AB 264: Protective orders.
- Session Year: 2017-2018
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2017-09-25
Under existing law, the court is required to consider, at the time of sentencing, issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, in a case in which a defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or of specified sex offenses, restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. Under existing law, contempt of a court order is a misdemeanor, as specified.
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a protective order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to a crime involving domestic violence, a violation of specified sex offenses, or a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs, if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as specified. The bill would also require the court to consider issuing that restraining order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, for a victim if the defendant is convicted of a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs.
By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Under existing law, the court is required to consider, at the time of sentencing, issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, in a case in which a defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or of specified sex offenses, restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. Under existing law, contempt of a court order is a misdemeanor, as specified.
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a protective order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to a crime involving domestic violence, a violation of specified sex offenses, or a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs, if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as specified. The bill would also require the court to consider issuing that restraining order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, for a victim if the defendant is convicted of a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs.
By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Under existing law, the court is required to consider, at the time of sentencing, issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, in a case in which a defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or of specified sex offenses, restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. Under existing law, contempt of a court order is a misdemeanor, as specified.
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a protective order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to a crime involving domestic violence, a violation of specified sex offenses, or a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs, if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as specified. The bill would also require the court to consider issuing that restraining order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, for a victim if the defendant is convicted of a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs.
By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Under existing law, the court is required to consider, at the time of sentencing, issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, in a case in which a defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or of specified sex offenses, restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. Under existing law, contempt of a court order is a misdemeanor, as specified.
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to a crime involving domestic violence, a violation of specified sex offenses, or a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs. gangs, if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as specified. The bill would also require the court to consider issuing that restraining order order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, for a victim if the defendant is convicted of a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs.
By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Under existing law, the court is required to consider, at the time of sentencing, issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, in a case in which a defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or of specified sex offenses, restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. Under existing law, contempt of a court order is a misdemeanor, as specified.
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of, or witness to, any crime for which the defendant suffered a conviction. to a crime involving domestic violence, a violation of specified sex offenses, or a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs. The bill would also require the court to consider issuing that restraining order for a victim if the defendant is convicted of a violation of laws relating to criminal gangs.
By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
Under existing law, the court is required to consider, at the time of sentencing, issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, in a case in which a defendant has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence or of specified sex offenses, restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. Under existing law, contempt of a court order is a misdemeanor, as specified.
This bill would require the court to consider issuing a protective order, which may be valid for up to 10 years, restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of, or witness to, any crime for which the defendant suffered a conviction.
By expanding the scope of an existing crime, this bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)The safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)The safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)Safety The safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)Safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of, or witness to, of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim or witness and his or her immediate family.
(2)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the defendant.
(2)(3)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)Safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime, crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a violation of Section 186.22, or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of, or witness to, the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of a victim or witness and his or her immediate family.
(2)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
(a)(1)Upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders, including, but not limited to, the following:
(A)An order issued pursuant to Section 6320 of the Family Code.
(B)An order that a defendant shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(C)An order that a person before the court other than a defendant, including, but not limited to, a subpoenaed witness or other person entering the courtroom of the court, shall not violate any provision of Section 136.1.
(D)An order that a person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim, except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.
(E)An order calling for a hearing to determine if an order as described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, should be issued.
(F)(i)An order that a particular law enforcement agency within the jurisdiction of the court provide protection for a victim or a witness, or both, or for immediate family members of a victim or a witness who reside in the same household as the victim or witness or within reasonable proximity of the victims or witness household, as determined by the court. The order shall not be made without the consent of the law enforcement agency except for limited and specified periods of time and upon an express finding by the court of a clear and present danger of harm to the victim or witness or immediate family members of the victim or witness.
(ii)For purposes of this paragraph, immediate family members include the spouse, children, or parents of the victim or witness.
(G)(i)An order protecting a victim or witness of violent crime from all contact by the defendant, or contact, with the intent to annoy, harass, threaten, or commit acts of violence, by the defendant. The court or its designee shall transmit orders made under this paragraph to law enforcement personnel within one business day of the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of the order, pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. It is the responsibility of the court to transmit the modification, extension, or termination orders made under this paragraph to the same agency that entered the original protective order into the Domestic Violence Restraining Order System.
(ii)(I)If a court does not issue an order pursuant to clause (i) in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the court on its own motion shall consider issuing a protective order upon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, that provides as follows:
(ia)The defendant shall not own, possess, purchase, receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(ib)The defendant shall relinquish any firearms that he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(II)Every person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while this protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(iii)An order issued, modified, extended, or terminated by a court pursuant to this subparagraph shall be issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council of California that have been approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 6380 of the Family Code. However, the fact that an order issued by a court pursuant to this section was not issued on forms adopted by the Judicial Council and approved by the Department of Justice shall not, in and of itself, make the order unenforceable.
(iv)A protective order issued under this subparagraph may require the defendant to be placed on electronic monitoring if the local government, with the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy to authorize electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy to authorize electronic monitoring. The duration of electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued. At no time shall the electronic monitoring be in place if the protective order is not in place.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, a minor who was not a victim of, but who was physically present at the time of, an act of domestic violence, is a witness and is deemed to have suffered harm within the meaning of paragraph (1).
(b)A person violating an order made pursuant to subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) may be punished for any substantive offense described in Section 136.1, or for a contempt of the court making the order. A finding of contempt shall not be a bar to prosecution for a violation of Section 136.1. However, a person so held in contempt shall be entitled to credit for punishment imposed therein against a sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense described in Section 136.1. A conviction or acquittal for a substantive offense under Section 136.1 shall be a bar to a subsequent punishment for contempt arising out of the same act.
(c)(1)(A)Notwithstanding subdivision (e), an emergency protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 6250) of Part 3 of Division 10 of the Family Code or Section 646.91 shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order, provided the emergency protective order meets all of the following requirements:
(i)The emergency protective order is issued to protect one or more individuals who are already protected persons under another restraining or protective order.
(ii)The emergency protective order restrains the individual who is the restrained person in the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(iii)The provisions of the emergency protective order are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person than are the provisions of the other restraining or protective order specified in clause (i).
(B)An emergency protective order that meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) shall have precedence in enforcement over the provisions of any other restraining or protective order only with respect to those provisions of the emergency protective order that are more restrictive in relation to the restrained person.
(2)Except as described in paragraph (1), a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, shall have precedence in enforcement over any other restraining or protective order.
(d)(1)A person subject to a protective order issued under this section shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive, or attempt to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect.
(2)The court shall order a person subject to a protective order issued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or she owns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3)A person who owns, possesses, purchases, or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive, a firearm while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825.
(e)(1)In all cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, the court shall consider issuing the above-described orders on its own motion. All interested parties shall receive a copy of those orders. In order to facilitate this, the courts records of all criminal cases involving domestic violence or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, shall be marked to clearly alert the court to this issue.
(2)In those cases in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, or a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been issued, except as described in subdivision (c), a restraining order or protective order against the defendant issued by the criminal court in that case has precedence in enforcement over a civil court order against the defendant.
(3)Custody and visitation with respect to the defendant and his or her minor children may be ordered by a family or juvenile court consistent with the protocol established pursuant to subdivision (f), but if ordered after a criminal protective order has been issued pursuant to this section, the custody and visitation order shall make reference to, and, if there is not an emergency protective order that has precedence in enforcement pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), or a no-contact order, as described in Section 6320 of the Family Code, acknowledge the precedence of enforcement of, an appropriate criminal protective order. On or before July 1, 2014, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court forms consistent with this subdivision.
(f)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall promulgate a protocol, for adoption by each local court in substantially similar terms, to provide for the timely coordination of all orders against the same defendant and in favor of the same named victim or victims. The protocol shall include, but shall not be limited to, mechanisms for ensuring appropriate communication and information sharing between criminal, family, and juvenile courts concerning orders and cases that involve the same parties, and shall permit a family or juvenile court order to coexist with a criminal court protective order subject to the following conditions:
(1)An order that permits contact between the restrained person and his or her children shall provide for the safe exchange of the children and shall not contain language either printed or handwritten that violates a no-contact order issued by a criminal court.
(2)Safety of all parties shall be the courts paramount concern. The family or juvenile court shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer of the child, as provided in Section 3100 of the Family Code.
(g)On or before January 1, 2003, the Judicial Council shall modify the criminal and civil court protective order forms consistent with this section.
(h)(1)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, and the information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.
(2)In any case in which a complaint, information, or indictment charging a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, has been filed, the court may consider, in determining whether good cause exists to issue an order under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), the underlying nature of the offense charged, the defendants relationship to the victim, the likelihood of continuing harm to the victim, any current restraining order or protective order issued by any civil or criminal court involving the defendant, and the defendants criminal history, including, but not limited to, prior convictions for a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, any other forms of violence, or any weapons offense.
(i)(1)In all cases in which a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code, a violation of Section 261, 261.5, or 262, or any crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290, crime, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim. a victim of, or witness to, the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail or subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of any restraining order issued by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the a victim or witness and his or her immediate family.
(2)An order under this subdivision may include provisions for electronic monitoring if the local government, upon receiving the concurrence of the county sheriff or the chief probation officer with jurisdiction, adopts a policy authorizing electronic monitoring of defendants and specifies the agency with jurisdiction for this purpose. If the court determines that the defendant has the ability to pay for the monitoring program, the court shall order the defendant to pay for the monitoring. If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay for the electronic monitoring, the court may order the electronic monitoring to be paid for by the local government that adopted the policy authorizing electronic monitoring. The duration of the electronic monitoring shall not exceed one year from the date the order is issued.
(j)For purposes of this section, local government means the county that has jurisdiction over the protective order.
SEC. 2.No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Sep 25, 2017 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 270, Statutes of 2017. |
| Sep 25, 2017 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 13, 2017 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4 p.m. |
| Sep 7, 2017 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Aug 22, 2017 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. May be considered on or after August 24 pursuant to Assembly Rule 77. |
| Aug 21, 2017 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Jul 11, 2017 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Jul 10, 2017 | From committee: Be ordered to second reading pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8. |
| Jun 26, 2017 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Jun 20, 2017 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to committee. Read second time, amended, and re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 6, 2017 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 6. Noes 0.) (June 6). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| May 10, 2017 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| May 1, 2017 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 1, 2017 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. (Ayes 74. Noes 0. Page 1302.) |
| Apr 27, 2017 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Apr 26, 2017 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 16. Noes 0.) (April 26). |
| Mar 29, 2017 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Mar 28, 2017 | Read second time and amended. |
| Mar 27, 2017 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 0.) (March 21). |
| Mar 14, 2017 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Mar 13, 2017 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 9, 2017 | From committee chair, with author's amendments: Amend, and re-refer to Com. on PUB. S. Read second time and amended. |
| Feb 13, 2017 | Referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Feb 1, 2017 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 3. |
| Jan 31, 2017 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 7, 2017 | AB 264 LOW Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 21, 2017 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB264 Low et al. By Anderson | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Jun 6, 2017 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| May 1, 2017 | AB 264 LOW Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Apr 26, 2017 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Mar 21, 2017 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
|
Organization
|
Position
|
Date
|
|---|---|---|
| American Civil Liberties Union | * Support | Apr 26, 2017 |
| Assembly Floor Vote: 74 - 0 | ** Against | Jun 5, 2017 |
| California District Attorneys Association | ** Support | Jul 12, 2017 |
| California Public Defenders Association | ** Against | Jul 12, 2017 |
| Crime Victims United Of California | ** Support | Jul 12, 2017 |
| Firearms Policy Coalition | ** Against | Mar 20, 2017 |
| PURPOSE | ** Against | Jun 5, 2017 |
| San Diego County District Attorney | ** Support | Jul 12, 2017 |
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 264
Author:(Low)
As Amended Ver:June 20, 2017
Majority vote
ASSEMBLY: | 74-0 | (May 1, 2017) | SENATE: | 39-0 | (August 21, 2017) |
Original Committee Reference: PUB. S.
SUMMARY: Requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court's authority to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes.
The Senate amendments make nonsubstantive technical changes.
EXISTING LAW:
- Makes it a crime to intimidate a witness.
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur.
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court.
- Allows the court to issue protective orders as a condition of probation.
- Allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases.
- Allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders and workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
AS PASSED BY THE ASSEMBLY, this bill:
- Extends the court's authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity, as specified.
- Allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
- Defines "harassment" as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner."
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8, negligible state costs.
COMMENTS: According to the author, "I introduced AB 264 to help ensure the safety of victims and witnesses of crimes. Currently, most victims and witnesses must go through the onerous task of opening a civil case to receive a protective order. This bill will improve courtroom efficiency by allowing the criminal court to issue a protective order to victims and witnesses of crimes. These protective orders will also help prevent retaliation by perpetrators and their associates. AB 264 is a necessary step towards ensuring the safety [sic] and improving efficiency in our courtrooms."
Analysis Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0001115
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 264
:
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 6-0, 6/6/17
AYES: Skinner, Anderson, Bradford, Jackson, Stone, Wiener
NO VOTE RECORDED: Mitchell
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 74-0, 5/1/17 - See last page for vote
SOURCE: California District Attorneys Association
DIGEST:
This bill requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court’s authority to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes.
Existing law:
- Provides that any person who knowingly and maliciously prevents or dissuades, or attempts to prevent or dissuade, any witness or victim from attending or giving testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); subd. (a)(2).)
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Requires the court to issue a protective order as a condition of probation in domestic violence cases, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
- Requires a court to consider issuing a protective order, that may be valid for up to 10 years, to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Any offense requiring sex offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 646.9, subd. (k); 368, subd. (l).)
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders for up to five years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Pro. Code, §§ 527.6.)
- Allows the court to issue workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Pro. Code, § 527.8.)
This bill:
- Extends the court’s authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity, as specified.
- Allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
- Defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.”
Background
As a general matter, a court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has the authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation in cases where probation was granted. In some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant’s child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases. (Pen. Code, §646.9, subd. (k)). Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order “that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim’s family members or spouse.” (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (l).)
Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended “to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) Nevertheless, a violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order.” (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code Section 166 is a misdemeanor, and so proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) Therefore, the criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution; the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt is “entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights.” (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4t Supp. 8, 11.) Therefore, the defendant has the right to a jury trial, regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
The consequences of having the court issue a restraining order against a person can be very severe. For example, the restraining order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, thereby implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing him or her to vacate his or her own home.
A restraining order may affect a person’s immigration status. A violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states: “Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.”
The restrained person will generally not be able to own a gun and will have to turn in, sell, or store any guns he or she has, and will not be able to buy a gun while the restraining order is in effect. (Pen. Code, § 29825.)
This bill authorizes the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to domestic violence, specified sex offenses, and gang activity if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
Gang Statutes:
Penal Code section 186.22 has three separate charging provisions. The first
provision is contained in 186.22, subdivision (a), and is a substantive offense for actively participating in and willfully furthering felonious conduct by members of a criminal street gang. The second provision is an enhancement allegation contained in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The allegation is applicable to felony charges committed for the benefit of any criminal street gang with the specific intent to further criminal conduct by gang members. The third provision, contained in section 186.22, subdivision (d), is an alternate penalty provision for committing a public offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the specific intent to further criminal conduct by gang members. The provisions share some common elements and also have unique elements unto themselves.
The “criminal street gang” component of the gang provisions (i.e., the gang’s existence) is a component of all three provisions and requires proof of three essential elements: (1) that there be an “ongoing association” involving three or more participants, having a “common name or common identifying sign or symbol”; (2) that the group has as one of its “primary activities” the commission of one or more specified crimes; and (3) the group’s members either separately or as a group “have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466-467.)
The substantive gang offense, section 186.22, subdivision (a), is chargeable as either a felony or misdemeanor. The gravamen of the offense is the “participation in the gang itself.” (People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467, fns. omitted.) The crime of participation in a criminal street gang requires proof of two elements which are not part of the enhancement: active participation in a gang, and knowledge that its members engage or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. (People v. Bautista (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 646, 656, fn. 5; People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467.) A person need not be a gang member to be guilty of the offense. (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1114, fn 4; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466; In re Lincoln J. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 322.) All that is required is “active participation,” which means “more than a nominal or passive involvement.” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 749-750; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466.)
The sentencing enhancement, section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), cannot be imposed unless the defendant is convicted of a felony. To receive a gang enhancement, the defendant need not be a current and active member of a gang. (In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201.) In addition to the criminal street gang components discussed above, there are two other essential elements that must be proven: (1) that the charged crime(s) were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the gang; and (2) that they were committed with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (CALCRIM 1401; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619; People v. Louen (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 11; In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201, 207-208; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 484-485.)
Finally, section 186.22, subdivision (d), is neither a crime nor an enhancement. Rather, “[i]t provides for an alternate sentence of one, two, or three years when it is proven that the underlying offense has been committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang.” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 899.) Application of the provision is not limited to “wobblers.” (Id. at p. 901-903.) The provision applies to all felonies and all misdemeanors. (Id. at p. 903.)
This bill extends the court’s authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity under Penal Code section 186.22, which includes a substantive gang offense and gang enhancements.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: Fiscal Com.: Local:
California District Attorneys Association (source)
Crime Victims United of California
San Diego County District Attorney
OPPOSITION: (Verified 7/10/17)
California Public Defenders Association
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 74-0, 5/1/17
AYES: Acosta, Aguiar-Curry, Travis Allen, Arambula, Baker, Berman, Bigelow, Bloom, Bocanegra, Bonta, Brough, Burke, Caballero, Calderon, Cervantes, Chau, Chávez, Chen, Chiu, Choi, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Cunningham, Dababneh, Daly, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gallagher, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gomez, Gonzalez Fletcher, Grayson, Harper, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kiley, Lackey, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, Mathis, Mayes, McCarty, Medina, Melendez, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, Obernolte, O'Donnell, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Reyes, Rodriguez, Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Steinorth, Mark Stone, Thurmond, Ting, Voepel, Waldron, Weber, Wood, Rendon
NO VOTE RECORDED: Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gray, Patterson, Ridley-Thomas
Prepared by: Stephanie Jordan / PUB. S. /
7/12/17 11:21:45
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair
2017 - 2018 Regular
Bill No: AB 264 Hearing Date: June 6, 2017
Author: | Low | ||
Version: | March 28, 2017 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | SJ | ||
Subject: Protective Orders
HISTORY
Source: California District Attorneys Association
Prior Legislation: SB 352 (Block) Ch. 279, Stats. of 2015
AB 307 (Campos) Ch. 291, Stats. of 2013
AB 723 (Pavley) Ch. 155, Stats. of 2011
SB 834 (Florez) Ch. 627, Stats. of 2010
AB 289 (Spitzer) Ch. 582, Stats. of 2007
Support: Crime Victims United of California; San Diego County District Attorney
Opposition: California Public Defenders Association
Assembly Floor Vote: 74 - 0
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to require the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases, and to expand the court’s authority to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes.
Existing law provides that any person who knowingly and maliciously prevents or dissuades, or attempts to prevent or dissuade, any witness or victim from attending or giving testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law is guilty of a crime. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); subd. (a)(2).)
Existing law authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
Existing law provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
Existing law requires the court to issue a protective order as a condition of probation in domestic violence cases, as specified. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
Existing law requires a court to consider issuing a protective order, that may be valid for up to 10 years, to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Any offense requiring sex offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 646.9, subd. (k); 368, subd. (l).)
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
Existing law allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders for up to five years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Pro. Code, §§ 527.6.)
Existing law allows the court to issue workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Pro. Code, § 527.8.)
This bill extends the court’s authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity, as specified.
This bill allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
This bill defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.”
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
Assembly Bill (AB) 264 will allow a court to issue a protective order for victims and witnesses in crimes involving domestic violence, sexual assault, and certain gang related crimes for up to 10 years after a defendant’s final sentencing, in cases that warrant such protection. Under current law, Penal Code section 136.2(a)(1) allows a court to issue a protective order in a criminal case through to the defendant’s final sentencing. By contrast, section 136.2(i) allows a court to issue a protective order for domestic violence and sexual assault victims for up to 10 years after a defendant’s sentencing. Once a defendant is sentenced, those victims and witnesses currently must seek protections on their own in a separate, civil proceeding from a court that will necessarily be less familiar with the facts. Moreover, if the defendant is serving a jail or prison term for a period of time, effectuating legal process and obtaining such an order in civil court will be arduous if not impossible.
AB 264 will not only offer more protections to victims and witnesses but also increase efficiency in the court system. A court familiar with the facts and circumstances of a criminal case should be empowered to grant a protective order in the appropriate circumstances to victims and witnesses of domestic violence, sexual assault, and certain gang-related crimes. Our justice system should enable our courts to offer protection for victims or witnesses of these crimes, and minimize the risk of retaliation that arises from not only reporting the crime, but also participating in the criminal justice process afterward.
The proposal seeks to expand the ability of the court to issue a protective order not only to prevent dissuasion and intimidation before a victim or witness participates in the judicial process, but also to prevent retaliation for a victim or witness’s participation afterward. The proposal also addresses the current law’s failure to account for other legislative changes that have put victims and witnesses of crime at greater risk for retaliatory contact by offenders. With the advent of sentencing pursuant to section 1170(h), for example, a court can sentence a defendant to prison locally for as little as a day and with an extensive mandatory supervision period instead of state prison. Thus, additional persons that previously would remain in custody serving a prison sentence are now in the community, and have the potential to contact the victims of, and witnesses to, their crimes. There are also other examples of legislative and court reforms in favor of rehabilitation over incarceration that result in defendants being in custody for less time, and thus increasing their potential to harm victims and witnesses in retaliation. In light of these reforms, additional potential safeguards for victims and witnesses are appropriate.
With the increase in use of social media, victims and witnesses of crimes are at greater risk now than in years past. Social media now makes it easier for a defendant to locate and retaliate against a victim or witness for participating in the criminal justice system. Critically, it has now become a societal norm for persons to have a publicly available social media presence through Facebook, Twitter, Linked-In, etc. Also, there are several publicly available resources that can scour the internet and other public resources to locate and communicate with individuals, including victims and witnesses. These resources have made it easier for defendants to locate and contact victims and witnesses for purposes of retaliation for participating in criminal prosecutions.
The proposal does not undermine criminal justice reforms resulting in less custodial time. Rather, it enables courts to provide protection to those members of the public that are placed at greatest risk by those reforms. The current standards for issuing a protective order are unaffected by the proposal and will continue to
strike the appropriate balance between restricting a convicted criminal’s conduct
and further securing a victim’s or witness’s safety. Specifically, “a criminal protective order must be based on a finding of good cause to believe an attempt to intimidate or dissuade a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur . . . but a mere finding of past harm to the victim or a witness is not sufficient.” Babalola v. Super. Ct., 192 Cal. App. 948, 964 (2011).
In sum, in light of other criminal justice reforms, the courts are now required to balance the various societal goals in a criminal case, even after sentencing. This proposal provides the courts a necessary tool to protect victims and witnesses as necessary in crimes involving domestic violence, sexual assault, and certain gang-related offenses.
2. Protective Orders Generally
As a general matter, a court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has the authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation in cases where probation was granted. In some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases. (Pen. Code, §646.9, subd. (k)). Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order “that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim’s family members or spouse.” (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (l).)
3. Criminal Contempt
Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended “to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) Nevertheless, a violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order.” (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code Section 166 is a misdemeanor, and so proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) Therefore, the criminal contempt power
is vested in the prosecution; the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt is “entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights.” (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4t Supp. 8, 11.) Therefore, the defendant has the right to a jury trial, regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
4. Effects of Restraining Orders
The consequences of having the court issue a restraining order against a person can be very severe. For example, the restraining order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, thereby implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing him or her to vacate his or her own home.
A restraining order may affect a person’s immigration status. A violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states: “Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.”
The restrained person will generally not be able to own a gun and will have to turn in, sell, or store any guns he or she has, and will not be able to buy a gun while the restraining order is in effect. (Pen. Code, § 29825.)
5. Gang Statutes
Penal Code section 186.22 has three separate charging provisions. The first
provision is contained in 186.22, subdivision (a), and is a substantive offense for actively participating in and willfully furthering felonious conduct by members of a criminal street gang. The second provision is an enhancement allegation contained in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The allegation is applicable to felony charges committed for the benefit of any criminal street gang with the specific intent to further criminal conduct by gang members. The third provision, contained in section 186.22, subdivision (d), is an alternate penalty provision for committing a public offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the specific intent to further criminal conduct by gang members. The provisions share some common elements and also have unique elements unto themselves.
The “criminal street gang” component of the gang provisions (i.e., the gang’s existence) is a component of all three provisions and requires proof of three essential elements: (1) that there be an “ongoing association” involving three or more participants, having a “common name or common identifying sign or symbol”; (2) that the group has as one of its “primary activities” the commission of one or more specified crimes; and (3) the group’s members either separately or as a group “have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466-467.)
The substantive gang offense, section 186.22, subdivision (a), is chargeable as either a felony or misdemeanor. The gravamen of the offense is the “participation in the gang itself.” (People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467, fns. omitted.) The crime of participation in a criminal street gang requires proof of two elements which are not part of the enhancement: active participation in a gang, and knowledge that its members engage or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. (People v. Bautista (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 646, 656, fn. 5; People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467.) A person need not be a gang member to be guilty of the offense. (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1114, fn 4; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466; In re Lincoln J. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 322.) All that is required is “active participation,” which means “more than a nominal or passive involvement.” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 749-750; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466.)
The sentencing enhancement, section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), cannot be imposed unless the defendant is convicted of a felony. To receive a gang enhancement, the defendant need not be a current and active member of a gang. (In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201.)
In addition to the criminal street gang components discussed above, there are two other essential elements that must be proven: (1) that the charged crime(s) were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the gang; and (2) that they were committed with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (CALCRIM 1401; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619; People v. Louen (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 11; In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201, 207-208; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 484-485.)
Finally, section 186.22, subdivision (d), is neither a crime nor an enhancement. Rather, “[i]t provides for an alternate sentence of one, two, or three years when it is proven that the underlying offense has been committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang.” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 899.) Application of the provision is not limited to “wobblers.” (Id. at p. 901-903.) The provision applies to all felonies and all misdemeanors. (Id. at p. 903.)
6. What This Bill Does
This bill extends the court’s authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity under Penal Code section 186.22, which includes a gang substantive offense and gang enhancements.
This bill would authorize the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to domestic violence, specified sex offenses, and gang activity if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
7. Argument in Support
According to the sponsor of the bill, the California District Attorneys Association:
Currently, Penal Code section 136.2(a)(1) allows a court to issue a protective order in a criminal case through to the defendant’s final sentencing – i.e. when the court has “jurisdiction over a criminal matter.” By contrast, PC 136.2(i) allows a court to issue a protective order for domestic violence and sexual assault victims that will remain in place for up to 10 years after a defendant’s sentencing. AB 264 will extend the court’s ability to issue a 10-year protective order for all victims and witnesses, when the circumstances warrant such protection.
A court familiar with the facts and circumstances of a criminal case should be empowered to grant a post-conviction protective order in the appropriate circumstances to victims and witnesses of all crimes – not simply domestic violence and sexual assault – especially when those crimes involve violence, weapons, or gang activity.
Once a defendant is sentenced, those victims and witnesses currently must seek those protections on their own in a separate, civil proceeding from a court that will likely be less familiar with all of the facts. Moreover, if the defendant is serving a jail or prison term for a period of time, effectuating legal process and obtaining such an order in civil court will be arduous, if not impossible. Our justice system should enable our courts to offer protection for any victim or witness of a crime, and minimize the risk of retaliation that arises from not only reporting the crime, but also participating in the criminal justice process afterward.
8. Argument in Opposition
The California Public Defenders Association opposes this bill stating:
AB 264 would amend Penal Code 136.2 to allow a court to issue a 10-year restraining order prohibiting any contact by an individual convicted of any crime with a victim or witness for 10 years. Under existing law, Penal Code section 136.2(i) provides that the court shall consider issuing 10-year restraining orders prohibiting any contact with the victim or witness to a crime in cases in which the individual has been convicted of domestic violence or sexual assault. Existing law is carefully tailored to protect both the rights and security of the victims and the defendants who are more likely to have had familial bonds or have been seriously traumatized.
This unwarranted wholesale expansion has the potential to create many unintended consequences. First, busy calendar courts will find themselves being asked to impose these orders in every case with a victim or civilian witness. Unable to take the time in every misdemeanor shoplifting, disturbing the peace and hit and run or county jail felony case to consider whether a victim or witness is likely to be contacted, courts will just impose the order on the theory “better safe, than sorry.” Making such orders will have extraordinary costs because clerks must enter them in the minutes and law enforcement will be tasked with ascertaining if they have been violated.
Ten-year restraining orders will make the community less safe because they will make rehabilitation for the individuals enjoined difficult. It will affect their chances of finding work, thus affecting their families and potentially forcing the tax payers to shoulder an additional burden of providing for their families. These proposed 10-year orders would last long past the expiration of the individual’s
summary court or felony probation, Study after study has shown that individuals who are reintegrated into the community are less likely to reoffend. Finally, there is no evidence that 10-year restraining orders would provide any additional layer of safety or peace of mind to victims or witnesses in non-violent cases.
9. Related Legislation
AB 270 (Gallagher) would expand the court’s authority to issue a post-conviction restraining order in cases involving domestic violence to cover a child witness who is physically present at the time of an act of domestic violence but who is not a victim. AB 270 is scheduled to be heard by this committee on June 13, 2017.
-- END –
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 264
Author:(Low)
As Amended Ver:March 28, 2017
Majority vote
Committee | Votes | Ayes | Noes |
Public Safety | 7-0 | Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Cunningham Gonzalez Fletcher, Quirk, Rubio, Santiago | |
Appropriations | 16-0 | Gonzalez Fletcher, Bigelow, Bloom, Bocanegra, Bonta, Brough, McCarty, Chau, Eggman, Fong, Friedman, Eduardo Garcia, Gray, Muratsuchi, Obernolte, Reyes |
SUMMARY: Requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court's authority to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes. Specifically, this bill:
Extends the court's authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity, as specified.
- Allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
- Defines "harassment" as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner."
EXISTING LAW:
Makes it a crime to intimidate a witness.
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur.
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court.
- Allows the court to issue protective orders as a condition of probation.
- Allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases.
- Allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders and workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
FISCAL EFFECT: According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee, minor costs to the trial courts.
COMMENTS: According to the author, "I introduced AB 264 to help ensure the safety of victims and witnesses of crimes. Currently, most victims and witnesses must go through the onerous task of opening a civil case to receive a protective order. This bill will improve courtroom efficiency by allowing the criminal court to issue a protective order to victims and witnesses of crimes. These protective orders will also help prevent retaliation by perpetrators and their associates. AB 264 is a necessary step towards ensuring the safety [sic] and improving efficiency in our courtrooms."
Analysis Prepared by: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0000176
Date of Hearing: April 26, 2017
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 264
Author:(Low) – As Amended Ver:March 28, 2017
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 7 - 0 |
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: Yes Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill requires the court to consider issuing post-conviction no-contact restraining orders for up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court’s authority to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Minor costs to the trial courts.
COMMENTS:
- Background. Current law allows the court to issue protective orders as a condition of probation, and allows the court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of specified crimes. Current law allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders and workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.
- Purpose. According to the author, AB 264 was introduced, “to help ensure the safety of victims and witnesses of crimes. Currently, most victims and witnesses must go through the onerous task of opening a civil case to receive a protective order. This bill will improve courtroom efficiency by allowing the criminal court to issue a protective order to victims and witnesses of crimes. These protective orders will also help prevent retaliation by perpetrators and their associates. AB 264 is a necessary step towards ensuring the safety [sic] and improving efficiency in our courtrooms.”
- Support. The sponsors, the California District Attorneys Association, states, “A court familiar with the facts and circumstances of a criminal case should be empowered to grant a post-conviction protective order in appropriate circumstances to victims and witnesses of all crimes – not simply domestic violence and sexual assault – especially when those crimes involve violence, weapons or gang activity.”
- Opposition. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is concerned that a restraining order might make it impossible for the defendant to return to his former home or neighborhood without fear of violating the order, regardless of whether the defendant intended to contact the victim or witness. An offender who is unable to reconnect with friends, neighbors and family is more likely to reoffend, not less. Also, ACLU is concerned the restraining order could be used as a form of additional punishment, regardless of whether there was any reason to believe that the defendant posed a threat to the victim or witness.
- Related Legislation: AB 270 (Gallagher) would expand the court’s authority to issue a 10-year post conviction restraining order in domestic violence and sex cases to cover a child witness who is physically present at the time of an act of domestic violence but who is not a victim. AB 270 is currently on the Assembly Floor.
- Prior Legislation:
SB 352 (Block), Chapter 279, Statutes of 2015, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving abuse of an elder or a dependent adult, regardless of the sentence imposed.
AB 307 (Campos), Chapter 291, Statutes of 2013, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted of specified sex crimes, regardless of the sentence imposed.
SB 723 (Pavley), Chapter 155, Statutes of 2011, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving domestic violence, regardless of the sentence imposed.
SB 834 (Florez), Chapter 627, Statutes of 2010, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years in sex cases involving a minor victim.
AB 289 (Spitzer), Chapter 582, Statutes of 2007, allows a court to issue a protective order for 10 years upon a defendant's conviction for stalking.
Analysis Prepared by: Pedro Reyes / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: March 21, 2017
Counsel: Sandra Uribe
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:
Author:() – As Ver:
As Proposed to be Amended in Committee
SUMMARY:
Requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court’s authority to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes. Specifically, this bill:
- Extends the court's authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity, as specified.
- Allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed.
- Defines “harassment” as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.”
EXISTING LAW:
- Makes it a crime to intimidate a witness. (Pen. Code, § 136.1.)
- Authorizes the trial court in a criminal case to issue protective orders when there is a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (a).)
- Provides that a person violating a protective order may be punished for any substantive offense described in provisions of law related to intimidation of witnesses or victims, or for contempt of court. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (b).)
- Allows the court to issue protective orders as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
- Allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years to protect the victim of the crime when a defendant is convicted of any of the following crimes:
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Cases of rape, spousal rape, and statutory rape;
- Any offense requiring sex-offender registration;
- Stalking cases; and
- Elder and dependent adult abuse cases. (Pen. Code, §§ 136.2, subd. (i)(1); 646.9, subd. (k); 368, subd. (l).)
- A crime involving domestic violence, as specified;
- Allows the court to issue civil harassment protective orders and workplace violence protective orders for up to three years upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. (Civ. Pro. Code, §§ 527.6 and 527.8.)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, "I introduced AB 264 to help ensure the safety of victims and witnesses of crimes. Currently, most victims and witnesses must go through the onerous task of opening a civil case to receive a protective order. This bill will improve courtroom efficiency by allowing the criminal court to issue a protective order to victims and witnesses of crimes. These protective orders will also help prevent retaliation by perpetrators and their associates. AB 264 is a necessary step towards ensuring the safety [sic] and improving efficiency in our courtrooms.”
- Protective Orders: As a general matter, the court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding pursuant to Penal Code Section 136.2 where it finds good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Protective orders issued under this statute are valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue protective orders as a condition of probation. For example, when domestic violence criminal proceedings have concluded, the court can issue a "no-contact order" as a condition of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097.)
Finally, in some cases in which probation has not been granted, the court also has the authority to issue post-conviction protective orders. The court is authorized to issue no-contact orders for up to 10 years when a defendant has been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of the defendant's child. The court can also issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving a domestic-violence-related offense, rape, spousal rape, statutory rape, or any crime requiring sex offender registration. (Pen. Code, § 136.2, subd. (i)(1).) The same is true of stalking cases (Pen. Code, §646.9, subd. (k)). Similarly, in cases involving a criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense in which the victim was a minor, the court may issue an order "that would prohibit … harassing, intimidating, or threatening the victim or the victim's family members or spouse." (Pen. Code, § 1201.3, subd. (a).) Lastly, the court has authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving the abuse of an elder or dependent adult. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (l).)
This bill extends the court's authority to issue no-contact orders lasting up to 10 years in cases involving gang activity under Penal Code section 186.22, which includes a gang substantive offense and gang enhancements.
Additionally, under current law, the court can only issue post-conviction protective orders to cover the victims of the defendant’s crimes. This bill would authorize the court to include percipient witnesses to crimes in the post-conviction restraining orders. However, under the proposed amendments, before the court could issue an order enjoining the defendant from contacting a witness, good cause must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed. This is the same standard used in civil court to issue a civil harassment protective order. (See Civ. Pro. Code, § 527.6.)
- Criminal Contempt: Disobedience of a court order may be punished as criminal contempt. The crime of contempt is a general intent crime. It is proven by showing that the defendant intended to commit the prohibited act, without any additional showing that he or she intended "to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence." (People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.) Nevertheless, a violation must also be willful, which in the case of a court order encompasses both intent to disobey the order, and disregard of the duty to obey the order." (In re Karpf (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 355, 372.)
Criminal contempt under Penal Code Section 166 is a misdemeanor, and so proceedings under the statute are conducted like any other misdemeanor offense. (In re McKinney (1968) 70 Cal.2d 8, 10; In re Kreitman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) Therefore, the criminal contempt power is vested in the prosecution; the trial court has no power to institute criminal contempt proceedings under the Penal Code. (In re McKinney, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 13.) A defendant charged with the crime of contempt "is entitled to the full panoply of substantive and due process rights." (People v. Kalnoki (1992) 7 Cal.App.4t Supp. 8, 11.) Therefore, the defendant has the right to a jury trial, regardless of the sentence imposed. (People v. Earley (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 542, 550.)
- Effects of Restraining Orders: The consequences of having the court issue a restraining order against a person can be very severe. The person will not be able to go to certain places or to do certain things. For example, the restraining order may prohibit the defendant from being within a certain distance of the person named in the order, thereby implicating the defendant’s right to travel. Depending on the facts, such an order may implicate an individual’s property interests by forcing him or her to vacate his or her own home.
The restraining order may affect a person’s immigration status. A violation of a protective order is a deportable offense. Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states: “Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a protection order issued by a court an whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order was issued is deportable.”
The restrained person will generally not be able to own a gun and will have to turn in, sell, or store any guns he or she has, and will not be able to buy a gun while the restraining order is in effect. (Pen. Code, § 29825.) - Gang Statutes: Penal Code section 186.22 has three separate charging provisions. The first
provision is contained in 186.22, subdivision (a), and is a substantive offense for actively participating in and willfully furthering felonious conduct by members of a criminal street gang. The second provision is an enhancement allegation contained in section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). The allegation is applicable to felony charges committed for the benefit of any criminal street gang with the specific intent to further criminal conduct by gang members. The third provision, contained in section 186.22, subdivision (d), is an alternate penalty provision for committing a public offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the specific intent to further criminal conduct by gang members. The provisions share some common elements and also have unique elements unto themselves.
The “criminal street gang” component of the gang provisions (i.e., the gang’s existence) is a component of all three provisions and requires proof of three essential elements: (1) that there be an “ongoing association” involving three or more participants, having a “common name or common identifying sign or symbol”; (2) that the group has as one of its “primary activities” the commission of one or more specified crimes; and (3) the group’s members either separately or as a group “have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466-467.)
The substantive gang offense, section 186.22, subdivision (a), is chargeable as either a felony or misdemeanor. The gravamen of the offense is the “participation in the gang itself.” (People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467, fns. omitted.) The crime of participation in a criminal street gang requires proof of two elements which are not part of the enhancement: active participation in a gang, and knowledge that its members engage or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. (People v. Bautista (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 646, 656, fn. 5; People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1467.) A person need not be a gang member to be guilty of the offense. (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1114, fn 4; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466; In re Lincoln J. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 322.) All that is required is “active participation,” which means “more than a nominal or passive involvement.” (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 749-750; In re Jose P. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 458, 466.)
The sentencing enhancement, section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), cannot be imposed unless the defendant is convicted of a felony. To receive a gang enhancement, the defendant need not be a current and active member of a gang. (In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201.) - In addition to the criminal street gang components discussed above, there are two other essential elements that must be proven: (1) that the charged crime(s) were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the gang; and (2) that they were committed with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. (CALCRIM 1401; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 619; People v. Louen (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 11; In re Ramon T. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 201, 207- 208; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 484-485.)
Finally, section 186.22, subdivision (d), is neither a crime nor an enhancement. “It provides for an alternate sentence of one, two, or three years when it is proven that the underlying offense has been committed for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang.” (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 899.) Application of the provision is not limited to “wobblers.” (Id. at p. 901-903.) The provision applies to all felonies and all misdemeanors. (Id. at p. 903.)
The post-conviction restraining order authorized by this bill will apply to any of the gang provisions. - Argument in Support: According to the California District Attorneys Association, the sponsor of this bill, “A court familiar with the facts and circumstances of a criminal case should be empowered to grant a post-conviction protective order in appropriate circumstances to victims and witnesses of all crimes – not simply domestic violence and sexual assault – especially when those crimes involve violence, weapons or gang activity.
“Once a defendant is sentenced, those victims and witnesses currently must seek those protections on their own in a separate civil proceedings from a court that will likely be less familiar with all of the facts. Moreover, if the defendant is serving a jail or prison term for a period of time, effectuating legal process and obtaining such an order in civil court will be arduous, if not impossible. Our justice system should enable our courts to offer protection for any victim or witness of a crime, and minimize the risk of retaliation that arises from not only reporting the crime, but also participating in the criminal justice process afterward.” - Argument in Opposition: According to the American Civil Liberties Union, “Existing law provides numerous avenues for the protection of witnesses in cases where there is reason to believe that the defendant may attempt to intimidate the witness. Witness intimidation is a crime under Penal Code section 136.1, punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony. If the intimidation is gang related, it is subject to a seven year to life gang enhancement under Penal Code section 186.22. California also has its own witness protection plan, the California Witness Relocation and Assistance Program.
“Under the provisions of AB 264, prosecutors would be able to ask the court for a restraining order that could last up to 10 years and prohibit contact with any victim or – in a change in from the existing provision – witness. Subdivision (i) of Penal Code section 136.2 allow courts to give additional protection to victims of specific types of crimes, such as domestic violence or rape, where the victim may have particular reason to fear further harm from the offender. Requiring the court to consider protective orders for witnesses could vastly increase the number of protective orders issued, often without the same kind of specific need for protection having been shown. In many cases this could be used as a form of additional punishment, regardless of whether there was any reason to believe that the defendant posed a threat to the victim or witness. For up to ten years, potentially far longer than the period of the sentence or term of probation, the defendant would remain subject to the control of the criminal justice system. The terms of the restraining order in many cases would make it much more difficult for the defendant to reintegrate into the community. For example, in domestic violence cases, the witnesses may be members of the defendant’s family or neighbors. The restraining order might make it impossible for the defendant to return his former home or neighborhood without fear of violating the order, regardless of whether the defendant intended to contact the victim or witness. An offender who is unable to reconnect with friends, neighbors and family is more likely to reoffend, not less.
“The end result in many cases would likely be conviction for violation of the restraining order, and a prolonged cycle of reincarceration.”
- Related Legislation: AB 270 (Gallagher) would expand the court’s authority to a 10-year post conviction restraining order in domestic violence and sex cases to cover a child witness who is physically present at the time of an act of domestic violence but who is not a victim. AB 270 is pending in the Assembly Appropriations Committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- SB 352 (Block), Chapter 279, Statutes of 2015, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving abuse of an elder or a dependent adult, regardless of the sentence imposed.
- AB 307 (Campos), Chapter 291, Statutes of 2013, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted of specified sex crimes, regardless of the sentence imposed.
- SB 723 (Pavley), Chapter 155, Statutes of 2011, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving domestic violence, regardless of the sentence imposed.
- SB 834 (Florez), Chapter 627, Statutes of 2010, allows a court to issue a protective order for up to 10 years in sex cases involving a minor victim.
- AB 289 (Spitzer), Chapter 582, Statutes of 2007, allows a court to issue a protective order for 10 years upon a defendant's conviction for stalking.
- SB 352 (Block), Chapter 279, Statutes of 2015, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for up to 10 years when a defendant is convicted for an offense involving abuse of an elder or a dependent adult, regardless of the sentence imposed.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
California District Attorneys Association (Sponsor)
Crime Victims United of California
San Diego County District Attorney’s Office
Opposition
American Civil Liberties Union
California Public Defenders Association
Firearms Policy Coalition
Analysis Prepared by:
Discussed in Hearing
Assembly Floor
Senate Floor
Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety
Assembly Floor
Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations
Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):