number of months for which other election materials must be kept.
- Defines what it means to "interfere" or "attempt to interfere" with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes, the act of which is already a felony under existing law.
COMMENTS
The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure California has the most rigorous and stringent voting system and voting equipment standards and approval procedures. Notably, SB 360 (Padilla), Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013, made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG) set forth by the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) or its successor agency, as specified.
Accordingly, in 2014, California established its own standards – California voting system standards (CVSS) – for electronic components of voting systems which were derived from the EAC's VVSG versions 1.1 and 2.0. The CVSS provides a set of specifications and requirements to which voting systems are required to be tested to determine if they provide all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems. All voting technology, including, but not limited to voting systems, electronic pollbooks, and remote accessible vote by mail systems, are required to be certified for use prior to being sold or used in any California election.
This bill updates and expands existing procedures and requirements related to election technology to keep pace with the evolution of voting technologies.
According to the Author
"California must act to ensure that voting systems and associated material is protected from those who would act irresponsibly in their privileged role that grants them access to this highly sensitive material. We must also send a strong message that these privileged individuals will suffer substantial consequences for attempting to undermine voters and one of the most basic principles of our democracy – fair and secure elections."
Arguments in Support
The sponsor of this bill, Secretary of State Shirley N. Weber, Ph.D., writes, "AB 1559 provides that the storage, maintenance, and destruction of election material are clear in law by updating the preservation guidelines of election materials, covering the lifecycle of voting technology. Specifically, this measure defines the parameters of the chain of custody of voting technology not yet covered in existing law. Assembly Bill 1559 is necessary to ensure that our requirements in the state of California are clear and unambiguous around the chain of custody, retention, use, and security of voting infrastructure. This measure will enhance the already stringent voting system security protocols imposed by the Office of Voting System Technology and Assessment (OVSTA) within the Office of the California Secretary of State."
Arguments in Opposition
None received.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Minor and absorbable costs to the SOS to update requirements for voting systems and materials.
- By requiring county elections officials to maintain voting systems and materials in a specified manner, this bill creates a state-mandated local program. If the Commission on State Mandates determines the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service for which the state must reimburse local costs, counties could claim reimbursement from the state (General Fund (GF)). The magnitude of these costs is unknown, but potentially in excess of $150,000 across all counties, depending on an individual county's capacity to store additional records, including electronic data, for specified periods of time.
- By clarifying the scope of an existing felony, this bill may make it easier to try and convict an individual for the specified felony, resulting in potential non-reimbursable costs in the tens of thousands of dollars annually for increased incarceration costs. The average annual cost to incarcerate a defendant in county jail is approximately $29,000. California county jails are increasingly overcrowded – particularly since the enactment of the Realignment Act in 2011. Jail overcrowding since 2011 has resulted in court-mandated population caps and increased rates of inmate violence and death. Overcrowding has also resulted in significant state funding for additional jail construction. Although new crimes are not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012), overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the GF because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding after the 2011 Realignment Act.
VOTES
ASM ELECTIONS: 8-0-0
YES: Bryan, Lackey, Bennett, Essayli, Lee, Low, Pellerin, Blanca Rubio
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 8-0-0
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Alanis, Bonta, Bryan, Lackey, Ortega, Santiago, Zbur
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 15-0-1
YES: Holden, Megan Dahle, Bryan, Calderon, Wendy Carrillo, Dixon, Mike Fong, Hart, Lowenthal, Mathis, Papan, Pellerin, Sanchez, Weber, Ortega
ABS, ABST OR NV: Robert Rivas
UPDATED
VERSION: April 26, 2023
CONSULTANT: Nichole Becker / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094 FN: 0000464
Date of Hearing: May 10, 2023
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Chris Holden, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1559
Author:(Jackson) – As Amended Ver:April 26, 2023
Policy Committee: | Elections | Vote: | 8 - 0 |
Public Safety | 8 - 0 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: Yes
SUMMARY:
This bill revises election record retention, preservation, and destruction procedures to provide clear guidance regarding electronic voting data, including clarifying that it is a felony to knowingly provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology and finished or unfinished ballot cards.
Specifically, this bill:
- Authorizes the Secretary of State (SOS) to impose additional conditions of approval for electronic poll books, ballot systems, and voting systems before the use of such items in an election. The SOS may also set processes for the items’ disposal.
- Requires a county elections official to keep paper cast vote records and certain electronic data for the same minimum number of months for which other election materials must be kept.
- Defines what it means to “interfere” or “attempt to interfere” with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes, the act of which is already a felony under existing law.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Minor and absorbable costs to the SOS to update requirements for voting systems and materials.
- By requiring county elections officials to maintain voting systems and materials in a specified manner, this bill creates a state-mandated local program. If the Commission on State Mandates determines the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service for which the state must reimburse local costs, counties could claim reimbursement from the state (General Fund (GF)). The magnitude of these costs is unknown, but potentially in excess of $150,000 across all counties, depending on an individual county’s capacity to store additional records, including electronic data, for specified periods of time.
- By clarifying the scope of an existing felony, this bill may make it easier to try and convict an individual for the specified felony, resulting in potential non-reimbursable costs in the tens of thousands of dollars annually for increased incarceration costs. The average annual cost to incarcerate a defendant in county jail is approximately $29,000. California county jails are increasingly overcrowded – particularly since the enactment of the Realignment Act in 2011. Jail overcrowding since 2011 has resulted in court-mandated population caps and increased rates of inmate violence and death. Overcrowding has also resulted in significant state funding for additional jail construction. Although new crimes are not considered reimbursable state mandates pursuant to Proposition 30 (2012), overcrowding in county jails creates cost pressure on the GF because the state has historically granted new funding to counties to offset overcrowding after the 2011 Realignment Act.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
California must act to ensure that voting systems and associated material is protected from those who would act irresponsibly in their privileged role that grants them access to this highly sensitive material. We must also send a strong message that these privileged individuals will suffer substantial consequences for attempting to undermine voters and one of the most basic principles of our democracy – fair and secure elections.
This bill is sponsored by SOS Shirley N. Weber and supported by the California Association of Clerks and Election Officials.
- Voting System Standards. SB 360 (Padilla), Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013, made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines. All voting technology must be certified for use prior to being sold or used in any California election. This bill updates and expands these existing procedures and requirements to keep pace with the evolution of voting technologies.
- Related Legislation. AB 1539 (Berman) makes it a misdemeanor for a person to vote or attempt to vote in both an election held in this state and an election held in another state on the same day. AB 1539 is pending on the Assembly Consent Calendar.
Analysis Prepared by: Irene Ho / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 25, 2023
Counsel: Liah Burnley
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:
Author:() – As Ver:
As Proposed to Be Amended In Committee
SUMMARY:
Clarifies that it is a criminal offense to interfere with voting by knowingly providing unauthorized access to certified voting technology. Specifically, this bill:
- Updates existing election record retention, preservation, and destruction requirements to provide clear guidance for electronic voting data, as specified.[1]
- Clarifies that it is a felony to knowingly provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
- Defines “chain of custody” as a process used to track the movement and control of certified voting technology, through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles certified voting technology, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer.
- Defines a “break in the chain of custody” as a period during which control of the certified voting technology is uncertain and during which actions taken on the certified voting technology are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- Defines “certified voting technology” as any certified voting technologies certified by the Secretary of State, including voting systems, ballot on demand printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
- Defines “lifecycle” of certified voting technology as the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides that it is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years to, before or during an election, tamper with, interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damage in order to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source codes. (Elec. Code, § 18564, subd. (a).)
- Provides that it is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years to, before or during an election, interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes. (Elec. Code, § 18564, subd. (b).)
- Provides that it is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years to, before or during an election, knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that will be used in elections in this State. (Elec. Code, § 18564, subd. (c).)
- Provides that it is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years to, before or during an election to willfully substitute or attempt to substitute forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes. (Elec. Code, § 18564, subd. (d).)
- Provides aiding and abetting in the commission of any of the above offenses is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of six months or in the state prison for 16 months or two or three years. (Elec. Code, § 18565.)
- Prohibits knowingly accessing and without permission altering, damaging, deleting, destroying, or otherwise using any data, computer, computer system, or computer network in order to wrongfully control or obtain property or data. This offense is punishable as a felony by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or as a misdemeanor, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both. (Pen. Code, § 502, subds. (c)(1) & (d)(1).)
- Prohibits knowingly accessing and without permission taking, copying, or making use of any data from a computer, computer system, or computer network, or any supporting documentation, whether existing or residing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network. This offense is a felony, punishable by imprisonment pursuant for 16 months, or two or three years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both. (Pen. Code, § 502, subds. (c)(2) & (d)(1).)
- Requires the court to consider prohibitions on access to and use of computers in determining the terms and conditions applicable to a person convicted of any of the above offenses. (Pen. Code, § 502, subd. (k).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “In California, home to nearly 20 percent of the nation’s electors, election security is of the highest priority. As the nonpartisan, chief election official for the state, the California Secretary of State’s Office works around the clock to ensure every vote is safe and secure.
“California has the most stringent voting system testing, certification and use requirements in the country.
- Any new voting system in California must receive certification and undergo months of testing, including 1) functional testing, 2) source code review, 3) red team security penetration testing that involves open-ended vulnerability testing of the voting system, and 4) accessibility and volume testing.
- Voting systems cannot connect to the internet.
- All voting systems are air-gapped and kept separate from all other systems.
- Every ballot must either be paper or have a voter-verifiable paper audit trail.
- Prior to every election a logic and accuracy test must be conducted to verify the functioning of the voting system.
- Following every election, the elections officials must conduct a manual audit of a random 1% of ballots to ensure vote count machines are accurate.
“The Secretary of State’s Office of Voting System Technology and Assessment (OVSTA) requires that voting systems once certified for use in California has strict chain of custody.
“The Secretary of State’s office has administered over $400 million dollars in state and federal funding for voting infrastructure updates, including strengthening the accessibility, accuracy, security, and safety of our elections.
“Even with all that California has done – and spends – we must continue to do more to ensure that our requirements for chain of custody, retention, use, and security are clear and unambiguous.
“Now California must act to ensure that voting systems and associated material is protected from those who would act irresponsibly in their privileged role that grants them access to this highly sensitive material. We must also send a strong message that these privileged individuals will suffer substantial consequences for attempting to undermine voters and one of the most basic principles of our democracy – fair and secure elections.”
- Need for this Bill: This bill would clarify that it is a felony to knowingly provide unauthorized access to, or break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards.
Elections Code section 18564 makes corruption of voting a felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years. (Elec. Code, § 18564.) This statute generally prohibits tampering, interfering with, prohibiting the use of voting systems and ballot or tally software program source codes; interfering with the secrecy of voting; the unauthorized possession of a key to a voting machine; and, substitution or forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes. (Ibid.) This bill clarifies that a person who provides unauthorized access to voting technology or unfinished ballot cards interferes with the use of voting systems. This clarification is necessary given updates to election technology certified for use in California.
This conduct can also be prosecuted as a misdemeanor or felony under the State’s hacking statute, Penal Code section 502. Under this law, a person is guilty of an offense if they knowingly access, without permission, any data, computer, computer system, or computer network in order to wrongfully control or obtain property or data. This would include voting systems. If convicted for a felony, the offense is punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years and a fine not exceeding $10,000, or as a misdemeanor, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both. (Pen. Code, § 502, subds. (c)(1) & (d)(1).) In addition to fines and imprisonment, a court can also order forfeiture of any computer system used by the person to commit the offense and prohibit the person from accessing and using computers. (Pen. Code, § 502, subd. (k).) In addition, existing law authorizes the Secretary of State (SOS), and in some cases the Attorney General (AG) and county elections officials, to take civil legal action regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections. The penalty is not to exceed $50,000 for each act and for injunctive relief. (Elec. Code, § 18564.5.) - Argument in Support: According to the California Secretary of State (SOS), “AB 1559 provides that the storage, maintenance, and destruction of election material are clear in law by updating the preservation guidelines of election materials, covering the lifecycle of voting technology. Specifically, this measure defines the parameters of the chain of custody of voting technology not yet covered in existing law.”
- Related Legislation: AB 1593 (Berman) would make it a misdemeanor for any person to vote or to attempt to vote both in an election held in this state and in an election held in another state on the same date. AB 1593 is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 777 (Harper), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, would have increased the maximum fine amount from $1,000 to $10,000 for fraudulently signing a ballot.
- SB 1376 (Perata), Chapter 813, Statutes of 2004, authorized the SOS, and in some cases the AG and county elections officials, to take legal actions regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections.
- AB 777 (Harper), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, would have increased the maximum fine amount from $1,000 to $10,000 for fraudulently signing a ballot.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Secretary of State (Sponsor)
California Association of Clerks & Election Officials
Opposition
None submitted.
Analysis Prepared by:
This bill has been double referred to the Assembly Elections Committee. Accordingly, the primary focus of this analysis is the penalty provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of this Committee. ↑
Date of Hearing: March 29, 2023
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS
Isaac G. Bryan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1559 (
Author:Jackson) – As Introduced Ver:February 17, 2023
SUBJECT: Elections.
SUMMARY: Updates existing election record retention, preservation, and destruction requirements to provide clear guidance for electronic voting data, as specified. Makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data related to voting technology, or to provide unauthorized access to certified voting technology, as specified. Specifically this bill:
- Defines the term “jurisdiction” to mean any county, city and county, city, or special district that conducts elections pursuant to the Elections Code.
- Authorizes the Secretary of State (SOS) to impose additional conditions of approval as deemed necessary by the SOS for the certification of electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, ballot on demand (BOD) systems, voting systems, and remote accessible vote by mail (RAVBM) systems.
- Reduces, from two business days to 24 hours, the amount of time that a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor has to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes.
- Adds paper cast vote records to the list of election materials required to be kept by a county elections official for 22 months for elections involving a federal office, or 6 months for all other elections.
- Requires any copy of a magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified.
- Defines the term “ballot printer” to mean any company or jurisdiction that manufactures, finishes, or sells ballot cards, including test ballots, for use in an election conducted pursuant to the Elections Code, and recasts provisions of law that require a ballot printer, as defined, to be approved by the SOS before manufacturing or finishing ballot cards, or accepting or soliciting orders for ballot cards.
- Defines the following terms for the preservation of electronic data related to voting technology:
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- “Certified voting technology” to mean any certified voting technologies certified by the SOS, including voting systems, BOD printing systems, electronic poll book systems, or adjudication systems, and the hardware, firmware, software, proprietary intellectual property they contain, any components, and any products they generate, including ballots, ballot images, reports, logs, cast vote records, or electronic data.
- “Chain of custody” to mean a process used to track the movement and control of an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- “Electronic data” to include voting technology software, operating systems, databases, firmware, drivers, and logs.
- “End of lifecycle” to mean the secure clearing or wiping of the certified voting technology so that no software, firmware, or data remains on the equipment and the equipment becomes a nonfunctioning piece of hardware.
- “HASH” to mean a mathematical algorithm used to create a digital fingerprint of a software program, which is used to validate software as identical to the original.
- “Lifecycle” of certified voting technology to mean the entire lifecycle of the certified voting technology from the time of certification and trusted build creation through the end of lifecycle of the certified voting technology.
- “Ballot image” to mean an electronically captured or generated image of a ballot that is created on a voting device or machine, which contains a list of contests on the ballot, may contain the voter selections for those contests, and complies with the ballot layout requirements. A ballot image can be considered a cast vote record.
- Requires the following data to be kept by the elections official, on electronic media, stored and unaltered, for 22 months for those elections where candidates for one or more of the following offices are voted upon: President, Vice President, United States (US) Senator, and US Representative; and for six months for all other state and local elections:
- All voting system electronic data.
- All BOD system electronic data, if applicable.
- All adjudication electronic data.
- All RAVBM system electronic data, if applicable.
- All electronic poll book electronic data, if applicable.
- HASH values taken from the voting technology devices, if applicable.
- All ballot images.
- All voting system electronic data.
Provides that if a contest is not commenced within the 22-month period or within a six-month period, or if a criminal prosecution involving fraudulent use, using the ballot tally system to mark or falsify ballots, or manipulation of the ballot tally system, is not commenced within the relevant period, the elections official shall have the backups destroyed.
- Authorizes certified voting technology equipment and components that are at the end of lifecycle to be securely disposed of or destroyed with the written approval of the manufacturer and the SOS.
- Requires all of the following to occur for any part or component of certified voting technology for which the chain of custody has been compromised or the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached:
- The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery;
- The equipment shall be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible; and,
- The integrity and reliability of the certified voting technology system, components, and accompanying electronic data shall be evaluated to determine whether they can be restored to their original state and reinstated.
- The chief elections official of the city, county, or special district and the SOS shall be notified within 24 hours of discovery;
- Expands an existing crime that makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California to additionally include possessing credentials, passwords, or access keys to such a voting machine.
- Makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data, and to knowingly, and without authorization, provide unauthorized access to, or to break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology, or any finished or unfinished ballot cards, as specified.
- Prohibits a voting system from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions. Prohibits communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission at any time. Prohibits a component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, from being connected to the internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
- Requires a voting system to be used in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an air-gap. Provides that an “air-gap” includes all of the following:
- A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
- A physically-isolated duplicate system, reformatted after every election to guard against the possibility of infection, that is used solely to read memory cards containing vote results, accumulate and tabulate those results, and produce reports.
- A separate computer dedicated solely to this purpose that is used to reformat all memory devices before they are connected to the permanent system again.
- A permanent central system known to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware that is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment and memory cards.
- Makes technical, clarifying, and conforming changes.
EXISTING LAW:
- Defines a “paper cast vote record” to mean an auditable document that corresponds to the selection made on the voter’s ballot and lists the contests on the ballot and the voter’s selections for those contests. (Elections Code §305.5)
- Requires, generally, electronic poll books, ballot manufacturers and finishers, BOD systems, voting systems, and RAVBM systems to be approved by the SOS before their use in an election. (Elections Code §§2250, 13004.5, 19201, 19281)
- Requires a ballot card manufacturer, ballot card finisher, or BOD system vendor to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials in writing within two business days after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. (Elections Code §13004(d))
- Requires an electronic poll book vendor to notify the SOS and affected local elections officials in writing within 24 hours after discovering any flaw or defect that could adversely affect the future casting or tallying of votes. (2 Code of California Regulations §20161)
- Requires any magnetic or electronic storage medium, used for a ballot tabulation program or containing election results, to be kept in a secure location, as specified. (Elections Code §15209)
- Requires specified ballots and identification envelopes to be kept by an elections official unopened and unaltered, as specified, for 22 months following a federal election, and for six months following any other state or local election. (Elections Code §§17301, 17302)
- Makes it a felony for a person to knowingly, and without authorization, make or have in their possession a key to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California. (Elections Code §18564)
- Prohibits any part of a voting system from doing any of the following: being connected to the Internet at any time; electronically receiving or transmitting election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center; or, receiving or transmitting wireless communications or wireless data transfers. (Elections Code §19205)
FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown. State-mandated local program; contains a crimes and infractions disclaimer.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose of the Bill: According to the author:
In California, home to nearly 20 percent of the nation’s electors, election security is of the highest priority. As the nonpartisan, chief election official for the state, the California Secretary of State’s Office works around the clock to ensure every vote is safe and secure.
California has the most stringent voting system testing, certification and use requirements in the country that includes:
• Any new voting system in California must receive certification and undergo months of testing, including 1) functional testing, 2) source code review, 3) red team security penetration testing that involves open-ended vulnerability testing of the voting system, and 4) accessibility and volume testing.
• Voting systems cannot connect to the internet.
• All voting systems are air-gapped and kept separate from all other systems.
• Every ballot must either be paper or have a voter-verifiable paper audit trail.
• Prior to every election a logic and accuracy test must be conducted to verify the functioning of the voting system.
• Following every election, the elections officials must conduct a manual audit of a random 1% of ballots to ensure vote count machines are accurate.
The Secretary of State’s Office of Voting System Technology and Assessment (OVSTA) requires that voting systems once certified for use in California has strict chain of custody.
The Secretary of State’s office has administered over $400 million dollars in state and federal funding for voting infrastructure updates, including strengthening the accessibility, accuracy, security, and safety of our elections.
Even with all that California has done – and spends – we must continue to do more to ensure that our requirements for chain of custody, retention, use, and security are clear and unambiguous.
Now California must act to ensure that voting systems and associated material is protected from those who would act irresponsibly in their privileged role that grants them access to this highly sensitive material. We must also send a strong message that these privileged individuals will suffer substantial consequences for attempting to undermine voters and one of the most basic principles of our democracy – fair and secure elections.
- Voting Technology: The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure California has the most rigorous and stringent voting system and voting equipment standards and approval procedures. Notably, SB 360 (Padilla), Chapter 602, Statutes of 2013, made significant changes to procedures and criteria for the certification and approval of a voting system, required the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems, and required those standards to meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG) set forth by the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) or its successor agency, as specified.
Accordingly, in 2014, California established its own standards – California voting system standards (CVSS) – for electronic components of voting systems which were derived from the EAC’s VVSG versions 1.1 and 2.0. The CVSS provides a set of specifications and requirements to which voting systems are required to be tested to determine if they provide all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems. All voting technology, including, but not limited to voting systems, electronic pollbooks, and RAVBM systems, are required to be certified for use prior to being sold or used in any California election.
In counties that use electronic voting systems, state law requires election officials to provide paper ballots at the polling place. State law additionally prohibits any part of a voting system from being connected to the Internet at any time, and California's voting system standards prohibit voting systems from having the capability to communicate individual votes or vote totals over public communications networks or from having wireless communications capabilities.
This bill includes various provisions that update and expand existing procedures and requirements related to election technology. For example, this bill codifies the authority for the SOS to impose additional conditions on voting equipment approved for use in any election, and requirements for a vendor to provide notice within 24 hours of any flaw or defect for certain voting equipment. Additionally, this bill clarifies current prohibitions and specifies that a voting system is prohibited from establishing a network connection to any device not directly used and necessary for the voting system functions, and any communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission. - Electronic Election Materials: Existing law specifies the requirements for retention, preservation, and destruction of certain election materials, such as ballots, voter rosters and indexes. However, according to the author and sponsor of this bill, existing law related to the storage, maintenance, preservation and destruction of election data has not kept pace with the evolution of voting technologies and does not provide clear guidance for retention of electronic voting data. Accordingly, this bill updates and clarifies existing procedures and requirements to ensure they include electronic election materials, such as paper cast records and magnetic or electronic storage mediums, and establishes specific requirements for the preservation of election data.
- New Threats to Election Integrity: According to news articles, since the 2020 general election, there have been suspected or attempted “insider” security breaches in local election offices across the nation. One highly publicized breach occurred in Colorado in which a county clerk was indicted for her role in facilitating unauthorized access to voting machines.
According to the author and sponsor, while there have not been any suspected or attempted security breach incidents in California, this bill will nonetheless strengthen existing law and provide clear authority to prosecute should a violation occur. Specifically, this bill expands existing law to make it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, possess credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in California. Additionally, this bill makes it a felony to knowingly, and without authorization, make or possess copies of electronic data, to provide unauthorized access to, or to break the chain of custody to, certified voting technology during the lifecycle of that technology. - Critical Infrastructure Designation: On January 6, 2017, then-Secretary of the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Jeh Johnson announced that he was designating election infrastructure in the country as critical infrastructure, a decision that was later reaffirmed by the Trump administration. According to information from DHS, critical infrastructure is a designation "established by the Patriot Act and given to 'systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.'" In his announcement, Secretary Johnson noted that the designation generally gives DHS the ability to provide additional cybersecurity assistance to state and local elections officials, but does not mean that there will be new or additional federal regulation or oversight of the conduct of elections by state and local governments.
The DHS has prepared a Cybersecurity Services Catalog for Election Infrastructure that outlines the services and other assistance available to the election infrastructure community, including state and local elections officials. Among the services provided are various no-cost cybersecurity assessments, information sharing about cybersecurity threats, cybersecurity training, assistance in cyber incident planning and cyber incident response, and network protection.
- Technical Amendments: After the committee’s deadline for pre-committee author’s amendments, the author proposed technical amendments to clarify the definition of the term “chain of custody.” Committee staff recommends the following technical amendments:
On page 9, starting in line 6, amend the bill as follows:
(c) “Chain of custody” means a process used to track the movement and control of a certified voting technology, pursuant to subsection (b) of section 17600, an asset through its lifecycle by documenting each person and organization who handles a certified voting technology an asset, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose of the transfer. A break in the chain of custody refers to a period during which control of the certified voting technology an asset is uncertain and during which actions taken on the certified voting technology asset are unaccounted for or unconfirmed.
- Double Referral: This bill is double referred to the Assembly Public Safety Committee.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
None on file.
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: Nichole Becker / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):