AB 302: Department of Technology: high-risk automated decision systems: inventory.
- Session Year: 2023-2024
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2023-10-13
Current Status:
Passed
(2023-10-13: Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 800, Statutes of 2023.)
Introduced
In Committee
First Chamber
In Committee
Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law establishes the Department of Technology within the Government Operations Agency and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the Department of Technology and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology.
This bill would require the department, in coordination with other interagency bodies, to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems, as defined, that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies, as defined. The bill would require the comprehensive inventory to include a description of, among other things, the categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions. On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the bill would require the department to submit a report of the above-described comprehensive inventory to specified committees of the Legislature.
Existing law establishes the Department of Technology within the Government Operations Agency and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the Department of Technology and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology.
This bill would require the department, in coordination with other interagency bodies, to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems, as defined, that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies, as defined. The bill would require the comprehensive inventory to include a description of, among other things, the categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions. On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the bill would require the department to submit a report of the above-described comprehensive inventory to specified committees of the Legislature.
Existing law establishes the Department of Technology within the Government Operations Agency and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the Department of Technology and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology.
This bill would require the department, in coordination with other interagency bodies, to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems, as defined, that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies, as defined. The bill would require the comprehensive inventory to include a description of, among other things, the categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions. On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the bill would require the department to submit a report of the above-described comprehensive inventory to specified committees of the Legislature.
Existing law establishes the Department of Technology within the Government Operations Agency and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the Department of Technology and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology.
This bill would require the department, in coordination with other interagency bodies, to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems, as defined, that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies. agencies, as defined. The bill would require the comprehensive inventory to include a description of, among other things, the categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions. On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the bill would require the department to submit a report of the above-described comprehensive inventory to specified committees of the Legislature.
Existing law establishes the Department of Technology within the Government Operations Agency and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the Department of Technology and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology.
This bill would require the department department, in coordination with other interagency bodies, to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems, as defined, that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies. The bill would require the comprehensive inventory to include a description of, among other things, the categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions. On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the bill would require the department to submit a report of the above-described comprehensive inventory to specified committees of the Legislature.
Existing law establishes the Department of Technology within the Government Operations Agency and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the Department of Technology and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology.
This bill would require the department to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems, as defined, that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies. The bill would require the comprehensive inventory to include a description of, among other things, the categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions. On or before January 1, 2025, the bill would require the department to submit a report of the above-described comprehensive inventory to the Legislature.
(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
(2)Board means any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both.
(3)Department means the Department of Technology.
(4)High-risk automated decision system means an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
(5)(A)State agency means any of the following:
(i)Any state office, department, division, or bureau.
(ii)The California State University.
(iii)The Board of Parole Hearings.
(iv)Any board or other professional licensing and regulatory body under the administration or oversight of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
(B)State agency does not include the University of California, the Legislature, the judicial branch, or any board, except as provided in subparagraph (A).
(b)On or before September 1, 2024, the Department of Technology shall conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
(c)The comprehensive inventory described by subdivision (b) shall include a description of all of the following:
(1)(A)Any decision the automated decision system can make or support and the intended benefits of that use.
(B)The alternatives to any use described in subparagraph (A).
(2)The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the automated decision system described by paragraph (1).
(3)The categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions.
(4)(A)The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the automated decision system.
(B)Measures described by this paragraph may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
(ii)Cybersecurity controls.
(iii)Privacy controls.
(iv)Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
(v)Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
(d)(1)On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the department shall submit a report of the comprehensive inventory described in subdivision (b) to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
(2)The requirement for submitting a report imposed under paragraph (1) is inoperative on January 1, 2029, pursuant to Section 10231.5.
(3)A report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
(2)Board means any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both.
(3)Department means the Department of Technology.
(4)High-risk automated decision system means an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
(5)(A)State agency means any of the following:
(i)Any state office, department, division, or bureau.
(ii)The California State University.
(iii)The Board of Parole Hearings.
(iv)Any board or other professional licensing and regulatory body under the administration or oversight of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
(B)State agency does not include the University of California, the Legislature, the judicial branch, or any board, except as provided in subparagraph (A).
(b)On or before September 1, 2024, the Department of Technology shall conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
(c)The comprehensive inventory described by subdivision (b) shall include a description of all of the following:
(1)(A)Any decision the automated decision system can make or support and the intended benefits of that use.
(B)The alternatives to any use described in subparagraph (A).
(2)The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the automated decision system described by paragraph (1).
(3)The categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions.
(4)(A)The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the automated decision system.
(B)Measures described by this paragraph may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
(ii)Cybersecurity controls.
(iii)Privacy controls.
(iv)Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
(v)Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
(d)(1)On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the department shall submit a report of the comprehensive inventory described in subdivision (b) to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
(2)The requirement for submitting a report imposed under paragraph (1) is inoperative on January 1, 2029, pursuant to Section 10231.5.
(3)A report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
(2)Board means any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both.
(2)(3)Department means the Department of Technology.
(3)(4)High-risk automated decision system means an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
(4)(5)(A)State agency includes every state means any of the following:
(i)Any state office, department, division, bureau, and the California or bureau.
(ii)The California State University.
(iii)The Board of Parole Hearings.
(iv)Any board or other professional licensing and regulatory body under the administration or oversight of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
(B)(i)State agency does not include the University of California, the Legislature, the judicial branch, or any board, except as provided in clause (ii). subparagraph (A).
(ii)For purposes of clause (i), board means any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both. Board does not include a board or other professional licensing and regulatory body under the administration or oversight of the Department of Consumer Affairs.(b)On or before September 1, 2024, the Department of Technology shall conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
(c)The comprehensive inventory described by subdivision (b) shall include a description of all of the following:
(1)(A)Any decision the automated decision system can make or support and the intended benefits of that use.
(B)The alternatives to any use described in subparagraph (A).
(2)The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the automated decision system described by paragraph (1).
(3)The categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions.
(4)(A)The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the automated decision system.
(B)Measures described by this paragraph may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
(ii)Cybersecurity controls.
(iii)Privacy controls.
(iv)Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
(v)Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
(d)(1)On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the department shall submit a report of the comprehensive inventory described in subdivision (b) to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
(2)The requirement for submitting a report imposed under paragraph (1) is inoperative on January 1, 2029, pursuant to Section 10231.5.
(3)A report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) (1) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
(2)Department means the Department of Technology.
(3)High-risk automated decision system means an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
(4)(A)State agency includes every state office, department, division, bureau, and the California State University.
(B)(i)State agency does not include the University of California, the Legislature, the judicial branch, or any board, except as provided in clause (ii).
(ii)For purposes of clause (i), board means any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both. Board does not include a board or other professional licensing and regulatory body under the administration or oversight of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
(b)On or before September 1, 2024, the Department of Technology shall conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agencies. agency.
(c)The comprehensive inventory described by subdivision (b) shall include a description of all of the following:
(1)(A)Any decision the automated decision system can make or support and the intended benefits of that use.
(B)The alternatives to any use described in subparagraph (A).
(2)The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the automated decision system described by paragraph (1).
(3)The categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions.
(4)(A)The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the automated decision system.
(B)Measures described by this paragraph may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
(ii)Cybersecurity controls.
(iii)Privacy controls.
(iv)Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
(v)Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
(d)(1)On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the department shall submit a report of the comprehensive inventory described in subdivision (b) to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
(2)The requirement for submitting a report imposed under paragraph (1) is inoperative on January 1, 2029, pursuant to Section 10231.5.
(3)A report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
(2)Department means the Department of Technology.
(3)High-risk automated decision system means an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
(b)On or before September 1, 2024, the Department of Technology shall conduct conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies.
(c)The comprehensive inventory described by subdivision (b) shall include a description of all of the following:
(1)(A)Any decision the automated decision system can make or support and the intended benefits of that use.
(B)The alternatives to any use described in subparagraph (A).
(2)The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the automated decision system described by paragraph (1).
(3)The categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions.
(4)(A)The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the automated decision system.
(B)Measures described by this paragraph may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
(ii)Cybersecurity controls.
(iii)Privacy controls.
(iv)Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
(v)Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
(d)(1)On or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, the department shall submit a report of the comprehensive inventory described in subdivision (b) to the Legislature. Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
(2)The requirement for submitting a report imposed under paragraph (1) is inoperative on January 1, 2029, pursuant to Section 10231.5.
(3)A report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(a)For purposes of this section:
(1)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons.
(2)Department means the Department of Technology.
(3)High-risk automated decision system means an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
(b)On or before September 1, 2024, the Department of Technology shall conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies.
(c)The comprehensive inventory described by subdivision (b) shall include a description of all of the following:
(1)(A)Any decision the automated decision system can make or support and the intended benefits of that use.
(B)The alternatives to any use described in subparagraph (A).
(2)The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the automated decision system described by paragraph (1).
(3)The categories of data and personal information the automated decision system uses to make its decisions.
(4)(A)The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the automated decision system.
(B)Measures described by this paragraph may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
(i)Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
(ii)Cybersecurity controls.
(iii)Privacy controls.
(iv)Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
(v)Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
(d)(1)On or before January 1, 2025, the department shall submit a report of the comprehensive inventory described in subdivision (b) to the Legislature.
(2)The requirement for submitting a report imposed under paragraph (1) is inoperative on January 1, 2029, pursuant to Section 10231.5.
(3)A report to be submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Oct 13, 2023 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 800, Statutes of 2023. |
| Oct 13, 2023 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 21, 2023 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3:30 p.m. |
| Sep 14, 2023 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 80. Noes 0. Page 3545.). |
| Sep 13, 2023 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Sep 13, 2023 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 39. Noes 0. Page 2765.). |
| Sep 8, 2023 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| Sep 5, 2023 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 1, 2023 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Sep 1, 2023 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (September 1). |
| Aug 14, 2023 | In committee: Referred to APPR suspense file. |
| Jul 6, 2023 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (July 6). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 27, 2023 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on JUD. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (June 27). Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 7, 2023 | Referred to Coms. on G.O. and JUD. |
| May 31, 2023 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 30, 2023 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 79. Noes 0. Page 1897.) |
| May 22, 2023 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 18, 2023 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| May 18, 2023 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (May 18). |
| Apr 19, 2023 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Mar 27, 2023 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 23, 2023 | Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 22, 2023 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 11. Noes 0.) (March 21). |
| Feb 2, 2023 | Referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jan 27, 2023 | From printer. May be heard in committee February 26. |
| Jan 26, 2023 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 14, 2023 | AB 302 Ward Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 13, 2023 | Special Consent AB302 Ward et al. By Allen | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 1, 2023 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 14, 2023 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 6, 2023 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Jun 27, 2023 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Judiciary] | Senate Standing Committee on Governmental Organization |
Passed |
|
| May 30, 2023 | AB 302 Ward Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 18, 2023 | Do pass as amended. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Mar 21, 2023 | Do pass as amended, and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| California Civil Liberties Advocacy | ** Support | |
| Electronic Frontier Foundation | ** Support | |
| Electronic Privacy Information Center | ** Support | |
| Equality California | ** Support | |
| Media Alliance | ** Support | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| Privacy Rights Clearinghouse | ** Support | |
| Secure Justice | ** Support | |
| TechEquity Collaborative | ** Support | |
| The Greenlining Institute | ** Support |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 302
Author:(Ward)
As Amended Ver:September 1, 2023
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct an inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems being used in state agencies by September 1, 2024.
- Requires the inventory to include a description of categories of data and personal information the automated system uses to make its decisions, the results of any research assessing the efficacy of the system, and any measures in place to mitigate the risks, including the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions.
- Requires departments to submit a report of the inventory on our before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organizations.
- Defines "automated decision system" to mean a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision-making and materially impacts people.
- Clarifies that the term "automated decision system" does not include a junk email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, data set, or other compilation of data.
- Defines "high-risk automated decision system" to mean an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that impact access to or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- Exempts the University of California, the Legislature, the judicial branch and all boards, with more than one person appointed by the Governor and/or the Legislature, except for the Board of Parole Hearings and the boards under the Department of Consumer Affairs.
Senate Amendments
Specifies that the Board of Parole Hearings, which is part of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, must be included in the inventory, despite being a board consisting of commissioners appointed by the Governor.
COMMENTS
This bill will provide the Administration and Legislature with a much needed inventory and analysis of all of the critical automated decision systems (ADS) in state departments being used or proposed for use to replace human decision making that helps determine access to housing, healthcare, unemployment insurance, safety-net programs and length of incarceration, to name a few.
Given the growing research demonstrating that biases may be built into automated decision systems that are being used to make critical decisions affecting people’s lives, and the state’s ongoing commitment to protecting civil rights and providing support and assistance equally to all Californians, requiring an inventory of the computerized decision-making systems used by the state is a critical first step in ensuring that Californians are not being harmed by flawed data or flawed systems.
Use of algorithms by government. Over the last 50 years, monumental advances in computer and information science, along with the rise of "big data," have facilitated new milestones in artificial intelligence and machine learning. As computers and the software controlling them become more sophisticated, the types of decisions that machines are capable of making can become both more complex and more consequential. If designed and operated conscientiously, ADS can considerably expedite decision-making to dramatically improve the efficiency of services, and may mitigate the influence of biases that otherwise interfere with objective human decision-making.
The promise of ADS for reliably managing decision-making with respect to large datasets makes the adoption of ADS by government entities particularly enticing. Governments at all levels are increasingly using artificial intelligence and ADS in the criminal justice system, public benefit decision making, fighting climate change, regulatory enforcement, healthcare, and education, to name a few. Because government agencies are typically tasked with making highly consequential decisions in a manner that is reliable, reproducible, efficient, and scalable to large populations, if designed and used properly, ADS have the potential to become an indispensable tool for supporting many public functions. The value of ADS for decision-making, however, depends on how they are developed and how they are used. It is incredibly difficult to assess and measure the nature and impact of algorithmic decision-making systems and research is increasingly showing the potential for biased and inaccurate decisions.
According to the Author
California is leading the way in adopting Automated Decision Systems (ADS) across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. State agencies are using ADS in various ways, including to detect fraud in unemployment and tax filings, speed up document processing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and help make better decisions in welfare services and healthcare reimbursements and California's climate investments.
When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them.
AB 302 would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS. By requiring the CDT to establish guidelines identifying ADS that have a high-risk of adverse impacts and conduct an inventory of those high-risk ADS, this bill will help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts that result from their design and implementation of ADS.
Arguments in Support
A diverse coalition of groups advocated for government transparency, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Equality California, and Secure Justice write in support:
Throughout California, automated systems are used to identify fraud, streamline document processing and to make decisions that control access to public resources and benefits. ADS have the potential to improve the delivery of government services, however, poorly designed systems can create unfair, biased and inaccurate results, causing disproportionate harm to low-income families and communities of color who are more likely to interact with government ADS. For example, Michigan's unemployment benefits ADS had a 93% error rate and wrongly accused over 40,000 workers of fraud. As California works to improve and modernize its government functions through the use of big data and automated systems, it must also lead in transparency around where these systems are used, what decisions they can support and how each agency is managing the risks associated with the use of these systems.
Arguments in Opposition
None
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- CDT reports a one-time cost of approximately $3.28 million and ongoing annual costs of $2.04 million to create and update the ADS inventory and annual report (General Fund).
- Unknown, likely significant costs ranging in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for all impacted state agencies to identify, analyze, and submit information relevant to ADS data collection (General Fund and various special funds).
VOTES:
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 11-0-0
YES: Gabriel, Joe Patterson, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Essayli, Vince Fong, Irwin, Lowenthal, Papan, Wicks, Wilson
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-0-5
YES: Holden, Bryan, Calderon, Wendy Carrillo, Mike Fong, Hart, Lowenthal, Papan, Pellerin, Weber, Ortega
ABS, ABST OR NV: Megan Dahle, Dixon, Mathis, Robert Rivas, Sanchez
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 79-0-1
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Juan Carrillo, Wendy Carrillo, Cervantes, Chen, Connolly, Megan Dahle, Davies, Dixon, Flora, Mike Fong, Vince Fong, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Holden, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Lee, Low, Lowenthal, Maienschein, Mathis, McCarty, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Stephanie Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Jim Patterson, Joe Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Santiago, Schiavo, Soria, Ta, Ting, Valencia, Villapudua, Waldron, Wallis, Ward, Weber, Wicks, Wilson, Wood, Zbur, Rendon
ABS, ABST OR NV: Essayli
SENATE FLOOR: 39-0-1
YES: Allen, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Ashby, Atkins, Becker, Blakespear, Bradford, Cortese, Dahle, Dodd, Durazo, Eggman, Glazer, Gonzalez, Grove, Hurtado, Jones, Laird, Limón, McGuire, Menjivar, Min, Newman, Nguyen, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Seyarto, Skinner, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Wiener, Wilk
ABS, ABST OR NV: Caballero
UPDATED
VERSION: September 1, 2023
CONSULTANT: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0002286
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 302 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 302
Author: Ward (D), et al.
Amended: 9/1/23 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COMMITTEE: 15-0, 6/27/23
AYES: Dodd, Wilk, Alvarado-Gil, Archuleta, Ashby, Bradford, Glazer, Jones, Nguyen, Ochoa Bogh, Padilla, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Seyarto
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 11-0, 7/6/23
AYES: Umberg, Wilk, Allen, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Laird, Min, Niello, Stern, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 9/1/23
AYES: Portantino, Jones, Ashby, Bradford, Seyarto, Wahab, Wiener
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 79-0, 5/30/23 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Department of Technology: high-risk automated decision systems: inventory
SOURCE: The Greenlining Institute
DIGEST:
This bill requires the California Department of Technology (CDT), in coordination with other interagency bodies, to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) used by state agencies on or before September 1, 2024, and report the findings to the Legislature by January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes the CDT and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the CDT and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology (IT).
- Provides that any report required or requested by law to be submitted by a state or local agency to the Members of either house of the Legislature, shall, generally, instead be submitted as a printed copy to the Secretary of the Senate, as an electronic copy to the Chief Clerk of the Assembly, and as an electronic or printed copy to the Legislative Counsel.
This bill:
- Requires CDT, on or before September 1, 2024, to conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
- Requires the comprehensive inventory described above to include a description of all of the following:
- Any decision the ADS can make or support and the intended benefits of that use, as specified.
- The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the ADS.
- The categories of data and personal information the ADS uses to make its decisions.
- The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the ADS. Measures may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
- Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
- Cybersecurity controls.
- Privacy controls.
- Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
- Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
- Defines “automated decision system” to mean a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence (AI) that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision making and materially impacts natural persons. “Automated decision system” does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
- Defines “high-risk automated decision system” to mean an ADS that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- Defines “board” to mean any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both.
- Defines “state agency” to mean any of the following: any state office, department, division, or bureau; the California State University, the Board of Parole Hearings; and any board or other professional licensing and regulatory body under the administration or oversight of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
- Requires CDT, on or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, to submit a report of the comprehensive inventory to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
- Includes a sunset date for reporting of January 1, 2029.
Background
- Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “California is leading the way in adopting ADS across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. State agencies are using ADS in various ways, including to detect fraud in unemployment and tax filings, speed up document processing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and help make better decisions in welfare services and healthcare reimbursements and California's climate investments. When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them.”
Further, the author’s office states that, “AB 302 would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS. By requiring the CDT to establish guidelines identifying ADS that have a high-risk of adverse impacts and conduct an inventory of those high-risk ADS, this bill will help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts that result from their design and implementation of ADS.”
- Automated Decision Systems. Over the last 50 years, monumental advances in computer and information science, along with the rise of “big data,” have facilitated new milestones in AI and machine learning. First coined in 1956, AI is a wide-ranging branch of computer science focused on building smart machines capable of performing tasks that typically require human intelligence. As computers and the software controlling them become more sophisticated, the types of decisions that machines are capable of making can become both more complex and more consequential.
Specifically, ADS comprise any software, system, or process that aims to automate, aid, or replace human decision-making. ADS are widely used in administering government services; allocating resources; and, making inference about individuals, groups, or places. Their ubiquity across government agencies means that ADS have the potential to impact a person’s eligibility for, among other things, benefits, education opportunities, or the imposition of penalties. Another example is the use of ADS by the Federal Department of Veteran Affairs to better predict medical complications and improve treatment of combat wounds.
If designed and operated conscientiously, these ADS can considerably expedite decision-making to dramatically improve the efficiency of services, and may mitigate the influence of heuristics and biases that otherwise interfere with objective human decision-making. The promise of these ADS for reliably managing decision-making with respect to large datasets makes the adoption of ADS by government entities particularly enticing. Because government agencies are typically tasked with making highly consequential decisions in a manner that is reliable, reproducible, efficient, and scalable to large populations, ADS have the potential to become an indispensable tool for supporting many public functions.
According to a list compiled by the AI Now Institute, for the New York City Automation Decision Systems Task Force, the following are some examples of the ways in which governments are currently using ADS:
- Child Risk and Safety Assessments are used by child welfare agencies to evaluate potential child neglect and abuse cases for risk of child death/injury. Data often comes from multiple sources, including a jurisdiction’s department of human services and the police.
- Inmate Housing Classification is a system that analyzes a variety of criminal justice data and outcomes to determine the conditions of confinement, eligibility for programming, and overall housing arrangements of people who are incarcerated in a jail or prison.
- School Assignment Algorithm is used to assign students to schools for K-12. NYC uses this type of system to match eighth-graders to high schools based on preference, test scores, portfolios, and other requirements.
- Student Risk Prevention Algorithm is used to predict students at risk of being arrested or in crisis by creating a model that uses families’ zip codes, incomes, truancy numbers, race, and other indicators. The data used in these systems is often shared with law enforcement and other government agencies.
- Residential Face Authentication is a biometric scanning technology that is used in some residential buildings for entry of residents and guests. Its use may be limited to private residences, and where used it is replacing key fobs.
- Immigration Detention Risk Assessment is a computerized system that evaluates an individual’s criminal history, work status, likelihood of fleeing, and other information to produce recommendation about whether the person should be detained or released prior to a removal hearing.
- Predictive Policing is algorithmic software that attempts to identify where a crime may occur in a given window of time in small geographic areas or identify individuals who may be a perpetrator or victim of a crime.
However, ADS are not a panacea, and their value for decision-making critically depends on how they are developed and how they are used. Algorithmic decision-making, and in particular machine learning and AI, is generally opaque in terms of its decision-making process, relying on ineffable variables derived from complex and unintuitive relationships between inputs and outputs that can change as the machine learns from new information. Andrew McLaughlin, executive director of the Center for Innovative Thinking at Yale University, predicts, “AI [has] massive short-term benefits, along with long term negatives that can take decades to be recognizable. AI will drive a vast range of efficiency optimizations but also enable hidden discrimination and arbitrary penalization of individuals in areas like insurance, job seeking and performance assessment.”
Several examples of government uses of ADS from throughout the country have resulted in inequitable outcomes, particularly for already disadvantaged communities. For instance, between 2013 and 2015, a privately built, error-prone Michigan unemployment ADS operating with minimal employee oversight wrongly accused 40,000 people of fraud, many of whom were forced to pay heavy fines, declared bankruptcy, or had their homes foreclosed upon. Upon appeal, less than eight percent of those fraud charges were validated.
In 2016, the state of Arkansas implemented an algorithm to assign access to Medicaid benefits. An estimated 19% of Medicaid beneficiaries had their benefits inappropriately cut, losing access to home care, nursing visits, and medical treatments. In a lawsuit filed by Arkansas Legal Aid, the courts ultimately found that those who were denied benefits could not effectively challenge the system, since there was no way of knowing what information factored into the algorithm’s opaque decision-making process leading to that result. Fact-finding during the court case ultimately revealed that the algorithm featured several design flaws, miscoding, and incorrect calculations. Depending on how the systems are designed and what types of datasets are used to train them for making the desired decisions, ADS can easily reflect or even exacerbate the same biases that plague human judgement.
- Comprehensive Inventory of all High-Risk ADS. This bill requires CDT, by September 1, 2024, and in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been prosed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency. The inventory must include a description of any decision the ADS can make or support and the intended benefits of that use, the results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the ADS, the categories of data and personal information the ADS uses to make its decisions, and the measures in place, if any, to mitigate risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate discriminatory or biased decisions, of the ADS.
This bill requires CDT, on or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, to submit a report of the comprehensive inventory to the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization and the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection. This bill includes a sunset date for the reports of January 1, 2029.
Related/Prior Legislation
SB 313 (Dodd, 2023) names itself the “California AI-ware Act”, requires any generative AI engaging in direct communication with a natural person on behalf of a state agency to clearly and conspicuously disclose to the individual that the interaction is being facilitated through an AI system, and establishes the Office of AI, within CDT, to guide the design, use, or deployment of automated systems by a state agency, as specified. (Held on the Senate Appropriations Committee Suspense File)
SB 591 (Min, 2023) requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to submit a report to the Legislature on the feasibility, benefits, risks, and costs of requiring credit reporting bureaus and lenders to implement new information security tactics, as specified. (Held on the Senate Appropriations Committee Suspense File)
SB 721 (Becker, 2023) establishes the California Interagency AI Working Group consisting of 11 members with expertise in computer science, AI technology, workforce development, and data privacy to report to the Legislature regarding the implications of AI by January 1, 2025. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
AB 331 (Bauer-Kahan, 2023) prohibits “algorithmic discrimination,” that is, use of an ADS tool to contribute to unjustified differential treatment or outcomes that may have a significant effect on a person’s life. (Held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee Suspense File)
AB 13 (Chau, 2021) would have, among other things, required state agencies seeking to procure ADS for high-risk applications to consider, among other things, steps taken by a prospective contractor to identify and mitigate potential disparate impacts that could result from use of that ADS, as specified. (Gut and amended into an unrelated issue)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, CDT reports a one-time cost of approximately $3.28 million and ongoing annual costs of $2.04 million to create and update the ADS inventory and annual report (General Fund).
Unknown, likely significant costs ranging in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for all impacted state agencies to identify, analyze, and submit information relevant to ADS data collection (General Fund and various special funds).
SUPPORT: (Verified 9/1/23)
The Greenlining Institute (source)
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Equality California
Media Alliance
Oakland Privacy
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Secure Justice
TechEquity Collaborative
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/1/23)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of this bill, the Greenlining Institute writes that, “California is taking the lead in modernizing government systems, utilizing ADS to identify fraud, streamline document processing, and to make decisions for public benefits programs. However, poorly designed automated systems can result in biased, unfair or inaccurate results that disproportionately impact low-income families, and communities of color. For example, the IRS’ tax auditing algorithm is three times more likely to flag Black Americans for audits compared to other taxpayers, despite having no evidence that these taxpayers are at a higher risk of tax evasion. In Michigan and Arkansas, poorly designed algorithms wrongly denied tens of thousands of low-income families access to unemployment benefits and Medicaid. AB 302 grants California the opportunity to ensure the adoption of government ADS is done in a way that is transparent and promotes proper accountability and oversight over the use of these systems.”
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 79-0, 5/30/23
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Juan Carrillo, Wendy Carrillo, Cervantes, Chen, Connolly, Megan Dahle, Davies, Dixon, Flora, Mike Fong, Vince Fong, Friedman, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Grayson, Haney, Hart, Holden, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Lackey, Lee, Low, Lowenthal, Maienschein, Mathis, McCarty, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Stephanie Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Jim Patterson, Joe Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Santiago, Schiavo, Soria, Ta, Ting, Valencia, Villapudua, Waldron, Wallis, Ward, Weber, Wicks, Wilson, Wood, Zbur, Rendon
NO VOTE RECORDED: Essayli
Prepared by: Brian Duke / G.O. / (916) 651-1530
9/2/23 16:56:01
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular Session
AB 302 (Ward) - Department of Technology: high-risk automated decision systems: inventory
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 302 requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct an inventory and submit a report on all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) proposed for or in current use, development, or procurement by a state agency, as specified.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on September 1, 2023
Fiscal Impact:
- CDT reports a one-time cost of approximately $3.28 million and ongoing annual costs of $2.04 million to create and update the ADS inventory and annual report (General Fund).
- Unknown, likely significant costs ranging in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for all impacted state agencies to identify, analyze, and submit information relevant to ADS data collection (General Fund and various special funds).
Author Amendments:
- Add the Board of Parole Hearings to the state entities in the ADS inventory.
- Make technical and conforming changes.
- Add a coauthor.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular Session
AB 302 (Ward) - Department of Technology: high-risk automated decision systems: inventory
Version: May 18, 2023 | Policy Vote: G.O. 15 - 0, JUD. 11 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: August 14, 2023 | Consultant: Janelle Miyashiro |
Bill Summary:
AB 302 requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct an inventory and submit a report on all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) proposed for or in current use, development, or procurement by a state agency, as specified.
Fiscal Impact:
- CDT reports a one-time cost of approximately $1.24 million and ongoing annual costs of $2.04 million to create and update the ADS inventory and annual report (General Fund).
- Unknown, likely significant costs ranging in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for other state agencies to identify, analyze, and submit information relevant to ADS data collection (General Fund and various special funds).
Background:
ADS comprise any software, system, or process that aims to automate, aid, or replace human decision-making. ADS are used in a broad range of applications, such as in the administration of government services, allocation of resources, and making inference about individuals, groups, or places. Their ubiquity across government agencies means that ADS have the potential to impact a person’s eligibility for, among other things, benefits, education opportunities, or the imposition of penalties
Proposed Law:
- Before September 1, 2024, requires CDT to coordinate with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been proposed for or are currently used, developed, or procured by any state agency. Requires the inventory to include a description the following:
- Any decision the ADS can make or support and the intended benefits of that use, as well as alternatives to any use.
- The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the ADS.
- The categories of data and personal information the ADS uses to make its decisions.
- The measures in place, if any, to mitigate risks.
- Before January 1, 2025 and annually thereafter, requires CDT to submit a report of the inventory to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
- Defines “ADS” as a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision making and materially impacts natural persons.
- Specifies that “ADS” does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
- Defines “high-risk ADS” as an ADS that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- Specifies state agency includes every state office, department division, bureau, and the California State University, except: the University of California; the Legislature; the judicial branch; any administrative or regulatory board, commission, committee, council, association, or authority consisting of more than one person whose members are appointed by the Governor, the Legislature, or both; or any of the programs under the Department of Consumer Affairs.
Related Legislation:
SB 313 (Dodd, 2023) the California AI-ware Act would have required any generative artificial intelligence (AI) engaging in direct communication with a natural person on behalf of a state agency to clearly and conspicuously disclose to the individual that the interaction is being facilitated through an AI system, and would have established the Office of AI, within CDT, to guide the design, use, or deployment of automated systems by a state agency, as specified. SB 313 was held on the Suspense File in this committee.
SB 591 (Min, 2023) would have required the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to submit a report to the Legislature on the feasibility, benefits, risks, and costs of requiring credit reporting bureaus and lenders to implement new information security tactics, as specified. SB 591 was held on the Suspense File in this committee.
SB 721 (Becker, 2023) establishes the California Interagency AI Working Group consisting of 11 members with expertise in computer science, AI technology, workforce development, and data privacy to report to the Legislature regarding the implications of AI by January 1, 2025. SB 721 is pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.
AB 331 (Bauer-Kahan, 2023) would have prohibited “algorithmic discrimination,” that is, use of an ADS tool to contribute to unjustified differential treatment or outcomes that may have a significant effect on a person’s life. AB 331 was held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee Suspense File.
Staff Comments: While the total fiscal impact across all affected state agencies is unknown at this time, it is likely to total into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. For example, the California Department of Insurance reports costs of $36,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024-25 and $14,000 in FY 2025-26 and ongoing (Insurance Fund). While not all impacted state agencies will need the same resources, to the extent that other state entities may experience similar workload impacts, the total cost to identify, analyze, and submit information relevant to ADS data collection will be significant.
-- END --
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2023-2024 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 302 (Author:Ward)
Version: May 18, 2023
Hearing Date: July 6, 2023
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Department of Technology: high-risk automated decision systems: inventory
DIGEST
This bill requires the California Department of Technology (CDT), on or before September 1, 2024, to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ADS are algorithm-driven applications that can assist or supplant human decisionmaking processes in areas such as credit decisions, employment screening, insurance eligibility, and the delivery of government services. ADS process enormous datasets and make decisions with speed and reliability that vastly exceed human capabilities. However, poorly designed or poorly understood systems can create unfair, biased, and inaccurate results. When deployed by government agencies, flawed ADS may disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color and undermine trust in the public sector. Moreover, norms of participatory governance and due process may be jeopardized when ADS affect agency policymaking, adjudications, or enforcement.
The bill seeks to promote the oversight of automated decisionmaking in California by requiring CDT to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS, which is ADS that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to housing and employment. CDT is then required to submit a report of the inventory to the Legislature. The bill is sponsored by the Greenlining Institute and supported by civil rights and consumer protection advocates, including the TechEquity Collaborative and Equality California. There is no known opposition. It passed the Senate Governmental Organization Committee by a vote of 15 to 0.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Establishes, within the Government Operations Agency, the CDT, and generally tasks the department with the approval and oversight of information technology (IT) projects, and with improving the governance and implementation of IT by standardizing reporting relationships, roles, and responsibilities for setting IT priorities. (Gov. Code § 11545, et seq.)
- Expresses the intent of the Legislature that policies and procedures developed by CDT and Department of General Services (DGS) pertaining to the acquisition of IT goods and services provide for all of the following: the expeditious and value-effective acquisition of IT goods and services to satisfy state requirements; the acquisition of IT goods and services within a competitive framework; the delegation of authority by DGS to each state agency that has demonstrated to DGS’s satisfaction the ability to conduct value-effective IT goods and services acquisitions; and the review and resolution of protests submitted by any bidders with respect to any IT goods and services acquisitions. (Pub. Con. Code § 12101.)
- Provides that no person in the State of California shall, on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation, be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state. (Gov. Code § 11135 et. seq.)
- Provides, pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, that all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Civ. Code § 51.)
This bill:
- Requires CDT, on or before September 1, 2024, to conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
- Requires the comprehensive inventory to include a description of all of the following:
- any decision the ADS can make or support, the intended benefits of that use, and the alternatives to that use;
- the results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the ADS described above;
- the categories of data and personal information the ADS uses to make its decisions;
- the measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the ADS, including performance metrics, cybersecurity controls, privacy controls, risk assessments or audits for potential risks, and measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
- Requires CDT, on or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, to submit a report, as specified, of the comprehensive inventory to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization. This requirement expires on January 1, 2029.
- Defines the following terms:
- “Automated decision system” means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. ADS does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
- “High-risk automated decision system” means an ADS that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- “State agency” includes every state office, department, division, bureau, and the California State University. It does not include the University of California, the Legislature, the judicial branch, or any board, except as provided.
COMMENTS
- Background
- Algorithmic bias
Owing to recent advances in processing power and the rise of big data, artificial intelligence’s capacity and the scope of its applications have expanded rapidly, impacting how we communicate, interact, entertain ourselves, travel, transact, and consume media. In ways we may not fully comprehend, artificial intelligence empowers and encumbers us. It has been used to accelerate productivity, achieve efficiencies, liberate us from drudgery, help us understand and enjoy the world, connect with each other, and live longer, fuller lives. It has also been used to constrain personal autonomy, compromise privacy and security, foment social upheaval, exacerbate inequality, spread misinformation, and subvert democracy. For good or ill, its transformative potential seems boundless.
The rapid proliferation of algorithm-driven applications reflects advances in a subset of artificial intelligence known as “machine learning,” a technique that “aims to help computers discover fuzzy rules by themselves, without having to be explicitly instructed every step of the way by human programmers.”[1] Machine learning “enables computer systems to learn and make predictions based on historical data. The machine learning process is powered by a machine learning algorithm, a function that is able to improve its performance over time by training itself using methods of data analysis and analytical modelling.”[2] The most prominent type of machine learning is “deep learning,” which “uses artificial neural networks – simplified computer simulations of how biological neurons behave—to extract rules and patterns from sets of data.”[3]
Algorithms process enormous datasets and make decisions with speed and reliability that vastly exceed human capabilities. “They determine everything from what ads we see on the Internet, to whether we are flagged for increased security screening at the airport, to our medical diagnoses and credit scores. They lie behind two of the most powerful products of the digital information age: Google Search and Facebook’s Newsfeed.”[4] The most sophisticated algorithms need no supervision and use deep neural networks to “discover hidden patterns in data, typically those unrecognizable to, or difficult to discern by, humans.”[5] In addition to organizing vast troves of data, algorithms offer the possibility of eliminating human biases in areas such as hiring decisions, credit scores, and criminal sentencing.
However, an algorithm is only as good as the information it is analyzing. Flawed inputs will produce flawed outputs. And an algorithm may key in on factors other than those intended by its designer. In one example, a software student was dismayed to learn his program that could reliably distinguish dogs from wolves had, in actuality, learned to recognize snow in the background of the pictures rather than the canine’s features.[6]
When we do not fully understand how an algorithm works, we are unable to determine which aspects of data it is focusing on.
And in many cases algorithms may inadvertently pick up human biases. In Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy, Cathy O’Neill shows that ultimately, a person shapes an algorithm, mediating the datasets gathered and deciding how to weigh them. These decisions are colored by our inherent biases and cultural predilections. Jacob Weisberg writes that “[c]orrelations reflected in historical data become invisibly entrenched in policy without programmers having ill intentions. Quantified information naturally points backward.”[7] Rather than eliminating bias, some algorithms reinforce it, cloaking discrimination with mathematical neutrality.
ProPublica recently explored this phenomenon in the field of criminal justice.[8] Some jurisdictions factor algorithm-driven risk assessments into criminal bail, sentencing, and parole decisions. In 2014, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder warned that the risk scores might be injecting bias into the courts. “Although these measures were crafted with the best of intentions, I am concerned that they inadvertently undermine our efforts to ensure individualized and equal justice,” he stated, adding, “they may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society.” After obtaining the risk scores assigned to more than 7,000 people arrested in Broward County, Florida, ProPublica found that the scores “proved remarkably unreliable in forecasting violent crime.” ProPublica’s study validated Holder’s fears: “Black defendants were still 77 percent more likely to be pegged as at higher risk of committing a future violent crime and 45 percent more likely to be predicted to commit a future crime of any kind.”
A lack of transparency reduces accountability, again underscoring the importance of oversight. “[A]lgorithms simply grind out their results, and it is up to humans to review and address how that data is presented to users, to ensure the proper context and application of that data.”[9] New York University School of Law Professor Sarah Valentine puts a finer point on it: “Helpful as algorithms may be, they inevitably target marginalized populations and exacerbate the social stratification and vast inequality that already exists in our society.”[10]
Illustrating this dynamic in the field of education, Meredith Broussard, a data journalism professor at New York University and author of “Artificial Unintelligence: How Computers Misunderstand the World,” wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times detailing how “the International Baccalaureate—a global program that awards prestigious diplomas to high school students—canceled its usual in-person exams because of the [COVID-19] pandemic” and instead “used an algorithm to ‘predict’ student grades based on an array of student information, including teacher-estimated grades and past performance by students in each school.”[11] Tens of thousands of students, surprised to find out they failed, protested the results. “High-achieving, low-income students were hit particularly hard: many took the exams expecting to earn college credit with their scores and save thousands of dollars on tuition.”[12]
Coining the term “technochauvinism”—the idea that technological solutions are almost always superior to ordinary human decisionmaking—Broussard writes:
Computers are excellent at doing math, but education is not math — it’s a social system. And algorithmic systems repeatedly fail at making social decisions. Algorithms can’t monitor or detect hate speech, they can’t replace social workers in public assistance programs, they can’t predict crime, they can’t determine which job applicants are more suited than others, they can’t do effective facial recognition, and they can’t grade essays or replace teachers.
In the case of the International Baccalaureate program, grades could have been assigned based on the sample materials that students had already submitted by the time schools shut down. Instead, the organization decided to use an algorithm, which probably seemed like it would be cheaper and easier.
The process worked like this: Data scientists took student information and fed it into a computer. The computer then constructed a model that outputted individual student grades, which International Baccalaureate claimed the students would have gotten if they had taken the standardized tests that didn’t happen. It’s a legitimate data science method, similar to the methods that predict which Netflix series you’ll want to watch next or which deodorant you’re likely to order from Amazon.
The problem is, data science stinks at making predictions that are ethical or fair. In education, racial and class bias is baked into the system — and an algorithm will only amplify those biases.
Crude generalizations work for Netflix predictions because the stakes are low. If the Netflix algorithm suggests a show and I don’t like it, I ignore it and move on with my day. In education, the stakes are much higher.[13]
- Examples of harmful uses of ADS in state government
Nationally, there have been several examples of state governments’ use of ADS that have disproportionately harmed disadvantaged communities:
- Between 2013 and 2015, a Michigan ADS operating with minimal employee oversight wrongly accused 40,000 people of employment insurance fraud, many of whom were forced to pay heavy fines. Upon appeal, less than eight percent of those fraud charges were found to be legitimate.[14] The ADS cost the state $47 million and millions more as a result of lawsuits.
- In 2016, the state of Arkansas implemented an algorithm to assign access to Medicaid benefits. However, an estimated 19 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries had their benefits inappropriately cut, losing access to home care, nursing visits and medical treatments. In a lawsuit filed by Arkansas Legal Aid, the courts ultimately found those who were denied benefits could not effectively challenge the system, since there was no way of knowing what information factored into the algorithm’s opaque decision-making process leading to that result. That case ultimately revealed the algorithm featured several design flaws, miscoding and incorrect calculations.[15]
- A market analysis algorithm used in Detroit to direct public housing subsidies, tax breaks and housing development redirected critical funding away from Detroit’s poorest and predominantly black neighborhoods.[16]
- Since 2016, social workers in a Pennsylvania county have relied on an algorithm to help them determine which child welfare calls warrant further investigation. Now, the Justice Department is reportedly scrutinizing the controversial family-screening tool over concerns that using the algorithm may be violating the Americans with Disabilities Act by allegedly discriminating against families with disabilities, including families with mental health issues.[17]
In California, the CalWIN system, which provides a means for applying for CalFresh benefits, Medi-Cal and CalWORKS, included incorrectly translated policy in its code, which caused overpayments, underpayments, and improper terminations of public benefits, including the denial of Medicaid to foster children in contravention of federal law.[18] More recently, the ACLU found that the California Department of Public Health’s COVID-19 vaccine distribution algorithm could “leave more than 2 million vulnerable Californians—many of them from Black and Latinx communities—without additional supply, despite the state’s core goal of equity in vaccine distribution.”[19]
An article by two professors from the University of California at Berkeley argues that government officials are increasingly purchasing ADS with insufficient knowledge of their design and operation, and how this aligns with public values.[20] The article states:
At every level of government, officials contract for technical systems that employ machine learning—systems that perform tasks without using explicit instructions, relying on patterns and inference instead. These systems frequently displace discretion previously exercised by policymakers or individual front-end government employees with an opaque logic that bears no resemblance to the reasoning processes of agency personnel. However, because agencies acquire these systems through government procurement processes, they and the public have little input into—or even knowledge about—their design or how well that design aligns with public goals and values.
[…] When the adoption of these systems is governed by procurement, the policies they embed receive little or no agency or outside expertise beyond that provided by the vendor. Design decisions are left to private third-party developers. There is no public participation, no reasoned deliberation, and no factual record, which abdicates Government responsibility for policymaking.[21]
If the state agency is unable to understand or explain how an ADS that supplants a human decisionmaking process works, this raises due process concerns, as denials of rights or deprivations of property would be difficult to meaningfully challenge.
(See Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333.) “Automated systems jeopardize due process norms. Their lack of meaningful notice, and a hearing officer’s tendency to presume a computer system’s infallibility, devalue hearings.”[22]
- Frameworks for addressing ADS
In 2018, New York City enacted the nation’s first algorithmic accountability law, which regulates New York City agencies’ use of algorithms by creating a task force to oversee the government’s use of algorithms, examine how error and bias enter into their design, and recommend measures that ensure accuracy and fairness.
In 2019, the Canadian government adopted a Directive on Automated Decision-Making and an accompanying algorithmic impact assessment tool to guide the use of automated decision making at the federal level.[23] The Directive defines ADS as “any technology that either assists or replaces the judgement of human decision-makers.” The Directive establishes impact assessment levels for ADS, based on the anticipated impact on the rights of individuals or communities, the health or well-being of individuals or communities, the economic interests of individuals, entities, or communities, and the ongoing sustainability of an ecosystem.
Article 22 of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation provides that a “data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” Exceptions are allowed when necessary for entering into or performing a contract or when the person has granted explicit consent, provided that “the data controller … implement[s] suitable measures to safeguard the data subject‘s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.”
More recently the Biden Administration has published its Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, which is a set of five principles and associated practices to help guide the
design, use, and deployment of AI to protect the rights of the American public:
- Safe and Effective Systems: You should be protected from unsafe or ineffective systems. Automated systems should be developed with consultation from diverse communities, stakeholders, and domain experts to identify concerns, risks, and potential impacts of the system.
- Algorithmic Discrimination Protections: Designers, developers, and deployers of automated systems should take proactive and continuous measures to protect individuals and communities from algorithmic discrimination and to use and design systems in an equitable way. This protection should include proactive equity assessments as part of the system design, use of representative data and protection against proxies for demographic features, ensuring accessibility for people with disabilities in design and development, pre-deployment and ongoing disparity testing and mitigation, and clear organizational oversight.
- Data Privacy: You should be protected from abusive data practices via built-in protections and you should have agency over how data about you is used. You should be protected from violations of privacy through design choices that ensure such protections are included by default, including ensuring that data collection conforms to reasonable expectations and that only data strictly necessary for the specific context is collected. Designers, developers, and deployers of automated systems should seek your permission and respect your decisions regarding collection, use, access, transfer, and deletion of your data in appropriate ways and to the greatest extent possible; where not possible, alternative privacy by design safeguards should be used. Systems should not employ user experience and design decisions that obfuscate user choice or burden users with defaults that are privacy invasive. Consent should only be used to justify collection of data in cases where it can be appropriately and meaningfully given. Any consent requests should be brief, be understandable in plain language, and give you agency over data collection and the specific context of use; current hard-to-understand notice-and-choice practices for broad uses of data should be changed. Enhanced protections and restrictions for data and inferences related to sensitive domains, including health, work, education, criminal justice, and finance, and for data pertaining to youth should put you first. In sensitive domains, your data and related inferences should only be used for necessary functions, and you should be protected by ethical review and use prohibitions. You and your communities should be free from unchecked surveillance; surveillance technologies should be subject to heightened oversight that includes at least pre-deployment assessment of their potential harms and scope limits to protect privacy and civil liberties. Continuous surveillance and monitoring should not be used in education, work, housing, or in other contexts where the use of such surveillance technologies is likely to limit rights, opportunities, or access. Whenever possible, you should have access to reporting that confirms your data decisions have been respected and provides an assessment of the potential impact of surveillance technologies on your rights, opportunities, or access.
- Notice and Explanation: You should know that an automated system is being used and understand how and why it contributes to outcomes that impact you. Designers, developers, and deployers of automated systems should provide generally accessible plain language documentation including clear descriptions of the overall system functioning and the role automation plays, notice that such systems are in use, the individual or organization responsible for the system, and explanations of outcomes that are clear, timely, and accessible. Such notice should be kept up-to-date and people impacted by the system should be notified of significant use case or key functionality changes. You should know how and why an outcome impacting you was determined by an automated system, including when the automated system is not the sole input determining the outcome.
- Human Alternatives, Consideration, and Fallback: You should be able to opt out from automated systems in favor of a human alternative, where appropriate. Appropriateness should be determined based on reasonable expectations in a given context and with a focus on ensuring broad accessibility and protecting the public from especially harmful impacts.[24]
- Taking inventory of high-risk ADS used by state agencies
The bill defines “automated decision system” as a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Under the bill, an ADS does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
The bill defines “high-risk” ADS as an ADS that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect. This includes decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice. Examples of high-risk ADS would likely include those that determine a person’s eligibility for public benefits and services, are used for state employment screening, or used by law enforcement authorities for profiling individuals or predicting the likelihood of recidivism.
The bill requires, on or before September 1, 2024, CDT to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been proposed for, or are being used, developed, or procured by, state agencies. CDT is to coordinate with other interagency bodies, as it deems appropriate.
The inventory must include a description of the decisions that the ADS can make or support and both the intended benefits and alternatives to that use. Detail must be provided about the categories of data and personal information used by the ADS. In order to meaningfully assess the ADS listed in the inventory, the bill requires a description of any research into its efficacy and benefits and of any measures in place to mitigate the risks. These risks include those discussed at length above – the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions – as well as cybersecurity risks. Examples of this would be any performance metrics that gauge the accuracy of the system; cybersecurity and privacy controls; and risk assessments or audits for potential risks. The inventory must also highlight any measures or processes that are in place to contest an automated decision to better assess the due process being afforded affected individuals.
The CDT must submit a report of the comprehensive inventory to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization by January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter until January 1, 2029.
- Stakeholder positions
According to the author:
California is leading the way in adopting Automated Decision Systems (ADS) across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. State agencies are using ADS in various ways, including to detect fraud in unemployment and tax filings, speed up document processing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and help make better decisions in welfare services and healthcare reimbursements and California's climate investments.
When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them.
AB 302 would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS. By requiring the CDT to establish guidelines identifying ADS that have a high-risk of adverse impacts and conduct an inventory of those high-risk ADS, this bill will help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts that result from their design and implementation of ADS.
The Greenlining Institute, the sponsor of the bill, writes:
California is taking the lead in modernizing government systems, utilizing ADS to identify fraud, streamline document processing, and to make decisions for public benefits programs. However, poorly designed automated systems can result in biased, unfair or inaccurate results that disproportionately impact low-income families, and communities of color. For example, the IRS’ tax auditing algorithm is three times more likely to flag Black Americans for audits compared to other taxpayers, despite having no evidence that these taxpayers are at a higher risk of tax evasion. In Michigan and Arkansas, poorly designed algorithms wrongly denied tens of thousands of low-income families access to unemployment benefits and Medicaid. AB 302 grants California the opportunity to ensure the adoption of government ADS is done in a way that is transparent and promotes proper accountability and oversight over the use of these systems.
A coalition of advocacy groups, including Oakland Privacy and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, writes in support:
As California works to improve and modernize its government functions through the use of big data and automated systems, it must also lead in transparency around where these systems are used, what decisions they can support and how each agency is managing the risks associated with the use of these systems.
AB 302 will authorize the California Department of Technology to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk Automated Decision Systems used by state agencies. The inventory will also identify the decisions these systems make or support, the potential benefits of these systems and the measures taken to reduce the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased automated decisions. We therefore support AB 302 to provide much needed information to Californians and state agencies around the use of ADS.
SUPPORT
Greenlining Institute (sponsor)
California Civil Liberties Advocacy
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Equality California
Media Alliance
Oakland Privacy
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Secure Justice
TechEquity Collaborative
OPPOSITION
None known
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation:
SCR 17 (Dodd, 2023) affirms the California Legislature’s commitment to President Biden’s vision for a safe AI and the principles outlined in the “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights” and expresses the Legislature’s commitment to examining and implementing those principles in its legislation and policies related to the use and deployment of automated systems. SCR 17 is currently in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.
SB 313 (Dodd, 2023) establishes the Office of Artificial Intelligence. It requires state agencies to disclose when they are using generative artificial intelligence to communicate with a person and to provide them an option to speak with a natural person at the agency. SB 313 was held on suspense in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 398 (Wahab, 2023) establishes the Artificial Intelligence for California Research Act, which requires CDT to develop and implement a comprehensive research plan to study the feasibility of using advanced technology to improve state and local government services. SB 398 is currently in the Senate Governmental Organization Committee.
SB 721 (Becker, 2023) creates, until January 1, 2030, the California Interagency AI Working Group made up of members with varied expertise to deliver a report to the Legislature regarding AI. The group is directed to specified tasks, including recommending a definition of AI and determining the relevant agencies to develop and oversee AI policy and implementation of that policy. SB 721 is currently in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.
AB 331 (Bauer-Kahan, 2023) prohibits “algorithmic discrimination,” that is, use of an automated decision tool to contribute to unjustified differential treatment or outcomes that may have a significant effect on a person’s life. It requires any deployer of an automated decision tool to perform an impact assessment for those tools and to notify any natural person that is the subject of the consequential decision that an automated decision tool is being used to make, or be a controlling factor in making, the consequential decision. AB 331 was held on suspense in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
Prior Legislation:
AB 13 (Chau, 2021) would have established the Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act, which, in the context of the State’s procurement policies, promotes oversight over ADS that pose a high risk of adverse impacts on individual rights. The bill was eventually gutted and amended to address a different topic.
AB 858 (Jones-Sawyer, 2021) would have provided that the use of technology—defined to include algorithms derived from the use of health care-related data—shall not limit a worker who is providing direct patient care from exercising independent clinical judgment in the assessment, evaluation, planning, and implementation of care, nor from acting as a patient advocate. AB 858 was vetoed by Governor Newsom at the request of the author and sponsor.
AB 976 (Chau, 2020) would have established the AI in State Government Services Commission to gather input on how AI and data science could be used to improve state services. The bill was held on the Senate Appropriations Committee suspense file.
AB 2269 (Chau, 2020) the Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act of 2020, among other things, would have required a business in California that provides a program or device that uses an ADS to take affirmative steps to ensure that there are processes in place to continually test for biases, as specified; and, would have established an ADS Advisory Task Force, as specified. The bill died in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee.
ACR 125 (Jones-Sawyer, 2020) would have urged policymakers in both federal and state government to explore ways to promote the development and use of new technologies to reduce bias and discrimination in hiring and employment. The measure died in this Committee due to the limits placed on the Legislature because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
SB 348 (Chang, 2019) would have required the Director of CDT to develop a strategic plan to aid departments and agencies with incorporating AI into state IT operations, as specified. The bill died in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
SB 444 (Umberg, 2019) would have requested the Regents of the University of California (UC) to enact a resolution authorizing the law schools at UC Berkeley and UC Irvine to participate in a pilot project to develop AI or machine-learning solutions to address access to justice issues faced by self-representing litigants in their respective courts. The bill died in the Assembly Higher Education Committee.
AB 1576 (Calderon, 2019) would have required the Secretary of Government Operations to appoint participants to an AI working group to evaluate the uses, risks, benefits, and legal implications associated with the development and deployment of AI by California-based businesses. The bill was held on the Senate Appropriations Committee suspense file.
SJR 6 (Chang, Res. Ch. 112, Stats. 2019) urged the President and the Congress of the United States to develop a comprehensive AI Advisory Committee and to adopt a comprehensive AI policy.
AB 594 (Salas, 2019) would have authorized the Director CDT to designate a position within the department to evaluate the uses of AI in state government and to advise the Director of Technology on incorporating AI into state IT strategic plans, policies, standards and enterprise architecture, and would have required CDT to adopt guidelines by January 1, 2021, to govern the use and implementation of AI technologies in state government functions, as specified. The bill was vetoed by Governor Newsom.
ACR 215 (Kiley, Resolution Ch. 206, Stats. 2018) expressed the Legislature’s support for a set of principles for the governance of AI known as the 23 Asilomar AI Principles.
PRIOR VOTES:
Senate Governmental Organization Committee (Ayes 15, Noes 0)
Assembly Floor (Ayes 79, Noes 0)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 0)
Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 11, Noes 0)
**************
How machine learning works (May 14, 2015) The Economist, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2015/05/13/how-machine-learning-works. All internet citations are current as of June 21, 2023. ↑
Intro to AI for Policymakers: Understanding the Shift (March 2018) Brookfield Institute, http://brookfieldinstitute.ca/research-analysis/intro-to-ai-for-policymakers/. ↑
How machine learning works, supra, fn. 1. ↑
Jacob Weisberg, The Digital Poorhouse (June 7, 2018) The New York Review of Books, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/07/algorithms-digital-poorhouse/. ↑
AI for Policymakers, supra, fn. 2 at p. 5. ↑
Husky or Wolf? Using a Black Box Learning Model to Avoid Adoption Errors (August 24, 2017) UCI Applied Innovation, http://innovation.uci.edu/2017/08/husky-or-wolf-using-a-black-box-learning-model-to-avoid-adoption-errors/. ↑
The Digital Poorhouse, supra, fn. 4. ↑
Angwin, et al., Machine Bias (2016) ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. ↑
Keith Kirkpatrick, Battling Algorithmic Bias (2016) Communications of the ACM Vol. 59, No. 10, pp. 16-17, https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/10/207759-battlingalgorithmic-bias/abstract. ↑
Artificial Intelligence and Predictive Algorithms: Why Big Data Can Lead to Big Problems (2019) 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 364, 365. ↑
When Algorithms Give Real Students Imaginary Grades (Sept. 8, 2020) New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/08/opinion/international-baccalaureate-algorithm-grades.html. ↑
Id. ↑
Id. ↑
Alejandro de la Garza, States’ Automated Systems Are Trapping Citizens in Bureaucratic Nightmares With Their Lives on the Line (May 20, 2020) Time Magazine https://time.com/5840609/algorithm-unemployment/. ↑
Colin Lecher, What happens when an algorithm cuts your healthcare (Mar. 21, 2018) The Verge https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy. ↑
Le, Vinhcent, Algorithmic Bias Explained: How Automated Decision-Making Becomes Automated Discrimination (Feb. 23, 2021) The Greenlining Institute, http://greenlining.org/publications/reports/2021/algorithmic-bias-explained/ ↑
Ashley Belanger, AI tool used to spot child abuse allegedly targets parents with disabilities (Jan. 31, 2023) Ars Technica, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/01/doj-probes-ai-tool-thats-allegedly-biased-against-families-with-disabilities/. ↑
Daniel Keats Citron, Technological Due Process (2007) 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1249 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012360. ↑
ACLU research suggests that California’s vaccine distribution plan may leave more than 2 million vulnerable residents without additional supply (May 6, 2021) ACLU Northern California, https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-research-suggests-california-s-vaccine-distribution-plan-may-leave-more-2-million. ↑
Diedre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger, Procurement As Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning (2019) 34 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 781 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3464203#page=4. ↑
Id. at 781. ↑
Technological Due Process, supra, fn. 17. ↑
Directive on Automated Decision-Making, Government of Canada website, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592. ↑
Blueprint For An AI Bill Of Rights (Oct. 2022) Office of Science and Technology Policy, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Blueprint-for-an-AI-Bill-of-Rights.pdf. ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
Senator Bill Dodd
Chair
2023 - 2024 Regular
Bill No: AB Hearing Date: 6/27/2023
Author: | Ward, et al. | ||
Version: | Amended | ||
Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
SUBJECT:
DIGEST: This bill requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) used by state agencies and report to the Legislature by January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes the CDT and requires the Director of Technology to supervise the CDT and report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology (IT).
- Provides that any report required or requested by law to be submitted by a state or local agency to the Members of either house of the Legislature, shall, generally, instead be submitted as a printed copy to the Secretary of the Senate, as an electronic copy to the Chief Clerk of the Assembly, and as an electronic or printed copy to the Legislative Counsel.
This bill:
- Requires CDT, on or before September 1, 2024, to conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency.
- Requires the comprehensive inventory described above to include a description of all of the following:
- Any decision the ADS can make or support and the intended benefits of that use, as specified.
- The results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the ADS.
- The categories of data and personal information the ADS uses to make its decisions.
- The measures in place, if any, to mitigate the risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions, of the ADS. Measures may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
- Performance metrics to gauge the accuracy of the system.
- Cybersecurity controls.
- Privacy controls.
- Risk assessments or audits for potential risks.
- Measures or processes in place to contest an automated decision.
- Defines “automated decision system” to mean a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence (AI) that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision making and materially impacts natural persons. “Automated decision system” does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of data.
- Defines “high-risk automated decision system” to mean an ADS that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- Defines “state agency” to include every state office, department, division, bureau, and the California State University (CSU). “State agency” does not include the University of California (UC), the Legislature, the judicial branch, or any board, as specified.
- Requires CDT, on or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, to submit a report of the comprehensive inventory to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
- Includes a sunset date for reporting of January 1, 2029.
Background
Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “California is leading the way in adopting ADS across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. State agencies are using ADS in various ways, including to detect fraud in unemployment and tax filings, speed up document processing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and help make better decisions in welfare services and healthcare reimbursements and California's climate investments. When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them.”
Further, the author’s office states that, “AB 302 would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS. By requiring the CDT to establish guidelines identifying ADS that have a high-risk of adverse impacts and conduct an inventory of those high-risk ADS, this bill will help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts that result from their design and implementation of ADS.”
Automated Decision Systems. Over the last 50 years, monumental advances in computer and information science, along with the rise of “big data,” have facilitated new milestones in AI and machine learning. First coined in 1956, AI is a wide-ranging branch of computer science focused on building smart machines capable of performing tasks that typically require human intelligence. As computers and the software controlling them become more sophisticated, the types of decisions that machines are capable of making can become both more complex and more consequential.
Specifically, ADS comprise any software, system, or process that aims to automate, aid, or replace human decision-making. ADS are widely used in administering government services; allocating resources; and making inference about individuals, groups, or places. Their ubiquity across government agencies means that ADS have the potential to impact a person’s eligibility for, among other things, benefits, education opportunities, or the imposition of penalties. Another example is the use of ADS by the Federal Department of Veteran Affairs to better predict medical complications and improve treatment of combat wounds.
If designed and operated conscientiously, these ADS can considerably expedite decision-making to dramatically improve the efficiency of services, and may mitigate the influence of heuristics and biases that otherwise interfere with objective human decision-making. The promise of these ADS for reliably managing decision-making with respect to large datasets makes the adoption of ADS by government entities particularly enticing. Because government agencies are typically tasked with making highly consequential decisions in a manner that is reliable, reproducible, efficient, and scalable to large populations, ADS have the potential to become an indispensable tool for supporting many public functions.
According to a list compiled by the AI Now Institute, for the New York City Automation Decision Systems Task Force, the following are some examples of the ways in which governments are currently using ADS:
- Child Risk and Safety Assessments are used by child welfare agencies to evaluate potential child neglect and abuse cases for risk of child death/injury. Data often comes from multiple sources, including a jurisdiction’s department of human services and the police.
- Inmate Housing Classification is a system that analyzes a variety of criminal justice data and outcomes to determine the conditions of confinement, eligibility for programming, and overall housing arrangements of people who are incarcerated in a jail or prison. (The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation currently uses COMPAS, discussed in the next section, for this purpose.)
- School Assignment Algorithm is used to assign students to schools for K-12. NYC uses this type of system to match eighth-graders to high schools based on preference, test scores, portfolios, and other requirements.
- Student Risk Prevention Algorithm is used to predict students at risk of being arrested or in crisis by creating a model that uses families’ zip codes, incomes, truancy numbers, race, and other indicators. The data used in these systems is often shared with law enforcement and other government agencies.
- Residential Face Authentication is a biometric scanning technology that is used in some residential buildings for entry of residents and guests. Its use may be limited to private residences, and where used it is replacing key fobs.
- Immigration Detention Risk Assessment is a computerized system that evaluates an individual’s criminal history, work status, likelihood of fleeing, and other information to produce recommendation about whether the person should be detained or released prior to a removal hearing.
- Predictive Policing is algorithmic software that attempts to identify where a crime may occur in a given window of time in small geographic areas or identify individuals who may be a perpetrator or victim of a crime.
However, ADS are not a panacea, and their value for decision-making critically depends on how they are developed and how they are used. Algorithmic decision-making, and in particular machine learning and AI, is generally opaque in terms of its decision-making process, relying on ineffable variables derived from complex and unintuitive relationships between inputs and outputs that can change as the machine learns from new information. Andrew McLaughlin, executive director of the Center for Innovative Thinking at Yale University, predicts, “AI [has] massive short-term benefits, along with long term negatives that can take decades to be recognizable. AI will drive a vast range of efficiency optimizations but also enable hidden discrimination and arbitrary penalization of individuals in areas like insurance, job seeking and performance assessment.”
Several examples of government uses of ADS from throughout the country have resulted in inequitable outcomes, particularly for already disadvantaged communities. For instance, between 2013 and 2015, a privately built, error-prone Michigan unemployment ADS operating with minimal employee oversight wrongly accused 40,000 people of fraud, many of whom were forced to pay heavy fines, declared bankruptcy, or had their homes foreclosed upon. Upon appeal, less than eight percent of those fraud charges were validated.
In 2016, the state of Arkansas implemented an algorithm to assign access to Medicaid benefits. An estimated 19% of Medicaid beneficiaries had their benefits inappropriately cut, losing access to home care, nursing visits, and medical treatments. In a lawsuit filed by Arkansas Legal Aid, the courts ultimately found that those who were denied benefits could not effectively challenge the system, since there was no way of knowing what information factored into the algorithm’s opaque decision-making process leading to that result. Fact-finding during the court case ultimately revealed that the algorithm featured several design flaws, miscoding, and incorrect calculations. Depending on how the systems are designed and what types of datasets are used to train them for making the desired decisions, ADS can easily reflect or even exacerbate the same biases that plague human judgement.
Comprehensive Inventory of all High-Risk ADS. This bill requires CDT, by September 1, 2024, and in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been prosed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency. The inventory must include a description of any decision the ADS can make or support and the intended benefits of that use, the results of any research assessing the efficacy and relative benefits of the uses and alternatives of the ADS, the categories of data and personal information the ADS uses to make its decisions, and the measures in place, if any, to mitigate risks, including cybersecurity risk and the risk of inaccurate discriminatory or biased decisions, of the ADS.
This bill requires CDT, on or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, to submit a report of the comprehensive inventory to the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization and the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection. This bill includes a sunset date for the reports of January 1, 2029.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 313 (Dodd, 2023) the California AI-ware Act requires any generative AI engaging in direct communication with a natural person on behalf of a state agency to clearly and conspicuously disclose to the individual that the interaction is being facilitated through an AI system, and establishes the Office of AI, within CDT, to guide the design, use, or deployment of automated systems by a state agency, as specified. (Held on the Senate Appropriations Committee Suspense File)
SB 591 (Min, 2023) requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to submit a report to the Legislature on the feasibility, benefits, risks, and costs of requiring credit reporting bureaus and lenders to implement new information security tactics, as specified. (Held on the Senate Appropriations Committee Suspense File)
SB 721 (Becker, 2023) establishes the California Interagency AI Working Group consisting of 11 members with expertise in computer science, AI technology, workforce development, and data privacy to report to the Legislature regarding the implications of AI by January 1, 2025. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
SCR 17 (Dodd, 2023) affirms the California Legislature’s commitment to President Biden’s vision for a safe AI and the principles outlined in the “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights” and expresses the Legislature’s commitment to examining and implementing those principles in its legislation and policies related to the use and deployment of automated systems. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
AB 331 (Bauer-Kahan, 2023) prohibits “algorithmic discrimination,” that is, use of an ADS tool to contribute to unjustified differential treatment or outcomes that may have a significant effect on a person’s life. (Held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee Suspense File)
AB 13 (Chau, 2021) the Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act would have, among other things, required state agencies seeking to procure ADS for high-risk applications to consider, among other things, steps taken by a prospective contractor to identify and mitigate potential disparate impacts that could result from use of that ADS, as specified. (Gut and Amended into an Unrelated Issue)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
SUPPORT:
The Greenlining Institute (Source)
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Equality California
Media Alliance
Oakland Privacy
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Secure Justice
TechEquity Collaborative
OPPOSITION:
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of the bill, The Greenlining Institute writes that, “California is taking the lead in modernizing government systems, utilizing ADS to identify fraud, streamline document processing, and to make decisions for public benefits programs. However, poorly designed automated systems can result in biased, unfair or inaccurate results that disproportionately impact low-income families, and communities of color. For example, the IRS’ tax auditing algorithm is three times more likely to flag Black Americans for audits compared to other taxpayers, despite having no evidence that these taxpayers are at a higher risk of tax evasion. In Michigan and Arkansas, poorly designed algorithms wrongly denied tens of thousands of low-income families access to unemployment benefits and Medicaid. AB 302 grants California the opportunity to ensure the adoption of government ADS is done in a way that is transparent and promotes proper accountability and oversight over the use of these systems.”
DUAL REFERRAL: Senate Governmental Organization Committee & Senate Judiciary Committee
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 302
Author:(Ward)
As Amended Ver:May 18, 2023
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct an inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems being used in state agencies by September 1, 2024.
Major Provisions
- Requires the inventory to include a description of categories of data and personal information the automated system uses to make its decisions, the results of any research assessing the efficacy of the system, and any measures in place to mitigate the risks, including the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions.
- Defines "automated decision system" to mean a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision-making and materially impacts people.
- Clarifies that the term "automated decision system" does not include a junk email filter, firewall, antivirus software, calculator, database, data set, or other compilation of data.
- Defines "high-risk automated decision system" to mean an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that impact access to or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
COMMENTS
This bill will provide the Administration and Legislature with a much needed inventory and analysis of all of the critical automated decision systems (ADS) in state departments being used or proposed for use to replace human decision making that helps determine access to housing, healthcare, unemployment insurance, safety-net programs and length of incarceration, to name a few.
Given the growing research demonstrating that biases may be built into automated decision systems that are being used to make critical decisions affecting people’s lives, and the state's ongoing commitment to protecting civil rights and providing support and assistance equally to all Californians, requiring an inventory of the computerized decision-making systems used by the state is a critical first step in ensuring that Californians are not being harmed by flawed data or flawed systems.
Use of algorithms by government. Over the last 50 years, monumental advances in computer and information science, along with the rise of "big data," have facilitated new milestones in artificial intelligence and machine learning. As computers and the software controlling them become more sophisticated, the types of decisions that machines are capable of making can become both more complex and more consequential. If designed and operated conscientiously, ADS can considerably expedite decision-making to dramatically improve the efficiency of services, and may mitigate the influence of biases that otherwise interfere with objective human decision-making.
The promise of ADS for reliably managing decision-making with respect to large datasets makes the adoption of ADS by government entities particularly enticing. Governments at all levels are increasingly using artificial intelligence and ADS in the criminal justice system, public benefit decision making, fighting climate change, regulatory enforcement, healthcare, and education, to name a few. Because government agencies are typically tasked with making highly consequential decisions in a manner that is reliable, reproducible, efficient, and scalable to large populations, if designed and used properly, ADS have the potential to become an indispensable tool for supporting many public functions.
According to a list compiled by the AI Now Institute, for the New York City Automation Decision Systems Task Force [https://ainowinstitute.org/nycadschart.pdf], the following are some examples of the ways in which governments are currently using ADS:
- Child Risk and Safety Assessments are used by child welfare agencies to evaluate potential child neglect and abuse cases for risk of child death/injury. Data often comes from multiple sources, including a jurisdiction's department of human services and the police.
- Inmate Housing Classification is a system that analyzes a variety of criminal justice data and outcomes to determine the conditions of confinement, eligibility for programming, and overall housing arrangements of people who are incarcerated in a jail or prison. (The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation currently uses COMPAS, discussed in the next section, for this purpose.)
- School Assignment Algorithm is used to assign students to schools for K-12. NYC uses this type of system to match eighth-graders to high schools based on preference, test scores, portfolios, and other requirements.
- Student Risk Prevention Algorithm is used to predict students at risk of being arrested or in crisis by creating a model that uses families' zip codes, incomes, truancy numbers, race, and other indicators. The data used in these systems is often shared with law enforcement and other government agencies.
- Residential Face Authentication is a biometric scanning technology that is used in some residential buildings for entry of residents and guests. Its use may be limited to private residences, and where used it is replacing key fobs.
- Immigration Detention Risk Assessment is a computerized system that evaluates an individual's criminal history, work status, likelihood of fleeing, and other information to produce recommendation about whether the person should be detained or released prior to a removal hearing.
- Predictive Policing is algorithmic software that attempts to identify where a crime may occur in a given window of time in small geographic areas or identify individuals who may be a perpetrator or victim of a crime.
The value of ADS for decision-making depends on how they are developed and how they are used. It is incredibly difficult to assess and measure the nature and impact of algorithmic decision-making systems and research is increasingly showing the potential for biased and inaccurate decisions.
According to the Author
California is leading the way in adopting Automated Decision Systems (ADS) across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. State agencies are using ADS in various ways, including to detect fraud in unemployment and tax filings, speed up document processing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and help make better decisions in welfare services and healthcare reimbursements and California's climate investments.
When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them.
AB 302 would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS. By requiring the CDT to establish guidelines identifying ADS that have a high-risk of adverse impacts and conduct an inventory of those high-risk ADS, this bill will help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts that result from their design and implementation of ADS.
Arguments in Support
A coalition of privacy and technology groups supporting this legislation note:
Throughout California, automated systems are used to identify fraud, streamline document processing and to make decisions that control access to public resources and benefits. ADS have the potential to improve the delivery of government services, however, poorly designed systems can create unfair, biased and inaccurate results, causing disproportionate harm to low-income families and communities of color who are more likely to interact with government ADS. As California works to improve and modernize its government functions through the use of big data and automated systems, it must also lead in transparency around where these systems are used, what decisions they can support and how each agency is managing the risks associated with the use of these systems.
Arguments in Opposition
None on file.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- CTD estimates one-time General Fund costs of $1.24 million for five contracted vendors and ongoing annual costs of $2.04 million for five full-time staff ($1.37 million) and four contracted vendors ($672,000) to conduct the inventory and meet the reporting requirements.
- CTD also notes unknown costs for any state department that may need to hire a vendor or require other resources to identity, analyze, and submit information relevant to a potential ADS data collection, given that every ADS system is not centrally tracked or managed within a specific department.
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee, amendments taken in that Committee do not change the fiscal impact.
VOTES
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 11-0-0
YES: Gabriel, Joe Patterson, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Essayli, Vince Fong, Irwin, Lowenthal, Papan, Wicks, Wilson
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-0-5
YES: Holden, Bryan, Calderon, Wendy Carrillo, Mike Fong, Hart, Lowenthal, Papan, Pellerin, Weber, Ortega
ABS, ABST OR NV: Megan Dahle, Dixon, Mathis, Robert Rivas, Sanchez
UPDATED
VERSION: May 18, 2023
CONSULTANT: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0000927
Date of Hearing: April 19, 2023
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Chris Holden, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 302
Author:(Ward) – As Amended Ver:March 23, 2023
Policy Committee: | Privacy and Consumer Protection | Vote: | 11 - 0 |
|
| ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) in use or proposed for use by the state and to submit a report of the inventory to the Legislature by January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter.
Specifically, this bill:
- Requires CDT to conduct, by September 1, 2024, and in conjunction with other interagency bodies as appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of every high-risk ADS proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or that is being used, developed, or procured by state agencies.
- Requires the inventory to include a description of categories of data and personal information each automated system uses to make its decisions, the results of any research assessing the efficacy of the system, and any measures in place to mitigate the risks, including the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions.
- Defines “high-risk automated decision system” to mean an automated decision system used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that impact access to, or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- Requires CDT, by January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, to submit a report of the inventory to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- CTD estimates one-time General Fund costs of $1.24 million for five contracted vendors and ongoing annual costs of $2.04 million for five full-time staff ($1.37 million) and four contracted vendors ($672,000) to conduct the inventory and meet the reporting requirements.
- CTD also notes unknown costs for any state department that may need to hire a vendor or require other resources to identity, analyze, and submit information relevant to a potential ADS data collection, given that every ADS system is not centrally tracked or managed within a specific department.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. This bill seeks to assist state agencies to identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts resulting from their design and implementation of high-risk ADS. According to the author:
California is leading the way in adopting Automated Decision Systems (ADS) across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them. [This bill] would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS.
- Background. Significant advances in computer and information science have facilitated new milestones in artificial intelligence and machine learning. If designed and operated conscientiously, ADS can considerably expedite decision-making to dramatically improve the efficiency of services, and may mitigate the influence of biases that otherwise interfere with objective human decision-making.
Governments at all levels are increasingly using artificial intelligence (AI) and ADS in the criminal justice system, public benefit decision-making, regulatory enforcement, healthcare, and education, to name a few examples. However, extensive research is increasingly showing the potential for biased and inaccurate decisions. There are examples from throughout the country where a government’s use of ADS has resulted in inequitable outcomes, particularly for already disadvantaged communities.
This bill requires CDT to inventory every high-risk ADS in use, or proposed to be used, by state agencies in an effort to improve transparency and ensure state agencies are not inadvertently increasing inequity by using flawed decision-making tools.
- Related Legislation. AB 331 (Bauer-Kahan) requires a user or developer of AI products, including a state or local agency, beginning in 2025, to perform an annual impact assessment for the automated tools they use or build. AB 331 is pending in the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
SB 313 (Dodd) creates the Office of Artificial Intelligence within CDT, with the authority to guide the design, use, or deployment of automated systems by a state agency. SB 313 is pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
SB 721 (Becker) establishes a California Interagency AI Working Group to study AI and provide a report to the Legislature. SB 721 is pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
- Prior Legislation. AB 13 (Chau), of the 2021-22 Legislative Session, would have established the Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act of 2021, which would have required state agencies seeking ADS for high-risk applications to consider, among other things, steps taken by a prospective contractor to identify and mitigate potential disparate impacts that could result from use of ADS. AB 13 was held on the Senate Appropriations Committee’s suspense file, but was later amended as an urgency bill for another purpose.
Analysis Prepared by: Jennifer Swenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: March 21, 2023
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Jesse Gabriel, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 302 (
Author:Ward) – As Introduced Ver:January 26, 2023
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: Department of Technology: high-risk automated decision systems: inventory
SYNOPSIS
This bill will provide the Administration and Legislature with a much needed inventory and analysis of all of the critical automated decision systems (ADS) in state departments being used or proposed for use to replace human decision making that helps determine access to housing, healthcare, unemployment insurance, safety-net programs and length of incarceration, to name a few.
Given the growing research demonstrating that biases may be built into automated decision systems that are being used to make critical decisions affecting people’s lives, and the state’s ongoing commitment to protecting civil rights and providing support and assistance equally to all Californians, requiring an inventory of the computerized decision-making systems used by the state is a critical first step in ensuring that Californians are not being harmed by flawed data or flawed systems.
This bill is sponsored by the Greenlining Institute. There is no registered opposition at this time.
SUMMARY: Requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to conduct an inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems being used in state agencies. Specifically, this bill:
- Requires DOT to conduct, on or before September 1, 2024, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk ADS that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by all state agencies.
- Requires the inventory to include a description of categories of data and personal information the automated system uses to make its decisions, the results of any research assessing the efficacy of the system, and any measures in place to mitigate the risks, including the risk of inaccurate, unfairly discriminatory, or biased decisions.
- Defines “automated decision system” to mean a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision-making and materially impacts people.
- Clarifies that the term “automated decision system” does not include a junk email filter, firewall, antivirus software, calculator, database, data set, or other compilation of data.
- Defines “high-risk automated decision system” to mean an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that impact access to or approval for, housing or accommodations, education, employment, credit, health care, and criminal justice.
- Requires that on or before January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter, that CDT submit a report to the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protections Committee and the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides, pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, that all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Civ. Code § 51.)
- Provides that no person in the State of California shall, on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation, be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state. (Gov. Code §§ 11135 et. seq.)
- Establishes CDT within the Government Operations Agency, and generally tasks the department with the approval and oversight of information technology (IT) projects, and with improving the governance and implementation of IT by standardizing reporting relationships, roles, and responsibilities for setting IT priorities. (Gov. Code §§ 11545, et seq.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS:
1) Purpose of bill. This bill would require the California Department of Technology (CDT), within the Government Operations Agency, to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems (ADS) being used by state agencies and submit a report to the Legislature by January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter. The inventory is intended to help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts resulting from their design and implementation of ADS.
2) Author’s statement. According to the author:
California is leading the way in adopting Automated Decision Systems (ADS) across state agencies to modernize and deliver services more efficiently. State agencies are using ADS in various ways, including to detect fraud in unemployment and tax filings, speed up document processing at the Department of Motor Vehicles, and help make better decisions in welfare services and healthcare reimbursements and California's climate investments.
When used properly, these systems can benefit Californians. However, if these systems are not designed and implemented correctly, they can create unfairly biased or inaccurate results that harm Californians and reduce trust in these systems. These results can disproportionately harm low-income families and communities of color given the number of government services and programs that impact them.
AB 302 would ensure that Californians have transparency into the government's use of high-risk ADS and provide state agencies with the information to analyze their use of high-risk ADS. By requiring the CDT to establish guidelines identifying ADS that have a high-risk of adverse impacts and conduct an inventory of those high-risk ADS, this bill will help state agencies identify and minimize the risk of adverse and discriminatory impacts that result from their design and implementation of ADS.
3) Use of algorithms by government. Over the last 50 years, monumental advances in computer and information science, along with the rise of “big data,” have facilitated new milestones in artificial intelligence and machine learning. As computers and the software controlling them become more sophisticated, the types of decisions that machines are capable of making can become both more complex and more consequential. If designed and operated conscientiously, ADS can considerably expedite decision-making to dramatically improve the efficiency of services, and may mitigate the influence of biases that otherwise interfere with objective human decision-making.
The promise of ADS for reliably managing decision-making with respect to large datasets makes the adoption of ADS by government entities particularly enticing. Governments at all levels are increasingly using artificial intelligence and ADS in the criminal justice system, public benefit decision making, fighting climate change, regulatory enforcement, healthcare, and education, to name a few. Because government agencies are typically tasked with making highly consequential decisions in a manner that is reliable, reproducible, efficient, and scalable to large populations, if designed and used properly, ADS have the potential to become an indispensable tool for supporting many public functions.
According to a list compiled by the AI Now Institute, for the New York City Automation Decision Systems Task Force (https://ainowinstitute.org/nycadschart.pdf), the following are some examples of the ways in which governments are currently using ADS:
- Child Risk and Safety Assessments are used by child welfare agencies to evaluate potential child neglect and abuse cases for risk of child death/injury. Data often comes from multiple sources, including a jurisdiction’s department of human services and the police.
- Inmate Housing Classification is a system that analyzes a variety of criminal justice data and outcomes to determine the conditions of confinement, eligibility for programming, and overall housing arrangements of people who are incarcerated in a jail or prison. (The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation currently uses COMPAS, discussed in the next section, for this purpose.)
- School Assignment Algorithm is used to assign students to schools for K-12. NYC uses this type of system to match eighth-graders to high schools based on preference, test scores, portfolios, and other requirements.
- Student Risk Prevention Algorithm is used to predict students at risk of being arrested or in crisis by creating a model that uses families’ zip codes, incomes, truancy numbers, race, and other indicators. The data used in these systems is often shared with law enforcement and other government agencies.
- Residential Face Authentication is a biometric scanning technology that is used in some residential buildings for entry of residents and guests. Its use may be limited to private residences, and where used it is replacing key fobs.
- Immigration Detention Risk Assessment is a computerized system that evaluates an individual’s criminal history, work status, likelihood of fleeing, and other information to produce recommendation about whether the person should be detained or released prior to a removal hearing.
- Predictive Policing is algorithmic software that attempts to identify where a crime may occur in a given window of time in small geographic areas or identify individuals who may be a perpetrator or victim of a crime.
The value of ADS for decision-making depends on how they are developed and how they are used. It is incredibly difficult to assess and measure the nature and impact of algorithmic decision-making systems and research is increasingly showing the potential for biased and inaccurate decisions.
By requiring an inventory and analysis of all of the high-risk ADS used in state departments, this bill seeks to provide transparency in the use of ADS and begin the process of identifying and minimizing the risks associated with replacing human decision making with computer-driven decision making.
4) Algorithmic Bias. Depending on how the systems are designed and what types of datasets are used to train them for making the desired decisions, ADS can easily reflect or even exacerbate the same biases that plague human judgement. Particularly in the context of government, where public trust and accountability are paramount, this lack of transparency and potential for mechanizing human biases can be highly problematic.
A coalition of privacy and technology groups supporting this legislation note:
Throughout California, automated systems are used to identify fraud, streamline document processing and to make decisions that control access to public resources and benefits. ADS have the potential to improve the delivery of government services, however, poorly designed systems can create unfair, biased and inaccurate results, causing disproportionate harm to low-income families and communities of color who are more likely to interact with government ADS. As California works to improve and modernize its government functions through the use of big data and automated systems, it must also lead in transparency around where these systems are used, what decisions they can support and how each agency is managing the risks associated with the use of these systems.
These concerns are not hypothetical. Several examples of government uses of ADS from throughout the country have resulted in devastatingly inequitable outcomes, particularly for already disadvantaged communities. For example, in the criminal legal system the widespread use of algorithmic risk assessments to determine the likelihood that someone will commit a crime if either released before their trial or as part of a parole consideration process has raised significant concerns. Almost 10 years ago, then-U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder warned that the use of risk assessment scores being used by the courts, rather than ensuring equal justice, may be exacerbating “unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common.” He then called on the United States Sentencing Commission to study the use of risk assessments. While the Sentencing Commission declined the request, journalists at ProPublica analyzed a risk assessment tool created by Northpointe, Inc. called COMPAS that is widely used throughout the country, including in California’s prison system. They found that the tool proved “remarkable unreliable” when forecasting violent crime and that there were significant racial disparities in the results. (Angwin, et al., Machine Bias (May 2016) ProPublica, available at https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.)
In another more recent example, a study released by the Stanford Institute for Economic and Policy Research (SIEPR) found that Black Americans are up to five times more likely to have their federal tax returns audited than taxpayers of all other races due to a flawed algorithm used by the Internal Revenue Service to decide which taxpayers get audited. The researchers in that study noted that even when algorithms are formally neutral with respect to protected characteristics like race, there is widespread concern that they can disproportionately burden vulnerable groups of people. (Elzayn, et al., Measuring and Mitigating Racial Disparities in Tax Audits (Jan. 30, 2023) SIEPR, available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kA7CG3cLq6eWmwBVgTDOIMhxuGZwRJ5O/view)
Examples from other states include a privately-built, error-prone Michigan unemployment ADS operating with minimal employee oversight that wrongly accused 40,000 people of fraud between 2013 and 2015, many of whom were forced to pay heavy fines, declare bankruptcy, or have their homes foreclosed upon. Upon appeal, less than 8% of those fraud charges were validated. (de la Garza, States’ Automated Systems Are Trapping Citizens in Bureaucratic Nightmares with Their Lives on the Line (May 20, 2020) Time Magazine, available at https://time.com/5840609/algorithm-unemployment/.)
Finally, in 2016, the state of Arkansas implemented an algorithm to assign access to Medicaid benefits, only for an estimated 19% of Medicaid beneficiaries to see their benefits inappropriately cut, losing access to home care, nursing visits, and medical treatments. In a lawsuit filed by Arkansas Legal Aid, the courts ultimately found that those who were denied benefits could not effectively challenge the system, since there was no way of knowing what information factored into the algorithm’s opaque decision-making process leading to that result. Fact-finding during the court case ultimately revealed that the algorithm featured several design flaws, miscodings, and incorrect calculations. (Lecher, What happens when an algorithm cuts your healthcare (Mar. 21, 2018) The Verge, available at https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy .)
5) California’s Commitment to Fighting Discrimination. California has a long history of protecting the civil rights of its citizens. Along with the laws discussed above declaring that all people are free and equal in California regardless of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status, California continues to be at the forefront in passing laws and establishing government entities tasked with protecting its residents. For example, in 1959, California established the Fair Employment Practices Commission to implement state-wide protections against discrimination in the workplace. In 1980, the 1959 Fair Employment Practices Act and the 1963 Rumford Fair Housing Act were combined into the Fair Employment and Housing Act. At that time, the commission became the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, a department-level agency. In July of 2022, the department updated its name to the Civil Rights Department, more accurately reflecting the duties of the department, which include enforcing laws prohibiting hate violence, human trafficking, discrimination in private businesses and government funded programs.
In addition to this department, in 2015, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed the Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA) of 2015 (AB 953 (Weber, Chap. 466, Stats. 2015)) in order to prevent racial profiling by, among other things, clarifying and modernizing California's prohibition against profiling to better account for the ways in which profiling occurs. The bill established a uniform system for collecting and analyzing data on law enforcement-community interactions, and also established an advisory board that investigates profiling patterns and practices and provides recommendations on how to curb its harmful impact.
As a final example, the state Attorney General is tasked with enforcing federal and state civil rights laws, including ensuring reproductive rights, disability access rights, educational rights, immigrants’ rights, children’s rights, voting rights, and worker’s rights, among other protections. The Civil Rights Enforcement Section is tasked with identifying civil rights violations to be remedied by the Attorney General. It also works closely with the public, state, federal and local government agencies, and civil rights and community organizations to identify potential civil rights initiatives. When civil rights violations are confirmed, the Civil Rights Enforcement Section will represent the Attorney General in his independent capacity as California’s chief law officer in prosecuting those who have violated the law, and will seek remedies to prevent further violations of those laws.
Given this decades’ long commitment to fighting discrimination, it would appear that this proposed legislation is a logical step toward ensuring that state agencies tasked with providing support and assistance equally to all Californians are not inadvertently increasing inequity by using flawed decision making tools.
6) Author’s Amendments. Author’s amendments to the bill, reflected in the analysis above, are set forth below.
SECTION 1. Section 11546.8 is added to the Government Code, to read:
11546.8. (a) For purposes of this section:
(1) (A) “Automated decision system” means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons.
(B) “Automated decision system” does not include a junk email filter, firewall, antivirus software, calculator, database, data set, or other compilation of data.
7) Related Legislation. AB 13 (Chau, 2021) would have established the Automated Decision Systems Accountability Act of 2021. The Act would have required state agencies seeking to procure ADS for high-risk applications to consider, among other things, steps taken by a prospective contractor to identify and mitigate potential disparate impacts that could result from use of that ADS; required a prospective contractor for an ADS for a high-risk application to submit an ADS impact assessment containing specified information about the ADS; and required the contracting agency to submit to CDT a high-risk ADS accountability report containing specified information regarding their proposed use of the ADS. That bill was gutted and amended for another purpose.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Greenlining Institute (Sponsor)
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
Media Alliance
Oakland Privacy
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Secure Justice
Techequity Collaborative
Opposition
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: Julie Salley / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Governmental Organization
Assembly Floor
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):