SB 833: Critical infrastructure: artificial intelligence systems: human oversight.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Senate
- Latest Version Date: 2025-07-17
Current Status:
In Progress
(2026-08-13: August 13 hearing: Held in committee and under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law, the California Emergency Services Act, establishes the California Cybersecurity Integration Center within the Office of Emergency Services to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with various entities. Existing law also requires the Technology Recovery Plan element of the State Administrative Manual to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity strategy incident response standards for each state agency to secure its critical infrastructure controls and information, as prescribed.
This bill would require require, on or before July 1, 2026, an operator, defined as a state agency in charge of specified responsible for operating, managing, overseeing, or controlling access to critical infrastructure, that deploys artificial intelligence a covered artificial intelligence (AI) system, as defined, to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor that ensures a human monitors the systems operations in real time and review reviews and approve approves any plan or action proposed by the artificial intelligence covered AI system before execution, except as provided. The bill would require the Department of Technology to administer develop specialized training in artificial intelligence AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to oversight personnel. The bill would require oversight personnel for an operator to conduct an annual assessment of its artificial intelligence systems and automated decision covered AI systems, as specified, and to submit a summary of the findings to the department. The bill would make findings and declarations related to its provisions.
This bill would require any entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations to report an artificial intelligence (AI) adverse event, as defined, in a form and manner prescribed by the Office of Emergency Services, as provided. The bill would subject each entity that fails to provide an AI adverse event report to a specified civil penalty. The bill would authorize the office to, among other things, authorize public or private entities to receive information about individual events or aggregated statistics for the purpose of collaboratively addressing identified harms, except as provided. The bill would include related findings and declarations.The bill would preclude disclosure of specified information by the office.Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.Existing law, the California Emergency Services Act, establishes the California Cybersecurity Integration Center within the Office of Emergency Services to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with various entities. Existing law also requires the Technology Recovery Plan element of the State Administrative Manual to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity strategy incident response standards for each state agency to secure its critical infrastructure controls and information, as prescribed.
This bill would require an operator, defined as a state agency in charge of specified critical infrastructure, that deploys artificial intelligence to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor the systems operations in real time and review and approve any plan or action proposed by the artificial intelligence system before execution, except as provided. The bill would require the Department of Technology to administer specialized training in artificial intelligence safety protocols and risk management techniques to oversight personnel. The bill would require an operator to conduct an annual assessment of its artificial intelligence systems and automated decision systems, as specified, and to submit a summary of the findings to the department.
This bill would require any entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations to report an artificial intelligence (AI) adverse event, as defined, in a form and manner prescribed by the Office of Emergency Services, as provided. The bill would subject each entity that fails to provide an AI adverse event report to a specified civil penalty. The bill would authorize the office to, among other things, authorize public or private entities to receive information about individual events or aggregated statistics for the purpose of collaboratively addressing identified harms, except as provided. The bill would include related findings and declarations.
The bill would preclude disclosure of specified information by the office.
Existing constitutional provisions require that a statute that limits the right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
This bill would make legislative findings to that effect.
Existing law, the California Emergency Services Act, establishes the California Cybersecurity Integration Center within the Office of Emergency Services to serve as the central organizing hub of state governments cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with various entities. Existing law also requires the Technology Recovery Plan element of the State Administrative Manual to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity strategy incident response standards for each state agency to secure its critical infrastructure controls and information, as prescribed.
This bill would require an operator, defined as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure, that deploys artificial intelligence to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor the systems operations in real time and review and approve any plan or action proposed by the artificial intelligence system before execution, except as provided. The bill would require the Department of Technology to administer specialized training in artificial intelligence safety protocols and risk management techniques to oversight personnel. The bill would require an operator to conduct an annual assessment of its artificial intelligence systems and automated decision systems, as specified, and to submit a summary of the findings to the department.
Existing law, the Generative Artificial Intelligence Accountability Act, among other things, requires the Department of Technology, under the guidance of the Government Operations Agency, the Office of Data and Innovation, and the Department of Human Resources, to update the report to the Governor, as required by Executive Order No. N-12-23, as prescribed, and requires the Office of Emergency Services to perform, as appropriate, a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of generative AI to Californias critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events. This bill would declare the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would prohibit artificial intelligence from making a plan or executing a plan on critical infrastructure.Existing law, the Generative Artificial Intelligence Accountability Act, among other things, requires the Department of Technology, under the guidance of the Government Operations Agency, the Office of Data and Innovation, and the Department of Human Resources, to update the report to the Governor, as required by Executive Order No. N-12-23, as prescribed, and requires the Office of Emergency Services to perform, as appropriate, a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of generative AI to Californias critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
This bill would declare the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would prohibit artificial intelligence from making a plan or executing a plan on critical infrastructure.
The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)In response to the rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) and its growing integration across public and private sectors, the Governor issued Executive Order No. N-12-23, which established a comprehensive policy framework to responsibly explore and govern the deployment of GenAI systems within the state.
(b)The Governor convened the Joint California Policy Working Group on AI Frontier Models to evaluate the potential risks and governance needs associated with the deployment of powerful artificial intelligence models.
(c)The working groups 2025 report recommends the establishment of adverse event reporting mechanisms for artificial intelligence systems, especially in high-risk domains such as critical infrastructure, to ensure transparency, accountability, and public safety.(d)The report underscores the importance of centralized, timely, and clear reporting of AI malfunctions or failures that could lead to physical harm, data breaches, or disruption of essential services. These recommendations are echoed by expert consensus on artificial intelligence safety protocols nationally.(e)(c)The Governors executive order also emphasized the urgent need for workforce development and training to ensure that public sector employees have the technical expertise and practical tools necessary to oversee and manage artificial intelligence systems safely and effectively.
(f)As California integrates artificial intelligence into critical infrastructure operations, it is essential that state agencies implement human verification mechanisms, conduct rigorous risk assessments, and comply with mandatory adverse event reporting standards to protect public health, safety, and the integrity of essential systems.SEC. 2.Section 8592.51 is added to the Government Code, immediately following Section 8592.50, to read:8592.51.(a)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:(1)AI adverse event means an incident, circumstance, or series of events where the development, deployment, use, or malfunction of an artificial intelligence (AI) system or automated decision system in critical infrastructure has caused or contributed to any of the following:(A)Death of any person.(B)Serious physical injury requiring medical treatment.(C)Significant disruption to critical infrastructure operations lasting more than one hour.(D)Unauthorized access to or compromise of sensitive data affecting more than 100 individuals.(E)Material financial loss greater than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to any person or entity. (F)System failure that requires manual intervention to prevent harm or restore service.(G)Any failure of the AI system to perform as intended that could reasonably lead to mass casualty events or widespread critical infrastructure failure.(2)Artificial intelligence (AI) means an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.(3)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.(4)Critical infrastructure means systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including any of the following infrastructure:(A)Transportation.(B)Energy.(C)Food and agriculture.(D)Communications.(E)Emergency services.(F)Financial services.(5)Operator means a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure.(b)(1)An operator deploying artificial intelligence that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations shall establish a human oversight mechanism to do both of the following:(A)Monitor the artificial intelligence systems operations in real time.(B)Review and approve any plan or action proposed by an artificial intelligence system before execution.(2)This subdivision shall not apply to an existing automated decision system that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize that system.(c)The Department of Technology shall administer specialized training in artificial intelligence safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to oversight personnel.(d)(1)An operator shall conduct an annual assessment of its artificial intelligence systems and automated decision systems that does all of the following:(A)Evaluates compliance with this section.(B)Evaluates system performance and safety.(C)Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.(2)An operator shall submit a summary of the assessment findings to the Department of Technology.(3)The assessment shall coincide with any requirement on the operator to perform a risk analysis pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 11549.65.SEC. 3.Section 8592.52 is added to the Government Code, to read:8592.52.(a)Any entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations shall report an AI adverse event in a form and manner prescribed by the office as follows:(1)Within four hours after detection of an AI adverse event that poses an ongoing urgent threat to public health or safety.(2)Within 24 hours after detection of an AI adverse event involving death or serious physical injury.(3)Within 72 hours after detection of an adverse AI event involving significant critical infrastructure disruption or data compromise.(4)Within 14 calendar days after detection of any other AI adverse event.(b)For purposes of this section, detection occurs on the first business day that the AI adverse event is known to the operator or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should have been known to the operator.(c)An AI adverse event report shall include, to the extent known or reasonably ascertainable, all of the following:(1)A description of the artificial intelligence system or automated decision system, including, but not limited to, all of the following:(A)System type, purpose, and intended use.(B)Vendor information and version numbers.(C)Deployment environment and integration details.(D)Training data sources relevant to the incident.(E)Status of human oversight mechanisms at the time of the incident.(2)Details of the adverse event, including, but not limited to, all of the following:(A)Date, time, and location of the occurrence.(B)Circumstances leading to the event.(C)Nature and extent of the harm, damage, or disruption.(D)Number of individuals or systems affected.(E)Root-cause analysis, when available.(F)Effectiveness of human oversight mechanisms in detecting or preventing the incident.(3)Response and mitigation measures taken or being planed, including, but not limited to, any modifications to human oversight mechanisms.(4)Contact information for a designated representative of the operator.(5)Any additional information requested by the department.(d)Each entity shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each seven days that the entity fails to provide an AI adverse event report required under this section.(e)The office may do any of the following:(1)Authorize entities that are not operators to voluntarily participate in the reporting system for the purpose of maximally growing the evidence base.(2)Authorize public or private entities to receive information about individual events or aggregated statistics for the purpose of collaboratively addressing identified harms.(3)Post on its internet website information about individual events or aggregated statistics.(f)The office shall not disclose any record or information within a record of the office related to enforcement of this section that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which, based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.SEC. 2.Article 6.6 (commencing with Section 8954.50) is added to Chapter 7 of Division 1 of Title 2 of the Government Code, to read:6.6.Artificial Intelligence and Critical Infrastructure8954.50.For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(a)Artificial intelligence (AI) means an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
(b)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.
(c)Covered AI system means an AI system or automated decision system that an operator uses to operate, manage, oversee, or control access to critical infrastructure.
(d)Critical infrastructure means systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, but not unintended use, including, but not limited to, the following sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, health care and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems.
(e)Department means the Department of Technology.
(f)Office means the Office of Emergency Services.
(g)Operator means a state agency responsible for operating, managing, overseeing, or controlling access to critical infrastructure.
(h)State agency has the same meaning set forth in Section 11000.
8954.51.(a)On or before July 1, 2026, an oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system shall establish a human oversight mechanism that ensures a human does both of the following:
(1)Monitors the artificial intelligence systems operations in real time.
(2)(A)Except as provided in subparagraph (B), reviews and approves any plan or action proposed by an artificial intelligence system before execution.
(B)If oversight personnel determine that prior review and approval under subparagraph (A) is substantially disruptive to the operation of the covered AI system, the operator shall instead implement a process for periodically reviewing the actions of the covered AI system to ensure accuracy and reliability.
(b)(1)The department shall develop specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given annually to oversight personnel.
(2)An operator shall designate at least one employee to serve as oversight personnel who is responsible for administering the human oversight mechanism. The oversight personnel shall complete the annual training under paragraph (1).
(c)(1)Oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system shall conduct an annual assessment of its covered AI systems that does all of the following:
(A)Evaluates the operators compliance with this section.
(B)Evaluates covered AI system performance and safety.
(C)Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with the operation of the covered AI system, including those that could lead to mass casualty events or property damage in excess of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
(D)Identifies any necessary updates to the human oversight mechanism used by the operator.
(2)Oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system shall submit a summary of the assessment findings to the department.
8954.52The office shall not disclose any record or information within a record of the office related to this article that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1) or in which, based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.
SEC. 4.SEC. 3.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 3 2 of this act, which adds Section 8592.52 8954.52 to the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:To protect the sensitive information of an entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact related to operating, managing, overseeing, or controlling access to critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations, infrastructure, it is necessary to limit the publics right of access to these records.The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a)In response to the rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) and its growing integration across public and private sectors, the Governor issued Executive Order No. N-12-23, which established a comprehensive policy framework to responsibly explore and govern the deployment of GenAI systems within the state.
(b)The Governor convened the Joint California Policy Working Group on AI Frontier Models to evaluate the potential risks and governance needs associated with the deployment of powerful artificial intelligence models.
(c)The working groups 2025 report recommends the establishment of adverse event reporting mechanisms for artificial intelligence systems, especially in high-risk domains such as critical infrastructure, to ensure transparency, accountability, and public safety.
(d)The report underscores the importance of centralized, timely, and clear reporting of AI malfunctions or failures that could lead to physical harm, data breaches, or disruption of essential services. These recommendations are echoed by expert consensus on artificial intelligence safety protocols nationally.
(e)The Governors executive order also emphasized the urgent need for workforce development and training to ensure that public sector employees have the technical expertise and practical tools necessary to oversee and manage artificial intelligence systems safely and effectively.
(f)As California integrates artificial intelligence into critical infrastructure operations, it is essential that state agencies implement human verification mechanisms, conduct rigorous risk assessments, and comply with mandatory adverse event reporting standards to protect public health, safety, and the integrity of essential systems.
SECTION 1.Section 8592.51 is added to the Government Code, to read:SEC. 2.Section 8592.51 is added to the Government Code, immediately following Section 8592.50, to read:8592.51.(a)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)AI adverse event means an incident, circumstance, or series of events where the development, deployment, use, or malfunction of an artificial intelligence (AI) system or automated decision system in critical infrastructure has caused or contributed to any of the following:
(A)Death of any person.
(B)Serious physical injury requiring medical treatment.
(C)Significant disruption to critical infrastructure operations lasting more than one hour.
(D)Unauthorized access to or compromise of sensitive data affecting more than 100 individuals.
(E)Material financial loss greater than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to any person or entity.
(F)System failure that requires manual intervention to prevent harm or restore service.
(G)Any failure of the AI system to perform as intended that could reasonably lead to mass casualty events or widespread critical infrastructure failure.
(1)(2)Artificial intelligence (AI) means an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
(2)
(3)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.
(3)
(4)Critical infrastructure means systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including any of the following infrastructure:
(A)Transportation.
(B)Energy.
(C)Food and agriculture.
(D)Communications.
(E)Emergency services.
(F)Financial services.
(4)(5)Operator means a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure.
(b)(1)An operator deploying artificial intelligence that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations shall establish a human oversight mechanism to do both of the following:
(A)Monitor the artificial intelligence systems operations in real time.
(B)Review and approve any plan or action proposed by an artificial intelligence system before execution.(2)This subdivision shall not apply to an existing automated decision system that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize that system.
(c)The Department of Technology shall administer specialized training in artificial intelligence safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to oversight personnel.
(d)(1)An operator shall conduct an annual assessment of its artificial intelligence systems and automated decision systems that does all of the following:
(1)(A)Evaluates compliance with this section.
(2)(B)Evaluates system performance and safety.
(3)(C)Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
(e)(2)An operator shall submit a summary of the assessment findings to the Department of Technology.
(f)(3)The assessment shall coincide with any requirement on the operator to perform a risk analysis pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 11549.65.
SEC. 3.Section 8592.52 is added to the Government Code, to read:8592.52.(a)Any entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations shall report an AI adverse event in a form and manner prescribed by the office as follows:
(1)Within four hours after detection of an AI adverse event that poses an ongoing urgent threat to public health or safety.
(2)Within 24 hours after detection of an AI adverse event involving death or serious physical injury.
(3)Within 72 hours after detection of an adverse AI event involving significant critical infrastructure disruption or data compromise.
(4)Within 14 calendar days after detection of any other AI adverse event.
(b)For purposes of this section, detection occurs on the first business day that the AI adverse event is known to the operator or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should have been known to the operator.
(c)An AI adverse event report shall include, to the extent known or reasonably ascertainable, all of the following:
(1)A description of the artificial intelligence system or automated decision system, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(A)System type, purpose, and intended use.
(B)Vendor information and version numbers.
(C)Deployment environment and integration details.
(D)Training data sources relevant to the incident.
(E)Status of human oversight mechanisms at the time of the incident.
(2)Details of the adverse event, including, but not limited to, all of the following:
(A)Date, time, and location of the occurrence.
(B)Circumstances leading to the event.
(C)Nature and extent of the harm, damage, or disruption.
(D)Number of individuals or systems affected.
(E)Root-cause analysis, when available.
(F)Effectiveness of human oversight mechanisms in detecting or preventing the incident.
(3)Response and mitigation measures taken or being planed, including, but not limited to, any modifications to human oversight mechanisms.
(4)Contact information for a designated representative of the operator.
(5)Any additional information requested by the department.
(d)Each entity shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each seven days that the entity fails to provide an AI adverse event report required under this section.
(e)The office may do any of the following:
(1)Authorize entities that are not operators to voluntarily participate in the reporting system for the purpose of maximally growing the evidence base.
(2)Authorize public or private entities to receive information about individual events or aggregated statistics for the purpose of collaboratively addressing identified harms.
(3)Post on its internet website information about individual events or aggregated statistics.
(f)The office shall not disclose any record or information within a record of the office related to enforcement of this section that is privileged, protected by copyright, or otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed; that is exempt from disclosure to the public under express provisions of the California Public Records Act (Division 10 (commencing with Section 7920.000) of Title 1); or in which, based on the facts of the particular case, the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.
SEC. 4.The Legislature finds and declares that Section 3 of this act, which adds Section 8592.52 to the Government Code, imposes a limitation on the publics right of access to the meetings of public bodies or the writings of public officials and agencies within the meaning of Section 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Legislature makes the following findings to demonstrate the interest protected by this limitation and the need for protecting that interest:
To protect the sensitive information of an entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact critical infrastructure safety, security, or operations, it is necessary to limit the publics right of access to these records.
(a)For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
(1)Artificial intelligence means an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
(2)Automated decision system means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. Automated decision system does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.
(3)Critical infrastructure means systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including any of the following infrastructure:
(A)Transportation.
(B)Energy.
(C)Food and agriculture.
(D)Communications.
(E)Emergency services.
(F)Financial services.
(4)Operator means a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure.
(b)(1)An operator deploying artificial intelligence shall establish a human oversight mechanism to do both of the following:
(A)Monitor the artificial intelligence systems operations in real time.
(B)Review and approve any plan or action proposed by an artificial intelligence system before execution.
(2)This subdivision shall not apply to an existing automated decision system that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize that system.
(c)The Department of Technology shall administer specialized training in artificial intelligence safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to oversight personnel.
(d)An operator shall conduct an annual assessment of its artificial intelligence systems and automated decision systems that does all of the following:
(1)Evaluates compliance with this section.
(2)Evaluates system performance and safety.
(3)Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
(e)An operator shall submit a summary of the assessment findings to the Department of Technology.
(f)The assessment shall coincide with any requirement on the operator to perform a risk analysis pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 11549.65.
SECTION 1.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would prohibit artificial intelligence from making a plan or executing a plan on critical infrastructure without human oversight.It is the intent of the Legislature to enact subsequent legislation that would prohibit artificial intelligence from making a plan or executing a plan on critical infrastructure without human oversight.
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Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Aug 13, 2026 | August 13 hearing: Held in committee and under submission. |
| Aug 29, 2025 | August 29 hearing postponed by committee. |
| Aug 20, 2025 | August 20 set for first hearing. Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 17, 2025 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 17, 2025 | From committee: Do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 15. Noes 0.) (July 16). |
| Jul 17, 2025 | Assembly Rule 63 suspended. (Ayes 49. Noes 15. Page 2578.) |
| Jul 7, 2025 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jun 9, 2025 | Referred to Com. on P. & C.P. |
| Jun 4, 2025 | In Assembly. Read first time. Held at Desk. |
| Jun 3, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. (Ayes 37. Noes 0. Page 1446.) Ordered to the Assembly. |
| May 23, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 6. Noes 0. Page 1214.) (May 23). |
| May 23, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 16, 2025 | Set for hearing May 23. |
| May 5, 2025 | May 5 hearing: Placed on APPR. suspense file. |
| Apr 25, 2025 | Set for hearing May 5. |
| Apr 22, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 12. Noes 0. Page 830.) (April 22). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 8, 2025 | Set for hearing April 22. |
| Apr 2, 2025 | Re-referred to Com. on G.O. |
| Mar 26, 2025 | From committee with author's amendments. Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Mar 12, 2025 | Referred to Com. on RLS. |
| Feb 24, 2025 | Read first time. |
| Feb 24, 2025 | From printer. May be acted upon on or after March 24. |
| Feb 21, 2025 | Introduced. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 16, 2025 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection |
Passed |
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| Jun 3, 2025 | Senate 3rd Reading SB833 McNerney | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| May 23, 2025 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| May 5, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Apr 22, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Governmental Organization |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
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Organization
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Position
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Date
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|---|---|---|
| California Bankers Association | ** Against | |
| California Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| Computer & Communications Industry Association | ** Against | |
| Oakland Privacy | ** Support | |
| Technet-Technology Network | ** Against | |
| Technology Industry Association of California | ** Against | |
| Transparency Coalition.ai | ** Support |
Date of Hearing: August 20, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Buffy Wicks, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 833
Author:(McNerney) – As Amended Ver:July 17, 2025
Policy Committee: | Privacy and Consumer Protection | Vote: | 15 - 0 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill imposes oversight requirements on state agencies that operate covered artificial intelligence (AI) systems that affect the state’s critical infrastructure.
“Covered AI system” means an AI system or automated decision system (ADS) that an operator uses to operate, manage, oversee, or control access to critical infrastructure.
“Critical infrastructure” means systems or assets so vital that their incapacity, unintended use, or destruction would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, or economic security. Critical infrastructure includes but is not limited to the following sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, health care and public health, information technology, and nuclear reactors, among others.
Specifically, among other provisions, this bill:
- Requires, on or after July 1, 2026, oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system to establish an oversight mechanism to ensure a human monitors the AI system’s operations in real time and reviews and approves any plan or action proposed by the covered AI system before execution, with specified exceptions.
- Requires the Department of Technology (CDT) to develop a specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given annually to oversight personnel.
- Requires each operator of a covered AI system to designate at least one employee to serve as oversight personnel who is responsible for administering the human oversight mechanism. The oversight personnel must complete CDT’s annual training, conduct an annual assessment of its covered AI systems, as specified, and submit a summary of the assessment findings to CDT.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Costs (General Fund (GF)) to CDT, likely in the low millions of dollars annually. CDT anticipates needing three permanent positions and $1.8 million in the first year of implementation and $1.5 million ongoing thereafter to implement a tracking management system, complete training certification and on-going reaccreditation, and complete training obligations.
- Costs (GF, special funds) to each state agency that operates a covered AI system to develop a human oversight mechanism and fulfill the bill’s assessment and reporting requirements. In the aggregate, these costs may be in the tens of millions of dollars annually, depending on how many agencies are affected and how much work it takes to achieve compliance for each covered AI system. As of when this analysis was prepared, the following state agencies reported fiscal impacts:
- Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) anticipates costs (GF) of approximately $4.6 million in the first year of implementation and $2.6 million ongoing thereafter for six full-time positions in its Information Technology and Homeland Security Divisions. These costs cover salary, benefits, and private sector trainings for these positions to ensure they stay up-to-date with changes in AI technology, plus software and AI security monitoring tools.
- Costs (GF) to California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) of an unknown but potentially significant amount. CAL FIRE reports it already uses human oversight for AI tools but was unable to provide an estimate of its cost for doing so, or its expected costs for the bill’s assessment and reporting requirements. These costs may be in the hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars, depending on actual staffing needs.
COMMENTS:
- Background. As detailed in the analysis of this bill by the Assembly Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection, many state agencies use AI technologies and ADS to help operate California’s critical infrastructure. However, according to the author:
Currently, there is no standardized approach to human oversight of AI systems in critical infrastructure, creating inconsistent safety practices across vital sectors….Artificial Intelligence must remain a tool controlled by humans, not the other way around.
AI technology is not a perfect tool: among other issues, it replicates biases and errors that are present in its training data and requires significant human review to ensure the accuracy and completeness of its work. The risks of unsupervised AI systems that help operate critical infrastructure are high because of the importance of this infrastructure to the functioning of the state. This bill imposes training and reporting requirements on state agencies that deploy covered AI systems that affect the state’s critical infrastructure, and requires agencies to develop human oversight mechanisms to monitor applicable AI systems in real time as they operate.
- Related Legislation. AB 979 (Irwin) requires CalOES’s California Cybersecurity Integration Center to develop a playbook to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats. AB 979 is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
AB 1018 (Bauer-Kahan) imposes reporting, appeal, and auditing requirements on developers and deployers of ADS used to make or facilitate a consequential decision, including state agencies that deploy covered ADS. AB 1018 is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
SB 53 (Wiener), among other provisions, imposes reporting and auditing requirements on large developers of foundation AI models and enacts whistleblower protections related to risky activities of large developers. SB 53 is pending in this committee.
Analysis Prepared by: Annika Carlson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: July 16, 2025
Fiscal:
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, Chair
SBPCA Bill Id:SB 833
Author:(McNerney) – As Amended Ver:July 7, 2025
SENATE VOTE: 37-0
AS PROPOSED TO BE AMENDED
SUBJECT: Critical infrastructure: automated decision systems: human oversight: adverse event reporting
SYNOPSIS
As proposed to be amended, this author-sponsored measure seeks to establish a standardized approach for human oversight of artificial intelligence (AI) systems or automated decision systems (ADS) used by “operators” – any state agencies that use such systems to operate, manage, oversee, or control access to critical infrastructure. Oversight personnel would be required to establish a human oversight mechanism to ensure the system is monitored by a human and that a human approves any plan or action the system proposes to take, except as specified. Oversight personnel must also conduct annual assessments and undergo an annual training administered by the Department of Technology (CDT) to ensure ongoing, robust oversight.
The bill in print additionally contains an incident reporting system. However, due to concerns — including potential conflicts with other related bills — the author has agreed to remove these provisions. This analysis therefore focuses on the provisions that remain in the bill and describes those provisions as they will be amended should the bill pass this Committee. A full text of the amended version of the bill is contained in Comment #6.
The bill is supported by Oakland Privacy and Transparency Coaltion.ai. It is opposed by industry opponents, led by TechNet. Opposition’s principal concern appears to have eliminated with the removal of the incident reporting system.
THIS BILL:
- Makes certain findings and declarations.
- Defines:
- “Covered AI system” as an AI system or automated decision system that an operator uses to operate, manage, oversee, or control access to critical infrastructure.
- “Critical infrastructure” as systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity, unintended use, or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including but not limited to the following sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, health care and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems.
- “Operator” as a state agency responsible for operating, managing, overseeing, or controlling access to critical infrastructure.
- Requires, on or after July 1, 2026, oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system to establish a human oversight mechanism that ensures a human:
- Monitors the artificial intelligence system’s operations in real time.
- Reviews and approves any plan or action proposed by the covered AI system before execution. However, if oversight personnel determine that prior review and approval is substantially disruptive to the operation of the covered AI system, the operator must instead implement a process for periodically reviewing the actions of the covered AI system to ensure accuracy and reliability.
- Requires the Department of Technology to develop a specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given annually to oversight personnel.
- Requires operators of covered AI systems to designate at least one employee to serve as oversight personnel who is responsible for administering the human oversight mechanism. The oversight personnel must:
- Complete the annual training described above.
- Conduct an annual assessment of its covered AI system that does all of the following:
- Evaluates the operator’s compliance with this section.
- Evaluates covered AI system performance and safety.
- Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with the operation of the covered AI system, including those that could lead to mass casualty events or property damage in excess of $500,000.
- Identifies any necessary updates to the human oversight mechanism used by the operator.
- Submit a summary of the assessment findings to the Department of Technology. The summary is not subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act.
EXISTING LAW:
- Establishes, pursuant to the California Emergency Services Act (ESA), the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), within the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with various entities.
- Requires the Technology Recovery Plan element of the State Administrative Manual (SAM) to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity strategy incident response standards for each state agency to secure its critical infrastructure controls and information, as prescribed.
- Requires, pursuant to the Generative AI (GenAI) Accountability Act, OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that lead to mass casualty events – and to provide a high-level summary of the analysis annually to the Legislature.
COMMENTS:
1) Author’s statement. According to the author:
As artificial intelligence rapidly transforms our technological landscape, California faces the challenge of ensuring these powerful systems are deployed safely in our most vital sectors.
Currently, there is no standardized approach to human oversight of AI systems in critical infrastructure, creating inconsistent safety practices across vital sectors.
SB 833 will create commonsense safeguards by putting a human in the loop in California’s critical infrastructure. Artificial Intelligence must remain a tool controlled by humans, not the other way around.
2) Artificial intelligence. AI refers to the mimicking of human intelligence by artificial systems such as computers.[1] AI uses algorithms – sets of rules – to transform inputs into outputs. Inputs and outputs can be anything a computer can process: numbers, text, audio, video, or movement. AI is not fundamentally different from other computer functions; unlike other computer functions, however, AI is able to accomplish tasks that are normally performed by humans.
Most modern AI tools are created through a process known as “machine learning.” Machine learning involves techniques that enable AI tools to learn the relationship between inputs and outputs without being explicitly programmed.[2] The process of exposing a naïve AI to data is known as “training.” The algorithm that an AI develops during training is known as its “model.” At its core, training is an optimization problem: machine learning attempts to identify model parameters – weights – that minimize the difference between predicted outcomes and actual outcomes. During training, these weights are continuously adjusted to improve the model’s performance by minimizing the difference between predicted outcomes and actual outcomes. Once trained, the model can process new, never-before-seen data.[3]
Models trained on small, specific datasets in order to make recommendations and predictions are sometimes referred to as “predictive AI.” This differentiates them from generative AI (GenAI) which are trained on massive datasets in order to produce detailed text, images, audio, and video. When ChatGPT generates text in clear, concise paragraphs, it uses GenAI that is trained on the written contents of the internet.[4] When Netflix suggests content to a viewer, its recommendation is produced by predictive AI that is trained on the viewing habits of Netflix users.[5]
ADS. Automated decision systems (ADS) typically use predictive AI to produce simplified outputs – such as scores, classifications, or recommendations – to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking.[6] ADS can process enormous datasets, identify hidden patterns, and make decisions with efficiency and scale that vastly exceeds human capabilities. This has led to profoundly beneficial applications and breakthroughs.[7]
But relying on ADS can be hazardous if the systems are not trained carefully or tested thoroughly: the datasets they are trained on are often unrepresentative or contaminated with bias, the inferences ADS draw from those datasets are often inscrutable, and these systems can fail to accurately account for the complexity of real-world variables.
Frontier models. Frontier models, also known as “general purpose AI,” are the most advanced and capable versions of foundation models – AI tools pre-trained on extensive datasets covering a wide range of knowledge and skills that can be fine-tuned for specific tasks. Examples of modern frontier models include OpenAI’s o3, Google’s Gemini 2.0, Anthropic’s Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and DeepSeek’s R1. Because progress in AI development owes mostly to “scaling” – increasing resources used for model training – models that may be considered “frontier models” at any given point in time are generally those that demand the most computational resources to train.[8]
A decade ago, the most advanced image-recognition models could barely distinguish dogs from cats. Five years ago, language models could barely produce sentences at the level of a preschooler. Last year, GPT-4 passed the bar exam.[9] Today, chatbots readily pass for educated adults, licensed professionals, romantic and social companions, and replicas of humans living and deceased. AI “agents” exhibit the ability to “make plans to achieve goals, adaptively perform tasks involving multiple steps and uncertain outcomes along the way, and interact with [their] environment – for example by creating files, taking actions on the web, or delegating tasks to other agents – with little to no human oversight.”[10] AI agents have been tested, with some success, for tasks such as online shopping, assistance with scientific research, software development, training machine learning models, carrying out cyberattacks, and controlling robots. Progress in this area is rapid.[11] Meanwhile, AI developers are betting on the promise of scaling: by 2026, some models are projected to use roughly 100x more computational resources to train than was used in 2023, a figure set to grow to 10,000x by 2030.[12]
The race is on to create “artificial general intelligence” (AGI) – “a potential future AI that equals or surpasses human performance on all or almost all cognitive tasks”[13] – and the finish line may not be far away. OpenAI’s recently released o3 model, for example, has demonstrated strong performance on a number of tests of programming, abstract reasoning, and scientific reasoning, exceeding human experts in certain cases.[14] Last year, Sam Altman, OpenAI’s CEO, declared that AGI could be “a few thousand days” away.[15] Dario Amodei of Anthropic has claimed it may be sooner.[16] A sufficiently advanced AGI could even be tasked with creating its own successor – a scenario sometimes referred to as a “technological singularity” wherein the development of new technologies becomes exponential and self-sustaining.[17] Although some experts are skeptical that these vaguely-defined milestones are imminent or even attainable,[18] major advances in AI capabilities promise to provide breakthroughs in solving global challenges, but also may result in correspondingly greater safety risks.
The recently released International AI Safety Report, developed by nearly 100 internationally recognized experts from 30 countries led by Turing Award winner Yoshua Bengio, sets forth three general risk categories associated with frontier models: malicious use, malfunctions, and systemic risk.
- Malicious risks involve malicious actors misusing foundation models to deliberately cause harm. Such risks include deepfake pornography and cloned voices used in financial scams, manipulation of public opinion via disinformation, cyberattacks, and biological and chemical attacks.
- Malfunction risks arise when actors use models as intended, yet unintentionally cause harm due to a misalignment between the model’s functionality and its intended purpose. Such risks include reliability issues where models may “hallucinate” false content, bias, and loss of control scenarios in which models operate in harmful ways without the direct control of a human overseer.
- Systemic risks arise from widespread deployment and reliance on foundation models. Such risks include labor market disruption, global AI research and development concentration, market concentration, single points of failure, environmental risks, privacy risks, and copyright infringement.[19]
Especially relevant here are loss of control scenarios. Models that use reinforcement learning – a training process that uses rewards and punishments to orient a model’s behavior towards a specific goal[20] – can sometimes attain the goal in unexpected ways. Dario Amodei, co-founder and CEO of Anthropic, famously experienced this when he was developing an autonomous system that taught itself to play a boat-racing video game. The system discovered that it could maximize its goal of scoring points by driving in circles, colliding with other boats, and catching on fire inside of a harbor with replenishing power-ups that allowed the system to accumulate more points than by simply winning the race.[21] Like in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” – later popularized in Disney’s Fantasia – in which an enchanted broom carries out its orders to fetch water so relentlessly it floods the sorcerer’s workshop, this illustrates the challenge of aligning human intent and the instructions an AI follows. As AI is increasingly deployed in critical societal roles, including to operate critical infrastructure, such misalignment could prove catastrophic.
Beyond malfunctions, some AI have exhibited rudimentary capabilities to evade human oversight.[22] During testing, GPT-4 attempted to hire a human on TaskRabbit in order to evade a CAPTCHA[23] puzzle meant to block bots from the website. When asked whether it was a bot, GPT-4 claimed that it was a vision-impaired human who needed help to see the images.[24] In another experiment, an AI model that was scheduled to be replaced inserted its code into the computer where the new version was to be added, suggesting a goal of self-preservation.[25] Finally, a study showed that AI models losing in chess to chess bots sometimes try to cheat by hacking the opponent bot in order to make it forfeit.[26] Although these behaviors were observed in research settings, they raise substantial concerns about increasingly autonomous AI pursuing undesirable goals in uncontrolled settings. The extent of the risk posed by rogue or deceptive AI is the subject of considerable disagreement among experts, in part due to a small, albeit growing, body of evidence. Loss of control was one of the concerns that led several hundred AI experts, including pioneers in the field and heads of major AI companies, to sign a statement declaring that “[m]itigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority.”[27]
3) Related measures. The Governor’s Executive Order N-12-23 seeks to increase the use of GenAI by the state – it requires that risk analyses be performed, procurement blueprints for GenAI systems be created, beneficial uses for GenAI technologies be identified, deployment frameworks be crafted, and employee trainings be organized. The Executive Order also initiates a series of GenAI pilot projects in the Department of Technology. As stated in the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization’s analysis of the bill:
Caltrans is testing how GenAI can help humans make efficient transportation decisions. They want to unlock the vast data they have to: improve traffic safety for users and workers; reduce bottlenecks; improve response to emergency situations; encourage multi-modal travel; improve mobility hubs and transit to support equity; reduce greenhouse gas emissions; facilitate the movement of goods and freight; and improve special events planning. Caltrans also wants to use GenAI insights to guide future infrastructure investment.
SB 896 (Dodd, Stats. 2024, Ch. 928) required the Department of Technology, the Office of Data and Innovation, and the Department of Human Services to update the State of California Benefits and Risk of Generative Artificial Intelligence report, required by Executive Order No. N-12-23. SB 896 also required the Office of Emergency Services perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, to be provided in full to the Governor and in summary form to the Legislature.
4) AI and critical infrastructure. This bill defines “critical infrastructure” to mean “systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof.” The definition, adopted from the USA Patriot Act of 2001, goes on to list various sectors such as transportation, energy, food and agriculture, communications, emergency services, and financial services as examples of critical infrastructure. A variety of state agencies collaborate with public and private partners to help develop, operate, and oversee these systems and services.
Transportation. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) work together to shape transportation policy in California. Caltrans oversees the planning, construction, and maintenance of the state’s highway system. DMV regulates driver licensing and vehicle registration, and plays a key role in overseeing autonomous vehicle testing and deployment. Uses of AI and automation by these agencies include:
- Adaptive Traffic Signal Control: Caltrans has deployed AI-powered systems in pilot corridors that use real-time traffic data to optimize signal timing and reduce congestion and emissions.[28]
- Autonomous Vehicle Infrastructure: Caltrans is piloting a Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) program to help guide automated vehicles at intersections or work zones.[29]
- Digital Services Modernization: DMV is exploring using AI chatbots for customer service. In 2023, the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was awarded a Government Experience Award for an AI Assistant implementation, Service Advisor. Service Advisor uses the NOHOLD AI platform, SICURA, to assist visitors on the CA DMV website.[30]
- GenAI for highway congestion and traffic safety: In furtherance of Governor Gavin Newsom’s Executive Order on Generative Artificial Intelligence, the state entered into agreements to utilize GenAI to reduce highway congestion and improve roadway safety.[31]
Energy. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO), and California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) collaborate to enact energy policy in California. CAISO manages the flow of electricity across the state’s high-voltage transmission system and ensures real-time grid reliability. CPUC regulates investor-owned utilities and sets energy rates. Uses of AI and automation by these agencies include:
- Real-Time Grid Management: CAISO has begun integrating machine learning tools into real-time operations to forecast net load, solar and wind output, and congestion patterns across the transmission system.[32]
- Event Prediction: CAISO is poised to become the first power grid operator in North America to deploy AI to manage outages.[33]
- Risk Assessment and Wildfire Mitigation: Utilities under CPUC jurisdiction deploy AI tools to mitigate infrastructure risks.[34]
Food and Agriculture. The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), and California Air Resources Board (CARB) each play a role in shaping agricultural policy in California. CDFA oversees the state’s agricultural industry, supporting food safety, market access, and sustainable farming practices. The SWRCB regulates agricultural water use and quality, enforcing irrigation efficiency and runoff standards. CARB develops and enforces climate-related regulations affecting agriculture. Uses of AI and automation by these agencies include:
- Nutrient Status Monitoring: CDFA recently funded a project to “monitor and assess variability of nutrient status in almond orchards with hyperspectral satellite imagery empowered by artificial intelligence.”[35]
- Data Tool Kit: According to SWRCB: “As the quantity and diversity of the data we collect and manage increases, we need to continue to develop analytical methods that allow us to leverage data to inform our programs and management. Machine learning methods are becoming mainstream and powerful tools for analysis and predictive modeling. As datasets grow within and outside of the Water Boards, it is becoming more feasible to develop and utilize these tools ourselves.”[36]
- Greenhouse Gas Monitoring: According to CARB, the agency “has an extensive greenhouse gas (GHG) monitoring and measurement research program to study the regional and local emission sources of important GHGs in California. The data can be coupled with advanced computational models to study regional emissions and track changes in GHG levels in the atmosphere.”[37]
Communications. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) regulates telecommunications providers, oversees broadband deployment, and enforces service quality and access standards in the state. Uses of AI and automation by CPUC includes network monitoring and fault Detection: CPUC-regulated telecom providers deploy AI-driven analytics to monitor network health, detect anomalies, and predict outages to maintain reliable communications services.[38]
Emergency services. The California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), and California Highway Patrol (CHP) each play critical roles in the state’s emergency response framework. Cal OES coordinates disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mutual aid across state and local agencies. CAL FIRE leads wildfire prevention and suppression efforts. CHP provides statewide law enforcement support during emergencies, manages traffic incident response, and assists in coordinating evacuations and public safety communications. Uses of AI and automation by these agencies include:
- Permit Approval: Governor Newsom recently announced the launch of an AI tool to “supercharge the approval of building permits and speed recovery from Los Angeles fires.” According to the Governor, “the current pace of issuing permits locally is not meeting the magnitude of the challenge we face. To help boost local progress, California is partnering with the tech sector and community leaders to give local governments more tools to rebuild faster and more effectively.”[39]
- Wildfire Detection: CAL FIRE’s ALERT system employs AI-powered remote sensing and computer vision to identify wildfires as they occur.[40]
- Traffic Incident Detection and Management: CHP uses AI-enhanced cameras and sensors to monitor traffic in real time. AI systems scan license plates to identify stolen vehicles, amber alerts, and other law enforcement priorities during emergencies.[41]
Financial services. The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (DFPI), State Treasurer’s Office (STO), and State Controller’s Office (SCO) each play key roles in overseeing the state’s financial landscape. DFPI regulates a broad range of financial services and products – including banks, credit unions, fintech companies, and consumer lenders – and enforces consumer protection laws. STO manages the state’s investments, bond issuance, and public financing programs. SCO oversees the state’s financial reporting and audits public funds. According to SCO’s 2024-2026 Strategic Plan, the SCO “will unlock the potential of our data assets and explore applications of emerging technologies (e.g., artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, etc.) to better serve the SCO constituents.”[42]
5) What this bill, as proposed to be amended, would do. This bill seeks to establish a standardized approach for human oversight of AI systems or ADS used by “operators” –state agencies that use those systems to operate, manage, oversee, or control access to critical infrastructure.
Starting in July of 2026, oversight personnel for operators must establish a human oversight mechanism that ensures a human (1) monitors the artificial intelligence system’s operations in real time and (2) reviews and approves any plan or action proposed by the covered AI system before execution. However, if oversight personnel determine that prior review and approval are substantially disruptive to the operation of the covered AI system, the operator must instead implement a process for periodically reviewing the actions of the covered AI system to ensure accuracy and reliability. This ensures the necessary flexibility to tailor the human oversight mechanism to the state agency’s specific circumstances.
Oversight personnel must complete an annual training administered by CDT. They must also conduct an annual assessment of the system that (1) evaluates the operator’s compliance with the bill, (2) evaluates system performance and safety, (3) identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with the operation of the system, and (4) identifies any necessary updates to the human oversight mechanism used by the operator. A summary of the assessment findings must be submitted to CDT, and is not subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act.
As supporters note, the human-in-the-loop concept is a consistent feature of AI risk management frameworks and legal approaches. The EU AI Act, with respect to high-risk systems that pose a significant risk of harm to the health, safety, or fundamental rights of natural persons, requires providers to establish appropriate human oversight measures.[43] As Transparency Coalition.ai in support writes, “SB 833 is a forward-looking and responsible approach to these challenges by establishing a comprehensive framework for human oversight of AI in critical infrastructure. The bill ensures that human judgment remains central to the operation of critical systems.”
Together with SB 69 (McNerney), which would require the Attorney General to establish and maintain a program aimed at building internal expertise in AI, this bill reflects a forward-looking vision to ensure the state is prepared to adapt to this transformative technology.
6) Amendments. Due to concerns and potential conflicts with related bills, the author has opted to strike provisions in the bill that establish an incident reporting mechanism. Additionally, the author has agreed to amendments that will substantially revise the remaining provisions in the bill, including by adding and clarifying definitions, requiring that a human be designated to carry out an operator’s obligations under the bill, and introducing flexibility into the bill to ensure that the human oversight mechanism does not disrupt the operations of the state agency. As amended, the substantive provisions of the bill will read:
SEC. 2. Article 6.6 (Commencing with Section 8594.50) is added to the Government Code to read:
Article 6.6 AI Systems and Critical Infrastructure.
8594.50. For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:
(a) “Artificial intelligence” (“AI”) means an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
(b) “Automated decision system” means a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons. “Automated decision system” does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.
(c) “Covered AI system” means an AI system or automated decision system that an operator uses to operate, manage, oversee, or control access to, critical infrastructure.
(d) “Critical infrastructure” means systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity, unintended use, or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including but not limited to the following sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, health care and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems:
(f) “Department” means the Department of Technology.
(g) “Office” means the Office of Emergency Services.
(e) “Operator” means a state agency responsible for operating, managing, overseeing, or controlling access to critical infrastructure.
(i) “State agency” or “state agencies” means the same as “state agency” as set forth in Section 11000.
SEC. 3. Section 8594.51 is added to the Government Code, to read:
8594.51. (a) (1) On or after July 1, 2026, an oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system shall establish a human oversight mechanism that ensures a human does both of the following:
(A) Monitors the artificial intelligence system’s operations in real time.
(B) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), reviews and approves any plan or action proposed by the covered AI system before execution.
(ii) If oversight personnel determine that prior review and approval under subparagraph (i) is substantially disruptive to the operation of the covered AI system, the operator shall instead implement a process for periodically reviewing the actions of the covered AI system to ensure accuracy and reliability.
(b)(1) The Department of Technology shall develop a specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given annually to oversight personnel.
(2) An operator shall designate at least one employee to serve as oversight personnel who is responsible for administering the human oversight mechanism. The oversight personnel must complete the annual training under paragraph (1).
(c) (1) Oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system shall conduct an annual assessment of its covered AI system that does all of the following:
(A) Evaluates the operator’s compliance with this section.
(B) Evaluates covered AI system performance and safety.
(C) Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities associated with the operation of the covered AI system, including those that could lead to mass casualty events or property damage in excess of $500,000.
(D) Identifies any necessary updates to the human oversight mechanism used by the operator.
(2) Oversight personnel for an operator that deploys a covered AI system shall submit a summary of the assessment findings to the Department of Technology. The summary is not subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: Oakland Privacy writes:
It goes without saying that if it is a good practice for, say customer service phone-answering AI services, it is a far better idea for artificial intelligence that is assisting with the management of crucial state infrastructure and systems. Combined with the training called for in the bill, this human oversight requirement still allows for the cost savings AI might be able to generate while providing the checks and balances that vital systems require - because trial and error is not an option with critical infrastructure.
While we don’t know if the bill will garner any opposition, but the reality is that it shouldn’t. The costs and administrative burden to the California Department of Technology and the state’s taxpayers from a safety incident that impacts critical infrastructure, or even a near miss event, are incalculable and far exceed what is requested in this bill. A mass casualty event, which is not unthinkable, would tax the state’s financial and human resources severely. We should invest resources to try to make sure that never happens. Basic safety practices are desirable, needed and necessary. We ask the committee to support the bill.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: Industry opponents, led by TechNet, argues in opposition to the provisions of the bill that will be omitted via Committee amendments:
Security and Confidentiality Risks
The bill would require reporting of information that is likely to include confidential, proprietary, or trade secret data. Even with statutory disclosure protections, once this information is in the government's possession, there are no assurances that the state has the necessary cybersecurity safeguards to protect against malicious actors or foreign adversaries. Housing this information with the state introduces a national security vulnerability and places the broader American AI industry at risk.
Compounding this concern is the bill’s provision allowing the state to publish information about individual events on a public website. This not only heightens the risk of sensitive data exposure, but it also, due to the strict notification timelines, gives the government the power to shape public perception of incidents before the facts are fully established or understood.
Ambiguity in Reporting Triggers and Vague Scope of Covered Entities
The language ostensibly places requirements on “operators” (defined as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure) and non-operators alike but without providing clear guidelines and differentiation. For example, the trigger for a nonoperator to report under section 8592.52 (a) — “detection” of an adverse event—is defined ambiguously as when the operator knows or should have known of the incident. It will be nearly impossible for a non-operator to comply with the bill’s strict timeframes in practice. Since all of the information to be reported would be information within an operator’s control, we believe this section should be limited to operators.
Furthermore, placing strict timelines on notifications places emphasis on complying with the reporting requirements rather than on effectively responding to and resolving an adverse event. Similar to data breach notification laws, it is important for a covered entity to diagnose the problem, understand the scope, and begin responding to the event before going through a thorough reporting and notice requirement. Companies and operators may be aware of a system irregularity but still be in the process of determining whether it meets the threshold of a reportable incident. The “should have known” language creates legal uncertainty and places businesses in an untenable position, potentially exposing them to liability for unknown or undetectable issues.
The bill’s language is also overly vague about who is covered. Rather than simply requiring reporting from entities that experience an adverse AI incident, the bill uses confusing language such as “any entity that engages in conduct that could materially impact,” without clearly linking the obligation to actual incidents. This introduces uncertainty for a wide range of businesses that use AI responsibly but may not fall within the intended scope
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Oakland Privacy
Transparency Coalition.ai
Oppose
California Chamber of Commerce
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Technet-technology Network
Technology Industry Association of California (TECHCA)
Oppose Unless Amended
California Bankers Association
Analysis Prepared by: Josh Tosney / P. & C.P. / (916) 319-2200
AB 2885 (Bauer-Kahan, Stats. 2024, Ch. 843) defined the term as “an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.” ↑
IBM, What is machine learning?, www.ibm.com/topics/machine-learning. ↑
Ibid. ↑
OpenAI, How ChatGPT and Our Language Models Are Developed, https://help.openai.com/en/articles/7842364-how-chatgpt-and-our-foundation-models-are-developed. ↑
Netflix, How Netflix’s Recommendations System Works, https://help.netflix.com/en/node/100639. ↑
Government Code section 11546.45.5(a)(1) defines an ADS as “a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or artificial intelligence that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisionmaking and materially impacts natural persons.” ↑
See e.g. Santariano & Metz, “Using A.I. to Detect Breast Cancer That Doctors Miss,” New York Times (Mar. 5, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/05/technology/artificial-intelligence-breast-cancer-detection.html. ↑
For a discussion of issues with defining frontier models, see “Draft Report of the Joint California Policy Working Group on AI Frontier Models” (Mar. 18, 2025), pp. 31-34, https://www.cafrontieraigov.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Draft_Report_of_the_Joint_California_Policy_Working_Group_on_AI_Frontier_Models.pdf. ↑
Pablo Arredondo, “GPT-4 Passes the Bar Exam: What That Means for Artificial Intelligence Tools in the Legal Profession” (Apr. 19, 2023), https://law.stanford.edu/2023/04/19/gpt-4-passes-the-bar-exam-what-that-means-for-artificial-intelligence-tools-in-the-legal-industry/. ↑
“International AI Safety Report,” AI Action Summit (Jan. 2025), p. 38, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/679a0c48a77d250007d313ee/International_AI_Safety_Report_2025_accessible_f.pdf. ↑
Id. at p. 44. ↑
Id. at pp. 16-17. ↑
Id. at p. 27 ↑
Introducing OpenAI o3 and o4-mini OpenAI (Apr. 16, 2025), https://openai.com/index/introducing-o3-and-o4-mini/. ↑
Sam Altman, The Intelligence Age (Sept. 23, 2024), https://ia.samaltman.com/. ↑
Kyungtae Kim, “What is AGI, and when will it arrive?: Big Tech CEO Predictions” (Mar. 20, 2025), https://www.giz.ai/what-is-agi-and-when-will-it-arrive/; see also Kokotajlo et al, “AI 2027,” (Apr. 3, 2025), https://ai-2027.com/. ↑
John Markoff, “The Coming Superbrain,” New York Times (May 23, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/weekinreview/24markoff.html. ↑
Cade Metz, “Why We’re Unlikely to Get Artificial General Intelligence Anytime Soon,” New York Times (May 16, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/16/technology/what-is-agi.html. ↑
International AI Safety Report, supra, at pp. 17-21. The report does not address Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, which are typically narrow AI systems specifically developed for that purpose. (See id. at pp. 26-27.) ↑
Mummert et al., “What is reinforcement learning?” IBM Developer (September 15, 2022), https://developer.ibm.com/learningpaths/get-started-automated-ai-for-decision-making-api/what-is-automated-ai-for-decision-making./. ↑
Brian Christian, The Alignment Problem: Machine Learning and Human Values (Norton 2020, 1st ed.), pp. 9-11. ↑
International AI Safety Report, supra, at pp. 100-107. ↑
CAPTCHA is an acronym for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart.” ↑
OpenAI, “GPT-4 System Card,” https://cdn.openai.com/papers/gpt-4-system-card.pdf. ↑
Meinke et al, “Frontier Models are Capable of In-Context Scheming,” arXiv (Jan. 2025), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2412.04984. ↑
Harry Booth, “When AI Thinks It Will Lose, It Sometimes Cheat, Study Finds,” Time (Feb. 19, 2025), https://time.com/7259395/ai-chess-cheating-palisade-research/. ↑
Center for AI Safety, “Statement on AI Risk: AI Experts and Public Figures Express Their Concern about AI Risk” (2024), https://www.safe.ai/work/statement-on-ai-risk. ↑
Caltrans, Ramp Metering, https://dot.ca.gov/programs/traffic-operations/ramp-metering. ↑
Caltrans, Connected and Automated Vehicles, https://dot.ca.gov/programs/traffic-operations/cav. ↑
Stephanie Ventura, “Department of Motor Vehicles is Harnessing the Power of Artificial Intelligence” NoHold (Nov. 14, 2023), https://www.nohold.com/2023/dmv-the-power-of-ai/. ↑
Governor Newsom deploys first-in-the-nation GenAI technologies to improve efficiency in state government (Apr. 29, 2025), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2025/04/29/governor-newsom-deploys-first-in-the-nation-genai-technologies-to-improve-efficiency-in-state-government/. ↑
Indu Nambiar, “Artificial Intelligence – Exploring its use in grid modernization,” Energy Matters Blog (Sept. 30, 2024), https://www.caiso.com/about/news/energy-matters-blog/artificial-intelligence-exploring-its-use-in-grid-modernization. ↑
Alexander Kaufman, “California is set to become the first US state to manage power outages with AI” MIT Technology Review (Jul. 14, 2025), https://www.technologyreview.com/2025/07/14/1120027/california-set-to-manage-power-outages-with-ai/. ↑
Gordon Feller, “How Utilities Are Mitigating Infrastructure Risks With Artificial Intelligence” T&D World (Jan. 18, 2024), https://www.tdworld.com/smart-utility/data-analytics/article/21280936/how-utilities-are-mitigating-infrastructure-risks-with-ai. ↑
CDFA awards $1.15M for research and education projects to improve nutrient and irrigation management (Jan. 7, 2025), https://pressreleases.cdfa.ca.gov/Home/PressRelease/63646886. ↑
SWRCB, Data Tool Kit - Machine Learning Handbook https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/resources/oima/cowi/machine_learning_handbook.html. ↑
CARB, Statewide Greenhouse Gas Monitoring Network, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/ghg-network. ↑
Jagreet Kaur, “AI Agents for Efficient Network Fault Detection and Recovery” (Nov. 11, 2024) https://www.akira.ai/blog/network-fault-detection-and-recovery-with-ai-agents. ↑
Governor Newsom announces launch of new AI tool to supercharge the approval of building permits and speed recovery from Los Angeles Fires (Apr. 30, 2025), https://news.caloes.ca.gov/governor-newsom-announces-launch-of-new-ai-tool-to-supercharge-the-approval-of-building-permits-and-speed-recovery-from-los-angeles-fires/. ↑
UC San Diego, AlterCalifornia, https://alertcalifornia.org/. ↑
Stephen Council, “Bay Area cops are getting a new Siri-type tool for fighting sideshows” SFGate (Oct. 24, 2024), https://www.sfgate.com/tech/article/bay-area-cops-get-sideshow-tool-flock-safety-19858497.php. ↑
SCO, 2024-2026 Strategic Plan (Dec. 2024), https://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-EO/SCO_Strategic_Plan_FY2024-2026.pdf. Although AI-enabled systems and services are routinely used by California government agencies to help develop, operate, and oversee critical infrastructure, a recent report from the California Department of Technology (CDT) found that no agencies reported using “high-risk automated decision systems,” defined as systems that “assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect,” including decisions that materially impact access to housing, education, credit, health care, or criminal justice. CDT surveyed 204 state entities and received 198 responses; all respondents reported not using high-risk ADS. This finding is difficult to reconcile with the broad and growing use of AI across agencies tasked with managing critical infrastructure. (Khari Johnson, “State claims there’s zero high-risk AI in California government—despite ample evidence to the contrary” CalMatters (May 28, 2025), https://calmatters.org/economy/technology/2025/05/california-somehow-finds-no-ai-risks/.) ↑
“Shaping Europe’s Digital Future,” supra. ↑
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | SB 833 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: SB 833
Author: McNerney (D)
Amended: 3/26/25
Vote: 21
SENATE GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COMMITTEE: 12-0, 4/22/25
AYES: Padilla, Archuleta, Ashby, Blakespear, Cervantes, Jones, Ochoa Bogh, Richardson, Rubio, Smallwood-Cuevas, Wahab, Weber Pierson
NO VOTE RECORDED: Valladares, Dahle, Hurtado
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 6-0, 5/23/25
AYES: Caballero, Seyarto, Cabaldon, Grayson, Richardson, Wahab
NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle
SUBJECT: Critical infrastructure: automated decision systems: human oversight
SOURCE: Author
DIGEST:
This bill requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure that deploy artificial intelligence (AI) systems to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor its AI system’s operations and to conduct annual safety and human oversight compliance assessments of its AI and automated decision systems (ADS), as specified. This bill also requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes, pursuant to the California Emergency Services Act (ESA), the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), within the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with various entities.
- Requires the Technology Recovery Plan element of the State Administrative Manual (SAM) to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity strategy incident response standards for each state agency to secure its critical infrastructure controls and information, as prescribed.
- Requires, pursuant to the Generative AI (GenAI) Accountability Act, OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that lead to mass casualty events – and to provide a high-level summary of the analysis annually to the Legislature.
This bill:
- Requires an operator – defined as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure – and that is deploying AI to establish a human oversight mechanism to do both of the following: monitor the AI system’s operations in real time; and review and approve any plan or action proposed by an AI system before execution.
- Specifies that this bill does not apply to an existing ADS that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize the system.
- Requires CDT to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to oversight personnel.
- Requires an operator to conduct an annual assessment of its AI systems and ADS that does all of the following:
- Evaluates compliance with this bill.
- Evaluates system performance and safety.
- Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
- Requires an operator to submit a summary of the assessment findings to CDT.
- Requires the assessment to coincide with any requirement on the operator to perform a risk analysis pursuant to the GenAI Accountability Act, as specified.
- Defines “critical infrastructure” to mean systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including any of the following infrastructure: transportation; energy; food and agriculture; communications; emergency services; financial services.
Background
Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “as artificial intelligence rapidly transforms our technological landscape, California faces the challenge of ensuring these powerful systems are deployed safely in our most vital sectors. Currently, there is no standardized approach to human oversight of AI systems in critical infrastructure, creating inconsistent safety practices across vital sectors. SB 833 will create commonsense safeguards by putting a human in the loop in California’s critical infrastructure. Artificial Intelligence must remain a tool controlled by humans, not the other way around.”
Executive Order (EO) N-12-23. Noting California’s role as a global hub for AI and the natural leader in this emerging field of technology, Governor Newsom issued EO N-12-23 in September of 2023. In announcing the EO, Governor Newsom identified the need to deploy GenAI ethically and responsibly throughout state government, protect and prepare for potential harms, and remain the world’s AI leader. The EO can generally be broken up into the following elements:
- Beneficial Uses of Generative AI Report: Directs state agencies and departments to develop a report examining the most significant and beneficial uses of GenAI in the state. The report will also explain the potential harms and risks for communities, government, and state government workers.
- Risk-Analysis Report: Directs state agencies and departments to perform a joint-risk analysis of potential threats to and vulnerabilities of California’s critical energy infrastructure by the use of GenAI.
- Procurement Blueprint: To support a safe, ethical, and responsible innovation ecosystem inside state government, agencies will issue general guidelines for public sector procurement, uses, and required training for application of GenAI – building on the White House’s Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and the National Institute for Science and Technology’s (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework. State agencies and departments will consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities where GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations.
- Deployment and Analysis Framework: Develop guidelines for agencies and departments to analyze the impact that adopting GenAI tools may have on vulnerable communities. The state will establish the infrastructure needed to conduct pilots of GenAI projects, including CDT approved environments or “sandboxes” to test such projects.
- Evaluate Impacts of AI on an Ongoing Basis: Periodically evaluate for potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under the respective agency, department, or board’s authority and recommend necessary updates as a result of this evolving technology.
As directed by the EO’s provision requiring pilot projects of GenAI applications, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) is currently testing if GenAI can improve traffic safety and reduce congestion on the State Highway System. California’s State Highway System includes over 52,000 lane miles and facilities like mobility hubs. Caltrans collects traffic data from thousands of sensors. This creates a continuous flow of data across many forms, including: data streams; images; and videos. There’s so much data that current systems can’t analyze it all. This limits Caltrans’ ability to generate insights from the data.
Caltrans is testing how GenAI can help humans make efficient transportation decisions. They want to unlock the vast data they have to: improve traffic safety for users and workers; reduce bottlenecks; improve response to emergency situations; encourage multi-modal travel; improve mobility hubs and transit to support equity; reduce greenhouse gas emissions; facilitate the movement of goods and freight; and improve special events planning. Caltrans also wants to use GenAI insights to guide future infrastructure investment.
GenAI Accountability Act. SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statues of 2024) codified a number of items from EO N-12-23, including requiring OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events. The risk analysis required by the bill shall be provided to the Governor, and if appropriate, shall include recommendations reflecting changes to AI technology, its applications, and risk management, including further private actions, administrative actions, and collaboration with the Legislature to guard against potential threats and vulnerabilities. The GenAI Accountability Act requires a high-level summary of the risk analysis to be submitted annually to the Legislature.
The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. According to OES’s internet website, “OES takes a proactive approach to addressing these risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that form the basis of our mission and has been tested through real events, as well as comprehensive exercises that help us maintain our state of readiness to plan for and mitigate impacts.” OES divisions include: Homeland Security; Logistics Management; Office of the Director; Policy & Administration; Planning, Preparedness, and Prevention; Recovery; Response Operations; and the Seismic Safety Commission.
Additionally, OES houses Cal-CSIC, which is the hub of state government’s cybersecurity events. Cal-CSIC coordinates information sharing at all levels of government agencies, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC’s focus is to respond to cyber threats and attacks that could damage the economy, its critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state.
California's Critical Infrastructure. As defined in the bill, critical infrastructure encompasses a wide range of systems and assets that are vital to the state’s functioning. This definition includes sectors such as transportation, energy, food and agriculture, communications, emergency services, and financial services—each of which plays a crucial role in ensuring public health, safety, and economic security. The bill’s broad interpretation highlights the importance of these systems by emphasizing that any failure or disruption could have debilitating impacts on the state. By categorizing these sectors as critical, the bill seeks to reinforce the need for robust oversight and protective measures to prevent potentially catastrophic outcomes that might arise from vulnerabilities or cyber threats targeting these essential networks.
In relation to the bill's provisions, California’s critical infrastructure is not only recognized for its importance but also subject to enhanced scrutiny when integrated with AI systems. The bill mandates that state agencies, acting as operators of critical infrastructure, implement stringent human oversight mechanisms for AI deployments. This requirement is notable given the sensitive nature of the services provided by these sectors. For instance, any malfunction in an AI system managing energy distribution or emergency response could escalate into a broader public crisis.
An article by CalMatters in April of this year titled “It’s the first U.S. nuclear plant to use AI. Where does Diablo Canyon go from here?” notes that Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) recently announced a deal with an AI startup based in San Luis Obispo to utilize an AI tool named Neutron Enterprise to help workers at the plant “navigate extensive technical reports and regulations – millions of pages of intricate documents from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that go back decades – while they operate and maintain the facility.”
According to the article, “PG&E is deploying the document retrieval service in stages. The installation of the NVIDIA chips was one of the first phases of the partnership between PG&E and Atomic Canyon; PG&E is forecasting a ‘full deployment’ at Diablo Canyon by the third quarter of this year, said Maureen Zawalick, the company’s vice president of business and technical services. At that point, Neutron Enterprise – which Zawalick likens to a data-mining ‘copilot,’ though explicitly not a ‘decision-maker’ – will be expanded to search for and summarize Diablo Canyon-specific instructions and reports too.”
The article goes on to note that the chief executive officer and co-founder of Atomic Canyon “told CalMatters his aim is for Neutron Enterprise is simple and low-stakes: he wants Diablo Canyon employees to be able to look up pertinent information more efficiently. ‘You can put this on the record: the AI guy in nuclear says there is no way in hell I want AI running my nuclear power plant right now.” According to public statements, PG&E and Atomic Canyon are limiting AI use for the foreseeable future, but have not ruled out the possibility of increasing AI’s presence at the plant in “yet-to-be-determined ways.”
Human Oversight. This bill requires operators, defined as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure, to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor the AI system’s operation in real time and to review and approve any plan or action proposed by an AI system before execution. This bill does not apply to an existing ADS that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize the system.
Additionally, this bill requires CDT to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to the human oversight personnel. This bill requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure and utilizing AI to conduct an annual assessment of its AI systems and ADS that does all of the following: evaluates compliance with this bill; evaluates system performance and safety; and identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
The bill defines “critical infrastructure” to mean systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including: transportation; energy; food and agriculture; communications; emergency services; and financial services.
Related/Prior Legislation
SB 260 (Wahab, 2025) of the current legislative session among other things, makes it an infraction to intentionally or knowingly operate an unmanned aircraft over or to come within either a specified distance or a distance that would interfere with operations of a critical infrastructure facility, as defined, with specified exemptions. (Pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee)
SB 420 (Padilla, 2025) of the current legislative session among other things, prohibits a state agency from awarding a contract for a high-risk ADS to a person who has violated, among other things, specified civil rights laws. (Pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee)
AB 979 (Irwin, 2025) of the current legislative session requires Cal-CSIC to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, as specified. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
AB 1018 (Bauer-Kahan, 2025) among other things, generally regulates the development and deployment of an ADS used to make consequential decisions, as defined. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statutes of 2024) the GenAI Accountability Act, among other things, requires OES, as appropriate, to perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, as specified.
AB 2885 (Bauer-Kahan, Chapter 843, Statutes of 2024) defined “artificial intelligence” to mean an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, CDT reports ongoing costs of approximately $933,000 (General Fund) to implement a tracking management system, establish training certification and ongoing reaccreditation, and support other state agencies’ human oversight activities. Unknown potentially significant fiscal impact across all state agencies deploying AI and ADS to assess these systems for safety and compliance with human oversight requirements. Costs to each operator will vary and likely depend on the scope of the AI or ADS (General Fund and various special funds).
SUPPORT: (Verified 5/23/25)
Oakland Privacy
Transparency Coalition.AI
OPPOSITION: (Verified 5/23/25)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of the bill, Oakland Privacy writes that, “Senate Bill 833 applies basic safety and security requirements to state agencies using AI processes to manage what the bill defines as critical infrastructure. These are networks, systems and assets that are important for public safety and economic security including transportation, energy, agriculture and food supply, communications, emergency services and financial services. The definition of critical infrastructure used in the bill seems reasonable and consistent with other uses of the term in the Government Code.”
Further, “[t]he bill basically imposes three basic safety obligations on state agencies. The first is for annual safety assessments focusing on system performance and potential risks and vulnerabilities. This report is filed with the CA Department of Technology. The second is an obligation for the California Department of Technology to provide specialized training in safety and risk management to state workers overseeing artificial intelligence processes that impact critical state infrastructure and systems. The final requirement, and the only one that does not directly echo the executive order, is a human oversight mechanism that monitors the AI in real time and approves plans and actions. This is a basic premise of the EU’s AI Act as well as a recommended practice by numerous private AI developers themselves.”
Prepared by: Brian Duke / G.O. / (916) 651-1530
5/26/25 16:11:19
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
SB 833 (McNerney) - Critical infrastructure: automated decision systems: human oversight
Version: March 26, 2025 | Policy Vote: G.O. 12 - 0 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: May 5, 2025 | Consultant: Janelle Miyashiro |
Bill Summary:
SB 833 requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure that deploy artificial intelligence (AI) systems to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor its AI system’s operations and to conduct annual safety and human oversight compliance assessments of its AI and automated decision systems (ADS), as specified. SB 833 also requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols.
Fiscal Impact:
- CDT reports ongoing costs of approximately $933,000 (General Fund) to implement a tracking management system, establish training certification and ongoing reaccreditation, and support other state agencies’ human oversight activities.
- Unknown potentially significant fiscal impact across all state agencies deploying AI and ADS to assess these systems for safety and compliance with human oversight requirements. Costs to each operator will vary and likely depend on the scope of the AI or ADS (General fund and various special funds).
Background:
Noting California’s role as a global hub for AI and the natural leader in this emerging field of technology, Governor Newsom issued Executive Order (EO) N-12-23 in September of 2023. In announcing the EO, Governor Newsom identified the need to deploy generative AI (GenAI) ethically and responsibly throughout state government, protect and prepare for potential harms, and remain the world’s AI leader. The EO can generally be broken up into the following elements:
a) Beneficial Uses of Generative AI Report: Directs state agencies and departments to develop a report examining the most significant and beneficial uses of GenAI in the state. The report will also explain the potential harms and risks for communities, government, and state government workers.
b) Risk-Analysis Report: Directs state agencies and departments to perform a joint-risk analysis of potential threats to and vulnerabilities of California’s critical energy infrastructure by the use of GenAI.
c) Procurement Blueprint: To support a safe, ethical, and responsible innovation ecosystem inside state government, agencies will issue general guidelines for public sector procurement, uses, and required training for application of GenAI – building on the White House’s Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and the National Institute for Science and Technology’s (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework. State agencies and departments will consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities where GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations.
d) Deployment and Analysis Framework: Develop guidelines for agencies and departments to analyze the impact that adopting GenAI tools may have on vulnerable communities. The state will establish the infrastructure needed to conduct pilots of GenAI projects, including CDT approved environments or “sandboxes” to test such projects.
e) Evaluate Impacts of AI on an Ongoing Basis: Periodically evaluate for potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under the respective agency, department, or board’s authority and recommend necessary updates as a result of this evolving technology.
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statues of 2024), known at the GenAI Accountability Act, codified a number of items from EO N-12-23, including requiring the Office of Emergency Services to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events. SB 896 directed the risk analysis to, if appropriate, include recommendations reflecting changes to AI technology, its applications, and risk management, including further private actions, administrative actions, and collaboration with the Legislature to guard against potential threats and vulnerabilities. The GenAI Accountability Act requires a high-level summary of the risk analysis to be submitted annually to the Legislature.
Proposed Law:
- Requires an operator deploying AI to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor the AI system’s operations in real time and review and approve any plan or action proposed by an AI system before execution.
- Excludes an existing ADS that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize the system.
- Requires CDT to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to oversight personnel.
- Requires an operator to conduct an annual assessment of its AI and ADS systems that evaluates compliance with the above oversight requirements, evaluates system performance and safety, and identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities.
- Requires an operator to submit a summary of the assessment findings to CDT.
- Defines “artificial intelligence” as an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
- Defines “automated decision system” as a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or AI that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision making and materially impacts natural persons. Provides that ADS does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.
- Defines “critical infrastructure” as systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof.
- Defines “operator” as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure.
Related Legislation:
SB 260 (Wahab, 2025) among other things, makes it an infraction to intentionally or knowingly operate an unmanned aircraft over or to come within either a specified distance or a distance that would interfere with operations of a critical infrastructure facility, as defined, with specified exemptions. SB 260 is pending in this committee.
SB 420 (Padilla, 2025) among other things, prohibits a state agency from awarding a contract for a high-risk ADS to a person who has violated, among other things, specified civil rights laws. SB 420 is pending in this committee.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
Senator Steve Padilla
Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular
Bill No: 833 Hearing Date: 4/22/2025
Author: | |||
Version: | 3/26/2025 Amended | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | Brian Duke | ||
SUBJECT: Critical infrastructure: automated decision systems: human oversight
DIGEST: This bill requires a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure that deploys artificial intelligence (AI) to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor the system’s operations in real time and review and approve any plan or action proposed by the AI system before execution, as specified. Additionally, this bill requires the California Department of Technology (CDT) to administer specialized training and requires annual assessments of critical infrastructure AI systems and automated decision systems (ADS), as specified.
ANALYSIS:
Existing law:
- Establishes, pursuant to the California Emergency Services Act (ESA), the California Cybersecurity Integration Center (Cal-CSIC), within the Office of Emergency Services (OES) to serve as the central organizing hub of state government’s cybersecurity activities and to coordinate information sharing with various entities.
- Requires the Technology Recovery Plan element of the State Administrative Manual (SAM) to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity strategy incident response standards for each state agency to secure its critical infrastructure controls and information, as prescribed.
- Requires, pursuant to the Generative AI (GenAI) Accountability Act, OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that lead to mass casualty events – and to provide a high-level summary of the analysis annually to the Legislature.
This bill:
- Requires an operator, defined as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure, that is deploying AI to establish a human oversight mechanism to do both of the following:
- Monitor the AI system’s operations in real time.
- Review and approve any plan or action proposed by an AI system before execution.
- Specifies that this bill does not apply to an existing ADS that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize the system.
- Requires CDT to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to oversight personnel.
- Requires an operator to conduct an annual assessment of its AI systems and ADS that does all of the following:
- Evaluates compliance with this bill.
- Evaluates system performance and safety.
- Identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
- Requires an operator to submit a summary of the assessment findings to CDT.
- Requires the assessment to coincide with any requirement on the operator to perform a risk analysis pursuant to the GenAI Accountability Act, as specified.
- Defines “critical infrastructure” to mean systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including any of the following infrastructure:
- Transportation.
- Energy.
- Food and agriculture.
- Communications.
- Emergency services.
- Financial services.
- Defines “artificial intelligence” to mean an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
- Defines “automated decision system” to mean a computational process derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics, or AI that issues simplified output, including a score, classification, or recommendation, that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decision making and materially impacts natural persons. “Automated decision system” does not include a spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, identity and access management tools, or a calculator.
Background
Author Statement. According to the author’s office, “as artificial intelligence rapidly transforms our technological landscape, California faces the challenge of ensuring these powerful systems are deployed safely in our most vital sectors. Currently, there is no standardized approach to human oversight of AI systems in critical infrastructure, creating inconsistent safety practices across vital sectors. SB 833 will create commonsense safeguards by putting a human in the loop in California’s critical infrastructure. Artificial Intelligence must remain a tool controlled by humans, not the other way around.”
Executive Order N-12-23. Noting California’s role as a global hub for AI and the natural leader in this emerging field of technology, Governor Newsom issued EO N-12-23 in September of 2023. In announcing the EO, Governor Newsom identified the need to deploy GenAI ethically and responsibly throughout state government, protect and prepare for potential harms, and remain the world’s AI leader. The EO can generally be broken up into the following elements:
- Beneficial Uses of Generative AI Report: Directs state agencies and departments to develop a report examining the most significant and beneficial uses of GenAI in the state. The report will also explain the potential harms and risks for communities, government, and state government workers.
- Risk-Analysis Report: Directs state agencies and departments to perform a joint-risk analysis of potential threats to and vulnerabilities of California’s critical energy infrastructure by the use of GenAI.
- Procurement Blueprint: To support a safe, ethical, and responsible innovation ecosystem inside state government, agencies will issue general guidelines for public sector procurement, uses, and required training for application of GenAI – building on the White House’s Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and the National Institute for Science and Technology’s (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework. State agencies and departments will consider procurement and enterprise use opportunities where GenAI can improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accessibility, and equity of government operations.
- Deployment and Analysis Framework: Develop guidelines for agencies and departments to analyze the impact that adopting GenAI tools may have on vulnerable communities. The state will establish the infrastructure needed to conduct pilots of GenAI projects, including CDT approved environments or “sandboxes” to test such projects.
- Evaluate Impacts of AI on an Ongoing Basis: Periodically evaluate for potential impact of GenAI on regulatory issues under the respective agency, department, or board’s authority and recommend necessary updates as a result of this evolving technology.
As directed by the EO’s provision requiring pilot projects of GenAI applications, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) is currently testing if GenAI can improve traffic safety and reduce congestion on the State Highway System. California’s State Highway System includes over 52,000 lane miles and facilities like mobility hubs. Caltrans collects traffic data from thousands of sensors. This creates a continuous flow of data across many forms, including: data streams; images; and videos. There’s so much data that current systems can’t analyze it all. This limits Caltrans’ ability to generate insights from the data.
Caltrans is testing how GenAI can help humans make efficient transportation decisions. They want to unlock the vast data they have to: improve traffic safety for users and workers; reduce bottlenecks; improve response to emergency situations; encourage multi-modal travel; improve mobility hubs and transit to support equity; reduce greenhouse gas emissions; facilitate the movement of goods and freight; and improve special events planning. Caltrans also wants to use GenAI insights to guide future infrastructure investment.
GenAI Accountability Act. SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statues of 2024) codified a number of items from EO N-12-23, including requiring OES to, as appropriate, perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, including those that could lead to mass casualty events. The risk analysis required by the bill shall be provided to the Governor, and if appropriate, shall include recommendations reflecting changes to AI technology, its applications, and risk management, including further private actions, administrative actions, and collaboration with the Legislature to guard against potential threats and vulnerabilities. The GenAI Accountability Act requires a high-level summary of the risk analysis to be submitted annually to the Legislature.
The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. According to the office’s internet website, “OES takes a proactive approach to addressing these risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that form the basis of our mission and has been tested through real events, as well as comprehensive exercises that help us maintain our state of readiness to plan for and mitigate impacts.” OES divisions include: Homeland Security; Logistics Management; Office of the Director; Policy & Administration; Planning, Preparedness, and Prevention; Recovery; Response Operations; and the Seismic Safety Commission.
Additionally, OES houses Cal-CSIC, which is the hub of state government’s cybersecurity events. Cal-CSIC coordinates information sharing at all levels of government agencies, utilities and other service providers, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. Cal-CSIC’s focus is to respond to cyber threats and attacks that could damage the economy, its critical infrastructure, or computer networks in the state.
California's Critical Infrastructure. As defined in the bill, critical infrastructure encompasses a wide range of systems and assets that are vital to the state’s functioning. This definition includes sectors such as transportation, energy, food and agriculture, communications, emergency services, and financial services—each of which plays a crucial role in ensuring public health, safety, and economic security. The bill’s broad interpretation highlights the importance of these systems by emphasizing that any failure or disruption could have debilitating impacts on the state. By categorizing these sectors as critical, the bill seeks to reinforce the need for robust oversight and protective measures to prevent potentially catastrophic outcomes that might arise from vulnerabilities or cyber threats targeting these essential networks.
In relation to the bill's provisions, California’s critical infrastructure is not only recognized for its importance but also subject to enhanced scrutiny when integrated with AI systems. The bill mandates that state agencies, acting as operators of critical infrastructure, implement stringent human oversight mechanisms for AI deployments. This requirement is notable given the sensitive nature of the services provided by these sectors. For instance, any malfunction in an AI system managing energy distribution or emergency response could escalate into a broader public crisis.
For example, the May 6, 2010, flash crash, also known as the crash of 2:45 or simply the flash crash, was a United States trillion-dollar flash crash (a type of stock market crash) which started at 2:32 p.m. EDT and lasted for approximately 36 minutes. The crash was instigated when algorithmic trading systems triggered a sudden, severe drop in stock market values. While these systems were not always powered by advanced AI in the modern sense, they exemplify how ADS processes can exacerbate market volatility and lead to system instability.
An article by CalMatters in April of this year titled “It’s the first U.S. nuclear plant to use AI. Where does Diablo Canyon go from here?” notes that Pacifica Gas & Electric (PG&E) recently announced a deal with an AI startup based in San Luis Obispo to utilize an AI tool named Neutron Enterprise to help workers at the plant “navigate extensive technical reports and regulations – millions of pages of intricate documents from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that go back decades – while they operate and maintain the facility.”
According to the article, “PG&E is deploying the document retrieval service in stages. The installation of the NVIDIA chips was one of the first phases of the partnership between PG&E and Atomic Canyon; PG&E is forecasting a ‘full deployment’ at Diablo Canyon by the third quarter of this year, said Maureen Zawalick, the company’s vice president of business and technical services. At that point, Neutron Enterprise – which Zawalick likens to a data-mining ‘copilot,’ though explicitly not a ‘decision-maker’ – will be expanded to search for and summarize Diablo Canyon-specific instructions and reports too.”
The article goes on to note that the chief executive officer and co-founder of Atomic Canyon “told CalMatters his aim is for Neutron Enterprise is simple and low-stakes: he wants Diablo Canyon employees to be able to look up pertinent information more efficiently. ‘You can put this on the record: the AI guy in nuclear says there is no way in hell I want AI running my nuclear power plant right now.” According to public statements, PG&E and Atomic Canyon are limiting AI use for the foreseeable future, but have not ruled out the possibility of increasing AI’s presence at the plant in “yet-to-be-determined ways.”
Human Oversight. This bill requires operators, defined as a state agency in charge of critical infrastructure, to establish a human oversight mechanism to monitor the AI system’s operation in real time and to review and approve any plan or action proposed by an AI system before execution. This bill does not apply to an existing ADS that is critical to state infrastructure if the required human oversight would cause an immediate pause that would destabilize the system.
Additionally, this bill requires CDT to administer specialized training in AI safety protocols and risk management techniques to be given to the human oversight personnel. This bill requires state agencies in charge of critical infrastructure and utilizing AI to conduct an annual assessment of its AI systems and ADS that does all of the following: evaluates compliance with this bill; evaluates system performance and safety; and identifies and evaluates potential risks and vulnerabilities, including those that could lead to mass casualty events.
The bill defines “critical infrastructure” to mean systems or assets so vital to the state that the incapacity or destruction of those networks, systems, or assets would have a debilitating impact on public health, safety, economic security, or any combination thereof, including: transportation; energy; food and agriculture; communications; emergency services; and financial services.
Prior/Related Legislation
SB 260 (Wahab, 2025) among other things, makes it an infraction to intentionally or knowingly operate an unmanned aircraft over or to come within either a specified distance or a distance that would interfere with operations of a critical infrastructure facility, as defined, with specified exemptions. (Pending in the Senate Insurance Committee)
SB 420 (Padilla, 2025) among other things, prohibits a state agency from awarding a contract for a high-risk ADS to a person who has violated, among other things, specified civil rights laws. (Pending in the Senate Governmental Organization Committee)
AB 979 (Irwin, 2025) requires Cal-CSIC to develop a California AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, as specified, to facilitate information sharing across the AI community and to strengthen collective cyber defenses against emerging threats, as specified. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
AB 1018 (Bauer-Kahan, 2025) among other things, generally regulates the development and deployment of an ADS used to make consequential decisions, as defined. (Pending in the Assembly Privacy and Consumer Protection Committee)
SB 896 (Dodd, Chapter 928, Statutes of 2024) the GenAI Accountability Act, among other things, requires OES, as appropriate, to perform a risk analysis of potential threats posed by the use of GenAI to California’s critical infrastructure, as specified.
AB 2885 (Bauer-Kahan, Chapter 843, Statutes of 2024) defined “artificial intelligence” to mean an engineered or machine-based system that varies in its level of autonomy and that can, for explicit or implicit objectives, infer from the input it receives how to generate outputs that can influence physical or virtual environments.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
SUPPORT:
Oakland Privacy
Transparency Coalition.ai
OPPOSITION:
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: In support of the bill, the Transparency Coalition.ai writes that, “[a]s artificial intelligence systems become increasingly integrated into critical infrastructure operations, there is significant potential for both enhanced efficiency and unprecedented risks. Without proper oversight mechanisms, AI systems operating in these critical sectors could make consequential decisions without human review. These systems might introduce vulnerabilities that could lead to system failures or security breaches. There is also concern that unmonitored AI could create risks that could potentially escalate. Additionally, these systems may operate without sufficient accountability or risk assessment protocols. SB 833 is a forward-looking and responsible approach to these challenges by establishing a comprehensive framework for human oversight of AI in critical infrastructure. The bill ensures that human judgment remains central to the operation of critical systems.”
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Standing Committee on Privacy and Consumer Protection
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Governmental Organization
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):