(1)Existing state and federal law provides for the enforcement of laws related to elections.

This bill would prohibit a peace officer from interfering with the administration of an election, as specified. This bill would authorize certain persons to enforce those prohibitions by filing a civil action, as specified. This bill would also prohibit any individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as specified, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order or to investigate certain types of voting fraud. The bill would additionally require the Attorney General to provide guidance and information regarding how to respond to requests by law enforcement, as defined, to access areas where ballots are present.

(2)Existing law requires an elections official, upon receiving a vote by mail ballot, to compare the signature on the identification envelope with the voters prior signatures, and it also provides a mechanism by which a voter can verify their signature and cure this defect. Existing law provides that the processing of vote by mail ballots is open to the public and permits specified persons and organizations to observe this processing.

This bill would prohibit a vote by mail observer from challenging a signature on a vote by mail ballot that has been verified by the voter.

(3)Under existing law, it is a crime for a person in possession of a firearm, a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or any person wearing the uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the appropriate elections official. It is also a crime for a person to hire or arrange for such a person to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the elections official.

This bill would authorize the Secretary of State or Attorney General to object to authorization provided by the appropriate elections official, in which case the person stationed or posted at the polling place, or the person who hired or arranged for such a person to be stationed or posted at the polling place, is guilty of a crime. By expanding the scope of these crimes, the bill would create a state-mandated local program.

(4)Existing law authorizes the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and any local elections official in the county in which the act occurs, to bring a civil action against an individual, business, or other legal entity that commits any specified act of tampering with a voting system or voting equipment before, during, or after an election.

This bill would additionally authorize the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the appropriate local elections official to bring a civil action against a person, business, or entity that takes a package containing ballots from the custody of an elections official.

(5)Existing law makes it a crime for an individual to undertake a number of enumerated actions that would result in interference with an election, including displaying a container for the purpose of collecting ballots with the intent to deceive a voter into casting a ballot in an unofficial ballot box.

This bill would also make it a crime to take a package containing voted ballots out of the custody of an elections official. By expanding the scope of this crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

(6)Existing law requires the elections official of any county or city using a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every 2 years.

This bill would prohibit an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as defined, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of certified voting technology unless authorized by a court order. To the extent this bill would establish new procedures for the conduct of elections, it would create a state-mandated local program.

(7)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.

With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.

(8)This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.

(1)Existing state and federal law provides for the enforcement of laws related to elections.

This bill would prohibit a peace officer from interfering with the administration of an election, as specified. This bill would authorize certain persons to enforce those prohibitions by filing a civil action, as specified. This bill would also prohibit any individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as specified, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order or to investigate certain types of voting fraud. The bill would additionally require the Attorney General to provide guidance and information regarding how to respond to requests by law enforcement, as defined, to access areas where ballots are present.

(2)Existing law requires an elections official, upon receiving a vote by mail ballot, to compare the signature on the identification envelope with the voters prior signatures, and it also provides a mechanism by which a voter can verify their signature and cure this defect. Existing law provides that the processing of vote by mail ballots is open to the public and permits specified persons and organizations to observe this processing.

This bill would prohibit a vote by mail observer from challenging a signature on a vote by mail ballot that has been verified by the voter.

(3)Under existing law, it is a crime for a person in possession of a firearm, a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or any person wearing the uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the appropriate elections official. It is also a crime for a person to hire or arrange for such a person to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the elections official.

This bill would authorize the Secretary of State or Attorney General to object to authorization provided by the appropriate elections official, in which case the person stationed or posted at the polling place, or the person who hired or arranged for such a person to be stationed or posted at the polling place, is guilty of a crime. By expanding the scope of these crimes, the bill would create a state-mandated local program.

(4)Existing law authorizes the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and any local elections official in the county in which the act occurs, to bring a civil action against an individual, business, or other legal entity that commits any specified act of tampering with a voting system or voting equipment before, during, or after an election.

This bill would additionally authorize the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the appropriate local elections official to bring a civil action against a person, business, or entity that takes a package containing ballots from the custody of an elections official.

(5)Existing law makes it a crime for an individual to undertake a number of enumerated actions that would result in interference with an election, including displaying a container for the purpose of collecting ballots with the intent to deceive a voter into casting a ballot in an unofficial ballot box.

This bill would also make it a crime to take a package containing voted ballots out of the custody of an elections official. By expanding the scope of this crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

(6)Existing law requires the elections official of any county or city using a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every 2 years.

This bill would prohibit an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as defined, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of certified voting technology unless authorized by a court order. To the extent this bill would establish new procedures for the conduct of elections, it would create a state-mandated local program.

(7)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.

With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.

(8)This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.

(1)Existing state and federal law provides for the enforcement of laws related to elections.

This bill would prohibit a peace officer from interfering with the administration of an election, as specified, from establishing or attempting to establish the qualifications of voters, or from imposing rules, standards, or practices contrary to state elections law. specified. This bill would authorize certain persons to enforce those prohibitions by filing a civil action, as specified. This bill would also prohibit any individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as specified, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order or to investigate certain types of voting fraud. The bill would additionally require the Attorney General to provide guidance and information regarding how to respond to requests by law enforcement, as defined, to access areas where ballots are present.

(2)Existing law requires an elections official, upon receiving a vote by mail ballot, to compare the signature on the identification envelope with the voters prior signatures, and it also provides a mechanism by which a voter can verify their signature and cure this defect. Existing law provides that the processing of vote by mail ballots is open to the public and permits specified persons and organizations to observe this processing.

This bill would prohibit a vote by mail observer from challenging a signature on a vote by mail ballot that has been verified by the voter.

(3)Under existing law, it is a crime for a person in possession of a firearm, a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or any person wearing the uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the appropriate elections official. It is also a crime for a person to hire or arrange for such a person to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the elections official.

This bill would authorize the Secretary of State or Attorney General to object to authorization provided by the appropriate elections official, in which case the person stationed or posted at the polling place, or the person who hired or arranged for such a person to be stationed or posted at the polling place, is guilty of a crime. By expanding the scope of these crimes, the bill would create a state-mandated local program.

(4)Existing law authorizes the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and any local elections official in the county in which the act occurs, to bring a civil action against an individual, business, or other legal entity that commits any specified act of tampering with a voting system or voting equipment before, during, or after an election.

This bill would additionally authorize the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the appropriate local elections official to bring a civil action against a person, business, or entity that takes a package containing ballots from the custody of an elections official.

(5)Existing law makes it a crime for an individual to undertake a number of enumerated actions that would result in interference with an election, including displaying a container for the purpose of collecting ballots with the intent to deceive a voter into casting a ballot in an unofficial ballot box.

This bill would also make it a crime to take a package containing voted ballots out of the custody of an elections official. By expanding the scope of this crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

(6)Existing law requires the elections official of any county or city using a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every 2 years.

This bill would prohibit an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as defined, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of certified voting technology unless authorized by a court order. To the extent this bill would establish new procedures for the conduct of elections, it would create a state-mandated local program.

(7)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.

With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.

(8)This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.

(1)Existing state and federal law provides for the enforcement of laws related to elections.

This bill would prohibit a peace officer from interfering with the administration of an election, as specified, from establishing or attempting to establish the qualifications of voters, or from imposing rules, standards, or practices contrary to state elections law. This bill would authorize certain persons to enforce those prohibitions by filing a civil action, as specified. This bill would also prohibit any individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as specified, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order. order or to investigate certain types of voting fraud. The bill would additionally require the Attorney General to provide guidance and information regarding how to respond to requests by law enforcement, as defined, to access areas where ballots are present.

(2)Existing law requires an elections official, upon receiving a vote by mail ballot, to compare the signature on the identification envelope with the voters prior signatures, and it also provides a mechanism by which a voter can verify their signature and cure this defect. Existing law provides that the processing of vote by mail ballots is open to the public and permits specified persons and organizations to observe this processing.

This bill would prohibit a vote by mail observer from challenging a signature on a vote by mail ballot that has been verified by the voter. This bill would also prohibit an elections official from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as defined, acting in their official capacity from serving as a vote by mail voter observer.

(3)Under existing law, it is a crime for a person in possession of a firearm, a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or any person wearing the uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the appropriate elections official. It is also a crime for a person to hire or arrange for such a person to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization from the elections official.

(4)Existing law authorizes the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and any local elections official in the county in which the act occurs, to bring a civil action against an individual, business, or other legal entity that commits any specified act of tampering with a voting system or voting equipment before, during, or after an election.

This bill would additionally authorize the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the appropriate local elections official to bring a civil action against a person, business, or entity that takes a package containing ballots from the custody of an elections official, as specified. official.

(5)Existing law makes it a crime for an individual to undertake a number of enumerated actions that would result in interference with an election, including displaying a container for the purpose of collecting ballots with the intent to deceive a voter into casting a ballot in an unofficial ballot box.

This bill would also make it a crime to take a package containing voted ballots out of the custody of an elections official, as specified. official. By expanding the scope of these crimes, this crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

(6)Existing law requires the elections official of any county or city using a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every 2 years.

This bill would prohibit an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency, as defined, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of a voting system machine, device, software, or source code, certified voting technology unless authorized by a court order. To the extent this bill would establish new procedures for the conduct of elections, it would create a state-mandated local program.

(7)The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that with regard to certain mandates no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.

With regard to any other mandates, this bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs so mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.

(8)This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.

This bill would declare that it is to take effect immediately as an urgency statute.

(1)The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires a lead agency, as defined, to prepare, or cause to be prepared, and certify the completion of an environmental impact report (EIR) on a project that it proposes to carry out or approve that may have a significant effect on the environment or to adopt a negative declaration if it finds that the project will not have that effect. CEQA also requires a lead agency to prepare a mitigated negative declaration for a project that may have a significant effect on the environment if revisions in the project would avoid or mitigate that effect and there is no substantial evidence that the project, as revised, would have a significant effect on the environment.

CEQA exempts from its requirements certain residential, employment center, and mixed-use development projects meeting specified criteria, including that the project is located in a transit priority area and that the project is undertaken and is consistent with a specific plan for which an environmental impact report has been certified.

This bill would additionally exempt those projects located in a very low vehicle travel area, as defined. The bill would require that the project is undertaken and is consistent with either a specific plan prepared pursuant to specific provisions of law or a community plan, as defined, for which an EIR has been certified within the preceding 15 years in order to be exempt. The bill would additionally require the project site to have been previously developed or to be a vacant site meeting certain requirements. Because a lead agency would be required to determine the applicability of this exemption, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

(2)CEQA exempts from its requirements agricultural employee housing projects, affordable housing projects, and housing projects on infill sites that meet certain requirements, including, among others, the site is not located within the boundaries of a state conservancy. CEQA prohibits those exempt projects from being located in certain areas.

This bill would allow the location of agricultural employee housing projects, affordable housing projects, and housing projects on infill sites to be located within the boundaries of a state conservancy in order to be exempt. The bill would revise and recast the areas in which those exempt projects cannot be located, as provided.

(3)CEQA exempts from its requirements residential projects on infill sites that meet certain requirements, including, among others, that the location of the residential project on an infill site is no more than 4 acres and that the project is located within ¹/₂ mile of a major transit stop.

This bill instead would require that the location of a residential project on an infill site be no more than 5 acres. The bill would additionally exempt those residential projects located in a very low vehicle travel area, as defined.

(4)CEQA exempts from its requirements a transit priority project meeting certain requirements and that is declared by a legislative body to be a sustainable communities project. CEQA prohibits a transit priority project declared to be a sustainable communities project from being located in certain areas and requires the project to be within ¹/₂ mile of a rail transit station or a ferry terminal included in a regional transportation plan or within ¹/₄ mile of a high-quality transit corridor included in a regional transportation plan.

This bill would revise and recast the areas in which the transit priority project declared to be a sustainable communities project cannot be located, as provided. The bill would additionally authorize the transit priority project declared to be a sustainable community project if the project is located within a very low vehicle travel area, as defined. The bill would additionally require the site for the transit priority project to have been previously developed or to be a vacant lot meeting certain requirements.

(5)This bill would require a lead agency approving a project that is exempt from CEQA under the provisions described in paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) above to file with the Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation a notice of exemption. By imposing additional duties on the lead agency, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

(6) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.

 UNFINISHED BUSINESS  

Bill No: SB 73

Author: Cervantes (D) and Umberg (D), et al.

Amended: 5/18/26

Vote: 27 - Urgency

SENATE ELECTIONS & C.A. COMMITTEE: 4-1, 1/13/26

AYES: Cervantes, Allen, Durazo, Umberg

NOES: Choi

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 1/22/26

AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab

NOES: Seyarto, Dahle

SENATE FLOOR: 30-10, 1/27/26

AYES: Allen, Archuleta, Arreguín, Ashby, Becker, Blakespear, Cabaldon, Caballero, Cervantes, Cortese, Durazo, Gonzalez, Grayson, Hurtado, Laird, Limón, McGuire, McNerney, Menjivar, Padilla, Pérez, Reyes, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Stern, Umberg, Wahab, Weber Pierson, Wiener

NOES: Alvarado-Gil, Choi, Dahle, Grove, Jones, Niello, Ochoa Bogh, Seyarto, Strickland, Valladares

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 57-19, 5/22/26 - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Elections

SOURCE: Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders for Civic Empowerment

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

DIGEST:

This bill restricts law enforcement agencies and officers from engaging in specified conduct related to elections; (2) clarifies that a person who is observing the processing of vote by mail (VBM) ballots is prohibited from challenging whether signatures compare.

Assembly Amendments

of 5/18/26 added provisions prohibiting conduct by law enforcement agencies and officers as well as clarifications surrounding challenges to VBM ballot signatures.

ANALYSIS:

Existing federal law:

1. Provides, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, the times, places, and manner of holding elections for U.S. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives be prescribed by a state’s legislature. Congress may, at any time, make law or alter regulations related to elections, except as to the places of choosing U.S. Senators.
2. Prohibits an officer or member of the Armed Forces of the United States from doing any of the following:
   1. Prescribing, fixing, or attempting to prescribe or fix by proclamation, order, or otherwise, the qualifications of voters at any election in any state.
   2. Preventing or attempting to prevent by force, threat, intimidation, advice, or otherwise any qualified voter of any state from fully exercising the right of suffrage at any general or special election.
   3. Ordering, compelling, or attempting to compel any election officer in any state to receive a vote from a person not legally qualified to vote.
   4. Imposing or attempting to impose any regulations for conducting any general or special election in a state different from those prescribed by law.
   5. Interfering in any manner with an election official’s discharge of their duties.
3. Prohibits military officials or federal officials from stationing troops or armed personnel at any place where a general or special election is held, unless such force is necessary to repel armed enemies of the U.S.
4. Provides specified exceptions when a person in 2) and 3) of existing federal law is exercising their right of suffrage.
5. Provides a person violating 2) and 3) of existing federal law is subject to a fine or imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. The person is also disqualified from holding any office of honor, profit, or trust under the U.S.
6. Prohibits a person employed in any administrative position in the U.S. government, as specified, from using official authority for the purpose of interfering with, or affecting, the nomination or the election of any candidate for President, Vice President, Presidential Elector, Member of the U.S. Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner. A person in violation of this is subject to a fine or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.

Existing state law:

1. Requires a state or local agency or political subdivision to provide notice to the Secretary of State (SOS) and the Attorney General (AG) within three court days of the filing or service of a court action relating to an election-related claim under federal law, and at least 14 court days before entering into a settlement, consent decree, or other court-approved agreement in such an action.
2. Provides for public observation during the processing of VBM ballots and permits observers to challenge whether individuals handling VBM ballots are following established procedures.
3. Makes it a crime for a person to do any of the following:
   1. Interfere with the officers holding an election or conducting a canvass or with voters lawfully voting in an election, as specified.
   2. Use, or threaten to use, force, violence, intimidation, or coercion (or to have someone else do so) to influence how a person votes, or whether they vote at all, or to punish them for how or whether they voted.
   3. Place a sign relating to voters’ qualifications, speak to a voter related to their qualifications, record a voter entering or exiting a voting location, or obstruct ingress, egress, or parking, within 100 feet of a voting location or ballot drop-off location with the intent of dissuading a person from voting.
   4. Knowingly challenge a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds.
   5. Be stationed at a voting location without the written authorization of the elections official while in possession of a firearm as a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or while wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, except as specified.
   6. Hire or arrange for a person to be stationed at a voting location without the written authorization of the elections official while in possession of a firearm as a uniformed law enforcement officer, private guard, or security personnel, or while wearing a uniform of a law enforcement officer, guard, or security personnel, except as specified.
   7. Tamper with, interfere with, or damage voting technology, as specified. Interfering with voting technology includes providing unauthorized access to or breaking the chain of custody of certified voting technology.
   8. Tamper with ballots, poll lists, ballot containers, or election returns.
   9. Act as an election officer or perform any of an election officer’s duties without first having been appointed as such.
4. Prohibits a person, other than a poll worker or other official responsible for conducting an election, from challenging or questioning a voter at a voting location regarding their qualifications to vote.
5. Establishes a civil cause of action against a person who intimidates, threatens, or coerces another person, or attempts to do any of those things, for voting, attempting to vote, urging or aiding another person in voting or attempting to vote, or exercising powers or duties to administer elections.
6. Prohibits sealed packages containing voted ballots from an election from being taken from the custody of an elections official.
7. Permits the SOS, the AG, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against any person who tampers with voting technology.

This bill:

1. Requires the AG, in consultation with the SOS, to provide guidance and information to county election officials regarding how election officials, precinct boards, election workers, and election volunteers should respond to requests by an agent of a law enforcement agency to access areas where ballots are cast, handled, processed, counted, tabulated, tallied, audited, or recounted.
2. Requires the AG, in consultation with the SOS, to publish and provide guidance to managers of election sites regarding how to respond to requests by an agent of a law enforcement agency to access areas where ballots are cast, handled, processed, counted, tabulated, tallied, audited, or recounted.
3. Defines “law enforcement agency” as all of the following:
   1. Any law enforcement agency, department, or other entity of the state or any political subdivision thereof, that employs any peace officer.
   2. Any law enforcement agency of another state.
   3. Any federal law enforcement agency.
4. Prohibits a peace officer from interfering in any manner with the administration of any election in this state and in the discharge of duties by the SOS, a county elections official, an election worker, or a volunteer performing required elections-related tasks prescribed by the Elections Code or any other provision of state law, except as necessary to respond to urgent threats to public health and safety.
5. Permits the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action to enforce the prohibitions in 4) of this bill. A court must expedite the scheduling and disposition of a civil action if the action is filed during the period beginning 30 days before Election Day and ending with the completion of the canvass.
6. Prohibits an election observer from challenging a signature on VBM ballot return envelopes or on VBM signature cure statements on the basis that they believe the signature does not compare with the signatures appearing in the voter’s registration record.
7. Prohibits any individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order or to investigate a specific violation of voter fraud or double voting. This does not prohibit an individual, in accordance with a written agreement between the elections official conducting the election and a law enforcement agency, from permitting agents of a law enforcement agency to provide logistical, transportation, or security support during the voting period, on Election Day, or during the canvass of the vote.
8. Permits the AG or SOS to object to a county election official’s decision to authorize peace or law enforcement officers, private guards, or security personnel to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office. Criminal penalties apply after the AG or SOS objects to a specific election official’s decision, the person stationed at a voting location or county elections office knows about the objection, and the person remains at the voting location or elections office.
9. Permits the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against any person who, in violation of existing law, takes a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official. For a person who knowingly takes a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official, this crime be punishable by a $1,000 fine, imprisonment for up to three years, or by both.
10. Prohibits an individual from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of certified voting technology or a portion thereof unless authorized by a court order.
11. Contains severability and urgency clauses.

Background

Riverside County. In early 2026, a local election watchdog group raised concerns that the number of ballots cast in the November 2025 statewide special election differed from the official total reported by the Riverside County Registrar of Voters (ROV) by nearly 46,000 ballots. Taking these concerns into consideration, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department applied to the Superior Court and sought a warrant to seize the ballots “in order to prove or disprove any criminal conduct.” The court issued a judicial warrant on February 9, 2026.

At a presentation to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors on February 10, 2026, the ROV addressed the alleged discrepancies and disputed the watchdog group’s figures. The ROV noted the difference between ballots cast and ballots counted, based on official results, was 103 ballots.

On February 26, 2026, the Sheriff’s Department seized about 1,000 boxes of ballots and ballot materials.

The Sheriff’s Department also obtained two additional search warrants: one to seize additional election materials (beyond ballots) and another to appoint a special master to oversee the Sheriff Department’s counting of ballots.

As this process unfolded, the AG issued multiple letters directing the Riverside County Sheriff to preserve all seized ballots and pause further action. The AG further questioned whether the warrants were supported by probable cause and whether the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department presented the magistrate with all the material evidence required by law.

On April 8, 2026, the California Supreme Court ordered the Riverside County Sheriff to halt his investigation into alleged fraud in the November 2025 special election and preserve all seized items. Proceedings remain ongoing and the California Supreme Court indicated that this matter will be considered on an expedited basis.

Requesting State Voter Rolls. There have been various reports that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has requested election records or access to voting equipment in various states. According to the State Democracy Research Initiative with the University of Wisconsin Law School, the DOJ has filed federal lawsuits against the District of Colombia and 30 states, including California. These lawsuits are seeking orders to compel jurisdictions to submit copies of complete voter registration lists, including dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and the last four digits of Social Security numbers. While many of these suits are being litigated, six federal district courts have dismissed the DOJ’s suits. This includes suits against Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Rhode Island. The DOJ also reached a settlement with Oklahoma where the state agreed to provide its sensitive voter data in exchange for the DOJ dismissing the lawsuit.

Requesting Local Voter Rolls. In 2025, the DOJ received a complaint of a non-citizen in Orange County, California, receiving a VBM ballot. The DOJ requested various voter registration records from Orange County relating to the number and information of cancelled voter registrations since 2020. The Orange County Registrar of Voters provided data, but redacted sensitive information, such as driver’s license numbers, identification numbers, Social Security numbers, language preferences, and signatures. The DOJ went to court for the requested materials. The matter was subsequently stayed while the case between the DOJ and the California SOS was pending. The case between the DOJ and the California SOS was dismissed.

In January 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raided election offices in Fulton County, Georgia and seized more than 600 boxes of ballots and other election materials from the 2020 election pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant also sought tabulator tapes for every voting machine and ballot images that were created from ballot scanning from the 2020 General Election in Fulton County. The warrant targeted voter rolls from the 2020 General Election including lists of voters who were issued and returned absentee ballots or who participated in advanced voting or Election Day voting. In February, Fulton County officials filed an emergency motion in federal court seeking the return of the election records seized by the FBI, and in April, a federal judge ordered the U.S. DOJ to turn over key details behind its seizure of 2020 election records in Fulton County, Georgia. The case is pending.

Additionally, in April, the New York Times reported that the DOJ sent a letter to the chief elections officer in Wayne County, Michigan requesting election records from the November 2024 federal election.

Federal Monitors in California’s Elections. For the November 4, 2025, statewide special election, the DOJ sent election monitors to five California counties. The five counties were Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, and Riverside. The goal of the election observers was to “ensure transparency, ballot security, and compliance with federal law.” Following the election, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Harmeet K. Dhillon stated, “in the counties we monitored, there were no major headlines out of that work.”

It should be noted for the November 5, 2024, presidential general election, the DOJ planned to monitor 86 jurisdictions nationwide, including San Joaquin County. For the November 8, 2022, gubernatorial general election, the DOJ planned to monitor 64 jurisdictions nationwide, including Los Angeles County and Sonoma County.

Comments

Author’s Statement. “California has a responsibility to protect the voices of California voters and we will not stand by as outside forces seek to undermine our electoral process. This bill builds on the foundation established by SB 851 from 2025 and strengthens California’s safeguards against election interference in time for the June 2 statewide primary election.”

Related/Prior Legislation

SB 884 (Umberg) of 2026, among other provisions, requires a law enforcement officer to notify the AG or SOS of any suspected, planned, or violation of electioneering or arrests of specified crimes near a polling location and the disruption of the operation of a polling location. The bill passed the Senate and is pending in the Assembly.

AB 1664 (Jackson) of 2026 requires local agencies and election officials to notify the AG and the SOS within one business day of becoming aware of any warrant, subpoena, or active law enforcement investigation pertaining to election records or voting systems. The bill passed the Assembly and is pending in the Senate.

AB 2230 (Ávila Farías) of 2026, among other provisions related to immigration enforcement at child daycare facilities, expands the crime of a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel being stationed in the immediate vicinity of a polling place without written authorization to include an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency. The bill is pending in the Assembly.

SB 851 (Cervantes, Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025) sought to address potential interference in California’s elections. Among the provisions of the bill, it expanded the prohibition for a person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling location to include an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency, unless certain conditions are met.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

According to Assembly Committee on Appropriations:

1. Ongoing costs of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, in excess of $150,000, to the AG to provide guidance to local elections officials, building owners, and employers; override a county’s decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (General Fund (GF) or special fund). The DOJ reports no significant impact from this bill. However, actual costs will depend on the scope of such training and oversight, how often the AG pursues legal intervention, and the level of additional staffing DOJ may need to handle the related workload. In light of heightened political distrust and hostility in our nation and state, such interventions may become increasingly common. If DOJ hires staff to handle interventions authorized by this bill, DOJ would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum.
2. Ongoing costs of an unknown amount to the SOS to develop guidance with the AG, override a county’s decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (GF).
3. Ongoing cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts in additional workload by allowing the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to file a civil action to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions, some of which also receive precedence when filed in court, and by creating various new elections-related crimes, for which a defendant is entitled to no-cost legal representation and a jury trial (GF or Trial Court Trust Fund (TCTF)). It is unclear how many actions or prosecutions may commence statewide and how much court time may be needed to resolve each case, but it generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on staff and the TCTF may create a demand for increased court funding from the GF. The state budget provides annual GF backfills to the TCTF to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in fiscal year 2025-26.
4. Potential incarceration costs of an unknown amount to the counties and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the extent criminal prosecutions of this bill’s elections-related crimes result in convictions (local funds, GF). Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence is served in county jail or state prison.
5. By requiring a county elections official to follow certain procedures related to conducting an election, this bill may create a state-mandated local program. If the Commission on State Mandates determines the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service for which the state must reimburse local costs, counties could seek reimbursement from the state (GF). However, any such costs are likely minor and absorbable.

The Legislative Analyst’s Office recently warned of GF structural deficits of around $35 billion per year in the 2027-28 fiscal year and ongoing.

SUPPORT: (Verified 5/22/26)

Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders for Civic Empowerment (source)

Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (source)

California Common Cause

SEIU California

One individual

OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/22/26)

Jim Cooper, Sacramento County Sherrif

California State Sheriffs’ Association

Two individuals

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 57-19, 5/22/26

AYES: Addis, Aguiar-Curry, Ahrens, Alvarez, Ávila Farías, Bains, Bauer-Kahan, Bennett, Berman, Boerner, Bonta, Bryan, Calderon, Caloza, Carrillo, Connolly, Elhawary, Fong, Garcia, Gipson, Mark González, Haney, Harabedian, Hart, Irwin, Jackson, Kalra, Krell, Lee, Lowenthal, McKinnor, Muratsuchi, Nguyen, Ortega, Pacheco, Papan, Patel, Pellerin, Petrie-Norris, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Ransom, Michelle Rodriguez, Rogers, Blanca Rubio, Schiavo, Schultz, Sharp-Collins, Solache, Soria, Stefani, Valencia, Ward, Wicks, Wilson, Zbur, Rivas

NOES: Alanis, Castillo, Davies, DeMaio, Dixon, Ellis, Flora, Gallagher, Jeff Gonzalez, Hadwick, Hoover, Johnson, Lackey, Macedo, Patterson, Sanchez, Ta, Tangipa, Wallis

NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Chen, Gabriel, Celeste Rodriguez

Prepared by: Scott Matsumoto / E. & C.A. / (916) 651-4106

5/22/26 17:16:38

**** END ****

SENATE THIRD READING

STR Bill Id:SB 73

Author:(Cervantes and Umberg)

As Amended Ver:May 18, 2026

2/3 vote. Urgency

SUMMARY

Restricts law enforcement agencies and officers from engaging in specified conduct related to elections. Prohibits a person who is observing the processing of vote by mail (VBM) ballots from challenging whether signatures compare.

Major Provisions

1. Requires the Attorney General (AG) to provide guidance to county elections officials, and to managers of election sites, regarding how they should respond to requests by law enforcement agencies to access areas where ballots are being cast, processed, or otherwise handled, as specified. Requires this guidance to be developed in consultation with the Secretary of State (SOS) and be consistent with state and federal law.
2. Prohibits a peace officer (a term that does not include federal law enforcement) from interfering with the administration of an election and the discharge of duties of election personnel, except as necessary to respond to urgent threats to public health and safety.
3. Permits the AG, the SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action to enforce 2) above. Requires the court to expedite an action that is brought during the period beginning 30 days before the election and ending with the completion of the election canvass.
4. Prohibits an observer of VBM ballot processing from challenging whether the signature to verify a VBM ballot compares to a signature in the voter's registration record.
5. Prohibits any person from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency (including a federal agency) to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, voter lists, or certified voting technology unless authorized by a court order or to investigate a violation of state law prohibiting fraudulent voting, as specified.
6. Allows the SOS or the AG to override a county's decision to authorize uniformed peace or law enforcement officers, private guards, or security personnel to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office. Specifies that criminal penalties apply after the SOS or AG objects to the county's decision only if the person knows about the objection and remains at the voting location or elections office, or permits the person they hired or arranged for to remain stationed at the voting location or elections office.
7. Permits the SOS, the AG, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against any person who, in violation of existing law, takes a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official. Makes it a crime, punishable by a $1,000 fine, imprisonment for up to three years, or by both, for a person to knowingly take a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official.
8. Specifies that this bill does not prohibit a written agreement between an elections official and a law enforcement agency for the agency to provide logistical, transportation, or security support during the voting period or during the canvass of the vote, as specified.
9. Contains a severability clause. Contains an urgency clause, allowing this bill to take effect immediately upon enactment. Specifies that the need for the urgency clause is so that the bill can apply to the June 2, 2026, statewide primary election.

COMMENTS

In February, the Riverside County Sheriff's Department applied to the Superior Court for a search warrant authorizing a search of the Riverside County Registrar of Voters' office and the seizure of ballots from the November 2025 statewide special election. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that a local watchdog group had conducted an audit and concluded that the number of ballots cast differed from the official total reported by the Registrar of Voters by nearly 46,000 ballots. The affidavit does not indicate whether the Sheriff's Department took any steps to attempt to substantiate these allegations. It also does not identify any individual suspected of wrongdoing or any particular crime believed to have been committed.

Instead, just three days after receiving an email from the watchdog group alleging discrepancies, the Sheriff's Department sought a warrant to seize the ballots "in order to prove or disprove any criminal conduct." The Sheriff's Department later obtained two additional warrants: one to seize additional election materials and another to appoint a special master to oversee the department's counting of ballots. By the time the third warrant was requested, the department had already opened boxes of ballots and begun counting them, despite state laws generally requiring election materials to remain sealed and in the custody of the elections official during the retention period.

In March, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a petition in Appellate Court seeking an immediate stay of the Sheriff's investigation. The AG's office expressed "grave concerns about the legal sufficiency" of the search warrants and stated that it had directed the Sheriff's Department to pause its investigation. Although the Sheriff indicated that he would comply, the petition alleges that did not occur and the Sheriff continued to take actions related to the investigation, including obtaining the third warrant without notifying the AG.

The Appellate Court denied the requested relief on procedural grounds, and the AG subsequently petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief. Last month, the Supreme Court granted review, ordered a pause in the investigation into the November 2025 statewide special election, and directed that all seized materials be preserved. Proceedings remain ongoing, and the Court has indicated it will consider the matter on an expedited basis.

In January, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raided election offices in Fulton County, Georgia and seized more than 600 boxes of ballots and other election materials from the 2020 election pursuant to a search warrant. In February, Fulton County officials filed an emergency motion in federal court seeking the return of the election records seized by the FBI, and in April, a federal judge ordered the United States Department of Justice (US DOJ) to turn over key details behind its seizure of 2020 election records in Fulton County, Georgia. The case is pending.

Additionally, in April, the New York Times reported that the US DOJ sent a letter to the chief elections officer in Wayne County, Michigan requesting election records—including ballots—from the November 2024 federal election.

Although federal law prohibits federal troops or law enforcement from interfering with voting, multiple media reports indicate that allies of the Trump administration have floated the possibility of deploying immigration agents or other federal personnel to polling locations this fall. Notwithstanding that federal law, President Trump refused to rule out sending federalized National Guard soldiers or Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to voting sites when asked earlier this month.

The possibility of federal agents being stationed at or near polling places has heightened concerns about voter intimidation. Some dismiss these concerns by arguing that only citizens are eligible to vote. However, this reasoning overlooks the reality that the visible presence of immigration or other law enforcement officers can deter even eligible voters. This concern is amplified by documented cases of large numbers of United States citizens being stopped by immigration authorities, and smaller numbers being detained notwithstanding their citizenship.

The author intends for this bill to take effect in time for next month's statewide primary election. That election is already underway. California counties have mailed ballots to all voters, and in person voting is already available at county elections offices, with expanded voting locations opening across much of the state in the coming days. Election officials have also begun pre-election testing and are permitted to process returned VBM ballots.

Although this bill is unlikely to directly affect most voters' experience, implementing it during the primary election could complicate election administration. State and county officials would need to quickly understand the legal changes and their operational impact.

Addressing these issues will require time and resources in the days leading up to the election, potentially diverting attention from core election operations. The compressed timeline also increases the risk of confusion, inconsistent implementation, and limited access to legal guidance on unclear provisions. Together, these factors could interfere with election administration.

At the same time, the activities this bill seeks to restrict could disrupt election operations or threaten voters' rights, potentially in serious ways. For that reason, action to address genuine risks to election integrity may be warranted despite the challenges.

According to the Author

"Democracy in California is under attack, not only by the Trump Administration but also by some officials in our state, including Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco. We have a responsibility to protect the voices of California voters and we will not stand by as outside forces seek to undermine our electoral process. Senate Bill 73 builds on the foundation established by my Senate Bill 851 from 2025, strengthening California's safeguards against election interference in time for the June 2 statewide primary election."

Arguments in Support

In support of a prior version of this bill, the League of Women Voters of California wrote, "The legislation is designed to address federal overreach - a real and escalating threat to California's elections. Under our constitutional system, states play the principal role in administering elections, subject to Congress's authority over federal elections, and California has built a rigorous framework to test, certify and monitor voting systems used in this state…"

"The legislation is especially important because the threat is no longer hypothetical. In a climate where federal officials are openly criminalizing the routine work of election administration, seeking sensitive voter data from states, and testing the limits of federal authority over election administration, local election officials need clear legal footing to resist ad hoc law enforcement demands for access to California's election infrastructure - and to ensure that armed or uniformed personnel cannot be deployed at polling places or county elections offices without proper authorization."

Arguments in Opposition

In opposition to a prior version of this bill, the California State Sheriffs' Association wrote, "SB 73 imposes new restrictions and enhances existing provisions with the specter of civil remedies (potentially including damages) and/or criminal penalties related to law enforcement investigations, which is especially problematic given our statutory mandate to investigate crimes…"

"Further, SB 73 highlights a potential conflict between a statute that prohibits a package of voted ballots from being taken from the custody of an elections official and a court order compelling a law enforcement officer to seize ballots and take them to a magistrate… And despite arguments that keeping ballots with the elections official is necessary to protect the chain of custody, law enforcement officers are keenly aware of evidence preservation issues and are routinely charged with protecting all types of sensitive evidence. Lastly, this conflict creates very real issues when elections officials are suspected of criminal activities, effectively guaranteeing they would be in charge of preserving evidence that could potentially implicate them in a crime."

FISCAL COMMENTS

According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:

1. Ongoing costs of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, in excess of $150,000, to the AG to provide guidance to local elections officials, building owners, and employers; override a county's decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (General Fund (GF) or special fund). The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no significant impact from this bill. However, actual costs will depend on the scope of such training and oversight, how often the AG pursues legal intervention, and the level of additional staffing DOJ may need to handle the related workload. In light of heightened political distrust and hostility in our nation and state, such interventions may become increasingly common. If DOJ hires staff to handle interventions authorized by this bill, DOJ would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum.
2. Ongoing costs of an unknown amount to the SOS to develop guidance with the AG, override a county's decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (GF).
3. Ongoing cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts in additional workload by allowing the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to file a civil action to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions, some of which also receive precedence when filed in court, and by creating various new elections-related crimes, for which a defendant is entitled to no-cost legal representation and a jury trial (GF or Trial Court Trust Fund (TCTF)). It is unclear how many actions or prosecutions may commence statewide and how much court time may be needed to resolve each case, but it generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on staff and the TCTF may create a demand for increased court funding from the GF. The state budget provides annual GF backfills to the TCTF to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in fiscal year 2025-26.
4. Potential incarceration costs of an unknown amount to the counties and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the extent criminal prosecutions of this bill's elections-related crimes result in convictions (local funds, GF). Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence is served in county jail or state prison.
5. By requiring a county elections official to follow certain procedures related to conducting an election, this bill may create a state-mandated local program. If the Commission on State Mandates determines the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service for which the state must reimburse local costs, counties could seek reimbursement from the state (GF). However, any such costs are likely minor and absorbable.

The Legislative Analyst's Office recently warned of GF structural deficits of around $35 billion per year in the 2027-28 fiscal year and ongoing.

VOTES

SENATE FLOOR: Vote not relevant

YES:

NO:

ASM ELECTIONS: 6-1-1

YES: Pellerin, Bennett, Addis, Elhawary, Solache, Stefani

NO: Gallagher

ABS, ABST OR NV: Johnson

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 7-1-1

YES: Schultz, Mark González, Hart, Harabedian, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins

NO: Lackey

ABS, ABST OR NV: Alanis

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-3-1

YES: Wicks, Bauer-Kahan, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache

NO: Ellis, Ta, Tangipa

ABS, ABST OR NV: Hoover

UPDATED

VERSION: May 18, 2026

CONSULTANT: Ethan Jones / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094 FN: 0003051

SENATE THIRD READING

STR Bill Id:SB 73

Author:(Cervantes and Umberg)

As Amended Ver:May 11, 2026

2/3 vote. Urgency

SUMMARY

Restricts law enforcement agencies and officers from engaging in specified conduct related to elections. Prohibits a person who is observing the processing of vote by mail (VBM) ballots from challenging whether signatures compare.

Major Provisions

1. Requires the Attorney General (AG) to provide guidance to county elections officials, and to building owners and employers, regarding how they should respond to requests by law enforcement agencies to access areas where ballots are being cast, processed, or otherwise handled, as specified. Requires this guidance to be developed in consultation with the Secretary of State (SOS) and be consistent with state and federal law.
2. Prohibits a peace officer (a term that does not include federal law enforcement) from doing any of the following, in connection with an election in the state:
   1. Establishing or attempting to establish voter qualifications contrary to state law.
   2. Imposing or attempting to impose election rules or practices contrary to state law.
   3. Interfering with the conduct of the election and the discharge of duties of election personnel, except as necessary to respond to urgent threats to public health and safety.
3. Permits the AG, the SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action to enforce 2) above. Requires the court to expedite an action that is brought during the period beginning 30 days before the election and ending with the completion of the election canvass.
4. Prohibits an observer of VBM ballot processing from challenging whether the signature to verify a VBM ballot compares to a signature in the voter's registration record.
5. Prohibits any person from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency (including a federal agency) to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, voter lists, or certified voting technology unless authorized by a court order or to investigate a violation of state law prohibiting double voting, as specified.
6. Prohibits a person from hiring or arranging for uniformed military personnel to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office without the elections official's authorization.
7. Allows the SOS or the AG to override a county's decision to authorize uniformed peace or law enforcement officers, private guards, military personnel, or security personnel to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office. Specifies that criminal penalties apply after the SOS or AG objects to the county's decision only if the person knows about the objection and remains at the voting location or elections office, or permits the person they hired or arranged for to remain stationed at the voting location or elections office.
8. Permits the SOS, the AG, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against any person who, in violation of existing law, takes a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official. Makes it a crime, punishable by a $1,000 fine, imprisonment for up to three years, or by both, for a person to knowingly take a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official.
9. Specifies that this bill does not prohibit a written agreement between an elections official and a law enforcement agency for the agency to provide logistical, transportation, or security support during the voting period or during the canvass of the vote, as specified.
10. Contains a severability clause. Contains an urgency clause, allowing this bill to take effect immediately upon enactment. Specifies that the need for the urgency clause is so that the bill can apply to the June 2, 2026, statewide primary election.

COMMENTS

In February, the Riverside County Sheriff's Department applied to the Superior Court for a search warrant authorizing a search of the Riverside County Registrar of Voters' office and the seizure of ballots from the November 2025 statewide special election. The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that a local watchdog group had conducted an audit and concluded that the number of ballots cast differed from the official total reported by the Registrar of Voters by nearly 46,000 ballots. The affidavit does not indicate whether the Sheriff's Department took any steps to attempt to substantiate these allegations. It also does not identify any individual suspected of wrongdoing or any particular crime believed to have been committed.

Instead, just three days after receiving an email from the watchdog group alleging discrepancies, the Sheriff's Department sought a warrant to seize the ballots "in order to prove or disprove any criminal conduct." The Sheriff's Department later obtained two additional warrants: one to seize additional election materials and another to appoint a special master to oversee the department's counting of ballots. By the time the third warrant was requested, the department had already opened boxes of ballots and begun counting them, despite state laws generally requiring election materials to remain sealed and in the custody of the elections official during the retention period.

In March, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a petition in Appellate Court seeking an immediate stay of the Sheriff's investigation. The AG's office expressed "grave concerns about the legal sufficiency" of the search warrants and stated that it had directed the Sheriff's Department to pause its investigation. Although the Sheriff indicated that he would comply, the petition alleges that did not occur and the Sheriff continued to take actions related to the investigation, including obtaining the third warrant without notifying the AG.

The Appellate Court denied the requested relief on procedural grounds, and the AG subsequently petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief. Last month, the Supreme Court granted review, ordered a pause in the investigation into the November 2025 statewide special election, and directed that all seized materials be preserved. Proceedings remain ongoing, and the Court has indicated it will consider the matter on an expedited basis.

In January, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raided election offices in Fulton County, Georgia and seized more than 600 boxes of ballots and other election materials from the 2020 election pursuant to a search warrant. In February, Fulton County officials filed an emergency motion in federal court seeking the return of the election records seized by the FBI, and in April, a federal judge ordered the United States Department of Justice (US DOJ) to turn over key details behind its seizure of 2020 election records in Fulton County, Georgia. The case is pending.

Additionally, in April, the New York Times reported that the US DOJ sent a letter to the chief elections officer in Wayne County, Michigan requesting election records—including ballots—from the November 2024 federal election.

Although federal law prohibits federal troops or law enforcement from interfering with voting, multiple media reports indicate that allies of the Trump administration have floated the possibility of deploying immigration agents or other federal personnel to polling locations this fall. Notwithstanding that federal law, President Trump refused to rule out sending federalized National Guard soldiers or Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to voting sites when asked earlier this month.

The possibility of federal agents being stationed at or near polling places has heightened concerns about voter intimidation. Some dismiss these concerns by arguing that only citizens are eligible to vote. However, this reasoning overlooks the reality that the visible presence of immigration or other law enforcement officers can deter even eligible voters. This concern is amplified by documented cases of large numbers of United States citizens being stopped by immigration authorities, and smaller numbers being detained notwithstanding their citizenship.

The author intends for this bill to take effect in time for next month's statewide primary election. That election is already underway. California counties have mailed ballots to all voters, and in person voting is already available at county elections offices, with expanded voting locations opening across much of the state in the coming days. Election officials have also begun pre-election testing and are permitted to process returned VBM ballots.

Although this bill is unlikely to directly affect most voters' experience, implementing it during the primary election could complicate election administration. State and county officials would need to quickly understand the legal changes and their operational impact.

Addressing these issues will require time and resources in the days leading up to the election, potentially diverting attention from core election operations. The compressed timeline also increases the risk of confusion, inconsistent implementation, and limited access to legal guidance on unclear provisions. Together, these factors could interfere with election administration.

At the same time, the activities this bill seeks to restrict could disrupt election operations or threaten voters' rights, potentially in serious ways. For that reason, action to address genuine risks to election integrity may be warranted despite the challenges.

According to the Author

"Democracy in California is under attack, not only by the Trump Administration but also by some officials in our state, including Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco. We have a responsibility to protect the voices of California voters and we will not stand by as outside forces seek to undermine our electoral process. Senate Bill 73 builds on the foundation established by my Senate Bill 851 from 2025, strengthening California's safeguards against election interference in time for the June 2 statewide primary election."

Arguments in Support

In support of a prior version of this bill, the League of Women Voters of California wrote, "The legislation is designed to address federal overreach - a real and escalating threat to California's elections. Under our constitutional system, states play the principal role in administering elections, subject to Congress's authority over federal elections, and California has built a rigorous framework to test, certify and monitor voting systems used in this state…"

"The legislation is especially important because the threat is no longer hypothetical. In a climate where federal officials are openly criminalizing the routine work of election administration, seeking sensitive voter data from states, and testing the limits of federal authority over election administration, local election officials need clear legal footing to resist ad hoc law enforcement demands for access to California's election infrastructure - and to ensure that armed or uniformed personnel cannot be deployed at polling places or county elections offices without proper authorization."

Arguments in Opposition

In opposition to a prior version of this bill, the California State Sheriffs' Association wrote, "SB 73 imposes new restrictions and enhances existing provisions with the specter of civil remedies (potentially including damages) and/or criminal penalties related to law enforcement investigations, which is especially problematic given our statutory mandate to investigate crimes…"

"Further, SB 73 highlights a potential conflict between a statute that prohibits a package of voted ballots from being taken from the custody of an elections official and a court order compelling a law enforcement officer to seize ballots and take them to a magistrate… And despite arguments that keeping ballots with the elections official is necessary to protect the chain of custody, law enforcement officers are keenly aware of evidence preservation issues and are routinely charged with protecting all types of sensitive evidence. Lastly, this conflict creates very real issues when elections officials are suspected of criminal activities, effectively guaranteeing they would be in charge of preserving evidence that could potentially implicate them in a crime."

FISCAL COMMENTS

According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:

1. Ongoing costs of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, in excess of $150,000, to the AG to provide guidance to local elections officials, building owners, and employers; override a county's decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (General Fund (GF) or special fund). The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no significant impact from this bill. However, actual costs will depend on the scope of such training and oversight, how often the AG pursues legal intervention, and the level of additional staffing DOJ may need to handle the related workload. In light of heightened political distrust and hostility in our nation and state, such interventions may become increasingly common. If DOJ hires staff to handle interventions authorized by this bill, DOJ would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum.
2. Ongoing costs of an unknown amount to the SOS to develop guidance with the AG, override a county's decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (GF).
3. Ongoing cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts in additional workload by allowing the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to file a civil action to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions, some of which also receive precedence when filed in court, and by creating various new elections-related crimes, for which a defendant is entitled to no-cost legal representation and a jury trial (GF or Trial Court Trust Fund (TCTF)). It is unclear how many actions or prosecutions may commence statewide and how much court time may be needed to resolve each case, but it generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on staff and the TCTF may create a demand for increased court funding from the GF. The state budget provides annual GF backfills to the TCTF to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in fiscal year 2025-26.
4. Potential incarceration costs of an unknown amount to the counties and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the extent criminal prosecutions of this bill's elections-related crimes result in convictions (local funds, GF). Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence is served in county jail or state prison.
5. By requiring a county elections official to follow certain procedures related to conducting an election, this bill may create a state-mandated local program. If the Commission on State Mandates determines the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service for which the state must reimburse local costs, counties could seek reimbursement from the state (GF). However, any such costs are likely minor and absorbable.

The Legislative Analyst's Office recently warned of GF structural deficits of around $35 billion per year in the 2027-28 fiscal year and ongoing.

VOTES

SENATE FLOOR: Not Relevant

YES:

NO:

ASM ELECTIONS: 6-1-1

YES: Pellerin, Bennett, Addis, Elhawary, Solache, Stefani

NO: Gallagher

ABS, ABST OR NV: Johnson

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 7-1-1

YES: Schultz, Mark González, Hart, Harabedian, Nguyen, Ramos, Sharp-Collins

NO: Lackey

ABS, ABST OR NV: Alanis

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 11-3-1

YES: Wicks, Bauer-Kahan, Calderon, Caloza, Fong, Mark González, Krell, Pacheco, Pellerin, Sharp-Collins, Solache

NO: Ellis, Ta, Tangipa

ABS, ABST OR NV: Hoover

UPDATED

VERSION: May 11, 2026

CONSULTANT: Ethan Jones / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094 FN: 0002549

Date of Hearing: May 13, 2026

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Buffy Wicks, Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 73

Author:(Cervantes) – As Amended Ver:May 11, 2026

Urgency: Yes State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: Yes

SUMMARY:

This bill restricts law enforcement agencies and officers from engaging in certain conduct related to elections, prohibits a person who is observing the processing of vote by mail (VBM) ballots from challenging whether signatures compare, and makes other changes related to the oversight of elections.

Specifically, this bill:

1. Requires the Attorney General (AG) to provide guidance, developed in consultation with the Secretary of State (SOS), to county elections officials regarding how election personnel should respond to requests by law enforcement agencies (including a federal agency) to access areas where ballots are being cast, processed, or otherwise handled, and requires the AG to provide similar guidance to building owners and employers.
2. Prohibits a peace officer (not including federal law enforcement) from establishing or attempting to establish voter qualifications contrary to state law, imposing or attempting to impose election rules or practices contrary to state law, or interfering with the conduct of an election and the discharge of duties of election personnel.
3. Authorizes the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action to enforce these peace officer prohibitions and requires a court to expedite the scheduling of such an action brought beginning 30 days before an election through the completion of the canvass.
4. Prohibits an observer of VBM ballot processing from challenging whether the signature to verify a VBM ballot compares to the signature in the voter’s registration record.
5. Expands an existing crime to additionally prohibit a person from hiring or arranging for uniformed military personnel stationed at a voting location or county elections office without the election official’s authorization and allows the AG or SOS to override a county’s decision to authorize uniformed military personnel, as well as uniformed peace officers and other security personnel, to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office.
6. Subjects such uniformed guards, as well as the person who hires or arranges for their presence, to criminal penalties if the AG’s or SOS’s objection is known and the uniformed guard still remains at the voting location or county elections office or the person who hired or arranged for the uniformed guard permits the guard to remain stationed.
7. Authorizes the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against a person who, in violation of existing law, takes a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official, and also makes it a crime punishable by a $1,000 fine, imprisonment for up to three years, or both.
8. Prohibits a person from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency (including a federal agency) to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of certified voting technology or rosters or voter lists unless authorized by a court order, but does not prohibit a written agreement between an elections official and a law enforcement agency for logistical, transportation, or security support during the voting period, on election day, or during the canvass of the vote.
9. Contains a severability clause and urgency clause to take effect and apply to the June 2, 2026, statewide primary election.

FISCAL EFFECT:

1. Ongoing costs of an unknown, but potentially significant amount, in excess of $150,000, to the AG to provide guidance to local elections officials, building owners, and employers; override a county’s decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (General Fund (GF) or special fund). The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports no significant impact from this bill. However, actual costs will depend on the scope of such training and oversight, how often the AG pursues legal intervention, and the level of additional staffing DOJ may need to handle the related workload. In light of heightened political distrust and hostility in our nation and state, such interventions may become increasingly common. If DOJ hires staff to handle interventions authorized by this bill, DOJ would incur significant costs, likely in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars annually at a minimum.
2. Ongoing costs of an unknown amount to the SOS to develop guidance with the AG, override a county’s decision to utilize uniformed guards at voting locations, and bring civil actions to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions (GF).
3. Ongoing cost pressures of an unknown amount to the courts in additional workload by allowing the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to file a civil action to enforce specified peace officer and chain of custody prohibitions, some of which also receive precedence when filed in court, and by creating various new elections-related crimes, for which a defendant is entitled to no-cost legal representation and a jury trial (GF or Trial Court Trust Fund (TCTF)). It is unclear how many actions or prosecutions may commence statewide and how much court time may be needed to resolve each case, but it generally costs approximately $1,000 to operate a courtroom for one hour. Although courts are not funded on the basis of workload, increased pressure on staff and the TCTF may create a demand for increased court funding from the GF. The state budget provides annual GF backfills to the TCTF to offset revenue reductions, totaling approximately $117.3 million in fiscal year 2025-26.
4. Potential incarceration costs of an unknown amount to the counties and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the extent criminal prosecutions of this bill’s elections-related crimes result in convictions (local funds, GF). Actual incarceration costs will depend on the number of convictions, the length of each sentence, and whether each sentence is served in county jail or state prison.
5. By requiring a county elections official to follow certain procedures related to conducting an election, this bill may create a state-mandated local program. If the Commission on State Mandates determines the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service for which the state must reimburse local costs, counties could seek reimbursement from the state (General Fund). However, any such costs are likely minor and absorbable.

The Legislative Analyst’s Office recently warned of GF structural deficits of around $35 billion per year in the 2027-28 fiscal year and ongoing.

COMMENTS:

1. Purpose. According to the author:

Democracy in California is under attack, not only by the Trump Administration but also by some officials in our state, including Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco. We have a responsibility to protect the voices of California voters and we will not stand by as outside forces seek to undermine our electoral process. [SB 73] builds on the foundation established by my [SB 851] from 2025, strengthening California’s safeguards against election interference in time for the June 2 statewide primary election.

1. Background. Seizure of Ballots in Riverside County. In February 2026, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department applied to the Riverside County Superior Court for a search warrant authorizing a search of the Riverside County Registrar of Voters office and the seizure of all ballots from the November 2025 statewide special election. In March 2026, AG Rob Bonta filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, seeking an immediate stay on the sheriff’s investigation and warrant. The Court of Appeal denied the requested relief, concluding that the AG should have first sought relief in the Riverside County Superior Court. The AG subsequently petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief, which granted review, ordered a pause in the investigation, and directed all seized materials be preserved. Proceedings remain ongoing, and court has indicated the matter will be considered on an expedited basis.

In light of this event and others around the country where elections officials were presented with court orders to turn over election materials, this bill acknowledges the difficult position of elections officials in these situations and seeks to provide guidance and support. This bill requires the AG to advise elections officials on how to respond to such requests from law enforcement, prohibits law enforcement officers from engaging in certain activities, and provides for civil or criminal enforcement of these various prohibitions.

VBM Signature Comparison. A VBM ballot must be verified by an elections official before the ballot may be counted. The verification process includes comparing the signature on the VBM ballot identification envelope with the signature that is part of the voter’s registration record. Existing law generally allows the public to observe the processing of VBM ballots, including the signature verification process. Observers may challenge whether an elections worker is following established procedures. However, existing law does not explicitly allow a VBM observer to challenge an election worker’s determination of whether signatures compare, although some counties do permit such challenges with disputes typically resolved by senior elections staff. This bill expressly prohibits an observer from challenging an elections worker’s determination about whether signatures compare to promote greater uniformity statewide and protect against politically motivated challenges to VBM ballots.

1. Support and Opposition. This bill is supported by voter empowerment groups, with the League of Women Voters of California arguing this bill “ensures that local elections officials are not put in the position of yielding to politically charged demands from law enforcement without a clear legal basis” and “reinforces state authority, protects ballot security, and helps ensure that every vote is counted through systems free from improper influence.”

This bill is opposed by the California State Sheriffs’ Association, which argues this bill imposes “new restrictions and enhances existing provisions with the specter of civil remedies (potentially including damages) and/or criminal penalties related to law enforcement investigations, which is especially problematic given our statutory mandate to investigate crimes.”

1. Related Legislation. SB 851 (Cervantes), Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025, requires a state or local agency to provide written notices to the AG and SOS after the agency files or is served a court action related to an elections claim arising under federal law and makes it a crime for a person to hire or arrange for a federal law enforcement agent to be stationed at or near a voting location without authorization from the elections official, among other provisions.

AB 1664 (Jackson) requires certain local entities to provide written notice to the SOS and AG within one business day of becoming aware of a legal investigation of the entity’s election records or voting systems and authorizes the AG to intervene in court. AB 1664 is pending on the Assembly Floor.

AB 2230 (Ávila Farías) expands the crime of a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel being stationed at a voting location or county elections office without authorization from the elections official to include a federal law enforcement agent and prohibits an employee of a licensed child daycare facility from allowing an immigration enforcement agent to enter a nonpublic area without a valid judicial warrant, subpoena, or court order. AB 2230 is pending on this committee’s suspense file.

Analysis Prepared by: Irene Ho / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing: May 6, 2026

Counsel: Ilan Zur

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Nick Schultz, Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 73

Author:(Cervantes) – As Amended Ver:April 27, 2026

SUMMARY:

Makes it an alternate-felony misdemeanor (wobbler) for a peace officer to establish the qualification of voters at an election, impose a rule for conducting any election, or interfere with the administration of any election, as specified, and expands the crime of specified uniformed persons being stationed at a polling place to include non-uniformed persons. Specifically, this bill:

1. Requires, when a court order is being executed related to the search or seizure of a voting system machine or device, software, or source code, or of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists, or voted ballots or vote by mail ballot envelopes, or any other elections materials, records, or equipment, the elections official required to comply with the court order to provide immediate notice to the Secretary of State (SOS) and Attorney General (AG).
2. Requires the AG to provide guidance and information to county elections officials regarding how elections officials, precinct boards, election workers, and election volunteers should respond to requests by an agent of a law enforcement agency to access areas where ballots are cast, handled, processed, counted, tabulated, tallied, audited, or recounted.
3. Requires the AG to publish and provide guidance to building owners and employers regarding how to respond to requests by an agent of a law enforcement agency to access areas where ballots are cast, handled, processed, counted, tabulated, tallied, audited, or recounted.
4. Requires the guidance and information described above to be consistent with federal and state law and specifies that this is intended to ensure that all voting locations remain safe and accessible to all voters.
5. Prohibits a peace officer from interfering with an election, as follows:
   1. Prohibits a peace officer from doing any of the following:
      1. Establishing or attempting to establish the qualifications of voters at any election in the state, contrary to the laws of the state.
      2. Imposing or attempting to impose a rule, standard, or practice for conducting any election in this state, contrary to the laws of the state.
      3. Interfering in any manner with the administration of any election in this state and in the discharge of duties by the SOS, a county elections official, an election worker, or a volunteer performing required elections-related tasks prescribed by the Elections Code or any other provision of state law except as necessary to respond to urgent threats to public health and safety.
   2. Authorizes the AG, SOS, or a county elections official (with respect to violations that occur within the election official’s county) to bring a civil action to enforce the above prohibitions.
   3. Authorizes a court to expedite the scheduling and disposition of any such civil action if the action is filed during the period beginning thirty days before election day and ending with the completion of the canvass.
   4. Provides that none of the above provisions shall prevent a qualified elector from exercising their right to vote in an election in this state and shall not be construed to authorize an action that would be prohibited by federal law or to limit any federal authority that is validly exercised pursuant to federal law.
   5. Makes a violation of the above prohibitions a wobbler, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to 12 months, or by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years in state prison, and makes a conspiracy to violate these prohibitions a straight felony.
6. Prohibits a vote-by-mail (VBM) voter observer from being permitted to challenge a signature on an unsigned identification envelope statement and a signature verification statement, as specified, on the basis that they believe the signature does not compare with the signatures appearing in the voter’s registration record.
7. Prohibits an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency to serve as a VBM voter observer, as follows:
   1. Prohibits, during the voting period, on Election Day, or during the canvass of the vote, an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency who is acting in their official capacity to serve as a VBM observer, as specified, unless authorized by a court order.
   2. Specifies that this shall not be construed to prevent an elections official from authorizing, in writing, agents of a law enforcement agency to provide logistical or security support at a polling place or county elections office, as specified.
8. Prohibits an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order or to investigate a person for voting more than once, attempting to vote more than once, or knowingly handing in two or more ballots at an election.
9. Modifies the crime of a person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or any person who is wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, being stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without written authorization of the appropriate city or county elections official, as follows:
   1. Removes the requirement that the peace officer, private guard, or security personnel be uniformed.
   2. Specifies that the written authorization from the appropriate city or county elections official may be overridden by an objection by the SOS or AG after the authorization is granted.
10. Modifies the crime of hiring or arranging for any other person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed law enforcement officer (including a peace officer or an officer of a federal law enforcement agency), private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of such a person, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of a polling place without written authorization of the appropriate elections official or written authorization by a federal court order, as follows:
    1. Removes the requirement that the law enforcement officer, private guard, or security personnel be uniformed.
    2. Adds military personnel and any person wearing the uniform of military personnel to the list of people encompassed by this crime.
    3. Specifies that the written authorization from the appropriate elections official may be overridden by an objection by the SOS or AG after the authorization is granted.
    4. Removes the requirement that judicial written authorization must be made by a federal court order, instead permitting written authorization to be given by any court order.
11. Adds taking a package containing the voted ballots or their contents from the custody of the elections official, as prohibited by existing law, to the list of acts for which the SOS, AG, and a local elections official may bring a civil action for up to $50,000 for each act, and for injunctive relief, against the individual, business, or other entity that committed the act.
12. Makes it a crime to knowingly take a package containing voted ballots or their contents from the custody of the elections official, as prohibited by existing law, punishable by up to a $1,000 fine or as a jail-eligible felony by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
13. Prohibits an individual from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of a voting system machine or device, software, or source code, unless authorized by a court order.
14. Defines “law enforcement agency,” as used in this bill, to mean all of the following:
    1. Any law enforcement agency, department, or other entity of the state or any political subdivision thereof that employs any peace officer, as defined.
    2. Any law enforcement agency of another state.
    3. Any federal law enforcement agency.
15. Specifies that this bill shall be construed and applied in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution and the United States Constitution.
16. Contains an urgency clause.
17. Contains a severability clause.
18. Makes technical and clarifying changes.

EXISTING STATE LAW:

1. Authorizes each qualified political party, and any bona fide association of citizens or a media organization, to employ and have present at the central counting place, not more than two representatives to check and review the preparation and operation of the tabulating devices, their programming and testing, and have the representatives in attendance at all phases of the election. (Elec. Code, § 15004, subds. (a) & (b).)
2. Requires the processing of VBM ballot return envelopes and the processing and counting of VBM ballots to be open to the public, as specified. (Elec. Code, § 15104, subd. (a).)
3. Requires VBM voter observers to be allowed sufficiently close access to enable them to observe the VBM ballot return envelopes and the signatures thereon and challenge whether those individuals handling VBM ballots are following established procedures, as specified. (Elec. Code, § 15104, subd. (d).)
4. Prohibits a VBM voter observer from interfering with the orderly processing of VBM ballot return envelopes or the processing and counting of VBM ballots, including the touching or handling of the ballots. (Elec. Code, § 15104, subd. (e).)
5. Requires, if a contest or criminal prosecution has commenced before the date fixed for its destruction, the package containing the voted ballots must be subject to the order of the court in which the contest or criminal prosecution is pending, and prohibits the package from being destroyed until after final determination of the contest or prosecution. (Elec. Code, § 15551.)
6. Prohibits the package or its contents from being taken from the custody of the elections official. (Elec. Code, § 15551.)
7. Authorizes the SOS, AG, and any local elections official in the county in which the act occurs, to bring a civil action for up to $50,000 for each act and for injunctive relief, if appropriate, against an individual, business, or other legal entity that commits specified acts, including tampering, interfering, or attempting to interfere with the correction operation of, or willfully damaging to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulation device, or ballot tally software, before, during, or after an election. (Elec. Code, § 18564.5, subd. (a)(1).)
8. Prohibits a person from intimidating, threatening, coercing, or attempting to intimidate or coerce any other person for any of the following: 1) voting or attempting to vote; 2) urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, whether as part of official election administration activity or otherwise; 3) exercising any powers or duties to administer elections, including counting votes, canvassing and certifying an election; or 4) that other person’s status as a past or present participant in the administration of elections, enforceable in a suit at law. (Elec. Code, §§ 18581, subd. (a), 18582, subd. (a).)
9. Specifies that in any suit to enforce the above prohibition, a person who openly carries a firearm while interacting with or observing an activity or person described in the immediately preceding paragraph shall be presumed to have engaged in specified prohibited intimidation in the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence, although this presumption does not apply to a specified California peace officers acting within the scope of their official duties. (Elec. Code, §§ 18580, subd. (c), 18581.)
10. Prohibits a person, other than a member of a precinct board or other official responsible for the conduct of the election, from challenging or questioning any voter concerning the voter’s qualifications to vote. (Elec. Code, § 14240, subd. (b).)
11. Establishes specified election and voting crimes, as follows:
    1. Makes it a felony to commit or attempt to commit fraud, or to aid or abet or attempt to aid or abet fraud, in connection with any vote cast, to be cast, or attempted to be cast, punishable by imprisonment for 16 months or two or three years. (Elec. Code, § 18500.)
    2. Makes it a felony for a public official to knowingly violate provisions of the Elections Code relating to the corruption of the voting process, and thereby aid in the illegal casting or attempting to cast a vote, or to connive to nullify any provision of the Election Code relating to corruption of the voting process so that fraud may be perpetrated, punishable by imprisonment in state prison for 16 months, or two or three years, and lifelong disqualification from holding office. (Elec. Code, § 18501.)
    3. Makes it a jail-eligible felony, punishable by imprisonment for 16 months or two or three years, for a person charged with the performance of any duty under any law of this state related to elections to willfully neglect or refuse to perform it; or, in the person’s official capacity, to knowingly and fraudulently act in violation of any of those laws, except where a different punishment is provided by the Elections Code. (Elec. Code, § 18002, subd. (a).)
    4. Makes it a jail-eligible felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years, for a person, at any election, to act as an election officer without first having been appointed and qualified or to perform or discharge any of the duties of an election officer regarding the handling, counting, or canvassing of ballots when that person is not an elections officer. (Elec. Code, § 18575.)
    5. Makes it a felony to interfere with the officers holding an election or conducting a canvass, as to prevent the election or canvass from being fairly and lawfully conducted, or with the voters lawfully exercising their rights of voting at an election, punishable by imprisonment for 16 months or two or three years. (Elec. Code, § 18502, subd. (a).)
    6. Makes it a felony to make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or tactic of coercion or intimidation, to induce or compel any other person to vote or refrain from voting or to vote or refrain from voting for any particular person or measure, or because any person voted or refrained from voting at an election, as specified, or to hire or arrange for a person to engage in such conduct, punishable as a felony by 16 months or two or three years. (Elec. Code, § 18540, subds. (a) & (b).)
    7. Prohibits a person from, with the intent of dissuading another person from voting, within a 100-foot limit of the entrance to a building containing a polling place, as specified, from engaging in certain conduct, including soliciting a vote, speaking to a voter about marking their ballot, placing a sign relating to the voter’s qualifications, or speaking to a voter about the voter’s qualifications except as specified, and makes these offenses a wobbler, punishable by imprisonment for up to 12 months in county jail or by 16 months, or two or three years in state prison, and as a felony if a person conspires to commit these offenses. (Elec. Code, § 18541, subds. (a), (b) & (d).)
    8. Prohibits a person, with the intent of dissuading another person from voting, from, within the immediate vicinity of a voter in line to cast a ballot or drop off a ballot, soliciting a vote, speaking to a voter about marking their ballot, or disseminating visible or audible electioneering information, and makes these offenses a wobbler, punishable by up to one year in county jail or by 16 months, or two or three years in state prison, and as a felony if a person conspires to violate these offenses. (Elec. Code, § 18541, subd. (c) & (d).)
    9. Prohibits a person from knowingly challenging a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent or spurious grounds, or from engaging in mass, indiscriminate, and groundless challenging of voters solely for the purpose of preventing voters from voting or to delay the process of voting, or from fraudulently advising any person that they are not eligible to vote or is not registered to vote when in fact that person is eligible or is registered, and makes this offense as a wobbler by up to one year in county jail, or by 16 months, or two or three years in state prison, and as a felony if a person conspires to violate this offense. (Elec. Code, § 18543.)
    10. Prohibits any person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, from being stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without written authorization of the appropriate city or county elections official, and makes this offense a wobbler, punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for up to one year in county jail or 16 months, or two or three years, or by both that fine and imprisonment. This does not apply to any of the following:
        1. An unarmed uniformed guard or security personnel who is at the polling place to cast their vote.
        2. A peace officer who is conducting official business in the course of their public employment or who is at the polling place to cast their vote.
        3. A private guard or security personnel hired or arranged for by a city or county elections official.
        4. A private guard or security personnel hired or arranged for by the owner or manager of the facility or property in which the polling place is located, if the guard or security personnel is not hired or arranged solely for the day on which an election is held. (Elec. Code, § 18544, subds. (a) & (b).)
    11. Prohibits any person who hires or arranges for any other person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed law enforcement officer, private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of a law enforcement officer, guard, or security personnel, from being stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place or a county elections office without written authorization of the appropriate elections official or written authorization by a federal court order, and makes this offense a wobbler punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to one year, up to a $10,000 fine, or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment for sixteen months, or two or three years and by a fine up to $10,000. (Elec. Code, § 18545, subd. (a).)
    12. Defines “law enforcement officer,” for purposes of the above crime, to mean a peace officer, as defined, or an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency, or any person acting on behalf of a federal law enforcement agency. (Elec. Code, § 18545, subd. (c).)
    13. Makes it a wobbler for a person: 1) who is not entitled to vote to fraudulently vote or attempt to vote at that election; 2) who is entitled to vote to vote more than once, attempt to vote more than once, or knowingly hand in two or more ballots at that election; and 3) to impersonate or attempt to impersonate a voter at an election. (Elec. Code, § 18560.)
    14. Makes it a jail-eligible felony for a person to procure, assist, counsel, or advise another to give or offer their vote at any election, knowing that the person is not qualified to vote, or to aid or abet in specified voting crimes related to fraudulent voting, voting more than once, or impersonating a voter. (Elec. Code, § 18561.)
    15. Makes it a misdemeanor for a member of the public, while observing specified canvass and recount proceedings, to willfully attempt to ascertain the identity and ballot choices of a voter, open a provisional or vote by mail ballot envelope containing a voted ballot to ascertain the voter’s ballot choices, or make a mark or device on a ballot or secrecy envelope in an attempt to ascertain the voter’s ballot choices. (Elec. Code, § 18562.5.)
    16. Makes it a jail-eligible felony, punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years, for a person, before or during an election to: 1) tamper with, interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, the correct operation of, or willfully damage to prevent the use of, any voting machine, voting device, voting system, vote tabulating device, or ballot tally software program source code; 2) interfere or attempt to interfere with the secrecy of voting or ballot tally software program source codes; 3) knowingly, and without authorization, make or have in the person’s possession credentials, passwords, or access keys to a voting machine that has been adopted and will be used in elections in this state; or 4) willfully substitute or attempt to substitute forged or counterfeit ballot tally software program source codes. (Elec. Code, § 18564.)
    17. Provides that aiding or abetting any of the above offenses is punishable as a wobbler. (Elec. Code, § 18565.)
    18. Makes it a jail-eligible felony, punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years, or a fine up to $1,000, or by both that fine and imprisonment, for a person to engage in any of the following:
        1. Aid in changing or destroying any poll list or official ballot.
        2. Aid in wrongfully placing any ballots in the ballot container or in taking any therefrom.
        3. Add or attempt to add any ballots to those legally polled at any election by fraudulently putting them into the ballot container, either before or after the ballots therein have been counted.
        4. Add to or mix with, or attempt to add to or mix with, the ballots polled, any other ballots, while they are being counted or canvassed or at any other time, with intent to change the result of the election, or allows another to do so, when in the person’s power to prevent it.
        5. Carry away or destroy, attempt to carry away or destroy, or knowingly allow another to carry away or destroy, any poll list, ballot container, or ballots lawfully polled, or willfully detain, mutilate, or destroy any election returns.
        6. Remove any unvoted ballots from the polling place before the completion of the ballot count.
        7. Display a container or provide an envelope for the purpose of collecting or returning ballots, with the intent to deceive a voter into casting a ballot in an unofficial ballot or returning a ballot in an unofficial ballot return envelope.
        8. Direct or solicit a voter to place a ballot in a container or envelope described above. (Elec. Code, § 18568.)
    19. Provides that aiding and abetting of the above offenses is a wobbler. (Elec. Code, § 18569.)

EXISTING FEDERAL LAW

1. Prohibits a person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, as specified. (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).)
2. Prohibits a person employed in any administrative position by the United States, or any department of agency thereof, in connection with any activity which is financed by loans or grants made by the United States, from using their official authority for the purposes of interfering with or affecting the election of any candidate to specified elective offices, and punishes this offense by imprisonment for up to one year. (18 U.S.C. § 595.)

FISCAL EFFECT:

Unknown

COMMENTS:

1. Author's Statement: “Democracy in California is under attack, not only by the Trump Administration but also by some officials in our state, including Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco. We have a responsibility to protect the voices of California voters and we will not stand by as outside forces seek to undermine our electoral process. Senate Bill 73 builds on the foundation established by my Senate Bill 851 from 2025, strengthening California’s safeguards against election interference in time for the June 2 statewide primary election.”
   
2. Background:
   1. Seizure of Ballots in Riverside County

On February 26, 2026, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office, at the direction of Sheriff Chad Bianco, seized approximately 1,000 boxes of ballot materials (totaling more than 650,000 ballots) in Riverside County related to the November 2025 election for Proposition 50, which temporarily redrew California’s congressional districts.^[1] To effectuate this seizure, the Sheriff’s office secured multiple judicial search warrants.^[2] The Riverside County Sheriff’s Office claimed this was necessary to “prove or disprove any criminal conduct” and to determine the validity of a claim by a local citizens’ group that the county’s tally was falsely inflated, a contention rejected by local election officials.^[3]

Attorney General Rob Bonta subsequently issued multiple letters directing Sheriff Bianco to preserve all seized ballots and pause further action.^[4] The AG further questioned whether the warrants were supported by probable cause and whether the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office presented the magistrate with all the material evidence required by law.^[5] As stated by the AG in his first letter to Sheriff Bianco, “[T]he affidavits identify no specific felony offenses you have probable cause to believe were committed, nor do they identify particular persons whom you have probable cause to believe committed any such offenses, as required by [existing provisions of law].”^[6]

On April 8, 2026, the California Supreme Court ordered Sheriff Bianco to halt his investigation into alleged fraud in the November 2025 special election and preserve all seized items.^[7] Proceedings remain ongoing. Reporting indicates that Sheriff Bianco has not ruled out undertaking another effort to seize ballots in upcoming elections.^[8]

• 1. Federal Immigration Enforcement and Elections:

Immigration arrests have significantly increased since President Trump’s second term began.^[9] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) removals in California were substantially similar to the numbers from the previous year in the first few months of Trump’s second term; however, beginning in the summer of that year, removals significantly ramped up.^[10] Data indicates that ICE deported at least 8,250 people from California in the first nine months of 2025.^[11] From June 6 to June 22, 2025, federal immigration enforcement teams arrested 1,618 immigrants for deportation in Los Angeles and the surrounding Southern California regions.^[12] In September and October of 2025, federal immigration officers arrested more than twice as many people in the region of San Diego as they did in the entirety of 2024.^[13] In response to the protests, President Trump deployed National Guard troops and Marines to L.A. over the objections of state officials.^[14]

Such aggressive immigration enforcement efforts have resulted in an uptick in immigration-enforcement-related deaths, including the January 24, 2026, shooting of Alex Pretti by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers.^[15] Recent reporting found that it is the deadliest year for those in immigration detention in over two decades.^[16] Since October 23, 2025, more people have died in ICE custody than in the entire prior fiscal year.^[17] The rapid increase in immigration arrests has contributed to overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and issues related to healthcare and food access in detention centers.^[18]

Ahead of this year’s midterm elections, there have been reports that federal immigration agents could be placed at polling sites this fall.^[19] In response to these reports, DHS has stated that ICE agents will not be patrolling polling places during the midterms.^[20] Those reports, however, have nonetheless raised concerns that federal immigration officers may contribute to voter intimidation and reduced voter turnout.

1. Effect of this Bill: As relevant to the jurisdiction of this committee, this bill creates several new election-related crimes applicable to California peace officers, including: 1) establishing or attempt to establish the qualifications of voters at any election in the state, contrary to the laws of the state; 2) imposing or attempting to impose a rule, standard, or practice for conducting any election in this state, contrary to the laws of the state; and 3) interfering in any manner with the administration of any election and with the discharge of duties by the SOS, a county elections official, an election worker, or a volunteer performing required elections-related tasks, except as necessary to respond to urgent threats to public health and safety. These proposed crimes would be wobblers punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for up to 12 months, or by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years in state prison. Conspiring to commit these crimes would be punishable as a straight felony. This bill also authorizes the AG, SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action to enforce these offenses.

The need to create these new crimes is somewhat unclear. Existing law establishes numerous crimes that may already encompass the type of conduct these new crimes seek to address. It is a felony for any person to interfere with the officers holding an election or conducting a canvass as to prevent the election or canvass from being fairly held and lawfully conducted, or with voters lawfully exercising their voting rights. (Elec. Code, § 18502, subd. (a).) It is also a felony to threaten or make use of any force, violence, tactic, coercion, or intimidation, or to induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting. (Elec. Code, § 18540, subd. (a); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).) Further, it is a jail-eligible felony for a person to act as an election officer without first having been appointed or to discharge the duties of an election officer regarding the handling, counting, or canvassing of ballots when that person is not an election officer. (Elec. Code, § 18575.) A peace officer who attempts to establish a voter qualification or impose an election standard contrary to the laws of the state, or who interferes with an election, to the extent that this conduct constitutes election interference, voter intimidation, or rises to the level of performing the duties of an election officer, may be subject to felony charges.

Existing law also establishes crimes and prohibitions pertaining to questioning a voter’s qualifications and right to vote. For example, it is a felony for a person, with the intent of dissuading another from voting, within 100 feet of a polling place, to speak to a voter on the subject of marking the voter’s ballot or on the voter’s qualifications, unless it is a member of the precinct board making the challenge on specified grounds. (Elec. Code, § 18541, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) A person, other than a member of a precinct board or other official responsible for the conduct of an election, is prohibited from challenging or questioning a voter’s qualification to vote. (Elec. Code, § 14240, subd. (b).) Further, it is a wobbler for a person to knowingly challenge a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent or spurious grounds. (Elec. Code, § 18543.) A peace officer who seeks to establish a heightened voter qualification or a voting or election standard contrary to law, depending on their particular conduct, could be subject to criminal penalties under these provisions.

Additionally, this bill expands the crime of a person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel, or any person who is wearing a uniform of such a person, being stationed in the immediate vicinity of a polling place without written authorization of the appropriate elections official. This crime is a wobbler. (Elec. Code, § 18544, subd. (a).) This offense does not apply to a peace officer, unarmed guard, or security personnel casting their vote, or to a peace officer conducting official business in the course of their public employment. (Elec. Code, § 18544, subd. (b).)

This bill makes two primary changes to this crime. First, it specifies that written authorization from the elections official may be overridden by an objection by the SOS or AG after the authorization is granted. This may contribute to unjust outcomes, particularly if the stationed personnel are not aware of this objection and believe they are lawfully present at the polling place. For example, if the SOS objects to that authorization several days after the peace officers were lawfully present at the polling place, those peace officers may be subject to criminal punishment even though their initial placement was lawful. The author may wish to consider clarifying that criminal punishment may only apply if the person stationed at the polling place has knowledge of the objection and remains stationed at the polling place after gaining such knowledge.

Second, it removes the requirement that the peace officer, private guard, or security personnel be uniformed. Currently, this crime largely applies only to uniformed personnel. (Elec. Code, § 18544, subd. (a) (prohibiting “any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform [of such a person] from being stationed at a polling place” (italics added).) The only person covered who does not need to be uniformed is a person in possession of a firearm. This statute appears to be designed to deter voter intimidation by treating certain law enforcement and security officials who are wearing formal attire as presumptively intimidating, regardless of their conduct. The author’s office cites concern that this uniform requirement may not encompass law enforcement officers who are not in uniform but are nonetheless wearing intimidating attire. While this may be true, expanding the crime to include non-uniformed officers may encompass individuals who are not intimidating voters and whose identities as peace officers or security officers are not even known to voters or elections officials. Removing the uniform requirement may also make it difficult to enforce this crime, seeing as it may be hard to identify such persons without uniforms. Notably, other statutes encompass voter intimidation more generally, irrespective of whether the offender is uniformed. (See, e.g., Elec. Code, § 18540, subd. (a).)

Further, this bill makes similar changes to the crime of hiring or arranging for a person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed law enforcement officer (including an officer of a federal law enforcement agency), private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of such a person, to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of a polling place without written authorization of the appropriate elections official or a federal court order. This statute is substantially similar to Elections Code section 18544, but instead of applying to persons who are stationed at a polling place, it applies to a “person who hires or arranges” for such persons to be hired. It also encompasses hiring or arranging for an officer of a federal law enforcement agency to be stationed at a polling place, whereas Elections Code section 18544 does not apply to federal law enforcement officers.

Similar to the changes to Elections Code section 18544, this bill, for the crime of hiring or arranging for specified persons to be stationed at a polling place, removes the requirement that specified personnel be uniformed and specifies that the written authorization may be overridden by an objection by the SOS or AG. These changes raise the same issues discussed above. Additionally, it adds military personnel and persons wearing the uniform of military personnel to the list of prohibited persons encompassed by this crime. It also removes the requirement that judicial written authorization be obtained by a federal court order, instead permitting written authorization to be given by any court order.

This bill makes it a crime to knowingly take a package containing voted ballots or their contents from the custody of the elections official, and makes this offense a jail-eligible felony, punishable by up to a $1,000 fine or by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years, or by both that fine and imprisonment. Existing law already prohibits a package containing voted ballots or their contents from being taken from the custody of the elections official; however, it does not establish a specific criminal penalty for violating this prohibition. (Elec. Code, § 15551.) This bill makes this existing prohibition a straight felony.

In addition to the above provisions relating to election crimes, this bill makes a handful of additional changes to existing law. Among other things, it requires that, when a court order is being executed related to the search or seizure of a voting system machine, voter ballots, VBM ballot envelopes, or other specified election materials, the elections official required to comply with the court order must provide immediate notice to the SOS and AG. It also requires the AG to provide county elections officials with guidance on how elections officials, precinct boards, election workers, and election volunteers should respond to requests by an agent of a law enforcement agency to access areas where ballots are cast, handled, processed, counted, tabulated, tallied, audited, or recounted. Similarly, the AG must provide guidance to building owners and employers regarding how to respond to requests by an agent of a law enforcement agency to access those areas.

Among other things, this bill prohibits an “individual” from permitting law enforcement agents to engage in certain conduct. It prohibits an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency who is acting in their official capacity to serve as a VBM observer, as specified, unless authorized by a court order and except as specified. Similarly, it prohibits an individual from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists, unless authorized by a court order or to investigate specified offenses. Lastly, it prohibits an individual from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of a voting system machine or device, software, or source code, unless authorized by a court order. “Law enforcement agency” for purposes of these provisions includes peace officers, as well as any law enforcement agency of another state, and any federal law enforcement agency. This is the same definition of law enforcement agency that was utilized in SB 805 (Perez), Chapter 126, Statutes of 2025.

This bill places the responsibility to prevent law enforcement agents from engaging in certain actions on unspecified “individual[s].” In practice, this responsibility would likely fall on county election officials, elections workers, and other persons responsible for administering elections. Notably, an election worker may not always be able to prevent a law enforcement officer from engaging in such prohibited conduct. While the bill does not establish specific criminal penalties for individuals who violate these prohibitions, Elections Code section 18002 makes it a felony for a person charged with any duty related to elections to willfully neglect or refuse to perform it, or, in their official capacity, to knowingly and fraudulently act in violation of any of those laws. (Elec. Code, § 18002, subd. (a).) Accordingly, an elections worker who willfully or knowingly permits law enforcement officers to engage in the type of conduct prohibited by this bill could be subject to felony charges.

1. Suggested Committee Amendments: To address the concerns discussed above, the Committee recommends the following amendments. First, the author may wish to remove the proposed criminal penalties on peace officers that establish the qualifications of voters at any election, impose a rule, standard, or practice for conducting any election, or interfere in any matter with the administration of any election, as specified. Second, the author may wish to reinstate the requirement that certain personnel be uniformed for purposes of the crime of specified persons being stationed or posted at a polling place without written authorization from an elections official, and the crime of hiring or arranging for such a person to be stationed, as specified. Third, regarding the provision permitting the SOS or AG to object to such written authorization, the author may wish to add language that if the SOS or AG does object to the written authorization, criminal penalties do not apply unless a person remained stationed or posted at the polling place after gaining knowledge of the objection. Similarly, for the crime of hiring or arranging for another to be stationed at a polling place or elections office, the author may wish to specify that criminal penalties do not apply unless that person gains knowledge of the objection, and after gaining such knowledge, permits the person they hired or arranged for to remain stationed at the polling place or elections office.
2. Argument in Support: According to the League of Women Voters of California, “SB 73 restricts law enforcement access to voting system machines, devices, software, source code, rosters, combined rosters, and voter lists; strengthens ballot custody protections; requires immediate notice to the Secretary of State and Attorney General when court ordered searches or seizures of election materials are executed; and bars peace officers from interfering with election administration…

“The legislation is especially important because the threat is no longer hypothetical. In a climate where federal officials are openly criminalizing the routine work of election administration, seeking sensitive voter data from states, and testing the limits of federal authority over election administration, local election officials need clear legal footing to resist ad hoc law enforcement demands for access to California’s election infrastructure - and to ensure that armed or uniformed personnel cannot be deployed at polling places or county elections offices without proper authorization.

“SB 73 provides the necessary legal footing. It draws an appropriate and constitutional line. When law enforcement seeks access to California’s voting systems, software, source code, rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists, SB 73 makes clear that those demands cannot be handled through informal pressure or ad hoc requests. Instead, they must be grounded in legal authority, including a court order where the bill requires one. And when court ordered searches or seizures reach ballots, VBM envelopes, voter lists, voting systems, or other covered election materials, the bill requires immediate notice to the Secretary of State and Attorney General to enable state oversight. The bill ensures that local election officials are not put in the position of yielding to politically charged demands from law enforcement without a clear legal basis. It gives counties clarity, protects the independence of California’s election infrastructure, and helps prevent intimidation from undermining public confidence in our democracy.”

“At a time when federal actors are pressing states for voter data, threatening election officials with criminal prosecution simply for doing their jobs, and probing local election infrastructure, California must be clear that its election systems will be governed by law, expertise, and transparent processes, not by pressure from the current federal administration or unauthorized intervention by any law enforcement agency. SB 73 reinforces state authority, protects ballot security, and helps ensure that every vote is counted through systems free from improper interference.”

1. Argument in Opposition: According to the California State Sheriff’s Association, “SB 73 would add to existing regulation of state elections and restrict law enforcement’s ability to conduct criminal investigations. We understand there are likely amendments coming to the bill, but with regard to the language that is currently in print, we must communicate our concerns.

“Existing law requires the sheriff to “investigate public offenses which have been committed.” (Government Code Section 26602). SB 73 imposes new restrictions and enhances existing provisions with the specter of civil remedies (potentially including damages) and/or criminal penalties related to law enforcement investigations, which is especially problematic given our statutory mandate to investigate crimes. For example, proposed Elections Code Section 15007 prohibits a peace officer from “[interfering] in any manner with the administration of any election in this state…” At best, this language is vague and could be used to attack a lawful law enforcement investigation.

“Further, SB 73 highlights a potential conflict between a statute that prohibits a package of voted ballots from being taken from the custody of an elections official and a court order compelling a law enforcement officer to seize ballots and take them to a magistrate. While existing law creates this conflict, the bill raises the stakes in such a dispute by subjecting a peace officer to civil and criminal penalties for complying with a court order that requires something different from what the statute provides or judicial punishment for following statute and not the court order. And despite arguments that keeping ballots with the elections official is necessary to protect the chain of custody, law enforcement officers are keenly aware of evidence preservation issues and are routinely charged with protecting all types of sensitive evidence. Lastly, this conflict creates very real issues when elections officials are suspected of criminal activities, effectively guaranteeing they would be in charge of preserving evidence that could potentially implicate them in a crime

“SB 73 would also allow the Secretary of State or Attorney General to essentially veto a local arrangement whereby the sheriff’s office provides for security at polling places. We understand this provision may not be directly aimed at local law enforcement, but without further guardrails, this language would allow for political concerns or motives to upend local security arrangements that protect elections workers, ballots and voting materials, and citizens’ right to vote.”

1. Related Legislation:
   1. SB 884 (Umberg), among other things, would prohibit a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer shall not arresting any person within 200 feet of a polling place on election day during the time in which the polling place is open, except for a crime related to disrupting the operation of the polling place, a violent or serious felony, as defined, or larceny; and provides that this provision does not provide legal amnesty for any crime within the buffer zone on election day. SB 884 is pending a hearing in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
   2. AB 1664 (Jackson) would require local agencies and elections officials to notify the SOS and AG within one business day of becoming aware of any warrant, subpoena, or active law enforcement investigation pertaining to election records or voting systems. AB 1664 is pending a hearing in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
   3. AB 2230 (Ávila Farías) would expand the crime of a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel being stationed in the immediate vicinity of a polling place without written authorization to include an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency, as specified. AB 2230 is pending a hearing in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
2. Prior Legislation:
   1. SB 851 (Cervantes), Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025, expended the crime of hiring or arranging for any person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed officer to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or posted at, a polling place without authorization of the appropriate elections official, which includes an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency and exempts a person stationed at a polling place or county elections official’s office pursuant to a federal court order.
   2. AB 2642 (Berman), Chapter 533, Statutes of 2024, prohibited a person from intimidating, threatening, or coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person for engaging in specified election-related activities, and authorized an aggrieved person, an officer holding an election or conducting a canvass, or the AG to file a civil action to enforce those prohibitions.
   3. SB 485 (Becker), Chapter 611, Statutes of 2023, established additional specificity for penal provisions within the Elections Code as it pertains to a person who interferes with the officers holding an election, officers conducting a canvass, or with voters lawfully exercising their voting rights.
   4. SB 35 (Umberg), Chapter 318, Statutes of 2021, among other things, prohibited a person from engaging in electioneering and prescribed political activities within the immediate vicinity of a voter in line to cast a ballot or drop off a VBM ballot, as specified.
   5. SB 1376 (Perata), Chapter 813, Statutes of 2004, authorized the SOS, and in some cases the AG and county elections officials, to take legal actions regarding the security of voting systems and the conduct of elections.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders for Civic Empowerment
League of Women Voters of California
Seiu California

Opposition

California State Sheriffs' Association

Analysis Prepared by: Ilan Zur / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744

1. Branson-Potts, What we know about the Republican sheriff who seized 650,000 ballots, L.A. Times (Mar. 23, 2026) <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-03-23/riverside-county-sheriff-has-seized-650-000-ballots-heres-what-we-know> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

2. Ibid. ↑

3. Corasaniti, California Supreme Court orders Sheriff to Halt Election Investigation, N.Y. Times (April 8, 2026) <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/08/us/politics/california-supreme-court-orders-sheriff-to-halt-election-investigation.html> (as of May 4, 2026); Branson-Potts, supra. ↑

4. Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta, letter to Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco, Feb. 26, 2026 <https://kesq.b-cdn.net/2026/03/Feb.-26-Letter-to-Sheriff-Bianco_Redacted.pdf> (as of May 4, 2026); Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta, letter to Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco, Mar. 4, 2026 <https://www.scribd.com/document/1015362106/Letter-from-California-Attorney-General-to-Riverside-County-sheriff-dated-March-26> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

5. Ibid. ↑

6. Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta, letter to Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco, Feb. 26, 2026 <https://kesq.b-cdn.net/2026/03/Feb.-26-Letter-to-Sheriff-Bianco_Redacted.pdf> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

7. Timm, California Supreme Court halts GOP sheriff’s voter fraud investigation, NBC News (April 8, 2026) <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/california-supreme-court-halts-gop-sheriffs-voter-fraud-investigation-rcna267299> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

8. Rubin et al., Internal emails show how fringe groups fueled Sheriff Chad Bianco’s ballot seizure, CalMatters (April 21, 2026) <https://calmatters.org/investigation/2026/04/chad-bianco-emails/> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

9. Sun, Immigration Arrests Are Up Sharply in Every State. Here Are the Numbers, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2025) <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/06/27/us/ice-arrests-trump.html> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

10. Miranda, ICE deportations in California surged in the thousands as 2025 went on, Sacramento Bee (Jan. 12, 2026) <https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/article314213552.html> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

11. Ibid. ↑

12. Castillo, More than 1600 immigrants detained in Southern California this month, DHS says, L.A. Times (June 25, 2025) <https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2025-06-25/more-than-1-600-immigrants-detained-in-southern-california-this-month-dhs-says> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

13. Fry et al., Immigration Arrests surge by 1,500% in San Diego: ‘I feel the temperature rising’, CalMatters (Jan. 29, 2026) <https://calmatters.org/justice/2026/01/san-diego-immigration-arrest-surge/> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

14. Hutchinson, LA protests timeline: How ICE raids sparked demonstrations and Trump to send in the military, ABC News (June 11, 2025) <https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-ice-raids-sparked-la-protests-prompted-trump/story?id=122688437> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

15. McSwane, Two CBP Agents Identified in Alex Pretti Shooting, ProPublica (Feb. 1, 2026) <https://www.propublica.org/article/alex-pretti-shooting-cbp-agents-identified-jesus-ochoa-raymundo-gutierrez> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

16. Bustillo et al., Immigration detention on track for deadliest fiscal year since 2004, NPR (March 10, 2026) <https://www.npr.org/2026/03/10/g-s1-111238/immigration-detention-deaths-custody> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

17. Ibid. ↑

18. Ibid. ↑

19. Cohen, ICE agents have been deployed to airports. Are the polls next?, CNN.com (March 25, 2026) <https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/25/politics/ice-agents-polling-places-bannon> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

20. Parks, ICE won’t be at polling places this year, a Trump DHS official promises, NPR.org (Feb. 25, 2026) <https://www.npr.org/2026/02/25/nx-s1-5726768/ice-agents-midterm-elections> (as of May 4, 2026). ↑

Date of Hearing: May 6, 2026

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS

Gail Pellerin, Chair

SBPCA Bill Id:SB 73

Author:(Cervantes) – As Amended Ver:April 27, 2026

SENATE VOTE: (vote not relevant)

SUBJECT: Elections: inspection of voting systems.

SUMMARY: Restricts law enforcement agencies and officers from engaging in specified conduct related to elections. Prohibits a person who is observing the processing of vote by mail (VBM) ballots from challenging whether signatures compare. Specifically, this bill:

1. Requires an elections official to notify the Secretary of State (SOS) and the Attorney General (AG) immediately if a court order is being executed to search or seize voting technology, materials, or equipment, as specified.
2. Requires the AG to provide guidance to county elections officials regarding how election personnel should respond to requests by law enforcement agencies (including federal agencies) to access areas where ballots are being cast, processed, or otherwise handled, as specified. Requires the AG to provide similar guidance to building owners and employers. Requires this guidance to be consistent with state and federal law.
3. Prohibits a peace officer (a term that does not include federal law enforcement) from doing any of the following, in connection with an election in the state:
   1. Establishing or attempting to establish voter qualifications contrary to state law.
      
   2. Imposing or attempting to impose election rules or practices contrary to state law.
      
   3. Interfering with the conduct of the election and the discharge of duties of election personnel, except as necessary to respond to urgent threats to public health and safety.
4. Permits the AG, the SOS, or a county elections official to bring a civil action to enforce 3) above. Requires the court to expedite the scheduling of such an action that is brought during the period beginning 30 days before the election and ending with the completion of the canvass of the election. Makes a violation of 3) above subject to imprisonment in county jail for up to 12 months, or in state prison.
5. Prohibits an observer of VBM ballot processing from challenging whether the signature on a form to verify a VBM ballot compares to a signature in the voter’s registration record.
6. Prohibits any person from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency (including a federal agency), as specified, to serve as an observer of VBM ballot processing in their official capacity unless authorized by a court order. Specifies that this provision does not prohibit an elections official from providing written authorization for law enforcement personnel to provide logistical or security support at a voting location or a county elections office, as specified.
7. Prohibits any person from permitting an agent of a law enforcement agency (including a federal agency), as specified, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of rosters, combined rosters, or voter lists unless authorized by a court order or to investigate a violation of state law prohibiting double voting.
8. Prohibits non-uniformed peace officers, private guards, and security personnel from being stationed at a voting location without the elections official’s authorization. Prohibits a person from hiring or arranging for military personnel (whether uniformed or not), and non-uniformed law enforcement officers, private guards, and security personnel to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office without the elections official’s authorization.
9. Allows the SOS or the AG to override a county’s decision to authorize peace or law enforcement officers, private guards, or security personnel to be stationed at a voting location or county elections office.
10. Permits the SOS, the AG, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against any person who, in violation of existing law, takes a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official. Makes it a crime, punishable by a $1,000 fine, imprisonment for up to three years, or by both, for a person to knowingly take a package containing voted ballots from the custody of the elections official.
11. Prohibits any person from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency (including a federal agency), as specified, to access, disrupt, modify, or take possession of a voting system machine or device, software, or source code, unless authorized by a court order.
12. Contains a severability clause. Contains an urgency clause, allowing this bill to take effect immediately upon enactment. Specifies that the need for the urgency clause is so that the bill can apply to the June 2, 2026, statewide primary election.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Requires a state or local agency or political subdivision to provide notice to the SOS and AG within three court days of filing or being served with a court action relating to an election-related claim under federal law, and at least 14 court days before entering into a settlement, consent decree, or other court-approved agreement in such an action. (Elections Code §21)
   
2. Requires a county elections official to verify the signature on a VBM ballot envelope against signatures in the voter's registration record, count the ballot if the signatures compare, and provide voters a way to fix missing signatures or signatures that do not compare. Makes VBM ballot processing open to public observation and allows observers to challenge whether individuals handling VBM ballots are following established procedures. (Elections Code §§3019, 15104)
   
3. Makes it a crime for a person to do any of the following:
   1. Interfere with the officers holding an election or conducting a canvass or with voters lawfully voting in an election, as specified. (Elections Code §18502)
   2. Use, or threaten to use, force, violence, intimidation, or coercion (or to have someone else do so) to influence how a person votes, whether they vote at all, or to punish them for how or whether they voted. (Elections Code §18540)
      
   3. Place a sign relating to voters’ qualifications, speak to a voter related to their qualifications, record a voter entering or exiting a voting location, or obstruct ingress, egress, or parking, within 100 feet of a voting location or ballot drop-off location with the intent of dissuading a person from voting. (Elections Code §§18370, 18541)
      
   4. Knowingly challenge a person’s right to vote without probable cause or on fraudulent grounds. (Elections Code §18543)
      
   5. Be stationed at a voting location without the written authorization of the elections official while in possession of a firearm; as a uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel; or while wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel, except as specified. (Elections Code §18544)
      
   6. Hire or arrange for a person to be stationed at a voting location without the written authorization of the elections official while in possession of a firearm; as a uniformed law enforcement officer, private guard, or security personnel; or while wearing a uniform of a law enforcement officer, guard, or security personnel, except as specified. (Elections Code §18545)
      
   7. Tamper with, interfere with, or damage voting technology, as specified. Provides, for these purposes, that interfering with voting technology includes providing unauthorized access to or breaking the chain of custody of certified voting technology, as specified. (Elections Code §18564)
   8. Tamper with ballots, poll lists, ballot containers, or election returns, as specified. (Elections Code §18568)
   9. Act as an election officer or perform any of an election officer’s duties without first having been appointed as such, as specified. (Elections Code §18575)
4. Prohibits a person other than a poll worker or other official responsible for conducting an election from challenging or questioning a voter at a voting location regarding their qualifications to vote. (Elections Code §14240)
   
5. Establishes a civil cause of action against a person who intimidates, threatens, or coerces another person, or attempts to do any of those things, for voting, attempting to vote, urging or aiding another person in voting or attempting to vote, or exercising powers or duties to administer elections. (Elections Code §§18580 et seq.)
6. Prohibits sealed packages containing voted ballots from an election from being taken from the custody of an elections official. (Elections Code §15551)
7. Establishes rules governing the collection of ballots from VBM drop boxes. Provides that only designated ballot retrievers and law enforcement identified by the county elections official may transport VBM ballots retrieved from drop boxes. (2 Code of California Regulations §20137)
8. Prohibits any election observer from interfering with the conduct of the election or wearing the uniform of a peace officer, private guard, or security personnel. (2 Code of California Regulations §20878)
9. Permits the SOS, the AG, or a county elections official to bring a civil action against any person who tampers with voting technology, as specified. (Elections Code §18564.5)
10. Requires an elections official who uses a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every two years to determine their accuracy. (Elections Code §19230)

FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown. State-mandated local program; contains a crimes and infractions disclaimer; contains reimbursement direction.

COMMENTS:

1. New Bill: As approved by the Senate, this bill would have prohibited local election officials from permitting a federal government agency or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order. While a modified version of that proposal remains in this bill, all other substantive provisions of this bill were recently added to the bill at the author’s request. As a result, prior votes and analyses are not relevant. The current version of this bill proposes many substantive policy changes that have not been heard in an Assembly or Senate policy committee during this legislative session.
2. Purpose of the Bill: According to the author:

Democracy in California is under attack, not only by the Trump Administration but also by some officials in our state, including Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco. We have a responsibility to protect the voices of California voters and we will not stand by as outside forces seek to undermine our electoral process. Senate Bill 73 builds on the foundation established by my Senate Bill 851 from 2025, strengthening California’s safeguards against election interference in time for the June 2 statewide primary election.

1. Seizure of Ballots in Riverside County: In February, the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department applied to the Superior Court for a search warrant authorizing a search of the Riverside County Registrar of Voters’ office and the seizure of all ballots from the November 2025 statewide special election.
   
   The affidavit supporting the warrant stated that a local election watchdog group had conducted an audit and concluded that the number of ballots cast differed from the official total reported by the Registrar of Voters by nearly 46,000 ballots. However, the affidavit does not indicate that the Sheriff’s Department contacted the Registrar’s office to seek a response or took any other steps to attempt to substantiate these allegations. It also does not identify any specific individual suspected of wrongdoing or any particular crime believed to have been committed.
   
   Instead, just three days after receiving an email from the watchdog group alleging discrepancies, the Sheriff’s Department sought a warrant to seize the ballots “in order to prove or disprove any criminal conduct.” This request was made even though the department acknowledged that the Registrar of Voters was scheduled to present information addressing the alleged discrepancies to the Board of Supervisors the following day. At that presentation, the Registrar disputed the watchdog group’s figures, stating that the difference between ballots cast and ballots counted, based on official results, was 103 ballots.
   

The Sheriff’s Department later obtained two additional search warrants: one to seize additional election materials (beyond ballots) and another to appoint a special master to oversee the department’s counting of ballots. By the time the third warrant was requested, the department had already opened boxes of ballots and had begun counting them, despite state laws generally requiring election materials to remain sealed and in the custody of the elections official during the retention period.

In March, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a petition in Appellate Court seeking an immediate stay of the Sheriff’s investigation and the warrant appointing a special master. The AG’s office expressed “grave concerns about the legal sufficiency” of the search warrants and stated that it had directed the Sheriff’s Department to pause its investigation while the state reviewed the matter and determined next steps. According to the petition, the Sheriff indicated he would comply. That, however, did not occur and the Sheriff continued to take actions related to the investigation, including obtaining the third warrant without notifying the AG.

The Appellate Court denied the requested relief, concluding that the AG should have first sought relief in the Riverside County Superior Court. The AG subsequently petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief. Last month, the Supreme Court granted review, ordered a pause in the investigation into the November 2025 statewide special election, and directed that all seized materials be preserved. Proceedings remain ongoing, and the Court has indicated it will consider the matter on an expedited basis.

Regardless of the current procedural posture, the fact that the Sheriff’s Department obtained a warrant and seized election ballots without identifying a specific crime or suspect raises significant concerns about the security and chain of custody of election materials. The ballots from the 2025 statewide special election are no longer in the county elections official’s custody but instead are held by the Sheriff’s Department.

1. Federal Demands for Election Records and Access to Equipment: There have been various reports that the United States (US) Department of Justice (DOJ) has requested election records or access to voting equipment in various states. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, last year, the federal administration sought access to voting equipment in Colorado, Missouri, and Minnesota.
   

In January, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raided election offices in Fulton County, Georgia and seized more than 600 boxes of ballots and other election materials from the 2020 election pursuant to a search warrant. In addition to physical ballots from the 2020 general election, the warrant sought tabulator tapes for every voting machine and ballot images that were created from ballot scanning from the 2020 General Election in Fulton County. Additionally, the warrant targeted voter rolls from the 2020 General Election including lists of voters who were issued and returned absentee ballots or who participated in advanced voting or election day voting. In February, Fulton County officials filed an emergency motion in federal court seeking the return of the election records seized by the FBI, and in April, a federal judge ordered the US DOJ to turn over key details behind its seizure of 2020 election records in Fulton County, Georgia. The case is pending.

Additionally, in April, the New York Times reported that the US DOJ sent a letter to the chief elections officer in Wayne County, Michigan requesting election records—including ballots—from the November 2024 federal election.

1. Threats of Federal Interference in Elections: Although federal law prohibits federal troops or law enforcement from interfering with voting, multiple media reports indicate that allies of the Trump administration have floated the possibility of deploying immigration agents or other federal personnel to polling locations this fall. In response, the White House and a senior Department of Homeland Security official have stated that there are no plans to send US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to polling sites.
   
   Despite these denials, the mere possibility of federal agents being stationed at or near polling places has heightened concerns about voter intimidation. Some dismiss these concerns by arguing that only citizens are eligible to vote. However, this reasoning overlooks the reality that the visible presence of immigration or other federal law enforcement officers can deter even eligible voters. This concern is amplified by documented cases of large numbers of US citizens being stopped by immigration authorities, and smaller numbers being detained notwithstanding their citizenship.
   
   For instance, a report by ProPublica, a nonprofit investigative news organization, identified more than 170 cases during the first nine months of President Trump’s second administration in which US citizens were detained by immigration agents.^[1] More than 20 of those individuals reported being held for over a day without access to family members or legal counsel. ProPublica also indicated that these totals were almost certainly incomplete, because the federal government does not track the number of cases where US citizens are detained by immigration agents. The report also highlights a broader historical pattern of US citizens being wrongfully detained—and, in some cases, even deported—across multiple presidential administrations.
   
2. Court Orders, Elections Officials, Related Legislation, and Suggested Amendments: This bill is partially motivated by recent situations, described in detail above, where elections officials were presented with court orders to turn over election materials (including ballots). Under state law, these materials generally are required to be kept in the custody of the elections official under specific conditions to ensure their integrity and maintain the chain of custody. Following the execution of those court orders, significant questions have arisen about the sufficiency of law enforcement’s applications to seize the materials, and whether the courts should have granted those applications based on the information provided.
   
   Although the applications for the search warrants in these cases have been unsealed and are publicly available, the elections officials who were served with the warrants did not have access to that information at the time. Even if they had, and even if they believed the applications were insufficient, the officials were faced with court orders compelling them to hand over the ballots. Short of defying a court order and risking considerable legal liability, elections officials have limited options to resist such seizures, even when state law requires the materials to remain in their custody. Once those materials are seized, officials can no longer guarantee their chain of custody or ensure that they have not been altered or tampered with.
   
   This bill acknowledges the difficult position of elections officials in these situations and seeks to provide guidance and support. It requires the AG to advise elections officials on how to respond to these types of requests from law enforcement. Given that the SOS is the chief elections officer of the state, elections officials would also benefit from that office’s involvement in preparing the advice. Accordingly, committee staff recommends that this bill be amended to require the AG to develop this guidance in consultation with the SOS.
   
   Additionally, this bill requires prompt notification to the AG and the SOS whenever such situations arise. This could enable state officials to intervene quickly. However, other pending legislation establishes more robust procedures for state intervention. Specifically, AB 1664 (Jackson) not only requires prompt notification to the AG and SOS but also ensures the AG can intervene in relevant court proceedings or initiate proceedings to seek appropriate relief, with priority in court scheduling. AB 1664 was approved by this committee last month on a 6-2 vote and is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
   
   In light of the foregoing, the author and the committee may wish to consider amending this bill to delete Section 1 in favor of the more comprehensive protections offered by AB 1664.
3. Risks to an Ongoing Election: The author intends for this bill to take effect in time for next month’s statewide primary election. However, as of this committee hearing, that election is already underway. California counties were required to begin mailing ballots to all voters earlier this week, and ballots for military and overseas voters were sent more than two weeks ago. In person voting is already available at county elections offices, with expanded voting locations opening across much of the state in about two and a half weeks. Election officials have also begun pre-election testing and are permitted to process returned VBM ballots. Meanwhile, election materials have already been produced or are in production.
   
   Most provisions of this bill were made public only last week, and this hearing is the first policy committee review of those proposals. If approved here, the bill must still pass additional committees, be approved by both legislative chambers, and be signed by the Governor before taking effect. As a result, many voters will likely have already cast their ballots before this bill could be implemented, and legislative consideration of this bill will need to be expedited considerably for it to apply to the primary election.
   
   Although this bill is unlikely to directly affect most voters’ experience, implementing it during the primary election could complicate election administration. State and county officials would need to quickly understand the legal changes and their operational impact. That task will be made more difficult by the limited time that the public has had to review these proposed changes. At a minimum, some jurisdictions will need to revise election observation procedures and educate observers on those changes. Officials may also need to reassess partnerships with local law enforcement, such as those related to facility security or equipment transport, to ensure compliance, and adjust practices where necessary.
   
   Additionally, the bill introduces new criminal liability on individuals who allow law enforcement personnel to take certain actions. Because elections officials are the most likely individuals to be in a position to allow those actions to occur, they will need to evaluate these provisions carefully to understand their obligations.

Addressing these issues will require time and resources in the critical days leading up to the election, potentially diverting attention from core election operations. The compressed timeline also increases the risk of confusion, inconsistent implementation, and limited access to legal guidance on unclear provisions. Together, these factors could interfere with effective election administration.

At the same time, the activities this bill seeks to restrict could disrupt election operations or threaten voters’ rights, potentially in more serious ways. For that reason, action to address genuine risks to election integrity may be warranted despite the challenges of mid-election implementation.

However, as discussed elsewhere in this analysis, existing state law already appears to address some of the conduct targeted by this bill. While a “belt-and-suspenders” approach can help close even theoretical gaps, it is less clear whether the benefits of adding potentially duplicative provisions during an ongoing election outweigh the risks posed by rushed implementation.

1. Existing Protections Against Election Interference: California law has long included robust protections against election interference, and the Legislature has strengthened these protections in recent years in response to escalating hostility and contentious discourse surrounding elections. Many of these protections are described in more detail in the “Existing Law” section of this analysis.
   
   This bill seeks to add further safeguards against potential interference by the federal government or other actors, beginning with next month’s statewide primary election. However, some provisions appear duplicative of existing law, and for others, it is unclear whether they are appropriately targeted to address the potential threats identified by the author. As a result, certain parts of the bill may add complexity and create new civil and criminal liabilities without meaningfully increasing protections for California elections.
   
   1. Restrictions on Peace Officers and Suggested Amendments: Section 3 of this bill proposes adding Section 15007 to the Elections Code, specifying certain actions that peace officers are prohibited from taking, including attempting to establish the qualifications of voters, attempting to impose rules for conducting elections, and interfering with the conduct of elections.
      
      It is unclear whether these restrictions are necessary. Their inclusion could create ambiguity regarding the scope of existing protections against election interference, which apply broadly to all individuals.
      
      For example, state law already prohibits anybody other than a poll worker or elections official from challenging a voter’s qualifications at a polling place and makes it a crime to speak to a voter about the voter’s qualifications near a voting location. It is also a crime to challenge a voter without probable cause, to use force or intimidation to influence how a person votes or whether they vote, to perform the duties of an elections official without being appointed as an elections official, or to interfere with officers holding an election or with voters lawfully voting in an election. State law also establishes a civil cause of action for intimidating or threatening people for voting or administering elections.
      
      Moreover, nothing in the Elections Code grants peace officers authority to determine voter qualifications or establish elections policies. Voter qualifications are set by law, and elections policies are established by elections officials or are specified by law.
      
      As a result, it is unclear whether Section 15007 addresses a real gap in protections. Additionally, by explicitly singling out peace officers, it could imply that the prohibited conduct is permissible for others, which would be misleading.
      
      In light of the foregoing, the author and the committee may wish to consider deleting the criminal penalties associated with violations. Such an amendment would maintain the ability to bring a civil action for enforcement while avoiding the creation of new crimes that are duplicative of existing law.
      
   2. Restrictions on VBM Ballot Observers and Suggested Amendments: Section 5 of this bill prohibits an individual from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency who is acting in their official capacity from serving as an observer of VBM ballot processing, unless authorized by a court order. According to the author, this provision aims to protect election workers from potential intimidation by armed, uniformed officers.
      
      Existing law, however, already prohibits election observers from wearing uniforms of peace officers, private guards, or security personnel. If an agent is not in uniform, it is unclear whether the elections official would know if the person was an agent of a law enforcement agency, much less whether the person was acting in their official capacity. Accordingly, it is unclear whether this new restriction could be effectively enforced. Furthermore, this provision departs from California’s long-standing policy of allowing any individual to observe election processes.
      
      In light of the foregoing, the author and the committee may wish to consider amendments to delete Section 5 of the bill.
      
   3. Restrictions on Permitting Law Enforcement Agencies to Engage in Specified Conduct and Suggested Amendments: In addition to the provisions of Section 5 of this bill, Sections 7 and 12 of this bill similarly prohibit an individual from permitting agents of law enforcement agencies to engage in specified conduct, including accessing or taking possession of voter rosters or lists or voting machines or devices, unless authorized by a court order.
      
      As drafted, these sections could be read to criminalize longstanding partnerships between elections officials and law enforcement agencies to provide security and support to elections operations. For instance, many county elections officials work with their county sheriffs to transport election materials from voting locations to the county elections office after the polls close on election day. This is especially common in geographically large counties, where county elections officials have sheriffs transport materials from voting locations in remote areas of the county by helicopter in order to expedite the elections official’s receipt of those materials.
      
      While some provisions of this bill expressly allow elections officials to work with law enforcement agencies to provide logistical or security support, those exceptions do not apply to Sections 7 and 12.
      
      In light of the foregoing, committee staff recommends amendments to Sections 7 and 12 of this bill to expressly specify that those provisions do not prohibit agreements between the county elections official and a law enforcement agency for the transport of election materials.
      
   4. Restrictions on Stationing of Non-Uniformed Officers at Voting Locations: Under current law, uniformed law enforcement, private guards, and security personnel may not be stationed at a voting location or county elections office without the authorization of the elections official. This bill proposes extending those restrictions to include non-uniformed and unarmed law enforcement, private guards, and security personnel. The bill also allows the AG or the SOS to override an elections official’s decision to authorize law enforcement, private guards, or security personnel at a voting location or county elections office.
      
      The benefit of restricting non-uniformed and unarmed personnel is unclear. If law enforcement or security personnel are present near a voting location without a uniform or visible weapons, it may be difficult for anyone to know their role. This raises questions about how the restriction could be effectively enforced. The lack of visible identifiers could also lead to false reports of law enforcement presence, which could divert election staff from other election responsibilities.
      
      Additionally, the provision allowing the AG or SOS to override an elections official’s authorization could benefit from clearer language.
      
      Committee staff recommends amendments to (1) reinstate the term “uniformed” so that the restriction applies only to uniformed personnel (and individuals with firearms), and (2) rewrite the language regarding the AG and SOS’s authority to object, to ensure that the provision is clear and actionable.
2. VBM Ballot Signature Comparison and Suggested Amendments: Under California law, a VBM ballot must be verified by the elections official before it can be counted. That verification includes comparing the signature on the VBM ballot identification envelope with signatures that are part of the voter’s registration record to confirm that the ballot was completed and returned by the correct voter. If the elections official determines that the signatures do not compare, or if the voter did not sign the envelope, state law includes a process for the voter to correct that issue by submitting a signed statement, commonly referred to as a “cure form,” verifying that they cast the ballot.
   
   State law generally allows the public to observe the processing of VBM ballots, including the signature verification process. Observers may challenge whether election workers who are handling VBM ballots are following established procedures. However, the law does not explicitly allow VBM observers to challenge an election worker’s determination of whether signatures compare. Despite this, some counties do permit observers to challenge those determinations, with disputes typically resolved by senior elections staff.
   
   To promote greater uniformity statewide and to protect against politically motivated challenges to VBM ballots, this bill expressly prohibits observers from challenging an election worker’s determination about whether signatures compare during VBM ballot processing. As currently drafted, however, that restriction applies only to signature comparisons from cure forms and does not extend to the comparison of signatures on VBM ballot identification envelopes.
   
   To ensure consistency and uniformity, committee staff recommends an amendment to apply that restriction to signature comparisons on VBM ballot identification envelopes.
3. Voting Equipment and Suggested Amendments: To protect the security, integrity, and chain of custody of election equipment, this bill prohibits an individual from allowing an agent of a law enforcement agency to take possession of specified equipment without a court order. The equipment that is included in that restriction, however, may be less than comprehensive and may exclude certain equipment that should similarly be protected. Accordingly, committee staff recommends an amendment to make that provision applicable to all certified voting technology, as defined by subdivision (b) of Section 17600 of the Elections Code, or any portion thereof.
4. Sunset Date: As detailed above, the text of this bill has been publicly available only for a few days, and enactment of this bill in time for this year’s primary election, as intended by the author, necessarily requires expedited legislative consideration. In turn, it is unlikely that the contents of this bill will receive the consideration and deliberation of a proposal that went through the normal legislative process.
   
   In light of the foregoing, and consistent with a provision that is included in AB 1664 (Jackson), the author and the committee may wish to consider an amendment to this bill to add a January 1, 2030, sunset date. Such an amendment would allow this bill to take effect immediately to respond to any imminent threat to elections, while ensuring that its contents are revisited in the future under a process that allows for more thorough deliberation.
5. Arguments in Support: In support of this bill, the League of Women Voters of California writes:

SB 73 restricts law enforcement access to voting system machines, devices, software, source code, rosters, combined rosters, and voter lists; strengthens ballot custody protections; requires immediate notice to the Secretary of State and Attorney General when court ordered searches or seizures of election materials are executed; and bars peace officers from interfering with election administration.

The legislation is designed to address federal overreach - a real and escalating threat to California’s elections. Under our constitutional system, states play the principal role in administering elections, subject to Congress’s authority over federal elections, and California has built a rigorous framework to test, certify and monitor voting systems used in this state…

The legislation is especially important because the threat is no longer hypothetical. In a climate where federal officials are openly criminalizing the routine work of election administration, seeking sensitive voter data from states, and testing the limits of federal authority over election administration, local election officials need clear legal footing to resist ad hoc law enforcement demands for access to California’s election infrastructure - and to ensure that armed or uniformed personnel cannot be deployed at polling places or county elections offices without proper authorization.

1. Related Legislation: AB 2230 (Ávila Farías) expands an existing law that makes it a crime for a peace officer to be stationed at or near a voting location without authorization from the elections official such that the prohibition would also apply to an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency, among other provisions. AB 2230 was approved by this committee by a 6-2 vote and is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
2. Previous Legislation: SB 851 (Cervantes), Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025, requires a state or local agency or political subdivision to provide written notice to the SOS and AG after it files or is served a court action relating to elections which contains a claim arising under federal law, and makes it a crime for a person to hire or arrange for an officer or agent of a federal law enforcement agency to be stationed at or near a voting location without authorization from the elections official, among other provisions.
3. Double Referral: This bill is double referred to the Assembly Public Safety Committee. If this bill is approved in this committee today, it is scheduled to be heard in the Assembly Public Safety Committee this afternoon. If this bill were amended in this committee today, however, it would not be able to be heard in the Assembly Public Safety Committee today as scheduled. In light of this fact, should the committee wish to amend this bill, committee staff recommends that any motion to approve this bill be to approve it without amendments at this time, but with the author’s commitment to take these amendments subsequent to passage by this committee.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

League of Women Voters of California
SEIU California

Opposition

None on file.

Analysis Prepared by: Ethan Jones / ELECTIONS / (916) 319-2094

1. https://www.propublica.org/article/immigration-dhs-american-citizens-arrested-detained-against-will, accessed 5/1/26. ↑

 THIRD READING  

Bill No: SB 73

Author: Cervantes (D)

Amended: 1/5/26

Vote: 27 - Urgency

SENATE ELECTIONS & C.A. COMMITTEE: 4-1, 1/13/26

AYES: Cervantes, Allen, Durazo, Umberg

NOES: Choi

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 1/22/26

AYES: Caballero, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab

NOES: Seyarto, Dahle

SUBJECT: Elections: inspection of voting systems

SOURCE: Author

DIGEST:

This bill prohibits local election officials from permitting a federal government agency or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order.

ANALYSIS:

Existing federal law:

1. States, pursuant to the Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”
2. Provides the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), and the Civil Rights Act of 1960.
3. Establishes, in general and pursuant to HAVA, minimum standards and requirements for voting equipment used in federal elections, including, but not limited to, accessibility, voter verification, paper records, error rate, and audit capacity.

Existing state law:

1. Defines a voting system as a mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic system and its software, or any combination of these used for casting a ballot, tabulating votes, or both. A voting system does not include a remote accessible vote by mail system.
2. Requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems that meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and incorporates best practices in election technology.
3. Authorizes the SOS to require additional testing of voting systems to ensure it meets the requirements in law. A voting system, in whole or in part, cannot be bought or used unless the SOS has certified it or conditionally approved it prior to any election at which it is to be used.
4. Requires a vendor, jurisdiction, or applicant, if the SOS has certified or conditionally approved a voting system or a part of a voting system, to notify the SOS and all local election officials who use the system in writing of any defect, fault, or failure of the hardware, software, or firmware of the voting system or a part of the voting system.
5. Requires the elections official of any county or city using a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every two years to determine its accuracy. This inspection must follow the regulations adopted and promulgated by the SOS. The elections official must also certify the results of the inspection to the SOS.

This bill:

1. Prohibits a local elections official from permitting a federal government agency or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order.
2. Defines “federal government agency” to mean, but is not limited to, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.
3. Includes a severability clause and an urgency clause.

Background

Help America Vote Act. In 2002, Congress passed and President Bush signed HAVA into law to address, among other provisions, issues with voting systems arising from the 2000 presidential election. HAVA mandated the replacement of all punch card and lever voting machines in the country, required every polling place to deploy at least one accessible voting machine to allow voters with disabilities to mark, cast, and verify their ballots privately and independently, and required all voting systems to meet a set of minimum standards to be used in federal elections.

HAVA also established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to serve as an independent and bipartisan commission responsible for developing and adopting guidelines to meet HAVA requirements and serving as a national clearinghouse of information on election administration. The EAC also accredits testing laboratories, certifies voting systems, and audits the use of HAVA funds. Using the EAC’s testing and certification program is not mandatory, but many states require their use through statute or rule. Since states have different requirements for what voting systems need to do, the EAC’s program is not necessarily a substitute for state-based requirements and testing.

Other States and Voting System Testing. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 37 states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) and the District of Columbia have statutes or rules requiring some aspect of the federal testing and certification program. Some of these require full EAC certification, while others require testing to federal standards or testing by a federally accredited laboratory. Some states, such as Alaska, use federally certified machines, but do not have statutory requirements.

Some states, including California, do not use the federal program but have robust state-based standards, testing, and certification programs. In California, the Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment (OVSTA) within the SOS is charged with the examination, testing, and certification of voting systems for use in California elections. OVSTA also oversees the approval of ballot printers and authorizes as well as monitors the manufacture and distribution of ballots for elections.

Voting Technology in California. The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure California has rigorous and stringent voting systems, voting equipment standards, and approval procedures. In 2014, California established its own standards for electronic components of voting systems which were derived from the EAC’s guidelines. California’s standards provide a set of specifications and requirements for the testing of voting systems to determine if it provides all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems.

Executive Order. On March 25, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO), “Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections,” containing a number of directives on policies that the U.S. Constitution assigns to states. The EO directs federal agencies to conduct specific activities related to election integrity, including (1) updating the federal voter registration form to include a requirement for “documentary proof of U.S. citizenship,” (2) withholding funding from states that do not comply with federal law, including the EO’s documentary proof of U.S. citizenship requirements, (3) prohibiting the use of certain voting systems, and (4) rescinding all previous certifications of certain systems.

Other major directives contained in the EO include requiring the Department of Homeland Security to review each state’s publicly available voter lists and available records, require all ballots to be received on Election Day, and mandate all electors be selected on Election Day. Several lawsuits have been filed challenging aspects of the EO. The lawsuits ask courts to block many of its provisions, arguing it unconstitutionally preempts state authority and amounts to executive overreach. In at least two cases, including one case brought by the State of California with 18 other states, courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking implementation of key provisions of the EO.

Senate Bill 851. SB 851 (Cervantes, Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025) made various changes to protect California’s elections from federal interference. SB 851 repealed requirements that standards adopted by the SOS for testing of voting equipment must meet or exceed voluntary federal standards set by the EAC. Instead, SB 851 requires the state standards to meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and to incorporate best practices in election technology. The bill also repealed the requirement for the SOS to notify the EAC or its successor agency of the problem after receiving written notification from a vendor, jurisdiction, or applicant, of a defect, fault, or failure of a voting system, part of a voting system, or a remote accessible vote by mail system.

Federal Monitors in California’s Elections. For the November 4, 2025, statewide special election, the U.S. Department of Justice sent election monitors to five California counties. The five counties were Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, and Riverside. The goal of the election observers was to “ensure transparency, ballot security, and compliance with federal law.” Following the election, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Harmeet K. Dhillon stated, “in the counties we monitored, there were no major headlines out of that work.”

It should be noted for the November 5, 2024, presidential general election, the U.S. Department of Justice planned to monitor 86 jurisdictions nationwide, including San Joaquin County. For the November 8, 2022, gubernatorial general election, the U.S. Department of Justice planned to monitor 64 jurisdictions nationwide, including Los Angeles County and Sonoma County.

Comments

Author’s Statement. “President Donald Trump is waging war against elections in California. This includes in August 2025, when he made false statements declaring that voting machines used in states like California are inaccurate. In response, last year, the Legislature approved SB 851 to provide our state’s elections systems with more protections against federal interference. Among other provisions, SB 851 prevented our voting system standards from attack by the federal government, ensuring that voting machines in California continue to meet the highest industry standards, not the warped demands of the President. However, during the November 4, 2025, statewide special election, the U.S. Department of Justice deployed election monitors to five California counties with large populations of Latino voters, including my home county of Riverside. That is why I intend to follow up and build on the protections against federal interference in our elections that were established in SB 851 with SB 73. This bill will prohibit county registrars from allowing federal government agencies to inspect their county’s voting machines unless required to do so by a federal court order.”

Related/Prior Legislation

SB 851 (Cervantes, Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025), among other provisions, repealed provisions requiring the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards that meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines prescribed by the EAC, and instead required the SOS to adopt and publish voting standards that meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and incorporate best practices in election technology.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: Yes

According to the Senate Committee on Appropriations:

By modifying the duties of local elections officials as specified, this bill creates a state-mandated local program. To the extent the Commission on State Mandates determines that the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service on local agencies, local agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs. The magnitude is unknown but could exceed $50,000 per year (General Fund).

SUPPORT: (Verified 1/22/26)

One individual

OPPOSITION: (Verified 1/22/26)

One individual

Prepared by: Scott Matsumoto / E. & C.A. / (916) 651-4106

1/23/26 15:39:09

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON

Senator Anna Caballero, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular Session

SB 73 (Cervantes) - Elections: inspection of voting systems

Bill Summary:

SB 73 would prohibit local election officials from permitting a federal government agency or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order.

Fiscal Impact:

By modifying the duties of local elections officials as specified, this bill creates a state-mandated local program. To the extent the Commission on State Mandates determines that the provisions of this bill create a new program or impose a higher level of service on local agencies, local agencies could claim reimbursement of those costs. The magnitude is unknown but could exceed $50,000 per year (General Fund).

Background:

In 2002, the federal government enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to address, among other provisions, issues with voting systems arising from the 2000 presidential election. HAVA (1) mandated the replacement of all punch card and lever voting machines in the country, (2) required every polling place to deploy at least one accessible voting machine to allow voters with disabilities to mark, cast, and verify their ballots privately and independently, and (3) required all voting systems to meet a set of minimum standards to be used in federal elections.

Additionally, HAVA established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to serve as an independent and bipartisan commission responsible for developing and adopting guidelines to meet HAVA requirements and serving as a national clearinghouse of information on election administration. EAC also accredits testing laboratories, certifies voting systems, and audits the use of HAVA funds. Using the EAC’s testing and certification program is not mandatory; however, many states require their use through statute or rule. Since states have different requirements for what voting systems need to do, the EAC’s program is not necessarily a substitute for state-based requirements and testing. Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures indicates that 38 states currently have statutes or rules requiring some aspect of the federal testing and certification program. Some of these require full EAC certification, while others require testing to federal standards or testing by a federally accredited laboratory.

In contrast, other states, including California, do not use the federal program but have robust state-based standards, testing, and certification programs. In California, the Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment (OVSTA) within SOS is charged with the examination, testing, and certification of voting systems for use in California elections. OVSTA also oversees the approval of ballot printers and authorizes as well as monitors the manufacture and distribution of ballots for elections. In 2014, California established its own standards for electronic components of voting systems which were derived from EAC’s guidelines. California’s standards provide a set of specifications and requirements for the testing of voting systems to determine if it provides all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems.

In March 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order containing a number of directives on policies that the U.S. Constitution assigns to states. The EO directs federal agencies to conduct specific activities related to election integrity, including (1) updating the federal voter registration form to include a requirement for “documentary proof of U.S. citizenship,” (2) withholding funding from states that do not comply with federal law, including the EO’s documentary proof of U.S. citizenship requirements, (3) prohibiting the use of certain voting systems, and (4) rescinding all previous certifications of certain systems.

Other major directives contained in the EO include requiring the Department of Homeland Security to review each state’s publicly available voter lists and available records, require all ballots to be received on Election Day, and mandate all electors be selected on Election Day. Several lawsuits have been filed challenging aspects of the EO. The lawsuits ask courts to block many of its provisions, arguing it unconstitutionally preempts state authority and amounts to executive overreach. In at least two cases, including one case brought by the State of California with 18 other states, courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking implementation of key provisions of the EO.

Proposed Law:

This bill, among other things, would prohibit a local elections official from permitting a federal government agency (as defined) or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order.

Related Legislation:

SB 851 (Cervantes, Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025), among other provisions, repealed requirements that standards adopted by SOS for testing of voting equipment must meet or exceed voluntary federal standards set by the EAC. Instead, SB 851 requires the state standards to meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and to incorporate best practices in election technology. The bill also repealed the requirement for SOS to notify the EAC or its successor agency of the problem after receiving written notification from a vendor, jurisdiction, or applicant, of a defect, fault, or failure of a voting system, part of a voting system, or a remote accessible vote by mail system.

Staff Comments:

The fiscal impact of this bill would be driven by how broadly the term “inspect” is defined. If the definition of the term “inspect” includes seizing or opening voting equipment, local elections officials indicate that counties could experience significant costs.

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Senator Sabrina Cervantes, Chair

2025 - 2026 Regular

Bill No: Hearing Date: 1/13/26

Subject:

DIGEST

This bill prohibits local election officials from permitting a federal government agency or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order.

ANALYSIS

Existing federal law:

1. States, pursuant to the Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”
2. Provides the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), and the Civil Rights Act of 1960.
3. Establishes, in general and pursuant to HAVA, minimum standards and requirements for voting equipment used in federal elections, including, but not limited to, accessibility, voter verification, paper records, error rate, and audit capacity.

Existing state law:

1. Defines a voting system as a mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic system and its software, or any combination of these used for casting a ballot, tabulating votes, or both. A voting system does not include a remote accessible vote by mail system.
2. Requires the Secretary of State (SOS) to adopt and publish voting system standards and regulations governing the use of voting systems that meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and incorporates best practices in election technology.
3. Authorizes the SOS to require additional testing of voting systems to ensure it meets the requirements in law. A voting system, in whole or in part, cannot be bought or used unless the SOS has certified it or conditionally approved it prior to any election at which it is to be used.
4. Requires a vendor, jurisdiction, or applicant, if the SOS has certified or conditionally approved a voting system or a part of a voting system, to notify the SOS and all local election officials who use the system in writing of any defect, fault, or failure of the hardware, software, or firmware of the voting system or a part of the voting system.

1. Requires the elections official of any county or city using a voting system to inspect the machines or devices at least once every two years to determine its accuracy. This inspection must follow the regulations adopted and promulgated by the SOS. The elections official must also certify the results of the inspection to the SOS.

This bill:

1. Prohibits a local elections official from permitting a federal government agency or its employees from inspecting a voting system machine or device, unless authorized by a federal court order.
2. Defines “federal government agency” to mean, but is not limited to, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.
3. Includes a severability clause and an urgency clause.

BACKGROUND

Help America Vote Act. In 2002, Congress passed and President Bush signed HAVA into law to address, among other provisions, issues with voting systems arising from the 2000 presidential election. HAVA mandated the replacement of all punch card and lever voting machines in the country, required every polling place to deploy at least one accessible voting machine to allow voters with disabilities to mark, cast, and verify their ballots privately and independently, and required all voting systems to meet a set of minimum standards to be used in federal elections.

HAVA also established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to serve as an independent and bipartisan commission responsible for developing and adopting guidelines to meet HAVA requirements and serving as a national clearinghouse of information on election administration. The EAC also accredits testing laboratories, certifies voting systems, and audits the use of HAVA funds. Using the EAC’s testing and certification program is not mandatory, but many states require their use through statute or rule. Since states have different requirements for what voting systems need to do, the EAC’s program is not necessarily a substitute for state-based requirements and testing.

Other States and Voting System Testing. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 38 states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) and the District of Columbia have statutes or rules requiring some aspect of the federal testing and certification program. Some of these require full EAC certification, while others require testing to federal standards or testing by a federally accredited laboratory.

Some states, including California, do not use the federal program but have robust state-based standards, testing, and certification programs. In California, the Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment (OVSTA) within the SOS is charged with the examination, testing, and certification of voting systems for use in California elections. OVSTA also oversees the approval of ballot printers and authorizes as well as monitors the manufacture and distribution of ballots for elections.

Voting Technology in California. The Legislature has approved various bills to ensure California has rigorous and stringent voting systems, voting equipment standards, and approval procedures. In 2014, California established its own standards for electronic components of voting systems which were derived from the EAC’s guidelines. California’s standards provide a set of specifications and requirements for the testing of voting systems to determine if it provides all the basic functionality, accessibility, and security capabilities required of voting systems.

Executive Order. On March 25, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO), “Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections,” containing a number of directives on policies that the U.S. Constitution assigns to states. The EO directs federal agencies to conduct specific activities related to election integrity, including (1) updating the federal voter registration form to include a requirement for “documentary proof of U.S. citizenship,” (2) withholding funding from states that do not comply with federal law, including the EO’s documentary proof of U.S. citizenship requirements, (3) prohibiting the use of certain voting systems, and (4) rescinding all previous certifications of certain systems.

Other major directives contained in the EO include requiring the Department of Homeland Security to review each state’s publicly available voter lists and available records, require all ballots to be received on Election Day, and mandate all electors be selected on Election Day. Several lawsuits have been filed challenging aspects of the EO. The lawsuits ask courts to block many of its provisions, arguing it unconstitutionally preempts state authority and amounts to executive overreach. In at least two cases, including one case brought by the State of California with 18 other states, courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking implementation of key provisions of the EO.

Senate Bill 851. SB 851 (Cervantes), Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025, made various changes to protect California’s elections from federal interference. SB 851 repealed requirements that standards adopted by the SOS for testing of voting equipment must meet or exceed voluntary federal standards set by the EAC. Instead, SB 851 requires the state standards to meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and to incorporate best practices in election technology. The bill also repealed the requirement for the SOS to notify the EAC or its successor agency of the problem after receiving written notification from a vendor, jurisdiction, or applicant, of a defect, fault, or failure of a voting system, part of a voting system, or a remote accessible vote by mail system.

Federal Monitors in California’s Elections. For the November 4, 2025, statewide special election, the U.S. Department of Justice sent election monitors to five California counties. The five counties were Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, and Riverside. The goal of the election observers was to “ensure transparency, ballot security, and compliance with federal law.” Following the election, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Harmeet K. Dhillon stated, “in the counties we monitored, there were no major headlines out of that work.”

It should be noted for the November 5, 2024, presidential general election, the U.S. Department of Justice planned to monitor 86 jurisdictions nationwide, including San Joaquin County. For the November 8, 2022, gubernatorial general election, the U.S. Department of Justice planned to monitor 64 jurisdictions nationwide, including Los Angeles County and Sonoma County.

COMMENTS

Author’s Statement. President Donald Trump is waging war against elections in California. This includes in August 2025, when he made false statements declaring that voting machines used in states like California are inaccurate. In response, last year, the Legislature approved SB 851 to provide our state’s elections systems with more protections against federal interference. Among other provisions, SB 851 prevented our voting system standards from attack by the federal government, ensuring that voting machines in California continue to meet the highest industry standards, not the warped demands of the President. However, during the November 4, 2025, statewide special election, the U.S. Department of Justice deployed election monitors to five California counties with large populations of Latino voters, including my home county of Riverside. That is why I intend to follow up and build on the protections against federal interference in our elections that were established in SB 851 with SB 73. This bill will prohibit county registrars from allowing federal government agencies to inspect their county’s voting machines unless required to do so by a federal court order.

RELATED/PRIOR LEGISLATION

SB 851 (Cervantes), Chapter 238, Statutes of 2025, among other provisions, repealed provisions requiring the SOS to adopt and publish voting system standards that meet or exceed federal voluntary voting system guidelines prescribed by the EAC, and instead required the SOS to adopt and publish voting standards that meet the minimum requirements of HAVA and incorporate best practices in election technology.

POSITIONS

Sponsor: Author

Support: None received

Oppose: None received

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