CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS

CSA2 Bill Id:AB 1618

Author:(Jones-Sawyer)

As Amended Ver:July 5, 2019

Majority vote

SUMMARY:

Provides that a provision of a plea bargain requiring a general waiver of future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.

The Senate Amendments

Delete the Assembly version of this bill and instead:

1. Make legislative findings citing United States and California Supreme Court case law on plea bargains, and declaring that a plea bargain which requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea contradicts of case law and is not knowing and intelligent.
2. Specify that a provision of a plea bargain requiring a general waiver of future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.
3. Defines "plea bargain" as "any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or his or her counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant."

COMMENTS:

Impetus for this Bill: In April of this year, the San Diego Union Tribune reported about the San Diego District Attorney's new policy of making some defendants waive future unknown potential legislation that might be in their favor. The new policy, which was to be used in selected cases, was seen by some as a response to current criminal justice reform efforts by both the electorate and the Legislature. Regardless of the motive, criminal defense attorneys and criminal justice reform advocates argue this is an end run around the legislative process. (See, G. Moran, After Waves of Criminal Justice Reforms, Prosecutors Now Want to Lock in Pleas, Ask Defendants to Give up Future Rights, San Diego Union Tribune, April 17, 2017, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2019-04-17/after-waves-of-criminal-justice-reforms-prosecutors-now-want-to-lock-in-pleas-ask-defendants-to-give-up-future-rights)

Such plea bargains raise constitutional concerns. Because significant constitutional rights are at stake and waived when entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant's guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243. fn. 5.) An effective waiver requires knowledge that the right exists. (Taylor v. United States (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19.)

Moreover, the California Supreme Court has held that plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them." (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64.)

This bill codifies Supreme Court case law and specifies that a plea bargain requiring a general waiver of future benefits of legislation, initiatives, or other changes in the law is void as against public policy.

According to the Author:

In 2013, the California Supreme Court settled the issue of pre-emptive agreements in plea bargains by stating clearly that parties entering a plea agreement are not insulated from any future legislation. AB 1618 simply re-states and clarifies the Legislature's authority to affect the terms of a plea agreement. The voters, the Governor, and the Legislature have shown time and time again that there is a desire to ensure that our justice system reflects our values of fairness and justice, and that includes ensuring that the law applies equally to individuals that have entered into a plea agreement.

Arguments in Support:

According to the Alameda County District Attorney's Office, "Plea agreements have historically been recognized to be subject to changes if the Legislature, or the voters, make changes to state law. The practice of requiting a defendant to waive their rights to the benefit of future legislation in signing a plea agreement does not honor due process. When a defendant signs away their rights under legislation that has not passed, or even been introduced, they do so without knowing what rights are being abandoned, and thus cannot enter a plea agreement without full knowledge of the consequences.

"To preserve due process, it is necessary that the law apply to all plea agreements equally. AB 1618 (Jones-Sawyer) preserves the democratic process by clarifying existing law and codifying court decisions that make clear that state law is applicable to all plea agreements."

Arguments in Opposition:

None

FISCAL COMMENTS:

According to Senate Appropriations Committee, pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8, negligible state costs.

VOTES:

ASM TRANSPORTATION: Vote not relevant

YES:

NO:

ABS, ABST OR NV:

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: Vote not relevant

YES:

NO:

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: Vote not relevant

YES:

NO:

ABS, ABST OR NV:

SENATE FLOOR: 36-2-2

YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Borgeas, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Grove, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Jones, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk

NO: Morrell, Stone

ABS, ABST OR NV: Dahle, Moorlach

ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 7-0-1

YES: Jones-Sawyer, Lackey, Bauer-Kahan, Diep, Kamlager-Dove, Quirk, Wicks

ABS, ABST OR NV: Santiago

UPDATED:

VERSION: July 5, 2019

CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002415

CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS

CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1618

Author:(Jones-Sawyer)

As Amended Ver:July 5, 2019

Majority vote

SUMMARY:

Provides that a provision of a plea bargain requiring a general waiver of future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.

The Senate Amendments

Delete the Assembly version of this bill and instead:

• 1. Make legislative findings citing United States and California Supreme Court case law on plea bargains, and declaring that a plea bargain which requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea contradicts of case law and is not knowing and intelligent.
  2. Specify that a provision of a plea bargain requiring a general waiver of future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.
  3. Defines "plea bargain" as "any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or his or her counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant."

COMMENTS:

Impetus for this Bill: In April of this year, the San Diego Union Tribune reported about the San Diego District Attorney's new policy of making some defendants waive future unknown potential legislation that might be in their favor. The new policy, which was to be used in selected cases, was seen by some as a response to current criminal justice reform efforts by both the electorate and the Legislature. Regardless of the motive, criminal defense attorneys and criminal justice reform advocates argue this is an end run around the legislative process. (See, G. Moran, After Waves of Criminal Justice Reforms, Prosecutors Now Want to Lock in Pleas, Ask Defendants to Give up Future Rights, San Diego Union Tribune, April 17, 2017, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2019-04-17/after-waves-of-criminal-justice-reforms-prosecutors-now-want-to-lock-in-pleas-ask-defendants-to-give-up-future-rights)

Such plea bargains raise constitutional concerns. Because significant constitutional rights are at stake and waived when entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant's guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243. fn. 5.) An effective waiver requires knowledge that the right exists. (Taylor v. United States (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19.)

Moreover, the California Supreme Court has held that plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them." (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64.)

This bill codifies Supreme Court case law and specifies that a plea bargain requiring a general waiver of future benefits of legislation, initiatives, or other changes in the law is void as against public policy.

According to the Author:

In 2013, the California Supreme Court settled the issue of pre-emptive agreements in plea bargains by stating clearly that parties entering a plea agreement are not insulated from any future legislation. AB 1618 simply re-states and clarifies the Legislature's authority to affect the terms of a plea agreement. The voters, the Governor, and the Legislature have shown time and time again that there is a desire to ensure that our justice system reflects our values of fairness and justice, and that includes ensuring that the law applies equally to individuals that have entered into a plea agreement.

Arguments in Support:

According to the Alameda County District Attorney's Office, "Plea agreements have historically been recognized to be subject to changes if the Legislature, or the voters, make changes to state law. The practice of requiting a defendant to waive their rights to the benefit of future legislation in signing a plea agreement does not honor due process. When a defendant signs away their rights under legislation that has not passed, or even been introduced, they do so without knowing what rights are being abandoned, and thus cannot enter a plea agreement without full knowledge of the consequences.

"To preserve due process, it is necessary that the law apply to all plea agreements equally. AB 1618 (Jones-Sawyer) preserves the democratic process by clarifying existing law and codifying court decisions that make clear that state law is applicable to all plea agreements."

Arguments in Opposition:

None.

FISCAL COMMENTS:

According to Senate Appropriations Committee, pursuant to Senate Rule 28.8, negligible state costs.

VOTES:

ASM TRANSPORTATION: 12-2-1

YES: Frazier, Aguiar-Curry, Berman, Chu, Cunningham, Daly, Friedman, Gipson, Grayson, Medina, Nazarian, O'Donnell

NO: Fong, Diep

ABS, ABST OR NV: Bigelow

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-5-0

YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Friedman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Jones-Sawyer, Robert Rivas

NO: Bigelow, Brough, Diep, Fong, Obernolte

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 55-19-6

YES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cunningham, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon

NO: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Cooper, Dahle, Diep, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Mayes, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Salas, Voepel, Waldron

ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Boerner Horvath, Brough, Burke, Frazier, Gabriel

SENATE FLOOR: 36-2-2

YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Bates, Beall, Borgeas, Bradford, Caballero, Chang, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Grove, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Jones, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Nielsen, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener, Wilk

NO: Morrell, Stone

ABS, ABST OR NV: Dahle, Moorlach

UPDATED:

VERSION: July 5, 2019

CONSULTANT: Sandy Uribe (Counsel) / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002001

 THIRD READING  

Bill No: AB 1618

Author: Jones-Sawyer (D)

Amended: 7/5/19 in Senate

Vote: 21

SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 7/2/19

AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener

NOES: Morrell

NO VOTE RECORDED: Moorlach

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: Senate Rule 28.8

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 55-19, 5/13/19 - See last page for vote

SUBJECT: Plea bargaining: benefits of later enactments

SOURCE: Author

DIGEST:

This bill clarifies that a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent, and thus void as against public policy.

ANALYSIS:

Existing law:

1. Defines “plea bargaining” to mean “any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or their counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.” (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (b).)
2. States that if the public offense charged is a felony not punishable with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon the appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint to the defendant and ask whether they plead guilty or not guilty to the offenses charged and to a previous conviction or convictions if charged. (Pen. Code, § 859a, subd. (a).)
3. Provides that while the charge remains pending before the magistrate and when the defendant is present, the defendant may plead guilty to the offense charged, or with the consent of the magistrate and the prosecuting attorney, plead nolo contendere to the offense charged, or to any other offense that is necessarily included in the charged offense, or to an attempt to commit the charged offense, or to any previous convictions charged. (Ibid.)
4. Provides that if the defendant subsequently files a written motion to withdraw the plea, the motion shall be heard and determined by the court before which the plea was entered. (Ibid.)
5. States that every plea must be made in open court, and may be oral or in writing, shall be entered upon the minutes of the court, and shall be taken down in shorthand by the official reporter if one is present. All pleas of guilty or nolo contendere to misdemeanors or felonies shall be oral or in writing. (Pen. Code, § 1017.)
6. States that unless otherwise provided by law, every plea shall be entered or withdrawn by the defendant personally in open court. (Pen. Code, § 1018.)
7. Provides that on application of the defendant at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. (Ibid.)
8. States that where the plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as provided, cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea. (Pen. Code, § 1192.5.)
9. Provides that if the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior to the making of the plea that (a) its approval is not binding, (b) it may, a the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter, and (c) in that case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his or her plea if he or she desires to do so. The court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea. (Id.)

This bill:

1. States that the Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
   1. The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.
   2. In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
   3. Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).
   4. A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.
2. Provides that a provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.
3. Defines “plea bargain” as defined in Penal Code Section 1192.7, subdivision (b).

Background

According to the author:

After the Prison Law Office in Berkeley brought forward a case against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), a three judge court ruled that California had to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of capacity to abide by the constitutional rights of prisoners. The court made many findings in their ruling, including that overcrowding led to inadequate medical services, which violated their 8th amendment rights by not providing proper adequate care, and that reducing the prison population could be done without endangering public safety.

In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision in Brown v. Plata, ordering California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% capacity. In order to comply, California passed various legislation including, “The Public Safety Realignment Act” in 2011. Realignment, which created a shift in public policy on criminal justice reform, shifted the supervision of certain convictions from state prison to county jails.

In continuing criminal justice reform and to further reduce the prison population, a number of policy changes have been enacted via legislation and voter initiatives in recent years. Recognizing the need to reduce penalties for non-serious and non-violent property and drug crime the Legislature placed Proposition 47 on the ballot in 2014 and it passed with about 60% of the vote. In 2016 the Legislature placed Prop 57, which passed with 64% of the vote, on the ballot to provide increased parole opportunities for individuals serving sentences for non-violent crimes and authorized sentence credits for rehabilitation, good behavior, and education. As the Legislature and voters have made clear the need and desire to shift our justice system’s focus to rehabilitation, recent reports have noted that prosecutors have begun to force defendants to sign away their rights from any future changes in law when entering a plea bargain.

Various court cases have made clear that plea bargains are subject to changes in state law, and must be entered in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner by all parties. In Doe v. Harris the California Supreme Court ruled that “[p]lea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.” This ruling makes clear that plea bargains are still subject to the power of the state to make changes affecting sentencing standards. Furthermore, in Brooklyn v. Alabama the US Supreme Court held that holding “[s]ignificant constitutional rights [are] at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”

Prosecutors that decide to have defendants sign away all future potential benefits from changes in state law circumvents the Legislative process and the will of the voters. When changes in state law resulted in increased penalties for individuals after they entered plea agreements prosecutors did not feel the need to pre-empt future legislation, and only appear willing to do so now that voters and the Legislature have begun to focus on reforming our criminal justice system. The Legislature is tasked with making changes in state law that affect all individuals equally, to have pockets of the state where future laws would have no impact because of the decision of local prosecutors is neither fair nor just.

FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No

SUPPORT: (Verified 8/9/19)

American Civil Liberties Union of California

California Public Defenders Association

OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/9/19)

None received

ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 55-19, 5/13/19

AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cunningham, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon

NOES: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Cooper, Dahle, Diep, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Mayes, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Salas, Voepel, Waldron

NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Boerner Horvath, Brough, Burke, Frazier, Gabriel

Prepared by: Stella Choe / PUB. S. /

8/14/19 15:17:06

**** END ****

SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY

Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair

2019 - 2020 Regular

Bill No: AB 1618 Hearing Date: July 2, 2019

Subject: Plea Bargaining: Benefits of Later Enactments

HISTORY

Source: Author

Prior Legislation: AB 1343 (Thurmond), Ch. 705, Stats. 2015

AB 267 (Jones-Sawyer), vetoed, 2015

Support: California Public Defenders Association

Opposition: None known

Assembly Floor Vote: Not relevant

This analysis reflect the bill as proposed to be amended.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this bill is to clarify that a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent, and thus void as against public policy.

Existing law defines “plea bargaining” to mean “any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or their counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.” (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (b).)

Existing law states that if the public offense charged is a felony not punishable with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon the appearance of counsel for the defendant read the complaint to the defendant and ask whether they plead guilty or not guilty to the offenses charged and to a previous conviction or convictions if charged. (Pen. Code, § 859a, subd. (a).)

Existing law provides that while the charge remains pending before the magistrate and when the defendant is present, the defendant may plead guilty to the offense charged, or with the consent of the magistrate and the prosecuting attorney, plead nolo contendere to the offense charged, or to any other offense that is necessarily included in the charged offense, or to an attempt to commit the charged offense, or to any previous convictions charged. (Ibid.)

Existing law provides that if the defendant subsequently files a written motion to withdraw the plea, the motion shall be heard and determined by the court before which the plea was entered. (Ibid.)

Existing law states that every plea must be made in open court, and may be oral or in writing, shall be entered upon the minutes of the court, and shall be taken down in shorthand by the official reporter if one is present. All pleas of guilty or nolo contendere to misdemeanors or felonies shall be oral or in writing. (Pen. Code, § 1017.)

Existing law states that unless otherwise provided by law, every plea shall be entered or withdrawn by the defendant personally in open court. (Pen. Code, § 1018.)

Existing law provides that on application of the defendant at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. (Ibid.)

Existing law states that where the plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as provided, cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea. (Pen. Code, § 1192.5.)

Existing law provides that if the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, a the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter, and (3) in that case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his or her plea if he or she desires to do so. The court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea. (Id.)

This bill states that the Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

1. The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.
2. In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
3. Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).
4. A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.

This bill provides that a provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.

This bill defines “plea bargain” as defined in Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (b).

COMMENTS

1. Need for This Bill

According to the author of this bill:

After the Prison Law Office in Berkeley brought forward a case against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), a three judge court ruled that California had to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of capacity to abide by the constitutional rights of prisoners. The court made many findings in their ruling, including that overcrowding led to inadequate medical services, which violated their 8th amendment rights by not providing proper adequate care, and that reducing the prison population could be done without endangering public safety.

In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision in Brown v. Plata, ordering California to reduce its prison population to 137.5% capacity. In order to comply, California passed various legislation including, “The Public Safety Realignment Act” in 2011. Realignment, which created a shift in public policy on criminal justice reform, shifted the supervision of certain convictions from state prison to county jails.

In continuing criminal justice reform and to further reduce the prison population, a number of policy changes have been enacted via legislation and voter initiatives in recent years. Recognizing the need to reduce penalties for non-serious and non-violent property and drug crime the Legislature placed Proposition 47 on the ballot in 2014 and it passed with about 60% of the vote. In 2016 the Legislature placed Prop 57, which passed with 64% of the vote, on the ballot to provide increased parole opportunities for individuals serving sentences for non-violent crimes and authorized sentence credits for rehabilitation, good behavior, and education. As the Legislature and voters have made clear the need and desire to shift our justice system’s focus to rehabilitation, recent reports have noted that prosecutors have begun to force defendants to sign away their rights from any future changes in law when entering a plea bargain.

Various court cases have made clear that plea bargains are subject to changes in state law, and must be entered in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner by all parties. In Doe v. Harris the California Supreme Court ruled that “[p]lea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.” This ruling makes clear that plea bargains are still subject to the power of the state to make changes affecting sentencing standards. Furthermore, in Brooklyn v. Alabama the US Supreme Court held that holding “[s]ignificant constitutional rights [are] at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”

Prosecutors that decide to have defendants sign away all future potential benefits from changes in state law circumvents the Legislative process and the will of the voters. When changes in state law resulted in increased penalties for individuals after they entered plea agreements prosecutors did not feel the need to pre-empt future legislation, and only appear willing to do so now that voters and the Legislature have begun to focus on reforming our criminal justice system. The Legislature is tasked with making changes in state law that affect all individuals equally, to have pockets of the state where future laws would have no impact because of the decision of local prosecutors is neither fair nor just.

1. Relevant Case Law

The issue of whether a plea agreement can bar a defendant from invoking a post-judgment change in law was recently considered in two cases.

In People v. Wright, (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 749, the defendant pled guilty to transporting a controlled substance and admitted a prior conviction which triggered a three-year enhancement pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 11370.2. In the written plea agreement, the defendant waived his right to appeal, including among other things, “any sentence stipulated herein.” Following his conviction, SB 180 (Mitchell), Ch. 677, Stats. 2017 was signed into law so that effective January 1, 2018 the three-year enhancement under Health & Safety Code section 11370.2 no longer applied to the crime for which the defendant had plead guilty. Another appellate court ruled held that the changes made by SB 180 applies retroactively to actions in which the judgement of conviction is not final. The defendant then appealed contending that the court should vacate the now inapplicable three-year enhancement from his sentence. (People v. Wright, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 753.)

The Fourth District Court of Appeal in People v. Wright concluded that Wright had not waived his right to appeal future sentencing error based on a change of the law which he was unaware of at the time he entered his plea. The court reasoned that while a plea bargain may include the waiver of the right to appeal, “the valid waiver of a right presupposes an actual and demonstrable knowledge of the very right being waived.” (People v. Wright, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 754.) The court, relying on Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, also stated that “the general rule in California is that a plea agreement is ‘“deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy.”’” (Id. at pp. 755, citing Doe v. Harris, supra 57 Cal.4th at p. 73.)

The court found that “Wright's waiver of his right to appeal his stipulated sentence cannot be construed as applying to a sentencing error of which he had no notice when he signed the plea agreement. Nothing in the record suggests that the parties considered or addressed the possibility that future legislation might abolish the required three-year enhancement for Wright's prior felony drug conviction. (People. v. Wright, supra, Cal.App.5th at 756.) The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to strike the three year enhancement from his sentence.

In People v. Barton, (2019) 32 Cal. App. 5th 1088, the Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the Wright decision. In Barton, the defendant pleaded guilty to two drug-related counts and admitted two prior convictions which added two three-year sentence enhancements to her sentence pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 11370.2. As part of her plea agreement, the defendant signed a written waiver stating, in pertinent part, “I understand that I will be waiving my right to appeal and I will not be able to appeal from this Court's sentence based on the plea that I enter into in this matter.” (Id. at p. 1093.) After defendant was sentenced, SB 180 (Mitchell), Ch. 677, Stats. 2017 was signed into law making the three-year enhancement inapplicable to the drug-related offenses that the defendant was convicted of. Defendant appealed seeking to have the two three-year sentence enhancements vacated from her sentence stating that there was nothing in the record to suggest that she knew of SB 180 when she entered into her plea.

The Barton court, relying on Doe v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th 64 and People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68) which were also discussed in the Wright case, concluded that Barton’s right to appeal was knowingly and intelligently waived. (People v. Barton, supra, 32 Cal. App. 5th at 1096.) In summarizing Doe v. Harris, the court stated that “parties to a plea agreement ‘“are deemed to know and understand that the state … may enact laws that will affect the consequences attending the conviction entered upon the plea.”’ (Citation omitted.) However, the parties can affirmatively agree, or reach an implied understanding, that ‘“the consequences of a plea will remain fixed despite amendments to the relevant law.”’ (Citation omitted.) ‘“Whether such an understanding exists presents factual issues that generally require an analysis of the representations made and other circumstances specific to the individual case.”’ (Id. at p. 1094.)

The court stated that “the dispositive inquiry is not whether or why subsequent events have transformed a prison term into an unauthorized sentence, but whether (1) the parties' plea agreement specified a particular sentence and (2) the waiver of appellate rights ‘“specifically extended to any right to appeal such sentence.”’ (People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 86.) The court found that the Barton’s plea agreement included a stipulated term of incarceration and the waiver of her right to appeal the sentence. The court concluded that because the sentence imposed by the court was neither unforeseen or unknown at the time Barton executed the waiver and plea agreement, she knowingly and intelligently executed an enforceable waiver of the right to challenge her sentence on appeal. (People v. Barton, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.)

The Barton court noted that their analysis conflicts with People v. Wright, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th 749, and reasoned that in the court’s view, Wright’s holding conflicts with controlling and dispositive case law, referring to People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 68. (People v. Barton, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.)

The California Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Barton. (Review granted 6/19/19.)

1. Impetus for this Bill

This bill appears to be in response to an article in the San Diego Union Tribune regarding a new provision that had been offered as part of a plea agreement in two separate cases prosecuted by the San Diego District Attorney’s Office:

The waiver has been offered in at least two cases, both murder cases. In one case in North County the plea deal with the waiver was rejected. In a second case in South Bay a jury deadlocked on murder charges against Victor Sanchez in early March. Then on April 10 he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter with an 11 year sentence — and the waiver.

The wording of the waiver offered in the North County case is sweeping. “This agreement waives all future potential benefits of any legislative actions or judicial decisions or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of this plea, whether or not such future changes are specifically designed to provide pre- or post-conviction relief to any convicted defendants, and whether or not they are intended to be retroactive,” it reads.

Under the law, plea agreements are considered binding contracts among all parties. They usually contain a general waiver — the legal term where someone voluntarily gives up their rights — to appeal a ruling or sentence in a case.

The state Supreme Court has ruled that when agreeing to a plea deal, all sides are deemed to understand that the law can change in the future, and that the parties to the plea deal aren’t protected from those changes. The decision came in the case of a registered sex offender, who said amendments to the law after he registered that allowed for publication of some personal information violated his plea deal.

That principle was upheld in January in a decision by the 4th District Court of Appeal in San Diego, where defendant Justin Wright agreed to an 11-year sentence for selling drugs. But when the Legislature passed a law in 2017 that eliminated a three-year sentencing enhancement for prior drug convictions, Wright went to court and argued the law was retroactive and he should now get the three years removed from his sentence.

The court ruled for Wright. But in the decision, Associate Justice Gil Nares indicated that a waiver like the one San Diego prosecutors are using, would be workable.

“If parties to a plea agreement want to insulate the agreement from future changes in the law, they should specify that the consequences of the plea will remain fixed despite amendments to the relevant law,” he wrote.

(Moran, After waves of criminal justice reforms, prosecutors now want to lock in pleas, ask defendants to give up future rights, San Diego Tribune (Apr. 17, 2019) <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2019-04-17/after-waves-of-criminal-justice-reforms-prosecutors-now-want-to-lock-in-pleas-ask-defendants-to-give-up-future-rights> [as of June 17, 2019].)

This bill would make such provisions in a plea bargain void as against public policy on the basis that a guilty plea must knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and any waiver of rights within a plea agreement shall accordingly be a voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Any waiver of unknown future potential benefits is not knowing, and intelligent.

1. Amendment

The author intends make a technical amendment to subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1016.8 in the bill as follows:

(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.

-- END –

ASSEMBLY THIRD READING

ATR Bill Id:AB 1618

Author:(Jones-Sawyer)

As Amended Ver:April 11, 2019

Majority vote

SUMMARY:

Repeals the ability for a court to suspend or delay someone's driver's license for a conviction of the crime of vandalism.

Major Provisions

1. Repeals the ability for a court to suspend or delay someone's driver's license for a conviction of the crime of vandalism.
2. Specifies that existing suspensions and delays will remain in effect.

COMMENTS:

The California Legislature passed a series of laws to fight graffiti in the 1990s, including measures expanding the definition of vandalism and forcing defendants to pay for the costs of apprehension after a conviction. With the passage of Proposition 21 in 2000, criminal penalties for vandalism were enhanced, including imposing a fine up to $50,000 if there was more than $10,000 in property damage. The state's anti-graffiti laws extended to a point where a judge can order a parent or guardian to keep a previously defaced area clean of graffiti for up to one year and can require them to pay the fine on behalf of their child. In addition to fines, vandalism charges also can result in jail time. If the vandalism results in less than $400 in damage, the defendant may be charged with a misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year. If the vandalism results in more than $400 worth of property damage, the defendant may be charged with a misdemeanor or a felony with imprisonment up to three years. If the vandalism is to a place for worship, a religious school or cemetery, and the act was a hate crime meant to deter persons from freely exercising their faith, the crime is a felony punishable up to three years. In addition, if the act was a hate crime it is within judicial discretion to add an additional one, two or three years to a person's sentence if they acted alone, or two, three or four years if they acted in concert with another person.

In 1990, the Legislature passed SB 1977 (Kopp), Chapter 712, which, among other things, granted a court the ability to suspend or delay someone's driver's license if they were convicted of vandalism. The Los Angeles Times reported at the time that "Kopp noted that to teen-agers, a driver's license is perhaps the most important thing in life and that losing it for a year or facing a delay in obtaining it should make youths think twice before defacing property with graffiti…. However, opponents objected that the driving privileges of youngsters have no connection with graffiti vandalism." The Assembly Transportation Committee Analysis for SB 1977 included a recommendation: "Do not pass. Bad policy; no linkage between the crime and punishment. Bills like this are gradually transforming the DMV into the warden for juvenile delinquency."

In 1996, the Legislature removed judicial discretion to suspend licenses, and instead required a driver's license suspension for every conviction of vandalism with the passage of AB 2331 (Goldsmith) Chapter 918. Assembly Member Goldsmith stated at the time that "The deficiency in our system is demonstrated by the continuing problem of graffiti. Even with legislation passed to treat graffiti more seriously in past years, we continue to see this problem that damages and destroys personal property." In 2006, the Legislature passed AB 2923 (Calderon), Chapter 434. That bill extended the one year suspension for vandalism to two years. The author argued at the time that "Graffiti blights communities, is a major cause in declining property values and gives the false impression that residents do not care and that they have given into hoodlums and vandals."

In 2018, 2,258 individuals had their licenses delayed as a result of a vandalism suspension. 2,628 licenses were suspended as a result of vandalism. Five of those suspensions were as a result of vandalism to a religious institution.

Committee comments: Despite decades of legislative efforts of using license suspensions as a deterrent against graffiti, graffiti has persisted. In 2014, the City of Los Angeles spent $7 million cleaning up 32.4 million square feet of graffiti. While the suspended licenses appear to have not had an effect on reducing graffiti, they have real world impacts on transportation. Suspending someone's driver's license does not stop someone from driving. In fact, there were 115,000 convictions for driving with a suspended license in 2018 (and that number does not include suspensions as a result of reckless driving or driving under the influence.) It does, however, stop someone from having a legal means of getting to work or school if there is no available public transportation.

Further, suspending licenses also stops those who opt to drive anyway from having vehicle insurance. This could have detrimental effects for anyone involved in vehicle accident with someone driving with a suspended license. According to a 2000 study from AAA entitled Unlicensed to Kill, nearly 1 in 5 traffic fatalities in California are committed by someone with a suspended license, and hit and runs are more likely to occur when someone has a suspended license. By delaying a teenager's ability to get a license until after the age of 18, you are also guaranteeing they will not get a provisional driver's license, which includes behind the wheel training requirements. While the state grants courts the ability to suspend licenses for something completely unrelated to driving, two years ago it removed the authority for courts to suspend driver's licenses for failing to pay traffic tickets out of recognition of the harm it may cause for low income families.

According to the Author:

No statement provided

Arguments in Support:

According to the California Police Chiefs Association, "Existing law allows the courts to suspend the driving privileges of a person over the age of 13 if they have been convicted of vandalism; however, under existing law, only persons over the age of 16 can operate a vehicle with a valid California driver's license. These suspensions are unnecessary, and the fines or hours of community service imposed on the person convicted of vandalism is sufficient enough to hold them accountable."

Arguments in Opposition:

None on file

FISCAL COMMENTS:

No direct state costs.

VOTES:

ASM TRANSPORTATION: 12-2-1

YES: Frazier, Aguiar-Curry, Berman, Chu, Cunningham, Daly, Friedman, Gipson, Grayson, Medina, Nazarian, O'Donnell

NO: Fong, Diep

ABS, ABST OR NV: Bigelow

ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-5-0

YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Friedman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Jones-Sawyer, Robert Rivas

NO: Bigelow, Brough, Diep, Fong, Obernolte

UPDATED:

VERSION: April 11, 2019

CONSULTANT: David Sforza / TRANS. / (916) 319-2093 FN: 0000365

Date of Hearing: May 1, 2019

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Lorena Gonzalez, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1618

Author:(Jones-Sawyer) – As Amended Ver:April 11, 2019

Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No

SUMMARY:

This bill repeals the ability for a court to suspend or delay someone’s driver’s license for a prospective conviction of the crime of vandalism.

FISCAL EFFECT:

No direct state costs.

COMMENTS:

1. Background and Purpose. Statute provides numerous, and in some cases severe, punishments for the crime of vandalism. One such punishment is to delay issuance of a driver’s license. Another is suspension of an existing driver’s license.

There is no direct, obvious link between possession of a license to drive and vandalism. Nor does it seem these punishments have reduced incidents of graffiti (the rationale behind creation of such punishments). The punishments do, however, guarantee a person who is sanctioned with such a punishment cannot drive…at least not legally.

1. Related and Prior Legislation.
   1. SB 485 (Beall) repeals various license suspensions for crimes unrelated to traffic safety, including a provision identical to this bill. The bill is pending in the Senate Appropriations Committee.
   2. AB 2685 (Lackey), Chapter 717, Statutes of 2018, eliminated license suspensions for habitual truancy.
   3. AB 2923 (Calderon), Chapter 434, Statutes of 2006, extended the license suspension for vandalism to up to two years.

Analysis Prepared by: Jay Dickenson / APPR. / (916) 319-2081

Date of Hearing: April 22, 2019

ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

Jim Frazier, Chair

ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1618 (

Author:Jones-Sawyer) – As Amended Ver:April 11, 2019

SUBJECT: Driving privileges: vandalism

SUMMARY: Repeals the ability for a court to suspend or delay someone’s driver’s license for a conviction of the crime of vandalism. Specifically, this bill:

1. Repeals the ability for a court to suspend or delay someone’s driver’s license for a conviction of the crime of vandalism.
2. Specifies that existing suspensions and delays will remain in effect.

EXISTING LAW:

1. Requires a court to suspend a person’s driving privilege for up to two years if a defendant is convicted of vandalism, unless the court finds that a personal or family hardship exists that requires the person to have a driver’s license.
2. Requires a court to delay issuing a driver’s license to a person for one year if they are convicted of vandalism and do not already have a driver’s license.
3. Allows a court to reduce the length of time a defendant’s license is suspended or delayed by performing community service.
4. Specifies that every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not their own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism:
5. Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material.
6. Damages.
7. Destroys.
8. Provides for higher criminal penalties for vandalism depending on the amount of property damage that is done, the use of materials to commit the act, or for specific locations of vandalism.

FISCAL EFFECT: Unknown

COMMENTS: The California Legislature passed a series of laws to fight graffiti in the 1990s, including measures expanding the definition of vandalism and forcing defendants to pay for the costs of apprehension after a conviction. With the passage of Proposition 21 in 2000, criminal penalties for vandalism were enhanced, including imposing a fine up to $50,000 if there was more than $10,000 in property damage. The state’s anti-graffiti laws extended to a point where a judge can order a parent or guardian to keep a previously defaced area clean of graffiti for up to one year and can require them to pay the fine on behalf of their child.

In addition to fines, vandalism charges also can result in jail time. If the vandalism results in less than $400 in damage, the defendant may be charged with a misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year. If the vandalism results in more than $400 worth of property damage, the defendant may be charged with a misdemeanor or a felony with imprisonment up to 3 years. If the vandalism is to a place for worship, a religious school or cemetery, and the act was a hate crime meant to deter persons from freely exercising their faith, the crime is a felony punishable up to 3 years. In addition, if the act was a hate crime it is within judicial discretion to add an additional one, two or three years to a person’s sentence if they acted alone, or two, three or four years if they acted in concert with another person.

In 1990, the Legislature passed SB 1977 (Kopp), Chapter 712, which, among other things, granted a court the ability to suspend or delay someone’s driver’s license if they were convicted of vandalism. The Los Angeles Times reported at the time that “For years, the Legislature has waged a mostly unsuccessful war against vandals armed with spray cans, paint brushes and ink pens. In a new twist, the Senate passed, 24 to 7, and sent to the Assembly a bill by Sen. Quentin L. Kopp (I-San Francisco) clamping a one-year license suspension on 16- to 21-year-olds convicted of graffiti vandalism. A graffiti conviction for 13- to 16-year-olds would delay issuance of a driver's license for one year. Kopp noted that to teen-agers, a driver's license is perhaps the most important thing in life and that losing it for a year or facing a delay in obtaining it should make youths think twice before defacing property with graffiti…. However, opponents objected that the driving privileges of youngsters have no connection with graffiti vandalism.”

The Assembly Transportation Committee Analysis for SB 1977 included a recommendation: “Do not pass. Bad policy; no linkage between the crime and punishment. Bills like this are gradually transforming the DMV into the warden for juvenile delinquency.”

In 1996, the Legislature removed judicial discretion to suspend licenses, and instead required a driver’s license suspension for every conviction of vandalism with the passage of AB 2331 (Goldsmith) Chapter 918. Assemblymember Goldsmith stated at the time that “The deficiency in our system is demonstrated by the continuing problem of graffiti. Even with legislation passed to treat graffiti more seriously in past years, we continue to see this problem that damages and destroys personal property.”

Graffiti was considered such a blight that in 1998, a Los Angeles Times reporter wrote that graffiti is “a silent scourge that just doesn't let up. It leaves ugly lesions scrawled on walls, windows and railroad trestles. It can be a running narrative of gang warfare or the signature of a disenfranchised youth seeking his own brand of glory. To property owners, it is a festering wound, a cowardly affront, a sign of neighborhood decline.”

In 2006, the Legislature passed AB 2923 (Calderon), Chapter 434. That bill extended the one year suspension for vandalism to two years. The author argued at the time that “Graffiti blights communities, is a major cause in declining property values and gives the false impression that residents do not care and that they have given into hoodlums and vandals.”

In 2018, 2,258 individuals had their licenses delayed as a result of a vandalism suspension. 2,628 licenses were suspended as a result of vandalism. Five of those suspensions were as a result of vandalism to a religious institution.

Committee comments: Despite decades of legislative efforts of using license suspensions as a deterrent against graffiti, graffiti has persisted. In 2014, the City of Los Angeles spent $7 million cleaning up 32.4 million square feet of graffiti.

While the suspended licenses appear to have not had an effect on reducing graffiti, they have real world impacts on transportation. Suspending someone’s driver’s license does not stop someone from driving. In fact, there were 115,000 convictions for driving with a suspended license in 2018 (and that number does not include suspensions as a result of reckless driving or driving under the influence.) It does, however, stop someone from having a legal means of getting to work or school if there is no available public transportation.

Further, suspending licenses also stops those who opt to drive anyway from having vehicle insurance. This could have detrimental effects for anyone involved in vehicle accident with someone driving with a suspended license. According to a 2000 study from AAA entitled Unlicensed to Kill, nearly 1 in 5 traffic fatalities in California are committed by someone with a suspended license, and hit and runs are more likely to occur when someone has a suspended license.

By delaying a teenager’s ability to get a license until after the age of 18, you are also guaranteeing they will not get a provisional driver’s license, which includes behind the wheel training requirements.

While the state grants courts the ability to suspend licenses for something completely unrelated to driving, two years ago it removed the authority for courts to suspend driver’s licenses for failing to pay traffic tickets out of recognition of the harm it may cause for low income families.

Last year, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed AB 2685 (Lackey) Chapter 717, Statutes of 2018, which eliminated license suspensions for habitual truancy.

The Legislature may want to consider whether it should continue to allow for the suspension of driver’s licenses for issues unrelated to traffic safety.

Related bills:

SB 485 (Beall, 2019) repeals various license suspensions for crimes unrelated to traffic safety, including a provision identical to this bill. That bill passed out of Senate Public Safety Committee and is pending a hearing in Senate Appropriations Committee.

Previous Legislation:

AB 2685 (Lackey) Chapter 717, Statutes of 2018, eliminated license suspensions for habitual truancy.

AB 2923 (Calderon) Chapter 434, Statutes of 2006, extended the license suspension for vandalism to up to two years.

AB 2331 (Goldsmith) chapter 918, Statutes of 1996, required a one year license suspension for a conviction of vandalism.

SB 1977 (Kopp), Chapter 712, Statutes of 1990, granted a court the ability to suspend or delay someone’s driver’s license if they were convicted of vandalism.

REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:

Support

American Civil Liberties Union of California
California District Attorneys Association

Opposition

None on file

Analysis Prepared by: David Sforza / TRANS. / (916) 319-2093