Senate Standing Committee on Privacy, Digital Technologies, and Consumer Protection

Good afternoon. The Senate committee on privacy digital technologies and consumer protection will come to order. We're gonna begin as a subcommittee today. Welcome to the second hearing of our committee. Today, we're gonna begin with Senator Weber Pearson who has number one on our file, SB 898. Welcome.

Good afternoon, chair and committee members. Today, I will be presenting SB 898, which requires manufacturers to disclose the minimum amount of time they will support their connected consumer products as well as provide notice when the product is approaching and reaching the point it will no longer receive necessary software support and updates. I want to thank the committee staff for working with our office and I am accepting the committee amendments today which will be taken in Senate Judiciary Committee due to timing.

Millions of consumer products today are enhanced through the Internet connectivity. Think dishwashers, vacuums, TVs, smart TVs, smartwatches, speakers, phones, and much more.

The average household has 21 connected consumer products. We buy these products to enjoy the benefits they promise, like security updates, monitoring for bugs, or performance issues, and like the full functionality of their smart features. However, consumers may be unaware if their connected products may lose software support at all, let alone win. This is important information they should have at the point of sale and easily available at any point.

If that software tether is discontinued, the products they rely on can quickly become vulnerable to security threats, privacy risk, or a significant loss of key features.

As products continue to innovate and connect to the Internet, those risks continue to grow. With that growth should also come reasonable protections and guardrails for consumers. This bill,

in addition to ensuring that before they make a big purchase, they know what the minimum amount of time is that they can expect that product to receive updates and support. This will also ensures that consumers know when a product will be reached will be reaching the end of life, meaning when the manufacturer will definitely no longer, support the critical update of this product. With me to testify is Becca Kramer with consumer reports.

I thank you so much for being here today, and I respectfully ask for an aye vote on SB 898. Thank you.

And, miss Kramer, you have two minutes.

Thank you. Becca Kramer with Kaiser advocacy on behalf of consumer reports in support. SB 898 requires the makers of connected devices to tell consumers how long they plan to support these devices. Consumers are purchasing more devices that connect to the Internet in the form of smart TVs, Smart Home products, and even large appliances. But over time, manufacturers stop updating the software in those connected products, which can affect their security and also their features.

For example, a connected TV that loses updates may not support certain apps like the latest version of Netflix. Just recently, the FBI announced that a Russian group had hacked the end of life consumer and small business routers to conduct attacks on websites, spy on passwords, and gather sensitive data. Some devices may stop working altogether and these end of life devices pose a problem to consumers and our cybersecurity. But there also is the lack of awareness around it is a consumer protection issue.

Many consumers don't understand that with some types of connected devices, when security updates end, many of the useful pea features of their product end with them.

The FTC researched a 184 connected products to discover that only 21 disclosed this device software support duration or end date on their web page. A December 2024 consumer report survey found that forty three percent of connected device owners said that the last time they purchased one, they were not aware it might lose software support at some point. And that same survey found that 68% of Americans believe manufacturers should be required to disclose how long they will support the software in their devices.

The requirements in this bill provide information that consumers can use to purchase connected devices that last longer and that stay secure. It also provides a mechanism for consumers to find out when their products are no longer supported so that they can remove them from their networks, closing a potential security hole.

Other countries have legislation that requires manufacturers of connected devices to disclose how long they plan to support the devices, and it's time that Californians receive these same protections.

Thank you. Thank you. We're gonna suspend consideration of a SB 898 for just a moment, so we can establish a quorum committee system. Please call the roll.

Senators Cabaldon? Hi. Cabaldon here. Jones? Here.

Jones here. Gonzales? McNearney? Here. McNerney here.

Ochoa Bogh. Padilla? Here. Padilla here. Reyes?

Here. Reyes here. Umberg Weiner, we have a quorum.

Alright. We have a quorum. So I'd like to invite any other witnesses in support who'd like to come forward to identify themselves for the record with their name and organization, if there are any. Seeing none, let's proceed to witnesses in opposition. Are there any lead witnesses in opposition that would like to testify in opposition to SB 898?

Any other witnesses in opposition? Alright. With that then we will turn to the committee for questions or discussion. Senator McNerney.

I just want to verify that the five years starts when the product is manufactured, not when it's sold.

The five years start date. That's Start when its manufacturered.

I don't. I would have to double check on that. I'm sorry that I

Yeah. That was a a last minute committee amendment, so we can go back and double check on that and make sure that it is when it's manufactured.

Yeah. That would that would make the most sense.

Yeah. And that's a amendment that will be taken into judish, so we can continue to make sure that we clarify that.

Okay. Thank you. That's all.

Any other questions or comments? Vice chair Jones?

I have some concerns about the enforcement through the unfair competition law that the bill proposes. Basically, it's setting up a private right of action. Some of the enforcement that would be available through that law are not really well well defined at this point in time or specific enough.

And so I was just wondering if you would be open to limiting the enforcement to public agencies that would have expertise in this rather than I guess the concern would be that there would be a flood of lawsuits filed in the state plugging up our judicial system at this point in time when it might be more appropriate for either the DOJ or or some of the attorney general, to enforce it.

Also, I would be interested if there were some safe harbors or cure periods and then, removing the narrow, or or narrow the mandatory replacement requirement.

Are have you given some thoughts to those concerns?

Yeah. So thank you so much for bringing up the concern about private right of action. We'll definitely continue to work on that because as a general policy, I am against the vast majority of the private right of actions.

What I'm finding in this committee is a lot of it is

Unintended consequence.

Well, that's the enforcement mechanism of choice, which I understand generally, but when we're getting into specifics like I think I would rather not plug up the judicial system.

Yeah. I agree with you on that one, so we'll continue

to work. Okay.

I'm gonna be opposed today, but obviously open to conversations as we move forward.

Absolutely. Thank you for bringing that up.

Continuing the San Diego dialogue, Senator deputy.

Alright. Thank you, mister chairman. And to the other, thanks for bringing the bill. Just a question about the extent to which there might be a need for further dialogue about a mechanism for the public notice, or has that been discussed when we're kind of putting the construct? Because that that there's sort of two tier requirements here, which I think is the public at large and then, you know, owner, receiver, lessee.

Is there a continue is there an idea about what that mechanism could look like or what satisfies the requirement?

So we can continue to have conversations about that, but the thought process would be, of course, at the point of purchase. And then if there, you know, at the there is an extension in that particular time, six months prior to the actual end of date and then again when the product will no longer be functioning. And so we can clarify that whether it's mail, email, text, call, to ensure that that consumer is notified.

Thank you, mister chairman.

Senator, ochoa bogh.

Thank you, mister chair . So I'm just, curious if there has been any conversations as to what this may the additional cost in consumers when we add a requirement to replace the devices at the end of life at no additional cost to the lessee on there. Has there been any conversations as to, at the point of sale moving forward, what that will look like for the consumer?

We have not had any conversations about, you know, additional cost. But for the leasee, the the issue is that if you are leasing something and it no longer functions as is and yet you're continuing to pay for it, that is problematic. And so that is why for those who are leasing, that that product would need to be replaced. So that's the thought process behind that.

Yeah. I just was kinda curious because I I understand it. I I understand why it would be. I just I'm thinking of the cost of of living and how any of these bills will have moving forward. And though it might have merit, there's still gonna be a cost to the consumer.

So well intended, but yet still adding to the cost of living. So that's why I was kinda curious to see because they're they're going to take considerations as far as the point of sale original cost moving forward knowing that there will be, the possibility of replacing those those appliances. So what would that entail as far as adding that to the other? So that was that was where I'm coming from.

Right. No. And I completely understand. And I guess the my counter would be having someone pay for something that's not really completely functional because the product had suspended the that function. But turn it over to

I was just gonna say the same, that if you're paying for something that you're leasing that is no longer working, then not only are you paying for something that you cannot use properly, but you're probably going to need it to enter into a lease for a new version of that. And so it's actually this is saving consumers money so that they're not paying twice, so that they can have a functional product that they're leasing.

I I wanna thank the author very much. This is a really important area of of law that needs to be modernized. We need modern solutions for this. I mean, I I'm old enough to remember when subscriptions were just for newspapers and for magazines, not for everything in our lives.

I'm old enough to remember when if Chevy said they're no longer gonna service your 1965 Impala, then you could still drive it even after even though even though they were no longer providing support, but also you could go somewhere else to get support, that was not a proprietary support system.

And this is just the nature of our new society, our new economy, and these devices as they exist that that, we're still filling in some of the rules of the road about making sure that consumers are protected. But as as the author has noted, it isn't just about consumers that this is because, these connected devices form a an Internet of things, a a web of devices across the state, across the country and the world.

They are subject to being hosts of malicious, and nefarious activities by foreign governments, by hackers. And we've seen, you know, somebody with a chatbot taking control of thousands of, robot robot vacuums all all at once, and then can take care take control of your bassinet, your refrigerator. So it has impacts for you, but also for as a foundation for all sorts of of terrorism and other much larger, threats to public safety as the as the senators noticed.

So it really there is a much bigger public interest here than only, consumer protection, and it's it's it's how we get our our our handle on it.

I mean, I think the the the notion of not being able to leave open connected devices without any support, especially in the cybersecurity domain is a is an even larger question, whether you should ever be able to stop providing some form of support to prevent against hacking for a connected device, but that's an that's an issue for another day and a lot more thought. This is a measured approach to try and deal with this and set some basic rules of the road.

The leasing piece I think is, you know, the the the example that we've talked about the most is, you know, I I I get my get my home Internet and the modem is leased by the telecommunications company. That that that device requires support and service for exactly the reasons we were just describing both to both to work as the Internet evolves, but also for security purposes.

And if for whatever reason the company stops providing that support, but I still have an out of date modem or router that no longer can function or no longer can function safely, either for me or for society as a whole, then and only then is the company required to provide a full replacement. So it's not anytime a company stops supporting a device, they must replace it, all products. It's far it's not that at all.

It's only in the specific case that you are leasing a device as part of some other arrangement like like you might from your ISP. So I think the the author's done really good work here to try to to craft a a measured approach, but that that addresses both the security and the consumer and the consumer protection to appreciate the amendments as well and would this is a do pass recommendation.

So if there's no further discussion, it's been moved by Senator McNerney. Committee assistant, please. I'm sorry. I do this every time. Senator Robert Pearson, you may close.

It's quite alright. I respectfully ask for an aye vote and I really appreciate all the conversations and suggestions on this bill. Thank you.

Alright. Committee assistant, please call the roll.

Motion is do passed to judiciary. Senators Cabaldon?

Aye.

Cabaldon, aye. Jones? No. Jones, no. Gonzales?

Aye. Gonzales, aye. McNerney? Aye. McNerney, aye.

Ochoabo? Padilla? Padilla, Aye. Reyes? Reyes, Aye.

Umberg? Weiner? Five to one.

All right. That vote is five to one, and we'll place it on call. Thank you, Senator. Next, if she's willing, we'll turn to Senator Gonzalez to present Item Number Seven, which is SB 1279, and you're welcome to proceed when you are ready.

Hi, Amy. She's here. All right. Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members. I wanna begin by accepting the committee amendments and would like to thank the committee staff for their thorough work.

I'm here to present SB 1279, which authorizes the City of Long Beach to place speed safety cameras along the Pacific Coast Highway. In 2023, as former chair of the Transportation Committee, I worked with Assembly Member Friedman on AB 645, which authorized six cities, including Long Beach, to create a Speed Camera Safety System Pilot Program to reduce speeding. The results speak for themselves. Since implementation, San Francisco has seen a 72% drop in speeding.

As Long Beach moved to implement its own speed safety camera program, they identified one critical gap, the Pacific Coast Highway. It has been incredible to be able to see how many crashes we are experiencing on PCH, which only makes up a 1% of the city's arterial roadways, but it accounts for almost a quarter of their fatalities, which is really unfortunate.

And so, SB 1279 would close the gap, of course, by authorizing these five cameras, and specifically, it requires the same strict guardrails as the current pilot program to protect privacy and promote equity and includes keeping DMV-collected information confidential, prohibiting the use of facial recognition technology, requiring non-punitive warnings for the first 60 days of operation of any camera and fee reductions available for low-income recipients. Testifying in support of the bill today, I welcome Amy Brown, who is here on behalf of the City of Long Beach. I respectfully ask for your aye vote.

Thank you. Mr. Chair and members. I'll use this one. Mr. Chair, members, Amy Brown, on behalf of the City of Long Beach, sponsors of the bill. I wanna thank the author for carrying-- authoring this measure. I'll just emphasize that we often think of the PCH as running along the coastline. In Long Beach, it runs directly through the city, next to elementary, middle, high schools, parks, Long Beach City College.

It's a high foot traffic area, and in fact, just this weekend, there was a fatal crash on PCH between Cherry Avenue and Orange Avenue due to high speed. I'll just mention a couple of the issues related to the privacy provisions of the bill.

Again, like the senator said, the city's department of public works would oversee this program and would not share that information with the police department or any other enforcement agencies, and it limits what is captured in the system in terms of clear photograph of the rear driver's-- rear license plate as opposed to people's faces either when they're walking or riding their bike or driving as a passenger, and it explicitly requires the notices exclude images of those faces. So here to answer any questions of the committee. Ask for your aye vote. Thank you.

Do you have any other lead witnesses? If not, then we'll proceed to witnesses who wish to express support. Please, with your name and organization, if any.

Good afternoon, committee and members. My name is Marc Vukcevich, Director of State Policy for Streets for All. We're in support, and I just wanna note, we were the sponsor of AB-- we were the sponsor of AB 645 by Assembly Member Friedman that instituted the Speed Safety Camera Program. Thank you.

All right. Are there any lead witnesses in opposition? Are there any other witnesses that would wish to express opposition? Seeing none, we'll return it to the committee. Vice Chair Jones.

Just real quick, I-- so there's no surprise, I will be opposing the bill, unfortunately. Based on my experience as a city council member for many years, we actually worked in our city to remove speed cameras and red light cameras, and many jurisdictions in San Diego County followed our lead on that. I just have lots of civil rights challenges with them and due process challenges with them, so I'll be opposing today. Sorry.

Senator Ochoa Bogh.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. So it's interesting because one of the concerns when we were reviewing the bill was-- you know, so I have opposed the previous bill that went into it. Couple of things for me. I like having a human being kind of overseeing thing, the same thing as we-- when we talked in other bills with regards to AI.

Having, you know, a human oversight into all of these, I think, is incredibly important, which is why I'm kinda leery about just having cameras by themselves catching this information. And one of the concerns that I expressed when I was being briefed on the bill was, well, what happens when people have tinted windows and you can't see who's actually driving the vehicle?

Because we can capture the license and we can see the vehicle, but not every person has the registration under their name for that particular bill is the driver, right? We have many, many folks.

So my question is, how do you determine in cases like this who the driver is, who was actually driving--what if the vehicle was stolen or borrowed--and something happens? They live-- and the investigations that go on through all of that. I think that just kinda gives it a little sticky point. And then you add, you know, whether or not they capture the faces, but in this particular case, you mentioned that you don't turn that in.

You don't facilitate the actual facial recognition. And then what guarantee do you have that you have the right driver for that right vehicle for that incident? How does that work?

So in terms of implementation, there is the-- they're not gonna issue these fiscal violations right out of the gate. They're gonna send a warning. This is basically, you know, not a revenue generator for the city by any means. This is a deterrent, essentially. And so those licenses that are captured on these speed cameras, they would be sent a warning, and then the Public Works Department could determine through that interaction if the car was stolen. Then it becomes another issue entirely.

It's no longer under the jurisdiction of the Public Works Department. It's under the, you know, law enforcement. And so, I think because you have that, you know, sort of warning implementation right out of the gate, that will allow some of those concerns that you have about, you know, who's driving the vehicle to be ironed out before a fiscal violation is determined.

So, you know-- so the warning is made to the person who's registered-- the vehicle is registered to, right--

Right.

--who may or may not actually be the driver? Does that, at any point--especially if it's borrowed many a times or whatever it may be--by the time it becomes an actual violation turned into the C-- the California Highway Patrol, CHB, when does that actually go on on a record for the person that actually registered-- is registered-- or the car is registered to that may or may not be the driver?

When they receive a violation, as opposed to a warning.

Okay. So are there investigations that happen then to figure out who the actual driver was?

If if there is-- if I'm driving-- if I'm-- if I own the car, and my son--which is, you know, a typical example because he's 18--if he was driving the vehicle and say, you know, the windows were tinted or, you know, we couldn't determine whether I was driving the car or he was driving the car, then I would receive the warning, right? And then I make the determination of the owner of the car who was driving it at the time.

So basically, the parent, if we're talking about parents and children, if we wanted to protect our children, we could actually take the blame and not actually hold the actual driver liable for, you know, doing a wrong turn or doing whatever he was doing. I don't know what the case may be, but potentially this could actually also deter, say, a parent from actually disclosing that it was the child or the son or the daughter driving the vehicle?

There-- if I may, Senator, there's a long process, I think, on page 7 of the bill. You know, it's 30 calendar days from the date of mailing of a notice of violation. Someone can come in and, you know, discuss, you know, in person what exactly the situation was, if they were the driver or not. There is a long process, and then the issuing agency of the processing agency shall mail the results of the initial review to the person contesting the notice within 60 days.

It's a very long process to be able to get to the root of, you know, who is driving or not, and there was tinted windows or some, you know, special circumstance, but I think at the end of the day, the larger picture is to deter speeding. I mean, we've gotten-- every other day in Long Beach, we have crashes that have mostly resulted in fatalities, and so that's really what we're getting to. I think this is a special circumstance that we can absolutely, you know, consider as it goes through the process and as there's, you know, various different issues.

And I completely understand and I respect the concern that they-- that that you currently have. I'm just very, very leery about the fact that we don't have a human person, like a human-- an actual-- a human person, of course a human person-- a person actually stopping and being and visually seeing who the driver is versus having a camera who is just taking a picture and having the tinted windows or whatever it may be where it could be questionable as to whether or not the actual driver was the actual driver and not somebody else saying-- covering up for somebody else on that end.

And that's a component just like the same concerns that we have with AI, that we wanna make sure that there's a human component in the oversight of how AI is being implemented. Same thing with these cameras.

I would say there is, you know, through the ticketing process. There is going to be, obviously, the Public Works Department that will be overseeing this, but we have-- in a city of 500,000, we have less than 700-- about 750 officers. They're on, you know, all the beats on major crimes in our city, and this is one less thing that they would have to worry about.

Of course, we would like more human, you know, operated or enforcement in these areas, but they sometimes just can't get to the speeding across the city. This is one deterrent to be able to help and assist them and supplement that-- not, you know, take over their role in enforcement.

And I-- the merit behind it, I completely understand why. I'm just trying to really put on record that there could be questions as to whether or not who actually is actually driving the vehicle when we only have a camera picture and, say, tinted windows and-- or something where we're not even-- you know, we don't know who they actually is because they're not being stopped and visually seeing who the driver is.

I'm just thinking of a lot could get away from a system like this, though well-merited and so forth. So that's my concern on that end and why I'm not very supportive of just having, you know, cameras saying, hey, you know, you're speeding. Well, they may or may not have been the driver, and say they are the driver, say a parent. They could easily, you know, cover for somebody else.

And so it makes the system faulty in its very, very-- in principle. So that's my concern on that. But I completely understand that in public safety we want to have every deterrent. And we-- you know, public safety is one of the most important aspects of local government, is to ensure that we have, you know, enough public safety officers to meet the needs of our community. Many of our cities don't have that, but that majority of the budget should be towards public safety on that end.

So that's why I won't be able to support, because I just think in principle, there's too many ways of just kind of curtailing the system and not being actually effective in holding people that are supposed to be held accountable, accountable. And I like the human component and just like we would in AI. That's my primary concern.

Thank you.

A bunch of us are from local government in the building. I just wanna just note, I took some of the same actions as our Vice Chair, and we undid-- police chief still hasn't forgiven me. We undid our red light camera bill for some of these reasons, but I will note that part of the reason for that was that for a long time, before the author as Chair of the Transportation Committee and others kind of really dug into this, the financial incentives that were there were so severely out of whack.

So what-- you know, our sister today sort of assumed, look, we're not gonna catch you most of the time. The vast majority, we will not catch you engaging in traffic violations. So when we do, the penalty has to be super high so that you don't do it.

But the problem has been that with the technology getting better, if we're gonna catch you half the time, most of the time, and we still charge enormous penalties, then there's a huge market opening for some of the companies that were in this space to make a lot of money in the cities as well.

So the economics incentives were all off, and so we couldn't rely on local governments necessarily to make the right choices about those balance. But this bill, like some of its predecessors-- but the author is, you know, taking care in this bill to assure that the penalties that are involved are not disabling, they're not $500 or $400 or the-- you know, because they recognize that's not the point.

The point here is to deal with traffic fatalities and injuries. Everything else is leading up to that, leading up to that point. So I think the author's done a good job of trying to build on the work that's already been done. Obviously, we're all especially sensitive right now about all camera data and other sort of things, so these are all important questions.

But, you know, for those with local-- you know, local government experience, having run a-- you know, overseen a police department before, all local law enforcement is tweeners and, you know, some things are ambiguous.

We're-- I'm sure parents are-- moms, if-- you know, I know my mom would do this if I got a parking ticket. She probably paid for it when I was 17, because parking already works like this, right? Parking violations aren't sent to the driver. They are sent to the owner of the car. So this is not unprecedented by any means. I'm sure Amy paid for her son's ticket.

So, I mean, it's just not that-- I mean, nothing is that black and white, and here what we're trying to do is give the authority on a pilot basis in order to to grapple with the very real implications for public safety, and not just for getting hit and dying; just for the walkability and the bikeability and the sharing of these streets.

So this seems like a well-balanced approach, but it is-- you know, like the others that have been passed by this Legislature, they're all have a pilot and sunsets and reports in order for us to really assess some of these questions and see, does it have the intended impact and if-- and even if it does, what are some of the unintended consequences? I do intend to support the bill myself and thank the author for her continued leadership on this work. And with that, invite you to close, Senator Gonzalez.

I just want to say thank you so much, even from my colleagues who don't support, but this, again, is with the intention of public safety, and since this is the Privacy Committee, this has been vetted.

In fact, the City of Long Beach is going even further on retention policies, on ensuring that the data is siloed enough so it isn't being shared. It's confidential, and so I think they have done an amazing job to be able to get this to a place where, you know, civil rights aren't being impeded on, and then of course, ensuring that we're learning more from this technology as we roll it out with the implementation of the city's pilot program that's in the works now. So with that, I respectfully ask for an aye vote.

All right. So we have a motion by Senator Padilla, and that motion is do pass as amended to the Committee on Appropriations. Committee Assistant, please call the roll.

[Roll call].

Six to two. We'll put that measure on call and now proceed to Item Five by Senator Ashby, which is SB 1111. And please proceed when you're ready.

Hello, colleagues. Thank you for having me. I am flying solo today, so all of my normal help is is not available. So we should just be Okay, great. I will do my best.

I'm here to present SB1111 which I call the artificial intelligence abuse protection act. The bill establishes a legal framework for regulating artificial intelligence, voice image, and video cloning technology. California is leading the nation in AI regulations. However, a significant gap remains. I should say we've been working on this bill for a while, Christian and I.

Okay. The lack of a comprehensive legal framework to address the nonconsensual creation of deep fake audio and images is dangerous and leaves victims with no remedy. This exposes individuals to various forms of exploitation, identity theft, scams, misinformation, and misrepresentation of character. While some deep fakes target public figures, AI software now allows users to create content really featuring anyone. Often women are the targeted victims and the vast majority of incidents are sexually explicit in nature.

This bill creates a framework to hold AI users accountable by creating clear legal standards for victims and defining the boundaries of AI technology. SB 1111 establishes violations in the right of publicity law and false impersonation law for using a person's voice or likeness to create a digital replica without their consent. As technology changes, it's important that California try to advance our standards to keep up AND MAKE SURE THAT PEOPLE ARE NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACTED.

THIS BILL IS SPONSORED BY eleven eleven MEDIA, WHICH IS PARIS HILTON'S ORGINIZATION AND SUPPORTED BY SAG AFTRA, RAIN, and the transparency coalition among others. I would just add that this bill has passed this legislature before and has had a lot of input from the chair of judiciary and the former staff of judiciary, both of whom are in the room are very familiar with the bill.

So, Mr. Jones, should you ask me hard questions, I have plenty of help. Respectfully ask for your aye vote.

Alright. Thank you, Senator. Are there any witnesses in support? Are there any witnesses in support that would merely wish to express their their support and their with your name and organization?

Connor Guzman. Good afternoon, chair and members. Connor Guzman on behalf of SAG AFTRA and prod support. Thank you.

Good afternoon. Dagny Starin with Brightlight Strategies on behalf of Common Sense Media in support.

Right. Thank you. Are there any lead witnesses in opposition? Does anyone else wish to express their opposition? Seeing none, let's move to the committee for any questions or comments.

Senator Ochoa Bogh, we we've had a motion in stereo by Senator Reyes. Senator Ochoa Bogh.

Thank you, mister chair. So, Senator Ashby, quick question. So have they had any conversations on whether or not, it would be reasonable that someone could sue that is included in an image that maybe like an employee being a part of the image in the background that they don't know that they're there? Has there been any discussions as to how that might be impacting these folks and the requirements or the liability for them being in the background?

Yeah. We did address that last year in judiciary and took some amendments to make sure that that there was just notice and that people were given permission. People had to give permission. We really the the focus of this bill is far more egregious than that. It's really this this all happened because, folks like happened to Taylor Swift and to Billie Eilish and to Paris Hilton that basically pornographic AI was made of them.

And there is a suite of laws that are in the criminal space, criminal code, penal code, that address that. But there's not a an ability for someone to enter into the civil arena and defend themselves. And so that's a real problem. So that's what we set out to address here.

And really this bill has it's had so much, input that I feel now it's I'm actually quite grateful for the process, but I think this bill is so much better now after the many conversations that it's had over the last couple years.

But that is a topic that was discussed last year in judiciary and we did address it as an employee I mean, a person doesn't give their image to their employer just unless they have already assigned for that. Pretty standard. We know that even in your kids' schools. They can't use pictures of them without you giving permission. We've tried to follow the existing law in that space.

I will be supporting the bill today.

Thank you.

But I do have a concern also with, removing the rebuttable presumption for employers. I think that is a

concern. And how that could open up the liability for those that are truly acting in good faith. That's the only concern.

I just wanna bring it to your mind because I know you're a very a very thoughtful legislator and I know that you always take the input and feedback in your bill so I just wanted just to plant that seed that I think it's a great bill but that is a concern that I do have and would love if the opportunity rises to see something addressing that.

Alright, sir. So noted. Thank you. Appreciate the feedback.

Any other questions or comments? Alright. Senator Ashley, you may close.

Respectfully ask for your aye vote.

Alright. It's been the motion is by Senator Reyes.

K. The motion is do passed to public safety. Senators Cabaldon? Aye. Cabaldon, aye.

Jones? No. Jones, no. Gonzales? Aye.

Gonzales, aye. McNerney? Aye. Aye. Padilla?

Aye.

Padilla? Aye. Reyes?

Aye.

Reyes, aye. Umberg? Aye. Thunberg, aye. Weiner?

Aye. Weiner, aye.

And the vote's seven to one. We'll place that measure on call.

Thank you. It's fine.

Thank you. Senator Grove has SB 1217. Welcome, and please proceed when you're ready.

My witnesses are outside, sir.

It is.

Thank you, mister chair and members. Before I begin, I want to thank the committee staff for their analysis and for working with my staff on the amendments that I believe make the bill better. As noted in the analysis, I would like to accept committee amendments that provide definition for what is an intimate image and to clarify the bill does not cover images of minors and to refine the definition of a covered platform.

I especially want to thank the sponsors of this bill who are survivors of sexual exploitation themselves and their tireless engagement to try to get their images offline from the public eye has been an incredible feat for them. This is a complex issue and the collaboration that we've seen so far is pretty incredible.

My commitment to protecting, the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, has been a cornerstone of my work here in the legislature. I've seen firsthand the victim's journey towards justice that does not end with a conviction. In this modern day ever and, era of traffickers and exploiters, we have a new weapon that survivors that survives long after someone is behind bars. It's the digital record of the abuse.

We're seeing an explosion of nonconsensual intimate imagery also called NCII, which includes not just stolen photos or pictures or videos taken under duress, but increasingly sophisticated AI generated deep fakes.

These images are used as blackmail to silence and to retraumatize survivors, often preventing them from ever truly rebuilding their lives. SB 1217 is the next step to fight against human trafficking and exploitation. The bill establishes a secure state administered clearinghouse within the California Department of Justice that will allow survivors to submit verified requests from, for removal after which the department will authenticate the request and generate unique identifiers and then transfer them to the covered platforms like Instagram and Facebook.

These platforms would then be required to remove the images within forty eight hours, which is consistent with the federal law under 2025, the Take It Down Act. The bill ensures that when criminal harm ends, the digital harm can finally end as well.

I'm proud that SB 1217 is a survivor driven proposal. Survivors came to me with this idea and this legislation to help them navigate, like, the whack a mole situation they have where they have to go through individually and identify all the platforms and approach each one of them in these corporate organizations on their own. And this solution that they focused on is fixing a very real problem that plagues many human trafficking and sexual assault survivors.

The bill reflects reflects that the survivors, what they've been asking for, which is a system that recognizes the ongoing nature of this harm and importantly shifts the burden away from those who are exploited. The bill focuses on three critical areas, closing the tech gap.

We explicitly include AI generated content to ensure that our laws keep pace with the predators using digital digital forgeries to harass victims. Number two, the frontline victim response. We require, police officers, to act as a bridge. All's we're asking the police officer to do when they get a complaint to someone filing a victim filing a complaint is to say, let me direct you to the clearing house. A centralized enforcement pillar is number three.

While federal law will undertake the take it down act, now requires platforms to remove this con the content, SB 1217 creates a how to do it. And it provides a secure state porthole where the DOJ verifies the request once the demands are removed and removal from all platforms simultaneously, not individually. I wanna reiterate my commitment to refining this bill.

I look forward to the continuing the work with the committee and further sharpen the verification process to ensure that this clearing house is safe, secure, and bulletproof process for all survivors. For the women trying to heal from their trafficking or whose lives have been, being upended by deep fakes, we should not ask them to play, like I said earlier, whack a mole with multibillion dollar tech companies.

We can provide them with the centralized government backed clearinghouse to help them reclaim their dignity. S. B. Twelve seventeen is supported by a large number of survivor led organizations, and I respectfully ask for your aye vote. Some of the organizations that we have all all address in my close, and they're also in your bill analysis.

With me today are two incredible warriors. The notes in my comments say survivors, but they are truly warriors with what they've endured in their life and continue to fight for those that are more vulnerable in some cases than they are because they have truly survived their ordeal. They're fierce advocates who represent are representatives of our sponsor their survivor coalition. I have Mariah Reeve and I have, Nitzia, Niamhales, and Serrano.

Welcome to you both. You at least have two minutes.

Mister chair and distinguished members of the committee, my name is Mariah Reif, and I am a federally recognized victim of sex trafficking in the Girls Do porn case. I am here today alongside another survivor who has also continued to live with the impact of this crime long after the case was prosecuted. More than a decade ago, the video of my abuse is still being uploaded, shared, and sold, often on foreign websites The United States has no jurisdiction over.

I have been told that if I want that content removed, that I need to contact Interpol. That is the current reality for survivors.

At the same time, the burden to respond falls entirely on us. I have been forced to search for my own abuse online, collect the links, document the evidence, and relive it, only to be told by an attorney that my case was not worth pursuing, not for the merits, but because of the logistics. This is not a rare story, but a rarely told one. In 2026, ten million Americans reported being victims of nonconsensual intimate imagery. By 2019, that number had risen by four hundred percent.

Research published in 2025 found that more than one in five adults have experienced online exploitation. I'm a single mother paying out of pocket to be here today in support of that bill. And while I'm doing this, I live every day with a very real fear that without the establishment of this clearing house, my children who are six and four may one day come home from school with tears in their eyes asking why somebody at school found a video of their mother online being abused.

So I'm asking you directly, without the establishment of this clearing house, what are victims supposed to do? Because right now, the system does not just fail to protect us after the crime is proven, it leaves us responsible for cleaning it up.

SB 1217 simply brings structure and accountability to that reality. It places the clearing house within the Department of Justice to ensure integrity and oversight while allowing collaboration with experienced nonprofit partners who are already doing this work every single day. This is not just about what happened to us. It is about what continues to happen to so many people every single day. The nonconsensual content is allowed to remain online.

And without action, we are not just failing to prevent exploitation, we are allowing it to continue indefinitely. I'm here not only in support of this bill, but I'm also here on behalf of the California Survivor Coalition, and also I'm here in support today for three strand of this bill. Thank you so much for listening, and thank you for your time.

Alright. Thank you.

Thank you. Chair and members of the committee, my name is Nitzia Nievesorano. I am a federally recognized victim of the sex trafficking case of Girls DuPorn. Nearly a decade ago I was strict, trapped and abused. It was filmed, shared and sold worldwide and today in twenty twenty six nothing has changed. My image is still being distributed online.

I am being doxxed nearly every day. I receive harassment and some of it even threatening my life. This didn't end when the case did. And just as Mariah stated, one in five adults have experienced exploitation, so this could be your daughter. Because every hour that content stays online, it spreads, downloaded, copied, and reuploaded faster than any victim can keep up with.

The internet moves in seconds, not days. That's the gap that this bill needs to close. Living like this creates constant fear, the kind that makes you question every person who approaches you whether they mean harm or not. This is what post traumatic stress disorder looks like when it never gets the chance to really heal.

With no one to turn to, not lawyers, not law enforcement, not society, I have lost my privacy, I have lost family, I have lost my friends, I have lost the ability to live a normal life, but I'm still required to live and provide to society as if nothing ever happened.

Because when your image is online, it doesn't stay there alone. It is tied to your name, your address and your identity. And that's why this clearinghouse really matters. But it must move fast enough to match the harm. Forty eight hours, not seventy two can really mean the difference between containment and permanent damage.

It must protect all victims of crimes that happened here in California, not just those who still live here. And I'm fortunate enough to say that I survived, but I'm also telling the story of those who died didn't. Bill SB 1217 has the power to give survivors something we don't have the right right now. A real chance at safety, at dignity, and at peace. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you both. Are there other members of the public that wish to express support for the bill? Please come forward to the stand up mic.

Clifton Wilson on behalf of the board of supervisors of Tulare and Fresno, both in support. Thank you.

I'm here in support, in my personal personal capacity as a survivor of a federal trafficking case, and I've experienced firsthand how the images of my abuse circulated long after the criminals in my case were put behind bars. These images disrupt communities, tear at the fabric of civic life, and generate a toll that impacts every layer of American society. The Internet is fragmented and complex, and for victims, it can feel ungovernable with very real consequences. That's why a centralized point of coordination is so important. I commend the sponsors for taking an important step in that direction, and I look forward to the work ahead.

Thank you. And just just a reminder, that that this portion of our testimony is for your name and or and organizational identification only. The no. Don't don't do not apologize. Happy to take the testimony, but just to just to know for for the for future presentations today.

Okay. Well, I didn't know that, but, my name is Marvette Judah. I'm here with Muslim Day at the Capitol, and, this bill really touched my heart because I know a lot of survivors. I know you're not planning to have us speak, but as a the chair of the Arab American Caucus and a person who knows a lot of survivors, I think this bill is extremely important. It's basic, and I really hope that it's get passed it's passed as as soon as possible.

I'm a mother of two daughters and have sisters and men and women that are survivors. Thank you. I hope you support.

Thank you. And are there any lead witnesses in opposition to the bill? Anyone who else wishes to express opposition to the bill? And if not, we'll turn to the committee, Senator Reyes.

Thank you, Senator Grove, for bringing this bill forward, and thank you to the witnesses for for your courage to come and tell us the story, not only for yourselves, but for other survivors. I did have some questions. Does the bill preclude civil lawsuits by survivors?

There's no language in the bill about civil lawsuits.

I know that in the analysis it says it specifically it clarifies that the bill does not include create a private private right of action. Is that correct?

Exactly.

Is it something you're you will consider in future for this bill?

No. I haven't even given it thought. I don't support private right of actions. In most all cases, it wasn't something that was discussed. The survivors and the survivor collection brought this idea to me and my staff because of the work that we've done in human trafficking in the past.

And so we took their language, their idea, and their information, and what they felt would be best suited for them as survivors of this. If you take, girls, do porn, which was the largest case in San Diego County in California where 600 individuals were arrested, Those people went to prison and got convictions, but their images of the individuals that they they raped, they videotaped it, they put it up online, the images are still out there.

So the goal of this is to allow them to have a centralized location to take down those images, so that those images don't haunt them or come back to them in future years, currently or in future years.

Thank you. And then there was comments about foreign countries and you were told to the the witnesses were told to contact INTERPOL. How how does this bill help with foreign countries?

It does not. California is we we're looking at California jurisdiction in partnership with, like, the Federal Government under the Take It Down Act. The Take It Down Act requires these these platforms to remove the contact within forty eight hours, but it doesn't give them a mechanism on how to do this. This allows them to file a complaint, provide the information. These are my images.

This is what happened to me. And then the the DOJ will authenticate that and immediately send a notice to the platform to remove it. It's a facilitating bill.

And then my final question, after a survivor has sent their their images to Department of Justice, and Department of Justice then notifies each of the platforms, and it is then taken down, can the survivor at that point request that their images be removed from the DOJ's list?

Absolutely. And I'll let Mariah, you wanna expand on that, how you put that together. She's actually the brains behind this.

I am the main author on this bill. So to hit on the

Can't take that because it belongs to the statute. No.

But I'm the survivor that she refers to and I Of course. Yes. So as far as the inter poll question, the idea with SB 1217 is that if there was a centralized clearing house that we could go to to submit one time, have our image verified by DOJ, DOJ that would then pass it off to a nonprofit to facilitate with the organizations or with the platforms.

The only thing that would be left over after the investigation and verification of DOJ would be the digital hash. After that, the the image should be removed, and we also support quarterly or however the committee sees fit audits to not just DOJ, but also nonprofits to see that it's a good fit and that those are happening in good faith as well.

And to extend on that, right now, there's over a thousand platforms with 230 or excuse me, a thousand images just of Mariah herself and 231 platforms. So we're allowing and trusting this stuff that I could show you and read the the horrific stuff that's online and posted and what it shows and, what is what happened to her, back in San Diego that's still online.

But we don't trust a sworn officer at the DOJ or police to be able to take these images and do the right thing with them.

That's where I feel like the question arises, because the bottom line is is that it's out there for the public purview right now, and, we're just asking DOJ to that are licensed sworn officers to look at the information, do the same facial recognition that they use on all these other cases, recognize that yes, this is her image and then request it to be taken down.

Thank you, ma'am.

And if I may, the the the other issue which I spoke to the author about was the capacity of DOJ to do this. That's in appropriations, it's not part of the policy. So with that, I would move the bill.

Thanks, Senator Reyes. Senator Gonzales.

Thank you very much. And I first want to thank the survivors for their stories and I'm sure it's not easy coming here in front of everyone, but nonetheless, you two are very brave and I really appreciate you personally being here, as my colleague said, to speak for not just yourself but so many survivors. I do thank the author for bringing this forward. I want this to be successful. As I had mentioned to her, I was just logistically trying to think of how it would work technically.

I have concerns, you know, sending this to the DOJ, and I'm not a survivor, so I can't I don't have your lived experience, but sending these to the DOJ, I think of, you know, is it encrypted? Is it are these really protected? And is it really getting to the merit of actually ensuring that they're taken down? That is the whole goal of this bill.

So how do you see this, working as, my Senate colleague said, you know, with lack of capacity, with maybe some lack of technical capabilities from some of the sworn officers to figure out whether what's intimate or not and then they also have to go to various websites too.

It's a bit of a cumbersome process but all righteous and worthy to ensure that you're all getting these images removed. How do you see all that? I mean, I'm willing to vote for this to make this move forward, but I'm just I really wanna make sure that it gets to the merit of what this bill is intended to do.

I'll respond in the letter due to process. It's not encrypted now. You can Google her name and all these things come up. Oh, sure. It's not encrypted now.

It's available to the public. So to say that the DOJ that the issue of giving it to the DOJ and is it encrypted? Is it safe? Is it secure? It's it's by far not safe and secure right now.

You can Google her name and you can get all the images where she was raped, where all these things happened to her when she thought she was going to a modeling a modeling photo shoot a photo shoot. And when she got there, there was a whole film set, everything set up, and instantaneously life changed. So all of that is available online for any of you to Google right now. Anybody in this room, you can Google her name and you can find it.

So it it's not encrypted now, ma'am, but I'll let her respond on the the process on how to do it.

The current the current, systems in place for victims would be to hire an attorney. No attorney that I've ever spoken to will take my case, unless they see it. We've we've followed a lot of the model of NCVIC, they do incredible work for child abuse material. Somebody within an an authorized person, in fact, NCVIC states on their website that they have three authorized people to review content before it is verified.

I can tell you truly from a survivor, and I and I also feel confidently that I speak for other survivors, I would so much rather submit my content to the DOJ to have somebody verify it than as miss Grove stated that currently, all you have to do is Google my name.

And if a concern is the DOJ storing it, I would ask the committee, is there concern about what is currently online and and the families that we try to build? Because I have reached out to two attorneys.

I've been I've been tasked with collecting my links, finding the data or finding my videos, reading the disgusting comments, and seeing how many views each video has amassed on each website, taken it before an attorney who's got back to me a month later and said, thank you for what you've done. It isn't the lack of merit, it is simply the basis. I have been successful in one one, lawsuit and it was against Pornhub.

Otherwise, there's it's just not worth an attorney's time, and that's where I would then ask the committee, what are we supposed to do? Because if we're not comfortable with DOJ seeing the photos and storing them temporarily, why are we okay sending them to an attorney who still has the links of my abuse, but just simply says, sorry, it's not worth my time. So that's what survivors are up against.

The only option that we have is to either take it upon our own hands, which I've tried to do. And like Senator Gross has stated, my content, if you Google it, is on up to page nine on Google.

There's it's on over 236 websites, each website amassing hundreds of thousands of views. And as far as the first amendment goes and how this could possibly be, you know, there's a transparency tool called Lumen database. Someone if anybody is familiar with that, that is a transparency tool that if anybody if anything is removed from Google, because it is deemed inappropriate, like my content, it then we have a we have a right under the constitution to know.

So Lumen database, actually, if it's deemed not appropriate for Google, gets catalogued on Lumen. So my name alone has over a thousand submissions.

So it's out there, and it's not encrypted already.

Yeah. And I appreciate you you mentioning that. I just wanna make sure we are not retraumatizing. As a government agency, we have the duty to ensure that your images are, you know, in in secure and that your privacy doesn't continue to be exploited, is why I'm asking the question, and I wholeheartedly understand, what you're saying. I just I'm logistically trying to figure out how this is all gonna work.

You know, we, you know, I want again, I wanna make sure that this is intended, to save continue safeguarding privacy, but ultimately ensures that your images are are taken off, which is the merit of this bill. So I will support the bill today. There'll be a lot of questions, I'm sure. This is brand new, nascent. It's, but it's all worth, the cause most certainly.

So again, I thank you both for for coming here and and speaking your truth, and, I look forward to working with the author on this. Thank you.

Other questions or comments? Vice Chair Jones.

I wanna thank, Senator Reyes for bringing up the point about the private right of action. That's been a topic of discussion here, and I share your concerns about the private right of action as I've shared also my position on that might evolve throughout the year. Maybe there's a tool you might talk about later on in a different vehicle or different avenue than this. I I do want to acknowledge the survivors for coming. I'm from San Diego.

I represent San Diego. Very familiar with this case and the multiple women that were trafficked and abused by this scenario, and it is despicable and so thank you for your bravery in coming forward today and bringing this to us. I think the members have pretty much addressed my concerns regarding the bill specifically today. Obviously, we will have some future conversations about how we're gonna fund this for DOJ and you know, what that standing it up in their department looks like.

So I don't know if Senator Grove, if you've had some conversations with DOJ that you can share with us about that, or if not, it's okay.

Approached it from the policy standpoint, but we do have suggestions for DOJ, and I can let Mariah follow-up on that one because there's a substantial amount of money that is not being used, that can be used for this specific purpose.

Okay. I think that's good. Just kinda set the foundation for that as this moves forward.

Yeah. So in the twenty twenty four, twenty twenty five fiscal year, governor Newsom, allocated, I believe it's a $103,000,000 to the CalVCB, foundation. That's California Victim Compensation Board. That is pure money to support not only victims, but also organizations or government entities that are established to support victims. And I think that that would be a great way a great place to start because, again, it's it's allocated specifically for victim support.

Okay. Thank you. Would would there Senator Grove, would you anticipate any kind of conversation that would include the DOJ going after these platforms and finding them as as they're pursuing these images?

So, the way the bill is written is that that DOJ would be the clearing house to verify the images are correct and then send a notice to the platforms, to take it down within forty eight hours. Now I would assume that, if they did not comply with the DOJ order, the DOJ would pursue that.

Okay. So basically, there's lots of room to find ways to make this work.

Yes.

Okay. Thank you.

The main thing is to make sure that the the images are taken offline. And like I said, with the security piece, I understand I understand my colleague from Long Beach that, you know, the immediate alarm in your brain is to say, well, what makes these images secure when they go to the DOJ? And I I just appreciate your support so much on the bill, but the images are already out there online. And anybody could get them and send them anywhere.

And so we just want to send them to a place where that will take action, hopefully, to remove those images online.

And to be honest, you if we are just if the DOJ sends Facebook, Instagram, or another platform, a thing that says these are not appropriate online, they're images that we're protecting these survivors. We are, you know, demanding, requesting, ordering you, whatever the language is to take it down. You would think that those those, platforms would abide by what the DOJ's request was.

Okay. Thank you. I'm supportive also.

Thank you, sir.

Senator Ochoa Bogh. Thank you.

I'll be supporting the bill today. And, you know, it's interesting, you know, we talk about advocacy and what that looks like and how to understand and navigate the legislative process. And I, today, you are literally a testament of what happens when you have a lived experience as mentioned and you bring that to action and you advocate. And you couldn't have picked a more fervent advocate and in my book of rock star than Senator Grove when it comes to advocating for victims in human trafficking.

So and, so kudos.

I hope for the sake of your two and four year old, that your success.

Thank you very much.

Alright. Thank you, Senator. I'm also gonna support the bill today. There there is I think there is continued work to be done. This is a it's a it's a it's a a new solution to an opening that happened because of the Take It Down Act, but obviously, as is common with the Federal Government, you know, decent policy, really not great for implementation because it leaves this enormous gap where where citizens have to kind of self enforce.

And so that's that's the gap this bill is trying to trying to address, which why it doesn't need as many of the novel enforcement approaches including including the private right of action because there is that other solution at the end of the day, that that so many victims are unable to access because of their the issues that we've heard today. This this puts the state of California in the victim's corner in the in the transaction of of, of showing that their rights are are upheld.

So I I think that the the intent is right, the design is right, I appreciate. I don't know what I think about the funding source, but that's enough for this committee to work on, but I but but just to also add, you know, add my my appreciation for the thoughtfulness that's gone into to the scope of the solution.

The and I I continue to have the same concern that's been raised by the by the by the members of the committee as well, even when I first read it, and if there's a clearing if it's one of the world's largest clearing houses of of nonconsensual illicit images, the Department of Justice will be a target for massive cyber security attacks.

I mean, to that name alone, is a is so inviting for for folks that are backed by Quantum computing or 20,000 autonomous AI bots that are gonna that so that it isn't as simple as simply declaring that it will be secure, that, this will be an a very, very attractive target for for folks to try to get access to the images. That's why, you know, staff has urged you to take a look at, you know, could we hash earlier in the process?

Could we avoid people having to send them unsecured? Because it I mean, really, the point of the bill is to is to be able to intercept this activity before it's on 200 websites and it's been downloaded a million times. That that's that's the idea.

So, you know, no one has to go through this again, and so it it does matter how secure it is and how how protected it is because our hope is that that we not only that that we'll catch it early enough and know that the state will not, as Senator Gonzales said, contribute potentially to to to increasing to amplifying the effect of these images globally. So I know that Senator Groves committed to to doing that.

Appreciate the work on the on the author's amendments and the recommendations do pass. And Senator Groves, would you like to close?

Thank you, mister chair, for your support.

The two passes submitted. Sorry. The amendments will be taken. The amendments will be taken in public safety. Thanks, Christian.

Yes. Thank you, sir. Thank you all for your support and your comments. It does I need to correct something. It doesn't create a civil penalty for the individual who's filing the complaint, but the DOJ can provide a civil penalty if they do not comply.

I could read you some of the horrific things that are up online about these two beautiful ladies sitting in front of you, And it's available, and it's available for out there for the world to see. This simply allows them to say, you know, mister DOJ investigator, this is my image. This is what's happening. These are the 231 platforms that are on that it's on.

And, as soon as they do that facial recognition, I think they get it, they send an email out, it says take it down, or they send out, whatever it is, their order to take it down.

And, it just gives them an opportunity for a one stop shop, I guess is the best way to explain it so that they don't have to go to each individual platform by themselves, engage an attorney, and have that attorney of record have documents, which are also available online that the attorney can get. But I think this the best secure place to do it is somebody who's a sworn law enforcement officer.

And I know that, you know, we have issues with some of that, but this is a sworn law enforcement officer at the DOJ that's gonna collect these images. As soon as it's verified, they're supposed to destroy those images and just let the hash stay so that we know that it's been taken care of. Thank you.

Respectfully ask for an aye vote.

Alright.

Oh, well, I apologize. Sorry. I do have three strands global foundation, California survivor coalition, central valley alliance for justice coalition. These are all in your, in your analysis. But I have three pages full of coalition letters from survivors that really do support this that didn't have the ability to come up here or the resources to come up and testify in person.

So thank you respectfully and ask for an aye vote.

Alright. Thank you, Senator Grove. Senator Reyes has made the motion, which is do pass to the committee on public safety. Committee system, please call the roll.

Senators Cabaldon? Aye. Cabaldon, aye. Jones? Aye.

Jones, aye. Gonzales? Aye. Gonzales, aye. McNerney?

Ochoa Bogh, aye. Padilla? Padilla, aye. Reyes Reyes, aye. Umberg?

Aye. Umberg, aye. Weiner? Aye. Weiner, aye.

That bill's eight to votes eight to zero, and we'll put the bill on call. Thank you.

Please tell thank you. Thank you.

Alright. Thank you for being here. Alright. Next we'll turn to Senator Perez who has item did she just step out?

She'll be right back.

Okay. There she is. Senator Perez, item number number two, which is SB957. Alright. There's no objection, we'll move to SB1095 First, and then we'll come back to SB957.

So, Senator Perez, you may proceed.

Thank you. Good afternoon, chair and members. Thank you to the chair and committee staff for their incredible work on SB 1095. We are accepting the amendments and are committed to continuing to work on this bill as it moves to the next committee.

SB 1095 protects privacy and constitutional rights of Californians by requiring the state agency overseeing fusion center operations and California law enforcement entities to adopt a memorandum of understanding that prohibits the sharing of sensitive personal information for immigration enforcement or racial or identity profiling, in order for that entity to participate in the fusion center.

This bill also requires annual reporting of all state fusion center operations. Fusion centers were originally established to support counterterrorism efforts following the September 11th terrorist attacks by attacking—by acting—as a data sharing hub, connecting local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. There are six of these state-run facilities located in California, which share information from sources such as automated license plate readers or ALPLRs, facial recognition scans, driver license records, utility records, and social media activity.

Despite California's constitutional right to privacy, as well as the California Values Act, which prohibits state and local law enforcement from using their resources to aid in immigration enforcement, these centers share personal information with federal and out of state agencies without consent and without regard for state and local laws. Fusion centers have documented history of being used to circumvent California's laws and privacy protections.

In Orange County, ICE agents asked a La Habra police officer to run searches at an Orange County fuse—fusion center. In San Francisco, local law enforcement circumvented a local ban on facial recognition by asking for help from a fusion center with access to the technology. The Northern California Fusion Center issued multiple warnings to 14,000 police officers stating local Black Lives Matters rallies were dangerous.

In Southern California, local and state law enforcement continue to share license plate surveillance information with federal agencies, including ICE and Border Patrol, violating state law more than 100 times in May of 2025 alone. These are state-run operations with no state oversight.

SB 1095 would strengthen transparency and accountability in fusion centers by requiring state and local entities to adopt an MOU to participate, share, or disclose information with the fusion center. These MOUs will be agreed upon by Cal OES, the state entity which largely oversees the operations of these centers for California, and state and local law enforcement that engage with these fusion centers.

These MOUs must contain provisions to affirm that information cannot be shared for the purposes of immigration enforcement or racial profiling consistent with federal, state, and local laws. It would prohibit targeted surveillance of individuals based on ideology or First Amendment protected activities.

It would set parameters to further protect individual privacy and prevent unlawful or unauthorized data sharing, and it would create a process for state and local elected officials to enter and inspect any state fusion center and prohibit changes to the terms of the MOU without the approval by the governing board.

These MOUs must be adopted in an open session meeting of the entity's governing board and any violation of the MOU will render the MOU invalid and result in the withdrawal of the entity from participation in the fusion center. The bill also requires an annual report of state fusion centers to be sent to the California Department of Justice.

SB 1095 establishes clear guardrails for the information transmitted through fusion centers, prevents their use for immigration enforcement or racial or identity profiling, and ensures that California's laws and constitutional rights are upheld. I wanna be clear that this is not an attempt to undermine the counterterrorism and public safety function that fusion centers serve.

This bill is intended to ensure that the main priority and use of fusion center resources are focused on issues such as preventing foreign and domestic terrorist attacks, instead of being used to help carry out immigration enforcement or racial profiling.

Today with me to testify in support of the bill, I have Mike German, former National Security Fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice. At the appropriate time, I respectfully ask for your aye vote.

Thank you, members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify in favor of S—SB 1095—and the audits and public reports on fusion centers that it would require. Most fusion center activity is hidden from the public and even from elected state and local representatives. Fusion centers have exploited the lack of oversight to collect and distribute information about people engaged in constitutionally protected activities in violation of their rights.

I began researching fusion centers while working for the ACLU in 2007, identifying five primary areas of concern within this developing domestic intelligence network. The ambiguous authorities governing the multi-jurisdictional environment, the participation of military assets, the participation of private parties who have no right to information collected with law enforcement authorities, the use—utilization—of data mining, which today we'd call data analytics or AI, and the excessive secrecy which undermines Democratic controls.

We included a quote from a Fusion Center Analyst that described the fusion center network as the wild west, where officials were free to, "Use a variety of technologies before politics catches up and limits it—limits options." Unfortunately, twenty years later, the policies that might protect Americans from this kind of intelligence abuse have yet to catch up with the fusion center activities. Abuse is exposed mostly through leaks over the last twenty years, highlight two additional concerns.

First, the participation of the US Department of Homeland Security and fusion centers, including the use of the Homeland Security Information Network as a primary information sharing portal, which undermines compliance with state laws, preventing law enforcement participation in immigration enforcement. And second, the vulnerability of California's private personal information created by poor information security practices at fusion centers.

Hackers and leakers have made some abusive materials public, but we have no way to know what hostile intelligence agencies, criminals, and corrupt insiders have secrets—secretly—exfiltrated for their own use. Department of Justice audits should have been happening from the beginning as a matter of appropriate management of such complex and novel multi-jurisdictional and multi state operations. Law enforcement intelligence gathering is historically and inherently threatening to civil liberties, and the information collected using state and federal law enforcement authorities is easily abused in the wrong hands.

DOJ should want to understand what's happening on a daily basis at fusion centers to ensure they are operating within the law and using resources effectively and efficiently. The public also has a right to know what these state actors are doing with their personal information.

A DOJ audit would be essential to the state auditor review that's already been requested. DOJ will have greater access to information systems and facilities than the state auditor will have, including law enforcement information and particularly the activities of participating federal law enforcement agencies. Given the familiarity the DOJ officials have with state and federal law enforcement agencies, systems, policies, and practices, an effective DOJ audit would be of great assistance to the state auditor.

For example, a 2019 audit of the Commonwealth Fusion Center by the Massachusetts State Auditor was frustrated by access restrictions, leaving the auditor unable to reach a conclusion because access "was prohibited by state and federal restrictions regarding the dissemination of threat and criminal intelligence information." This is, of course, ironic, given fusion centers give secretly selected private individuals access to participate in fusion center activities.

The DOJ audit would also be able to highlight common violations across several fusion centers and curb abuses as they are found, rather than waiting for the publication of an audit report. Thanks for your time.

Alright. Thank you. Are there any members of the public that wish to provide—express their support for the bill? And this is for your name and, organization, if any. We're not taking substantive testimony at this time.

Good afternoon, chair and members. Symphoni Barbee, on behalf of the ACLU California Action, in support. Thank you.

Good afternoon. Anieli Martin with the California Immigrant Policy Center, proud co-sponsors, and also registering support for the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Secure Justice, New Light Wellness, Orange County Rapid Response Network, Buenbacino Health and Partnership, California Coalition for Women Prisoners, Sixty Seven Sueños Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, Southeast Asia Resource Action Center, or CRAC, Harbor Institute for Immigrant and Economic Justice. Thank you.

Hi. I'm Kimberly Wiel with Services Immigrant Rights Education Network, also known as SIREN, in strong support and a proud cosponsor. Thank you.

Good afternoon, Chair and Members. Camden Sai with the California Immigrant Policy Center, proud cosponsor for the bill, and here also representing EMAC, Empowering Marginalized Asian Communities, South Bay People Power, Freedom for Immigrants, 18 Million Rising, Immigrant Defense Project, Asian Prisoner Support Committee, San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium, and National Day Labor Organizing Network, all in strong support. Thank you.

Good afternoon. My name is Alia Yousefey, on behalf of the California Chapter on the Council on American Islamic Relations, a proud cosponsor of this bill in support.

Good afternoon. My name is Lina Sabag, and I reside in Los Angeles, and I strongly support this bill. Thank you.

My name is—good afternoon. My name is Claudette Hudson. I'm also from Los Angeles, and I support this bill.

...My name is Majdul Islam. I'm from the GLA, and I, and I support this bill. Thank you.

Good afternoon. My name is Anjum Rashid. I'm from Stockton, and I support SB 1095.

Good evening, committee. My name is Salma Nasreddin, a citizen of Anaheim, California, and I urge you guys to support this bill. Thank you.

Good afternoon. My name is Masoud Nassimi. I am the executive director of Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, which is an umbrella organization for 76 mosque and 24 organizations in Southern California, and I support the bill. Thank you.

Hello again. My name is Marvette Judah. I'm the chair of the Arab American Caucus, and I support this bill. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.

My name is Kutzia Frady, also a resident of the LA region, and I support this bill. Thank you.

Good afternoon. My name is Yia Abidine, and I'm here with Council on American Islamic Relation, and I support this bill. Thank you.

Hello. Peace be upon you all. My name is Manar Carzone. I'm actually a resident here in Sacramento, California, and I'm also here with CAIR Sacramento, and I support this bill.

Good afternoon. My name is Batool Abedola. I am a resident of Rockland and with CAIR, and I support this bill. Thank you.

Good afternoon. Elias Belbatul with care San Diego, and we also support this bill. Thank you.

Good afternoon. I'm Yousef Oscar. I'm part of, Senator Cabaldon's District 3, and I'm on behalf of care, I also support this bill.

Good afternoon. I'm Leila Nomar, candidate for Assembly District 47, and I strongly support this bill. Thank you.

Hello. My name is Manny. I'm with steering for the Santa Cruz County immigration coalition. We represent about 70 to a 100 organizations and we support this bill.

Hello. My name is Faruk Sadehi from San Jose and support this bill.

Hi. I'm Sabrina Hassan. I'm from San Jose and I support this bill.

Hi. I'm Nora Siddiqui and I live in San Jose and I support this bill.

Hi. My name is Zainab Shahid. I go to Folsom Lake, and I support this bill.

Good afternoon. My name is Muni Bali. I'm a student at UC Davis, and I support this bill.

Anayeli Martin, also registering support for us at Public Defender's Office, in support.

Good afternoon. My name is Keb Dumaid. On behalf of CAIA, I support this bill.

Alright. Thank you all. Are there any witnesses in opposition? Alright. So now thanks to everybody who's come, whether you've come from down the block or or four or five, six hundred miles away.

We appreciate you taking the time to to to be with us and share your point of view today and your perspectives and your experience. Let's return now to the committee for questions or comments. Senator Reyes?

Thank you for bringing this bill forward. It's so important that when we have agencies working in the wild wild west, that we find ways to to catch up. Politics have caught up, to use your phrase, and I think it's so important to have the DOJ audit to make sure that these centers are not working exactly against, SB 54, which we passed, which was signed signed into law. But your your proposal, I think, is extremely important.

I thank you for for bringing it forward and the appropriate time, I will move the bill.

Thank you. Senator Gonzales and then Senator Padilla.

Thank you, Senator. And I wanna thank your witness as well for working on this. You You hear about the fusion centers and I was just telling Senator Ochoa Bogh you hear about them but you don't know the extent to which they can cause severe detriment in our communities. As our communities are getting kidnapped, as they're being you know, detained violently, and their information is out there without their knowledge. It is just really horrendous to know what we don't even know today.

We think we know just, you know, the surface level, but there's so much more that these fusion centers, I'm sure, have on many of us that is just really alarming. So I actually look forward to yes. There will be an audit, but I think there needs to be even more information out there publicly noticed, publicly known as to the extent of what these fusion centers are doing in our community. And so I look forward to working with you. I'd love to be added as a co author for this bill.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Padilla.

Thank you very much, mister chairman. Thank the author for bringing the bill. I will support the bill at a committee today. Just a comment, and then I think one of the sort of operational concerns and challenges, obviously, this will have in my professional career. Aye, many decades ago, I had occasion to often work sometimes at the intersection of local, regional, and federal law enforcement with with the United States intelligence community.

And when you have systems and centers of information collection and analysis that are designed to facilitate integration and to facilitate collaboration and cooperation for a legitimate end, one of the hardest challenges always is is that information per se in that world takes on a number of different characterizations. Piece of information may begin as just useful information that could lead to addressing a criminal enterprise. It could end up being classified as intelligence related information, enforcement related information.

And sometimes, I think the challenge here will also be that pieces of information will have multiple characterizations, and sometimes a classification. And that may be related to the type of enforcement the bill seeks to preclude or to safeguard against, but also may have another classification, that makes it problematic because it's both at the same time.

So what I'm saying, you know, sort of long winded way is the concept here is good. The objectives here, I think, are appropriate. Certainly, there's enough evidence to suggest by independent review outside of government and even in a bipartisan review as the analysis notes inside of government that are by credible, leadership in Congress that point out problems with mission creep, resource problems, all kinds of issues that need to be addressed.

So that's why I support the bill because we have an opportunity here with a state run facility. Right?

And so for those reasons, you know, clearly, I'll be supportive, but I'm just putting on the record. I think that this is not quite as clear as it seems on the surface and that the operational challenges will be will be ones that need to be overcome, but I think the goal is an important one.

Thank you. Senator Umberg.

Thank you. I too have spent time working in around fusion centers for a good chunk of my career, And you are correct. They they, possess and disseminate incredible amounts and detail of very personal information. And so I think it's certainly appropriate that we circumscribe them. We make sure that Californians are protected, their privacy is protected.

On the other hand, they also provide benefit to law enforcement. And historically, one of the challenges has been just the challenging coordinating law enforcement to both become effective and also make sure that only the right people actually get arrested. So in in this space, in terms of profiling, I'm I'm curious as to what can be shared, what can't be shared. I mean, can can race be shared? Can gender be shared?

Can religion be shared? Can, for example, someone's pattern of activity? Can can those things be shared in the fusion center?

So our bill doesn't dictate what information is shared because I know there's many different types of information that are shared through these fusion centers. But if the purpose is for the purpose of racial profiling or profiling based off of someone's political ideology, then that wouldn't be an appropriate use of said information. And I don't know if you wanna speak to that a little bit more.

Sure. And I was an FBI agent for sixteen years and and worked collaboratively and joined terrorism task forces with state and local law enforcement. So I agree there there is appropriate information sharing that can happen.

I think the problem with fusion centers is that they've created a system that is designed to break down all barriers and obstacles to information sharing without recognizing that a lot of those obstacles are legal restrictions that bodies like this put in place to make sure we're also protecting other interests, our privacy, our our civil liberties.

And, you know, one example that gets directly to your point, at the ACLU, the ACLU of Northern California back in, gosh, twenty ten, twenty eleven, did a lot of Freedom of Information Act requests and got what are called suspicious activity reports.

And they had things like a Middle Eastern appearing man buying a large quantity of water. That information was accepted by the fusion center process, put into a federal database called Eguardian, where it was shared with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies across country.

Obviously, there's nothing inherently suspicious about buying water, and it was the person's apparent Middle Eastern appearance that that justified that collection and dissemination that could result in in violations of California law, but in a system that's so closed that there's no independent actor that can view it to see if this is that number one, is it even helpful to law enforcement? I don't know what law enforcement would do with that kind of information.

But number two, they would that they're also protecting other important rights that that we wanna make sure they're protecting.

So just following so that actually gets to my question. Would it is it a function of racial profiling to input one's appearance?

I'm not really sure if

In other words, if so from my understanding, that fusion centers are designed to basically collect, analyze, and disseminate information. At the same time, protect sources and methods. So, for example, if you've got a confidential informant, you don't wanna share that with necessarily even other agencies. You wanna keep that very close hold. But you may wanna share characteristics of an automobile.

Here's here's what the automobile looks like. And you want others to be aware that this is what the automobile looks like, other agencies. So, you know, clearly, sharing characteristics of an automobile is not racial profiling. But sharing characteristics of a human, I'm I I wanna sort of drill down and and again, I'm gonna support the bill.

Maybe we need to do this further, but but sharing characteristics of a human, at some point, maybe becomes racial profiling where you're saying, you know, be on the lookout for all individuals that are 70 years old and are white straight males.

In other words, me. So so at that point, it it it's it's beyond, but to the point where you're actually, you know, for example, trying to identify a particular suspect, what where do you draw that line?

I think you the line was drawn by the Department of Justice in '28 code of federal regulations part 23, which requires a reasonable suspicion of criminal act. Part of this suspicious activity reporting program that they developed was intended and did undermine that standard. So what previously was you get information like that where there's no reasonable indication of criminal activity. You don't retain that, you don't send it out.

They created the SAR to run side by side, so that you could collect that, retain it, and send it out.

So that kind of where where it's just the person's appearance, their race, or or national origin that was creating that person's suspicion would have qualified as racial profiling and and should not have been collected, shouldn't have been stored. And a simple standard like reasonable suspicion, it's not a high standard. Right? Most cops are pretty suspicious of other people. So it's a it it was a workable standard that that all police agent police intelligence agencies across the country accepted.

But then when they created this system, they tried to undermine all all the barriers. Well, that was one of the barriers that they undermined.

Okay. More to follow. I mean, I I was a federal prosecutor and I prosecuted and investigated white supremacist groups and and we clearly, identified certain individuals based on tattoos, based on certain aspects of their appearance. And so go ahead. Yeah.

Don't mean to interrupt you. Alright. But but because there was

a reasonable indication of criminal activity related to that activity. Right? There was a victim of a hate crime. There was other activity that where that piece of information about their race was part of it fit into the reasonable suspicion. And yeah.

Yeah. But anyway, more more to follow. So okay.

Thank you, Senator Umberg. Senator Reyes for a follow-up.

Thank you. My only final question was on enforcement. If a fusion center is is not in compliance, what happens to them? And if there is continued violations by a particular fusion center, what what is the result?

Give me one second while I bring that one.

Or is that for for later?

Give me one moment. I'm just going through my notes here so I can I know I read it when I was providing

I might also note, Senator Reyes? So under the under the amendments, the principal instrument that is covered in the bill is is the MOU that the local that the jurisdiction signs to be a part of the fusion center. And so under under the, the committee amendments, any a violation of one of that MOU would be a material breach and result in its termination. It's a very it's a very hard, you know, very tough standard.

So and and then DOJ would have to verify that that that the violation had been cured before the MOU could be reinstated.

Very good. Thank you.

Yes. That's right. And I recognize me and the chair working on, this bill over the weekend and and discussing together. So, I I realized that maybe some of these details are not in in print yet or you might not have access to them. So but those bill will be reflected as we head into the next committee and I hope that'll actually help to answer both your question as well as Senator Umberg's question.

So thank you for that, Chair. I appreciate it.

Anyone any other comments? Senator Ochoa Bogh.

So this is really clearly unlike Senator Umberg, Senator Padilla, who have experience in this background, this is brand spanking new to me. And so I've been trying to digest this information to try to clearly understand the goals and so forth. So I'm going to, just kind of talk a little bit. I won't be supporting the bill today just, for for clarity, right off the bat. And here's some of the, concerns that we have.

One, and I think it might be, and I might be wrong, but I think this might be, along the same concerns that Senator Umbric had, which was, that it does not clearly define when permissible information sharing becomes prohibited, cooperation for purposes of immigration enforcement, not in this case for him for immigration, for for for us is immigration enforcement. Number two, the bill defines immigration enforcement broadly to include any effort to investigate or assist in enforcement of federal immigration law. Another area, a third one.

It says here, fusion centers operate as joint coordination environments involving federal, state, and local entities. The bill restricts certain forms of information sharing without addressing how those restrictions function in practice where multiple entities operate concurrently, which may create an, an operational uncertainty.

And last, the bill requires ongoing reporting by the office of emergency services and audits by the Department of Justice. These requirements are established before completion of the pending audit and without clear evidence that additional reporting is necessary beyond existing or forthcoming oversight. So those are some of the concerns that we have, with regards to this particular bill. And we'd gladly hear any other con any responses that you may have.

So I think what'll be helpful is for me to read out some of the, some of the parameters that we laid out in in the language. And as I mentioned before, I recognize, you all might not have seen some of those amendments because those were things that if not in print today, they're going to be in print by tomorrow.

So first and foremost, the MOU and the MOU that we're asking to be established for these fusion centers would prohibit reporting, investigating, surveilling, and detecting nonviolent civil disobedience or first amendment protected activities to the center as suspicious activity reports absent a showing of probable cause. Right? And so I wanna emphasize that because you'll see as we work through some of these details that we bring that up probable cause, right, that there's a justifiable reason why there is an investigation happening.

You also brought up just a moment ago, immigration enforcement and, you know, whether or not these fusion centers are engaging with immigration enforcement. And I I do want, you know, to just speak to that and and the committee as well that we did pass SB 54, the California Values Act that was signed into law, you know, by the governor back in 2017.

It was a bill by, at the time, our former pro tem, Senator Kevin De Leon, that prohibited our local and state law enforcement from working with federal law enforcement, around immigration enforcement activities. And so if fusion centers are then engaging in immigration enforcement through fusion centers, that would be a clear violation of state law. And I think therein for me lies the problem.

Now I I recognize that there may be members of this committee that disagree with s p 54, but regardless of what our feelings may be about the bill, that is state law, and I do think it's an incumbent to make sure that these centers are following what is already established as state law.

I'm glad you brought sorry, through the chair. I apologize. So I'm glad you brought 54 as the basis for, you know, in this vacation because of this bill.

And I'm one of those members that have concerns with SB 54, which is current statute and I think I've expressed those concerns because I think because of that, we because there is no cooperation, it does compel federal enforcement or immigration federal, immigration enforcement officers to come into our communities, subjecting everybody else into being subjected to being picked up and being deported because they're not being specific.

If we as a state gave directly the names that are being, basically warranted by the federal immigration officers, if we gave them that particular, addresses of those folks, they could go directly and get those individuals.

They wouldn't be coming into our communities. That's my biggest concerns with SB 54 is that because we're not giving them the name that they are asking for that and where the locations where these folks are at, they're coming into our community. So that's my concern with SB 54, which is current statute and I've expressed that I can't change that at this point. But but but But for the with this particular

For the whole committee, just we're not we're we're not taking up SB 54 today. No.

No. And I just I'm I'm just addressing it because it was brought up as as the foundation and and the reason for this particular bill. So I'm just addressing the concerns that I have with that particular with that particular bill at the time.

So when it comes to this, when we look at that as the foundation and being the concern for this for for why we're bringing this forward, that adds, again, another component of why I would be concerned about this particular bill trying to kind of, basically have the same standard of s p 54. I'm nervous about the unintended consequences that it may have for other community members if we're not cooperating.

So just wanted to address that that one component, and happy to hear if you have any other comments on the rest of the the concerns.

Yeah. I Aye, one, appreciate hearing your feedback, Senator Ochoa Bogan. We have a wonderful working relationship, and I know sometimes we agree and sometimes we disagree. And this is one of those moments where I I have to vehemently disagree. SB 54 was very clear in saying that, those that are have committed, you know, violent crimes could, that that that does not apply to them.

And so, you know, the concerns that I've heard raised by you as well as by, you know, other members, of the Republican caucus, I I I just don't think are quite founded.

And in addition to that, there's been reporting by, you know, CalMatters to also point out that, unfortunately, as a result of president, Trump's initiation of these kind of roving raids that we've seen all across the state as well as across the country, that our law enforcement has actually seen a decline in response from federal immigration authorities with actually deporting violent criminals, and that makes me incredibly concerned when we don't actually see a public safety operating as it should.

So, you know, part of the reason for us wanting to introduce this measure, you know, beyond just making sure that these fusion centers are following what is current state law and current statute as you stated, There's also, I think, this very concerning attempt to really broaden what we consider to be terrorism.

And it has been very concerning to hear statements from the president of The United States casting off views, views that I hold, views that he considers to be anti ice as being views of a terrorist.

And does that then mean that myself and other friends and other advocates and community members are going to be unfairly targeted by fusion centers? I have a real problem with that. And I think that this is a real moment where we need to be more thoughtful about information sharing and being sure that we're protecting first amendment activity. And so I wanna highlight that component as well because I think that's another critical component of this bill.

In addition to making sure that we are making sure that these centers are following current state law.

Last question, I promise. So are there any existing instances of this information being shared right now being a problem?

Yes. Certainly. And my witness can speak to that.

Sure. There is a report that came out a year or two ago from an organization called STOP Surveillance Technologies Oversight Program that documented fusion centers providing information to ICE agents for immigration enforcement.

Was that was the information being shared inappropriate?

My understanding is yes. I mean, I didn't write the report. I'm not part of that organization, but but, yes, there there have been reports of improper sharing information by law enforcement. Yes. There there have been media reports as well.

Alright. Thank you, Senator. So I I I I'm also gonna support the bill because I think with the it it's it's raising an important issue and and a problem that that cries out to be to be solved.

You know, if it if it weren't for the federal administration, I would I would suggest we've we follow our normal procedure, which is we there are lots of mysteries and allegations, and we did the the joint legislative audit committee just last month, the green light, an audit of of fusion setters in California sponsored by Senator Cervantes. So our normal procedure would be let's do the audit.

Let's find the find let's see the findings, and then we'll come back afterwards and legislate. These are not normal times. At the same time, I don't think there would be sufficient support in this committee for a bill to simply shut down all fusion centers. I just I wanna be very, you know, very, very, very honest with this with the sponsor and with with others that that's a a bill to close all fusion centers is a different bill than this.

They are fusion centers of across the state, both the state center and the regional centers are consortia of California public agencies, and there's always been questions about them.

Those aren't really the most of them are not the jurisdiction of this committee, But this bill is intended to to to to to to hold to hold accountable what is happening in order to protect people against the kinds of abuses that we've heard today. That's a different case than than simply closing.

And I say that just because, you know, it's the you know, this is a brand new committee and I I am very much concerned about you using our privacy and transparency and public records laws just as a cudgel to say we don't like you, and so here here's another and another thing. You have to comply with this thing and another thing and another thing, hoping you'll just go away.

That's not what this bill is, and our privacy laws need to be for the purposes that we have set them forth to protect people.

So, you know, that that said, information, you know, one of the reasons why fusion centers are not their existence is not the focus of this bill is that, as has been observed by both Senator Hamburg and Senator Padilla, information and data have it's not that it works in both directions. My my local police department was part of the part of the Northern California Center.

There are plenty of times when the information that was shared indicated you're you're on a you're on a wild goose chase on this one. We have other data that shows that this, you know, this is not actually a a a terrorist cell that's happening in your jurisdiction that you wouldn't have otherwise known. So it isn't just that more information means more more targeting, more abuse, more information is also essential to fairer and more just policing done properly.

So, the the fusion centers themselves are are they are key in the in concept for cyber security, for human trafficking, for terrorism, for all of those issues.

But the the I think the fundamental point though is they are public entities in California, and so I appreciate the author's work to to to to, I in my view, strengthen the bill, which is to say rather than think of fusion center solely as, like, where they engage in bad behavior, let's make sure we catch it and punish it, but also where we can set the standards for how they operate in the first place at the entry point, which are these memoranda of understanding that the sheriff or the police departments or or others may engage in on a regional scale, and that's what the bill as proposed to be amended in the next committee would focus on principally, not exclusively, but principally.

What are the what are the basic fundamental principles, the values that have to guide that? Things like the the the, reaffirmation because some folks have said, well, they're federal partnerships so the state privacy laws don't apply. No.

Yes. They do, and the MOUs have to make clear that the the privacy laws the the California privacy act applies, that SB 54 applies, that those are that those are made clear, that there are limitations and restrictions on the sharing of data to assure that it isn't being used for immigration enforcement purposes or to to crack down on legitimate, civil disobedience and protests, which are fundamental features of our democracy.

That those would be baked into the DNA of the centers through the MOU, which would then have a essentially a kill switch in it, that if you don't comply, then the MOU no longer functions.

So it's a so under the the this new frame this this evolved framework, it will be a stronger, bill in that sense to to try to make sure that the the design, the accountability is occurring at all levels, including the partners fundamentally that that are that are in the in the project from the from the very beginning.

And so just to summarize, the under under the amendments, the the the it creates a it requires participating law enforcement agencies to to affiliate or join a fusion center, because all the fusion is center is is a collaboration, to join using an MOU, and that that MOU must be adopted by the governing border of that agency in a public meeting, which has not been the case for many of these agreements before so that they can be held accountable, but then also that the MOU has strong protections on on privacy, on on on on protest, on free speech, on profiling, and on immigration enforcement baked into the MOU from the outset so that both our current laws and our values are baked into those MOUs with that accountability along with with the annual report by the Office of Emergency Services so that we have some mechanism, both us and the participants and the public, to be able to evaluate what's what's actually occurring in these centers.

And, and the ledge the the amendments would would strike the annual audit and also narrow the the inspections and other sorts of things, but really with the intention of trying to make sure that the that the the the constitution, which is the MOUs, essentially, the DNA of these centers, gets it right in the first place, and that the accountability is built in through that through that mechanism. Obviously, there is continued work that needs to be happened.

I know the author, is is is committed to assuring that that we don't interfere with the with the very important work that that local and regional law enforcement are doing in terms of protecting against human trafficking and terrorism and all of this, but also that given the given the environment that we're in, that we also meet that moment and assure that that our our own public agencies in California that are participating in fusion centers are doing so fully compliant with the law, with state law, and with, with California's values.

So, there is a there certainly is additional work appreciated. The broad range of discussion in the committee and certainly the author's work to try to continue to perfect this, it will be heard next in the public in the public safety committee.

So some of these some of these issues that are more appropriate in their jurisdiction will be taken up, there. So with that, Senator Perez, would you like to close?

I respectfully ask for your aye vote.

Thank you very much, and it's been, I think Senator Reyes had moved the bill. She's not here. Would someone else be be prepared to move this? Senator Gonzales will move the bill? Okay.

We got Gonzales. Okay. It's it's so just to be and to be clear, the amendments will be adopted in the public safety committee, and the motion is do passed to public safety. Please call the roll.

[Roll Call]

Alright. The vote is currently five to zero on that bill and the it will be put on call. That brings us now to SB 957. Senator Perez.

Excellent. Thank you all so much. Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and Members. I am here to present SB 957, the Shield Act. Before I begin, I will be accepting the committee amendments, and I appreciate the incredible work and effort of the committee staff to work through the language with my office.

SB 957 requires social media companies to notify individuals when the federal government seeks their personal information through an administrative subpoena. This bill also requires that users are given time to respond to or challenge the subpoena.

Establishes disclosures on shared information to users, and sets reporting requirements to the Attorney General. The committee amendments will do the following, expand the definition of administrative subpoena, require social media companies to provide users with 30 days to respond to or challenge an administrative subpoena.

Provide that if a social media company determines in their analysis that an administrative subpoena is invalid, a notification will be provided to the Attorney General's Office before disclosing an individual's personal information.

It also establishes disclosure requirements on social media companies so users will know what information was shared and why. And finally, it allows the Attorney General to request a delay pending their review of an administrative subpoena.

Social media has become a critical tool for Californians to engage in activism, political expression, and information sharing. This is especially true now. Discussions around politics and government have been particularly prominent as communities across the state are responding to increased federal immigration enforcement.

Community leaders and residents have organized to share updates about immigration enforcement activity, using social media platforms to track ICE presence, share alerts with their neighbors, and hold federal agencies accountable.

Despite the federal and state constitutional right to freedom of speech, administrative subpoenas are being increasingly used by DHS to obtain information about individuals who operate accounts that post about or criticize ICE.

These administrative subpoenas do not require judicial approval or probable cause, yet they can be used to obtain sensitive personal information like names, addresses, and phone numbers. We've already seen cases where individuals were targeted simply for expressing criticism of the federal government.

For example, a New York Times article sites that in recent months, Google, Meta, Discord, and Reddit have received multiple subpoenas from DHS requesting identifying details of anonymous accounts that have spoken out against ICE or tracked the location of ICE agents.

In another example, a man in Philadelphia was subpoenaed after sending an email to DHS criticizing their treatment of an asylum seeker. DHS agents and local police showed up to his home to interrogate him. The subpoena was challenged in federal court as a violation of the first amendment.

And the court ruled that subpoenas cannot be used to intimidate individuals who criticize federal agencies. While some social media companies have willingly provided notice to individuals, others have shared information without ever letting the user know their data was requested.

The lack of transparency in these instances undermines trust, exposes individuals to potential retaliation, and discourages people from speaking out publicly. People should not be intimidated into silence out of fear that their personal information may be secretly shared to the federal government without their knowledge.

SB 957 would protect user privacy and free speech by ensuring that Californians are notified and given a fair opportunity to challenge a subpoena before their information is disclosed. Today with me to provide testimony in support of this bill is Becca Cramer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Symphoni Barbee, Legislative Advocate with the ACLU of California, ACLU California Action.

Alright. You'll each have two minutes. Welcome back.

Thank you. Thank you, Chair and Members. Symphoni Barbee on behalf of the ACLU California Action, here to support SB 957. Since President Trump took office, the Department of Homeland Security has been sending legal demands called administrative subpoenas targeting US residents who have criticized the government online.

These subpoenas have never been seen by a judge and recent reporting indicates that there are hundreds of these abusive demands sent to social media companies. The government targeting people they disagree with to reveal their identities would be bad enough.

But people are being put in an impossible position when they are targeted. In some of the cases that the ACLU has litigated to challenge these subpoenas, the people have been given ten days to file a motion in federal court, which is nearly an impossible burden.

These subpoenas demand that big tech companies like Google and Meta turn over extensive private data about account users who did nothing more than exercise their first amendment right. And like the Senator mentioned a case covered by the Washington Post.

A person targeted by a subpoena had agents show up to his home to be interrogated. These subpoenas are intimidation dressed up as law, and they're an attack on people's fundamental rights. And for these reasons, we ask that you vote yes on SB 957. Thank you.

Becca Cramer with Kaiser Advocacy on behalf of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, also in support. In the past year, the Trump administration has consistently targeted people engaging in free speech. For example, ICE has issued administrative subpoenas to tech companies to unmask users tracking ICE activity, people who have criticized the government, and even those who attend a protest.

These ICE subpoenas are unlawful, and the government knows it. Every time a user has challenged one of these subpoenas in court in the past few months, ICE has withdrawn them. SB 957 offers very basic consumer protections.

It social media companies to do two things that they should already be doing. First, companies must give their users prior notice of a subpoena. In order to challenge a lawless subpoenas, users must first know about them. Many companies already promise to give this notice, but they don't always follow through.

EFF's lawyers are currently representing a PhD student whose data was turned over to ICE because Google did not give him notice that he was promised. Second, SB 957 requires companies to make sure ICE subpoenas do not exceed the agency's authority and are not overly broad. Companies say that they already do this.

For example, when EFF asked 10 tech companies to do more to protect their users from these subpoenas, one company replied, quote, we carefully review all legal process to ensure facial validity and legal sufficiency, and we will object when appropriate. End quote.

And while this statement is a good start, a mere promise from a tech company is no longer enough. We need enforceable laws, which is why SB 957 is so important. Thank you.

Both. Now we'll turn to any other testimony in by folks who like to express support, name, and organization, if any.

Hello. Good evening. John Bennett on behalf of Oakland Privacy in support.

Alright. Are there any lead witnesses in opposition? Does anyone wish to express opposition to the committee on this bill? Seeing none. We'll turn to the committee for any questions or comments. Okay. Motion by Senator Wiener.

Alright. Would Senator Perez, would you like to close?

I respectfully ask for your aye vote.

Alright. Thank you. And and and also thank you to Senator Perez for her extensive work on the amendments to continue to strengthen the bill. And with that, committee assistant, please call the roll.

[Roll Call]

Alright. The bill is five to zero, and we'll place it on call. And next up, Senator Padilla is, here to present on behalf of Senator Becker, who has SB 1000 before us. Thank you, Senator.