AB 1747: California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System: immigration.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-10-12
|
Date
|
Status
|
|---|---|
| Oct 12, 2019 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 789, Statutes of 2019. |
| Oct 12, 2019 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 14, 2019 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. |
| Sep 26, 2019 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 4 p.m. |
| Sep 14, 2019 | Senate amendments concurred in. To Engrossing and Enrolling. (Ayes 54. Noes 19. Page 3583.). |
| Sep 13, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Sep 13, 2019 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. |
| Sep 13, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. (Ayes 27. Noes 11. Page 2936.). |
| Sep 11, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 9, 2019 | Joint Rule 61 suspended. (Ayes 29. Noes 7.) |
| Sep 10, 2019 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Sep 9, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 5, 2019 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Sep 3, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Aug 30, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (August 30). |
| Aug 12, 2019 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 11, 2019 | Read second time and amended. Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jul 10, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 1.) (July 9). |
| Jun 25, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on JUD. (Ayes 5. Noes 1.) (June 25). Re-referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Jun 10, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| May 22, 2019 | Referred to Coms. on PUB. S. and JUD. |
| May 14, 2019 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 13, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 9, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 8, 2019 | Coauthors revised. |
| Apr 25, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Apr 24, 2019 | Read second time and amended. |
| Apr 23, 2019 | From committee: Amend, and do pass as amended and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 3.) (April 23). |
| Apr 10, 2019 | Coauthors revised. |
| Apr 1, 2019 | Re-referred to Com. on PUB. S. |
| Mar 28, 2019 | Referred to Coms. on PUB. S. and JUD. |
| Feb 25, 2019 | Read first time. |
| Feb 23, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 25. |
| Feb 22, 2019 | Introduced. To print. |
|
Date
|
Description
|
Location
|
Votes
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 14, 2019 | AB 1747 Gonzalez Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| Sep 13, 2019 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB1747 Gonzalez et al. By Durazo | Senate Floor |
Passed |
|
| Aug 30, 2019 | Do pass as amended | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Aug 12, 2019 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Jul 9, 2019 | Do pass as amended, but first amend, and re-refer to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Jun 25, 2019 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Judiciary] | Senate Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
|
| May 13, 2019 | AB 1747 Gonzalez Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
|
| May 8, 2019 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
|
| Apr 23, 2019 | Do pass as amended and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
|
| Apr 9, 2019 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Judiciary] | Assembly Standing Committee on Public Safety |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 1747
Author:(Gonzalez)
As Amended Ver:September 10, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Limits the use of the state's telecommunications system containing criminal history information for immigration enforcement purposes, as defined, and for purposes of investigating immigration crimes solely because criminal history includes a violation of federal immigration law, as specified.
The Senate Amendments:
- Require, commencing July 1, 2021, that any inquiry submitted through the statewide telecommunications system for information other than criminal history information shall include a reason for the initiation of the inquiry.
- Prohibit, effective January 1, 2020, subscribers to the state's telecommunications system from using information other than criminal history information transmitted through the system for immigration enforcement purposes, as defined. Clarify that this provision does not prohibit an agency from sharing information as dictated by federal law.
- Authorize the Attorney General's office, commencing July 1, 2021, to conduct investigations as the Attorney General deems appropriate to monitor compliance with these provisions, including the right to inspect case files and any records identified in the investigation process to substantiate a reason given for accessing information other than criminal history information in the system.
- Delete provisions prohibiting state and local agencies from providing information to federal authorities for the purpose of immigration enforcement, and delete provisions declaring as void any contract or agreement in effect on January 1, 2020 that conflicts with the prohibition on facilitating immigration enforcement.
COMMENTS:
According to the Author:
"Six years ago, undocumented Californians gained the right to a driver's license so they could be law abiding drivers, an effort aimed at providing us all peace of mind on the road. Now, fear is undermining the AB 60 [(Alejo), Chapter 524, Statutes of 2013] license program. AB 1747 prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making their databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement, except for the individual's citizenship or immigration status, which is required by federal law to be shared. This would not apply to information within those databases on individuals with active arrest warrants.
"Law enforcement agencies with access to [California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS)] are allowed to access certain information from driver's license or identification card records, including name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the [Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)]. The DMV does not release any applicant documents except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
"These federal immigration policy tactics are concerning. AB 1747 limits the involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. It is imperative that we protect the privacy of California residents."
Arguments in Support:
According to the California Public Defenders Association, "AB 1747 strengthens the principals SB 54 was built upon by limiting access to local enforcement agencies' databases and continues to uphold California's core values of community, family unity, and common humanity. Mass deportations threaten the civil rights and safety of all who reside in California. At a time when the current Administration continues to target immigrant communities, AB 1747 will reaffirm California's commitment to being at the forefront of the fight."
Arguments in Opposition:
According to the California State Sheriffs' Association, "This bill is an overly broad attempt to restrict information sharing among law enforcement agencies based on concerns about the use of information that can be retrieved from CLETS. Sheriffs do not engage in immigration enforcement, but law enforcement at local, state, and federal levels need to communicate about dangerous persons without regard to immigration status.
"Additionally, irrespective of any connection to questions about information being used for immigration enforcement, access to CLETS is already limited and closely protected. Users must be approved and properly trained, and unlawful accessing of the system carries significant consequences."
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, workload and contract costs to the Department of Justice in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund)
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 5-0-3
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Bauer-Kahan, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Diep, Kamlager-Dove
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
NO: Gallagher, Kiley, Obernolte
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-4-1
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Fong, Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Diep
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14-10
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NO: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Voepel, Waldron
ABS, ABST OR NV: Arambula, Brough, Burke, Cunningham, Diep, Frazier, Gloria, Mayes, Patterson, Smith
UPDATED:
VERSION: September 10, 2019
CONSULTANT: Nikki Moore (Counsel) / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0002414
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1747 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1747
Amended: 9/10/19 in Senate
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 6/25/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Morrell
NO VOTE RECORDED: Moorlach
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/9/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Law enforcement: immigration
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits state law enforcement agencies from creating or maintaining databases including an individual’s citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/10/19 clarify that the requirement for any inquiry for information other than a criminal history information shall include a reason for the initiation of the inquiry commences July 1, 2021.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/6/19 clarify that the prohibition against using the statewide telecommunications system to investigate federal immigration law is in addition to the other prohibitions.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/5/19 change the implementation date to January 1, 2020, for the requirement that any inquiry submitted to the statewide telecommunications system for information other than criminal history information include a reason for the inquiry. The amendments also change to July 1, 2021, the authorization for the Attorney General to conduct investigations to monitor compliance with the provisions of this bill.
Existing law:
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (Government Code § 7284.6 (a)):
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities.
- Providing personal information, as defined, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.
- Assisting immigration authorities “for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.”
- Performing the functions of an immigration officer.
- Placing peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employing peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement;
- Using immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody;
- Transferring an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or as otherwise authorized by statute;
- Providing office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility; and,
- Contracting with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for purposes of civil immigration custody, except as otherwise authorized by statute.
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- States that a law enforcement official shall have discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities only if doing so would not violate any federal, state, or local law, or local policy, and where permitted by the California Values Act. Specifies that coordination shall only occur with respect to specified convictions and offenses. (Government Code § 7282.5 (a).)
- Requires the Department of Justice to maintain a statewide telecommunications system for use by law enforcement agencies (CLETS). (Government Code § 15150 et seq)
- Requires the Attorney General, upon the advice of an advisory committee, to adopt policies, practices and procedures, and conditions of qualification for connection to the system. (Government Code § 15160)
This bill states that commencing July 1, 2021, all of the following shall apply:
- Any inquiry for information from CLETS other than criminal history information submitted through the system shall include a reason for initiation of the inquiry.
- Specifies that consistent with the California Values Act CLETS shall not be used for purposes of immigration violations.
- Provides that the Attorney General may conduct investigations, including inspections and audits, as appropriate.
Comments
According to the author:
AB 60 created a driver’s license program for undocumented residents to ensure these residents could drive legally, safely and obtain insurance. California residents were assured repeatedly that the driver’s license would not be used as evidence of their immigration or citizenship status, and not be used as a basis for a criminal investigation, arrest, or detention.
Recent news investigations have uncovered that Immigration Customs and Enforcement (I.C.E.) has been accessing state-run databases containing information about individuals with licenses that were made available under Assembly Bill 60. Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 1810.5, law enforcement agencies may access certain information from driver license or identification card records either directly from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) via a requester account, or via the Department of Justice’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-Photo programs. Available information includes name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV.
CLETS is available to all law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations purposes. According to the DMV, pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 12800.7, the Department does not release any document provided by an applicant for purposes of proving the applicant’s identity, true full name, California residency, or legal presence, except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must first apply for access to CLETS and once approved, they can submit individualized inquiries to obtain driver’s license or vehicle registration information collected by the DMV and maintained in standardized fields, such as name, address, physical characteristics and license plate information, which appear on the face of the driver’s license. The systems may also be used to obtain driver history such as accidents or tickets.
Once DHS has access to CLETS, they are not required to explain the purpose for each inquiry they make. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through DMV databases and CLETS is unknown, the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone.
Use of state databases by I.C.E. for immigration enforcement is concerning. Data that is collected by the DMV for the purpose of issuing drivers licenses, should not be used for immigration enforcement. Data already show that the number of applicants for AB 60 driver’s licenses has sharply dropped, and news reports cite individuals discussing their fear of immigration enforcement in relation to the licenses. This fear is undermining the purpose of the AB 60 program to enable residents to drive legally and to be insured. As a result, eligible residents may hesitate to apply for the license if I.C.E. is able to access to sensitive personal information.
AB 1747 protects the privacy of California residents and would ensure that I.C.E. does not have access to personal information in California law enforcement databases.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, workload and contract costs to the Department of Justice in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund)
American Civil Liberties Union
California Public Defenders Association
Monterey County
Oakland Privacy
Root and Rebound
OPPOSITION: (Verified 9/10/19)
California State Sheriffs’ Association
Electronic Frontier Foundation
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Brough, Burke, Cunningham, Diep, Frazier, Gloria, Mayes, Patterson, Smith
Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /
9/11/19 20:24:11
**** END ****
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1747 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1747
Amended: 9/6/19 in Senate
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 6/25/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Morrell
NO VOTE RECORDED: Moorlach
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/9/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Law enforcement: immigration
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits state law enforcement agencies from creating or maintaining databases including an individual’s citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/6/19 clarify that the prohibition against using the statewide telecommunications system to investigate federal immigration law is in addition to the other prohibitions.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/5/19 change the implementation date to January 1, 2020, for the requirement that any inquiry submitted to the statewide telecommunications system for information other than criminal history information include a reason for the inquiry. The amendments also change to July 1, 2021, the authorization for the Attorney General to conduct investigations to monitor compliance with the provisions of this bill.
Existing law:
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (Government Code § 7284.6 (a)):
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities.
- Providing personal information, as defined, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.
- Assisting immigration authorities “for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.”
- Performing the functions of an immigration officer.
- Placing peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employing peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement;
- Using immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody;
- Transferring an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or as otherwise authorized by statute;
- Providing office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility; and,
- Contracting with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for purposes of civil immigration custody, except as otherwise authorized by statute.
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- States that a law enforcement official shall have discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities only if doing so would not violate any federal, state, or local law, or local policy, and where permitted by the California Values Act. Specifies that coordination shall only occur with respect to specified convictions and offenses. (Government Code § 7282.5 (a).)
- Requires the Department of Justice to maintain a statewide telecommunications system for use by law enforcement agencies (CLETS). (Government Code § 15150 et seq)
- Requires the Attorney General, upon the advice of an advisory committee, to adopt policies, practices and procedures, and conditions of qualification for connection to the system. (Government Code § 15160)
This bill states that commencing July 1, 2021, all of the following shall apply:
- Any inquiry for information from CLETS other than criminal history information submitted through the system shall include a reason for initiation of the inquiry.
- Specifies that consistent with the California Values Act CLETS shall not be used for purposes of immigration violations.
- Provides that the Attorney General may conduct investigations, including inspections and audits, as appropriate.
Comments
According to the author:
AB 60 created a driver’s license program for undocumented residents to ensure these residents could drive legally, safely and obtain insurance. California residents were assured repeatedly that the driver’s license would not be used as evidence of their immigration or citizenship status, and not be used as a basis for a criminal investigation, arrest, or detention.
Recent news investigations have uncovered that Immigration Customs and Enforcement (I.C.E.) has been accessing state-run databases containing information about individuals with licenses that were made available under Assembly Bill 60. Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 1810.5, law enforcement agencies may access certain information from driver license or identification card records either directly from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) via a requester account, or via the Department of Justice’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-Photo programs. Available information includes name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV.
CLETS is available to all law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations purposes. According to the DMV, pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 12800.7, the Department does not release any document provided by an applicant for purposes of proving the applicant’s identity, true full name, California residency, or legal presence, except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must first apply for access to CLETS and once approved, they can submit individualized inquiries to obtain driver’s license or vehicle registration information collected by the DMV and maintained in standardized fields, such as name, address, physical characteristics and license plate information, which appear on the face of the driver’s license. The systems may also be used to obtain driver history such as accidents or tickets.
Once DHS has access to CLETS, they are not required to explain the purpose for each inquiry they make. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through DMV databases and CLETS is unknown, the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone.
Use of state databases by I.C.E. for immigration enforcement is concerning. Data that is collected by the DMV for the purpose of issuing drivers licenses, should not be used for immigration enforcement. Data already show that the number of applicants for AB 60 driver’s licenses has sharply dropped, and news reports cite individuals discussing their fear of immigration enforcement in relation to the licenses. This fear is undermining the purpose of the AB 60 program to enable residents to drive legally and to be insured. As a result, eligible residents may hesitate to apply for the license if I.C.E. is able to access to sensitive personal information.
AB 1747 protects the privacy of California residents and would ensure that I.C.E. does not have access to personal information in California law enforcement databases.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, workload and contract costs to the Department of Justice in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund)
American Civil Liberties Union
California Public Defenders Association
Monterey County
Oakland Privacy
Root and Rebound
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Brough, Burke, Cunningham, Diep, Frazier, Gloria, Mayes, Patterson, Smith
Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /
9/9/19 18:42:49
**** END ****
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1747 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1747
Amended: 9/5/19 in Senate
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 6/25/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Morrell
NO VOTE RECORDED: Moorlach
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/9/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Law enforcement: immigration
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits state law enforcement agencies from creating or maintaining databases including an individual’s citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/5/19 change the implementation date to January 1, 2020, for the requirement that any inquiry submitted to the statewide telecommunications system for information other than criminal history information include a reason for the inquiry. The amendments also change to July 1, 2021, the authorization for the Attorney General to conduct investigations to monitor compliance with the provisions of this bill.
Existing law:
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (Government Code § 7284.6 (a)):
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities.
- Providing personal information, as defined, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.
- Assisting immigration authorities “for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.”
- Performing the functions of an immigration officer.
- Placing peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employing peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement;
- Using immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody;
- Transferring an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or as otherwise authorized by statute;
- Providing office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility; and,
- Contracting with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for purposes of civil immigration custody, except as otherwise authorized by statute.
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- States that a law enforcement official shall have discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities only if doing so would not violate any federal, state, or local law, or local policy, and where permitted by the California Values Act. Specifies that coordination shall only occur with respect to specified convictions and offenses. (Government Code § 7282.5 (a).)
- Requires the Department of Justice to maintain a statewide telecommunications system for use by law enforcement agencies (CLETS). (Government Code § 15150 et seq)
- Requires the Attorney General, upon the advice of an advisory committee, to adopt policies, practices and procedures, and conditions of qualification for connection to the system. (Government Code § 15160)
This bill states that commencing July 1, 2021, all of the following shall apply:
- Any inquiry for information from CLETS other than criminal history information submitted through the system shall include a reason for initiation of the inquiry.
- Specifies that consistent with the California Values Act CLETS shall not be used for purposes of immigration violations.
- Provides that the Attorney General may conduct investigations, including inspections and audits, as appropriate.
Comments
According to the author:
AB 60 created a driver’s license program for undocumented residents to ensure these residents could drive legally, safely and obtain insurance. California residents were assured repeatedly that the driver’s license would not be used as evidence of their immigration or citizenship status, and not be used as a basis for a criminal investigation, arrest, or detention.
Recent news investigations have uncovered that Immigration Customs and Enforcement (I.C.E.) has been accessing state-run databases containing information about individuals with licenses that were made available under Assembly Bill 60. Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 1810.5, law enforcement agencies may access certain information from driver license or identification card records either directly from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) via a requester account, or via the Department of Justice’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-Photo programs. Available information includes name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV.
CLETS is available to all law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations purposes. According to the DMV, pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 12800.7, the Department does not release any document provided by an applicant for purposes of proving the applicant’s identity, true full name, California residency, or legal presence, except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must first apply for access to CLETS and once approved, they can submit individualized inquiries to obtain driver’s license or vehicle registration information collected by the DMV and maintained in standardized fields, such as name, address, physical characteristics and license plate information, which appear on the face of the driver’s license. The systems may also be used to obtain driver history such as accidents or tickets.
Once DHS has access to CLETS, they are not required to explain the purpose for each inquiry they make. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through DMV databases and CLETS is unknown, the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone.
Use of state databases by I.C.E. for immigration enforcement is concerning. Data that is collected by the DMV for the purpose of issuing drivers licenses, should not be used for immigration enforcement. Data already show that the number of applicants for AB 60 driver’s licenses has sharply dropped, and news reports cite individuals discussing their fear of immigration enforcement in relation to the licenses. This fear is undermining the purpose of the AB 60 program to enable residents to drive legally and to be insured. As a result, eligible residents may hesitate to apply for the license if I.C.E. is able to access to sensitive personal information.
AB 1747 protects the privacy of California residents and would ensure that I.C.E. does not have access to personal information in California law enforcement databases.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, workload and contract costs to the Department of Justice in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund)
American Civil Liberties Union
California Public Defenders Association
Monterey County
Oakland Privacy
Root and Rebound
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Brough, Burke, Cunningham, Diep, Frazier, Gloria, Mayes, Patterson, Smith
Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /
9/6/19 13:33:40
**** END ****
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 1747 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 1747
Amended: 8/30/19 in Senate
SENATE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE: 5-1, 6/25/19
AYES: Skinner, Bradford, Jackson, Mitchell, Wiener
NOES: Morrell
NO VOTE RECORDED: Moorlach
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-1, 7/9/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Jones
NO VOTE RECORDED: Borgeas
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Law enforcement: immigration
DIGEST:
This bill prohibits state law enforcement agencies from creating or maintaining databases including an individual’s citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Existing law:
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (Government Code § 7284.6 (a)):
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities.
- Providing personal information, as defined, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.
- Assisting immigration authorities “for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.”
- Performing the functions of an immigration officer.
- Placing peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employing peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement;
- Using immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody;
- Transferring an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or as otherwise authorized by statute;
- Providing office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility; and,
- Contracting with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for purposes of civil immigration custody, except as otherwise authorized by statute.
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- States that a law enforcement official shall have discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities only if doing so would not violate any federal, state, or local law, or local policy, and where permitted by the California Values Act. Specifies that coordination shall only occur with respect to specified convictions and offenses. (Government Code § 7282.5 (a).)
- Requires the Department of Justice to maintain a statewide telecommunications system for use by law enforcement agencies (CLETS). (Government Code § 15150 et seq)
- Requires the Attorney General, upon the advice of an advisory committee, to adopt policies, practices and procedures, and conditions of qualification for connection to the system. (Government Code § 15160)
This bill states that commencing July 1, 2021, all of the following shall apply:
- Any inquiry for information from CLETS other than criminal history information submitted through the system shall include a reason for initiation of the inquiry.
- Specifies that consistent with the California Values Act CLETS shall not be used for purposes of immigration violations.
- Provides that the Attorney General may conduct investigations, including inspections and audits, as appropriate
Comments
According to the author:
AB 60 created a driver’s license program for undocumented residents to ensure these residents could drive legally, safely and obtain insurance. California residents were assured repeatedly that the driver’s license would not be used as evidence of their immigration or citizenship status, and not be used as a basis for a criminal investigation, arrest, or detention.
Recent news investigations have uncovered that Immigration Customs and Enforcement (I.C.E.) has been accessing state-run databases containing information about individuals with licenses that were made available under Assembly Bill 60. Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 1810.5, law enforcement agencies may access certain information from driver license or identification card records either directly from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) via a requester account, or via the Department of Justice’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-Photo programs. Available information includes name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV.
CLETS is available to all law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations purposes. According to the DMV, pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 12800.7, the Department does not release any document provided by an applicant for purposes of proving the applicant’s identity, true full name, California residency, or legal presence, except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must first apply for access to CLETS and once approved, they can submit individualized inquiries to obtain driver’s license or vehicle registration information collected by the DMV and maintained in standardized fields, such as name, address, physical characteristics and license plate information, which appear on the face of the driver’s license. The systems may also be used to obtain driver history such as accidents or tickets.
Once DHS has access to CLETS, they are not required to explain the purpose for each inquiry they make. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through DMV databases and CLETS is unknown, the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone.
Use of state databases by I.C.E. for immigration enforcement is concerning. Data that is collected by the DMV for the purpose of issuing drivers licenses, should not be used for immigration enforcement. Data already show that the number of applicants for AB 60 driver’s licenses has sharply dropped, and news reports cite individuals discussing their fear of immigration enforcement in relation to the licenses. This fear is undermining the purpose of the AB 60 program to enable residents to drive legally and to be insured. As a result, eligible residents may hesitate to apply for the license if I.C.E. is able to access to sensitive personal information.
AB 1747 protects the privacy of California residents and would ensure that I.C.E. does not have access to personal information in California law enforcement databases.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee, workload and contract costs to the Department of Justice in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund)
American Civil Liberties Union
California Public Defenders Association
Monterey County
Oakland Privacy; Root and Rebound
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/30/19)
California State Sheriffs’ Association
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 56-14, 5/13/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooley, Cooper, Daly, Eggman, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Eduardo Garcia, Gipson, Gonzalez, Gray, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Mark Stone, Ting, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Lackey, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Arambula, Brough, Burke, Cunningham, Diep, Frazier, Gloria, Mayes, Patterson, Smith
Prepared by: Mary Kennedy / PUB. S. /
9/3/19 11:32:57
**** END ****
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 1747 (Gonzalez) - Law enforcement: immigration
Version: July 11, 2019 | Policy Vote: PUB. S. 5 - 1, JUD. 7 - 1 |
Urgency: No | Mandate: No |
Hearing Date: August 30, 2019 | Consultant: Shaun Naidu |
Bill Summary:
AB 1747 would prohibit California law enforcement agencies, as defined, from making the information in their databases available to any person or entity for the purposes of immigration enforcement, except as specified. It also would require a law enforcement agency to justify withholding specified information regarding its participation in a joint law enforcement task force.
*********** ANALYSIS ADDENDUM – SUSPENSE FILE ***********
The following information is revised to reflect amendments
adopted by the committee on August 30, 2019
Fiscal Impact:
Workload and contract costs to the Department of Justice in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund)
Author Amendments:
Narrow the scope of the bill to the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), require non-criminal history information inquiries to state reason for inquiry, and allow the Attorney General to investigate and monitor use of CLETS for compliance with the provisions of this measure.
-- END --
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 1747 (Gonzalez) - Law enforcement: immigration
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 1747 would prohibit California law enforcement agencies, as defined, from making the information in their databases available to any person or entity for the purposes of immigration enforcement, except as specified. It also would require a law enforcement agency to justify withholding specified information regarding its participation in a joint law enforcement task force.
Fiscal Impact:
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Workload and contract costs to DOJ in the millions of dollars largely related to information technology system modifications to comply with the restrictions that would be placed on access to various databases. (General Fund, special fund*)
- California Law Enforcement Agencies: One-time costs potentially over $50,000 in the aggregate to review access policies to existing databases, terminate contracts if warranted, and obtain written agreement from persons and entities who are provided database access that the database information will be treated as confidential and used only for purposes consistent with existing law and not for prohibited purposes. Local costs to comply with this measure likely would be subject to reimbursement from the General Fund as a state-mandated local program, the extent of which would be determined by the Commission on State Mandates. (General Fund, local funds)
*DNA Identification Fund—structurally imbalanced
Background:
In 2017, the state enacted the California Values Act (SB 54, de León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017) to divorce California law enforcement agencies from federal immigration enforcement. Among its many provisions, the act prohibits California law enforcement agencies from using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request. The act defines “California law enforcement agency” to mean a state or local law enforcement agency, including school police or security departments but explicitly excludes the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Additionally, the California Values Act allowed California law enforcement agencies to participate in joint law enforcement task forces. Participation, however, requires an annual report by the law enforcement agency to DOJ about the purpose of the task force; the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies involved; the total number of arrests made during the reporting period; and the number of people arrested for immigration enforcement purposes. The reports are public records for California Public Records Act (PRA) purposes, but an agency may withhold disclosing a particular item in such records if it would endanger (i) the safety of a person involved in the investigation or (ii) the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation.
Proposed Law:
This bill would:
- Prohibit a California law enforcement agency from making agency or department databases, as specified, or the information within the database available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
- Terminate, as void against public policy, any contract or agreement in effect on January 1, 2020 that conflict with this measure.
- Except from this measure information within those databases that is subject to a court order requiring its disclosure or is regarding an individual for whom a judicial warrant, as defined in existing law, has been issued.
- Require all persons and entities provided access to agency or department databases to agree in writing that material disclosed to them from the database which is not otherwise subject to disclosure be treated as confidential, as provided in a specified statute, only be used for purposes that are consistent with existing law, and not be used for specified prohibited purposes.
- Allow a law enforcement agency to not disclose the information related to its participation in a joint law enforcement task force if the agency provides justification as to why the information should not be disclosed, consistent with a specified provision of the PRA.
Related Legislation:
SB 54 (de León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017) established the California Values Act which, subject to certain exceptions relating to serious criminal activity, prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies from using money or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
Staff Comments:
The Department of Justice has indicated that its California Justice Information Services Division would be required to modify the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (CLETS) and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunication Network (NLETS) in order to implement AB 1747 properly. Specifically, it would require a 24-month contract with external consultants and the following personnel beginning January 1, 2020:
- 2.0 Associate Governmental Program Analysts (AGPAs) (permanent)
- 2.0 AGPAs (18-month limited-term)
- Information Technology Associate (ITA) (18-month limited-term)
- Information Technology Specialist (ITS) I, Range C (18-month limited-term)
- Information Technology Supervisor (IT Sup) I (permanent)
- Research Data Specialist (RDS) II (permanent)
- ITS II (12-month limited-term)
The AGPAs would be required to draft and coordinate the execution of federal and state Memorandum of Understanding agreements; act as a liaison between DOJ and federal, state, and local agencies; develop and maintain administrative policies relating to the regulation of AB 1747; and create and perform audits on agencies’ queries. The limited-term ITA and ITS II would be responsible for making the modifications to the CLETS tables to remove or disable federal agency access to ensure only clients with an approved data sharing agreement are allowed access. The RDS II and the IT Sup I would work jointly to inspect and validate the use and/or misuse of DOJ’s data by conducting on-site inspections. The ITS I would be responsible for procuring the necessary consultant resources. Additional temporary help of 40 hours in FY 2019-20, from staff at the ITS I level would be required to make changes to the CalPhoto application in order to disable federal access to DMV photos. Lastly, ongoing funding would be required for travel costs for the RDS II and the IT Sup I to conduct on-site inspections, beginning in FY 2019-20.
Separately, DOJ reports its Division of Law Enforcement also would expend resources warranting new personnel to comply with the requirements of AB 1747. Currently, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) searches at the DOJ State DNA Index System (SDIS) are carried out by a national network that is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As AB 1747 would prohibit data sharing for immigration enforcement purposes, DOJ would be required to build a new stand-alone CODIS for California. This information technology effort would require the engagement of an external consultant and the following permanent positions to assist in the implementation and ongoing operation of the database:
- 7.0 ITSs I (beginning January 1, 2020)
- 2.0 Field Representatives (beginning July 1, 2020)
- 2.0 ITAs (beginning July 1, 2020)
- ITS Sup I (beginning January 1, 2020)
The IT Sup I, ITSs I, and ITAs would assist the consultants with the development, deployment, and ongoing maintenance of the new software as well as provide assistance to software users.
The DNA Identification fund, from which workload related to CODIS normally would be funded, has been operating under a structural deficient for a number of years. For the 2019-20 fiscal year, the fund had a beginning balance of $5.1 million, projected revenues of $51.1 million, expected expenditures of $56 million, and a projected ending reserve of $270,000. Given the operational deficit of the DNA Identification Fund, added expenses (such as those associated with AB 1747) would create cost pressure on the General Fund to backfill any shortage.
-- END --
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2019-2020 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 1747 (Author:Gonzalez)
Version: April 24, 2019
Hearing Date: July 9, 2019
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: TSG
SUBJECT
Law enforcement: immigration
DIGEST
This bill restricts California law enforcement agencies from making the information in their databases available to any person or entity for the purposes of immigration enforcement, except under narrow, specified circumstances. Separately, the bill requires California law enforcement agencies, pursuant to existing law, to justify withholding information regarding their participation in joint law enforcement task forces from California Public Records Act (CPRA) requests, when such justification is requested.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With limited exceptions involving serious criminal matters, existing California laws prohibit state and local law enforcement agencies from utilizing their resources and personnel to assist with federal immigration enforcement. One key purpose behind these laws is to avoid entangling state law enforcement and related programs with federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), so that all California residents, regardless of immigration status, will feel secure participating in those programs and collaborating with California law enforcement officials. Despite these laws, reports indicate that ICE has managed to get access to information in certain California databases and is using them to pursue undocumented California residents. In particular, it appears that ICE may be regularly mining information from the Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV) records, including information about undocumented immigrants who obtained driver’s licenses under AB 60. It may be that ICE is accessing non-criminal personal information about undocumented Californians through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), as well. In response, this bill would explicitly restrict California law enforcement agencies from making the information in their databases available to any person or entity for the purposes of immigration enforcement, except in narrow, specified circumstances.
The bill is author-sponsored. Support is from immigrant rights and civil liberties advocates. Opposition is from law enforcement leadership associations. The bill passed out of the Senate Public Safety Committee by a vote of 5-1.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing federal law:
- Provides that any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue an Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other federal, state, or local law enforcement agency. An immigration detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks custody of an unauthorized foreigner presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the unauthorized foreigner. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the DHS, prior to release of the unauthorized foreigner, in order for the DHS to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible. (8 CFR § 287.7(a).)
- States that upon a determination by DHS to issue a detainer for an unauthorized foreigner not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the unauthorized foreigner for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the DHS. (8 CFR § 287.7(d).)
- Authorizes the DHS Secretary under the 287(g) program to enter into agreements that delegate immigration powers to local police. The negotiated agreements between ICE and the local police are documented in memorandum of agreements (MOAs). (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).)
- States that notwithstanding any other provision of federal, state, or local law, a federal, state, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. (8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).)
- States that notwithstanding any other provision of federal, state, or local law, no state or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the INS information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States. (8 U.S.C. § 1644.)
Existing state law:
- Finds and declares that a relationship of trust between California’s immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the public safety of the people of California. Recognizes that this trust is threatened when state and local agencies are entangled with federal immigration enforcement. (Gov. Code § 7284.2(b-c).)
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies, with limited exceptions relating to serious criminal activity, from using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including by inquiring into an individual’s immigration status; detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request; or providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information, unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities as specified. (Gov. Code § 7284.6(a)(1).)
- Clarifies that (2), above, does not prohibit or restrict any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, federal immigration authorities, information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an individual, or from requesting from federal immigration authorities the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual, or maintaining or exchanging that information with any other federal, state, or local government entity, pursuant to §§ 1373 and 1644 of Title 8 of the United States Code. (Gov. Code 7284.6(e).)
- Requires any California agency choosing to participate in a joint law enforcement task force, for which a California law enforcement agency has agreed to dedicate personnel or resources on an ongoing basis, to submit a report annually to the Department of Justice (DOJ), as specified by the Attorney General, that includes the following information:
- the purpose of the task force;
- the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies involved;
- the total number of arrests made during the reporting period; and
- the number of people arrested for immigration enforcement purposes. (Gov. Code § 7284.6(c)(1).)
- Requires all law enforcement agencies to report annually to DOJ, in a manner specified by the Attorney General, the number of transfers by the agency to federal immigration authorities authorized by judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, and the offense that allowed for the transfer. (Gov. Code § 7284.6(c)(2).)
- Declares that all records described in (4) and (5), above, are public records for purposes of the CPRA, except that to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation, or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, that information shall not be disclosed by the agency. (Gov. Code § 7284.6(c)(3).)
- Requires, for any databases operated by state and local law enforcement agencies, including databases maintained for the agency by private vendors, the Attorney General, by October 1, 2018, in consultation with appropriate stakeholders, to publish guidance, audit criteria, and training recommendations aimed at ensuring that those databases are governed in a manner that limits the availability of information therein to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with federal and state law, to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement; and encourages all state and local law enforcement agencies to adopt necessary changes to database governance policies consistent with that guidance. (Gov. Code § 7284.8(b).)
This bill:
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making information in their databases, including databases maintained for the agencies by private vendors, available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement, except:
- information regarding a person for whom an arrest warrant has been issued; or
- information regarding a person’s citizenship or immigration status.
- Provides that any contract or agreement in effect on January 1, 2020, that conflicts with the provisions of this bill is void as against public policy and is terminated as of that date.
- Requires that all persons and entities provided access to agency or department databases that include immigration information shall agree in writing that the material disclosed to them from the database which is not otherwise subject to disclosure shall be treated as confidential as provided by the CPRA, shall only be used for purposes that are consistent with existing law, and shall not be used for the purposes prohibited by the provisions in this bill.
- Clarifies that when responding to a CPRA request and if asked to do so, a California law enforcement agency which redacts part of its reports regarding participation in joint law enforcement task forces must provide a justification for the redaction pursuant to existing law.
COMMENTS
- Background on the California Values Act and principles of avoiding entangling California law enforcement resources with federal immigration enforcement
Over the past several years, California has enacted a series of measures intended to ensure that the state’s resources do not become entangled with federal immigration enforcement. This culminated most recently in the passage of SB 54 (De León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017), also known as the California Values Act. The Act generally prohibits California law enforcement from using its resources or personnel to assist with federal immigration enforcement, unless doing so pursuant to certain exceptions relating to serious criminal activity.
The purpose behind the Act was twofold. First, the Act was designed to make sure that California’s law enforcement resources would be focused on preventing crime and promoting public safety, rather than getting co-opted by the federal government for its immigration enforcement role. Second, the Act was intended to reassure all Californians, regardless of citizenship or immigration status, that they could feel secure and comfortable interacting with state law enforcement officers and agencies, without fear that these interactions could lead to detention or deportation.
- Federal access to state law enforcement databases
While the Act is meant to prevent entanglement of state law enforcement resources with federal immigration enforcement in theory, there is some evidence that, in practice, ICE may be obtaining access to information in certain state databases and is using that information for immigration enforcement purposes. In particular, it appears that ICE has been able to gather photographs, home addresses, vehicle registration numbers, and other, similar personal data from the DMV’s driver’s license and motor vehicle registry databases, as well as CLETS.
Offices within DHS may access these databases by signing up for Government Requester Accounts. DHS handles both criminal investigatory matters as well as immigration enforcement. Providing DHS with access to, and information from, California databases for the purpose of criminal investigations raises no concerns under the California Values Act. However, under the Act, California law enforcement is not generally supposed to provide any more assistance to DHS than is federally required when the purpose of the inquiry is immigration enforcement.
The problem is that there is no easy way to know which of the two things DHS is up to with any given account or inquiry. According to public records obtained and compiled by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) last year, the majority of DHS offices that have applied for Government Requester Accounts state that their purpose in wanting to obtain DMV records is “criminal investigation.”[1] In at least some cases, there may be reason to be skeptical of the stated purpose, however. The ACLU and NILC point to the account application submitted in October 2017 by ICE’s National Criminal Analysis and Targeting Center. In that application, ICE states that it is seeking access to the DMV records to “identify and locate fugitives and absconders who pose a danger to the community in coordination with federal, state, and international law enforcement agencies.”[2] Left unsaid is that at least part of the Center’s mission is to utilize data analytics systems to “assist [Enforcement and Removal Operations] field offices in locating aliens convicted of criminal offenses and other aliens who are amenable to removal.”[3]
- Indications that ICE is utilizing DMV databases for federal immigration enforcement purposes
NILC and the ACLU’s review of public records led them to conclude that DHS agencies have made hundreds of inquires every year to state driver’s license and vehicle registration databases using telephone and online methods of access.[4] A declaration filed in federal court states that DHS agencies made almost 70,000 queries on CLETS in 2017 and almost 90,000 such queries in 2018. While it is impossible to say what fraction of those inquiries were in fact made for immigration enforcement rather than criminal investigation purposes, the following incidents, as reported in the media, suggest that at least some of the inquiries were used to facilitate immigration enforcement.
- In July 2018, ICE agents pulled over an Escondido resident shortly after he left his home for work. Initially, the man was not overly concerned, because he believed he had no criminal record, his vehicle was properly registered, and he carried a valid driver’s license. According to his arrest record, however, ICE had been looking for the man for several months. The agents claimed to have a physical description of the man and his driver’s license photograph. The arrest record indicated that ICE first tried to locate the man using the address at which his car was registered, but when that failed, agents used “additional systems accessible to ICE” to locate the car at the man’s Escondido residence, whereupon they proceeded with the arrest. The man came to the United States at age 12, attended middle and high school in Escondido, is married to a lawful permanent resident and has four children who are U.S. citizens.[5]
- In June 2018, a different Escondido resident and his brother were pulled over by ICE agents on their way to work. This man did not have a driver’s license. He had applied for one and DMV took his photo, but he failed the test. When the ICE agents pulled him over, they had his DMV photo. The arrest report states that ICE’s lead on the man’s whereabouts “was discovered while conducting immigration checks in DHS/ICE systems as well as DHS/ICE accessible databases.” The report suggests that the agents traced the man using the addressed to which his vehicle was registered, then staked out this home, and followed him when he and his brother got in the car to go to work.[6]
- Also in June 2018, ICE arrested a man in San Marcos after identifying his home address by finding his vehicle parked outside.[7]
These reports strongly suggest that ICE is indeed accessing information originating from DMV’s databases and using that information for immigration enforcement purposes. NILC and the ACLU believe this could be happening through, among other possibilities, ICE access to DMV databases and ICE access to CLETS.
Either way, the practice contrasts with the intent behind the California Values Act by entangling the use of state law enforcement-related resources in immigration enforcement. For that reason, it is also likely to produce the very kind of policy consequence that the California Values Act was intended to prevent. Fearing that it could lead to their detention or deportation, undocumented immigrants living in California will be less likely to obtain driver’s licenses, and less likely to register their vehicles with the state. As a result, there will be more unlicensed, uninsured motorists on the state’s roadways and it will be more difficult for California law enforcement to track the ownership and location of vehicles.
4. How this bill responds
The intent behind this bill is to try to disentangle state databases from use as a tool for federal immigration enforcement. It would prohibit California law enforcement agencies, except under specified circumstances, from making their databases and the information contained in them available to any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement. The bill would also void any contract or agreement that makes the databases available effective January 1, 2020. Anyone provided access to the databases would have to agree in writing that the information they obtain from the database will be treated as confidential, unless it is otherwise subject to disclosure. However, under the bill in print, information in the databases regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued would still be accessible to ICE, as would information regarding any individual’s citizenship or immigration status. Since ICE can issue its own administrative arrest warrants, this provision in the bill currently allows ICE to gain relatively easy access to the databases for immigration purposes. In light of that, the author proposes to amend the bill in Committee to make information contained in the databases available only in response to a court order, or pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a federal court based upon probable cause.
The author also proposes amendments clarifying that photographs are included among the database information that cannot be made available unless one of the exceptions applies.
Both the California Police Chiefs Association and the California State Sheriffs Association oppose the bill. They assert that placing restrictions on ICE’s ability to access California law enforcement databases for immigration enforcement purposes as proposed by the bill will make it more difficult for them to carry out their missions. Both assert, in slightly different words, that they need to be able to communicate with their federal, state, and local counterparts about dangerous people. Their opposition statements do not indicate exactly how the bill would prevent them from undertaking such communication. As the bill only restricts access to databases for immigration enforcement purposes, the Committee may wish to inquire further into the basis for the opposition’s contentions.
5. Relationship of the bill to provisions removed from the California Values Act
The opponents of the bill additionally point out that similar provisions restricting database access were removed from the California Values Act during negotiations over the bill in the Legislature. As summarized by the California Police Chiefs Association:
In 2017, our association engaged in a year long stakeholder process to set clear boundaries regarding local and state law enforcements partnership with federal immigration authorities in Senate Bill 54 (de Leon, 2017). As a result of those negotiations, which included removing language similar to what is currently in AB 1747, CPCA removed our opposition to SB 54. Instead of banning the sharing of information, SB 54 required the California Department of Justice to establish guidelines aimed at ensuring any database operate by state and local law enforcement agencies “are governed in a manner that limits the availability of information therein to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with federal and state law, to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement” (Government Code 7284.8). That compromise allowed law enforcement agencies to continue sharing information regarding critical public safety threats, while also directing agencies to limit the use of that information solely for immigration enforcement purposes.
The author and proponents of the bill acknowledge this legislative history. From their point of view, however, the guidelines issued by the DOJ in October of 2018[8] do not seem to be preventing state databases from getting entangled with federal immigration enforcement operations. This may be, partially, an implementation problem rather than a problem with the guidelines themselves. Certainly, the media stories summarized above suggest that ICE agents are accessing information from DMV and/or CLETS databases in order to pursue immigration enforcement actions. On the other hand, it is incredibly difficult to know how ICE is getting the information that it is using. There are many different avenues through which data about Californians could reach ICE and it is not clear whether any can traced easily. The new DOJ policies are meant to make it harder for anyone to use CLETS and similar databases for unauthorized purposes, be it stalking an ex-girlfriend or immigration enforcement. Whether those policies will in fact achieve that aim remains to be seen. In the meantime, this bill proposes a less reserved approach, which is what draws the oppositions concerns.
6. Clarification that agencies must provide a justification for redacting information from a joint task force participation report, if requested, when responding to a CPRA request
This bill also clarifies the duty of California law enforcement agencies when responding to PRA requests relating to their involvement with joint law enforcement task forces.
As the name suggests, joint law enforcement task forces bring together various law enforcement agencies to collaborate on a particular law enforcement goal. While the California Values Act prohibited, with limited exceptions, state and local law enforcement agencies from utilizing their resources and personnel to assist with federal immigration enforcement, it did not prevent those law enforcement agencies from participating in joint law enforcement task forces involving the federal government. Instead, the Act established certain reporting requirements. Specifically, if a California law enforcement agency agrees to dedicate personnel or resources to a joint law enforcement task force on an ongoing basis, that agency must submit an annual report to the DOJ regarding the purpose of the task force, the agencies involved, the number of arrests made generally, and the number of people arrested for immigration enforcement purposes specifically. (Gov. Code § 7284(c)(1).)
These annual reports are available for public inspection through the CPRA. (Gov. Code § 6250 et seq.) Under existing law, any information in the report that would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation, or would endanger the successful completion of an investigation, must not be disclosed. This bill would modify these scheme slightly so that, if a law enforcement agency intends to withhold information in the report from disclosure on the basis that it would endanger a person or investigation, the law enforcement agency has to state, in writing, why the particular information is either exempt from disclosure pursuant to an express provision of the CPRA or because the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record. This would provide some additional accountability by creating a basis for challenging the decision not to disclose, should anyone wish to do so.
7. Proposed amendments
In order to address the issues set forth in the Comments, above, the author proposes to incorporate amendments into the bill that would:
- add co-authors;
- specify that photographs are included among the database information that state law enforcement agencies are not to make available for immigration enforcement purposes, except as specified; and
- allow access to information in databases for immigration enforcement purposes only pursuant to a court order, or when it pertains to someone for whom a federal judicial arrest warrant has been issued based on probable cause authorizing federal immigration authorities to take the subject of the warrant into custody.
The specific proposed amends are:
Amendment 1
In the heading, in line 4, after “Santiago,” insert:
Ting,
Amendment 2
In the heading, below line 4, insert:
(CoAuthor: Senator Skinner)
Amendment 3
On page 3, in line 38, strike out “information” and insert:
information, including, but not limited to, photographs,
Amendment 4
On page 3 in line 39, after “databases” insert:
that is subject to a court order requiring its disclosure or is
Amendment 5
On page 3, in line 39, strike out “an arrest warrant has”, on page 4, strike out lines 1 and 2 and insert:
a judicial warrant, as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 7284.4, has been issued.
8. Arguments in support of the bill
According to the author:
Six years ago, undocumented Californians gained the right to a driver’s license so they could be law abiding drivers, an effort aimed at providing us all peace of mind on the road. Now, fear is undermining the AB 60 license program. AB 1747 prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making their databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Law enforcement agencies with access to CLETS are allowed to access certain information from driver’s license or identification card records, including name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV. The DMV does not release any applicant documents except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
These federal immigration policy tactics are concerning. AB 1747 limits the involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. It is imperative that we protect the privacy of California residents.
In support of the bill, the California Public Defenders Association writes:
AB 1747 strengthens the principals SB 54 was built upon by limiting access to local enforcement agencies’ databases and continues to uphold California’s core values of community, family unity, and common humanity.
Mass deportations threaten the civil rights and safety of all who reside in California. At a time when the current Administration continues to target immigrant communities, AB 1747 will reaffirm California’s commitment to being at the forefront of the fight against mass deportations of its residents, and will send a powerful message of inclusion across the nation.
In further support of the bill, the Electronic Frontier Foundation writes:
Many California agencies (including police, human services, and the Department of Motor Vehicles) gather and store a host of personal information (including names, addresses, and social security numbers) from vast numbers of people. AB 1747 builds on the foundation laid by SB 54 by limiting access to state and local enforcement agencies’ databases for the purpose of immigration enforcement. This ban includes databases maintained by private vendors.
Combined with SB 54’s existing prohibitions on local law enforcement agencies from collecting information about immigration status, AB 1747 requires that California law enforcement agencies overhaul their confidentiality rules by limiting sharing of personal information. These rules advance a privacy best practice: government agencies should not collect or share personal information except to the extent strictly necessary to do their jobs.
9. Arguments in opposition to the bill
In opposition to the bill, the California State Sheriffs Association writes:
This bill is an overly broad attempt to restrict information sharing among law enforcement agencies. Sheriffs do not engage in immigration enforcement, but law enforcement at local, state, and federal levels need to communicate about dangerous persons without regard to immigration status.
In further opposition to the bill, the California Police Chiefs Association writes:
As police chiefs, our members are directly responsible for the safety of all Californians, regardless of immigration status, and our agencies do not engage in strict immigration enforcement. However, we do partner with all federal law enforcement agencies to avert the very real threats posed by foreign transnational criminal cartels, terrorists, and other statewide and national threats – and sharing information with our partners is essential to achieving the success of these operations.
As written, AB 1747 is overly broad, potentially dangerous, and adversely impacts our ability to protect the public.
SUPPORT
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - California
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Public Defenders Association
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc.
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Oakland Privacy
Root & Rebound
OPPOSITION
California Police Chiefs Association
California State Sheriffs Association
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation:
AB 1073 (Rubio, 2019) authorizes the Attorney General to enter into a memorandum of understanding with ICE to treat domestic violence or sexual assault shelters as sensitive locations for purposes of federal immigration enforcement activities. AB 1073 is currently pending consideration before the Senate Appropriations Committee.
AB 1563 (Santiago, 2019) makes it unlawful for any person to falsely represent themselves to be a public official or public employee conducting a government census with the knowing intent to deceive an undocumented immigrant. AB 1563 is currently pending consideration before the Senate Public Safety Committee.
AB 1408 (Mathis, 2019) requires that a person who is taken into custody for a specified category of misdemeanor receive a pretrial risk assessment and would allow information regarding the release or transfer of an individual to be provided to immigration authorities if the individual is deemed a medium or high risk by the pretrial risk assessment or if the sheriff or chief of police of the arresting agency deems the individual to be a risk or danger to public safety. AB 1408 failed passage in the Assembly Public Safety Committee.
Prior Legislation:
SB 54 (De León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017) established the California Values Act which, subject to certain exceptions relating to serious criminal activity, prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies, from using money or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
AB 2792 (Bonta, Ch. 768, Stats. 2016), known as the TRUTH Act, required local law enforcement agencies to provide copies of specified documentation received from ICE to the individual in custody and to notify the individual regarding the intent of the agency to comply with ICE requests.
SB 417 (Stone, 2015) would have required a law enforcement official to detain an individual on the basis of an ICE hold for up to 48 hours after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody if that individual has been convicted of, or arrested for, specified crimes. The bill would have required a local agency that violates these provisions to pay a fine of $100,000. SB 417 was returned to the Senate desk without further action.
AB 4 (Ammiano, Ch. 570, Stats. 2013), known as the TRUST Act, prohibited a law enforcement official, as defined, from detaining an individual on the basis of an ICE hold after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody, unless, at the time that the individual becomes eligible for release from custody, certain conditions are met, including, among other things, that the individual has been convicted of specified crimes.
AB 60 (Alejo, Ch. 524, Stats. 2013) authorized the DMV to issue driver’s licenses to undocumented individuals pursuant to specified procedures.
PRIOR VOTES:
Senate Public Safety Committee (Ayes 5, Noes 1)
Assembly Floor (Ayes 56, Noes 14)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 13, Noes 4)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 3)
Assembly Public Safety Committee (Ayes 5, Noes 0)
**************
How California Driver’s License Records Are Shared with the Department of Homeland Security (Dec. 2018) ACLU and NILC https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMV-PRA-report-2018-12.pdf (as of Jun. 30, 2019), p. 5. ↑
Ibid. ↑
See DHS/ICE/PIA-048 Data Analysis System (DAS), United States Department of Homeland Security https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-048-data-analysis-system-das (as of Jun. 30, 2019). ↑
How California Driver’s License Records Are Shared with the Department of Homeland Security (Dec. 2018) ACLU and NILC https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMV-PRA-report-2018-12.pdf (as of Jun. 30, 2019), p. 5. ↑
Srikrishnan, How California Laws Meant to Integrate Immigrants Can Open a Backdoor for ICE (Feb. 19, 2019) Voice of San Diego https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/news/how-california-laws-meant-to-integrate-immigrants-can-open-a-backdoor-for-ice/ (as of Jun. 30, 2019). ↑
Ibid. ↑
Ibid. ↑
See Joe Dominic, Chief, California Justice Information Services, California Department of Justice. Information Bulletin to All Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs, and Executives of California Law Enforcement Agencies (Oct. 1, 2018) No. 18-10-CJIS. ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Senator Nancy Skinner, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular
Bill No: AB 1747 Hearing Date: June 25, 2019
Author: | Gonzalez | ||
Version: | April 24, 2019 | ||
Urgency: | No | Fiscal: | Yes |
Consultant: | MK | ||
Subject: Law Enforcement: Immigration
HISTORY
Source: Author
Prior Legislation: SB 54 (De Leon), Chapter 495, Stats. 2017
AB 2792 (Bonta) Chapter 768, Stats. 2016
AB 4 (Ammiano) Chapter 570, Stats. 2013
AB 524 (Mullin) Chapter 572, Stats. 2013
Support: American Civil Liberties Union; California Public Defenders Association; Monterey County; Oakland Privacy; Root and Rebound
Opposition: California State Sheriffs’ Association
Assembly Floor Vote: 56 - 14
PURPOSE
The purpose of this bill is to prohibit state law enforcement agencies from creating or maintaining databases including an individual’s citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Existing law prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (Government Code § 7284.6 (a)):
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities.
- Providing personal information, as defined, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.
- Assisting immigration authorities “for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States;”
- Performing the functions of an immigration officer.
- Placing peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employing peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement;
- Using immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody;
- Transferring an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or as otherwise authorized by statute;
- Providing office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility; and,
- Contracting with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for purposes of civil immigration custody, except as otherwise authorized by statute.
Existing law states that a law enforcement official shall have discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities only if doing so would not violate any federal, state, or local law, or local policy, and where permitted by the California Values Act. Specifies that coordination shall only occur with respect to specified convictions and offenses. (Government Code § 7282.5 (a).)
This bill prohibits law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
This bill terminates and makes void as against public policy any contract or agreement that is in effect on January 1, 2020 which conflicts with this bill.
This bill clarifies that its provisions do not apply to information within those databases regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, or regarding an individual’s citizenship or immigration status that, pursuant to existing state and federal law, may be shared with federal immigration authorities.
This bill requires all persons and entities provided with access to agency or department databases to certify in writing that material disclosed from the database which is not otherwise subject to disclosure will be treated as confidential and only be used for purposes that are consistent with existing law, and will not be used for the purposes prohibited by the bill.
COMMENTS
1. Need for This Bill
According to the author:
AB 60 created a driver’s license program for undocumented residents to ensure these residents could drive legally, safely and obtain insurance. California residents were assured repeatedly that the driver’s license would not be used as evidence of their immigration or citizenship status, and not be used as a basis for a criminal investigation, arrest, or detention.
Recent news investigations have uncovered that Immigration Customs and Enforcement (I.C.E.) has been accessing state-run databases containing information about individuals with licenses that were made available under Assembly Bill 60. Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 1810.5, law enforcement agencies may access certain information from driver license or identification card records either directly from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) via a requester account, or via the Department of Justice’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-Photo programs. Available information includes name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV.
CLETS is available to all law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations purposes. According to the DMV, pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 12800.7, the Department does not release any document provided by an applicant for purposes of proving the applicant’s identity, true full name, California residency, or legal presence, except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must first apply for access to CLETS and once approved, they can submit individualized inquiries to obtain driver’s license or vehicle registration information collected by the DMV and maintained in standardized fields, such as name, address, physical characteristics and license plate information, which appear on the face of the driver’s license. The systems may also be used to obtain driver history such as accidents or tickets.
Once DHS has access to CLETS, they are not required to explain the purpose for each inquiry they make. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through DMV databases and CLETS is unknown, the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center report[1] that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone.
Use of state databases by I.C.E. for immigration enforcement is concerning. Data that is collected by the DMV for the purpose of issuing drivers licenses, should not be used for immigration enforcement. Data already show that the number of applicants for AB 60 driver’s licenses has sharply dropped[2], and news reports cite individuals discussing their fear of immigration enforcement in relation to the licenses[3]. This fear is undermining the purpose of the AB 60 program to enable residents to drive legally and to be insured. As a result, eligible residents may hesitate to apply for the license if I.C.E. is able to access to sensitive personal information.
AB 1747 protects the privacy of California residents and would ensure that I.C.E. does not have access to personal information in California law enforcement databases.
The bill prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement except for the individual’s citizenship or immigration status. This information is required by federal law to be shared.
This would not apply to information within those databases regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
2. Prohibition on sharing databases
The California Values Act, enacted in 2018 as the result of SB 54 (De León), Chap. 495, Stats. 2017, generally prohibits, with exceptions, a California law enforcement agency from using its moneys or personnel to investigate, detain, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes. This bill would extend that concept to law enforcement databases: prohibiting law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein available for the purpose of immigration enforcement and voiding any contracts or agreements that violate that prohibition. A similar provision was included in SB 54, but that language was removed from SB 54 before it was sent to Governor Brown for his signature.
3. DMV database
This bill terminates any contracts or agreements between local or state law enforcement agencies and the federal government in which the California entity agrees to share is law enforcement data regarding immigration status, except it permits disclosure of immigration information regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
On January 25, 2019, the author of this bill sent a letter to the acting director of the DMV requesting DMV’s policy on permitting access to DMV’s database. On February 4, 2019, DMV responded that it does share information in its DMV database in response to a criminal subpoena or a certification from law enforcement that the records are needed for an urgent health or safety reason. However, DMV stated that it does not identify in any records available to any person whether an applicant applied for a license under AB 60. DMV states that it also does not maintain a separate database for AB 60 licenses.
Despite DMV’s statements that it does not share information about immigration status, news reports conflict with those assurances. (See Flores, Sergio and Tom Jones, DMV Confirms ICE Has Limited Access to AB 60 License Information, NBC San Diego, February 19, 2019, Available at https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/DMV-Confirms-ICE-Has-Limited-Access-to-AB-60-License-Information-506071521.html.) NBC San Diego reports that ICE officials have copies of AB 60 licenses when they locate and detain individuals in at least two known cases.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) released a report in December 2018 with the purpose of providing “as much information as possible about how and what information is shared with the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies, so that California residents can effectively weigh the risks and benefits of obtaining a driver’s license.” (How California Driver’s License Records are Shared with the Department of Homeland Security, ACLU and NILC, at 2, available at https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMV-PRA-report-2018-12.pdf.) The report states, “Yet it is well-known that immigration agents frequently use DMV information, such as addresses, to locate individuals for civil immigration enforcement. The California DMV and CADOJ do not assess whether a DHS agency applying for a Government Requester Account or CLETS access will use DMV information for immigration enforcement purposes when DMV and CADOJ determine whether to approve that agency’s application.” (Id. at 3-4) In the first three months of 2018, the Department of Homeland Security apparently conducted 89,223 queries in CLETS. (Id. at fn. 14.)
In the report’s recommendations on how to address potential abuse by DHS in accessing information about California licenses, the report suggests that California “Terminate any approvals or memoranda of agreement between the state and DHS agencies that allow the agencies to obtain information from DMV databases for enforcement of civil immigration law.” (Id.) This bill would codify that recommendation.
4. Argument in Support
In support the American Civil Liberties Union of California states:
In 2017, California enacted the California Values Act (SB 54, de León) because entanglement of state and local public safety resources with the federal deportation system undercut immigrant communities’ confidence in law enforcement and undermined the public safety and well-being of all Californians. From 2009-2015, ICE’s controversial and failed Secured Communities program had California’s local officers detain and transfer people to ICE. It operated as an indiscriminate mass deportation program and cost the state’s taxpayers $65M annually. California officers were responsible for 30% of all deportations under this program.
AB 1747 builds on the foundation laid by SB 54 by limiting access to local enforcement agencies’ databases and continues to uphold California’s core values of community, family unity, and common humanity. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through Department of Motor Vehicle databases and California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System is unknown, the ACLU of Northern California and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS agencies made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone. In 2017, DHS agencies made 113 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 1,149 inquiries to the vehicle registration database through online access, and in the first three months of 2018, those agencies made 80 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 341 inquiries to the vehicle registration database. At a time when the current federal administration continues to target immigrant communities, AB 1747 will reaffirm California’s commitment to promoting public safety and protecting and integrating its immigrant communities.
5. Argument in Opposition
The California State Sheriffs’ Association opposes this bill stating:
This bill is an overly broad attempt to restrict information sharing among law enforcement agencies. Sheriffs do not engage in immigration enforcement, but law enforcement at local, state, and federal levels need to communicate about dangerous persons without regard to immigration status.
Additionally, language very similar to that contained in AB 1747 was amended out of 2017’s SB 54 before being signed into law by the Governor.
-- END –
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/how-calif-dl-records-shared-with-dhs/ ↑
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/105-type/95-guides/01-auto/lca/upload/Assessing-the-Impacts-of-AB-60-California-s-Low-Cost-Auto-Insurance-Program-and-Uninsured-Motorists-Report.pdf ↑
https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Undocumented-Immigrants-Fear-ICE-is-Obtaining-Their-Home-Address-from-AB-60-Licenses-486743421.html ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 1747
Author:(Gonzalez)
As Amended Ver:April 24, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Prohibits state law enforcement agencies from sharing information with any other entity about an individual's citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Major Provisions
- States that any contract or agreement in effect on January 1, 2020, that conflicts with the provisions of this bill are void as against public policy and are terminated as of that date.
- Permits law enforcement agencies to include in their databases citizenship information and immigration status of an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
- States that all persons and entities provided access to agency or department databases that include immigration information shall agree in writing that the material disclosed to them from the database which is not otherwise subject to disclosure shall be treated as confidential as provided by the California Public Records Act (CPRA), and shall only be used for purposes that are consistent with existing law, and shall not be used for the purposes prohibited by the provisions in this bill.
- Clarifies that information which is subject to public disclosure under the CPRA may be withheld or redacted on the basis that the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
COMMENTS:
According to the Author:
"Six years ago, undocumented Californians gained the right to a driver's license so they could be law abiding drivers, an effort aimed at providing us all peace of mind on the road. Now, fear is undermining the AB 60 [(Alejo), Chapter 524, Statutes of 2013] license program. AB 1747 prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making their databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement, except for the individual's citizenship or immigration status, which is required by federal law to be shared. This would not apply to information within those databases on individuals with active arrest warrants.
"Law enforcement agencies with access to [California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS)] are allowed to access certain information from driver's license or identification card records, including name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the [Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)]. The DMV does not release any applicant documents except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
"These federal immigration policy tactics are concerning. AB 1747 limits the involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. It is imperative that we protect the privacy of California residents."
Arguments in Support:
According to the American Civil Liberties Union of California (ACLU), "In 2017, California enacted the California Values Act (SB 54 (de León), [Chapter 495)] because entanglement of state and local public safety resources with the federal deportation system undercut immigrant communities' confidence in law enforcement and undermined the public safety and well-being of all Californians. From 2009-2015, [U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE's)] controversial and failed Secured Communities program had California's local officers detain and transfer people to ICE. It operated as an indiscriminate mass deportation program and cost the state's taxpayers $65M annually. California officers were responsible for 30% of all deportations under this program.
"AB 1747 builds on the foundation laid by SB 54 by limiting access to local enforcement agencies' databases and continues to uphold California's core values of community, family unity, and common humanity. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through Department of Motor Vehicle databases and California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System is unknown, the ACLU of Northern California and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, [The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] agencies made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver's license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone. In 2017, DHS agencies made 113 inquiries to the driver's license database and 1,149 inquiries to the vehicle registration database through online access, and in the first three months of 2018, those agencies made 80 inquiries to the driver's license database and 341 inquiries to the vehicle registration database. At a time when the current federal administration continues to target immigrant communities, AB 1747 will reaffirm California's commitment to promoting public safety and protecting and integrating its immigrant communities."
Arguments in Opposition:
None submitted.
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Assembly Appropriations Committee:
- Minor and absorbable costs to state law enforcement agencies, including the California Highway Patrol, to modify existing information technology (IT) use forms or generate new forms to certify employees do not disclose information from departmental databases for immigration enforcement purposes.
- Likely minor possibly reimbursable costs (local fund/GF) to local law enforcement agencies to modify existing IT usage forms and policies to ensure officers do not disclose database information for the purposes of immigration enforcement. Costs should be negligible given that local law enforcement is already prohibited from participating or assisting in immigration enforcement. Cost to the GF will depend on whether the duties imposed in this bill are viewed as a reimbursable mandate by the Commission on State Mandates.
Please see the policy committee analysis for a full discussion of this bill.
VOTES:
ASM PUBLIC SAFETY: 5-0-3
YES: Jones-Sawyer, Bauer-Kahan, Quirk, Santiago, Wicks
ABS, ABST OR NV: Lackey, Diep, Kamlager-Dove
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
NO: Gallagher, Kiley, Obernolte
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-4-1
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Fong, Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Diep
UPDATED:
VERSION: April 24, 2019
CONSULTANT: Nikki Moore (Counsel) / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744 FN: 0000411
Date of Hearing: May 8, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1747
Author:(Gonzalez) – As Amended Ver:April 24, 2019
Policy Committee: | Public Safety | Vote: | 5 - 0 |
Judiciary | 9 - 3 | ||
|
|
Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill prohibits, with limited exceptions, California law enforcement agencies from making available to any person or entity, agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein, for the purpose of immigration enforcement. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that any agreements in effect on January 1, 2020, that conflict with the provisions of this bill are terminated on that date.
- Permits a law enforcement agency to include in databases citizenship information about, or immigration status of, an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
- Requires all persons and entities provided with access to agency or department databases to certify in writing that material disclosed from the database will be treated as confidential and will not be used for purposes of immigration enforcement, unless otherwise authorized by law.
FISCAL EFFECT:
- Minor and absorbable costs to state law enforcement agencies, including the California Highway Patrol, to modify existing information technology (IT) use forms or generate new forms to certify employees do not disclose information from departmental databases for immigration enforcement purposes.
- Likely minor possibly reimbursable costs (local fund/GF) to local law enforcement agencies to modify existing IT usage forms and policies to ensure officers do not disclose database information for the purposes of immigration enforcement. Costs should be negligible given that local law enforcement is already prohibited from participating or assisting in immigration enforcement. Cost to the GF will depend on whether the duties imposed in this bill are viewed as a reimbursable mandate by the Commission on State Mandates.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
Six years ago, undocumented Californians gained the right to a driver’s license so they could be law-abiding drivers, an effort aimed at providing us all peace of mind on the road. Now, fear is undermining the AB 60 license program. AB 1747 prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making their databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
- Background. Under current law, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) will only provide information to federal immigration authorities in response to a subpoena or a certification that DMV records are needed for an urgent health or safety reason. However, federal immigration authorities appear to have information about AB 60 license holders in California. While the source of that information is unclear, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may access the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) without a subpoena or stated urgent need. Once DHS has the name of someone it suspects is undocumented and may have had contact with local law enforcement, it may use CLETS to find other identifying information, including the person’s address.
- Support. According to California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation:
AB 1747 will reaffirm California’s commitment to being at the forefront of the fight against mass deportations of its residents, and will send a powerful message of inclusion across the nation.
- Related Legislation. AB 1073 (Rubio) authorizes the Attorney General to enter into a memorandum of understanding with ICE to treat shelters providing services to domestic violence or sexual assault victims as sensitive locations for purposes of federal immigration enforcement activities. AB 1073 is pending in this committee.
- Prior Legislation. SB 54 (De Leon) Chapter 495, Statutes of 2017, prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies, including school police and security departments, from using money or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: April 23, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1747
Author:(Gonzalez) – As Amended Ver:March 28, 2019
As Proposed to be Amended
SUBJECT: LAW ENFORCEMENT DATABASES: IMMIGRATION
KEY ISSUE: SHOULD CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBIT LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FROM MAKING THEIR AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT DATABASES AND THE INFORMATION THEREIN AVAILABLE TO ANYONE OR ANY ENTITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, EXCEPT AS SPECFICIALLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW?
SYNOPSIS
The California Values Act, enacted in 2018 as the result of SB 54 (De León), Chap. 495, Stats. 2017, generally prohibits, with exceptions, a California law enforcement agency from using its moneys or personnel to investigate, detain, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes. This bill would extend that concept to law enforcement databases: prohibiting law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein available for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Additional clarity about access to state databases and information contained therein—whether directly via law enforcement or from state agencies such as the DMV—may be necessary, given recent reports that the federal Department of Homeland Security has routinely accessed the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and obtained driver’s license information from the DMV. According to recent news coverage and a report by the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Immigration Law Center, the Department of Homeland Security apparently conducted 89,223 queries in CLETS during just the first three months of 2018. According to the report, between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS agencies made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone. In 2017, DHS agencies made 113 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 1,149 inquiries to the vehicle registration database through online access; and in the first three months of 2018, those agencies made 80 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 341 inquiries to the vehicle registration database.
As currently in print, this bill would prohibit law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein, available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement (except under the limited circumstances provided by the bill: as allowed by state and federal law; and when the request is regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued). It would also terminate any agreement that allows access to law enforcement databases in violation of the bill. The author proposes a number of clarifying amendments to address four issues: (1) apply the bill to contracts, as well as agreements that allow access to law enforcement databases in violation of the bill, so contracts are also void; (2) require any agency that receives confidential information from a law enforcement database to maintain its confidentiality, except as authorized by law; (3) clarify the conditions under which law enforcement information may be shared for immigration purposes; and (4) correct an inconsistency in existing law regarding the California Public Records Act. All of these amendments are explained in and incorporated the analysis. The author acknowledges that even as it is proposed to be amended, the bill will only partially achieve her goal to limit access to state databases for immigration purposes and plans to continue working to close loopholes in existing law as the bill moves forward.
This author-sponsored bill, which previously passed the Assembly Public Safety Committee on a vote of 5-0 (with 3 abstentions) is supported by a wide coalition of immigration and civil rights organizations and has no opposition on file.
SUMMARY: Prohibits, with limited exceptions, California law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein, available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement. Specifically, this bill:
- Prohibits law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
- Terminates and makes void as against public policy any contract or agreement that is in effect on January 1, 2020 which conflicts with the terms of 1), above.
- Clarifies that 1), above, does not apply to information within those databases regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, or regarding an individual’s citizenship or immigration status that, pursuant to existing state and federal law, may be shared with federal immigration authorities.
- Requires all persons and entities provided with access to agency or department databases to certify in writing that material disclosed from the database which is not otherwise subject to disclosure will be treated as confidential and only be used for purposes that are consistent with existing law, and will not be used for the purposes prohibited by the bill.
EXISTING LAW:
- Prohibits, with limited exceptions, law enforcement agencies from using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including by inquiring into an individual’s immigration status; detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request; or providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information, unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities as specified. (Government Code Section 7284.6 (a)(1). All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise indicated.)
- Requires any California agency choosing to participate in a joint law enforcement task force, for which a California law enforcement agency has agreed to dedicate personnel or resources on an ongoing basis, to submit a report annually to the Department of Justice, as specified by the Attorney General, that includes the following information:
- The purpose of the task force.
- The federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies involved.
- The total number of arrests made during the reporting period.
- The number of people arrested for immigration enforcement purposes. (Section 7284.6 (c)(1).)
- Requires all law enforcement agencies to report annually to the Department of Justice, in a manner specified by the Attorney General, the number of transfers by the agency to federal immigration authorities authorized by judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, and the offense that allowed for the transfer. (Id. at (c)(2).)
- Declares that all records described are public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act, including the exemptions provided by that act and, as permitted under that act, but allows personal identifying information to be redacted prior to public disclosure. (Id. at (c)(3).)
- As an exception to 4), provides that, to the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation, or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, that information shall not be disclosed by the agency. (Ibid.)
- Clarifies that 1), above, does not prohibit or restrict any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, federal immigration authorities, information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an individual, or from requesting from federal immigration authorities immigration status information, lawful or unlawful, of any individual, or maintaining or exchanging that information with any other federal, state, or local government entity, pursuant to Sections 1373 and 1644 of Title 8 of the United States Code. (Id., at (e).)
- Makes all records relating to ICE access provided by local law enforcement agencies, including all communication with ICE, public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act, including the exemptions provided by that act and, as permitted under that act, personal identifying information may be redacted prior to public disclosure. (Section 7283.1 (c).)
- Clarifies that records relating to ICE access include, but are not limited to, data maintained by the local law enforcement agency regarding the number and demographic characteristics of individuals to whom the agency has provided ICE access, the date ICE access was provided, and whether the ICE access was provided through a hold, transfer, or notification request or through other means. (Ibid.)
- Requires, for any databases operated by state and local law enforcement agencies, including databases maintained for the agency by private vendors, the Attorney General, by October 1, 2018, in consultation with appropriate stakeholders, to publish guidance, audit criteria, and training recommendations aimed at ensuring that those databases are governed in a manner that limits the availability of information therein to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with federal and state law, to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement; and encourages all state and local law enforcement agencies to adopt necessary changes to database governance policies consistent with that guidance. (Section 7284.8 (b).)
EXISTING FEDERAL LAW:
- Provides that any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other federal, state, or local law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the DHS, prior to release of the alien, in order for the DHS to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible. (8 CFR Section 287.7 (a).)
- States that upon a determination by the DHS to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the DHS. (8 CFR Section 287.7 (d).)
- Authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security under the 287(g) program to enter into agreements that delegate immigration powers to local police. The negotiated agreements between ICE and the local police are documented in memorandum of agreements (MOAs). (8 U.S.C. Section 1357 (g).)
- States that notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. (8 U.S.C. 1373 (a).)
- States that notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States. (8 U.S.C. 1644.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: The California Values Act, enacted in 2018 as the result of SB 54 (De León), Chap. 495, Stats. 2017, generally prohibits, with exceptions, a California law enforcement agency from using its moneys or personnel to investigate, detain, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes. This bill would extend that concept to law enforcement databases: prohibiting law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein available for the purpose of immigration enforcement and voiding any contracts or agreements that violate that prohibition. A similar provision was included in SB 54 when it was heard in this Committee, but that language was removed from SB 54 before it was sent to Governor Brown for his signature. Supporters of this bill reasonably argue that the prohibition on allowing access to law enforcement databases is necessary to protect California residents from aggressive “zero tolerance” immigration enforcement efforts by the federal government. Although some may lack documentation of legal presence in the United States, the vast majority are law-abiding members of the community and important participants in the state economy. This bill may give these Californians additional comfort that they will be able to go about their lives without undo fear of apprehension. According to the author:
Six years ago, undocumented Californians gained the right to a driver’s license so they could be law-abiding drivers, an effort aimed at providing us all peace of mind on the road. Now, fear is undermining the AB 60 license program. AB 1747 prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making their databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
Law enforcement agencies with access to CLETS are allowed to access certain information from driver’s license or identification card records, including name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV. The DMV does not release any applicant documents except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
These federal immigration policy tactics are concerning. AB 1747 limits the involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. It is imperative that we protect the privacy of California residents.
The Department of Homeland Security has routinely accessed the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and obtained driver’s license information from the DMV for the purpose of immigration enforcement. On January 25, 2019, the author of this bill sent a letter to the acting director of the DMV, requesting DMV’s policy on permitting access to DMV’s database. On February 4, 2019, DMV responded that it only shares information in its DMV database in response to a criminal subpoena or a certification from law enforcement that DMV records are needed for an urgent health or safety reason. DMV also stated that it does not identify in any of its records whether an applicant applied for a license under AB 60 and does not maintain a separate database for driver’s licenses issued pursuant to AB 60.
Despite DMV’s statements that it does not routinely share information in its databases (which may include information about the immigration status of licensed individuals), news reports offer a different view of DMV’s conduct. (See Flores, Sergio and Tom Jones, DMV Confirms ICE Has Limited Access to AB 60 License Information, NBC San Diego, February 19, 2019, Available at https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/DMV-Confirms-ICE-Has-Limited-Access-to-AB-60-License-Information-506071521.html.) NBC San Diego reports that ICE officials had copies of AB 60 licenses when they located and detained individuals in at least two known cases.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) released a report in December 2018 for the purpose of providing “as much information as possible about how and what information is shared with the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies, so that California residents can effectively weigh the risks and benefits of obtaining a driver’s license.” (How California Driver’s License Records are Shared with the Department of Homeland Security, ACLU and NILC, at p. 2, available at https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMV-PRA-report-2018-12.pdf.) The report states:
[I]t is well-known that immigration agents frequently use DMV information, such as addresses, to locate individuals for civil immigration enforcement. The California DMV and CADOJ do not assess whether a DHS agency applying for a Government Requester Account or CLETS access will use DMV information for immigration enforcement purposes when DMV and CADOJ determine whether to approve that agency’s application. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)
In the first three months of 2018, federal agencies within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reportedly conducted 89,223 queries in CLETS. (Id. at p. 7, fn. 14.) According to the report, between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS agencies made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone. In 2017, DHS agencies made 113 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 1,149 inquiries to the vehicle registration database through online access; and in the first three months of 2018, those agencies made 80 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 341 inquiries to the vehicle registration database.
Oakland Privacy, writing to the author of this bill, Attorney General Xavier Becerra, and other elected officials, expresses concern with these findings and observes that such conduct may violate existing law, which both limits the use of state resources for the purpose of immigration enforcement and access to DMV information without a court order:
We believe that this blanket access grant to CLETS and via CLETS to the DMV database and the Cal Photos database does not meet the plain language provided in Senate Bill 244, which states that absent a court order or subpoena a certification must be made in writing of the specific circumstances that do not permit authorities time to obtain a court order.
According to Oakland Privacy, the requirement in existing law for a written certification regarding the specific circumstances that preclude a court order or subpoena, is easily circumvented because DMV has “no ‘mechanism’ for providing such information for each specific incident of database use by either of the two agencies (nor any other law enforcement agency).” It could be that, as Oakland Privacy observes, it may be necessary for the Legislature to establish such a “mechanism” to facilitate the enforcement of current law as intended by the Legislature.
The ACLU/NILC report recommends, in order to address potential inappropriate access to DMV databases, that California “Terminate any approvals or memoranda of agreement between the state and DHS agencies that allow the agencies to obtain information from DMV databases for enforcement of civil immigration law.” (How California Driver’s License Records are Shared with the Department of Homeland Security, supra, at p. 11.)
This bill. As currently in print, this bill would prohibit law enforcement agencies from making agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein, available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement (except under the limited circumstances provided by the bill: as allowed by state and federal law; and when the request is regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued). It would also terminate any agreement that allows access to law enforcement databases in violation of the bill. While these provisions would partially achieve the author’s goal to limit access to law enforcement databases (including access to a DMV database by means of CLETS, it would not necessarily address the issue of access to information within non-law enforcement databases accomplished without a formal contract or agreement. For example, even as it is proposed to be amended, the bill would not address the problem of DMV providing information from its databases to DHS upon written certification that the information is needed without scrutiny of whether the grounds for certification are valid. The author may wish to consider establishing a mechanism to more effectively implement the certification requirement in existing law as the bill moves forward.
Author’s amendments: The author proposes a number of clarifying amendments to address four issues. First, the bill in print proposes to terminate any “agreements” in which a California entity agrees to share its law enforcement data in violation of the bill, but does not specify whether any “contracts” in conflict with the bill would similarly be made void. While it is unclear whether any California entities currently have contractual obligations to share information with other entities that would violate the provisions of this bill, the bill in print is silent with respect to its effect on such contracts.
Second, the bill in print does not limit how an agency that receives information from a law enforcement database is required to treat the information. When SB 54 was heard by this Committee in 2017, it included a provision that required persons and entities that were provided access to agency or department databases to certify in writing that the information obtained from those databases would be kept confidential and will not be used for the purposes prohibited by the bill.
Third, the bill in print is somewhat confusing about which types of immigration-related information may be shared by California entities as an exception to the bill’s general prohibition on such sharing.
In order to address these three issues, the author proposes the following clarifying amendments, beginning on Page 3, at line 13:
(7) Make agency or department databases, including databases maintained for the agency or department by private vendors, or the information therein other than information within those databases regarding an individual’s citizenship or immigration status, available to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement.
(A) Any agreements contract or agreement in effect on January 1, 2020, that is in conflict with the terms of this paragraph are is void as against public policy and terminated on as of that date.
(B) This paragraph shall not apply to information within those databases regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, or regarding an individual’s citizenship or immigration status described in subdivision (e).
(C) All persons and entities provided access to agency or department databases shall certify in writing that material disclosed from the database which is not otherwise subject to disclosure will be treated as confidential as provided by subdivision (e) of Section 6254.5, shall only be used for purposes that are consistent with existing law, and will not be used for the purposes prohibited by this section.
Finally, in order to make the wording of Section 7284.6 (c)(3) consistent with the provisions of the California Public Records Act, including Section 6254 (f)—which allows, but does not require law enforcement agency to withhold information from disclosure to the public when the agency determines that disclosure would endanger the successful completion of the investigation—the author proposes the following clarifying amendment on Page 5, at lines 6-14. As proposed to be amended, that paragraph would read as follows:
(c)(3) All records described in this subdivision shall be public records for purposes of the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250)), including the exemptions provided by that act and, as permitted under that act, personal identifying information may be redacted prior to public disclosure. To the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation, or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation the law enforcement agency may withhold the information and, upon request for such information, shall justify, as provided by Section 6255, why that information shall not be disclosed.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, “AB 1747 builds on the foundation laid by SB 54 by limiting access to local enforcement agencies’ databases and continues to uphold California’s core values of community, family unity, and common humanity.” The American Civil Liberties Union of California and Asian Americans Advancing Justice – California both observe that, “At a time when the current federal administration continues to target immigrant communities, AB 1747 will reaffirm California’s commitment to promoting public safety and protecting and integrating its immigrant communities.” California Public Defenders Association write, “Mass deportations threaten the civil rights and safety of all who reside in California” and that “AB 1747 will reaffirm California’s commitment to being at the forefront of the fight against mass deportations of its residents, and will send a powerful message of inclusion across the nation.” The Electronic Frontier Foundation and Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights both add, “In the long run, it will protect the privacy of all Californians from the misuse of government databases.” Finally, Oakland Privacy writes that, “We believe the legislation supports the real-life implementation of goals already embraced by the Legislature on numerous previous occasions.”
Related Pending and Prior Legislation: AB 1073 (Rubio) would authorize the Attorney General to enter into a memorandum of understanding with ICE to treat shelters in this state that provide services to individuals who are victims of domestic violence or sexual assault as sensitive locations for purposes of federal immigration enforcement activities. AB 1073 is currently before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 1563 (Santiago) would make it unlawful for any person to falsely represent themselves to be a public official or public employee conducting a government census with the knowing intent to deceive an undocumented immigrant. AB 1563 is currently before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
AB 1408 (Mathis) would require that a person who is taken into custody for a specified category of misdemeanor receive a pretrial risk assessment and would allow information regarding the release or transfer of an individual to be provided to immigration authorities if the individual is deemed a medium or high risk by the pretrial risk assessment or if the sheriff or chief of police of the arresting agency deems the individual to be a risk or danger to public safety. AB 1408 was referred to the Assembly Public Safety Committee, but its hearing was canceled at the request of the author.
AB 4 (Ammiano), Chap. 570, Stats. 2013, known as the TRUST Act, prohibited a law enforcement official, as defined, from detaining an individual on the basis of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody, unless, at the time that the individual becomes eligible for release from custody, certain conditions are met, including, among other things, that the individual has been convicted of specified crimes.
AB 2792 (Bonta), Chap. 768, Stats. 2016, required local law enforcement agencies to provide copies of specified documentation received from ICE to the individual in custody and to notify the individual regarding the intent of the agency to comply with ICE requests.
SB 417 (Stone, 2015-2016) would have required a law enforcement official to detain an individual on the basis of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold for up to 48 hours after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody if that individual has been convicted of, or arrested for, specified crimes. The bill would have required a local agency that violates these provisions to pay a fine of $100,000. SB 417 was returned to the Senate desk without further action.
SB 54 (De Leon), Chap. 495, Stats. 2017, established the California Values Act which, among other things and with some exceptions, prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies, including school police and security departments, from using money or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - California
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Public Defenders Association
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc.
Coalition For Humane Immigrant Rights
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Oakland Privacy
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by: Alison Merrilees / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Date of Hearing: April 9, 2019
Counsel: Nikki Moore
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 1747
Author:(Gonzalez) – As Amended Ver:March 28, 2019
SUMMARY:
Prohibits state law enforcement agencies from creating or maintaining databases including an individual’s citizenship or immigration status for the purpose of immigration enforcement. Specifically, this bill:
- Provides that any agreements in effect on January 1, 2020, that conflict with the provisions of this bill are terminated on that date.
- Permits
alaw enforcement agencies to include in databases citizenship information about, or immigration status of, an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
EXISTING STATE LAW:
- Prohibits California law enforcement agencies from (Gov. Code, § 7282.5, subd. (a)):
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities.
- Providing personal information, as defined, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual’s home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.
- Assisting immigration authorities “for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States;”
- Performing the functions of an immigration officer.
- Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.
- Placing peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employing peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement;
- Using immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody;
- Transferring an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or as otherwise authorized by statute;
- Providing office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility; and,
- Contracting with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house individuals as federal detainees for purposes of civil immigration custody, except as otherwise authorized by statute.
- Using agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:
- States that a law enforcement official shall have discretion to cooperate with immigration authorities only if doing so would not violate any federal, state, or local law, or local policy, and where permitted by the California Values Act. Specifies that coordination shall only occur with respect to specified convictions and offenses. (Gov. Code, § 7282.5, subd. (a).)
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown
COMMENTS:
- Author's Statement: According to the author, “Six years ago, undocumented Californians gained the right to a driver's license so they could be law abiding drivers, an effort aimed at providing us all peace of mind on the road. Now, fear is undermining the AB 60 license program. AB 1747 prohibits California law enforcement agencies from making their databases, including those maintained by private vendors, available for the purpose of immigration enforcement, except for the individual's citizenship or immigration status, which is required by federal law to be shared. This would not apply to information within those databases on individuals with active arrest warrants.
“Law enforcement agencies with access to CLETS are allowed to access certain information from driver's license or identification card records, including name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV. The DMV does not release any applicant documents except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
“These federal immigration policy tactics are concerning. AB 1747 limits the involvement of state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. It is imperative that we protect the privacy of California residents.” - Need for this Bill: According to the bill’s fact sheet, “In 2013, Assembly Bill 60 (Alejo) created a driver’s license program for undocumented residents to ensure these residents could drive legally, safely and obtain insurance. California residents were assured repeatedly that the driver’s license would not be used as evidence of their immigration or citizenship status, and not be used as a basis for a criminal investigation, arrest, or detention.
“However, recent news reports have uncovered that I.C.E. has been accessing state-run databases containing information about individuals with licenses that were made available under Assembly Bill 60. Pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 1810.5, law enforcement agencies may access certain information from driver license or identification card records either directly from the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) via a requester account, or via the Department of Justice’s California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-Photo programs. Available information includes name, date of birth, residence and/or mailing address, and photos, as well as conviction information, accidents, and any licensing actions taken by the DMV.
“CLETS is available to all law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations purposes. According to the DMV, pursuant to Vehicle Code Section 12800.7, the Department does not release any document provided by an applicant for purposes of proving the applicant’s identity, true full name, California residency, or legal presence, except in response to a criminal subpoena, a court order, or a certification from law enforcement attesting to an urgent health or safety need for the release of the documents.
“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must first apply for access to CLETS and once approved, they can submit individualized inquiries to obtain driver’s license or vehicle registration information collected by the DMV and maintained in standardized fields, such as name, address, physical characteristics and license plate information, which appear on the face of the driver’s license. The systems may also be used to obtain driver history such as accidents or tickets.
“Once DHS has access to CLETS, they are not required to explain the purpose for each inquiry they make. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through DMV databases and CLETS is unknown, the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone.
“Use of state databases by I.C.E. for immigration enforcement is concerning. Data that is collected by the DMV for the purpose of issuing drivers licenses, should not be used for other purposes, like immigration enforcement. Data already shows that the number of applicants for AB 60 driver’s licenses has sharply dropped, and new reports cite individuals discussing their fear of immigration enforcement in relation to the licenses. This fear is undermining the purpose of the AB 60 program to enable residents to drive legally and to be insured, since now eligible residents may hesitate to apply for the license if I.C.E. is able to access to sensitive personal information.”
- The California Department of Motor Vehicles Shares Information with Law Enforcement Under Specified Circumstances: On January 25, 2019, the author of this bill sent a letter to the acting director of the DMV requesting DMV’s policy on permitting access to DMV’s database. On February 4, 2019, DMV responded that it does share information in its DMV database in response to a criminal subpoena or a certification from law enforcement that the records are needed for an urgent health or safety reason. However, DMV stated that it does not identify in any records available to any person whether an applicant applied for a license under AB 60. DMV states that it also does not maintain a separate database for AB 60 licenses.
- Reports of Data Sharing with ICE and DMV’s Response: Despite DMV’s statements that it does not share information about immigration status, news reports conflict with those assurances. (See Flores, Sergio and Tom Jones, DMV Confirms ICE Has Limited Access to AB 60 License Information, NBC San Diego, February 19, 2019, Available at https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/DMV-Confirms-ICE-Has-Limited-Access-to-AB-60-License-Information-506071521.html.) NBC San Diego reports that ICE officials have copies of AB 60 licenses when they locate and detain individuals in at least two known cases.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) released a report in December 2018 with the purpose of providing “as much information as possible about how and what information is shared with the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies, so that California residents can effectively weigh the risks and benefits of obtaining a driver’s license.” (How California Driver’s License Records are Shared with the Department of Homeland Security, ACLU and NILC, at 2, available at https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMV-PRA-report-2018-12.pdf.) The report states, “Yet it is well-known that immigration agents frequently use DMV information, such as addresses, to locate individuals for civil immigration enforcement. The California DMV and CADOJ do not assess whether a DHS agency applying for a Government Requester Account or CLETS access will use DMV information for immigration enforcement purposes when DMV and CADOJ determine whether to approve that agency’s application.” (Id. at 3-4) In the first three months of 2018, the Department of Homeland Security apparently conducted 89,223 queries in CLETS. (Id. at fn. 14.)
In the report’s recommendations on how to address potential abuse by DHS in accessing information about California licenses, the report suggests that California “Terminate any approvals or memoranda of agreement between the state and DHS agencies that allow the agencies to obtain information from DMV databases for enforcement of civil immigration law.” (Id.) This bill would codify that recommendation. - Scope of this Bill: This bill terminates any “agreements” between local or state law enforcement agencies and the federal government in which the California entity agrees to share is law enforcement data regarding immigration status, except it permits disclosure of immigration information regarding an individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued.
The California Values Act, enacted in 2018, generally prohibits, with exceptions, a California law enforcement agency from using its moneys or personnel to investigate, detain, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes. This bill would extend that concept to prohibiting law enforcement from using its data to facilitate the investigation, detention, or arrest of a person for immigration enforcement purposes.
However, this bill does not state that any “contracts” that conflict with the mandate it imposes are void, only agreements. It is unclear whether there are any California entities that have a contractual obligation to share information at issue in this bill. If so, this bill appears to be silent with respect to those contracts. However, any contract that does exist, if renewed or modified after January 1, 2020, would need to comply with the mandates in this bill moving forward if this bill is signed into law.
As currently drafted, this bill would include an exception that permits data sharing of immigration information if an arrest warrant is issued. However, I.C.E. has the ability to execute an arrest warrant without a judge’s signature, meaning that I.C.E. would still be able to access immigration information without any oversight. Should this bill be amended to permit disclosures only in cases where there is a judicial warrant issued? This would ensure that I.C.E. is not issuing warrants on its own accord in order to bypass the prohibition on access established by this bill.
- Argument in Support: According to the American Civil Liberties Union of California, “In 2017, California enacted the California Values Act (SB 54, de León) because entanglement of state and local public safety resources with the federal deportation system undercut immigrant communities’ confidence in law enforcement and undermined the public safety and well-being of all Californians. From 2009-2015, ICE’s controversial and failed Secured Communities program had California’s local officers detain and transfer people to ICE. It operated as an indiscriminate mass deportation program and cost the state’s taxpayers $65M annually. California officers were responsible for 30% of all deportations under this program.
“AB 1747 builds on the foundation laid by SB 54 by limiting access to local enforcement agencies’ databases and continues to uphold California’s core values of community, family unity, and common humanity. While the number of arrests that have resulted from information accessed through Department of Motor Vehicle databases and California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System is unknown, the ACLU of Northern California and the National Immigration Law Center report that between Jan. 1, 2017 and April 10, 2018, DHS agencies made 594 inquiries to the DMV driver’s license database and 1,085 inquiries to the DMV vehicle registration database by telephone. In 2017, DHS agencies made 113 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 1,149 inquiries to the vehicle registration database through online access, and in the first three months of 2018, those agencies made 80 inquiries to the driver’s license database and 341 inquiries to the vehicle registration database. At a time when the current federal administration continues to target immigrant communities, AB 1747 will reaffirm California’s commitment to promoting public safety and protecting and integrating its immigrant communities.”
- Related Legislation:
- AB 1073 (Rubio) would authorize the Attorney General to enter into a memorandum of understanding with ICE to treat shelters in this state that provide services to individuals who are victims of domestic violence or sexual assault as sensitive locations for purposes of federal immigration enforcement activities. AB 1073 is currently before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
- AB 1563 (Santiago) would make it unlawful for any person to falsely represent themselves to be a public official or public employee conducting a government census with the knowing intent to deceive an undocumented immigrant. AB 1563 is currently before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
- AB 1408 (Mathis) would require that a person who is taken into custody for a specified category of misdemeanor receive a pretrial risk assessment and would allow information regarding the release or transfer of an individual to be provided to immigration authorities if the individual is deemed a medium or high risk by the pretrial risk assessment or if the sheriff or chief of police of the arresting agency deems the individual to be a risk or danger to public safety. The hearing was canceled at the request of the author.
- AB 1073 (Rubio) would authorize the Attorney General to enter into a memorandum of understanding with ICE to treat shelters in this state that provide services to individuals who are victims of domestic violence or sexual assault as sensitive locations for purposes of federal immigration enforcement activities. AB 1073 is currently before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
- Prior Legislation:
- AB 4 (Ammiano), Chapter 570, Statutes of 2013, known as the TRUST Act, prohibits a law enforcement official, as defined, from detaining an individual on the basis of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody, unless, at the time that the individual becomes eligible for release from custody, certain conditions are met, including, among other things, that the individual has been convicted of specified crimes.
- AB 2792 (Bonta), Chapter 768, Statutes of 2016, requires local law enforcement agencies to provide copies of specified documentation received from ICE to the individual in custody and to notify the individual regarding the intent of the agency to comply with ICE requests.
- SB 713 (Nielsen), of 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have expanded the list of prior felony convictions under the TRUST Act to include the conviction of a felony which formed the basis upon which the individual was previously deported, thereby allowing a law enforcement official, to detain an individual with that felony conviction on the basis of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody. SB 713 was held in the Senate Public Safety Committee.
- SB 417 (Stone), of 2015-2016 Legislative Session, would have required a law enforcement official to detain an individual on the basis of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold for up to 48 hours after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody if that individual has been convicted of, or arrested for, specified crimes. The bill would have required a local agency that violates these provisions to pay a fine of $100,000. SB 417 was returned to the Senate desk without further action.
- SB 54 (De Leon), Chapter 495, Statutes of 2017, established the California Values Act which, among other things and with some exceptions, prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies, including school police and security departments, from using money or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
- AB 4 (Ammiano), Chapter 570, Statutes of 2013, known as the TRUST Act, prohibits a law enforcement official, as defined, from detaining an individual on the basis of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold after that individual becomes eligible for release from custody, unless, at the time that the individual becomes eligible for release from custody, certain conditions are met, including, among other things, that the individual has been convicted of specified crimes.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - California
California Public Defenders Association
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc.
Coalition For Humane Immigrant Rights
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Opposition
None
Analysis Prepared by:
Nikki Moore / PUB. S. / (916) 319-3744
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):