AB 979: California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2025-10-03
Current Status:
Passed
(2025-10-03: Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 285, Statutes of 2025.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law requires the Office of Emergency Services to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Existing law states that the centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. Existing law requires the center to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, on or before January 1, 2027, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The bill would require the center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, as specified, and to use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Except as specified, the bill would provide that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is confidential and would prohibit that information from being disclosed, except as specified. The bill would also make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law requires the Office of Emergency Services to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Existing law states that the centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. Existing law requires the center to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, on or before January 1, 2027, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The bill would require the center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, as specified, and to use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Except as specified, the bill would provide that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is confidential and would prohibit that information from being disclosed, except as specified. The bill would also make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law requires the Office of Emergency Services to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Existing law states that the centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. Existing law requires the center to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, on or before January 1, 2027, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence community communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The bill would require the center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, as specified, and to use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Except as specified, the bill would provide that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is confidential and would prohibit that information from being disclosed, except as specified. The bill would also make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law requires the Office of Emergency Services to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Existing law states that the centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. Existing law requires the center to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, on or before July January 1, 2026, 2027, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The bill would require the center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, as specified, and to use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Except as specified, the bill would provide that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is confidential and would prohibit that information from being disclosed, except as specified. The bill would also make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law requires the Office of Emergency Services to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Existing law states that the centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. Existing law requires the center to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, on or before July 1, 2026, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The bill would require the center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, as specified, and to use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Except as specified, the bill would provide that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is confidential and would prohibit that information from being disclosed, except as specified. The bill would also make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law requires the Office of Emergency Services to establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Existing law states that the centers mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. Existing law requires the center to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, on or before July 1, 2026, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The bill would require the center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, as specified, and to use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Except as specified, the bill would provide that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is confidential and would prohibit that information from being disclosed, except as specified. The bill would also make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law requires the Department of Technology to conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency. Existing law defines automated decision system as a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to artificial intelligence.Existing law requires the Department of Technology to conduct, in coordination with other interagency bodies as it deems appropriate, a comprehensive inventory of all high-risk automated decision systems that have been proposed for use, development, or procurement by, or are being used, developed, or procured by, any state agency. Existing law defines automated decision system as a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons.
This bill would state the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to artificial intelligence.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) is a public-private collaborative within the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that leverages authorities granted by Congress in the federal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) to unite the global cyber community in defense of cyberspace.
(b)On January 14, 2025, the JCDC published the JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate voluntary information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) communities, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(c)The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.
(d)Cybersecurity incident response best practice suggests that cybersecurity incidents are often best addressed at the state or local level. Therefore, it is critical to clarify and communicate the institutional reporting processes for cybersecurity incidents, including for AI-related incidents, at the state level, to complement the federal playbook.
(e)The federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) (CISA 2015) created protections for nonfederal entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose in accordance with certain requirements with the government and provides that they may do so notwithstanding any other law. These protections include the nonwaiver of privilege, protection of proprietary information, exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act (6 U.S.C. Sec. 552), and prohibition on use in regulatory enforcement. CISA 2015 also created protections for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared under its provisions with a state, tribal, or local government, including that the information shall be exempt from disclosure under local freedom of information law or similar law requiring disclosure of information or records.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:8586.5.(a)The Office of Emergency Services shall establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. The California Cybersecurity Integration Centers primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be composed of representatives from the following organizations:
(1)The Office of Emergency Services.
(2)The Office of Information Security.
(3)The State Threat Assessment Center.
(4)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(5)The Military Department.
(6)The Office of the Attorney General.
(7)The California Health and Human Services Agency.
(8)The California Utilities Emergency Association.
(9)The California State University.
(10)The University of California.
(11)The California Community Colleges.
(12)The State Department of Education.
(13)The United States Department of Homeland Security.
(14)The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(15)The United States Secret Service.
(16)The United States Coast Guard.
(17)Other members as designated by the Director of Emergency Services.
(b)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information that is received from utilities, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, private companies, and other appropriate sources. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of Californias agencies and departments.
(c)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. The cybersecurity strategy shall be developed to improve how cyber threats are identified, understood, and shared in order to reduce threats to California government, businesses, and consumers. The strategy shall also strengthen cyber emergency preparedness and response, standardize implementation of data protection measures, enhance digital forensics and cyber investigative capabilities, deepen expertise among Californias workforce of cybersecurity professionals, and expand cybersecurity awareness and public education.
(d)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall establish a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as Californias primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state. This team shall also assist law enforcement agencies with primary jurisdiction for cyber-related criminal investigations and agencies responsible for advancing information security within state government. This team shall be comprised of personnel from agencies, departments, and organizations represented in the California Cybersecurity Integration Center.
(e)Information sharing by the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security.
(f)(1)Notwithstanding Section 10231.5, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall create four reports that describe all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act (Subtitle B of Title VI of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58), as specified in Section 665g of Title 6 of the United States Code). The reports shall be delivered to the Legislature according to the following:
(A)The first report for the 202122 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2023.
(B)The second report for the 202223 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2024.
(C)The third report for the 202324 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2025.
(D)The fourth report for the 202425 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2026.
(2)Reports to be submitted pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(g)(1)On or before January 1, 2027, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, including AI.
(2)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall also consider how the federal government is implementing these requirements, standards, and best practices to inform its approach.
(3)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing artificial intelligence services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(4)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(5)Any record or information within a record of the Office of Emergency Services that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, shall not be disclosed to the public.
(6)Notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this subdivision is confidential and shall not be transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which amends Section 8586.5 of the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
The state has a very strong interest in protecting its information technology systems from intrusion because those systems contain confidential information and play a critical role in the performance of the duties of state government. Thus, information regarding the specific vulnerabilities of those systems must be protected to preclude use of that information to facilitate attacks on those systems.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) is a public-private collaborative within the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that leverages authorities granted by Congress in the federal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) to unite the global cyber community in defense of cyberspace.
(b)On January 14, 2025, the JCDC published the JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate voluntary information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) communities, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(c)The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.
(d)Cybersecurity incident response best practice suggests that cybersecurity incidents are often best addressed at the state or local level. Therefore, it is critical to clarify and communicate the institutional reporting processes for cybersecurity incidents, including for AI-related incidents, at the state level, to complement the federal playbook.
(e)The federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) (CISA 2015) created protections for nonfederal entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose in accordance with certain requirements with the government and provides that they may do so notwithstanding any other law. These protections include the nonwaiver of privilege, protection of proprietary information, exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act (6 U.S.C. Sec. 552), and prohibition on use in regulatory enforcement. CISA 2015 also created protections for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared under its provisions with a state, tribal, or local government, including that the information shall be exempt from disclosure under local freedom of information law or similar law requiring disclosure of information or records.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:8586.5.(a)The Office of Emergency Services shall establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. The California Cybersecurity Integration Centers primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be composed of representatives from the following organizations:
(1)The Office of Emergency Services.
(2)The Office of Information Security.
(3)The State Threat Assessment Center.
(4)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(5)The Military Department.
(6)The Office of the Attorney General.
(7)The California Health and Human Services Agency.
(8)The California Utilities Emergency Association.
(9)The California State University.
(10)The University of California.
(11)The California Community Colleges.
(12)The State Department of Education.
(13)The United States Department of Homeland Security.
(14)The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(15)The United States Secret Service.
(16)The United States Coast Guard.
(17)Other members as designated by the Director of Emergency Services.
(b)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information that is received from utilities, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, private companies, and other appropriate sources. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of Californias agencies and departments.
(c)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. The cybersecurity strategy shall be developed to improve how cyber threats are identified, understood, and shared in order to reduce threats to California government, businesses, and consumers. The strategy shall also strengthen cyber emergency preparedness and response, standardize implementation of data protection measures, enhance digital forensics and cyber investigative capabilities, deepen expertise among Californias workforce of cybersecurity professionals, and expand cybersecurity awareness and public education.
(d)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall establish a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as Californias primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state. This team shall also assist law enforcement agencies with primary jurisdiction for cyber-related criminal investigations and agencies responsible for advancing information security within state government. This team shall be comprised of personnel from agencies, departments, and organizations represented in the California Cybersecurity Integration Center.
(e)Information sharing by the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security.
(f)(1)Notwithstanding Section 10231.5, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall create four reports that describe all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act (Subtitle B of Title VI of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58), as specified in Section 665g of Title 6 of the United States Code). The reports shall be delivered to the Legislature according to the following:
(A)The first report for the 202122 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2023.
(B)The second report for the 202223 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2024.
(C)The third report for the 202324 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2025.
(D)The fourth report for the 202425 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2026.
(2)Reports to be submitted pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(g)(1)On or before January 1, 2027, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, including AI.
(2)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall also consider how the federal government is implementing these requirements, standards, and best practices to inform its approach.
(3)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing artificial intelligence services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(4)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(5)Any record or information within a record of the Office of Emergency Services that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, shall not be disclosed to the public.
(6)Notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this subdivision is confidential and shall not be transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which amends Section 8586.5 of the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
The state has a very strong interest in protecting its information technology systems from intrusion because those systems contain confidential information and play a critical role in the performance of the duties of state government. Thus, information regarding the specific vulnerabilities of those systems must be protected to preclude use of that information to facilitate attacks on those systems.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) is a public-private collaborative within the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that leverages authorities granted by Congress in the federal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) to unite the global cyber community in defense of cyberspace.
(b)On January 14, 2025, the JCDC published the JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate voluntary information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) community, communities, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(c)The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.
(d)Cybersecurity incident response best practice suggests that cybersecurity incidents are often best addressed at the state or local level. Therefore, it is critical to clarify and communicate the institutional reporting processes for cybersecurity incidents, including for AI-related incidents, at the state level, to complement the federal playbook.
(d)(e)The federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) (CISA 2015) created protections for nonfederal entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose in accordance with certain requirements with the government and provides that they may do so notwithstanding any other law. These protections include the nonwaiver of privilege, protection of proprietary information, exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act (6 U.S.C. Sec. 552), and prohibition on use in regulatory enforcement. CISA 2015 also created protections for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared under its provisions with a state, tribal, or local government, including that the information shall be exempt from disclosure under local freedom of information law or similar law requiring disclosure of information or records.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:8586.5.(a)The Office of Emergency Services shall establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. The California Cybersecurity Integration Centers primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be composed of representatives from the following organizations:
(1)The Office of Emergency Services.
(2)The Office of Information Security.
(3)The State Threat Assessment Center.
(4)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(5)The Military Department.
(6)The Office of the Attorney General.
(7)The California Health and Human Services Agency.
(8)The California Utilities Emergency Association.
(9)The California State University.
(10)The University of California.
(11)The California Community Colleges.
(12)The State Department of Education.
(13)The United States Department of Homeland Security.
(14)The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(15)The United States Secret Service.
(16)The United States Coast Guard.
(17)Other members as designated by the Director of Emergency Services.
(b)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information that is received from utilities, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, private companies, and other appropriate sources. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of Californias agencies and departments.
(c)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. The cybersecurity strategy shall be developed to improve how cyber threats are identified, understood, and shared in order to reduce threats to California government, businesses, and consumers. The strategy shall also strengthen cyber emergency preparedness and response, standardize implementation of data protection measures, enhance digital forensics and cyber investigative capabilities, deepen expertise among Californias workforce of cybersecurity professionals, and expand cybersecurity awareness and public education.
(d)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall establish a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as Californias primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state. This team shall also assist law enforcement agencies with primary jurisdiction for cyber-related criminal investigations and agencies responsible for advancing information security within state government. This team shall be comprised of personnel from agencies, departments, and organizations represented in the California Cybersecurity Integration Center.
(e)Information sharing by the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security.
(f)(1)Notwithstanding Section 10231.5, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall create four reports that describe all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act (Subtitle B of Title VI of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58), as specified in Section 665g of Title 6 of the United States Code). The reports shall be delivered to the Legislature according to the following:
(A)The first report for the 202122 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2023.
(B)The second report for the 202223 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2024.
(C)The third report for the 202324 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2025.
(D)The fourth report for the 202425 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2026.
(2)Reports to be submitted pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(g)(1)On or before January 1, 2027, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and artificial intelligence community communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. threats, including AI.
(2)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall also consider how the federal government is implementing these requirements, standards, and best practices to inform its approach.
(3)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing artificial intelligence services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(4)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(5)Any record or information within a record of the Office of Emergency Services that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, shall not be disclosed to the public.
(6)Notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this subdivision is confidential and shall not be transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which amends Section 8586.5 of the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
The state has a very strong interest in protecting its information technology systems from intrusion because those systems contain confidential information and play a critical role in the performance of the duties of state government. Thus, information regarding the specific vulnerabilities of those systems must be protected to preclude use of that information to facilitate attacks on those systems.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) is a public-private collaborative within the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that leverages authorities granted by Congress in the federal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) to unite the global cyber community in defense of cyberspace.
(b)On January 14, 2025, the JCDC published the JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate voluntary information sharing across the artificial intelligence (AI) community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(c)The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.
(d)The federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) (CISA 2015) created protections for nonfederal entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose in accordance with certain requirements with the government and provides that they may do so notwithstanding any other law. These protections include the nonwaiver of privilege, protection of proprietary information, exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act (6 U.S.C. Sec. 552), and prohibition on use in regulatory enforcement. CISA 2015 also created protections for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared under its provisions with a state, tribal, or local government, including that the information shall be exempt from disclosure under local freedom of information law or similar law requiring disclosure of information or records.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:8586.5.(a)The Office of Emergency Services shall establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. The California Cybersecurity Integration Centers primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be composed of representatives from the following organizations:
(1)The Office of Emergency Services.
(2)The Office of Information Security.
(3)The State Threat Assessment Center.
(4)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(5)The Military Department.
(6)The Office of the Attorney General.
(7)The California Health and Human Services Agency.
(8)The California Utilities Emergency Association.
(9)The California State University.
(10)The University of California.
(11)The California Community Colleges.
(12)The State Department of Education.
(13)The United States Department of Homeland Security.
(14)The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(15)The United States Secret Service.
(16)The United States Coast Guard.
(17)Other members as designated by the Director of Emergency Services.
(b)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information that is received from utilities, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, private companies, and other appropriate sources. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of Californias agencies and departments.
(c)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. The cybersecurity strategy shall be developed to improve how cyber threats are identified, understood, and shared in order to reduce threats to California government, businesses, and consumers. The strategy shall also strengthen cyber emergency preparedness and response, standardize implementation of data protection measures, enhance digital forensics and cyber investigative capabilities, deepen expertise among Californias workforce of cybersecurity professionals, and expand cybersecurity awareness and public education.
(d)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall establish a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as Californias primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state. This team shall also assist law enforcement agencies with primary jurisdiction for cyber-related criminal investigations and agencies responsible for advancing information security within state government. This team shall be comprised of personnel from agencies, departments, and organizations represented in the California Cybersecurity Integration Center.
(e)Information sharing by the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security.
(f)(1)Notwithstanding Section 10231.5, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall create four reports that describe all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act (Subtitle B of Title VI of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58), as specified in Section 665g of Title 6 of the United States Code). The reports shall be delivered to the Legislature according to the following:
(A)The first report for the 202122 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2023.
(B)The second report for the 202223 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2024.
(C)The third report for the 202324 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2025.
(D)The fourth report for the 202425 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2026.
(2)Reports to be submitted pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(g)(1)On or before July January 1, 2026, 2027, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(2)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(3)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing artificial intelligence services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(4)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(5)Any record or information within a record of the Office of Emergency Services that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, shall not be disclosed to the public.
(6)Notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this subdivision is confidential and shall not be transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which amends Section 8586.5 of the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
The state has a very strong interest in protecting its information technology systems from intrusion because those systems contain confidential information and play a critical role in the performance of the duties of state government. Thus, information regarding the specific vulnerabilities of those systems must be protected to preclude use of that information to facilitate attacks on those systems.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) is a public-private collaborative within the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that leverages authorities granted by Congress in the federal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) to unite the global cyber community in defense of cyberspace.
(b)On January 14, 2025, the JCDC published the JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate voluntary information sharing across the artificial intelligence (AI) community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(c)The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.
(d)The federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) (CSIA (CISA 2015) created protections for nonfederal entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose in accordance with certain requirements with the government and provides that they may do so notwithstanding any other law. These protections include the nonwaiver of privilege, protection of proprietary information, exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act (6 U.S.C. Sec. 552), and prohibition on use in regulatory enforcement. CISA 2015 also created protections for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared under its provisions with a state, tribal, or local government, including that the information shall be exempt from disclosure under local freedom of information law or similar law requiring disclosure of information or records.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:8586.5.(a)The Office of Emergency Services shall establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. The California Cybersecurity Integration Centers primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be composed of representatives from the following organizations:
(1)The Office of Emergency Services.
(2)The Office of Information Security.
(3)The State Threat Assessment Center.
(4)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(5)The Military Department.
(6)The Office of the Attorney General.
(7)The California Health and Human Services Agency.
(8)The California Utilities Emergency Association.
(9)The California State University.
(10)The University of California.
(11)The California Community Colleges.
(12)The State Department of Education.
(13)The United States Department of Homeland Security.
(14)The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(15)The United States Secret Service.
(16)The United States Coast Guard.
(17)Other members as designated by the Director of Emergency Services.
(b)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information that is received from utilities, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, private companies, and other appropriate sources. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of Californias agencies and departments.
(c)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. The cybersecurity strategy shall be developed to improve how cyber threats are identified, understood, and shared in order to reduce threats to California government, businesses, and consumers. The strategy shall also strengthen cyber emergency preparedness and response, standardize implementation of data protection measures, enhance digital forensics and cyber investigative capabilities, deepen expertise among Californias workforce of cybersecurity professionals, and expand cybersecurity awareness and public education.
(d)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall establish a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as Californias primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state. This team shall also assist law enforcement agencies with primary jurisdiction for cyber-related criminal investigations and agencies responsible for advancing information security within state government. This team shall be comprised of personnel from agencies, departments, and organizations represented in the California Cybersecurity Integration Center.
(e)Information sharing by the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security.
(f)(1)Notwithstanding Section 10231.5, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall create four reports that describe all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act (Subtitle B of Title VI of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58), as specified in Section 665g of Title 6 of the United States Code). The reports shall be delivered to the Legislature according to the following:
(A)The first report for the 202122 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2023.
(B)The second report for the 202223 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2024.
(C)The third report for the 202324 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2025.
(D)The fourth report for the 202425 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2026.
(2)Reports to be submitted pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(g)(1)On or before July 1, 2026, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(2)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(3)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing artificial intelligence services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(4)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(5)Any record or information within a record of the Office of Emergency Services that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, shall not be disclosed to the public.
(5)(6)Notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this subdivision is confidential and shall not be disclosed, expect that the information may be transmitted transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information as identified and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which amends Section 8586.5 of the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
The state has a very strong interest in protecting its information technology systems from intrusion because those systems contain confidential information and play a critical role in the performance of the duties of state government. Thus, information regarding the specific vulnerabilities of those systems must be protected to preclude use of that information to facilitate attacks on those systems.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) is a public-private collaborative within the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that leverages authorities granted by Congress in the federal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) to unite the global cyber community in defense of cyberspace.
(b)On January 14, 2025, the JCDC published the JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate voluntary information sharing across the artificial intelligence (AI) community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(c)The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.
(d)The federal Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-113) (CSIA 2015) created protections for nonfederal entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose in accordance with certain requirements with the government and provides that they may do so notwithstanding any other law. These protections include the nonwaiver of privilege, protection of proprietary information, exemption from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act (6 U.S.C. Sec. 552), and prohibition on use in regulatory enforcement. CISA 2015 also created protections for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared under its provisions with a state, tribal, or local government, including that the information shall be exempt from disclosure under local freedom of information law or similar law requiring disclosure of information or records.
SEC. 2.Section 8586.5 of the Government Code is amended to read:8586.5.(a)The Office of Emergency Services shall establish and lead the California Cybersecurity Integration Center. The California Cybersecurity Integration Centers primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage Californias economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be composed of representatives from the following organizations:
(1)The Office of Emergency Services.
(2)The Office of Information Security.
(3)The State Threat Assessment Center.
(4)The Department of the California Highway Patrol.
(5)The Military Department.
(6)The Office of the Attorney General.
(7)The California Health and Human Services Agency.
(8)The California Utilities Emergency Association.
(9)The California State University.
(10)The University of California.
(11)The California Community Colleges.
(12)The State Department of Education.
(13)The United States Department of Homeland Security.
(14)The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(15)The United States Secret Service.
(16)The United States Coast Guard.
(17)Other members as designated by the Director of Emergency Services.
(b)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall operate in close coordination with the California State Threat Assessment System and the United States Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, including sharing cyber threat information that is received from utilities, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, private companies, and other appropriate sources. The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures, and support cybersecurity assessments, audits, and accountability programs that are required by state law to protect the information technology networks of Californias agencies and departments.
(c)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop a statewide cybersecurity strategy, informed by recommendations from the California Task Force on Cybersecurity and in accordance with state and federal requirements, standards, and best practices. The cybersecurity strategy shall be developed to improve how cyber threats are identified, understood, and shared in order to reduce threats to California government, businesses, and consumers. The strategy shall also strengthen cyber emergency preparedness and response, standardize implementation of data protection measures, enhance digital forensics and cyber investigative capabilities, deepen expertise among Californias workforce of cybersecurity professionals, and expand cybersecurity awareness and public education.
(d)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall establish a Cyber Incident Response Team to serve as Californias primary unit to lead cyber threat detection, reporting, and response in coordination with public and private entities across the state. This team shall also assist law enforcement agencies with primary jurisdiction for cyber-related criminal investigations and agencies responsible for advancing information security within state government. This team shall be comprised of personnel from agencies, departments, and organizations represented in the California Cybersecurity Integration Center.
(e)Information sharing by the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, safeguards sensitive information, preserves business confidentiality, and enables public officials to detect, investigate, respond to, and prevent cyberattacks that threaten public health and safety, economic stability, and national security.
(f)(1)Notwithstanding Section 10231.5, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall create four reports that describe all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act (Subtitle B of Title VI of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58), as specified in Section 665g of Title 6 of the United States Code). The reports shall be delivered to the Legislature according to the following:
(A)The first report for the 202122 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2023.
(B)The second report for the 202223 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2024.
(C)The third report for the 202324 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2025.
(D)The fourth report for the 202425 fiscal year shall be delivered no later than December 31, 2026.
(2)Reports to be submitted pursuant to this subdivision shall be submitted in compliance with Section 9795.
(g)(1)On or before July 1, 2026, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
(2)The California Cybersecurity Integration Center shall review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(3)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing artificial intelligence services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(4)The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
(5)Notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this subdivision is confidential and shall not be disclosed, expect that the information may be transmitted to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information as identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 2 of this act, which amends Section 8586.5 of the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
The state has a very strong interest in protecting its information technology systems from intrusion because those systems contain confidential information and play a critical role in the performance of the duties of state government. Thus, information regarding the specific vulnerabilities of those systems must be protected to preclude use of that information to facilitate attacks on those systems.
SECTION 1.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to artificial intelligence.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation relating to artificial intelligence.
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Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Oct 3, 2025 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 285, Statutes of 2025. |
| Oct 3, 2025 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 24, 2025 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3 p.m. |
| Sep 12, 2025 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 79. Noes 0. Page 3383.). |
| Sep 12, 2025 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Sep 11, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 40. Noes 0. Page 2932.). |
| Sep 9, 2025 | Ordered to special consent calendar. |
| Sep 4, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 3, 2025 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Sep 2, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Ordered returned to second reading. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (August 29). |
| Aug 18, 2025 | In committee: Referred to suspense file. |
| Jul 2, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 13. Noes 0.) (July 1). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 24, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on JUD. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (June 24). Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 11, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on G.O. and JUD. |
| Jun 3, 2025 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| Jun 2, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 78. Noes 0. Page 1870.) |
| May 27, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 14. Noes 0.) (May 23). |
| May 14, 2025 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| May 1, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. with recommendation: To Consent Calendar. (Ayes 13. Noes 0.) (May 1). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 24, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Apr 23, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 1, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Mar 28, 2025 | Referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Mar 28, 2025 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on P. & C.P. Read second time and amended. |
| Feb 21, 2025 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 23. |
| Feb 20, 2025 | Read first time. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 12, 2025 | AB 979 Irwin Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 11, 2025 | Special Consent AB979 Irwin et al. By McNerney | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 29, 2025 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 18, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 1, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Jun 24, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Judiciary] with the recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Senate Standing Committee on Governmental Organization |
Passed |
|
| Jun 2, 2025 | AB 979 Irwin Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 23, 2025 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| May 1, 2025 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] with recommendation: To Consent Calendar | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Little Hoover Commission | ** Support | |
| The Little Hoover Commission | ** Support |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 979
Author:(Irwin)
As Amended Ver:September 3, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in coordination with the Office of Information Security, the Government Operations Agency, and relevant industry groups, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. This initiative would facilitate information sharing about threats to AI systems to promote safe deployment. Critically, the bill would mandate reporting mechanisms for state contractors and vendors providing AI services, requiring them to disclose known threats and vulnerabilities. It would also ensure that information can be shared confidentially between parties.
Senate Amendments
Delay the implementation date until January 1, 2027.
Directs Cal-CSIC to consider how the federal government is implementing its Playbook to inform the California Playbook, as specified.
COMMENTS
1) JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Joint Cyber Defense Collective (JCDC) was established under the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act with the goal of unifying the cyber defense capabilities and actions of government and industry partners.[1] The JCDC includes participants such as Microsoft, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, and various U.S. government agencies, among many others. Through voluntary information sharing coordinated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), JCDC enables rapid, coordinated responses to cybersecurity threats with access to authoritative, real-time information.
In the final week of the Biden Administration, JCDC released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The purpose of the Playbook was to:
[F]acilitate voluntary information sharing across the AI community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.[2]
The Playbook highlights the unique dangers that AI systems introduce due to their reliance on non-deterministic models, meaning the same input does not always produce the same output. This unpredictability leaves AI systems vulnerable to cyberattacks, such as model poisoning. In model poisoning attacks, adversaries manipulate training data or use carefully crafted inputs to introduce misleading or malicious information into models, coaxing them into generating specific or tailored responses. In some cases, attackers can poison models in ways that prevent AI systems from detecting certain types of malware, making them especially vulnerable to cyberattacks.
The Playbook also promotes the use of the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) for information sharing. This color-coded system ensures that sensitive information is shared only with the appropriate audiences.[3] The four-color system, TLP:RED, TLP:AMBER, TLP:GREEN, and TLP:CLEAR, guides recipients on how to handle shared information, indicating how to respond to risks and whether a threat impacts privacy, management, or other critical areas of an organization. Within the Playbook framework, member organizations voluntarily share information using TLP to inform partners about potential threats.
Information sharing at this level will be critical, as AI systems are continuously tested for vulnerabilities by both ethical researchers and malicious actors. Early detection, identification, and remediation of emerging threats will rely heavily on this collaboration. As AI becomes increasingly integrated into critical infrastructure, it will be even more important for public and private sector organizations to strengthen these partnerships and ensure that AI systems are deployed securely and resiliently.
2) What this bill would do. This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), in collaboration with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Playbook would facilitate the sharing of information regarding emerging risks and cybersecurity threats across the state. Cal-CSIC would be tasked with reviewing federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the JCDC's AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and using those resources to inform the development of California's Playbook. This effort would bring together many of the major AI companies based in California to develop technically feasible strategies that promote the safe deployment of AI systems statewide.
However, this bill differs from the JCDC's AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook by requiring mandatory reporting and information sharing for potential threats and vulnerabilities identified by state contractors and vendors providing AI services. This provision is particularly crucial as artificial intelligence becomes increasingly integrated into state infrastructure through initiatives launched under Executive Order N-12-23 and the recently announced AI initiative within the California State University system.[4] The author notes, "The state has multiple avenues in which this could be pursued, including through procurement contract language, the State Administrative Manual, or the State Information Management Manual". In addition to mandatory reporting for state-related AI services, the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook would also include a voluntary information-sharing mechanism for threats and vulnerabilities involving non-state-connected AI systems.
To safeguard sensitive information, the bill includes provisions ensuring the confidentiality of data shared with Cal-CSIC regarding potential threats to AI systems. This includes protection for copyrighted or otherwise legally protected materials, which would be exempt from disclosure under public records requests. Finally, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures, when shared according to the Playbook, would be disclosed only to state employees and contractors who are authorized to receive it, consistent with additional security measures set forth in the Playbook.
According to the Author
California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature's role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
Arguments in Support
The Little Hoover Commission writes:
The Little Hoover Commission supports AB 979, which would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, to facilitate information sharing among artificial intelligence users in state government.
In its 2024 report, Artificial Intelligence and California State Government, the Commission recommended broad adoption of AI for the benefit of all Californians, while also safeguarding against potential harms. Among its recommendations, the Commission called for the state to develop more robust mechanisms to anticipate and respond to AI-related threats. It also urged the state to think beyond AI and begin developing cybersecurity strategies that address emerging technological threats more broadly.
AB 979 aligns with these goals by promoting cross-agency communication and coordinated planning in the face of evolving cybersecurity challenges. The development of the Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook proposed in this bill would strengthen California's ability to implement AI safely, securely, and transparently—key values emphasized throughout the Commission's report.
Arguments in Opposition
None on file.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- The Office of Emergency Services (OES), which houses Cal-CSIC, reports total cost pressures of approximately $713,000 in the first year and $463,000 ongoing until completion of the playbook (General Fund). Costs include two limited term staff with the technical AI expertise to develop the playbook.
- The Government Operations (GovOps) Agency anticipates costs to consult with OES to be minor and absorbable.
VOTES:
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 13-0-2
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Bryan, Flora, Irwin, Lowenthal, Ortega, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Ward, Wicks, Wilson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dixon, DeMaio
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 14-0-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Dixon, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache, Ta, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0-1
YES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Elhawary, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
ABS, ABST OR NV: Bains
UPDATED
VERSION: September 3, 2025
CONSULTANT: John Bennett / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0002061
Jim Langevin and Mark Montgomery, "Making the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative Work", Lawfare (Aug. 6, 2021), accessed at http://lawfaremedia.org/article/making-joint-cyber-defense-collaborative-work. ↑
The CISA AI Cybersecurity Playbook can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ai-cybersecurity-collaboration-playbook. ↑
Infromation about the TLP system and CISA can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/traffic-light-protocol-tlp-definitions-and-usage. ↑
Amy DiPierro, "Cal State unveils artificial intelligence tools for students", EdSource (Feb. 4, 2025), accessed at https://edsource.org/2025/cal-state-unveils-artificial-intelligence-tools-for-students/726205. ↑
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 979 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 979
Author: Irwin (D), et al.
Amended: 9/3/25 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COMMITTEE: 15-0, 6/24/25
AYES: Padilla, Archuleta, Ashby, Blakespear, Cervantes, Choi, Dahle, Hurtado, Jones, Ochoa Bogh, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Wahab, Weber Pierson
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 13-0, 7/1/25
AYES: Umberg, Niello, Allen, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Laird, Stern, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 8/29/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Dahle, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 6/2/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop a California Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (Playbook) to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and AI communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, including AI, as specified.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/3/25 add language directing Cal-CSIC to consider how the federal government is implementing its Playbook to inform the California Playbook, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Requires the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to establish and lead the Cal-CSIC, as specified, and requires Cal-CSIC to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
- Defines “artificial intelligence” to mean an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
This bill:
- Requires Cal-CSIC to develop, by January 1, 2027, and in consultation with the Office of Information Security (OIS) and the Government Operations Agency (GovOps), the Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the cyber and AI communities and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, including AI.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the Playbook.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to also consider how the federal government is implementing these requirements, standards, and best practices to inform its approach.
- Requires the Playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the Playbook.
- Provides that the Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the Playbook.
- Prohibits any record or information within a record of OES that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act, as specified; or in which based on the fats of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, from being disclosed to the public.
- Provides that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the Playbook developed under this bill is confidential and prohibits that information from being transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the Playbook, as specified.
- Includes legislative findings and declarations demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies and the need for protecting that interest, as specified.
Background
Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.”
Rapidly Evolving World of AI Technologies. The development and deployment of AI, and Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI), is accelerating exponentially across sectors, including within California state government. GenAI tools can produce text, images, audio, and video content by processing massive datasets. These tools offer new capabilities for public service delivery, internal operations, and constituent engagement. Unlike traditional predictive AI systems trained on narrow datasets to make recommendations, GenAI systems are designed to generate new content in response to user prompts.
California’s Executive Order N-12-23 initiated a statewide effort to integrate GenAI into state operations, resulting in pilot projects, procurement toolkits, and a dedicated portal, GenAI.ca.gov. While this framework encourages adoption, it also highlights the need to address system vulnerabilities and security risks associated with GenAI tools, including model poisoning, adversarial inputs, and evasion attacks.
Executive Order N-12-23 and California’s Generative AI Accountability Act. Noting California’s role as a global hub for AI and the natural leader in this emerging field of technology, Governor Newsom issued EO N-12-23 in September of 2023. In announcing the EO, Governor Newsom identified the need to deploy GenAI ethically and responsibly throughout state government, protect and prepare for potential harms, and remain the world’s AI leader.
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statutes of 2024) known as the Generative AI (GenAI) Accountability Act codified a number of the items listed in EO N-12-23 including: requiring California Department of Technology, under the guidance of GovOps, ODI, and CalHR, to update the benefits and risks of GenAI report, as needed, to respond to significant developments; requiring OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events; requiring state agencies and departments to consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities in which GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations; and, requiring legal counsel for state agencies and departments to consider any potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under that respective agency’s or department’s authority and recommend necessary updates, if appropriate, as a result of this evolving technology.
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The JCDC, established by the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, brings together public and private sector partners to coordinate U.S. cyber defense efforts. Operated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), JCDC includes entities such as Microsoft, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, and multiple federal agencies. Through voluntary information sharing, JCDC supports real-time coordination and threat response across government and industry.
In the final days of the Biden Administration, JCDC released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, aimed at facilitating voluntary information exchange among AI developers, providers, and adopters. The Playbook seeks to promote operational collaboration to address AI-specific cybersecurity risks, and will be updated periodically to reflect the evolving threat landscape.
The Playbook identifies the distinct vulnerabilities of AI systems, particularly those stemming from their non-deterministic nature where identical inputs can produce different outputs. This characteristic makes AI susceptible to model poisoning attacks, where adversaries manipulate training data or introduce malicious inputs to alter model behavior. In some cases, poisoned models may even fail to detect malware, creating serious security risks.
To support responsible information exchange, the Playbook adopts the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), a color-coded framework for designating how shared information should be handled and disclosed. TLP categories (RED, AMBER, GREEN, and CLEAR) help guide recipient organizations on how to act on shared threat data while maintaining confidentiality where necessary.
California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Cal-CSIC, within OES, is the hub of state government’s cybersecurity events. Cal-CSIC coordinates information sharing at all levels of government agencies, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC’s mission is to reduce the number of cyber threats and attacks in California and its focus is to respond to cyber threats and attacks that could damage the economy, its critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state.
California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. This bill requires Cal-CSIC, in coordination with OIS and GovOps, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook by January 1, 2027. The purpose of the Playbook is to strengthen the state’s collective cyber defenses against emerging threats associated with artificial intelligence by establishing structured mechanisms for information sharing. In developing the Playbook, Cal-CSIC must review and incorporate relevant federal standards and best practices, including the JCDC’s AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and how the federal government is implementing requirements, standards, and best practices to inform Cal-CSIC’s approach.
The Playbook must include mandatory reporting requirements for state contractors and vendors that provide AI services, requiring them to share information about known threats and vulnerabilities related to those services with designated state entities. It may also include voluntary mechanisms for other organizations to participate in information sharing, where appropriate. To protect sensitive information, the bill specifies that any privileged, copyrighted, or otherwise legally protected records shall not be publicly disclosed. Additionally, any cyber threat information shared under the Playbook is considered confidential and may only be accessed by authorized state employees and contractors, in compliance with the Playbook’s security protocols.
Related/Prior Legislation
SB 833 (McNerney, 2025) requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure that deploy AI systems to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor its AI system’s operations and to conduct annual safety and human oversight compliance assessments of its AI and automated decision systems, as specified. This bill also requires the California Department of Technology to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols. (Pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, OES, which houses Cal-CSIC, reports total cost pressures of approximately $713,000 in the first year and $463,000 ongoing until completion of the playbook (General Fund). Costs include two limited term staff with the technical AI expertise to develop the playbook.
GovOps anticipates costs to consult with OES to be minor and absorbable.
SUPPORT: (Verified 9/4/25)
Little Hoover Commission
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/4/25)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of this bill, the Little Hoover Commission writes that, “[i]n its 2024 report Artificial Intelligence and California State Government, the Commission recommended broad adoption of AI for the benefit of all Californians, while also safeguarding against potential harms. Among its recommendations, the Commission called for the state to develop more robust mechanisms to anticipate and respond to AI-related threats. It also urged the state to think beyond AI and begin developing cybersecurity strategies that address emerging technological threats more broadly.”
Further, “AB 979 aligns with these goals by promoting cross-agency communication and coordinated planning in the face of evolving cybersecurity challenges. The development of the Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook proposed in this bill would strengthen California’s ability to implement AI safely, securely, and transparently—key values emphasized throughout the Commission’s report. If I [Chair Pedro Nava], the Commission, or our staff can be of any further assistance as this proposal moves through the legislative process, please do not hesitate to reach out.”
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 6/2/25
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Elhawary, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bains
Prepared by: Brian Duke / G.O. / (916) 651-1530
9/6/25 10:36:33
**** END ****
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 979 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 979
Author: Irwin (D)
Amended: 8/29/25 in Senate
Vote: 21
SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COMMITTEE: 15-0, 6/24/25
AYES: Padilla, Archuleta, Ashby, Blakespear, Cervantes, Choi, Dahle, Hurtado, Jones, Ochoa Bogh, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Wahab, Weber Pierson
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 13-0, 7/1/25
AYES: Umberg, Niello, Allen, Arreguín, Ashby, Caballero, Durazo, Laird, Stern, Valladares, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 7-0, 8/29/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Dahle, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 6/2/25 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop a California Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (Playbook) to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Requires the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to establish and lead the Cal-CSIC, as specified, and requires Cal-CSIC to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
- Defines “artificial intelligence” to mean an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
This bill:
- Requires Cal-CSIC to develop, by January 1, 2027, and in consultation with the Office of Information Security (OIS) and the Government Operations Agency (GovOps), the Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the Playbook.
- Requires the Playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the Playbook.
- Provides that the Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the Playbook.
- Prohibits any record or information within a record of OES that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act, as specified; or in which based on the fats of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, from being disclosed to the public.
- Provides that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the Playbook developed under this bill is confidential and prohibits that information from being transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the Playbook, as specified.
- Includes legislative findings and declarations demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies and the need for protecting that interest, as specified.
Background
Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.”
Rapidly Evolving World of AI Technologies. The development and deployment of AI, and Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI), is accelerating exponentially across sectors, including within California state government. GenAI tools can produce text, images, audio, and video content by processing massive datasets. These tools offer new capabilities for public service delivery, internal operations, and constituent engagement. Unlike traditional predictive AI systems trained on narrow datasets to make recommendations, GenAI systems are designed to generate new content in response to user prompts.
California’s Executive Order N-12-23 initiated a statewide effort to integrate GenAI into state operations, resulting in pilot projects, procurement toolkits, and a dedicated portal, GenAI.ca.gov. While this framework encourages adoption, it also highlights the need to address system vulnerabilities and security risks associated with GenAI tools, including model poisoning, adversarial inputs, and evasion attacks.
Executive Order N-12-23 and California’s Generative AI Accountability Act. Noting California’s role as a global hub for AI and the natural leader in this emerging field of technology, Governor Newsom issued EO N-12-23 in September of 2023. In announcing the EO, Governor Newsom identified the need to deploy GenAI ethically and responsibly throughout state government, protect and prepare for potential harms, and remain the world’s AI leader.
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statutes of 2024) known as the Generative AI (GenAI) Accountability Act codified a number of the items listed in EO N-12-23 including: requiring CDT, under the guidance of GovOps, ODI, and CalHR, to update the benefits and risks of GenAI report, as needed, to respond to significant developments; requiring OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events; requiring state agencies and departments to consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities in which GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations; and, requiring legal counsel for state agencies and departments to consider any potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under that respective agency’s or department’s authority and recommend necessary updates, if appropriate, as a result of this evolving technology.
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The JCDC, established by the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, brings together public and private sector partners to coordinate U.S. cyber defense efforts. Operated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), JCDC includes entities such as Microsoft, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, and multiple federal agencies. Through voluntary information sharing, JCDC supports real-time coordination and threat response across government and industry.
In the final days of the Biden Administration, JCDC released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, aimed at facilitating voluntary information exchange among AI developers, providers, and adopters. The Playbook seeks to promote operational collaboration to address AI-specific cybersecurity risks, and will be updated periodically to reflect the evolving threat landscape.
The Playbook identifies the distinct vulnerabilities of AI systems, particularly those stemming from their non-deterministic nature where identical inputs can produce different outputs. This characteristic makes AI susceptible to model poisoning attacks, where adversaries manipulate training data or introduce malicious inputs to alter model behavior. In some cases, poisoned models may even fail to detect malware, creating serious security risks.
To support responsible information exchange, the Playbook adopts the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), a color-coded framework for designating how shared information should be handled and disclosed. TLP categories (RED, AMBER, GREEN, and CLEAR) help guide recipient organizations on how to act on shared threat data while maintaining confidentiality where necessary.
California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Cal-CSIC, within OES, is the hub of state government’s cybersecurity events. Cal-CSIC coordinates information sharing at all levels of government agencies, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC’s mission is to reduce the number of cyber threats and attacks in California and its focus is to respond to cyber threats and attacks that could damage the economy, its critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state.
California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. This bill requires Cal-CSIC, in coordination with OIS and GovOps, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook by January 1, 2027. The purpose of the Playbook is to strengthen the state’s collective cyber defenses against emerging threats associated with artificial intelligence by establishing structured mechanisms for information sharing. In developing the Playbook, Cal-CSIC must review and incorporate relevant federal standards and best practices, including the JCDC’s AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
The Playbook must include mandatory reporting requirements for state contractors and vendors that provide AI services, requiring them to share information about known threats and vulnerabilities related to those services with designated state entities. It may also include voluntary mechanisms for other organizations to participate in information sharing, where appropriate. To protect sensitive information, this bill specifies that any privileged, copyrighted, or otherwise legally protected records shall not be publicly disclosed. Additionally, any cyber threat information shared under the Playbook is considered confidential and may only be accessed by authorized state employees and contractors, in compliance with the Playbook’s security protocols.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 833 (McNerney, 2025) requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure that deploy AI systems to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor its AI system’s operations and to conduct annual safety and human oversight compliance assessments of its AI and automated decision systems, as specified. This bill also requires the California Department of Technology to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols. (Pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee)
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, OES, which houses Cal-CSIC, reports total cost pressures of approximately $713,000 in the first year and $463,000 ongoing until completion of the playbook (General Fund). Costs include two limited term staff with the technical AI expertise to develop the playbook.
GovOps anticipates costs to consult with OES to be minor and absorbable.
SUPPORT: (Verified 8/29/25)
Little Hoover Commission
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/29/25)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of the bill, the Little Hoover Commission writes that, “[i]n its 2024 report Artificial Intelligence and California State Government, the Commission recommended broad adoption of AI for the benefit of all Californians, while also safeguarding against potential harms. Among its recommendations, the Commission called for the state to develop more robust mechanisms to anticipate and respond to AI-related threats. It also urged the state to think beyond AI and begin developing cybersecurity strategies that address emerging technological threats more broadly.”
Further, “AB 979 aligns with these goals by promoting cross-agency communication and coordinated planning in the face of evolving cybersecurity challenges. The development of the Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook proposed in this bill would strengthen California’s ability to implement AI safely, securely, and transparently—key values emphasized throughout the Commission’s report. If I [Chair Pedro Nava], the Commission, or our staff can be of any further assistance as this proposal moves through the legislative process, please do not hesitate to reach out.”
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 78-0, 6/2/25
AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alanis, Alvarez, Arambula, Ávila Farías, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Castillo, Chen, Connolly, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Elhawary, Ellis, Flora, Fong, Gabriel, Gallagher, Garcia, Gipson, Jeff Gonzalez, Mark González, Hadwick, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Hoover, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lackey, Lee, Lowenthal, Macedo, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Celeste Rodriguez, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Sanchez, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Ta, Tangipa, Valencia, Wallis, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas
NO VOTE RECORDED: Bains
Prepared by: Brian Duke / G.O. / (916) 651-1530
9/2/25 18:12:13
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 979 (Irwin) - California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 979 requires, by July 1, 2026, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop a California Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on August 29, 2025
Fiscal Impact:
- The Office of Emergency Services (OES), which houses Cal-CSIC, reports total cost pressures of approximately $713,000 in the first year and $463,000 ongoing until completion of the playbook (General Fund). Costs include two limited term staff with the technical AI expertise to develop the playbook.
- The Government Operations (GovOps) Agency anticipates costs to consult with OES to be minor and absorbable.
Author Amendments:
Extend the due date of the playbook from July 1, 2026 to January 1, 2027.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 979 (Irwin) - California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 979 requires, by July 1, 2026, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop a California Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
Fiscal Impact:
- The Office of Emergency Services (OES) reports total cost pressures of approximately $713,000 in the first year and $463,000 ongoing until completion of the playbook (General Fund). Costs include two limited term staff with the technical AI expertise to develop the playbook.
- The Government Operations (GovOps) Agency anticipates costs to consult with OES to be minor and absorbable.
Background:
Cal-CSIC, within OES, is the hub of state government’s cybersecurity events. Cal-CSIC coordinates information sharing at all levels of government agencies, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC’s mission is to reduce the number of cyber threats and attacks in California and its focus is to respond to cyber threats and attacks that could damage the economy, its critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state.
Proposed Law:
- By July 1, 2026, requires Cal-CSIC, in collaboration with the Office of Information Security (OIS) and the GovOps Agency, to develop a CA AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
- Requires the playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services regarding those contracted or purchased services. Authorizes the playbook to include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices and use those resources to inform the development of the playbook.
- Prohibits any record or information within a record of OES that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act, as specified; or in which based on the fats of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, from being disclosed to the public.
- Provides that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the playbook developed under this bill is confidential and prohibits that information from being transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the playbook, as specified.
- States legislative findings and declarations.
Related Legislation:
AB 869 (Irwin, 2025) requires every state agency to implement Zero Trust architecture, including multifactor authentication, enterprise endpoint detection and response solutions, and robust logging practices, following uniform technology policies, standards, and procedures developed by the Chief of OIS. AB 869 is pending in this committee.
-- END --
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 979 (Author:Irwin)
Version: April 23, 2025
Hearing Date: July 1, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence
DIGEST
This bill requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (California Playbook) to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Within the Office of Emergency Services (OES), Cal-CSIC stands to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks within the state.
To address growing cyber threats and the attendant risks, the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established a public-private partnership to “unify cyber defense capabilities” called the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). In January of this year, JCDC published the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (JCDC Playbook), which provides guidance to organizations across the AI community for sharing AI-related cybersecurity information voluntarily with CISA and other partners through JCDC.
This bill requires Cal-CSIC, in coordination with other agencies, to develop its own playbook for these same purposes and informed by the JCDC playbook and other industry standards and best practices.
The bill is author-sponsored. No timely support or opposition has been received by the Committee. This bill passed out of the Senate Governmental Organization Committee on a vote of 15 to 0.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Establishes Cal-CSIC, within the Office of Emergency Services (OES), to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state. (Gov. Code § 8586.5.)
- Requires Cal-CSIC to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. (Gov. Code § 8586.5.)
- Establishes the California Department of Technology (CDT) within the Government Operations Agency (GovOps), which is supervised by the Director of Technology. The director is the State Chief Information Officer and must report directly to the Governor on issues relating to information technology. (Gov. Code § 11545.)
- Provides for the Office of Information Security in CDT whose purpose is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of state systems and applications, and to promote and protect privacy as part of the development and operations of state systems and applications to ensure the trust of the residents of this state. The duties of the Office of Information Security, under the direction of the chief, are to provide direction for information security and privacy to state government agencies, departments, and offices, pursuant to Section 11549.3 of the Government Code. (Gov. Code § 11549.)
This bill:
- Requires Cal-CSIC, on or before July 1, 2026, to develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and GovOps, a California Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the JCDC Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California Playbook, which shall include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the California Playbook.
- Provides that the California Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to the identified state entity.
- Provides that any record or information within a record of OES that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act; or in which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, shall not be disclosed to the public.
- Deems, notwithstanding any other law, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California Playbook is confidential and shall not be transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California Playbook.
COMMENTS
- Cybersecurity infrastructure in California
In order to better prepare the state for cyber attacks, Governor Brown established Cal-CSIC by executive order, Executive Order B-34-15. Eventually, in 2018, the center was codified by AB 2813 (Irwin, Ch. 768, Stats. 2018). Cal-CSIC’s primary mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in our state. It serves as the central organizing hub of the state’s cybersecurity activities and coordinates information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations.
Within CDT exists the Office of Information Security. The purpose of the Office of Information Security is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of state systems and applications, and to promote and protect privacy as part of the development and operations of state systems and applications to ensure the trust of the residents of this state. The duty of the Office of Information Security is to provide direction for information security and privacy to state government agencies, departments, and offices.
- Creating a California Playbook to respond to emerging cyber threats
As stated, on January 14, 2025, JCDC published the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook:
The JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook facilitates voluntary information sharing across the AI community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates. This playbook aims to:
- Guide JCDC partners on how to voluntarily share information related to incidents and vulnerabilities associated with AI systems.
- Outline CISA’s actions upon receiving shared information.
- Facilitate collaboration between federal agencies, private industry, international partners, and other stakeholders to raise awareness of AI cybersecurity risks and improve the resilience of AI systems.[1]
JCDC notes that while its playbook is focused on strengthening collaboration within its collaborative, it also identifies “actionable information sharing categories applicable to broader critical infrastructure stakeholders and other sharing mechanisms. CISA encourages organizations to adopt the playbook’s guidance to enhance their own information-sharing practices, contributing to a unified approach to AI-related cybersecurity threats across critical infrastructure.”[2]
This bill heeds this call and directs Cal-CSIC, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and GovOps, to establish a California Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. They are to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the JCDC Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California Playbook. The bill requires the establishment of mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services regarding those services, to a state entity to be identified in the California Playbook. The bill also authorizes voluntary mechanisms for other entities to engage in such information sharing with the identified state entity. The bill also calls for confidentiality protections for the information so shared.
According to the author:
California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
SUPPORT
None known
OPPOSITION
None known
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation:
SB 468 (Becker, 2025) imposes a duty on a business that deploys a high-risk artificial intelligence system, or high-risk automated decision system, that processes personal information to protect that information and requires such a deployer to maintain a comprehensive information security program that meets specified requirements. SB 468 is currently in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
AB 1405 (Bauer-Kahan, 2025) establishes an enrollment process for AI auditors within GovOps. It creates a publicly accessible repository of AI auditors and requires that they adhere to minimum standards of transparency, confidentiality, and ethical conduct. It also provides for whistleblower protections in certain cases for employees employed by enrolled auditors. AB 1405 is currently in this Committee and is set to be heard the same day as this bill.
Prior Legislation:
SB 1047 (Wiener, 2024) would have required developers of powerful AI models and those providing the computing power to train such models to put appropriate safeguards and policies into place to prevent critical harms. It would have established a state entity to oversee the development of these models. It would have required developers to report each AI safety incident affecting a covered model to the Attorney General within 72 hours.
Governor Newsom vetoed SB 1047, stating in part:
By focusing only on the most expensive and large-scale models, SB 1047 establishes a regulatory framework that could give the public a false sense of security about controlling this fast-moving technology. Smaller, specialized models may emerge as equally or even more dangerous than the models targeted by SB 1047 - at the potential expense of curtailing the very innovation that fuels advancement in favor of the public good.
Adaptability is critical as we race to regulate a technology still in its infancy. This will require a delicate balance. While well-intentioned, SB 1047 does not take into account whether an AI system is deployed in high-risk environments, involves critical decision-making or the use of sensitive data. Instead, the bill applies stringent standards to even the most basic functions - so long as a large system deploys it. I do not believe this is the best approach to protecting the public from real threats posed by the technology.
SB 265 (Hurtado, 2023) would have required OES to direct Cal-CSIC to prepare, and OES to submit to the Legislature on or before January 1, 2025, a strategic, multiyear outreach plan to assist critical infrastructure sectors, as defined, in their efforts to improve cybersecurity and an evaluation of options for providing grants or alternative forms of funding to improve cybersecurity preparedness. SB 265 died in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
SB 844 (Min, Ch. 505, Stats. 2022) required Cal-CSIC to create an annual report for four years on all expenditures made by the state within a single fiscal year pursuant to the federal State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act.
AB 2813 (Irwin, Ch. 768, Stats. 2018) See Comment 1.
PRIOR VOTES:
Senate Governmental Organization Committee (Ayes 15, Noes 0)
Assembly Floor (Ayes 78, Noes 0)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 14, Noes 0)
Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee (Ayes 13, Noes 0)
**************
JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (January 14, 2025) JCDC, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/JCDC%20AI%20Playbook_1.pdf. All internet citations current as of June 24, 2025. ↑
AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook Fact Sheet (January 14, 2025) JCDC, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/JCDC%20AI%20Playbook_FACT%20SHEET.pdf. ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
Senator Steve Padilla
Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: AB Hearing Date: 6/10/2025
Author: | Irwin | ||
Version: | Amended | ||
Urgency: | Fiscal: | ||
Consultant: | |||
SUBJECT:
DIGEST: This bill requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop a California Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (Playbook) to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Requires the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to establish and lead the Cal-CSIC, as specified.
- States that Cal-CSIC’s mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or public and private sector computer networks in the state.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with specified entities, including local, state, and federal agencies.
- Requires, pursuant to existing constitutional provisions, that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
- Defines “artificial intelligence” to mean an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
This bill:
- Requires Cal-CSIC to develop, by July 1, 2026, and in consultation with the Office of Information Security (OIS) and the Government Operations Agency (GovOps), the Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
- Requires Cal-CSIC to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the Playbook.
- Requires the Playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services regarding those contracted or purchased services, to a state entity identified in the Playbook.
- Provides that the Playbook may include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities, to a state entity identified in the Playbook.
- Prohibits any record or information within a record of OES that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act, as specified; or in which based on the fats of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record, from being disclosed to the public.
- Provides that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the Playbook developed under this bill is confidential and prohibits that information from being transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the Playbook, as specified.
- Includes legislative findings and declarations demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies and the need for protecting that interest, as specified.
Background
Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.”
Rapidly Evolving World of AI Technologies. The development and deployment of AI, and Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI), is accelerating exponentially across sectors, including within California state government. GenAI tools can produce text, images, audio, and video content by processing massive datasets. These tools offer new capabilities for public service delivery, internal operations, and constituent engagement. Unlike traditional predictive AI systems trained on narrow datasets to make recommendations, GenAI systems are designed to generate new content in response to user prompts.
California’s Executive Order N-12-23 initiated a statewide effort to integrate GenAI into state operations, resulting in pilot projects, procurement toolkits, and a dedicated portal, GenAI.ca.gov. While this framework encourages adoption, it also highlights the need to address system vulnerabilities and security risks associated with GenAI tools, including model poisoning, adversarial inputs, and evasion attacks.
State reports, such as the 2023 “Benefits and Risks of Generative Artificial Intelligence” report, note that current cybersecurity practices do not explicitly address AI-specific incidents. Although Cal-CSIC manages threat detection and reporting across the state enterprise, there is no designated mechanism for capturing, analyzing, or responding to GenAI-related security events.
GenAI tools, whether open- or closed-source, pose distinct challenges. Open-source systems allow transparency and independent review but are more susceptible to manipulation and misuse. Closed-source models offer more controlled access but lack public oversight. Both formats can be exploited to create harmful content, including synthetic media, disinformation, and unauthorized surveillance tools.
The Governor’s Joint AI Policy Working Group and the federal Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) have both recommended the development of tailored incident reporting and monitoring systems to better understand post-deployment harms and emerging threats. These recommendations emphasize the importance of aggregating AI-related incidents to inform risk mitigation, regulatory frameworks, and best practices.
Executive Order N-12-23 and California’s Generative AI Accountability Act. Noting California’s role as a global hub for AI and the natural leader in this emerging field of technology, Governor Newsom issued EO N-12-23 in September of 2023. In announcing the EO, Governor Newsom identified the need to deploy GenAI ethically and responsibly throughout state government, protect and prepare for potential harms, and remain the world’s AI leader. The EO can generally be broken up into the following elements:
- Beneficial Uses of Generative AI Report: Directs state agencies and departments to develop a report examining the most significant and beneficial uses of GenAI in the state. The report will also explain the potential harms and risks for communities, government, and state government workers.
- Risk-Analysis Report: Directs state agencies and departments to perform a joint-risk analysis of potential threats to and vulnerabilities of California’s critical energy infrastructure by the use of GenAI.
- Procurement Blueprint: To support a safe, ethical, and responsible innovation ecosystem inside state government, agencies will issue general guidelines for public sector procurement, uses, and required training for application of GenAI – building on the White House’s Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and the National Institute for Science and Technology’s (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework. State agencies and departments will consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities where GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations.
- Deployment and Analysis Framework: Develop guidelines for agencies and departments to analyze the impact that adopting GenAI tools may have on vulnerable communities. The state will establish the infrastructure needed to conduct pilots of GenAI projects, including CDT approved environments or “sandboxes” to test such projects.
- Evaluate Impacts of AI on an Ongoing Basis: Periodically evaluate for potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under the respective agency, department, or board’s authority and recommend necessary updates as a result of this evolving technology.
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statutes of 2024) known as the Generative AI (GenAI) Accountability Act codified a number of the items listed in EO N-12-23 including: requiring CDT, under the guidance of GovOps, ODI, and CalHR, to update the benefits and risks of GenAI report, as needed, to respond to significant developments; requiring OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events; requiring state agencies and departments to consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities in which GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations; and, requiring legal counsel for state agencies and departments to consider any potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under that respective agency’s or department’s authority and recommend necessary updates, if appropriate, as a result of this evolving technology.
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The JCDC, established by the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, brings together public and private sector partners to coordinate U.S. cyber defense efforts. Operated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), JCDC includes entities such as Microsoft, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, and multiple federal agencies. Through voluntary information sharing, JCDC supports real-time coordination and threat response across government and industry.
In the final days of the Biden Administration, JCDC released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, aimed at facilitating voluntary information exchange among AI developers, providers, and adopters. The Playbook seeks to promote operational collaboration to address AI-specific cybersecurity risks, and will be updated periodically to reflect the evolving threat landscape.
The Playbook identifies the distinct vulnerabilities of AI systems, particularly those stemming from their non-deterministic nature where identical inputs can produce different outputs. This characteristic makes AI susceptible to model poisoning attacks, where adversaries manipulate training data or introduce malicious inputs to alter model behavior. In some cases, poisoned models may even fail to detect malware, creating serious security risks.
To support responsible information exchange, the Playbook adopts the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), a color-coded framework for designating how shared information should be handled and disclosed. TLP categories (RED, AMBER, GREEN, and CLEAR) help guide recipient organizations on how to act on shared threat data while maintaining confidentiality where necessary.
California Cybersecurity Integration Center. Cal-CSIC, within OES, is the hub of state government’s cybersecurity events. Cal-CSIC coordinates information sharing at all levels of government agencies, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC’s mission is to reduce the number of cyber threats and attacks in California and its focus is to respond to cyber threats and attacks that could damage the economy, its critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state.
California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. This bill requires Cal-CSIC, in coordination with OIS and GovOps, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook by July 1, 2026. The purpose of the Playbook is to strengthen the state’s collective cyber defenses against emerging threats associated with artificial intelligence by establishing structured mechanisms for information sharing. In developing the Playbook, Cal-CSIC must review and incorporate relevant federal standards and best practices, including the JCDC’s AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
The Playbook must include mandatory reporting requirements for state contractors and vendors that provide AI services, requiring them to share information about known threats and vulnerabilities related to those services with designated state entities. It may also include voluntary mechanisms for other organizations to participate in information sharing, where appropriate. To protect sensitive information, the bill specifies that any privileged, copyrighted, or otherwise legally protected records shall not be publicly disclosed. Additionally, any cyber threat information shared under the Playbook is considered confidential and may only be accessed by authorized state employees and contractors, in compliance with the Playbook’s security protocols.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 833 (McNerney, 2025) requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure that deploy AI systems to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor its AI system’s operations and to conduct annual safety and human oversight compliance assessments of its AI and automated decision systems, as specified. This bill also requires the California Department of Technology to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy & Consumer Protection Committee)
AB 869 (Irwin, 2025) requires every state agency to implement Zero Trust architecture, including multifactor authentication, enterprise endpoint detection and response solutions, and robust logging practices, following uniform technology policies, standards, and procedures developed by the Chief of OIS. (Pending in the Senate Governmental Organization Committee)
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statutes of 2024) the GenAI Accountability Act requires, among other things, OES to perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, as specified.
SB 265 (Hurtado, 2023) would have required OES to direct Cal-CSIC to prepare, and OES to submit to the Legislature on or before January 1, 2025, a strategic, multiyear outreach plan to assist critical infrastructure sectors, as defined, in their efforts to improve cybersecurity and an evaluation of options for providing grants or alternative forms of funding to, and potential voluntary actions that do not require funding and that assist, that sector in their efforts to improve cybersecurity preparedness, as specified. (Held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee)
SCR 17 (Dodd, Res. Chapter 135, Statutes of 2023) committed the Legislature to examining and implementing the principles outlined in the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, published in October 2022 by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
AB 1667 (Irwin, 2023) would have created the California Cybersecurity Awareness and Education Council to research ways to increase cybersecurity awareness and education of students, families, and other adults, with the goal of helping people learn and use healthy cybersecurity practices; and, ways to create a larger and more diverse cybersecurity-trained workforce, as specified. (Held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee)
AB 2813 (Irwin, Chapter 768, Statutes of 2018) established Cal-CSIC, as specified, and required it to develop a cybersecurity strategy for California.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
SUPPORT:
Little Hoover Commission
OPPOSITION:
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of the bill, the Little Hoover Commission writes that, “[i]n its 2024 report Artificial Intelligence and California State Government, the Commission recommended broad adoption of AI for the benefit of all Californians, while also safeguarding against potential harms. Among its recommendations, the Commission called for the state to develop more robust mechanisms to anticipate and respond to AI-related threats. It also urged the state to think beyond AI and begin developing cybersecurity strategies that address emerging technological threats more broadly.”
Further, “AB 979 aligns with these goals by promoting cross-agency communication and coordinated planning in the face of evolving cybersecurity challenges. The development of the Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook proposed in this bill would strengthen California’s ability to implement AI safely, securely, and transparently—key values emphasized throughout the Commission’s report. If I [Chair Pedro Nava], the Commission, or our staff can be of any further assistance as this proposal moves through the legislative process, please do not hesitate to reach out.”
DUAL-REFERRAL: Senate Governmental Organization Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 979
Author:(Irwin)
As Amended Ver:April 23, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in coordination with the Office of Information Security, the Government Operations Agency, and relevant industry groups, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. This initiative would facilitate information sharing about threats to AI systems to promote safe deployment. Critically, the bill would mandate reporting mechanisms for state contractors and vendors providing AI services, requiring them to disclose known threats and vulnerabilities. It would also ensure that information can be shared confidentially between parties.
Major Provisions
- Requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats on or before July 1, 2026.
- Requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
- Requires The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook
- Establishes that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this bill is confidential and prohibits that information from being transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
COMMENTS
- JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Joint Cyber Defense Collective (JCDC) was established under the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act with the goal of unifying the cyber defense capabilities and actions of government and industry partners.[1] The JCDC includes participants such as Microsoft, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, and various U.S. government agencies, among many others. Through voluntary information sharing coordinated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), JCDC enables rapid, coordinated responses to cybersecurity threats with access to authoritative, real-time information.
In the final week of the Biden Administration, JCDC released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The purpose of the Playbook was to:
[F]acilitate voluntary information sharing across the AI community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.[2]
The Playbook highlights the unique dangers that AI systems introduce due to their reliance on non-deterministic models, meaning the same input does not always produce the same output. This unpredictability leaves AI systems vulnerable to cyberattacks, such as model poisoning. In model poisoning attacks, adversaries manipulate training data or use carefully crafted inputs to introduce misleading or malicious information into models, coaxing them into generating specific or tailored responses. In some cases, attackers can poison models in ways that prevent AI systems from detecting certain types of malware, making them especially vulnerable to cyberattacks.
The Playbook also promotes the use of the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) for information sharing. This color-coded system ensures that sensitive information is shared only with the appropriate audiences.[3] The four-color system, TLP:RED, TLP:AMBER, TLP:GREEN, and TLP:CLEAR, guides recipients on how to handle shared information, indicating how to respond to risks and whether a threat impacts privacy, management, or other critical areas of an organization. Within the Playbook framework, member organizations voluntarily share information using TLP to inform partners about potential threats.
Information sharing at this level will be critical, as AI systems are continuously tested for vulnerabilities by both ethical researchers and malicious actors. Early detection, identification, and remediation of emerging threats will rely heavily on this collaboration. As AI becomes increasingly integrated into critical infrastructure, it will be even more important for public and private sector organizations to strengthen these partnerships and ensure that AI systems are deployed securely and resiliently.
- What this bill would do. This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), in collaboration with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Playbook would facilitate the sharing of information regarding emerging risks and cybersecurity threats across the state. Cal-CSIC would be tasked with reviewing federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the JCDC's AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and using those resources to inform the development of California’s Playbook. This effort would bring together many of the major AI companies based in California to develop technically feasible strategies that promote the safe deployment of AI systems statewide.
However, this bill differs from the JCDC's AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook by requiring mandatory reporting and information sharing for potential threats and vulnerabilities identified by state contractors and vendors providing AI services. This provision is particularly crucial as artificial intelligence becomes increasingly integrated into state infrastructure through initiatives launched under Executive Order N-12-23 and the recently announced AI initiative within the California State University system.[4] The author notes, "The state has multiple avenues in which this could be pursued, including through procurement contract language, the State Administrative Manual, or the State Information Management Manual". In addition to mandatory reporting for state-related AI services, the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook would also include a voluntary information-sharing mechanism for threats and vulnerabilities involving non-state-connected AI systems.
To safeguard sensitive information, the bill includes provisions ensuring the confidentiality of data shared with Cal-CSIC regarding potential threats to AI systems. This includes protection for copyrighted or otherwise legally protected materials, which would be exempt from disclosure under public records requests. Finally, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures, when shared according to the Playbook, would be disclosed only to state employees and contractors who are authorized to receive it, consistent with additional security measures set forth in the Playbook.
According to the Author
California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
Arguments in Support
The Little Hoover Commission writes:
The Little Hoover Commission supports AB 979, which would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, to facilitate information sharing among artificial intelligence users in state government.
In its 2024 report, Artificial Intelligence and California State Government, the Commission recommended broad adoption of AI for the benefit of all Californians, while also safeguarding against potential harms. Among its recommendations, the Commission called for the state to develop more robust mechanisms to anticipate and respond to AI-related threats. It also urged the state to think beyond AI and begin developing cybersecurity strategies that address emerging technological threats more broadly.
AB 979 aligns with these goals by promoting cross-agency communication and coordinated planning in the face of evolving cybersecurity challenges. The development of the Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook proposed in this bill would strengthen California's ability to implement AI safely, securely, and transparently—key values emphasized throughout the Commission’s report.
Arguments in Opposition
None on file.
FISCAL COMMENTS
According to the Appropriation Committee Analysis:
- Costs (General Fund) to the Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to develop the Playbook. If CalOES needs additional staffing to fulfill the requirements of the bill, costs may be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars at a minimum.
- Costs (General Fund) of an unknown amount to OIS and GovOps to consult on the creation of the Playbook. Costs will depend on the amount of additional workload to each entity to consult with CalOES.
VOTES
ASM PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: 13-0-2
YES: Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Bryan, Flora, Irwin, Lowenthal, Ortega, Patterson, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Ward, Wicks, Wilson
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dixon, DeMaio
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 14-0-1
YES: Wicks, Arambula, Calderon, Caloza, Dixon, Elhawary, Fong, Mark González, Hart, Pacheco, Pellerin, Solache, Ta, Tangipa
ABS, ABST OR NV: Sanchez
UPDATED
VERSION: April 23, 2025
CONSULTANT: John Bennett / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200 FN: 0000798
Jim Langevin and Mark Montgomery, “Making the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative Work”, Lawfare (Aug. 6, 2021), accessed at http://lawfaremedia.org/article/making-joint-cyber-defense-collaborative-work. ↑
The CISA AI Cybersecurity Playbook can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ai-cybersecurity-collaboration-playbook. ↑
Infromation about the TLP system and CISA can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/traffic-light-protocol-tlp-definitions-and-usage. ↑
Amy DiPierro, "Cal State unveils artificial intelligence tools for students", EdSource (Feb. 4, 2025), accessed at https://edsource.org/2025/cal-state-unveils-artificial-intelligence-tools-for-students/726205. ↑
Date of Hearing: May 14, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 979
Author:(Irwin) – As Amended Ver:April 23, 2025
Policy Committee: | Privacy and Consumer Protection | Vote: | 13 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC) to develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security (OIS) and the Government Operations Agency (GovOps), a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook (Playbook) to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence (AI) community and to strengthen cyber defenses.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs (General Fund) to the Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) of an unknown but potentially significant amount to develop the Playbook. If CalOES needs additional staffing to fulfill the requirements of the bill, costs may be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars at a minimum.
- Costs (General Fund) of an unknown amount to OIS and GovOps to consult on the creation of the Playbook. Costs will depend on the amount of additional workload to each entity to consult with CalOES.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
- Background. Under the umbrella of OES, Cal-CSIC serves as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinates information sharing between stakeholders, including local, state and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC is co-located at the California State Threat Assessment Center, with the primary mission to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents that could damage California’s economy, critical infrastructure or public and private sector computer networks.
In January 2025, the federal Joint Cyber Defense Collective (JCDC) released its AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. JCDC brings together representatives from international governments, U.S. government agencies, and industry to provide rapid, coordinated responses to cybersecurity threats. JCDC’s playbook provides best practices for information sharing between AI providers, developers, and governments about emerging security threats. This bill requires Cal-CSIC, within CalOES, to create a similar playbook, in consultation with other relevant state agencies, and requires the playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors. The bill requires Cal-CSIC to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices when developing the playbook.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: May 1, 2025
Fiscal: Yes
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 979 (
Author:Irwin) – As Amended Ver:April 23, 2025
SUBJECT: California Cybersecurity Integration Center: artificial intelligence
SYNOPSIS
California is home to 32 of the top 50 artificial intelligence (AI) companies, and the use cases for AI continue to expand. In September 2023, Governor Newsom issued Executive Order N-12-23 to establish a framework for assessing and deploying generative AI through pilot projects across different state agencies. This executive order laid the groundwork for what effective AI deployment could look like within the public sector. However, many AI systems have yet to demonstrate sufficient safety and resilience, posing potential risks to critical infrastructure if deployed prematurely.
In the final week of the Biden Administration, the Joint Cyber Defense Collective (JCDC), a public-private partnership, released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Playbook aims to establish best practices for information sharing regarding the risks and vulnerabilities of AI systems.
This author-sponsored bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center, in coordination with the Office of Information Security, the Government Operations Agency, and relevant industry groups, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. Similar to its federal counterpart, this initiative would facilitate information sharing about threats to AI systems to promote safe deployment. Critically, the bill would mandate reporting mechanisms for state contractors and vendors providing AI services, requiring them to disclose known threats and vulnerabilities. It would also ensure that information can be shared confidentially between parties. This bill is supported by the Little Hoover Commission and has no opposition.
THIS BILL:
- Requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats on or before July 1, 2026.
- Requires the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to review federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and use those resources to inform the development of the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
- Requires The California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to include mandatory mechanisms for information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities known to state contractors and vendors providing AI services to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
- Permits the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook to include voluntary mechanisms for other entities, as appropriate, to engage in information sharing on potential threats and vulnerabilities to a state entity identified in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
- Prohibits any record or information from being disclosed to the public that is within a record of the Office of Emergency Services that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act; or which based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.
- Establishes that any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures for a cybersecurity purpose shared in accordance with the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook developed under this bill is confidential and prohibits that information from being transmitted or shared, except to state employees and state contractors who have been approved as necessary to receive the information and in a manner that complies with all other security requirements in the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes the Cal-CSIC within the Office of Emergency Services. (Gov. Code § 8586.5 (a).)
- Directs Cal-CSIC to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and coordinate information sharing with local, state, and federal agencies, tribal governments, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, including school districts, county offices of education, and charter schools, and nongovernmental organizations. (Gov. Code § 8586.5(a).)
- Requires Cal-CSIC to provide warnings of cyberattacks to government agencies and nongovernmental partners, coordinate information sharing among these entities, assess risks to critical infrastructure and information technology networks, prioritize cyber threats and support public and private sector partners in protecting their vulnerable infrastructure and information technology networks, enable cross-sector coordination and sharing of recommended best practices and security measures. (Gov. Code § 8586.5(b).)
- Establishes the Office of Information Security within the Department of Technology. (Gov. Code § 11549(a).)
- Requires the Chief of the Office of Information Security to establish an information security program, and is empowered to create, update and publish policies, standards, and procedures to manage security and risk. (Gov. Code § 11549(b).)
- Directs the Department of Technology, in consultation with the Department of General Services, and the Department of Finance, to set procedures related to the procurement of information technology. (Pub. Contr. Code § 12104(b).)
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
California has a compelling interest in supporting the development and deployment of AI for the benefit of our constituents and our economy. The Legislature’s role in crafting AI policy must continue to focus on creating opportunities for transparency between developers and users to build trust, acceptance, and a sense of security. By creating a California AI Cybersecurity Playbook, the state can facilitate information sharing across the artificial intelligence community and strengthen our collective cyber defenses against emerging threats.
2) AI and GenAI. The development of GenAI is creating exciting opportunities to grow California’s economy and improve the lives of its residents. GenAI can generate compelling text, images and audio in an instant – but with novel technologies come novel safety concerns.
In brief, AI is the mimicking of human intelligence by artificial systems such as computers. AI uses algorithms – sets of rules – to transform inputs into outputs. Inputs and outputs can be anything a computer can process: numbers, text, audio, video, or movement. AI is not fundamentally different from other computer functions; its novelty lies in its application. Unlike normal computer functions, AI is able to accomplish tasks that are normally performed by humans.
AI that are trained on small, specific datasets in order to make recommendations and predictions are sometimes referred to as “predictive AI.” This differentiates them from GenAI, which are trained on massive datasets in order to produce detailed text and images. When Netflix suggests a TV show to a viewer, the recommendation is produced by predictive AI that has been trained on the viewing habits of Netflix users. When ChatGPT generates text in clear, concise paragraphs, it uses GenAI that has been trained on the written contents of the internet.
GenAI tools can be released in open-source or closed-source formats by their creators. Open-source tools are publically available; researchers and developers can access their code and parameters. This accessibility increases transparency, but it has downsides: when a tool’s code and parameters can be easily accessed, they can be easily altered, and open-source tools have the potential to be used for nefarious purposes such as generating deepfake pornography and targeted propaganda. By comparison, closed-source tools are opaque with respect to their security features. It is harder for bad actors to generate illicit materials using these tools. But unlike open-source tools, closed-source tools are not subject to collective oversight because their inner workings cannot be examined by independent experts.
3) Excutive order N-12-23. The growing use of generative AI (GenAI) is not only being pursued by private entities but also increasingly by the public sector. In September 2023, Governor Newsom signed Executive Order N-12-23, establishing a framework to study the development, use, and risks of GenAI, as well as a process for its evaluation and deployment within state government.[1] Currently, five GenAI pilot projects are underway, addressing a range of issues, from improving road safety to enhancing healthcare facility inspections. The administration is also seeking with a Requests for Innovative Ideas (RFI2) for possible future projects. Additionally, the executive order introduced a procurement toolkit to guide state employees and officials when purchasing a GenAI tool, renewing tools that incorporate GenAI features, or encountering GenAI capabilities unexpectedly in procurement contracts.
A crucial element of deploying these new technologies is ensuring that they do not jeopardize the security of critical state infrastructure. As part of the executive order, the Government Operations Agency, the California Department of Technology (CDT), the Office of Data and Innovation, and the Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development, in collaboration with other state agencies, released a report titled “Benefits and Risks of Generative Artificial Intelligence.”[2] The report highlighted that GenAI carries inherent risks and emphasized the importance of robust reporting mechanisms to ensure safety:
As members of Cal OES’s Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), CDT’s Office of Information Security works collaboratively with the California Highway Patrol (CHP), California Military Department (CMD), Office of Health Information Integrity, and other essential agencies on mitigating, identifying, responding to, and reporting security incidents.
GenAI systems can be susceptible to unique attacks and manipulations, such as poisoning of AI training datasets, evasion attacks, and interference attacks. As with any other technology-driven threat to state security, when a state employee suspects one of these GenAI related incidents such as a GenAI- generated or -impacted incident has occurred, to the degree they’re known, the employee should report it immediately for central tracking and coordination. Consistent with State Information Management Manual (SIMM) section and current practice for other technology-driven threats, it is the responsibility of the state entity Information Security Officer (ISO) or authorized user to immediately report the incident through the California Compliance and Security Incident Reporting System (Cal-CSIRS) so that further pattern analysis can be conducted for correction and safeguarding.
The Cal-CSIC’s current incident reporting and information sharing apparatus focuses on cyber threat detection, reporting and response, without an explicit focus on AI or GenAI applications.[3]
4) JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Joint Cyber Defense Collective (JCDC) was established under the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act with the goal of unifying the cyber defense capabilities and actions of government and industry partners.[4] The JCDC includes participants such as Microsoft, the UK National Cyber Security Centre, and various U.S. government agencies, among many others. Through voluntary information sharing coordinated by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), JCDC enables rapid, coordinated responses to cybersecurity threats with access to authoritative, real-time information.
In the final week of the Biden Administration, JCDC released the AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The purpose of the Playbook was to:
[F]acilitate voluntary information sharing across the AI community, including AI providers, developers, and adopters, to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. The playbook is intended to foster operational collaboration among government, industry, and international partners and will be periodically updated to ensure adaptability to the dynamic threat landscape as AI adoption accelerates.[5]
The Playbook highlights the unique dangers that AI systems introduce due to their reliance on non-deterministic models, meaning the same input does not always produce the same output. This unpredictability leaves AI systems vulnerable to cyberattacks, such as model poisoning. In model poisoning attacks, adversaries manipulate training data or use carefully crafted inputs to introduce misleading or malicious information into models, coaxing them into generating specific or tailored responses. In some cases, attackers can poison models in ways that prevent AI systems from detecting certain types of malware, making them especially vulnerable to cyberattacks.
The Playbook also promotes the use of the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) for information sharing. This color-coded system ensures that sensitive information is shared only with the appropriate audiences.[6] The four-color system, TLP:RED, TLP:AMBER, TLP:GREEN, and TLP:CLEAR, guides recipients on how to handle shared information, indicating how to respond to risks and whether a threat impacts privacy, management, or other critical areas of an organization. Within the Playbook framework, member organizations voluntarily share information using TLP to inform partners about potential threats.
Information sharing at this level will be critical, as AI systems are continuously tested for vulnerabilities by both ethical researchers and malicious actors. Early detection, identification, and remediation of emerging threats will rely heavily on this collaboration. As AI becomes increasingly integrated into critical infrastructure, it will be even more important for public and private sector organizations to strengthen these partnerships and ensure that AI systems are deployed securely and resiliently.
5) What this bill would do. This bill would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), in collaboration with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook. The Playbook would facilitate the sharing of information regarding emerging risks and cybersecurity threats across the state. Cal-CSIC would be tasked with reviewing federal requirements, standards, and industry best practices, including the JCDC’s AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, and using those resources to inform the development of California’s Playbook. This effort would bring together many of the major AI companies based in California to develop technically feasible strategies that promote the safe deployment of AI systems statewide.
However, this bill differs from the JCDC’s AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook by requiring mandatory reporting and information sharing for potential threats and vulnerabilities identified by state contractors and vendors providing AI services. This provision is particularly crucial as artificial intelligence becomes increasingly integrated into state infrastructure through initiatives launched under Executive Order N-12-23 and the recently announced AI initiative within the California State University system.[7] The author notes, “The state has multiple avenues in which this could be pursued, including through procurement contract language, the State Administrative Manual, or the State Information Management Manual”. In addition to mandatory reporting for state-related AI services, the California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook would also include a voluntary information-sharing mechanism for threats and vulnerabilities involving non-state-connected AI systems.
To safeguard sensitive information, the bill includes provisions ensuring the confidentiality of data shared with Cal-CSIC regarding potential threats to AI systems. This includes protection for copyrighted or otherwise legally protected materials, which would be exempt from disclosure under public records requests. Finally, any information related to cyber threat indicators or defensive measures, when shared according to the Playbook, would be disclosed only to state employees and contractors who are authorized to receive it, consistent with additional security measures set forth in the Playbook.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: The Little Hoover Commission writes:
The Little Hoover Commission supports AB 979, which would require the California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, in consultation with the Office of Information Security and the Government Operations Agency, to facilitate information sharing among artificial intelligence users in state government.
In its 2024 report, Artificial Intelligence and California State Government, the Commission recommended broad adoption of AI for the benefit of all Californians, while also safeguarding against potential harms. Among its recommendations, the Commission called for the state to develop more robust mechanisms to anticipate and respond to AI-related threats. It also urged the state to think beyond AI and begin developing cybersecurity strategies that address emerging technological threats more broadly.
AB 979 aligns with these goals by promoting cross-agency communication and coordinated planning in the face of evolving cybersecurity challenges. The development of the Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook proposed in this bill would strengthen California’s ability to implement AI safely, securely, and transparently—key values emphasized throughout the Commission’s report.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Little Hoover Commission
Opposition:
None on file.
Analysis Prepared by: John Bennett / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
Information about Executive Order N-12-23 can be found at https://www.govops.ca.gov/generative-ai-genai-executive-order/. ↑
Report on Benefits and Risks of Generative Artificial Intelligence can be found at https://www.govops.ca.gov/generative-ai-genai-executive-order/. ↑
Cal-SCIC reporting information can be found at https://www.caloes.ca.gov/office-of-the-director/operations/homeland-security/california-cybersecurity-integration-center/. ↑
Jim Langevin and Mark Montgomery, “Making the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative Work”, Lawfare (Aug. 6, 2021), accessed at http://lawfaremedia.org/article/making-joint-cyber-defense-collaborative-work. ↑
The CISA AI Cybersecurity Playbook can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ai-cybersecurity-collaboration-playbook. ↑
Infromation about the TLP system and CISA can be found at https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/traffic-light-protocol-tlp-definitions-and-usage. ↑
Amy DiPierro, “Cal State unveils artificial intelligence tools for students”, EdSource (Feb. 4, 2025), accessed at https://edsource.org/2025/cal-state-unveils-artificial-intelligence-tools-for-students/726205. ↑
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Assembly Floor
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):