AB 1109: Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege.
- Session Year: 2025-2026
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2025-02-20
Current Status:
In Progress
(2025-08-29: In committee: Held under submission.)
Introduced
In Committee
Awaiting First Chamber Vote
Passed First Chamber
In Committee
Awaiting Second Chamber Vote
Passed Second Chamber
Enacted
Existing law governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and generally provides a privilege as to communications made in the course of certain relations, including the attorney-client, physician-patient, and psychotherapist-patient relationship, as specified. Under existing law, the right of any person to claim those evidentiary privileges is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to a disclosure.
This bill would establish a privilege between a union agent, as defined, and a represented employee or represented former employee to refuse to disclose any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the union agents representative capacity, except as specified. The bill would permit a represented employee or represented former employee to prevent another person from disclosing a privileged communication, except as specified. The bill would further provide that this privilege may be waived in accordance with existing law and does not apply in criminal proceedings.
(a)Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of any person to claim a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1033 (privilege of penitent), 1034 (privilege of clergy member), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege) privilege), or 1048 (union agent-represented worker privilege) is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege.
(b)Where two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege), or 1048 (union agent-represented worker privilege) a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the privilege provided by Section 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), a waiver of the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege.
(c)A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver of any privilege.
(d)A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 966 (lawyer referral service-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.8 (sexual assault counselor-victim privilege), 1037.5 (domestic violence counselor-victim privilege), or 1038 (human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege), or 1048 (union agent-represented worker privilege) when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer, lawyer referral service, physician, psychotherapist, sexual assault counselor, domestic violence counselor, or human trafficking caseworker was consulted, is not a waiver of the privilege.
SEC. 2.Section 917 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:917.(a)If a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of the lawyer-client, lawyer referral service-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent, marital or domestic partnership, sexual assault counselor-victim, domestic violence counselor-victim, or human trafficking caseworker-victim relationship, or union agent-represented worker relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.
(b)A communication between persons in a relationship listed in subdivision (a) does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication.
(c)For purposes of this section, electronic has the same meaning provided in Section 1633.2 of the Civil Code.
SEC. 3.Article 9.5 (commencing with Section 1048) is added to Chapter 4 of Division 8 of the Evidence Code, to read:9.5.Union Agent-Represented Worker Privilege1048.(a)Except as provided by subdivisions (b) and (c), and subject to Section 912, a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the union agents representative capacity. A represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this section.
(b)A union agent may use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agents representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
(1)In actions against the union agent in the union agents personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union of affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities.
(2)When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit members estate or guardian or conservator.
(c)A union agent shall use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agents representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
1048.1.For purposes of this article, the following terms mean:
(a)Confidential communication means information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent, in confidence, by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of a representational relationship.
(b)Union agent means a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance and the appointed employee steward was a steward at the time the communication was made.
1048.2.There is no privilege under this article if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
1048.3.There is no privilege under this article with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
1048.4.The privilege established under this article does not apply in criminal proceedings.
REVISIONS: HeadingLine 2.|
Date
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Status
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|---|---|
| Aug 29, 2025 | In committee: Held under submission. |
| Jul 14, 2025 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 2, 2025 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 10. Noes 2.) (July 1). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 11, 2025 | Referred to Coms. on JUD. and APPR. |
| May 13, 2025 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 12, 2025 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 59. Noes 6. Page 1507.) |
| Apr 9, 2025 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 8, 2025 | Coauthors revised. |
| Apr 8, 2025 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 9. Noes 0.) (April 8). |
| Mar 13, 2025 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 21, 2025 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 23. |
| Feb 20, 2025 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 14, 2025 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Jul 1, 2025 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| May 12, 2025 | AB 1109 Kalra Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 8, 2025 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| Alameda County Office Of Education | ** Against | |
| American Federation Of State, County And Municipal Employees, Afl-Cio | ** Support | |
| Association of California Healthcare Districts | ** Against | |
| Association Of California School Administrators | ** Against | |
| Association of Flight Attendants CWA | ** Support | |
| California Association Of Joint Powers Authorities | ** Against | |
| California Association Of Psychiatric Technicians | ** Support | |
| California Association Of Recreation & Park Districts | ** Against | |
| California Association Of School Business Officials | ** Against | |
| California Chamber Of Commerce | ** Against | |
| California Conference Board Of The Amalgamated Transit Union | ** Support | |
| California Conference Of Machinists | ** Support | |
| California County Superintendents | ** Against | |
| California Farm Bureau | ** Against | |
| California Federation of Labor Unions, Afl-cio | ** Support | |
| California Hotel & Lodging Association | ** Against | |
| California Safety and Legislative Board of Smart – Transportation Division | ** Support | |
| California School Boards Association | ** Against | |
| California School Employees Association | ** Support | |
| California Special Districts Association | ** Against | |
| California State Association Of Counties | ** Against | |
| California State Association Of Electrical Workers | ** Support | |
| California State Council of Service Employees International Union | ** Support | |
| California State Pipe Trades Council | ** Support | |
| California Teachers Association | ** Support | |
| California Trucking Association | ** Against | |
| CFT- a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, Aft, Afl-cio | ** Support | |
| Chief Executive Officers of the California Community Colleges Board | ** Against | |
| City of Redwood City | ** Against | |
| Civil Justice Association Of California | ** Against | |
| Community College League of California | ** Against | |
| Construction Employers' Association | ** Against | |
| Desert Water Agency | ** Against | |
| Dublin Unified School District | ** Against | |
| El Dorado Irrigation District | ** Against | |
| Engineers and Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20, AFL-CIO | ** Support | |
| Flasher Barricade Association | ** Against | |
| League Of California Cities | ** Against | |
| National Federation Of Independent Business | ** Against | |
| Orange County Employees Association | ** Support | |
| Pleasanton Unified School District | ** Against | |
| Professional Engineers In California Government | ** Support | |
| Public Risk Innovation Solutions and Management | ** Against | |
| RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION | ** Support | |
| Rural County Representatives of California | ** Against | |
| School Employers Association Of California | ** Against | |
| Schools Excess Liability Fund | ** Against | |
| small school districts' association | ** Against | |
| State Building & Construction Trades Council Of California | ** Support | |
| Teamsters California | ** Support | |
| UFCW - Western States Council | ** Support | |
| Unite Here International Union, Afl-Cio | ** Support | |
| University of California | ** Against | |
| Urban Counties of California | ** Against | |
| Utility Workers Union of America | ** Support | |
| Western States Council Sheet Metal, Air, Rail And Transportation | ** Support |
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anna Caballero, Chair
2025 - 2026 Regular Session
AB 1109 (Kalra) - Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege
Version: February 20, 2025 | Policy Vote: JUD. 10 - 2 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: July 14, 2025 | Consultant: Liah Burnley |
Bill Summary:
AB 1109 establishes an evidentiary privilege for communications between union agents and represented employees.
Fiscal Impact:
CalHR estimates this bill would result in unknown but potentially significant unbudgeted costs (General Fund) related to dispute resolutions, arbitration fees, and attorney fees. CalHR notes that it is unknown to what extent this bill would impact current legal proceedings.
Background:
California has codified numerous evidentiary privileges, recognizing the need to protect the confidentiality of certain communications. Among those are the: lawyer-client privilege, lawyer referral service-client privilege, spousal privilege, confidential marital communications privilege, physician-patient privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, clergyman-penitent privilege, sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, domestic violence counselor-victim privilege, and human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege. Other statutory privileges protect official information acquired in confidence by a public employee and the identity of informants, protect persons from having to reveal their votes in public elections, and protect against disclosure of trade secrets.
According to the author, this bill would add union agent-represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs. These communications focus on workers’ rights and support California’s fair employment standards.
Although there are concerns about a privilege such as this interfering with workplace investigations, protecting communications between victims of discrimination and harassment in the workplace and their union representatives may encourage more victims to come forward to understand their options.
Proposed Law:
- Establishes the union agent-represented worker privilege and provides that a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between them made while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity.
- Specifies that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another person from disclosing, in connection with the proceedings outlined above, a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged.
- Authorizes a union agent to disclose, in connection with a proceeding, a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the agent’s representative capacity in specified circumstances, including actions against the union agent or against the local union or with consent.
- Requires a union agent to disclose, in connection with a proceeding, a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
- Defines “confidential communication” to mean information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent, in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agency in the course of a representational relationship.
- Defines “union agent” to mean a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance.
- Provides that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
- Provides that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
- Provides that the union agent-represented worker privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Applies the various provisions of the Evidence Code regarding waiver, joint holders, burden of proof, and other related provisions concerning privilege to the union agent-represented worker privilege.
Related Legislation:
- AB 729 (Hernández, 2013) would have established an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. AB 729 was vetoed by Governor Brown. In his veto message, the Governor wrote:
I am returning Assembly Bill 729 without my signature.
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege to prohibit the disclosure of confidential communications between represented employees and their union agents.
I don’t believe it is appropriate to put communications with a union agent on equal footing with communications with one’s spouse, priest, physician or attorney. Moreover, this bill could compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment and other allegations.
- AB 3121 (Kalra, 2018) and AB 418 (Kalra, 2019) were nearly identical to this bill but were not taken up on the Senate Floor.
-- END --
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1109 (Author:Kalra)
Version: February 20, 2025
Hearing Date: July 1, 2025
Fiscal: No
Urgency: No
Consultant: CK
SUBJECT
Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege
DIGEST
This bill establishes an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for confidential communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee, as provided.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
An evidentiary privilege permits an otherwise competent witness to refuse to testify and/or prevent another from testifying. This bill establishes an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. That privilege could be used to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, excluding criminal proceedings, any confidential communication between the represented employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity.
The bill provides that there is no privilege if disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act reasonably believed is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual or if the communication was made to help a person commit, or plan to commit, a crime or fraud. The union agent-represented worker privilege could be waived in accordance with existing law.
This bill is sponsored by the California Federation of Labor Unions and is supported by a broad coalition of labor unions, including the State Building and Construction Trades Council of California. It is opposed by a coalition of industry groups and governmental entities, including the California Farm Bureau and the League of California Cities.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Provides that no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness; to refuse to disclose any matter or to refuse to produce any writing, object, or other thing, or prevent another person from the same, unless otherwise provided by statute. (Evid. Code § 911.)
- Governs the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings and generally provides a privilege to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relationships. (Evid. Code §§ 954, 966, 980, 994, 1014, 1033, 1034, 1035.8, 1037.5, 1038.)
- Provides that the right of a person to claim specified privileges is waived with respect to a protected communication if the holder of the privilege has disclosed a significant part of that communication or consented to disclosure, without coercion. Existing law provides that a disclosure does not constitute a waiver where it was reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the lawyer, lawyer referral service, physician, psychotherapist, sexual assault counselor, domestic violence counselor, or human trafficking caseworker was consulted. (Evid. Code § 912(a), (d).)
- Provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Evid. Code § 912 (b).)
- Provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence, and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. A communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Evid. Code § 917.)
This bill:
- Establishes the union agent-represented worker privilege and provides that a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between them made while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity.
- Specifies that a represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another person from disclosing, in connection with the proceedings outlined above, a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged.
- Authorizes a union agent to disclose, in connection with a proceeding, a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the agent’s representative capacity in specified circumstances, including actions against the union agent or against the local union or with consent.
- Requires a union agent to disclose, in connection with a proceeding, a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity if required to do so by a court order.
- Defines “confidential communication” to mean information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent, in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agency in the course of a representational relationship.
- Defines “union agent” to mean a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization and whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance.
- Provides that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
- Provides that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
- Provides that the union agent-represented worker privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Applies the various provisions of the Evidence Code regarding waiver, joint holders, burden of proof, and other related provisions concerning privilege to the union agent-represented worker privilege.
COMMENTS
1. Evidentiary privileges
An evidentiary privilege permits an otherwise competent witness to refuse to testify and/or prevent another from testifying. Privileges are policy exclusions, unrelated to the reliability of the information involved, which are granted because it is considered more important to keep that information confidential than it is to require disclosure of all the information relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding. For example, to protect the lawyer-client relationship, it is necessary to prevent disclosure of confidential communications made in the course of that relationship. (Comments to Evid. Code § 910.) Whereas privileges of a witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence are governed by the principles of common law as interpreted by United States district courts in light of “reason and experience,” the only privileges that are recognized in California are those statutory privileges expressly codified in the Evidence Code. (See Fed. Rules of Evid., Rule 501; Evid. Code § 911.)
To date, California has codified numerous evidentiary privileges, recognizing the need to protect the confidentiality of certain communications. Among those are the: lawyer-client privilege, lawyer referral service-client privilege, spousal privilege, confidential marital communications privilege, physician-patient privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, clergyman-penitent privilege, sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, domestic violence counselor-victim privilege, and human trafficking caseworker-victim privilege. Yet other statutory privileges protect official information acquired in confidence by a public employee and the identity of informants, protect persons from having to reveal their votes in public elections, and protect against disclosure of trade secrets. (Evid. Code § 930 et seq.)
This bill seeks to create an evidentiary privilege for union agent-represented worker communications. Case law has held that no such privilege exists. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881, the court held that California law does not expressly provide for any such privilege; rather, the creation of evidentiary privileges is “the province of the Legislature.” (Id. at 890-891.) This bill follows the decision in Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P.3d 559, 565, decided by the Supreme Court of Alaska, which extended by implication the union agent-represented worker evidentiary privilege from the Alaska Public Employment Relations Act.
2. Communications between a union agent and a represented employee
This bill establishes an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. That privilege can be used to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the represented employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the agent’s representative capacity.
The author argues that most employees, when discussing issues affecting their employment with their union representative, assume that such communications are confidential and that the information may not be disclosed to the employer or other third parties. The author states that allowing such a privilege protects communications that focus on workers’ rights and supports California’s fair employment standards.
Various cases involving union agent-represented employee communications demonstrate the conflict between providing an employee with appropriate safety in communications with the union representative and the employer’s right to information regarding employment disputes.
In Cook Paint & Varnish Co. (1979) 246 NLRB 646, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recognized the need for a represented employee’s communications with the union agent to be confidential. The NLRB analyzed the balance necessary between the employer’s right to investigate employment-related allegations and the employee’s right to confidentiality in union communications. The NLRB reiterated that during the employer’s investigation of misconduct by an employee, the employer is entitled to disclosure. However, the NLRB held that after disciplinary proceedings have been finalized but the employer’s decision has been submitted to arbitration, an employee has a privilege against disclosing union-related communications because the employer is seeking to validate its disciplinary decision and discover the union’s arbitration position. (Id.) Notably, this decision was limited to cases involving the National Labor Relations Act.
However, for California labor disputes, American Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 881 is controlling. In that case, the court analyzed the balance between the employer’s right to information and the union representative’s privilege for non-disclosure of communications with employees:
Indeed, creating the type of evidentiary privilege proposed[, union representative-union member privilege,] could severely compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations pertaining to claims of harassment, discrimination, unlawful conduct, or other employer rules violations, all to the detriment of union members. For example, the [Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)] enunciates this state’s public policy to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. (See Gov. Code §§ 12920 [and] 12920.5; Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 366–367 [ ].) Under FEHA, an employer, as well as a labor union, has an obligation to “take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring” in the workplace. (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (k).) The affirmative and mandatory duty to ensure a discrimination-free work environment requires the employer to conduct a prompt investigation of a discrimination claim. (See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1035–1036 [ ].) To carry out its obligation to prevent discrimination by investigating claims, an employer likely will need to obtain information from a wrongdoer’s co-workers who were in a position to witness the misconduct and identify the wrongdoer. In a unionized workplace, an employer’s investigation could be hampered by a union representative-union member privilege, thus conceivably undermining an employer and a labor union’s statutory obligation to ensure a discrimination-free work environment.
Although there may be various countervailing policy reasons why a union representative should not be compelled during civil litigation to disclose factual information obtained from other union members he or she represents, that policy determination (and the parameters of any concomitant evidentiary privilege) is the province of the Legislature, not this court. [Citations omitted.] This is especially true in an area where the Legislature has declared the state’s public policy in such detail. (See Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 80 [ ] [describing FEHA as “comprehensive scheme” for combating employment discrimination].)
(Id. at 890-891; emphasis in original.) The court explicitly held that California law does not provide for any such privilege. (Id. at 890.) This bill creates such a privilege.
According to the author:
AB 1109 would add union agent-represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs. These communications focus on workers’ rights and support California’s fair employment standards.
3. Other states have created such a privilege
Illinois and Maryland have both established a union agent-representative worker privilege. Maryland’s statute provides: “[A] labor organization or an agent of a labor organization may not be compelled to disclose any communication or information the labor organization or agent received or acquired in confidence from an employee while the labor organization or agent was acting in a representative capacity concerning an employee grievance.” (Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-124.) Illinois’s law states:
[A] union agent, during the agency or representative relationship or after termination of the agency or representative relationship with the bargaining unit member, shall not be compelled to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency arbitration or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, any information he or she may have acquired in attending to his or her professional duties or while acting in his or her representative capacity.
(735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-803.5.) Courts have found Illinois’ statute provides “a relatively broad privilege” for the relevant communications.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Alaska, in Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P.3d 559, 565, extended by implication the union agent-represented worker evidentiary privilege from the Alaska Public Employment Relations Act. In Peterson, the court held that:
We emphasize that the expectation of confidentiality is critical to the privilege because without it “union members would be hesitant to be fully forthcoming with their representatives, detrimentally impacting a union representative’s ability to advise and represent union members with questions or problems.” Thus, “[a]bsent an expectation of confidentiality, there is little need to protect the communications.” We also emphasize that the privilege is only applicable when the union representative is acting in an official union role because “[p]rotecting informal conversations would extend the privilege too far, unnecessarily burdening the search for truth.”
(Id. at p. 567.)
The Peterson court clarified that the union agent-represented worker privilege “extends to communications made: (1) in confidence; (2) in connection with representative services relating to anticipated or ongoing disciplinary or grievance proceedings; (3) between an employee (or the employee’s attorney) and union representatives; and (4) by union representatives acting in official representative capacity. The privilege may be asserted by the employee or by the union on behalf of the employee. Like the attorney-client privilege, the union-relations privilege extends only to communications, not to underlying facts.” (Id.)
Similarly, this bill provides the evidentiary privilege for certain communications between the union agent and represented worker. This bill applies the privilege to confidential communications between the represented employee and union representative that are made while the union representative is acting in their representative capacity. The privilege to refuse to disclose can be asserted by either the employee or the union representative, and the employee can prevent another from disclosing the confidential communication between the employee and union representative in connection with a covered proceeding.
4. The policy goals of a privilege must be sufficiently important to outweigh the public’s right to evidence
As a general matter, privileges function to exclude evidence, no matter how relevant or reliable that evidence might be, in order to promote some other extrinsic policy. Because they tend to suppress otherwise relevant evidence, statutory privileges are strictly construed and in California, unlike under federal law, the courts are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial policy; they may only apply those privileges created by statute or those that arise out of state or federal constitutional law. (Evid. Code § 911; Sullivan v. Superior Court (Spingola) 29 Cal.App.3rd 64 (1972).)
As noted above, privileges are policy-based exclusions that are granted because it is considered more important to keep that information confidential than it is to require disclosure of all the information relevant to the issues in a pending proceeding. Thus, the central policy consideration raised by this bill is whether or not the policy promoted by the proposed union agent-represented worker privilege outweighs the public’s right to truth in evidence.
- Ensuring confidentiality of information shared with a union agent
While the public does have a right to all evidence, in codifying other evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the Legislature has previously judged that the importance of ensuring that people obtain effective counsel to protect their legal rights may outweigh that interest.
Proponents assert that the lack of evidentiary privilege for union agent-represented worker communications has a chilling effect on these communications.
Because a workers’ union is authorized under California law to represent the concerns and needs of employees, and free communication between the union agents and members is essential to providing adequate representation in employment contracts and labor concerns, a limited privilege is arguably appropriate to assure the union members and agents of the confidentiality of these communications and to protect the democracy of the workplace.
Pursuant to this bill, the employee, as a holder of the privilege, could claim the privilege to refuse disclosure or prevent another person from disclosing those confidential communications in various, specified proceedings. This is a more limited scope than other privileges which generally limit disclosure in any context. Therefore, the privilege created by the bill would not interfere with workplace investigations of sexual harassment or other misconduct.
- Similar limitations are applied as are found in existing privileges
It should be noted that most evidentiary privileges have been carefully limited to balance the need for confidentiality with the fundamental right of the public to evidence. To this end, existing law outlines both situations in which no privilege applies at all, and circumstances in which an otherwise valid claim of privilege will be deemed waived. Additionally, certain other elements, such as the definitions provided for “the holder of the privilege” and for “confidential communication,” serve as inherent limits on a privilege as well. As a result, not just anyone is authorized to claim or waive the privilege, and not all communications are considered confidential. In establishing a union agent-represented worker privilege, this bill includes limits that also apply to other privileges.
For example, under existing law, there is no lawyer-client privilege where either the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud, or the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to representation of a client is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
This bill provides that there is no privilege if the union agent “reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.” In addition, there is no privilege where the communication is made “to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.”
While the bill does not place an affirmative duty on the part of the union agent to divulge certain information, there are very few instances where individuals have an affirmative duty to report information divulged to them, outside of the child or elder abuse contexts. For instance, while the attorney-client privilege does not apply in certain circumstances related to the prevention of bodily harm, the California Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys merely provides that a lawyer “may, but is not required to, reveal information . . . to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.”
Similarly, the term “confidential communication between client and lawyer” is defined under existing law as:
. . . information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.
(Evid. Code § 952, italics added.) In other words, communications made in an open elevator full of third parties would not be privileged, nor would communications that are irrelevant to the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted.
This bill tracks that definition of confidential communication, among others, thereby ensuring that the proposed privilege also operates with certain limitations. “Confidential communication” is defined in this bill as:
information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent, in confidence, by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of a representational relationship.
Therefore, the privilege created by this bill only applies to truly confidential information.
The bill also provides additional situations where the privilege will not prevent disclosure. It authorizes a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the agent’s representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- in actions against the union agent in the agent’s personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union of affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities; or
- when, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member’s estate or guardian or conservator.
Arguably, these limitations on the evidentiary privilege provide an appropriate balance of the need for confidentiality with the fundamental right of the public to evidence. To this end, the bill outlines both situations in which no privilege applies at all, and circumstances in which an otherwise valid claim of privilege will be deemed waived. However, unlike certain other privileges, the union representative is authorized to claim the privilege in addition to the represented employee.
5. Previous attempts to establish a union agent-represented worker privilege
In 2013, AB 729 (Hernández, 2013) was passed by the Legislature. It would have established an evidentiary privilege from disclosure for communications between a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee. In fact, this bill largely tracks the language of AB 729. However, AB 729 was vetoed by Governor Brown. In his veto message, the Governor wrote:
I am returning Assembly Bill 729 without my signature.
This bill would establish an evidentiary privilege to prohibit the disclosure of confidential communications between represented employees and their union agents.
I don’t believe it is appropriate to put communications with a union agent on equal footing with communications with one’s spouse, priest, physician or attorney. Moreover, this bill could compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment and other allegations.
It should be noted that although there are concerns about a privilege such as this interfering with workplace investigations, protecting communications between victims of discrimination and harassment in the workplace and their union representatives may encourage more victims to come forward to understand their options.
Additional attempts have been made at establishing this privilege in California law. Both AB 3121 (Kalra, 2018) and AB 418 (Kalra, 2019) were nearly identical to this bill and both passed out of this Committee but were not taken up on the Senate Floor.
6. Stakeholder positions
The California Federation of Labor Unions, the sponsor of the bill, argues:
Under existing law, when a worker confides in their union, that communication is not legally confidential. This means that a company can subpoena a union representative and demand access to confidential communications that the union representative had with their members. This can chill union member communication with their representatives for fear of personal or sensitive information being disclosed to their employer, or more publicly. This fear will be exacerbated under a federal government that has pledged to repeal basic civil rights.
AB 1109 will simply extend an evidentiary privilege to confidential communications shared with a union representative. This privilege will not apply to any information that is necessary to disclose to prevent a crime and it is not a non-disclosure agreement or a gag order, meaning that a worker may voluntarily disclose information that they choose. By extending the evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, employee privacy will be protected, and workers will be able to speak freely with the union about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation, or fear that their union representative will be forced to disclose their private information to their employer or the public.
Writing in support, the California Teachers Association makes the case for the bill: “In instances when an employee faces adversarial grievance or disciplinary proceedings, the represented employee should be free to discuss these sensitive matters with the union agent openly and in confidence in order to permit the union agent to best represent the employee.”
Writing in opposition, the City of Redwood City argues the bill creates a “one-sided standard”:
The scope of privilege akin to an attorney-client relationship is carefully defined by state law. Privilege is by design narrow in scope to protect the confidentiality and integrity of relationships, both medical/professional and familial in nature, where highly sensitive and deeply personal information is exchanged. Unlike other privileges that apply to both sides of the litigation or proceedings such as the attorney-client privilege, AB 1109 does not bestow the same privilege upon management-labor negotiator communications, or communications among members of management regarding labor union disputes or grievance issues. Consequently, in labor related proceedings before courts and the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) hearings, an employer could be forced to disclose all such communications, while the union or employee could shield relevant and otherwise discoverable communications from disclosure pursuant to the terms proposed in AB 1109.
A coalition of organizations representing governmental entities, including the California County Superintendents and the School Excess Liability Fund, write in opposition:
In order to conduct proper investigations that uphold the public’s trust, protect against the misuse of public funds, and ensure the safety and well-being of both public employees and the public, it is critical that a public employer has the ability to interview all individuals with relevant information to ascertain the facts and understand the matter fully. AB 1109 would increase investigation and litigation costs for the state as well as local governments and schools due to incomplete investigations, because appropriate witnesses may refuse to disclose relevant information based on a faulty or incorrect understanding of AB 1109. For schools, this is a drain of Proposition 98 funding.
SUPPORT
California Federation of Labor Unions, AFL-CIO (sponsor)
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
California Association of Psychiatric Technicians
California Conference Board of the Amalgamated Transit Union
California Conference of Machinists
California Safety and Legislative Board of Smart – Transportation Division
California School Employees Association
California State Association of Electrical Workers
California State Council of Service Employees International Union (SEIU California)
California State Pipe Trades Council
California Teachers Association
CFT- a Union of Educators & Classified Professionals, AFT, AFL-CIO
Engineers and Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20, AFL-CIO
Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG)
State Building & Construction Trades Council of California
Teamsters California
UFCW - Western States Council
Unite Here International Union, AFL-CIO
Utility Workers Union of America
Western States Council Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation
OPPOSITION
Alameda County Office of Education
Association of California Healthcare Districts (ACHD)
Association of California School Administrators
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities (CAJPA)
California Association of Recreation & Park Districts
California Association of School Business Officials (CASBO)
California Chamber of Commerce
California County Superintendents
California Farm Bureau
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California School Boards Association
California Special Districts Association
California State Association of Counties (CSAC)
California Trucking Association
City of Redwood City
Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC)
Community College League of California
Construction Employers' Association
Desert Water Agency
Dublin Unified School District
El Dorado Irrigation District
Flasher Barricade Association
League of California Cities
National Federation of Independent Business
Pleasanton Unified School District
Public Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management (PRISM)
Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC)
School Employers Association of California (SEAC)
Schools Excess Liability Fund (SELF)
Small School Districts' Association
University of California
Urban Counties of California (UCC)
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation: AB 340 (Ahrens, 2025) prohibits a public employer from questioning a public employee, a representative of a recognized employee organization, or an exclusive representative regarding communications made in confidence between a public employee and the representative in connection with representation relating to any matter within the scope of the recognized employee organization’s representation. It also prohibits such employers from compelling a public employee, a representative of a recognized employee organization, or an exclusive representative to disclose to a third party, communications made in confidence between a public employee and the representative in connection with representation relating to any matter within the scope of the recognized employee organization’s representation. AB 340 is currently in the Senate Labor, Public Employment and Retirement Committee.
Prior Legislation:
AB 418 (Kalra, 2019) See Comment 5.
AB 3121 (Kalra, 2018) See Comment 5.
AB 729 (Hernández, 2013) See Comment 5.
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 59, Noes 6)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 0)
**************
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1109
Author:(Kalra)
As Introduced Ver:February 20, 2025
Majority vote
SUMMARY
Creates a new evidentiary privilege for communications between union agents and represented employees and extends certain current evidentiary rules relating to existing privileged communications to the union agent-represented employee communications.
Major Provisions
- Establishes that, subject to specified exceptions, a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the union agent's representative capacity, and that the represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to prevent another from disclosing, in connection with such a proceeding, a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this bill.
- Authorizes a union agent to disclose in connection with a proceeding a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent's representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- In actions against the union agent in the union agent's personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union or affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities;
- When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member's estate or guardian or conservator has been obtained.
- Requires a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity if required to do by a court order.
- Establishes that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
- Establishes that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
- Establishes that the privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Establishes that the right of any person to claim a privilege provided pursuant to 2), above, is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone.
- Establishes that, where two or more persons are joint holders of the privilege provided in 2), above, a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege.
- Establishes that a disclosure of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by 2), above, when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the union agent was consulted is not a waiver of the privilege.
- Establishes that, if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the court of the union agent-represented worker relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.
COMMENTS
This bill enacts a new evidentiary privilege that would protect the confidentiality of communications between an employee and union agent that was made to the agent while they were acting in their representative capacity.
The bill authorizes both the union agent and the represented employee to invoke the privilege to refuse to disclose the information "in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding." It also allows the represented employee, but not the union agent, to prevent another person, including the union agent, from disclosing a confidential communication. The bill defines a confidential communication as information shared between the represented employee and union agent in confidence "by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee [or] those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of a representational relationship."
The bill creates exceptions that are standard in other recognized privileges. The union agent may also reveal the confidential communication if compelled to do so by a court order. Additionally, the bill establishes that no privilege attaches to communications in three scenarios: first, if the agent believes disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent an act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm; second, if the communication was made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud; and third, in criminal proceedings. Distinct from several existing privileges, the bill authorizes a union agent to disclose a confidential communication in actions against the union agent or the union.
Balancing worker privacy and the need for evidence in the investigation and adjudication in workplace disputes. Opponents of the measure contend that adopting a union agent-employee privilege would inhibit timely and thorough investigations of misconduct claims. Specifically, they state the bill "permits the silencing of employees who wish to voluntarily report an accident or testify because it provides that '[a] represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employees and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this section.'" However, nothing in this bill limits who an employer can interview or prohibits other employees from disclosing facts relating to the subject of the communication. In the example cited by the opposition, employees who witnessed an incident themselves or has other relevant information that was gleaned outside of a confidential communication may provide that information to the employer. This bill simply limits the compelled disclosure of the communication between the union-agent and represented employee in order to facilitate open dialogue between a represented employee and their union agent.
According to the Author
AB 1109 would add union agent-represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs. These communications focus on workers' rights and support California's fair employment standards.
Arguments in Support
This bill is sponsored by the California Federation of Labor Unions. It is supported by the California Association of Psychiatric Technicians and the Riverside County Deputy District Attorneys Association. The California Federation of Labor Unions submits the following:
Union representatives handle union member allegations of contract violations by the employer. Often, union members confide to a union representative information that is highly sensitive, such as explaining that they were late due to a medical condition or missed work to obtain a domestic violence restraining order. They may confide about gender identity, legal issues, or other topics they want to keep confidential. Unions represent members in grievances and contract enforcement. For effective and efficient labor relations, union representatives need to have all the information relevant to a member's case, and members must trust that their disclosures to union representatives are confidential for the process to work.
[…]
AB 1109 will simply extend an evidentiary privilege to confidential communications shared with a union representative. This privilege will not apply to any information that is necessary to disclose to prevent a crime and it is not a non-disclosure agreement or a gag order, meaning that a worker may voluntarily disclose information that they choose. By extending the evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, employee privacy will be protected, and workers will be able to speak freely with the union about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation, or fear that their union representative will be forced to disclose their private information to their employer or the public.
Arguments in Opposition
This bill is opposed by two coalitions, one comprised of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce, and the other of local government advocates including Rural County Representatives of California. The Chamber of Commerce and its coalition submits the following:
In addition to being rare, privileges are carefully limited so that they do not shield more material than necessary – and judges are empowered to reject assertions of privilege if they are asserted too broadly.
[…]
In the context of AB 1109, we believe that allowing the union representative to refuse to testify to relevant information will delay the resolution of many employment litigation cases – leading to more litigation costs for all parties and delaying the potential award for any righteous plaintiff. As an example: if a union representative has information which would bolster a plaintiff's claim – such as the names of witnesses who could confirm the plaintiff's claims – but is forbidden from sharing those witnesses because either the plaintiff (or another witness) invokes that privilege, that information will not be made available to the defendant employer. Without those witnesses, the defendant employer may spend months (or years) litigating a case because they do not believe the plaintiff's case is strong. However, if that information had been disclosed, the defendant employer might have been able to quickly verify that the plaintiff's claim was indeed righteous, and pay the appropriate damages to the plaintiff. Similarly, AB 1109 may prevent the employer from becoming aware of an abusive employee – leading to additional abuse against employees/customers and additional liability for the employer based on that problematic employee's continuing conduct.
[…]
While we understand the important role that union representatives serve for their union members – we do not see that relationship as akin to the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, we do not believe it is good policy to hide relevant evidence of workplace misconduct by creating this privilege.
FISCAL COMMENTS
None
VOTES
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-0-3
YES: Kalra, Wicks, Bryan, Connolly, Harabedian, Pacheco, Papan, Stefani, Zbur
ABS, ABST OR NV: Dixon, Sanchez, Tangipa
UPDATED
VERSION: February 20, 2025
CONSULTANT: Manuela Boucher / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000214
Date of Hearing: April 8, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1109
Author:(Kalra) – As Introduced Ver:February 20, 2025
SUBJECT: Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege
KEY ISSUE: SHOULD private COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN A UNION REPRESENTATIVE AND A REPRESENTED EMPLOYEE BE PROTECTED BY A NEW EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE FOR SUCH COMMUNICATIONS?
SYNOPSIS
This bill would create a new evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between union agents and represented employees, similar to those traditionally granted to other relations that are characterized by, or that assume, confidentiality, including those between spouses, attorney and client, doctor and patient, and a clergy and penitent. The notion of evidentiary privileges dates back to the 1700s and English common law. Evidentiary privilege is an exclusionary rule of evidence that permits the holder of the privilege, or the professional acting on behalf of the holder, to refuse to disclose the content of a communication that occurs in the context of the confidential relationship. Extending an evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, the author contends, will encourage employees to speak freely and openly with the union agent about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation from the employer.
This bill reflects the most recent attempt in recent years to enact this evidentiary privilege in law. All prior iterations of this measure passed this Committee. Notably, in 2013, AB 729 (Hernández, 2013), made it to the Governor’s desk before it was vetoed by then- Governor Jerry Brown who offered two reasons for the veto. First, the Governor argued that communications between a union agent and an employee are not on equal footing with confidential communications made to a spouse, doctor, priest, or attorney; and second, that the privilege will compromise an employer's ability to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment, and other allegations. Such arguments are generally consistent with the arguments currently being presented by a coalition of local agencies that oppose this measure.
Although the groups that oppose this measure continue to offer similar arguments against this bill, supporters contend that adopting this privilege is more important in the wake of the new presidential administration’s efforts related to civil rights and attempts to find “cause” to fire federal workers. This measure is sponsored by the California Federation of Labor Unions and is supported by a broad coalition of labor unions. It is opposed by a coalition of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of local government and public employers.
SUMMARY: Creates a new evidentiary privilege for communications between union agents and represented employees and extends certain current evidentiary rules relating to existing privileged communications to the union agent-represented employee communications. Specifically, this bill:
- Defines all of the following for purposes of 2) – 7):
- “Confidential communication” means information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent and in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of the representational relationship;
- “Union agent” means a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance and the appointed employee steward was a steward at the time the communication was made.
- Establishes that, subject to the exception in 4) and subject to the limitations in 8) – 10), a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity, and that the represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to prevent another from disclosing, in connection with such a proceeding, a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this bill.
- Authorizes a union agent to disclose in connection with a proceeding a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- In actions against the union agent in the union agent’s personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union or affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities;
- When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member’s estate or guardian or conservator has been obtained.
- Requires a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity if required to do by a court order.
- Establishes that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
- Establishes that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
- Establishes that the privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Establishes that the right of any person to claim a privilege provided pursuant to 2) is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone.
- Establishes that, where two or more persons are joint holders of the privilege provided in 2) a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege.
- Establishes that a disclosure of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by 2), when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the union agent was consulted is not a waiver of the privilege.
- Establishes that, if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the court of the union agent-represented worker relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides a privilege enabling a party to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relationships, including the following:
- The attorney-client relationship. (Evidence Code Section 954.)
- The spousal relationship. (Evidence Code Section 980.)
- Physician-patient relationship. (Evidence Code Section 994.)
- Psychotherapist-patient relationship. (Evidence Code Section 1014.)
- Sexual assault counselor-victim relationship. (Evidence Code Section 1035.8.)
- Domestic violence counselor-victim relationship. (Evidence Code Section 1037.5)
- Clergy-penitent relationship. (Evidence Code Sections 1033 and 1034.)
- Prohibits the holder of a privilege from claiming a privilege based on one of the relations listed above if a holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to a disclosure made by anyone. (Evidence Code Section 912 (a).)
- Provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Evidence Code Section 912 (b).)
- Provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, then the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. Additionally, provides that a communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Evidence Code Section 917.)
- Establishes that it is necessary that the individual worker have freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and prohibits interference, restraint, or coercion of employers or their agents in such matters. (Labor Code Section 923.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: While not every employer exploits their workers, practically every workplace suffers from conflict both amongst workers and between workers and their employers. Unions and union representatives play a pivotal role in navigating these conflicts to ensure the greatest degree of balance between the power of an employer and the rights of their workers. Union representatives can serve as a source of guidance for workers, and represent their interests in a number of formal and informal contexts, including a the formal process of filing workplace grievances, and are best equipped to do so when workers have full trust in their representatives.
According to the author: AB 1109 would add union agent-represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs. These communications focus on workers’ rights and support California’s fair employment standards.
This bill enacts a new evidentiary privilege that would protect the confidentiality of communications between an employee and union agent that was made to the agent while they were acting in their representative capacity.
This bill authorizes both the union agent and the represented employee to invoke the privilege to refuse to disclose the information “in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding.” It also allows the represented employee, but not the union agent, to prevent another person, including the union agent, from disclosing a confidential communication. The bill defines a confidential communication as information shared between the represented employee and union agent in confidence “by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee [or] those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of a representational relationship.”
The bill creates exceptions that are standard in other recognized privileges. The union agent may also reveal the confidential communication if compelled to do so by a court order. Additionally, the bill establishes that no privilege attaches to communications in three scenarios: first, if the agent believes disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent an act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm; second, if the communication was made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud; and third, in criminal proceedings. Distinct from several existing privileges, the bill authorizes a union agent to disclose a confidential communication in actions against the union agent or the union.
Although similar to the relationship between a client and service provider, this privilege acknowledges the unique role of the union in employee-employer relations. Most of the existing evidentiary privileges, many of which date to Elizabethan English common law, involve a relationship between a professional of some sort and a client who divulges confidential information to that professional in the course of that professional relationship: for example, attorney-client, doctor-patient, psychotherapist-patient, trained domestic violence or sexual assault counselor-victim, and clergy-penitent. (Geoffery C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client privilege (1978) 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, 1070.) In those cases the client is considered to be the holder of the privilege and maintains the right to decide if the confidential information may be divulged. Not only may the client invoke the privilege in order to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose the contents of the privileged communication, but the patient or client can also prevent the trained professional from testifying about, or otherwise disclosing, the communication in an adjudicative proceeding. As a result of the codes of ethical conduct for many of the covered professions, these existing privileges extend beyond formal proceedings and serve as a general prohibition against the professional divulging the client’s communication in any context.
The proposed union agent-employee privilege in this bill differs from the existing privileges in a few key aspects. First, the bill proposes a new privilege only, rather than a privilege and attendant rules of ethics. A coalition of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce contends that the bill “attempts to copy attorney-client privilege – but without the strict ethical obligations for attorneys when clients have conflicting interests.” A coalition of local governments also contend that the bill “is lacking important guardrails commonly applicable to other privileges in the professional context[.]” The concerns of both coalitions on this point appear to be that the lack of these “guardrails” or equivalent rules of ethics will result in unmanageable conflicts for a union representative between multiple represented employees.
To the extent a union representative is an employee in the same workplace as the represented member, there are no corresponding rules of ethics relevant to this bill that attach to their employment. There are, however, rules that apply to unions generally that provide for represented workers’ right to fair representation. Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act imposes on a union the duty to represent all employees, regardless of whether they are a union member, in good faith and without discrimination. (Vaca v. Sipes (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 177. (For further summarized information, see What’s the Law (National Labor Relations Board) available at: https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/whats-law.)) To the extent multiple employees discuss a single matter with their representative in their capacity as a representative, it may be the case that the employees’ interests conflict with one another. In that case, the representative may be unable to disclose information that may aid one worker over the other due to the privileged nature of the communications. However, the “conflict” may not give rise to complication with a workplace investigation because, although the employer may not be able to gather information from the representative, nothing in this bill prohibits them from questioning either worker or their coworkers about anything other than a privileged communication.
Second, both the employee and the union agent are deemed holders of the privilege. Under a traditional privilege, once the client waives the privilege, the professional cannot use the privilege to keep the information confidential. For example, as soon as a client waives the attorney-client privilege, the attorney can be forced to testify as to the contents of the communication. This bill recognizes that unlike most professional-client relationships, the union agent owes a duty not only to the employee, but also to all of the employees represented by the union. Accordingly, under this bill, if the employee waives the communication, the union agent, unlike the attorney, may still refuse to disclose the content of the confidential communication on the grounds that disclosure could adversely affect the union agent's other represented employees. However, it is important to note that the bill does authorize a union agent to disclose otherwise-privileged information under certain circumstances.
First, the bill authorizes a union agent to disclose an otherwise protected communication when any of the following applies: 1) in an action against the union agent in their personal or official capacity or in an action against the union, 2) when the bargaining member who can invoke the privilege consents or, when applicable, their estate or guardian has consented, and 3) when ordered to do so by a court.
Second, the privilege does not apply when: 1) the union agent believes that disclosing the information is necessary to prevent a criminal act that is likely to result in harm, 2) when the otherwise privileged communication is made in order to enable the commission of a crime or fraud, and 3) in criminal proceedings.
Members of the opposition coalitions contend that the “one-sided” nature of the privilege would create an unfair information imbalance, resulting in unfair adversarial processes. First, it is important to note that the relationship between employers and workers is inherently imbalanced in favor of the employer – the employer exerts control over key elements of workers’ everyday lives, including access to pay and benefits. Moreover, it is unclear what specifically about the “one-sided” nature of the privilege is more unfair than any previously existing privilege. The coalition of local governments opposing this bill argue that “[u]nlike other privileges that apply to both sides of the litigation or proceedings such as the attorney-client privilege, AB 1109 does not bestow the same privilege upon management-labor negotiator communications, or communications among members of management regarding labor union disputes or grievance issues.”
This concern seems to suggest that by providing a novel privilege between a union representative and a represented employee, an employer is at an acute disadvantage because they do not have equivalent protection with others in management or a negotiating representative. However, in many cases involving a workplace dispute, an employer would confer with legal counsel. In that event, their communications would indeed be privileged under the existing attorney-client privilege. Employers are generally more capable of retaining legal representation, particularly for consultation prior to filing litigation, than workers. Instead, many workers rely on their union representative to provide guidance. Thus, this new privilege would seem to establish equal footing between workers and employers, rather than skew the balance in favor of workers.
It is true that the bill does not protect communications between members of management regarding workplace disputes. Neither does the bill protect conversations regarding workplace disputes between coworkers outside of the representative relationship. Whether there should be a privilege that attaches to a communication between members of management is a question wholly distinct from the matter at hand, that concept could be an appropriate proposal for new piece of legislation. It does not, however, directly address the soundness of establishing a new form of privilege between a union agent and an employee.
Finally, most privileges are limited to “confidential communications” and the privilege is void if the communication is disclosed to a third party. However the definition of "confidential communication" in this bill recognizes that a confidential communication could occur where a third party was present at the time when the communication was made, but only if the third person was present to "further the interest of the employee or union agent . . . or [was] reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information." For example, if a shop steward were present in order to assist the employee in the communication to a union agent, all three persons would be bound by the privilege. If the employee made the communication to the union agent in the presence of a person who was not there to further the interest of the employee or union agent, or who was not reasonably necessary for the transmission of information, the communication would not be deemed to be confidential and the privilege would not attach. This rule is most analogous to the existing precedent for the attorney-client relationship which provides for the limited presence of a third party.
Balancing worker privacy and the need for evidence in the investigation and adjudication in workplace disputes. Opponents of the measure contend that adopting a union agent-employee privilege would inhibit timely and thorough investigations of misconduct claims. Specifically, they state the bill “permits the silencing of employees who wish to voluntarily report an accident or testify because it provides that ‘[a] represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employees and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this section.’” However, nothing in this bill limits who an employer can interview or prohibits other employees from disclosing facts relating to the subject of the communication. In the example cited by the opposition, employees who witnessed an incident themselves or has other relevant information that was gleaned outside of a confidential communication may provide that information to the employer. This bill simply limits the compelled disclosure of the communication between the union-agent and represented employee in order to facilitate open dialogue between a represented employee and their union agent.
Should this bill be adopted, California would not be the first state to recognize this privilege. The right to protect the confidentiality of certain communications between an employee and a union agent has been recognized by at least three other states, either by statute or by court ruling. In 2012, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that a privilege between union agents and employees, similar to that between lawyers and their clients, was necessary in order to encourage employees to “communicate fully and frankly” with their union agents. (Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P. 3d. 559, 565.) The court noted that to force disclosure of such communication, particularly in the context of grievance discussions, would have a chilling effect on the employee's willingness to come forward and speak candidly with their agents. (Id., at p. 563; pp. 565-567.)
For the same reasons, Illinois and Maryland codified the privilege between employees and their union representatives. In Maryland, labor organizations and agents of labor organizations cannot be compelled to disclose the information that is given to them by an employee so long as that information relates to an employee grievance. (Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-124.) The Illinois provision extends even greater protection to the union agent and employee privilege. Under Illinois state law the privilege between the union agent and employee extends to both civil and criminal proceedings, unlike the Maryland statute and the proposed California legislation. (Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Ch. 733 Section 5/8-803.5.)
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: This bill is sponsored by the California Federation of Labor Unions. It is supported by the California Association of Psychiatric Technicians and the Riverside County Deputy District Attorneys Association. The California Federation of Labor Unions submits the following:
Evidentiary privilege is the right to refuse to disclose certain confidential information during legal proceedings, or to prevent someone else from doing so based on the relationship to that person. There are numerous types of existing evidentiary privileges in California to protect private communications such as lawyer and client, lawyer referral service and client, marital privilege between two spouses, physician and patient, psychotherapist and patient, clergy member and a penitent, sexual assault counselor and victim, domestic violence counselor and victim, and human trafficking caseworker and victim.
Union representatives handle union member allegations of contract violations by the employer. Often, union members confide to a union representative information that is highly sensitive, such as explaining that they were late due to a medical condition or missed work to obtain a domestic violence restraining order. They may confide about gender identity, legal issues, or other topics they want to keep confidential. Unions represent members in grievances and contract enforcement. For effective and efficient labor relations, union representatives need to have all the information relevant to a member’s case, and members must trust that their disclosures to union representatives are confidential for the process to work.
Under existing law, when a worker confides in their union, that communication is not legally confidential. This means that a company can subpoena a union representative and demand access to confidential communications that the union representative had with their members. This can chill union member communication with their representatives for fear of personal or sensitive information being disclosed to their employer, or more publicly. This fear will be exacerbated under a federal government that has pledged to repeal basic civil rights.
AB 1109 will simply extend an evidentiary privilege to confidential communications shared with a union representative. This privilege will not apply to any information that is necessary to disclose to prevent a crime and it is not a non-disclosure agreement or a gag order, meaning that a worker may voluntarily disclose information that they choose. By extending the evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, employee privacy will be protected, and workers will be able to speak freely with the union about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation, or fear that their union representative will be forced to disclose their private information to their employer or the public.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: This bill is opposed by two coalitions, one comprised of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce, and the other of local government advocates including Rural County Representatives of California. The Chamber of Commerce and its coalition submits the following:
Judicial proceedings have two related purposes: to determine what actually happened in a dispute, and then to apply the law to whatever truth is uncovered. However, by their very nature, evidentiary privileges like the one proposed in AB 1109 inherently hide the truth from courts – because they give a party the right to refuse to tell the truth, regardless of the consequences for the safety of others, or the consequences that might result from that hidden knowledge.
In simpler terms: privileges are incredibly rare because they make our justice system less accurate and less fair. As an example of that rarity: despite the importance of many familial relationships, a parent has no privilege to refuse to testify honestly in a matter involving their own child, or to refuse to testify against a sibling. The reason privileges are so rare is that they hide evidence from our courts. By hiding that evidence, privileges increase the odds of the wrong party being held liable, or of an innocent person being found guilty.
In addition to being rare, privileges are carefully limited so that they do not shield more material than necessary – and judges are empowered to reject assertions of privilege if they are asserted too broadly.
[…]
The ultimate goal of any dispute resolution process – whether it is a grievance process, a court case, or arbitration – is to efficiently determine what actually happened. And because litigation is costly for all parties (and courts are already congested), the faster that such disputes can be resolved, the better for all parties.
In the context of AB 1109, we believe that allowing the union representative to refuse to testify to relevant information will delay the resolution of many employment litigation cases – leading to more litigation costs for all parties and delaying the potential award for any righteous plaintiff. As an example: if a union representative has information which would bolster a plaintiff’s claim – such as the names of witnesses who could confirm the plaintiff’s claims – but is forbidden from sharing those witnesses because either the plaintiff (or another witness) invokes that privilege, that information will not be made available to the defendant employer. Without those witnesses, the defendant employer may spend months (or years) litigating a case because they do not believe the plaintiff’s case is strong. However, if that information had been disclosed, the defendant employer might have been able to quickly verify that the plaintiff’s claim was indeed righteous, and pay the appropriate damages to the plaintiff. Similarly, AB 1109 may prevent the employer from becoming aware of an abusive employee – leading to additional abuse against employees/customers and additional liability for the employer based on that problematic employee’s continuing conduct.
In other words: even if the information that AB 1109 keeps hidden is eventually revealed, that delay has real-world consequences for claimants (delaying resolution of their claims), courts (spending valuable resources on cases that should have resolved easily), and employers (being unable to identify and remove problematic employees from their workplace).
[…]
As aptly noted by former Governor Jerry Brown in his veto of a similar bill (AB 729 (Hernandez – 2013)): “I don’t believe it is appropriate to put communications with a union agent on equal footing with communications with one's spouse, priest, physician or attorney. Moreover, this bill could compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment, and other allegations.”
While we understand the important role that union representatives serve for their union members – we do not see that relationship as akin to the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, we do not believe it is good policy to hide relevant evidence of workplace misconduct by creating this privilege.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Federation of Labor Unions, AFL-CIO (sponsor)
Association of Flight Attendants - CWA (AFA)
California Association of Psychiatric Technicians
California Conference Board of The Amalgamated Transit Union
California Conference of Machinists
California State Council of Service Employees International Union (SEIU California)
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
Engineers and Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20, AFL-CIO
Orange County Employees Association
Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG)
Riverside County Deputy District Attorneys Association
Unite Here International Union, AFL-CIO
Utility Workers Union of America
Opposition
Alameda County Office of Education
Association of California Healthcare Districts (ACHD)
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities (CAJPA)
California Association of Recreation & Park Districts
California Chamber of Commerce
California County Superintendents
California Farm Bureau
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California School Boards Association
California Special Districts Association
California State Association of Counties (CSAC)
California Trucking Association
Chief Executive Officers of The California Community Colleges Board
Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC)
Construction Employers' Association
Dublin Unified School District
Flasher Barricade Association
League of California Cities
National Federation of Independent Business
Pleasanton Unified School District
Public Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management (PRISM)
Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC)
School Employers Association of California (SEAC)
Schools Excess Liability Fund (SELF)
Small School Districts' Association
Urban Counties of California (UCC)
Analysis Prepared by: Manuela Boucher-de la Cadena / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Date of Hearing: April 8, 2025
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Ash Kalra, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1109
Author:(Kalra) – As Introduced Ver:February 20, 2025
SUBJECT: Evidentiary privileges: union agent-represented worker privilege
KEY ISSUE: SHOULD private COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN A UNION REPRESENTATIVE AND A REPRESENTED EMPLOYEE BE PROTECTED BY A NEW EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE FOR SUCH COMMUNICATIONS?
SYNOPSIS
This bill would create a new evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between union agents and represented employees, similar to those traditionally granted to other relations that are characterized by, or that assume, confidentiality, including those between spouses, attorney and client, doctor and patient, and a clergy and penitent. The notion of evidentiary privileges dates back to the 1700s and English common law. Evidentiary privilege is an exclusionary rule of evidence that permits the holder of the privilege, or the professional acting on behalf of the holder, to refuse to disclose the content of a communication that occurs in the context of the confidential relationship. Extending an evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, the author contends, will encourage employees to speak freely and openly with the union agent about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation from the employer.
This bill reflects the most recent attempt in recent years to enact this evidentiary privilege in law. All t prior iterations of this measure passed this Committee. Notably, in 2013, AB 729 (Hernández, 2013), made it to the Governor’s desk before it was vetoed by then- Governor Jerry Brown who offered two reasons for the veto. First, the Governor argued that communications between a union agent and an employee are not on equal footing with confidential communications made to a spouse, doctor, priest, or attorney; and second, that the privilege will compromise an employer's ability to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment, and other allegations. Such arguments are generally consistent with the arguments currently being presented by a coalition of local agencies that oppose this measure.
Although the groups that oppose this measure continue to offer similar arguments against this bill, supporters contend that adopting this privilege is more important in the wake of the new presidential administration’s efforts related to civil rights and attempts to find “cause” to fire federal workers. This measure is sponsored by the California Federation of Labor Unions and is supported by a broad coalition of labor unions. It is opposed by a coalition of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of local government and public employers.
SUMMARY: Creates a new evidentiary privilege for communications between union agents and represented employees and extends certain current evidentiary rules relating to existing privileged communications to the union agent-represented employee communications. Specifically, this bill:
- Defines all of the following for purposes of 2) – 7):
- “Confidential communication” means information transmitted, by oral or written communication, between a represented employee or represented former employee and a union agent and in confidence by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee, former employee, or union agent or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of the representational relationship;
- “Union agent” means a person employed, elected, or appointed by a labor organization whose duties include the representation of employees in a bargaining unit in a grievance procedure or in negotiations for a labor agreement and the labor organization. An appointed employee steward is not a union agent except to the extent a represented employee or represented former employee communicates in confidence to the steward regarding a grievance or potential grievance and the appointed employee steward was a steward at the time the communication was made.
- Establishes that, subject to the exception in 4) and subject to the limitations in 8) – 10), a union agent and a represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding, any confidential communication between the employee or former employee and the union agent made while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity, and that the represented employee or represented former employee have a privilege to prevent another from disclosing, in connection with such a proceeding, a confidential communication between the employee and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this bill.
- Authorizes a union agent to disclose in connection with a proceeding a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity in either of the following circumstances:
- In actions against the union agent in the union agent’s personal or official representative capacity, or against the local union or subordinate body thereof or international union or affiliated or subordinate body thereof or any agent thereof in their personal or official representative capacities;
- When, after full disclosure has been provided, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member’s estate or guardian or conservator has been obtained.
- Requires a union agent to use or reveal a confidential communication made to the union agent while the union agent was acting in the union agent’s representative capacity if required to do by a court order.
- Establishes that there is no privilege if the union agent reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the union agent reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
- Establishes that there is no privilege with respect to a confidential communication made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud.
- Establishes that the privilege does not apply in criminal proceedings.
- Establishes that the right of any person to claim a privilege provided pursuant to 2) is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone.
- Establishes that, where two or more persons are joint holders of the privilege provided in 2) a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege.
- Establishes that a disclosure of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by 2), when disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the union agent was consulted is not a waiver of the privilege.
- Establishes that, if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the court of the union agent-represented worker relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.
EXISTING LAW:
- Provides a privilege enabling a party to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose confidential communications made in the course of certain relationships, including the following:
- The attorney-client relationship. (Evidence Code Section 954.)
- The spousal relationship. (Evidence Code Section 980.)
- Physician-patient relationship. (Evidence Code Section 994.)
- Psychotherapist-patient relationship. (Evidence Code Section 1014.)
- Sexual assault counselor-victim relationship. (Evidence Code Section 1035.8.)
- Domestic violence counselor-victim relationship. (Evidence Code Section 1037.5)
- Clergy-penitent relationship. (Evidence Code Sections 1033 and 1034.)
- Prohibits the holder of a privilege from claiming a privilege based on one of the relations listed above if a holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to a disclosure made by anyone. (Evidence Code Section 912 (a).)
- Provides that if two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege, a waiver of a right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the spousal privilege, the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege. (Evidence Code Section 912 (b).)
- Provides that if a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of a recognized privileged relation, then the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential. Additionally, provides that a communication does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it was communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication. (Evidence Code Section 917.)
- Establishes that it is necessary that the individual worker have freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and prohibits interference, restraint, or coercion of employers or their agents in such matters. (Labor Code Section 923.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed non-fiscal.
COMMENTS: While not every employer exploits their workers, practically every workplace suffers from conflict both amongst workers and between workers and their employers. Unions and union representatives play a pivotal role in navigating these conflicts to ensure the greatest degree of balance between the power of an employer and the rights of their workers. Union representatives can serve as a source of guidance for workers, and represent their interests in a number of formal and informal contexts, including a the formal process of filing workplace grievances, and are best equipped to do so when workers have full trust in their representatives.
According to the author: AB 1109 would add union agent-represented worker as a recognized statutory evidentiary privilege along with 11 existing types of communications deemed privileged. By allowing evidentiary privilege between workers and union representatives, we ensure the safe, private, and full disclosure of workplace concerns and needs. These communications focus on workers’ rights and support California’s fair employment standards.
This bill enacts a new evidentiary privilege that would protect the confidentiality of communications between an employee and union agent that was made to the agent while they were acting in their representative capacity.
This bill authorizes both the union agent and the represented employee to invoke the privilege to refuse to disclose the information “in any court or to any administrative board or agency, or in any arbitration or other proceeding.” It also allows the represented employee, but not the union agent, to prevent another person, including the union agent, from disclosing a confidential communication. The bill defines a confidential communication as information shared between the represented employee and union agent in confidence “by a means which, so far as the employee, former employee, or union agent is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the employee [or] those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or accomplishment of the purpose for which the communication was made, and includes advice given by a union agent in the course of a representational relationship.”
The bill creates exceptions that are standard in other recognized privileges. The union agent may also reveal the confidential communication if compelled to do so by a court order. Additionally, the bill establishes that no privilege attaches to communications in three scenarios: first, if the agent believes disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent an act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm; second, if the communication was made to enable or aid a person in committing, or planning to commit, a crime or fraud; and third, in criminal proceedings. Distinct from several existing privileges, the bill authorizes a union agent to disclose a confidential communication in actions against the union agent or the union.
Although similar to the relationship between a client and service provider, this privilege acknowledges the unique role of the union in employee-employer relations. Most of the existing evidentiary privileges, many of which date to Elizabethan English common law, involve a relationship between a professional of some sort and a client who divulges confidential information to that professional in the course of that professional relationship: for example, attorney-client, doctor-patient, psychotherapist-patient, trained domestic violence or sexual assault counselor-victim, and clergy-penitent. (Geoffery C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client privilege (1978) 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1061, 1070.) In those cases the client is considered to be the holder of the privilege and maintains the right to decide if the confidential information may be divulged. Not only may the client invoke the privilege in order to refuse to testify or otherwise disclose the contents of the privileged communication, but the patient or client can also prevent the trained professional from testifying about, or otherwise disclosing, the communication in an adjudicative proceeding. As a result of the codes of ethical conduct for many of the covered professions, these existing privileges extend beyond formal proceedings and serve as a general prohibition against the professional divulging the client’s communication in any context.
The proposed union agent-employee privilege in this bill differs from the existing privileges in a few key aspects. First, the bill proposes a new privilege only, rather than a privilege and attendant rules of ethics. A coalition of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce contends that the bill “attempts to copy attorney-client privilege – but without the strict ethical obligations for attorneys when clients have conflicting interests.” A coalition of local governments also contend that the bill “is lacking important guardrails commonly applicable to other privileges in the professional context[.]” The concerns of both coalitions on this point appear to be that the lack of these “guardrails” or equivalent rules of ethics will result in unmanageable conflicts for a union representative between multiple represented employees.
To the extent a union representative is an employee in the same workplace as the represented member, there are no corresponding rules of ethics relevant to this bill that attach to their employment. There are, however, rules that apply to unions generally that provide for represented workers’ right to fair representation. Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act imposes on a union the duty to represent all employees, regardless of whether they are a union member, in good faith and without discrimination. (Vaca v. Sipes (1967) 386 U.S. 171, 177. (For further summarized information, see What’s the Law (National Labor Relations Board) available at: https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/whats-law.)) To the extent multiple employees discuss a single matter with their representative in their capacity as a representative, it may be the case that the employees’ interests conflict with one another. In that case, the representative may be unable to disclose information that may aid one worker over the other due to the privileged nature of the communications. However, the “conflict” may not give rise to complication with a workplace investigation because, although the employer may not be able to gather information from the representative, nothing in this bill prohibits them from questioning either worker or their coworkers about anything other than a privileged communication.
Second, both the employee and the union agent are deemed holders of the privilege. Under a traditional privilege, once the client waives the privilege, the professional cannot use the privilege to keep the information confidential. For example, as soon as a client waives the attorney-client privilege, the attorney can be forced to testify as to the contents of the communication. This bill recognizes that unlike most professional-client relationships, the union agent owes a duty not only to the employee, but also to all of the employees represented by the union. Accordingly, under this bill, if the employee waives the communication, the union agent, unlike the attorney, may still refuse to disclose the content of the confidential communication on the grounds that disclosure could adversely affect the union agent's other represented employees. However, it is important to note that the bill does authorize a union agent to disclose otherwise-privileged information under certain circumstances.
First, the bill authorizes a union agent to disclose an otherwise protected communication when any of the following applies: 1) in an action against the union agent in their personal or official capacity or in an action against the union, 2) when the bargaining member who can invoke the privilege consents or, when applicable, their estate or guardian has consented, and 3) when ordered to do so by a court.
Second, the privilege does not apply when: 1) the union agent believes that disclosing the information is necessary to prevent a criminal act that is likely to result in harm, 2) when the otherwise privileged communication is made in order to enable the commission of a crime or fraud, and 3) in criminal proceedings.
Members of the opposition coalitions contend that the “one-sided” nature of the privilege would create an unfair information imbalance, resulting in unfair adversarial processes. First, it is important to note that the relationship between employers and workers is inherently imbalanced in favor of the employer – the employer exerts control over key elements of workers’ everyday lives, including access to pay and benefits. Moreover, it is unclear what specifically about the “one-sided” nature of the privilege is more unfair than any previously existing privilege. The coalition of local governments opposing this bill argue that “[u]nlike other privileges that apply to both sides of the litigation or proceedings such as the attorney-client privilege, AB 1109 does not bestow the same privilege upon management-labor negotiator communications, or communications among members of management regarding labor union disputes or grievance issues.”
This concern seems to suggest that by providing a novel privilege between a union representative and a represented employee, an employer is at an acute disadvantage because they do not have equivalent protection with others in management or a negotiating representative. However, in many cases involving a workplace dispute, an employer would confer with legal counsel. In that event, their communications would indeed be privileged under the existing attorney-client privilege. Employers are generally more capable of retaining legal representation, particularly for consultation prior to filing litigation, than workers. Instead, many workers rely on their union representative to provide guidance. Thus, this new privilege would seem to establish equal footing between workers and employers, rather than skew the balance in favor of workers.
It is true that the bill does not protect communications between members of management regarding workplace disputes. Neither does the bill protect conversations regarding workplace disputes between coworkers outside of the representative relationship. Whether there should be a privilege that attaches to a communication between members of management is a question wholly distinct from the matter at hand, that concept could be an appropriate proposal for new piece of legislation. It does not, however, directly address the soundness of establishing a new form of privilege between a union agent and an employee.
Finally, most privileges are limited to “confidential communications” and the privilege is void if the communication is disclosed to a third party. However the definition of "confidential communication" in this bill recognizes that a confidential communication could occur where a third party was present at the time when the communication was made, but only if the third person was present to "further the interest of the employee or union agent . . . or [was] reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information." For example, if a shop steward were present in order to assist the employee in the communication to a union agent, all three persons would be bound by the privilege. If the employee made the communication to the union agent in the presence of a person who was not there to further the interest of the employee or union agent, or who was not reasonably necessary for the transmission of information, the communication would not be deemed to be confidential and the privilege would not attach. This rule is most analogous to the existing precedent for the attorney-client relationship which provides for the limited presence of a third party.
Balancing worker privacy and the need for evidence in the investigation and adjudication in workplace disputes. Opponents of the measure contend that adopting a union agent-employee privilege would inhibit timely and thorough investigations of misconduct claims. Specifically, they state the bill “permits the silencing of employees who wish to voluntarily report an accident or testify because it provides that ‘[a] represented employee or represented former employee also has a privilege to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication between the employees and a union agent that is privileged pursuant to this section.’” However, nothing in this bill limits who an employer can interview or prohibits other employees from disclosing facts relating to the subject of the communication. In the example cited by the opposition, employees who witnessed an incident themself or has other relevant information that was gleaned outside of a confidential communication may provide that information to the employer. This bill simply limits the compelled disclosure of the communication between the union-agent and represented employee in order to facilitate open dialogue between a represented employee and their union agent.
Should this bill be adopted, California would not be the first state to recognize this privilege. The right to protect the confidentiality of certain communications between an employee and a union agent has been recognized by at least three other states, either by statute or by court ruling. In 2012, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that a privilege between union agents and employees, similar to that between lawyers and their clients, was necessary in order to encourage employees to “communicate fully and frankly” with their union agents. (Peterson v. State (2012) 280 P. 3d. 559, 565.) The court noted that to force disclosure of such communication, particularly in the context of grievance discussions, would have a chilling effect on the employee's willingness to come forward and speak candidly with their agents. (Id., at p. 563; pp. 565-567.)
For the same reasons, Illinois and Maryland codified the privilege between employees and their union representatives. In Maryland, labor organizations and agents of labor organizations cannot be compelled to disclose the information that is given to them by an employee so long as that information relates to an employee grievance. (Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 9-124.) The Illinois provision extends even greater protection to the union agent and employee privilege. Under Illinois state law the privilege between the union agent and employee extends to both civil and criminal proceedings, unlike the Maryland statute and the proposed California legislation. (Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Ch. 733 Section 5/8-803.5.)
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: This bill is sponsored by the California Federation of Labor Unions. It is supported by the California Association of Psychiatric Technicians and the Riverside County Deputy District Attorneys Association. The California Federation of Labor Unions submits the following:
Evidentiary privilege is the right to refuse to disclose certain confidential information during legal proceedings, or to prevent someone else from doing so based on the relationship to that person. There are numerous types of existing evidentiary privileges in California to protect private communications such as lawyer and client, lawyer referral service and client, marital privilege between two spouses, physician and patient, psychotherapist and patient, clergy member and a penitent, sexual assault counselor and victim, domestic violence counselor and victim, and human trafficking caseworker and victim.
Union representatives handle union member allegations of contract violations by the employer. Often, union members confide to a union representative information that is highly sensitive, such as explaining that they were late due to a medical condition or missed work to obtain a domestic violence restraining order. They may confide about gender identity, legal issues, or other topics they want to keep confidential. Unions represent members in grievances and contract enforcement. For effective and efficient labor relations, union representatives need to have all the information relevant to a member’s case, and members must trust that their disclosures to union representatives are confidential for the process to work.
Under existing law, when a worker confides in their union, that communication is not legally confidential. This means that a company can subpoena a union representative and demand access to confidential communications that the union representative had with their members. This can chill union member communication with their representatives for fear of personal or sensitive information being disclosed to their employer, or more publicly. This fear will be exacerbated under a federal government that has pledged to repeal basic civil rights.
AB 1109 will simply extend an evidentiary privilege to confidential communications shared with a union representative. This privilege will not apply to any information that is necessary to disclose to prevent a crime and it is not a non-disclosure agreement or a gag order, meaning that a worker may voluntarily disclose information that they choose. By extending the evidentiary privilege to communications between workers and union representatives, employee privacy will be protected, and workers will be able to speak freely with the union about workplace concerns without fear of retaliation, or fear that their union representative will be forced to disclose their private information to their employer or the public.
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION: This bill is opposed by two coalitions, one comprised of business advocates led by the Chamber of Commerce, and the other of local government advocates including Rural County Representatives of California. The Chamber of Commerce and its coalition submits the following:
Judicial proceedings have two related purposes: to determine what actually happened in a dispute, and then to apply the law to whatever truth is uncovered. However, by their very nature, evidentiary privileges like the one proposed in AB 1109 inherently hide the truth from courts – because they give a party the right to refuse to tell the truth, regardless of the consequences for the safety of others, or the consequences that might result from that hidden knowledge.
In simpler terms: privileges are incredibly rare because they make our justice system less accurate and less fair. As an example of that rarity: despite the importance of many familial relationships, a parent has no privilege to refuse to testify honestly in a matter involving their own child, or to refuse to testify against a sibling. The reason privileges are so rare is that they hide evidence from our courts. By hiding that evidence, privileges increase the odds of the wrong party being held liable, or of an innocent person being found guilty.
In addition to being rare, privileges are carefully limited so that they do not shield more material than necessary – and judges are empowered to reject assertions of privilege if they are asserted too broadly.
[…]
Judicial proceedings have two related purposes: to determine what actually happened in a dispute, and then to apply the law to whatever truth is uncovered. However, by their very nature, evidentiary privileges like the one proposed in AB 1109 inherently hide the truth from courts – because they give a party the right to refuse to tell the truth, regardless of the consequences for the safety of others, or the consequences that might result from that hidden knowledge.
In simpler terms: privileges are incredibly rare because they make our justice system less accurate and less fair. As an example of that rarity: despite the importance of many familial relationships, a parent has no privilege to refuse to testify honestly in a matter involving their own child, or to refuse to testify against a sibling. The reason privileges are so rare is that they hide evidence from our courts. By hiding that evidence, privileges increase the odds of the wrong party being held liable, or of an innocent person being found guilty.
In addition to being rare, privileges are carefully limited so that they do not shield more material than necessary – and judges are empowered to reject assertions of privilege if they are asserted too broadly.
[…]
The ultimate goal of any dispute resolution process – whether it is a grievance process, a court case, or arbitration – is to efficiently determine what actually happened. And because litigation is costly for all parties (and courts are already congested), the faster that such disputes can be resolved, the better for all parties.
In the context of AB 1109, we believe that allowing the union representative to refuse to testify to relevant information will delay the resolution of many employment litigation cases – leading to more litigation costs for all parties and delaying the potential award for any righteous plaintiff. As an example: if a union representative has information which would bolster a plaintiff’s claim – such as the names of witnesses who could confirm the plaintiff’s claims – but is forbidden from sharing those witnesses because either the plaintiff (or another witness) invokes that privilege, that information will not be made available to the defendant employer. Without those witnesses, the defendant employer may spend months (or years) litigating a case because they do not believe the plaintiff’s case is strong. However, if that information had been disclosed, the defendant employer might have been able to quickly verify that the plaintiff’s claim was indeed righteous, and pay the appropriate damages to the plaintiff. Similarly, AB 1109 may prevent the employer from becoming aware of an abusive employee – leading to additional abuse against employees/customers and additional liability for the employer based on that problematic employee’s continuing conduct.
In other words: even if the information that AB 1109 keeps hidden is eventually revealed, that delay has real-world consequences for claimants (delaying resolution of their claims), courts (spending valuable resources on cases that should have resolved easily), and employers (being unable to identify and remove problematic employees from their workplace).
[…]
As aptly noted by former Governor Jerry Brown in his veto of a similar bill (AB 729 (Hernandez – 2013)): “I don’t believe it is appropriate to put communications with a union agent on equal footing with communications with one's spouse, priest, physician or attorney. Moreover, this bill could compromise the ability of employers to conduct investigations into workplace safety, harassment, and other allegations.”
While we understand the important role that union representatives serve for their union members – we do not see that relationship as akin to the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, we do not believe it is good policy to hide relevant evidence of workplace misconduct by creating this privilege.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California Federation of Labor Unions, AFL-CIO (sponsor)
Association of Flight Attendants - CWA (AFA)
California Association of Psychiatric Technicians
California Conference Board of The Amalgamated Transit Union
California Conference of Machinists
California State Council of Service Employees International Union (SEIU California)
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
Engineers and Scientists of California, IFPTE Local 20, AFL-CIO
Orange County Employees Association
Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG)
Riverside County Deputy District Attorneys Association
Unite Here International Union, AFL-CIO
Utility Workers Union of America
Opposition
Alameda County Office of Education
Association of California Healthcare Districts (ACHD)
California Association of Joint Powers Authorities (CAJPA)
California Association of Recreation & Park Districts
California Chamber of Commerce
California County Superintendents
California Farm Bureau
California Hotel & Lodging Association
California School Boards Association
California Special Districts Association
California State Association of Counties (CSAC)
California Trucking Association
Chief Executive Officers of The California Community Colleges Board
Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC)
Construction Employers' Association
Dublin Unified School District
Flasher Barricade Association
League of California Cities
National Federation of Independent Business
Pleasanton Unified School District
Public Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management (PRISM)
Rural County Representatives of California (RCRC)
School Employers Association of California (SEAC)
Schools Excess Liability Fund (SELF)
Small School Districts' Association
Urban Counties of California (UCC)
Analysis Prepared by: Manuela Boucher-de la Cadena / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Discussed in Hearing
Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations
Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):