AB 668: Courthouses: Privilege from civil arrest.
- Session Year: 2019-2020
- House: Assembly
- Latest Version Date: 2019-10-12
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Date
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Status
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| Oct 12, 2019 | Chaptered by Secretary of State - Chapter 787, Statutes of 2019. |
| Oct 12, 2019 | Approved by the Governor. |
| Sep 23, 2019 | Enrolled and presented to the Governor at 3:30 p.m. |
| Sep 11, 2019 | Assembly Rule 77 suspended. |
| Sep 10, 2019 | In Assembly. Concurrence in Senate amendments pending. May be considered on or after September 12 pursuant to Assembly Rule 77. |
| Sep 10, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Assembly. |
| Sep 9, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| Sep 6, 2019 | Read third time and amended. Ordered to second reading. |
| Aug 30, 2019 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 5. Noes 2.) (August 30). |
| Aug 12, 2019 | In committee: Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Jul 3, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 7. Noes 2.) (July 2). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Jun 10, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Hearing canceled at the request of author. |
| Jun 6, 2019 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| May 29, 2019 | In Senate. Read first time. To Com. on RLS. for assignment. |
| May 28, 2019 | Read third time. Passed. Ordered to the Senate. |
| May 20, 2019 | Read second time. Ordered to third reading. |
| May 16, 2019 | From committee: Do pass. (Ayes 13. Noes 4.) (May 16). |
| Apr 3, 2019 | In committee: Set, first hearing. Referred to APPR. suspense file. |
| Mar 26, 2019 | From committee: Do pass and re-refer to Com. on APPR. (Ayes 9. Noes 3.) (March 26). Re-referred to Com. on APPR. |
| Feb 28, 2019 | Referred to Com. on JUD. |
| Feb 19, 2019 | From printer. May be heard in committee March 21. |
| Feb 15, 2019 | Read first time. To print. |
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Date
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Description
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Location
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Votes
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| Sep 11, 2019 | AB 668 Gonzalez Concurrence in Senate Amendments | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| Sep 10, 2019 | Assembly 3rd Reading AB668 Gonzalez et al. By Durazo | Senate Floor |
Passed |
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| Aug 30, 2019 | Do pass | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Aug 12, 2019 | Placed on suspense file | Senate Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Jul 2, 2019 | Do pass, but first be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Senate Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
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| May 28, 2019 | AB 668 Gonzalez Assembly Third Reading | Assembly Floor |
Passed |
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| May 16, 2019 | Do pass. | Assembly Standing Committee on Appropriations |
Passed |
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| Mar 26, 2019 | Do pass and be re-referred to the Committee on [Appropriations] | Assembly Standing Committee on Judiciary |
Passed |
This list shows positions taken on this bill by organizations on the date displayed, which is linked to the original source.
Positions by individuals are not included.
CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS
CSA1 Bill Id:AB 668
Author:(Gonzalez and Bonta)
As Amended Ver:September 6, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses by codifying the common law privilege against civil arrest.
Major Provisions
- Makes findings and declarations on the importance of keeping courts of justice open, accessible, and free from interruption, and on the need to protect persons from civil arrest or service of process while in California's courts or their environs, or while attending, or going to or coming from, judicial proceedings. Specifies that this protection is needed in order to ensure that litigants, witnesses, and others are not deterred from participating in such proceedings, and that the dignity of judicial proceedings are upheld and not disturbed.
- Provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest of any type in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse.
- Specifies that the provisions of the bill do not apply to arrests made pursuant to a valid judicial warrant.
The Senate Amendments:
- Remove provisions that would have allowed the Attorney General to bring as a civil action where there was reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred.
- Remove a provision that would have allowed a party bringing a successful action for violation of this bill to recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
- Specify that the provisions of the bill do not apply to arrests made pursuant to a valid judicial warrant.
COMMENTS:
Under the common law "privilege from arrest," a person may not be subjected to a "civil arrest" or served with process while attending, or going to and from, a court proceeding. Unlike a "criminal" arrest, based on probable cause that the arrestee committed a crime, a "civil arrest" typically compels a person's attendance as a witness or party in a civil suit or proceeding. While the common law privilege from arrest has a long history in both England and the United States, it has fallen out of use in modern law, largely because the "civil arrest" has also become less common. However, while traditional civil arrests may have declined, they have not entirely disappeared. Most notably, in the past two years especially, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers have carried out many civil arrests in California courthouses. When an ICE agent takes custody of a person suspected of being in the United States unlawfully, the agent makes a civil arrest, done to compel attendance at a deportation proceeding, which is entirely a civil matter. (Arizona v. U.S. (2012) 567 U.S. 387, 407; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-1039.)
This bill would effectively codify that common law privilege in three ways. First, it clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses, including by protecting the privilege from arrest. Second, it provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest or served with process while attending a courthouse or court proceeding. Third, it provides that any person who knowingly executes or facilitates an arrest or service of process at a courthouse or court proceeding shall be liable for contempt of court, false imprisonment, or both. However, unlike the common law privilege – which also protects persons going to and coming from a courthouse – this bill only prohibits civil arrests in the courthouse. The bill specifies that its provisions will not apply to arrests made pursuant to a valid judicial warrant.
The author's background material, as well as the letters of support, make clear that this bill responds, at least in part, to the increasing use of "civil arrests" by federal agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at California courthouses. Such arrests prompted California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to write a letter to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions to "respectfully request that you refrain from this sort of enforcement in California's courthouses," because such activities "not only compromise our core value of fairness but they undermine the judiciary's ability to provide equal access to justice." (Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, March 16, 2017.) The Chief Justice did not invoke the common law "privilege from civil arrest" by name. However, her letter perfectly summarized the twin aims of the privilege: protecting the right of persons to access the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest; and permitting the courts to fulfill their responsibility, as institutions, to ensure safe, efficient, and orderly judicial administration
However, it should be stressed that the bill does not target or single out federal ICE agents; rather, it would apply to the efforts of any local, state, or federal official to carry out civil arrests of persons having business at a California courthouse.
According to the Author:
California must protect an individual's right to visit the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest. The intent of this bill is to protect all individuals at a courthouse or court proceeding. A person's ability to access justice and vindicates rights benefits the individual and the state. The business and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as a witness, pay a fine, file papers, or seek state-sanctioned benefits.
Arguments in Support:
According to the California Applicants' Attorneys Association (CAAA) – the bill's sponsor – this bill will clarify "the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses" by codifying the common law privilege against arrests at courthouses. This will, according to CAAA, "foster a safe environment in our courts and assure that all people will be able to conduct their business without the fear of arrest," and it will "preserve the sanctity of the court" by codifying the "the power of judges to conduct proceedings without undue interference." Several other labor, immigrant rights, and civil rights groups support this bill for substantially the same reasons as those articulated above.
Arguments in Opposition:
None on file
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee (prior to latest amendments):
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Ongoing annual personnel costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate violations of this measure. Specifically, the department would require 3.0 Deputy Attorneys General, 2.0 Legal Analyst, and 3.0 Legal Secretaries. Additionally, DOJ reports requiring $100,000 annually for legal expert witnesses. Costs would be offset by successful civil actions. (General Fund)
- Courts: No fiscal impact to enforce this measure, as it is codifying a common law authority that the courts currently exercise.
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
NO: Gallagher, Fong, Obernolte
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-4-1
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Fong, Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Diep
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 58-15-7
YES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones‑Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Voepel, Waldron
ABS, ABST OR NV: Cooley, Diep, Eduardo Garcia, Gray, Lackey, Mayes, Ting
SENATE FLOOR: 29-11-0
YES: Allen, Archuleta, Atkins, Beall, Bradford, Caballero, Dodd, Durazo, Galgiani, Glazer, Lena Gonzalez, Hertzberg, Hill, Hueso, Hurtado, Jackson, Leyva, McGuire, Mitchell, Monning, Pan, Portantino, Roth, Rubio, Skinner, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski, Wiener
NO: Bates, Borgeas, Chang, Dahle, Grove, Jones, Moorlach, Morrell, Nielsen, Stone, Wilk
UPDATED:
VERSION: September 6, 2019
CONSULTANT: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0002245
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 668 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 668
Author: Gonzalez (D) and Bonta (D), et al.
Amended: 9/6/19 in Senate
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-2, 7/2/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Borgeas, Jones
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 58-15, 5/28/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Courthouses: Privilege from civil arrest
SOURCE: California Applicants’ Attorneys Association
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
DIGEST:
This bill makes a series of findings and declarations about the importance of free and open courthouse access to the fair administration of justice. Accordingly, this bill codifies key components of the common law privilege against civil arrest, under which a person may not be subjected to civil arrest in relation to one legal matter while attending a judicial proceeding for another.
Senate Floor Amendments of 9/6/19 (1) remove explicit reference to the Attorney General’s authority to enforce the terms of the bill; (2) eliminate a provision allowing successful parties to obtain attorney’s fees and court costs; (3) specify that the bill does not apply to arrests made pursuant to a valid judicial warrant; and (4) make further technical, non-substantive changes.
Existing law:
- Holds that courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them. (Stewart v. Ramsey (1916) 242 U.S. 128, 129.)
- Makes the following acts, in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, contempt of the authority of the court:
- unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial; and
- any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1209.)
- Provides that California Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 is to be liberally construed to effect its objects and promote justice. (Burns v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 9.)
- Gives judicial officers the power to:
- preserve and enforce order in their immediate presence, and in proceedings before them, when they are engaged in the performance of their official duties; and
- compel obedience to their lawful orders as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ. Proc. § 177.)
- Holds that a court has inherent power to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it in order to ensure the orderly administration of justice and maintain the dignity and authority of the court, and to summarily punish for acts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court when they impede, embarrass, or obstruct it in the discharge of its duties. (Mowrer v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 223, 230.)
This bill:
- Makes findings and declarations regarding, among other things:
- the importance of keeping courts of justice open, accessible, and free from interruption as a vital component of republican government and the exercise of constitutional rights;
- U.S. Supreme Court doctrine affirming state authority to adopt measures to safeguard the administration of justice and declaring that courts of justice ought everywhere… to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them; and
- the necessity of protecting people from civil arrests while at courthouses both to protect witnesses and litigants as well as to ensure that courts have access to testimony and other evidence critical to their fact-finding mission.
- Codifies and specifies that judicial officers have the power to prevent activities that threaten access to state courthouses and court proceedings, and to prevent interruption of judicial administration, including protecting the privilege from civil arrest at courthouses and court proceedings.
- Provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest of any type in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse. Specifies that this provision shall not be construed to narrow, or in any way lessen, the pre-existing common law privilege from arrest. Clarifies that the provision does not apply to arrests made pursuant to a valid judicial warrant.
- Specifies that its provisions are severable, and if any provision or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect this bill’s other provisions or applications.
Background
For centuries, English and American courts have held that people attending, going to, or returning from a court proceeding may not be placed under arrest in relation to an unrelated civil matter. (Lasch, A Common-Law Privilege to Protect State and Local Courts During the Crimmigration Crisis (2017) 127 Yale L.J.F. 410, 423.) This longstanding rule is known as the common law privilege from civil arrest.
In recent decades, the use of civil arrests as a mechanism for initiating a civil lawsuit has mostly fallen by the wayside. (Levy, Jr., Mense Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine (1968) 78 Yale L.J. 52, 61-68.) Instead, most civil actions today commence through delivery of paperwork – the summons and complaint – to the defendant. As a result, familiarity with the common law privilege against civil arrest has faded among legal practitioners and judges.
The passage of time does not alter the basic policy rationale giving rise to the privilege as it pertains to civil arrest, however. If attending court puts people’s liberty at risk on account of an unrelated civil matter, they will be afraid of participating and are likely to choose not to. That dynamic creates a practical barrier to access to justice and deprives the courts of valuable testimony that may be critical to ascertaining the truth.
Historical origins of the common law privilege against civil arrest
According to law professor Christopher Lasch, “[t]he common law privilege from arrest dates back at least to the early fifteenth century.” (127 Yale L.J.F. 410, 423. Footnote omitted.) As articulated in William Blackstone’s famed 1877 treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England, the common law privilege from arrest meant that:
Suitors, witnesses, and other persons, necessarily attending any courts of record upon business, are not to be arrested during their actual attendance, which includes their necessary coming and returning. And no arrest can be made in the king’s presence, nor within the verge of his royal palace, nor in any place where the king’s justices are actually sitting.[1]
Prof. Lasch traces two strands of the privilege in English and American case law: one applying to people attending court and the other applying to the place where judicial proceedings are occurring. (127 Yale L.J.F. 410 at 424.) The former appears in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in 1932. In a case involving immunity for residents of one state while traveling to attend court in another state, the Court noted the “general rule that witnesses, suitors, and their attorneys, while in attendance in connection with the conduct of one suit are immune from service of process[2] in another.” (Lamb v. Schmitt (1932) 285 U.S. 222, 225.) Lasch identifies references to the latter strand in U.S. federal cases in the 19th century. (See Blight v. Fisher (C.C.D.N.J. 1809) 3 F. Cas. 704, 704-705; Parker v. Hotchkiss (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) 18 F. Cas. 1137, 1138.)
In California, recognizable elements of the privilege from arrest appear in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8). That provision makes it a contempt of the authority of the court to unlawfully detain a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial. The California Legislature enacted the language in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) in 1872.[3] Although its precise numbering has changed over time, the content of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) appears to have remained unchanged ever since.
The historical origins of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) appear to run even deeper in the United States. New York State’s statute concerning contempt—and particularly that of unlawful detention of parties or witnesses near a courtroom--appears to have been enacted possibly as early as 1843, as noted in the case of Spalding v. People ex rel. Backus (New York Court for the Correction of Errors, 1843) 7 Hill 301. The New York Codes include language similar to California’s statute. Since New York’s codes were influential on the development of the Codes of Civil Procedures in several western states,[4] it seems likely that Section 1209 derives its origin from those earlier New York codes.
This history confirms that, although this bill would newly codify key components of the common law privilege against arrest, the existence of the privilege long predates this bill.
Significance of privilege against civil arrest for administration of justice and exercise of fundamental rights
The case law incorporating the common law privilege from arrest into American law also articulates the policy rationale behind the privilege: it is central to the effective administration of justice and critical to the exercise of fundamental rights.
In Lamb v. Schmitt, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that:
the due administration of justice requires that a court shall not permit interference with the progress of a cause pending before it, by the service of process[5] in other suits, which would prevent, or the fear of which might tend to discourage, the voluntary attendance of those whose presence is necessary or convenient to the judicial administration in the pending litigation. (Lamb, 285 U.S. at 225.)
More broadly, in Stewart v. Ramsay (1916) 242 U.S. 128, the Supreme Court stated that: “courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every man who necessarily approaches them.” (Id. at 129.)
Prof. Lasch points out that one New York State court even went so far as to describe enforcement of the privilege against arrest as a judicial obligation, stating: “[w]e have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and when they do attend, we are bound to protect them redundo.” (Norris v. Beach (1807) 2 Johns. 294, 294.)
Although many of these decisions were rendered long ago, the policy rationales articulated appear to be no less relevant today. An excruciating dilemma confronts the California worker who has been robbed of her wages but worries she will be arrested and civilly detained if she seeks redress at a courthouse. The same goes for the Californian who has information about the commission of a violent crime, but faces the prospect of civil arrest and detention if she appears as a witness to testify as to what she knows.
These examples illustrate that the policy interests at stake pertain not just to the individual, but also to the court, and the public more generally. The prospect of facing civil arrest and detention chills the individual worker from exercising her right to seek legal redress. That rewards the employer who has violated the law by enabling that employer to profit off of his wrongdoing. This, in turn, gives the dishonest employer a marketplace advantage over the employer’s honest competitors. From this perspective, the privilege against civil arrest protects both individual rights and the public interest. Similarly, if the witness to a violent crime is deterred by fear of civil arrest and detention from testifying as to what she knows, the court is deprived of key evidence that could help determine guilt or innocence. If, as a result, the violent criminal goes free or the innocent defendant gets convicted, the public at large is less safe and justice less certain.
As the findings and declarations accompanying this bill reflect, the intent of this bill is to respond to these concerns about the deleterious effect that civil arrests at the courthouse can have on the exercise of fundamental rights and the administration of justice.
Inapplicability to criminal arrests or arrests pursuant to a judicial warrant
The common law privilege against arrests traditionally applied to civil arrest and service of process. It is not clear whether the common law privilege might also extend to criminal arrest. This bill only codifies that aspect of the common law privilege that pertains to civil arrest. It would not apply to criminal arrest. Thus, this bill would not protect a criminal suspect from arrest at a courthouse. The privilege would only apply to those alleged to have committed civil violations or those arrested in connection with a civil matter. As amended, the bill also would not apply to arrests made pursuant to a judicial warrant, as opposed to an administrative or other lesser warrant.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: No Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Ongoing annual personnel costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate violations of this measure. Specifically, the department would require 3.0 Deputy Attorneys General, 2.0 Legal Analyst, and 3.0 Legal Secretaries. Additionally, DOJ reports requiring $100,000 annually for legal expert witnesses. Costs would be offset by successful civil actions. (General Fund)
- Courts: No fiscal impact to enforce this measure, as it is codifying a common law authority that the courts currently exercise.
California Applicants’ Attorneys Association (co-source)
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (co-source)
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Anti-Defamation League
California Employment Lawyers Association
California Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
National Association of Social Workers – California Chapter
Oakland Privacy
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/30/19)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
California must protect an individual’s right to access our justice system without fear. AB 668 would protect all individuals at a courthouse or court proceeding. A person’s ability to access justice benefits the individual and the state. The business and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as a witness, pay a fine, file papers, or seek state-sanctioned benefits.
As sponsor of the bill, the California Applicant Attorneys Association writes:
This measure will foster a safe environment in our courts and assure that all people will be able to conduct their business without the fear of arrest. It preserves the sanctity of the court, and codifies the power of judges to conduct proceedings without undue interference.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 58-15, 5/28/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cooley, Diep, Eduardo Garcia, Gray, Lackey, Mayes, Ting
Prepared by: Timothy Griffiths / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/9/19 18:05:16
**** END ***
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 766 (1877). Footnote omitted. ↑
The common law privilege from arrest encompassed civil arrest and, in some instances, extended to service of process as well. Though Lamb referred to service of process only, the federal case law to which it cited makes clear that the privilege was understood to extend primarily to civil arrest. (See Lasch, 127 Yale L.J. F. 410 at fn 93, collecting cases.) ↑
Deering’s Annotated California Code of Civil Procedure § 1209(a)(8) – History. ↑
Blume, William Wirt, “Adoption in California of the of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A Chapter in American Legal History,” Hastings Law Journal 17, no. 4 (May 1966) 716. ↑
See footnote 2, above. ↑
Office of Senate Floor Analyses (916) 651-1520 Fax: (916) 327-4478 | AB 668 |
THIRD READING
Bill No: AB 668
Author: Gonzalez (D) and Bonta (D), et al.
Introduced: 2/15/19
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: 7-2, 7/2/19
AYES: Jackson, Durazo, Lena Gonzalez, Monning, Stern, Umberg, Wieckowski
NOES: Borgeas, Jones
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE: 5-2, 8/30/19
AYES: Portantino, Bradford, Durazo, Hill, Wieckowski
NOES: Bates, Jones
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 58-15, 5/28/19 - See last page for vote
SUBJECT: Courthouses: Privilege from civil arrest
SOURCE: California Applicants’ Attorneys Association
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
DIGEST:
This bill makes a series of findings and declarations about the importance of free and open courthouse access to the fair administration of justice. Accordingly, this bill codifies key components of the common law privilege against civil arrest, under which a person may not be subjected to civil arrest in relation to one legal matter while attending a judicial proceeding for another, and provides mechanisms for enforcement of the privilege.
Existing law:
- Holds that courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them. (Stewart v. Ramsey (1916) 242 U.S. 128, 129.)
- Makes the following acts, in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, contempt of the authority of the court:
- unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial; and
- any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1209.)
- Provides that California Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 is to be liberally construed to effect its objects and promote justice. (Burns v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 9.)
- Gives judicial officers the power to:
- preserve and enforce order in their immediate presence, and in proceedings before them, when they are engaged in the performance of their official duties; and
- compel obedience to their lawful orders as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ. Proc. § 177.)
- Holds that a court has inherent power to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it in order to ensure the orderly administration of justice and maintain the dignity and authority of the court, and to summarily punish for acts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court when they impede, embarrass, or obstruct it in the discharge of its duties. (Mowrer v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 223, 230.)
This bill:
- Makes findings and declarations regarding, among other things:
- the importance of keeping courts of justice open, accessible, and free from interruption as a vital component of republican government and the exercise of constitutional rights;
- U.S. Supreme Court doctrine affirming state authority to adopt measures to safeguard the administration of justice and declaring that courts of justice ought everywhere… to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them; and
- the necessity of protecting people from civil arrests while at courthouses both to protect witnesses and litigants as well as to ensure that courts have access to testimony and other evidence critical to their fact-finding mission.
- Codifies and specifies that judicial officers have the power to prevent activities that threaten access to state courthouses and court proceedings, and to prevent interruption of judicial administration, including protecting the privilege from civil arrest at courthouses and court proceedings.
- Provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest of any type in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse. Specifies that this provision shall not be construed to narrow, or in any way lessen, the pre-existing common law privilege from arrest.
- Authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action in the name of the people to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the privilege against arrest has occurred.
- Authorizes the recovery of court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for a successful action to enforce liability for a violation of the privilege against civil arrest as expressed in this bill.
- Specifies that its provisions are severable, and if any provision or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect this bill’s other provisions or applications.
Background
For centuries, English and American courts have held that people attending, going to, or returning from a court proceeding may not be placed under arrest in relation to an unrelated civil matter. (Lasch, A Common-Law Privilege to Protect State and Local Courts During the Crimmigration Crisis (2017) 127 Yale L.J.F. 410, 423.) This longstanding rule is known as the common law privilege from civil arrest.
In recent decades, the use of civil arrests as a mechanism for initiating a civil lawsuit has mostly fallen by the wayside. (Levy, Jr., Mense Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine (1968) 78 Yale L.J. 52, 61-68.) Instead, most civil actions today commence through delivery of paperwork – the summons and complaint – to the defendant. As a result, familiarity with the common law privilege against civil arrest has faded among legal practitioners and judges.
The passage of time does not alter the basic policy rationale giving rise to the privilege as it pertains to civil arrest, however. If attending court puts people’s liberty at risk on account of an unrelated civil matter, they will be afraid of participating and are likely to choose not to. That dynamic creates a practical barrier to access to justice and deprives the courts of valuable testimony that may be critical to ascertaining the truth.
This bill seeks to address these concerns by codifying key components of the common law privilege against civil arrest and providing mechanisms for enforcement of the privilege.
Historical origins of the common law privilege against civil arrest
According to law professor Christopher Lasch, “[t]he common law privilege from arrest dates back at least to the early fifteenth century.” (127 Yale L.J.F. 410, 423. Footnote omitted.) As articulated in William Blackstone’s famed 1877 treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England, the common law privilege from arrest meant that:
Suitors, witnesses, and other persons, necessarily attending any courts of record upon business, are not to be arrested during their actual attendance, which includes their necessary coming and returning. And no arrest can be made in the king’s presence, nor within the verge of his royal palace, nor in any place where the king’s justices are actually sitting.[1]
Prof. Lasch traces two strands of the privilege in English and American case law: one applying to people attending court and the other applying to the place where judicial proceedings are occurring. (127 Yale L.J.F. 410 at 424.) The former appears in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in 1932. In a case involving immunity for residents of one state while traveling to attend court in another state, the Court noted the “general rule that witnesses, suitors, and their attorneys, while in attendance in connection with the conduct of one suit are immune from service of process[2] in another.” (Lamb v. Schmitt (1932) 285 U.S. 222, 225.) Lasch identifies references to the latter strand in U.S. federal cases in the 19th century. (See Blight v. Fisher (C.C.D.N.J. 1809) 3 F. Cas. 704, 704-705; Parker v. Hotchkiss (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) 18 F. Cas. 1137, 1138.)
In California, recognizable elements of the privilege from arrest appear in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8). That provision makes it a contempt of the authority of the court to unlawfully detain a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial. The California Legislature enacted the language in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) in 1872.[3] Although its precise numbering has changed over time, the content of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) appears to have remained unchanged ever since.
The historical origins of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) appear to run even deeper in the United States. New York State’s statute concerning contempt—and particularly that of unlawful detention of parties or witnesses near a courtroom--appears to have been enacted possibly as early as 1843, as noted in the case of Spalding v. People ex rel. Backus (New York Court for the Correction of Errors, 1843) 7 Hill 301. The New York Codes include language similar to California’s statute. Since New York’s codes were influential on the development of the Codes of Civil Procedures in several western states,[4] it seems likely that Section 1209 derives its origin from those earlier New York codes.
This history confirms that, although this bill would newly codify key components of the common law privilege against arrest, the existence of the privilege long predates this bill.
Significance of privilege against civil arrest for administration of justice and exercise of fundamental rights
The case law incorporating the common law privilege from arrest into American law also articulates the policy rationale behind the privilege: it is central to the effective administration of justice and critical to the exercise of fundamental rights.
In Lamb v. Schmitt, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that:
the due administration of justice requires that a court shall not permit interference with the progress of a cause pending before it, by the service of process[5] in other suits, which would prevent, or the fear of which might tend to discourage, the voluntary attendance of those whose presence is necessary or convenient to the judicial administration in the pending litigation. (Lamb, 285 U.S. at 225.)
More broadly, in Stewart v. Ramsay (1916) 242 U.S. 128, the Supreme Court stated that: “courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every man who necessarily approaches them.” (Id. at 129.)
Prof. Lasch points out that one New York State court even went so far as to describe enforcement of the privilege against arrest as a judicial obligation, stating: “[w]e have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and when they do attend, we are bound to protect them redundo.” (Norris v. Beach (1807) 2 Johns. 294, 294.)
Although many of these decisions were rendered long ago, the policy rationales articulated appear to be no less relevant today. An excruciating dilemma confronts the California worker who has been robbed of her wages but worries she will be arrested and civilly detained if she seeks redress at a courthouse. The same goes for the Californian who has information about the commission of a violent crime, but faces the prospect of civil arrest and detention if she appears as a witness to testify as to what she knows.
These examples illustrate that the policy interests at stake pertain not just to the individual, but also to the court, and the public more generally. The prospect of facing civil arrest and detention chills the individual worker from exercising her right to seek legal redress. That rewards the employer who has violated the law by enabling that employer to profit off of his wrongdoing. This, in turn, gives the dishonest employer a marketplace advantage over the employer’s honest competitors. From this perspective, the privilege against civil arrest protects both individual rights and the public interest. Similarly, if the witness to a violent crime is deterred by fear of civil arrest and detention from testifying as to what she knows, the court is deprived of key evidence that could help determine guilt or innocence. If, as a result, the violent criminal goes free or the innocent defendant gets convicted, the public at large is less safe and justice less certain.
As the findings and declarations accompanying this bill reflect, the intent of this bill is to respond to these concerns about the deleterious effect that civil arrests at the courthouse can have on the exercise of fundamental rights and the administration of justice.
Inapplicability to criminal arrests
The common law privilege against arrests traditionally applied to civil arrest and service of process. It is not clear whether the common law privilege might also extend to criminal arrest. This bill only codifies that aspect of the common law privilege that pertains to civil arrest. It would not apply to criminal arrest. Thus, this bill would not protect a criminal suspect from arrest at a courthouse. The privilege would only apply to those alleged to have committed civil violations or those arrested in connection with a civil matter.
FISCAL EFFECT: Appropriation: No Fiscal Com.: Yes Local: No
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee:
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Ongoing annual personnel costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate violations of this measure. Specifically, the department would require 3.0 Deputy Attorneys General, 2.0 Legal Analyst, and 3.0 Legal Secretaries. Additionally, DOJ reports requiring $100,000 annually for legal expert witnesses. Costs would be offset by successful civil actions. (General Fund)
- Courts: No fiscal impact to enforce this measure, as it is codifying a common law authority that the courts currently exercise.
California Applicants’ Attorneys Association (co-source)
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (co-source)
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Anti-Defamation League
California Employment Lawyers Association
California Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
National Association of Social Workers – California Chapter
Oakland Privacy
OPPOSITION: (Verified 8/30/19)
None received
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author:
California must protect an individual’s right to access our justice system without fear. AB 668 would protect all individuals at a courthouse or court proceeding. A person’s ability to access justice benefits the individual and the state. The business and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as a witness, pay a fine, file papers, or seek state-sanctioned benefits.
As sponsor of the bill, the California Applicant Attorneys Association writes:
This measure will foster a safe environment in our courts and assure that all people will be able to conduct their business without the fear of arrest. It preserves the sanctity of the court, and codifies the power of judges to conduct proceedings without undue interference.
ASSEMBLY FLOOR: 58-15, 5/28/19
AYES: Aguiar-Curry, Arambula, Bauer-Kahan, Berman, Bloom, Boerner Horvath, Bonta, Burke, Calderon, Carrillo, Cervantes, Chau, Chiu, Chu, Cooper, Cunningham, Daly, Eggman, Frazier, Friedman, Gabriel, Cristina Garcia, Gipson, Gloria, Gonzalez, Grayson, Holden, Irwin, Jones-Sawyer, Kalra, Kamlager-Dove, Levine, Limón, Low, Maienschein, McCarty, Medina, Mullin, Muratsuchi, Nazarian, O'Donnell, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Quirk-Silva, Ramos, Reyes, Luz Rivas, Robert Rivas, Rodriguez, Blanca Rubio, Salas, Santiago, Smith, Mark Stone, Weber, Wicks, Wood, Rendon
NOES: Bigelow, Brough, Chen, Choi, Dahle, Flora, Fong, Gallagher, Kiley, Mathis, Melendez, Obernolte, Patterson, Voepel, Waldron
NO VOTE RECORDED: Cooley, Diep, Eduardo Garcia, Gray, Lackey, Mayes, Ting
Prepared by: Timothy Griffiths / JUD. / (916) 651-4113
9/1/19 9:46:17
**** END ****
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 766 (1877). Footnote omitted. ↑
The common law privilege from arrest encompassed civil arrest and, in some instances, extended to service of process as well. Though Lamb referred to service of process only, the federal case law to which it cited makes clear that the privilege was understood to extend primarily to civil arrest. (See Lasch, 127 Yale L.J. F. 410 at fn 93, collecting cases.) ↑
Deering’s Annotated California Code of Civil Procedure § 1209(a)(8) – History. ↑
Blume, William Wirt, “Adoption in California of the of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A Chapter in American Legal History,” Hastings Law Journal 17, no. 4 (May 1966) 716. ↑
See footnote 2, above. ↑
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Senator Anthony Portantino, Chair
2019 - 2020 Regular Session
AB 668 (Gonzalez) - Courthouses: Privilege from civil arrest
Version: | Policy Vote: |
Urgency: | Mandate: |
Hearing Date: | Consultant: |
Bill Summary:
AB 668 would codify the common law privilege against civil arrest of a person while attending a judicial proceeding and would codify judicial authority to enforce the common law privilege against civil arrest. It also would permit the Attorney General to bring a civil action where there is reasonable cause to believe this measure has been violated.
Fiscal Impact:
- Department of Justice (DOJ): Ongoing annual personnel costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars to litigate violations of this measure. Specifically, the department would require 3.0 Deputy Attorneys General, 2.0 Legal Analyst, and 3.0 Legal Secretaries. Additionally, DOJ reports requiring $100,000 annually for legal expert witnesses. Costs would be offset by successful civil actions. (General Fund)
- Courts: No fiscal impact to enforce this measure, as it is codifying a common law authority that the courts currently exercise.
Background:
Existing common law (i.e., court-made law) recognizes the privilege against civil arrest of a person while attending a judicial proceeding. Specifically, U.S. courts (and English courts going back to at least as early as the 1400s) have held that people attending, going to, or returning from a court proceeding may not be placed under arrest in relation to an unrelated civil matter. The reasoning behind this common law privilege is that if attending court puts people’s liberty at risk on account of an unrelated civil matter, they will be afraid of participating and are likely to choose not to, creating a practical barrier to access to justice and depriving the courts of valuable testimony that may be critical to finding the truth.
Elements of this common law privilege has been codified in California law since 1872. Specifically as a renumbered provision, Code of Civil Procedure section 1209, subdivision (a)(8) provides that it is contempt of court to “[u]nlawfully detain[ ] a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial.”
Proposed Law:
This bill would:
- Codify the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses, including by protecting the privilege from arrest at a courthouse.
- Provide that no person shall be subject to civil arrest in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse.
- Allow the Attorney General to bring a civil action to obtain equitable and declaratory relief for a violation of this measure. A successful party seeking to enforce liability for a violation of AB 668 would be entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
Related Legislation:
SB 349 (Lara, 2018) was substantially similar to this bill and was vetoed by the Governor, who stated that he supported the underlying intent but was concerned that it may have unintended consequences. He felt that it was prudent to allow for guidance by the Attorney General’s model policies limiting assistance with immigration enforcement at courthouses and other public facilities, as required by SB 54, before enacting new laws in this area.
SB 54 (de León, Ch. 495, Stats. 2017), in part, required the Attorney General to publish model policies limiting assistance with immigration enforcement to the fullest extent possible consistent with federal and state law at several locations, including courts. It required all state courts to implement the model policies or an equivalent policy.
Staff Comments:
In October 2018, the Attorney General released the model policies required by SB 54 with respect to limiting assistance with immigration enforcement at courts. The categories of model policies are protecting access to justice, protecting children, protecting immigrant crime victims, regarding training court staff on responding to immigration enforcement activity, responding to requests for access for immigration enforcement purposes, regarding the collection and dissemination of personal information, and regarding responses to requests for information for immigration enforcement purposes. Within each category are specific policies for courts to follow, such as identifying nonpublic restricted locations within court facilities and training personnel on who may access restricted locations.
-- END --
Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Chair
2019-2020 Regular Session
Bill No: AB 668 (Author:Gonzalez)
Version: February 15, 2019
Hearing Date: July 2, 2019
Fiscal: Yes
Urgency: No
Consultant: TSG
SUBJECT
Courthouses: Privilege from civil arrest
DIGEST
This bill makes a series of findings and declarations about the importance of free and open courthouse access to the fair administration of justice. Accordingly, it codifies key components of the common law privilege against civil arrest, under which a person may not be subjected to civil arrest in relation to one legal matter while attending a judicial proceeding for another, and provides mechanisms for enforcement of the privilege.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
People’s ability to come and go freely from courthouses is a critical component in the fair administration of justice. Without it, parties will forgo pursuing or defending their rights, and judges and juries will be deprived of witness testimony which would otherwise shed light upon the truth. Recognizing the importance of free access to courthouses, jurists going back centuries recognized a privilege against civil arrest, meaning a basic rule that under which a person may not be subjected to detention in relation to one civil legal matter while attending a judicial proceeding for another. The concept appears in legal codes going back over a century. A version of it has appeared in the California Code of Civil Procedure since 1872. Today, the use of arrests as a method for initiating a civil proceeding is less common than it once was. However, the policy rationale behind the privilege against arrest remains as sound as ever: just as in centuries past, people today will avoid the courts if they fear civil arrest there. In response, this bill underscores and further codifies the privilege against arrest. At the same time, the bill sets forth mechanisms for enforcing it.
The bill is sponsored by the California Applicants’ Attorneys Association and the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights. There is no known opposition at this time.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW
Existing law:
- Holds that courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them. (Stewart v. Ramsey (1916) 242 U.S. 128, 129.)
- Makes the following acts, in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, contempt of the authority of the court:
- unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial; and
- any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1209.)
- Provides that California Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 is to be liberally construed to effect its objects and promote justice. (Burns v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 9.)
- Gives judicial officers the power to:
- preserve and enforce order in their immediate presence, and in proceedings before them, when they are engaged in the performance of their official duties; and
- compel obedience to their lawful orders as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ. Proc. § 177.)
- Holds that a court has inherent power to exercise reasonable control over all proceedings connected with the litigation before it in order to ensure the orderly administration of justice and maintain the dignity and authority of the court, and to summarily punish for acts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court when they impede, embarrass, or obstruct it in the discharge of its duties. (Mowrer v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 223, 230.)
This bill:
- Makes findings and declarations regarding, among other things:
- the importance of keeping courts of justice open, accessible, and free from interruption as a vital component of republican government and the exercise of constitutional rights;
- U.S. Supreme Court doctrine affirming state authority to adopt measures to safeguard the administration of justice and declaring that courts of justice ought everywhere… to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them; and
- the necessity of protecting people from civil arrests while at courthouses both to protect witnesses and litigants as well as to ensure that courts have access to testimony and other evidence critical to their fact-finding mission.
- Codifies and specifies that judicial officers have the power to prevent activities that threaten access to state courthouses and court proceedings, and to prevent interruption of judicial administration, including protecting the privilege from civil arrest at courthouses and court proceedings.
- Provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest of any type in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse. Specifies that this provision shall not be construed to narrow, or in any way lessen, the pre-existing common law privilege from arrest.
- Authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action in the name of the people to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the privilege against arrest has occurred.
- Authorizes the recovery of court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for a successful action to enforce liability for a violation of the privilege against civil arrest as expressed in this bill.
- Specifies that its provisions are severable, and if any provision or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect the bill’s other provisions or applications.
COMMENTS
- Background
For centuries, English and American courts have held that people attending, going to, or returning from a court proceeding may not be placed under arrest in relation to an unrelated civil matter. (Lasch, A Common-Law Privilege to Protect State and Local Courts During the Crimmigration Crisis (2017) 127 Yale L.J.F. 410, 423.) This longstanding rule is known as the common law privilege from civil arrest.
In recent decades, the use of civil arrests as a mechanism for initiating a civil lawsuit has mostly fallen by the wayside. (Levy, Jr., Mense Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine (1968) 78 Yale L.J. 52, 61-68.) Instead, most civil actions today commence through delivery of paperwork – the summons and complaint – to the defendant. As a result, familiarity with the common law privilege against civil arrest has faded among legal practitioners and judges.
The passage of time does not alter the basic policy rationale giving rise to the privilege as it pertains to civil arrest, however. If attending court puts people’s liberty at risk on account of an unrelated civil matter, they will be afraid of participating and are likely to choose not to. That dynamic creates a practical barrier to access to justice and deprives the courts of valuable testimony that may be critical to ascertaining the truth.
This bill would seek to address these concerns by codifying key components of the common law privilege against civil arrest and providing mechanisms for enforcement of the privilege.
2. Historical origins of the common law privilege against civil arrest
According to law professor Christopher Lasch, “[t]he common law privilege from arrest dates back at least to the early fifteenth century.” (127 Yale L.J.F. 410, 423. Footnote omitted.) As articulated in William Blackstone’s famed 1877 treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England, the common law privilege from arrest meant that:
Suitors, witnesses, and other persons, necessarily attending any courts of record upon business, are not to be arrested during their actual attendance, which includes their necessary coming and returning. And no arrest can be made in the king’s presence, nor within the verge of his royal palace, nor in any place where the king’s justices are actually sitting.[1]
Prof. Lasch traces two strands of the privilege in English and American case law: one applying to people attending court and the other applying to the place where judicial proceedings are occurring. (127 Yale L.J.F. 410 at 424.) The former appears in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in 1932. In a case involving immunity for residents of one state while traveling to attend court in another state, the Court noted the “general rule that witnesses, suitors, and their attorneys, while in attendance in connection with the conduct of one suit are immune from service of process[2] in another.” (Lamb v. Schmitt (1932) 285 U.S. 222, 225.) Lasch identifies references to the latter strand in U.S. federal cases in the 19th century. (See Blight v. Fisher (C.C.D.N.J. 1809) 3 F. Cas. 704, 704-705; Parker v. Hotchkiss (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) 18 F. Cas. 1137, 1138.)
In California, recognizable elements of the privilege from arrest appear in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8). That provision makes it a contempt of the authority of the court to unlawfully detain a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from the court where the action is on the calendar for trial. The California Legislature enacted the language in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) in 1872.[3] Although its precise numbering has changed over time, the content of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) appears to have remained unchanged ever since.
The historical origins of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1209(a)(8) appear to run even deeper in the United States. New York State’s statute concerning contempt—and particularly that of unlawful detention of parties or witnesses near a courtroom--appears to have been enacted possibly as early as 1843, as noted in the case of Spalding v. People ex rel. Backus (New York Court for the Correction of Errors, 1843) 7 Hill 301. The New York Codes include language similar to California’s statute. Since New York’s codes were influential on the development of the Codes of Civil Procedures in several western states,[4] it seems likely that Section 1209 derives its origin from those earlier New York codes.
At least eight other states currently have language similar to subsection (a)(8): Alaska (Alaska Stat. § 09.50.010); Idaho (Idaho Code § 7-601); Iowa (Iowa Code § 665.2); Michigan (MCLS § 600.1701); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. § 588.01); Montana (3-1-501, MCA); New York (NY CLS Jud § 753); and Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301).
This history[5] confirms that, although this bill would newly codify key components of the common law privilege against arrest, the existence of the privilege long predates the bill.
3. Significance of privilege against civil arrest for administration of justice and exercise of fundamental rights
The case law incorporating the common law privilege from arrest into American law also articulates the policy rationale behind the privilege: it is central to the effective administration of justice and critical to the exercise of fundamental rights.
In Lamb v. Schmitt, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that:
the due administration of justice requires that a court shall not permit interference with the progress of a cause pending before it, by the service of process[6] in other suits, which would prevent, or the fear of which might tend to discourage, the voluntary attendance of those whose presence is necessary or convenient to the judicial administration in the pending litigation. (Lamb, 285 U.S. at 225.)
More broadly, in Stewart v. Ramsay (1916) 242 U.S. 128, the Supreme Court stated that: “courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every man who necessarily approaches them.” (Id. at 129.)
Prof. Lasch points out that one New York State court even went so far as to describe enforcement of the privilege against arrest as a judicial obligation, stating: “[w]e have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and when they do attend, we are bound to protect them redundo.” (Norris v. Beach (1807) 2 Johns. 294, 294.)
Although many of these decisions were rendered long ago, the policy rationales articulated appear to be no less relevant today. An excruciating dilemma confronts the California worker who has been robbed of her wages but worries she will be arrested and civilly detained if she seeks redress at a courthouse. The same goes for the Californian who has information about the commission of a violent crime, but faces the prospect of civil arrest and detention if she appears as a witness to testify as to what she knows.
These examples illustrate that the policy interests at stake pertain not just to the individual, but also to the court, and the public more generally. The prospect of facing civil arrest and detention chills the individual worker from exercising her right to seek legal redress. That rewards the employer who has violated the law by enabling that employer to profit off of his wrongdoing. This, in turn, gives the dishonest employer a marketplace advantage over the employer’s honest competitors. From this perspective, the privilege against civil arrest protects both individual rights and the public interest. Similarly, if the witness to a violent crime is deterred by fear of civil arrest and detention from testifying as to what she knows, the court is deprived of key evidence that could help determine guilt or innocence. If, as a result, the violent criminal goes free or the innocent defendant gets convicted, the public at large is less safe and justice less certain.
As the findings and declarations accompanying the bill reflect, the intent of the bill is to respond to these concerns about the deleterious effect that civil arrests at the courthouse can have on the exercise of fundamental rights and the administration of justice.
4. Inapplicability to criminal arrests
The common law privilege against arrests traditionally applied to civil arrest and service of process. It is not clear whether the common law privilege might also extend to criminal arrest. This bill would only codify that aspect of the common law privilege that pertains to civil arrest. It would not apply to criminal arrest. Thus, this bill would not protect a criminal suspect from arrest at a courthouse. The privilege would only apply to those alleged to have committed civil violations or those arrested in connection with a civil matter.
5. Arguments in support of the bill
According to the author:
California must protect an individual’s right to access our justice system without fear. AB 668 would protect all individuals at a courthouse or court proceeding. A person’s ability to access justice benefits the individual and the state. The business and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as a witness, pay a fine, file papers, or seek state-sanctioned benefits.
California must permit the courts to fulfil their responsibility, as institutions, to ensure safe and orderly judicial administration. Codifying the common law privilege from civil arrest will ensure that litigants, witnesses and other Californians’ are not deterred from participating in the proceedings necessary to protect and defend their rights guaranteed by the State of California. The sanctity of the courts and the power of judges to conduct proceedings without physical interference are paramount to the fair access to and delivery of justice.
This bill does not prevent any law enforcement officer from making arrests in any other place or at another time. Nothing in this bill will prevent any law enforcement officer from making a criminal arrest in a courthouse if there is probable cause that the targeted person committed a crime, or if the arresting officer witnessed criminal conduct.
As sponsor of the bill, the California Applicant Attorneys Association writes:
This measure will foster a safe environment in our courts and assure that all people will be able to conduct their business without the fear of arrest. It preserves the sanctity of the court, and codifies the power of judges to conduct proceedings without undue interference.
In support, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office writes:
Crime victims and witnesses who attend courtroom proceedings often do so because they are compelled by a subpoena to appear. If those individuals are undocumented and don’t appear in court because they are afraid of being arrested for immigration reasons, or if they do appear and are then placed under civil arrest, that puts them in an unfairly difficult situation and could negatively impact cases wherein they are victims or witnesses.
SUPPORT
California Applicants’ Attorneys Association (sponsor)
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (sponsor)
American Civil Liberties Union of California
Anti-Defamation League
California Employment Lawyers Association
California Federation of Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO
California Immigrant Policy Center
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
National Association of Social Workers – California Chapter
Oakland Privacy
OPPOSITION
None known
RELATED LEGISLATION
Pending Legislation: None known
Prior Legislation:
SB 349 (Lara, 2018) was nearly identical to this bill. In his message vetoing SB 349, then-Governor Brown wrote: “I support the underlying intent of this measure, but I am concerned that it may have unintended consequences. Last year I signed SB 54 (De Leon), a provision of which tasked the Attorney General with publishing model policies limiting assistance with immigration enforcement to the fullest extent possible at courthouses […] to ensure that they remain safe and accessible to all California residents, regardless of immigration status. I believe the prudent path is to allow for that guidance to be released before enacting new laws in this area.”
PRIOR VOTES:
Assembly Floor (Ayes 58, Noes 15)
Assembly Appropriations Committee (Ayes 13, Noes 4)
Assembly Judiciary Committee (Ayes 9, Noes 3)
**************
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 766 (1877). Footnote omitted. ↑
The common law privilege from arrest encompassed civil arrest and, in some instances, extended to service of process as well. Though Lamb referred to service of process only, the federal case law to which it cited makes clear that the privilege was understood to extend primarily to civil arrest. (See Lasch, 127 Yale L.J. F. 410 at fn 93, collecting cases.) ↑
Deering’s Annotated California Code of Civil Procedure § 1209(a)(8) – History. ↑
Blume, William Wirt, “Adoption in California of the of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A Chapter in American Legal History,” Hastings Law Journal 17, no. 4 (May 1966) 716. ↑
Committee staff is grateful to the California Research Bureau generally, and Maeve Roche in particular, for compiling the history on which parts of this Comment are based. A copy of the corresponding memorandum is on file with the Senate Judiciary Committee. ↑
See footnote 2, above. ↑
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING
ATR Bill Id:AB 668
Author:(Gonzalez and Bonta)
As Introduced Ver:February 15, 2019
Majority vote
SUMMARY:
Clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses by codifying the common law privilege against civil arrest, and authorizes the Attorney General to bring actions for equitable and declaratory relief, as specified.
Major Provisions
- Makes findings and declarations on the importance of keeping courts of justice open, accessible, and free from interruption, and on the need to protect persons from civil arrest or service of process while in California's courts or their environs, or while attending, or going to or coming from, judicial proceedings. Specifies that this protection is needed in order to ensure that litigants, witnesses, and others are not deterred from participating in such proceedings, and that the dignity of judicial proceedings are upheld and not disturbed.
- Provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest of any type in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse.
- Permits the Attorney General to bring a civil action in the name of the people to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of 2) has occurred.
- Allows a party in a successful action to enforce the provision of this bill to recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
COMMENTS:
Under the common law "privilege from arrest," a person may not be subjected to a "civil arrest" or served with process while attending, or going to and from, a court proceeding. Unlike a "criminal" arrest, based on probable cause that the arrestee committed a crime, a "civil arrest" typically compels a person's attendance as a witness or party in a civil suit or proceeding. While the common law privilege from arrest has a long history in both England and the United States, it has fallen out of use in modern law, largely because the "civil arrest" has also become less common. However, while traditional civil arrests may have declined, they have not entirely disappeared. Most notably, in the past two years especially, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers have carried out many civil arrests in California courthouses. When an ICE agent takes custody of a person suspected of being in the United States unlawfully, the agent makes a civil arrest, done to compel attendance at a deportation proceeding, which is entirely a civil matter. (Arizona v. U.S. (2012) 567 U.S. 387, 407; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-1039.)
This bill would effectively codify that common law privilege in three ways. First, it clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses, including by protecting the privilege from arrest. Second, it provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest or served with process while attending a courthouse or court proceeding. Third, it provides that any person who knowingly executes or facilitates an arrest or service of process at a courthouse or court proceeding shall be liable for contempt of court, false imprisonment, or both. However, unlike the common law privilege – which also protects persons going to and coming from a courthouse – this bill only prohibits civil arrests in the courthouse.
The author's background material, as well as the letters of support, make clear that this bill responds, at least in part, to the increasing use of "civil arrests" by federal agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at California courthouses. Such arrests prompted California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to write a letter to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions to "respectfully request that you refrain from this sort of enforcement in California's courthouses," because such activities "not only compromise our core value of fairness but they undermine the judiciary's ability to provide equal access to justice." (Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, March 16, 2017.) The Chief Justice did not invoke the common law "privilege from civil arrest" by name. However, her letter perfectly summarized the twin aims of the privilege: protecting the right of persons to access the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest; and permittings the courts to fulfill their responsibility, as institutions, to ensure safe, efficient, and orderly judicial administration
However, it should be stressed that the bill does not target or single out federal ICE agents; rather, it would apply to the efforts of any local, state, or federal official to carry out civil arrests of persons having business at a California courthouse.
According to the Author:
California must protect an individual's right to visit the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest. The intent of this bill is to protect all individuals at a courthouse or court proceeding. A person's ability to access justice and vindicates rights benefits the individual and the state. The business and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as a witness, pay a fine, file papers, or seek state-sanctioned benefits.
Arguments in Support:
According to the California Applicants' Attorneys Association (CAAA) – the bill's sponsor – this bill will clarify "the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses" by codifying the common law privilege against arrests at courthouses. This will, according to CAAA, "foster a safe environment in our courts and assure that all people will be able to conduct their business without the fear of arrest," and it will "preserve the sanctity of the court" by codifying the "the power of judges to conduct proceedings without undue interference." Several other labor, immigrant rights, and civil rights groups support this bill for substantially the same reasons as those articulated above.
Arguments in Opposition:
None on file
FISCAL COMMENTS:
According to the Assembly Appropriations committee, unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (GF), likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, for the Department of Justice to handle increased workload associated with litigation.
VOTES:
ASM JUDICIARY: 9-3-0
YES: Mark Stone, Chau, Chiu, Gonzalez, Holden, Kalra, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Reyes
NO: Gallagher, Fong, Obernolte
ASM APPROPRIATIONS: 13-4-1
YES: Gonzalez, Bloom, Bonta, Calderon, Carrillo, Chau, Eggman, Gabriel, Eduardo Garcia, Maienschein, Petrie-Norris, Quirk, Robert Rivas
NO: Bigelow, Brough, Fong, Obernolte
ABS, ABST OR NV: Diep
UPDATED:
VERSION: February 15, 2019
CONSULTANT: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334 FN: 0000526
Date of Hearing: April 3, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
Lorena Gonzalez, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 668
Author:(Gonzalez and Bonta) – As Introduced Ver:February 15, 2019
Policy Committee: | Judiciary | Vote: | 9 - 3 |
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Urgency: No State Mandated Local Program: No Reimbursable: No
SUMMARY:
This bill codifies the common law privilege against civil arrest wherein a person may not be subjected to civil arrest while attending a judicial proceeding and codifies judicial authority to enforce the common law privilege against civil arrest. This bill also authorizes the attorney general to bring a civil action for any appropriate remedy where there is reasonable cause to believe the common law privilege has been violated.
FISCAL EFFECT:
Unknown, potentially significant cost pressures (GF), likely in the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, for the Department of Justice to handle increased workload associated with litigation.
COMMENTS:
- Purpose. According to the author:
California must protect an individual’s right to visit the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest. The intent of AB 668 is to protect all individuals at a courthouse or in court proceedings. A person’s ability to access justice and vindicate their rights benefits both the individual and the state. The businesses and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as witnesses, pay fines, file papers, or seek state-sanction benefits. California must permit the court to fulfil its responsibilities, as institutions, to ensure safe and orderly judicial administration. Codifying the common law privilege from civil arrest will ensure that litigants, witnesses, and other Californian’s are not deterred from participating in the proceedings necessary to protect and defend the rights guaranteed them by the State of California. The sanctity of the courts and the power of judges to conduct proceedings without physical interference are paramount to the fair access to and delivery of justice.
- Background. In the past two years, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials have increasingly used civil arrests to detain people suspected of being undocumented. When an ICE agent takes a person into custody for allegedly being in the United States unlawfully, the agent makes a civil, not a criminal, arrest. A criminal arrest occurs only when there is probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime, and the purpose of the arrest is to hold the person until there is a trial to establish guilt or the posting of sufficient bail. However, ICE arrests, as civil arrests, do not require any showing of probable cause and may lead directly to deportation proceedings. Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye wrote to former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions in 2017 to “respectfully request that you refrain from this sort of enforcement in California's courthouses,” because such activities not only “compromise our core value of fairness but they undermine the judiciary's ability to provide equal access to justice."
Although Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye did not invoke the common law “privilege from civil arrest” by name, her letter summarized the twin aims of the privilege: protecting the right of persons to access the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest; and permitting the courts to fulfill their responsibility, as institutions, to ensure safe, efficient, and orderly judicial administration. ICE agents that arrest people at California’s courthouses solely on allegations of being undocumented are doing so in direct contradiction to the express wishes of this state and should be legally prohibited from doing so. - Support. According to the California Applicants’ Attorneys Association (CAAA):
Like many of the other supporters of this bill, CAAA notes that codifying the privilege against civil arrests is particularly important at this time in light of reports of civil arrests by federal ICE agents at California Courthouses. CAAA approvingly notes that these arrests prompted California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to ask “the federal government to cease ‘stalking’ undocumented California residents near courts, and said that the presence of ICE agents has a chilling effect on documented and undocumented immigrants alike.” CAAA also notes that Labor Commissioner Julie Su issued guidelines to her staff to ban ICE agents from her offices because their presence ‘could disrupt enforcement of labor laws by discouraging immigrant workers from reporting’ violations.” Finally, CAAA concludes that, “AB 668 is a vital piece of legislation that will safeguard our courts and the business of our state. Arrests at our courthouses are unnecessarily disruptive to our judicial system and the business of California and our residents. Access to courts is part of the right to free speech enshrined in the California and United States constitutions. Our state is harmed when our judicial system is interfered with in any way.
- Prior Legislation. SB 349 (Lara), of the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, was identical to this bill and was vetoed by Governor Brown.
Analysis Prepared by: Kimberly Horiuchi / APPR. / (916) 319-2081
Date of Hearing: March 26, 2019
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
Mark Stone, Chair
ABPCA Bill Id:AB 668
Author:(Gonzalez and Bonta) – As Introduced Ver:February 15, 2019
SUBJECT: Courthouses: Privilege from civil arrest
KEY ISSUE: Should California codify the common law privilege that prohibits civil arrests in courthouses, so as not to deter litigants, witnesses and others from participating in judicial proceedings and to help further the important public interest and state priority of preventing the disturbance of court proceedings?
SYNOPSIS
Under the common law "privilege from arrest," a person may not be subjected to a "civil arrest" or served with process while attending, or going to and from, a court proceeding. Unlike a "criminal" arrest, based on probable cause that the arrestee committed a crime, a "civil arrest" typically compels a person's attendance as a witness or party in a civil suit or proceeding. This bill would effectively codify that common law privilege in three ways. First, it clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses, including by protecting the privilege from arrest. Second, it provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest or served with process while attending a courthouse or court proceeding. Third, it provides that any person who knowingly executes or facilitates an arrest or service of process at a courthouse or court proceeding shall be liable for contempt of court, false imprisonment, or both. As the background material provided by the author and the letters of supporters make clear, this bill was prompted, at least in part, by the increasing use of “civil arrests” by federal agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at California courthouses. These arrests prompted California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to write a letter to federal officials asking that these arrests cease, as they interfere with the right of persons to access California courts and the right of judicial officers to prevent disruption of court proceedings. However, it should be stressed that the bill does not target or single out federal ICE agents; rather, AB 668 will apply to the efforts of any local, state, or federal official to carry out civil arrests of persons attending judicial proceedings at a California courthouse.
This bill is substantially SB 349 (Lara, 2018), the contents of which this Committee heard last year as SB 183 (Lara, 2018). SB 349 passed out of both houses of the Legislature but what vetoed by Governor Brown, citing unarticulated “unintended consequences.” The bill is sponsored by the California Applicants’ Attorneys Association and supported by several labor, immigrant rights, and civil rights groups.
SUMMARY: Clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses by codifying the common law privilege against civil arrest, and authorizes the Attorney General to bring actions for equitable and declaratory relief, as specified. Specifically, this bill:
- Makes findings and declarations on the importance of keeping courts of justice open, accessible, and free from interruption, and on the need to protect persons from civil arrest or service of process while in California's courts or their environs, or while attending, or going to or coming from, judicial proceedings. Specifies that this protection is needed in order to ensure that litigants, witnesses, and others are not deterred from participating in such proceedings, and that the dignity of judicial proceedings are upheld and not disturbed.
- Provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest of any type in a courthouse while attending a court proceeding or having legal business in the courthouse.
- Permits the Attorney General to bring a civil action in the name of the people to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of 2) has occurred.
- Allows a party in a successful action to enforce the provision of this bill to recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
- Provides that the provisions of this bill are severable, so that if a court holds any provision invalid, that invalidity shall not affect the validity of the other provisions.
EXISTING LAW:
- Gives judicial officers the following powers:
- To preserve and enforce order in their immediate presence, and in proceedings before them, when they are engaged in the performance of official duty.
- To compel obedience to their lawful orders as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
- To compel the attendence of persons to testify in a proceeding before them, in the cases and manners provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
- To administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before them, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of their powers and duties. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 177.)
- Authorizes the court to issue warrants for the civil arrest of a witness who fails to appear in court pursuant to a subpoena or court order. (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1993.)
- Provides that if a person comes into this State in response to a subpoena directing that person to attend and testify in this State, that person shall not, while in the state for that purpose, be subject to arrest or to civil or criminal service of process, as specified. (Penal Code Section 1334.4.)
- Protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches; specifies that a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. (California Constitution, Article I, Section 13.)
- Holds that courts of justice ought everywhere to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast a perfect protection around every [person] who necessarily approaches them. (Stewart v. Ramsey (1916) 242 U.S. 128, 129.)
FISCAL EFFECT: As currently in print this bill is keyed fiscal.
COMMENTS: Under the common law "privilege from arrest," a person may not be subjected to a "civil arrest" or served with process while attending, or going to and from, a court proceeding. Unlike a "criminal" arrest, based on probable cause that the arrestee committed a crime, a "civil arrest" typically compels a person's attendance as a witness or party in a civil suit or proceeding. This bill would effectively codify that common law privilege in three ways. First, it clarifies the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses, including by protecting the privilege from arrest. Second, it provides that no person shall be subject to civil arrest or served with process while attending a courthouse or court proceeding. Third, it provides that any person who knowingly executes or facilitates an arrest or service of process at a courthouse or court proceeding shall be liable for contempt of court, false imprisonment, or both. However, unlike the common law privilege – which also protects persons going to and coming from a courthouse – this bill only prohibits civil arrests in the courthouse.
The author’s background material, as well as the letters of support, make clear that this bill responds, at least in part, to the increasing use of “civil arrests” by federal agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at California courthouses. However, it should be stressed that the bill does not target or single out federal ICE agents; rather, it would apply to the efforts of any local, state, or federal official to carry out civil arrests of persons having business at a California courthouse.
The Common Law Privilege from Arrest: The English common law "privilege from arrest" apparently dates back to at least the late 14th century, when references to it appear in the Year Books (English legal reports) from the reign of Henry IV. (Sampson v. Graves (1924) 203 NYS 729, 730.) When William Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the Laws of England in the late 18th century (1765-1769), the privilege was already well established. Blackstone wrote:
Suitors, witnesses, and other persons, necessarily attending any courts of record upon business, are not to be arrested during their actual attendance, which includes their necessary coming and returning. And no arrest can be made in the king’s presence, nor within the verge of his royal palace, nor in any place where the king’s justices are actually sitting. [William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Reprint, 1979), Book III, Chapter 19, p. 289.]
According to 19th century American treatise writers, the privilege was widely accepted in the American colonies and, subsequently, tacitly adopted by all of the U.S. states (including California) that adopted the English common law. For example, Simon Greenleaf's Treatise on the Law of Evidence, originally published in 1858, closely paraphrased Blackstone (absent references to the King). By 1896 an American federal judge wrote, "It is, perhaps, not too much to say that no rule of practice is more firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of United States courts than that of the exemption of persons from the writ of arrest and of summons while attending upon courts of justice, either as witnesses or suitors." (Hale v. Wharton (1896) 73 F. 739, 740.) California also expressly recognizes, by statute, a variation of the privilege from arrest. A person from out-of-state, if subpoenaed to attend a judicial proceeding in this state, shall not be subject to arrest or service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters that arose before his entrance into this State under the subpoena. (Penal Code Section 1334.4.)
While the common law privilege from arrest has a long history in both England and the United States, it has fallen out of use in modern law, largely because the "civil arrest" has also become less common. Not surprisingly, as civil arrests declined, there were fewer occasions to invoke the privilege. (See e.g. Christopher Lasch, A Common Law Privilege to Protect State and Local Courts During the Crimmigation Crisis, 127 Yale L. J. F. 410, 423-431.)
Immigration Arrests as a New Form of Civil Arrest: While traditional civil arrests may have declined, they have not entirely disappeared. Most notably, in the past two years especially, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers have carried out many civil arrests in California courthouses. When an ICE agent takes custody of a person suspected of being in the United States unlawfully, the agent makes a civil, not a criminal, arrest. A criminal arrest occurs only when there is probable cause that the arrestee has committed a crime, and the purpose of the arrest is to hold the person until there is a trial to establish guilt or the posting of sufficient bail. However, ICE arrests, as civil arrests, do not require probable cause of a crime. As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, "it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States." As such, a deportation hearing is "a purely civil matter." (Arizona v. U.S. (2012) 567 U.S. 387, 407.) The purpose of the hearing is not to determine if the person has committed a crime, but rather to determine if the person is eligible to remain in the country. The deportation proceeding itself is not a criminal proceeding, but is a civil proceeding that lacks many of the procedural protections of a criminal proceeding. A criminal conviction can lead to incarceration in a jail or prison. However, the "judge's sole power [in a civil deportation proceeding] is to order deportation; the judge cannot adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any crime related to unlawful entry into or presence in this country." (INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-1039.)
According to Professor Christopher Lasch, the increase in civil arrests committed by ICE and other federal immigration officers suggests that it might be time to dust off the old common law privilege. (Lasch, supra, at pp. 410-423, pp. 440-441.) It might be a particularly apt time to revive the doctrine in California. For example, ICE arrests at California courthouses prompted California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to write a letter to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions to "respectfully request that you refrain from this sort of enforcement in California's courthouses," because such activities "not only compromise our core value of fairness but they undermine the judiciary's ability to provide equal access to justice." (Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, March 16, 2017.) The Chief Justice did not invoke the common law "privilege from civil arrest" by name. However, her letter perfectly summarized the twin aims of the privilege: protecting the right of persons to access the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest; and permitting the courts to fulfill their responsibility, as institutions, to ensure safe, efficient, and orderly judicial administration.
This Bill Likely Avoids Federal Preemption: Two years ago, the Legislature enacted measures that sought to curb California's participation in the aggressive immigration policies of the current occupant of the White House. SB 54 (Chap. 495, Stats. 2017) limits the ability of local law enforcement to share information with immigration authorities and participate in immigration enforcement activities. AB 450 (Chap. 492, Stats. 2017) requires California employers to request a search warrant before allowing ICE agents to conduct enforcement actions in the non-public places of a workplace. AB 103 (Chap. 17, Stats. 2017) authorizes the California Attorney General to review and investigate the detention and enforcement practices of federal facilities. All three laws faced a challenge on preemption grounds in a suit brought by the United States against the State of California, Governor Brown, and Attorney General Becerra. (New York Times, March 6, 2018.) However, a federal court upheld SB 54 and AB 103, and upheld parts of AB 450. (United States v. California (2018) 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077.)
If this bill were to become law and if it were used to interfere with ICE activity, there is certainly a possibility that it could face a challenge from the current administration. However, like the measures that were recently upheld, this bill falls well within the police powers of this state and does not conflict with federal laws or authority. To begin with, this bill does not target immigration enforcement; it codifies the long-standing common law rule that prevents anyone from attempting to execute a civil arrest against a person attending a court proceeding. While the nature and extent of civil arrests may have changed over time, the rationale for the common law privilege has not. As Professor Lasch stresses in his recent article, the privilege serves two objectives, one related to the person, the other related to a place. As to the person, the privilege protects the right to all residents within the court's jurisdiction to access justice and vindicate rights, without fear of arrest. As to the place, the privilege protects the sanctity of the court as an institution and the power of judges to conduct proceedings without physical interference. (Lasch, supra, at pp. 424-431.) Both of these are legitimate and substantial state interests that have nothing to do with federal immigration, and which in no way frustrate the purposes of federal immigration law.
Not only are the courts and the administration of justice unquestionably "matters of traditional state concern," in the language of preemption analysis, this bill prohibits a civil arrest within the courthouse by "any person" – whether a private or public person, whether a local, state, or federal officer. Moreover, nothing in this bill prevents immigration officers, like any other law enforcement officer, from making arrests in any other place or at any other time. Because the bill, like the common law privilege, only applies to a civil arrest, nothing would prevent any law enforcement officer, at any level, from making a criminal arrest in the courthouse if there is probable cause that the targeted person committed a crime, or if the arresting officer witnessed criminal conduct.
Governor’s Veto of SB 349: This bill is substantially similar to SB 349 (Lara, 2018), the contents of which this Committee heard and passed as SB 183 (Lara, 2018). However, SB 349 provided for additional remedies that were not included in this bill; and it extended the prohibition against arrest to persons coming to and going from a courthouse. This bill only prohibits civil arrests within the courthouse, in part due to difficulties in defining the appropriate area around the courthouse that should be subject to the prohibition. While SB 349 passed out of both houses of the Legislature, then-Governor Brown vetoed the bill. In his veto message, Governor Brown wrote, in part:
I support the underlying intent of this measure, but I am concerned that it may have unintended consequences. Last year I signed SB 54 (De Leon), a provision of which tasked the Attorney General with publishing model policies limiting assistance with immigration enforcement to the fullest extent possible at courthouses and other public facilities to ensure that they remain safe and accessible to all California residents, regardless of immigration status.
It is not clear why Governor Brown felt that SB 54 – which generally limited the ability of local officials to cooperate with federal immigration officials – would address the concern raised by AB 349 and this bill. Civil arrests by ICE agents do not require any cooperation with local officials; indeed, it appears that ICE acts in defiance of judicial officials in the state, including the state’s top judicial official, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye. The Governor also did not specify what “unintended consequences” he had in mind when he wrote his veto message.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: According to the author, “California must protect an individual’s right to visit the courts and participate in court proceedings without fear of arrest. The intent of AB 668 is to protect all individuals at a courthouse or court proceeding. A person’s ability to access justice and vindicates rights benefits the individual and the state. The business and activities of California are harmed when people do not show up to court to act as a witness, pay a fine, file papers, or seek state-sanctioned benefits.”
According to the California Applicants’ Attorneys Association (CAAA) – the bill’s sponsor – AB 668 will clarify “the power of judicial officers to prevent activities that threaten access to courthouses” by codifying the common law privilege against arrests at courthouses. This will, according to CAAA, “foster a safe environment in our courts and assure that all people will be able to conduct their business without the fear of arrest,” and it will “preserve the sanctity of the court” by codifying the “the power of judges to conduct proceedings without undue interference.”
Like many of the other supporters of this bill, CAAA notes that codifying the privilege against civil arrests is particularly important at this time in light of reports of civil arrests by federal ICE agents at California Courthouses. CAAA approvingly notes that these arrests prompted California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye to ask “the federal government to cease ‘stalking’ undocumented California residents near courts, and said that the presence of ICE agents has a chilling effect on documented and undocumented immigrants alike.” CAAA also notes that Labor Commissioner Julie Su issued guidelines to her staff to ban ICE agents from her offices because their presence ‘could disrupt enforcement of labor laws by discouraging immigrant workers from reporting’ violations.” Finally, CAAA concludes that, “AB 668 is a vital piece of legislation that will safeguard our courts and the business of our state. Arrests at our courthouses are unnecessarily disruptive to our judicial system and the business of California and our residents. Access to courts is part of the right to free speech enshrined in the California and United States constitutions. Our state is harmed when our judicial system is interfered with in any way.”
Several other labor, immigrant rights, and civil rights groups support this bill for substantially the same reasons as those articulated above.
REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:
Support
Anti-Defamation League
California Applicants' Attorneys Association
California Employment Lawyers Association
California Nurses Association
California Partnership to End Domestic Violence
California Teamsters Public Affairs Council
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
Oakland Privacy
Opposition
None on file
Analysis Prepared by: Thomas Clark / JUD. / (916) 319-2334
Bill Author
Bill Co-Author(s):